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The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments. The Noragric Master thesis is the final thesis submitted by students in order to fulfill the requirements under the Noragric Master programme “Management of Natural Resources and Sustainable Agriculture” (MNRSA), “Development Studies” and other Master programmes. The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.

©Rebekka Øvstegård, May 2008 rebeo@student.umb.no Noragric Department of International Environment and Development Studies Norwegian University of Life Science (UMB) P.O. Box 5003 N-1432 Ås Norway Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00 Fax: +47 64 96 52 01 Internet: http://www.umb.no/noragric

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Declaration I hereby declare that this is my own original work, and applications of all other material are acknowledged. This thesis has not been submitted to any other University than UMB for any type of academic degree. Signature:__________________ Date:__________

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Abstract

Negotiating in intra-state conflict is a challenging task. Since the 1990’s Norway has

promoted itself as a country that is willing to contribute in such negotiations. Norway has a

distinct approach to peacemaking and this was applied in the Sri Lankan case. Norway has

had successes in peace making and was seen as a valuable mediator when entering as a peace-

broker in the Sri Lankan conflict. Protracted conflicts, such as the Sri Lankan conflict, are

however not easily solved by negotiation. The Sri Lankan case posed quite a challenging task

for the Norwegian mediators as they met a range of obstacles and challenges during the

rounds of peace talks.

This study assesses Norway’s approach to peacemaking efforts in general and specifically the

case of Sri Lanka. The thesis examines Norway’s role as a facilitator in the fifth peace process

in Sri Lanka, in the time period from 2000- 2003. It reviews major challenges in the peace

process and Norway’s responses. This is related to existing theory in the field of conflict

resolution and mediator conduct. The main conclusions found in this study are that Norway

needs to renew its approach to peacemaking, from the outdated rational approach to a conflict

dynamics approach. New strategies need to be explored in how to act as a mediator with the

tools that Norway have as a small state. Recommendations are given in terms of changes to

Norway’s foreign policy in this respect. The study also concludes that a new approach to

peace is necessary in Sri Lanka.

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Acknowledgement

The accomplishment of this thesis would not have been possible without help and support

from a number of people and organizations. I would first of all like to thank my advisor, Mr.

Shanmugaratnam, for his valuable advice and for being an active discussion partner. He has

made a large contribution to my understanding of the Sri Lankan conflict and has given me

excellent help in writing the thesis. I would also like to thank my external advisor, Mr.

Uyangoda, who provided me with valuable assistance during my fieldwork in Sri Lanka.

Several organizations in Sri Lanka also contributed to my research, most of all the Social

Scientists Association, The National Peace Council and the Center for policy Alternatives.

Mr. Jehan Perera and Ms. Bhavani Fonseka provided me with valuable information in my

understanding of the Sri Lankan conflict. Mr. Jon Hanssen Bauer from the Norwegian

Ministry of foreign Affairs was very helpful in helping me understand Norway’s approach to

peace brokering.

I would also like to thank my family and friends who have been patient during the writing of

this thesis. It could not have been possible without all the support everyone has given me. I

would especially like to thank Sten, who has spent hours reviewing my thesis.

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Abbreviations

TULF - Tamil United Liberation Front

GOSL - Government of Sri Lanka

LTTE - The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

CFA – Ceasefire

IPKF- Indian Peace Keeping Force

NPC- The National Peace Council of Sri Lanka

ICG- International Crisis Group

UNP - United National Party

SLFP- Sri Lanka Freedom Party

MFA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PA- People’s Alliance

SLMM- Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

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Contents Abstract III

Acknowledgement IV

Abbreviations V

1.1 Background to the conflict 1

1.1.1 Sri Lanka 1

1.1.2 Nature of the conflict 2

1.1.3 Political dynamics 6

1.2 Norway and the fifth peace process 9

1.3 Research objectives and questions 10

1.4 Relevance of study 11

1.5 Organization of thesis 11

Chapter 2: Conflict theory, international peacemaking and mediation 12

2.1 Conflict theory and conflict resolution 12

2.1.1 The concept of conflict 12

2.1.2 Conflict resolution 14

2.1.3 Theoretical approaches to conflict and conflict resolution 14

2.1.4 Peacemaking and third party intervention 17

2.2 Mediation theory 18

2.2.1 Negotiation and mediation 18

2.2.2 How and when to get involved 21

2.2.3 Power and mediation 25

Chapter 3: Methodology 26

3.1 Research strategy and design 26

3.2 Data collection and fieldwork 27

3.2.1 Method of data collection 27

3.2.2 Fieldwork 29

3.2.3 Reliability and validity 31

Chapter 4: Norway’s approach to international peacemaking 32

4.1 Previous efforts in peacemaking 32

4.2 The Norwegian approach 33

4.3 Norway’s motives and related criticism 37

Chapter 5: Assessing Norway’s efforts in the fifth peace process 42

VII

Chapter 6: Conclusion and recommendations 49

References 52

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background to the conflict

A protracted conflict has troubled the island of Sri Lanka since the mid 80’s. There have been

several attempts to solve the conflict. Norway entered the stage as a facilitator in 1999 in the

fifth peace process in Sri Lanka. In 2002, the Norwegian facilitation brought the result of a

ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (Tigers). The ceasefire (CFA) represented a renewed hope and optimism in finally

ending the protracted conflict. A round of peace talks were started, but a peace agreement was

never reached. Earlier this year the ceasefire was abrogated and the GOSL has stated that their

goal is to defeat the LTTE by military force. The conflict has now intensified and recent

developments show little hope of finding a solution to this conflict in the near future.

This study looks at Norway’s role as a mediator in an international context with Sri Lanka as

a case. The study aims to contribute to a needed analysis of third party intervention in

intrastate conflict, particularly involving small state actors such as Norway. It examines the

traditional approaches to conflict resolution and peacemaking and gives a new input to the

theory on mediation strategies. Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka is examined to assess the

impact it had on the peace process. Lessons in terms of international peacemaking and

mediation will be unraveled. An analysis of Norway’s responses and actions in the fifth peace

process will reveal necessary lessons that must be incorporated in future involvement, both in

terms of solving the conflict in Sri Lanka and in terms of Norway’s strategies and manner of

involvement in such a context.

To enable a discussion of Norway’s role in Sri Lanka, the thesis will begin with a short

introduction to the conflict and previous attempts to negotiate peace. First some short facts

about the country will be presented.

1.1.1 Sri Lanka

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is an island located in Southern Asia, off the

coast of India. The population is estimated around 20 million people and consists of several

ethnic groups: Sinhalese 73.8%, Sri Lankan Moors 7.2%, Indian Tamil 4.6%, Sri Lankan

Tamil 3.9%, other 0.5% and unspecified 10%. The island also inhabits several religious

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groups and this is the distribution according to data from the 2001 census: Buddhist 69.1%,

Muslim 7.6%, Hindu 7.1%, Christian 6.2% and unspecified 10%. (CIA World Factbook

2008) Sinhala and Tamil are the two native languages and English is the second language of a

minority. Almost all Buddhists in Sri Lanka are Sinhalese and Hinduism is the predominant

religion among the Tamil population.

(Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2007)

1.1.2 Nature of the conflict

Several aspects have come to characterize the Sri Lankan conflict: ethnicity, the intractability

of the conflict, competing nationalisms, determination in terms of military victory and the

perseverance of the LTTE insurgency.

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Ethnicity has been a defining feature in the conflict and is rooted in Sri Lanka’s history and

political system. The major cleavage in the conflict is between the majority group, the

Sinhalese, and the largest minority group, the Tamils. The Muslims, which are the second

largest minority group, have also entered the stage in the recent years, making it a tripartite

conflict in some aspects. The original conflict was however between the Sinhalese and the

Tamil community and they were the main parties involved in the fifth peace process. The

relationship between these two groups is rooted in a long history and not only one of rivalry

and conflict, but also of peaceful coexistence. They have existed together on the island for

many hundred years and have a shared history. However, different group identities developed

among the islands population, based on ethnic origin, ancestral territory, language, religion

and cultural attributes (Øvstegård, 2007:12). Sri Lanka was colonized over a period of 450

years and gained independence from the British in 1948 (DeVotta, 2003). It was considered a

peaceful and prosperous colony. During the colonial era, the British divided the society into

ethnic groups as a part of a divide and rule policy. They also deliberately favored the minority

group, the Tamils, and this created discontent with the Sinhalese majority. After

independence from Britain in 1948, the Sinhalese majority ruled the country. The Tamils had

been given prominent positions under the colonial powers and the Sinhalese were now intent

on removing this imbalance. The Tamil community, on the other hand, felt discriminated

against due to the policies imposed by the Sinhalese majority post-independence. They felt

they were being excluded from the domain of state power as the Sinhalese language and

religion became the state’s language and religion. (Ibid) These grievances led to frictions on

the political scene and a Tamil movement arose that were promoting the interests of this

marginalized group. There were several Tamil insurgent groups at that time. The group that

later became the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed in 1972, by Velupillai

Prabhakaran. He still remains the group’s leader today. In 1976, the Tamil United Liberation

Front (TULF) put forward a demand of self-determination and secession (Rotberg, 1999:7).

This was also when Prabhakaran’s group became the LTTE. The ethnic conflict had evolved

into a Tamil nationalist movement that challenged the legitimacy of the Sri Lankan state

(Shanmugaratnam, 2002:115). The claim was for the creation of an independent state for the

Tamils: Tamil Eelam. Tamils had been excluded from the political mainstream and felt a

sense of being treated as second-class citizens. The Tamil people felt more and more alienated

from the unitary state. Language rights, employment and educational opportunities and state –

aided land colonization were among the issues that led to the Tamils perceiving a systematic

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marginalization of their minority group (Shanmugaratnam 2002:114-115). In 1979, President

J.R Jayawardena decided to crush Tamil militancy by military means. In 1983, The LTTE

launched an attack against an army patrol in the North, killing 13 soldiers. This led to a series

of anti- Tamil riots. An event later described as “Black July”, which led to the deaths of

several hundred Tamils, pushed the fragile situation into a full- blown conflict. This marked

the beginning of a civil war between the Sinhalese- dominated government and the Tamil

separatists.

Since the mid 80’s this conflict has ravaged the island of Sri Lanka and has had negative

effects on the country’s development. The intractability of this conflict has been a defining

characteristic of this conflict. Ethnic turbulence, as mentioned above, has had its effect on the

resistance to resolution. Ethnic conflict can be described as a situation where one group’s

identity is threatened by the demands, behavior or identity of another group. This leads to an

incompatibility in goals, at least at a perceptual level (Sahadevan, 1997:24). Misperceptions

and deeply rooted hostility can keep a conflict intractable. A strong belief typically develops

among the parties that a solution can’t be found without intensifying the struggle. If the

parties see the conflict as inevitable and as necessary to pursue at any cost, there is hardly

willingness for attempting to solve the conflict. Military violence over time also creates deep

emotional scars and a feeling of being victimized by the other party. The way of viewing the

conflict will differ greatly between the parties, as one represents a state or at least the majority

of that state and the other represents an insurgency or oppressed group. For members of an

ethnic minority group, the state is the oppressor that they want to be saved from. The state on

the other hand, sees the insurgency as a threat to its sovereignty and claims it has to use force

because of the military activities of the adversary. A spiral develops of continued violent acts

and growing mistrust. These are part of the features that tend to keep an ethnic conflict

intractable and very much describes the features of the Sri Lankan conflict. (Ibid: 25)

Competing nationalisms is another important aspect of the Sri Lankan conflict. Sinhala

nationalism began under British rule, as the Sinhalese and Buddhist majority felt humiliated

and discriminated against. The Sinhala nationalists view Sri Lanka as the country of the

Sinhalese people, Sinhalese language and the Buddhist religion that most Sinhalese belong to.

A report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) from 2007 states that Sinhala nationalism

has long been an obstacle to the resolution, especially because of its manifestations in Sri

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Lankan politics. Tamil nationalism began as reaction to the Sinhala control of the state.

Originally, it was a peaceful movement for the rights of the Tamil minority. When a political

settlement to the grievances of the Tamil population never was reached, the movement

developed into an armed separatist movement. The Tamil nationalist movement became

dominated by the LTTE, which is today banned as a terrorist organization by many countries

and the European Union. Many Tamils do not belong to this nationalist movement and would

settle for home rule in the North and East areas of the island, where most Tamils live. Many

Sinhalese would also prefer a resolution and ending to this conflict, rather than prolonged

fighting and destruction. However, as in most conflicts, the extreme and nationalist parts of

each group are creating much of the friction that is sustaining the civil war today (ICG Report

2007). The goal of extreme minority nationalists is usually defined in maximalist terms, like a

separate state, and it typically evokes passionate resistance from majoritarian nationalists, as

is the situation in Sri Lanka. This is what makes a compromise so hard, as it has to be made at

two levels, among nationalists of the two sides and between two perspectives of state power.

Two competing nationalisms in Sri Lanka are fighting over mutually exclusive outcomes. For

the LTTE, a negotiated political settlement is unacceptable if it does not entail a confederation

or federal option with the northern and eastern provinces. The LTTE want political autonomy.

Such a settlement would be hard to accept for the Sinhalese community and the GOSL.

Political instability in other regions, such as in the South might change that or the eventual

downfall of the GOSL (Rotberg, 1999:161).

Another defining characteristic has been the determination by both parties to achieve military

victory. Both the GOSL and the LTTE to have a determination to fight militarily, which is

unparallel in any other conflict in the world. At times, the escalation of violence has seemed

unrelenting. It appears that both parties think a decisive outcome on the battlefield will have a

direct effect on the future political settlement (Rotberg, 1999: 157). It is however hard to

envision a situation where one party will win a decisive military victory, as both sides have

showed a capacity to recover quickly from military setbacks. The focus has often been on

gaining control over territory and inflicting loss on the other party. There seems also to have

been a lack of communication when the parties are in armed conflict. In many other conflicts,

political settlements have been negotiated during phases of armed conflict, not only when a

ceasefire exists. Past experience has shown that temporary cessations of hostility in Sri Lanka

have been very fragile. When hostilities have resumed again, after negotiation efforts, the

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communication between the parties has also broken down. (Ibid: 160)

Yet another important feature of this conflict is that Sri Lanka has a minority group which is

sizeable enough to pose a threat to the sovereignty of the state (Rotberg, 1999:4). In addition,

the Tamils are a majority group in the region as many million Tamils live in Tamil Nadu in

India. This is important in terms of the power relation between the parties. Even if the Tamils

are a minority in Sri Lanka, they are a majority in the region. A small minority would not

have been able to sustain a conflict against the government of the state in such a manner, as

the LTTE has been able to. They have also received support from outside, which has

strengthened their claims. Much financial backing to the LTTE came from the Tamil Diaspora

who had fled to other countries and who supported their goal if not their methods (Rotberg,

1999:8). The LTTE’s terrorist actions over the years have however created little support

abroad and both expatriate Tamils and other countries now view the organization as a terrorist

organization that would not be capable of politically managing a Tamil state. This does of

course not mean that the claims of the Tamil population should not be addressed. They have a

right to an equal participation in socio-economic and political processes in the country they

belong to. Achieving a political agreement based on ethnicity- based power sharing and a

satisfactory implementation of this, has been suggested as a solution to this protracted

conflict.

As explained, the conflict in Sri Lanka is very complex in terms of actors and the long history

of friction between the two adversaries. Understanding the basis of the conflict is very

important in any effort to solve the conflict, and these are all aspects a mediator needs to have

a thorough knowledge of. The shifting political conjunctures is one of the most challenging

aspects in the context of Sri Lanka’s conflict, and will now be briefly explained through

looking at the largest political parties and the characteristics of the political system.

1.1.3 Political dynamics

To find a solution to a protracted intrastate conflict one most have an understanding of the

political system and the effects of it. The politics in Sri Lanka is very complex with many

political actors and changing goals. It’s a challenging task to keep updated on the political

situation at all times as politicians tend to change their motives and political alliances. The

political system is also important in that a solution might lie in restructuring the state and

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building a new political culture that is not based on the ethnic cleavages in the society.

Studies have shown that post-colonial states often need to rebuild state institutions (Jung,

2003). In Sri Lanka there is democracy, which is often seen as a precondition for peace, but

the democracy in Sri Lanka has been flawed since the time of its introduction. The democratic

institutions in Sri Lanka tend to favor elite groups in the society and are built on ethnic

cleavages. Uyangoda (Rotberg, 1999:166-167) argues that sharing political power among the

three largest ethnic groups on the island is the only way to reach a lasting solution. The

Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims would then have to agree on a political vision. The idea of

power sharing has regrettably been much resisted in Sri Lankan politics. As mentioned

before, it has been difficult for the GOSL and Sinhalese majority to accept a solution

involving a confederation or federal option. Political will is a necessary precondition for

peace in Sri Lanka in that a compromise can then be reached.

Sri Lanka’s politics are characterized by a mixed executive system and dominance by

political dynasties. There is today a de facto two party system (Jayasuriya, 2005). These two

parties are the Center- Right UNP (United National Party) and Center- Left SLFP (Sri Lanka

Freedom Party). In the General Election in 1977 a new regime took over under UNP and

J.R.Jayawardene. This resulted a change in a new form of executive government from 1979.

Sri Lanka had previously had the British Westminster model of majoritarian parliamentary

democracy that elected the Head of Government. This means that today, there is a

cohabitation of a President and a Prime Minister. Often these are not from the same political

party and this can create frictions and be an obstacle in attempts for peace negotiations. There

has also been a consistent inability between the two main political parties in Sri Lanka to

agree on a united stance on the conflict issue. This is a major obstacle to the resolution.

The political system in Sri Lanka is flawed in that it favors the majority and the ruling elites

of the country. Sri Lanka has long had a political culture of family dynasties where some

families have dominated politics since independence from colonial rule. An example is the

UNP, which has had many leaders from the families of Senanayake’s, Jayewardene’s and

Wickremesinghe’s. The SFLP is also a political dynasty from which Prime Minister

Bandaranaike came. His successor was his wife, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and then their

daughter, Chandrika Kumaratunga, who finally came to power as a President and served until

2005 (ICG Report, 2007). A large problem has been that the political elite has been beyond

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popular challenge and accountability. Part of the political dynamic in Sri Lanka is also that

the winner takes it all, meaning that the parties in opposition have very little political

influence. This political culture results in a system which is democratic in its appearance, but

which is to a high degree exclusive and unresponsive to popular concerns. These elite- led

politics have led to violence and rebellion not only from the Tamil minority, but also from

other groups within the society (ICG Report, 2007: 2).

1.1.4 Previous peace attempts in Sri Lanka- a brief overview

Since the mid -fifties several attempts were made to make agreements between Sinhalese and

Tamil leaders. The most important third party intervention before Norway was India’s

involvement. In the early years of the war, India entered the stage as a mediator. Indian-

mediated peace talks were held in the capital of the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan

(Uyangoda, 2005:5). Up to 1987, India was engaged in active diplomacy and arranging high-

level political meetings to find a settlement to the Sri Lankan conflict. But covertly, India was

also arming and training Tamil militants (Bercovitch, 1996). In 1987, the Indian Prime

Minister and Sri Lanka’s President signed the Indo- Lankan Accord, in which the GOSL

made a commitment to give some regional autonomy to the Tamils in exchange for the end of

the secessionist insurgency. Part of the Indo- Lanka accord was India’s employment of

military forces (the Indian Peacekeeping Force) in the North and the East to enforce the

agreement. It was controversial, but was also an officially arranged intervention. A mistake

was made in believing that the Indian Peacekeeping Force would be able to contain the LTTE

insurgency. The LTTE were not part in signing the agreement and did not agree with the

content. This ended with an intensification of the conflict when the Indian Peacekeeping

Force entered into war with the LTTE to try to enforce the peace agreement (Uyangoda,

2005). The intervention has later been described as a disaster. India eventually had to retreat

and leave much of the controlled territory to the LTTE. (ICG report, 2006)

In 1989 there was another peace initiative, which led to the withdrawal of the Indian army

from Sri Lanka. No settlement was agreed on this time either. After a short ceasefire, the

parties returned to conflict in 1990. In 1994, the fourth attempt to peace was started. A new

government was in place in Colombo, representing a regime change. The new government

and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement in January 1995 and four rounds of peace talks

were held. This peace attempt did not last long and collapsed in April 1995, when the parties

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Timeline of the Sri Lankan conflict

A chronology of key events: 1948 – Sri Lanka gains independence from British colonial rule . 1949 - Indian Tamil plantation workers disenfranchised. 1956 - Sinhalese nationalism prominent in politics. Official language act makes Sinhala official language, strengthening the Sinhalese state and Sinhala Nationalism. Tamils protest against new laws. 1970s- The birth & rise of youth militancy. 1972 - Buddhism made main religion. Prabhakaran forms Tamil militant group, which later becomes LTTE. 1976 - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formed. 1977 - Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) party wins all seats in Tamil areas and puts forward a demand of self- determination. 1979- President J.R Jayawardena decides to crush youth militancy by military means. 1983 – LTTE attacks army patrol in the North of the country, leading to major anti-Tamil riots. This marks the beginning of the civil war between the state and the LTTE. 1985 - First attempt at peace talks between government and LTTE fails. 1987 - Government and India signs accords creating autonomy for Tamil areas in north and east. India deploys peace-keeping force. 1990 - Indian troops pull out of the North and East. 1994 - President Kumaratunga comes to power pledging to end war. Peace talks opened with LTTE. 1995-2001 - War rages across north and east. Tigers bomb Sri Lanka's holiest Buddhist site. President Kumaratunga is wounded in a bomb attack. Suicide attack on the international airport destroys half the Sri Lankan Airlines fleet. 2000 Norway is officially invited to broker talks between the parties, after four previous failed peace attempts 2002 February - Government and Tamil Tiger rebels sign a Norwegian-mediated ceasefire.

returned to conflict once again. The post- April

1995 phase of the conflict saw an intense

conflict escalation, which lasted for many years

until the new breakthrough in 2001- 2002.

(Uyangoda, 2005:5)

1.2 Norway and the fifth peace process

Norway had secretly been engaged in talks since

1999. In 2000, Norway was formally invited by

President Kumaratunga to broker the peace talks

between the GOSL and the LTTE. India, who

had been the former mediator, had many vested

interests in terms of its geographical proximity,

geopolitical interests and its large Tamil

population. The Norwegian mediators

represented a very different type of mediator,

seemingly neutral and powerless and ready to

take a strictly facilitating role. Optimism and

hope for a final resolution to the conflict was

renewed among the people of Sri Lanka and in

the international community with Norway’s

peace brokering. In 2001 there was a regime

change in Sri Lanka, which positively affected

the new peace process. President Kumaratunga’s

party, the People’s Alliance (PA), lost the

general election and the United National Party’s

leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, became the new

Prime Minister. A ceasefire agreement (CFA)

was achieved in February 2002 with the help of

the Norwegian mediators. The new Prime

Minister and the leader of the LTTE were the

parties signing the agreement. This left the

President feeling that she was being bypassed

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and not include in the process. This would later on create problems for the Norwegian

mediators. After the CFA was signed, a series of peace talks were started. Six rounds of talks

were conducted between September 2002 and March 2003. Norway acted as a facilitator and

arranged meetings, acted as a communication channel between the parties and informed the

key stakeholder nations outside the country (Moolakkattu in Peace review, 2004:211). Two

donor conferences were held in that period to raise money for development assistance to Sri

Lanka. The Norway- assisted peace process had from the start enjoyed a great deal of

international support, including from the EU countries, India, the U.S and Japan. These were

Co- Chairs of the “Tokyo Conference on The Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka”

in 2003, and they have continued to support the peace process and Norway’s role as a

mediator. The Norwegian mediation met difficulties during the fifth peace process and in

2003 the process entered an impasse. The period between 2000- 2003 is the main focus of this

study. The assessment of Norway as a mediator in Sri Lanka will follow in chapter five.

1.3 Research objectives and questions

This study examines Norway’s peacemaking efforts in general and specifically the case of Sri

Lanka. The thesis will be assessing Norway’s role as a facilitator in the fifth peace process in

Sri Lanka, in the time period from 2000- 2003. It will review major developments in the

process and assess how Norway responded to these.

The main objective is to assess Norway’s efforts as a facilitator in the fifth peace process in

Sri Lanka. The research questions are:

1.) Is there a Norwegian approach to peacemaking and how was this applied to the Sri Lankan

case?

2.) What was the conduct of the mediators and what should be an appropriate mediator

conduct in such a setting?

3.) How did Norway respond to developments and challenges in the fifth peace process?

The thesis will provide a critical perspective on Norway’s effort as a facilitator in the fifth

peace process in Sri Lanka and put this in context with possible lessons learned for further

11

involvement in peacemaking. The aim of this thesis is to bring a new dimension to the

analysis of Norway’s efforts in Sri Lanka, through examining the course of events from the

Norwegian perspective. The thesis also puts the Norwegian effort in a global context and

gives answers on how international mediation in intrastate conflict should be approached.

1.4 Relevance of study

This study hopes to contribute to a better understanding of Norway’s involvement in the Sri

Lankan peace process. One goal is to explore and better understand the complex task of a

mediator in such a situation. When a country is engaged in peace and reconciliation work in

an international context, such as Norway is, it is important to evaluate experiences and

incorporate that knowledge into further involvement.

It is hoped that this study will give input to the scholar debate on conflict resolution and the

appropriate conduct of a mediator in intrastate conflicts. A larger question is also posed in

terms of the value of such efforts on a global level. The nature and dynamics of mediation and

peace processes is a research field where there is little systematic knowledge. This study will

contribute to this.

1.5 Organization of thesis

The first chapter is an introduction to Sri Lanka and the history and complexity of the

conflict. To examine these aspects is important before venturing into an analysis. The nature

of the conflict and the political dynamics is explored. The most important peace attempts are

mentioned, to give an idea of the events that had occurred before Norway became involved. A

short introduction is also given on Norway and the fifth peace process. Then, the research

questions and objectives of the study are stated as well as the relevance of the study. The first

chapter also includes this section, which describes the way the thesis is organized.

The second chapter gives an overview of the literature on the field of conflict theory and

resolution, international peacemaking and mediation in intra state conflict. This provides a

basis for the discussion in chapters four and five. There are of course many other aspects that

could have been mentioned here, as there is a comprehensive amount of literature on the

topics. It has, however, been narrowed down to the most important aspects to get a simpler

overview.

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The third chapter is on methodology and contains a description of the methods used in the

study. The research strategy, data collection and fieldwork in Sri Lanka and Norway are

described to show the reader how the study was conducted and to discuss possible limitations

to the study and it generalizability.

The fourth chapter is an analysis on Norway’ s approach to peacemaking. It discusses if there

is a consistent Norwegian approach and mentions some of the previous efforts and the history

of Norway as involved in international peacemaking. A short critical review of the Norwegian

approach then follows. This is part of the analysis of my findings.

The fifth chapter assesses Norway’s efforts in the fifth peace process in Sri Lanka. First, the

stages in the process will be examined in relation to Norway’s responses. Then, the strategy

chosen by Norway will be discussed in relation to the theory introduced in the second chapter.

Challenges and developments in the peace process are analyzed to reveal choices made by

Norway in terms of the role played out as a mediator. Important questions will be posed and

answered, such as if being a humble facilitator was the appropriate choice of strategy. This is

the second part of analysis of my findings.

Concluding remarks and recommendations will be given in the sixth chapter. The evaluation

of Norway’s approach and the efforts made in Sri Lanka will be summarized and lessons

learned for further involvement in peacemaking, are presented.

Chapter 2: Conflict theory, international peacemaking and mediation This chapter will review the existing literature and theory related to the field of conflict theory

and conflict resolution. It will examine theory on international peacemaking and mediation as

a third party intervention in intra state conflicts.

2.1 Conflict theory and conflict resolution

2.1.1 The concept of conflict

Conflicts are a part of everyday life and we all find ourselves in disagreement with others at

times. In the existing literature on the topic, there are many definitions of conflict. Mitchell

13

(1981) describes conflict as “ a relationship between two or more parties who have, or think

they have, incompatible goals”. Another more complex definition is that conflict is “escalated

natural competition of two or more parties who believe they have incompatible goals, and

whose aim is to neutralize, injure, or gain advantage over the other party or parties”

(Uyangoda, 2006:3). Wallensteen (2007:15) gives this definition of conflict: “a social

situation in which a minimum of two actors strive to acquire at the same moment in time an

available set of scarce resources”. Conflicts often arise due to incompatibilities in power,

resources, wealth, and status and can result in the breakdown of states, destruction of national

economies and the tragic death of many civilians. Conflict reflects differences in values, aims

and needs. There are two types of conflict concerning states: inter- state conflicts, between

sovereign states, and intra-state conflicts, which are between the state and a group/groups

within that state. This study will focus on the latter. Intra- state conflicts have become the

most common type of conflict in the Post Cold War era.

A crucial point of conflict is how it is handled. Conflicts can be handled violently, but they

can also be expressed through dialogue, negotiation and compromise and in that way turning

the win-lose option into a mutually beneficial win-win perspective. In other words, they can

be handled in a constructive or destructive way. When there is a conflict, the parties tend to

see their interests as mutually exclusive and diametrically opposed and there is often a

tendency to seek unilateral gains (Uyangoda, 2006:7). Unilateral victory, where the enemy

surrenders, is one of the oldest forms of conflict resolution. The destructive consequences of

war are often due to such approaches to conflict. This is not a common solution anymore, as a

negotiated settlement is preferred to military victory. Licklider (1995), however, argues that

identity- based civil wars are more likely to resume after a negotiated settlement than military

victory. The same study also showed that military victory is likely to end in a genocide, which

could explain why a settlement is a preferred option. Today, many conflicts have also shown

that the defeated party will after a military victory re-emerge and perhaps even with a stronger

determination (Uyangoda, 2006:8). A common view among scholars of peace and conflict

research today is that conflict resolution must entail seeking joint gains instead of unilateral

gains, to find a solution that is acceptable to both parties. Military victory does not remove the

problems that were there and that created the conflict. A transformation is needed to change

the dynamics of the conflict and to resolve the underlying causes of it.

14

2.1.2 Conflict resolution

When conflicts generate into armed struggle it is a challenge to transform them again into

non-violent disputes by rebuilding broken relationships and promoting dialogue and

willingness for negotiated solutions between the conflicting parties (Uyangoda, 2001). This

can be achieved through conflict resolution. Uyangoda (2006) describes conflict resolution as

addressing the causes of a conflict and seeking to build new and lasting relationships between

hostile groups in such a way that the causes for re-emergence of that conflict are eradicated.

The core of this approach is to understand that the resolution of conflict is so much more than

just cessation of hostilities.

Wallensteen (2007:47) gives this definition of conflict resolution:

“A social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to

peacefully live with- and/or dissolve- their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use

arms against one another”

There are differences between contemporary conflict resolution efforts and the typically

realist approaches of the past. Today, a common view is that conflicts are not free of values

and feelings and that the challenges of religion, politics and culture must be accounted for.

During the Cold War, conflict was mainly between recognized governments or sovereign

states. Today, another kind of conflict is predominant. The new conflicts are often intrastate

and between ethno-political groups who are competing for identity recognition and secession.

Typical for such conflicts are the use of terrorism and the existence of low-level violence that

threatens security and infrastructure, which is the case in Sri Lanka. (Ellis, 2006:150) The

violent acts between the parties on the battlefield are an accepted part of the evils of conflict,

but when the parties target the civilian population it is considered an act of terrorism.

Especially the LTTE has been accused of this in the Sri Lankan conflict, as they have engaged

in suicide bombings and attacks on civilians. The EU and many countries in the world have

banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization, due to their methods in warfare.

2.1.3 Theoretical approaches to conflict and conflict resolution

There are different approaches to analyzing and understanding conflict and conflict

resolution. One possible division is these three perspectives: the conflict dynamics approach,

15

the needs- based approach and the rational calculative approach.

The conflict dynamics approach sees conflict as a dynamic process where one actor reacts to

what another is doing, which leads to further action. One sequence of events follows another

and the conflict escalates. Conflict escalation can evolve into a never- ending spiral. The idea

is that conflict is a social phenomenon moving by itself. The focus is on how to change a

conflict by affecting the conflict dynamics. Some tools have been developed to analyze such

dynamics. (Wallensteen, 2007:32) Johan Galtung created a conflict dynamics analysis in the

1960’s. In Galtung’s version of conflict dynamics, the conflict triangle is used. The triangle

consists of three corners: conflict attitudes, conflict behavior and the contradiction itself. The

theory suggests that resolving a conflict is a process that never ends (Ibid: 33). Galtung’s

view is that a durable resolution is not possible, but that a conflict transformation can happen

through transcendence (where goals are met fully for the conflict parties) and withdrawals

(where goals are given up). Dynamics are important in this approach as it can be used to make

a conflict creative. Galtung does not see it as the most important option to find agreements

through diplomatic means. His theory emphasizes the importance of changing conflict

dynamics. Negotiations are ways in which a conflict can be transformed, as finding a process

that both parties agree on can be a necessary precursor to a solution (Ibid: 33). Galtung’s

work is an example of the dynamic perspective on conflict analysis. His work represents an

early perspective in terms of conflict analysis and is in many ways parallel to game theory.

Game theory typically illustrates how parties act within the confines set up by the game itself

(Ibid: 32). Game theory focuses on predictable outcomes, where the assumption is that the

parties follow the rules of the game. The common emphasis in the dynamics approach is on

how difficult it is to break the dynamics of a conflict. Conflict resolution’s task is then to

change the direction of the flow of events is such a way that escalation is turned into de-

escalation. The dynamic approach also emphasizes the importance of establishing a dialogue

between the parties and the importance of confidence -building measures (Ibid: 35). This is

where a third party can be a valuable assistant, as a mediator or facilitator that helps

communication between the parties. Another aspect of this approach is that parties using non-

violent methods are efficient at changing conflict dynamics.

The needs- based approach sees conflict as emerging out of the denial of basic needs and as

such the resolution process must entail identifying those needs and finding an answer to them

16

(Wallensteen, 2007:37). This thinking belongs to a materialist theoretical tradition and

theorists under this approach tend to refer to frustration and deprivation as causes of conflict.

This perspective sees political access as an effective remedy to conflict, as violent acts are a

way of expressing what can’t be expressed through the political channel (Ibid: 37). With the

needs- based approach, the difficulty lies in meeting an individual party’s need. As long as the

conflict can be translated into the needs of the parties, an outcome can be found that will

satisfy both parties. (Ramsbotham et al, 2005:18)

The rational calculations approach sees the actors, and not the circumstances, as the reason for

conflict. It assumes that actors are rational, make decisions and pursue strategies and, as such

initiate the chains of events that lead to war (Wallensteen, 2007:42). It is based on the idea

that wars arise from rational calculation, which is an established realist and neorealist

explanation of the origins of war. In the rational approach, it is assumed that the parties

initiate wars to win them. Internal calculations are made by the parties to show that the

benefits are greater than the losses in escalating the conflict to an armed one. However, the

initial calculations have to be revised after a while, if no one wins and the costs of war are

growing. (Ibid) William Zartmann is a known theorist in this field. In his analysis, the parties

look towards the future and want to avoid a “mutually hurting stalemate”. If no reasonably

early chance of victory is available, then Zartmann argues that the mutually hurting stalemate

will affect the parties and create a “ripe moment” for resolution. Such a ripe moment may

create an opening for peace. However, it might also have another result. The parties might

agree on a cease- fire to reduce the pain of the hurting stalemate. But this pause can be used,

not to try and solve the conflict, but to recuperate and even gain strength and then return to a

new offensive. This is considered a dilemma in conflict termination. The optimistic view here

is that the stalemate will create an “enticing opportunity” for a settlement, a way out for both

parties. A third party can be utilized here to point out that there is a stalemate and help the

parties see alternatives for ending the conflict. (Ibid: 43) This approach presents a novel idea

in terms of trying to specify when a conflict can be brought to an agreed ending. In the

rational approach, the outside world has an active role, especially in terms of conflicts in

smaller countries. The concept of rationality entails that if it is rational to end a war, then the

parties will end it. The parties can be influenced by outside forces to see the rationality in

ending the conflict. As such, this approach legitimates influencing the parties’ through

mediation or other tools. Outsiders can influence the calculation rather than the dynamics or

17

needs. An outsider can then affect the calculus for conflict and conflict resolution through

rewards and punishment. (Ibid: 45) Another country or an international organization, such as

the UN or NATO, might get involved in a conflict in a small country to affect the parties to

end the conflict. The outsider can promise assistance to the parties if ending the conflict or

they can initiate sanctions for not engaging in negotiations. Aid, trade and investments are

examples of what might be used as reward or punishment. Such measures are considered

legitimate in terms of conflict resolution, but might not always have the wanted effects.

The perspectives presented here contrast each other, but do not necessarily exclude each

other. An important question is: who should settle a conflict? According to the dynamic

approach, as many actors as possible should be included to make the process as democratic as

possible (Wallensteen, 2007:45). In the needs- based approach the opposite is preferred. It

favors more secrecy, little media access and a limited number of parties, who act as

representatives, not as individuals. In the rational calculations approach, all parties who count

should be in. It is not necessary to always include as many as possible, although sometimes it

is preferred. In the rational calculations perspective, timing is very important. The focus is on

seizing opportunities, which requires rapid action carried out by a few, determined actors. The

dynamic and needs based approaches do not favor such a style, as conflict resolution is

viewed as a process that takes time and which can’t be solved by quick action and political

maneuvering. (Wallensteen, 2007:46)

This study views all these approaches as being valuable in analyzing conflict resolution. It

argues that Norway followed the rational calculations approach when engaging in the fifth

peace process in Sri Lanka. This topic will be addressed further in the fifth chapter, which

assesses Norway’s efforts in the fifth peace process.

2.1.4 Peacemaking and third party intervention

The end of the Cold War marked a change in the international system. Conflicts went from

being between states to mostly being intrastate conflicts. It also became more accepted to

interfere and try to make peace when there is a conflict within a sovereign state. Peacemaking

can be defined as political and diplomatic efforts to bring a peaceful resolution to a conflict. It

does not include using force to make the contending parties find a solution. (Darby &

MacGinty, 2003:435). Peacemaking today comprises of many approaches and methods for

18

understanding, managing and hopefully resolving conflicts. Increasing the knowledge of how

to solve intrastate conflicts is an important issue today. In our globalized world, people are

more dependent on each other than ever and a war in one country can swiftly have effects on

other countries. It may also affect countries that are not in the same region, but that are

ideologically different, such as in acts of terrorism. Countries are increasingly turning to

international organizations and other institutions for help in resolving conflicts. Intrastate

conflict can bring instability on a regional and global scale and as such, external agencies

have become increasingly involved in peacemaking through mediation and other third party

interventions (Ramsbotham, 2005:168).

A trend in the post- Cold war era is the internationalization of intrastate conflict resolution.

This has opened up for donors to be active stakeholders in peace processes in aid-dependent

countries. External pressure in the form of threat of sanctions or a peace conditionality for

development aid, can play an important role in pushing the government of a country with an

internal war to seek a negotiated settlement An armed movement may also come under

external pressure from interested governments which threaten or do declare them as a terrorist

movement. An international ban of such an organization and the label of terrorist may get the

insurgents to consider a settlement, or blocking the flow of money and weapons from outside.

An armed movement may then think and act more politically (Shanmugaratnam, 2008: 1-3).

2.2 Mediation theory

2.2.1 Negotiation and mediation

Negotiation is a strategy that can be a possibility to parties in conflict. In international politics

and diplomacy, negotiation has long been a policy tool and a strategic option. In Sri Lanka,

the parties have long been talking about what they call a ”negotiated settlement” (Uyangoda,

2006:18). Negotiation is also an everyday skill and as Fisher and Ury wrote in their book,

Getting to yes, (1991): “Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It

is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side

have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed”.

In conflict resolution, negotiation is a common practice. The objective of negotiation is to

reach a balanced agreement that seems fair to both parties. Negotiation can be defined as a

process where the parties in a conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflicts. Uyangoda

19

(2000) defines negotiation as “talks between conflicting parties who discuss ideas,

information and options in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement”. Negotiation is

aimed at changing the behavior of the parties involved so that the conditions are there to reach

a settlement to the conflict and eventually also a resolution of the conflict. Certain factors are

in conflict resolution theory seen as favoring negotiation: the conflicting parties must realize

that they are unlikely to get what they want through unilateral action, the conflict must be ripe

for negotiation and the representatives of each party must have enough authority to speak for

the whole party and commit it to a course of action (Uyangoda, 2000).

Reaching a settlement in a protracted and violent conflict is hard, and a directly negotiated

bilateral settlement is rare. It has become more usual for the parties to the conflict to need the

assistance of others. When direct negotiations fail, a third party can be called in to assist.

A trilateral negotiating process then begins, with the introduction of a third party to facilitate

or mediate (Mitchell in Darby & MacGinty, 2003:77).

Mediation can be described as a form of assisted negotiation. Ramsbotham (2005) defines

mediation as the intervention of a third party and sees it as a voluntary process where the

parties maintain control over the outcome, although sometimes it is combined with positive

and negative incentives. Uyangoda (2006) gives an even simpler definition of mediation:

“mediation consists of influencing the parties to a dispute to come to an agreement by

appealing to their own interests”. Christopher Mitchell (in Darby & MacGinty, 2003) gives a

definition of mediation as “any action undertaken by a third party with the primary intention

of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least

ending disruptive conflict behavior”.

A mediator can help the adversaries through what is known as a peace process, that start with

the parties communicating to find some common ground and possibly a solution. Parties to a

conflict are often inclined to see their interests as diametrically opposed. The task of conflict

resolution has traditionally been to help parties who perceive their situation as zero-sum to

perceive it as a non-zero-sum conflict instead (to see it as a situation where both parties can

win or lose), and then help them move in the positive sum direction (Ramsbotham, 2005:15).

This is where a mediator can assist. When two adversaries interact, a spiral of hostility and

escalation is likely to develop. The entry of a third party can provide easier communication

20

back and forth and filter the messages given. This may stop the spiral of escalation. It is

believed that third parties make a positive difference in this respect.

Norway’s role in Sri Lanka is often described as facilitation rather than mediation. The

labeling of Norway as a mediator or facilitator was also a major discussion in Sri Lanka

before the involvement. This is because the term “mediator” is interpreted as a strong third

party that aims to pressure the parties into an agreement. The GOSL wanted a facilitator who

could be a messenger back and forth between the parties. Especially after India’s attempt to

broker peace, there was desire for an impartial and weaker third party. This study describes

Norway’s involvement as mediation, but with employing facilitation strategies. It views this

distinction as a theoretical distinction, which is sometimes given other meanings than what it

actually entails. This distinction will now be explored to understand the implications of these

different mediator roles.

In the scholarly literature and in practice, there is often a division between mediation,

facilitation and arbitration. There is a range of choices in terms of third party involvement

where the third party can be very passive or highly active in deciding the outcome. Arbitration

for example entails a highly active role, where the third party decides the outcome and is

given authority by the parties to do so. (Rotberg, 1999: 152) A mediator’s role is often more

passive and the third party does not impose solutions on the parties, but can introduce ideas in

terms of solving the dispute. Mediator’s can play many types of roles and employ different

strategies. William Zartmann and Saadia Touval have divided the different strategies into

three categories: communication/facilitation strategies, formulation strategies and

manipulation strategies. (Ibid: 153) Facilitation strategies entail a relatively passive role,

where the mediator makes the contact between the parties, tries to gain their trust and arranges

communication between them, but doesn’t make inputs. Employing formulation strategies

entails the mediator taking on an active role by controlling the meeting environment, the

agenda and the procedures for the meetings and highlighting common interests, but not

proposing solutions. Employing manipulations strategies is the most active of the three

strategies the mediator can take on. It entails making proposals for solutions, pressing parties

to show flexibility, promising resources or threatening withdrawal of these, and offering to

monitor that the agreements made are being held. (Ibid) Facilitation also tends to be practiced

at the unofficial level as a pre-negotiation activity that creates an opportunity for the parties to

21

explore ways of addressing the barriers that have kept them from the negotiating table. Such

unofficial talks do not have the pressure of producing a binding agreement, which the official

negotiations do. (Rotberg, 1999:154) Official mediation can however employ facilitation

strategies as mentioned, and this has been Norway’s official approach in Sri Lanka.

Official mediators are usually official representatives of governments, who have been asked

to intervene as a third party, by one or both of the parties in conflict. (Rotberg, 1999: 153)

Rotberg argues that “the official mediator is more likely or not to have his or her own states

interests at stake in wanting to resolve a conflict” and that the role played by the mediator in

the resolution very much depends on the nature of the relationship between the represented

government and the parties in conflict. (Ibid: 154)

In international mediation the focus is often on finding a settlement as quickly as possible.

One wants to stop the violence and suffering. Transformational change, which takes a long

time, often goes on in the background while international mediators work at the macro level

to contain the conflict (Ellis, 2006:183). Ellis (2006) refers to three reasons for involvement

in such mediation and in finding a quick solution: humanitarian interest, strategic interests

and a concern for security and a stable political environment. The humanitarian reason is to

make resolution progress as soon as possible to stop human suffering due to the conflict and

avoid further disasters. The mediator can then be responsible for securing ceasefires,

coordinating the handling of refugees and assisting relief agencies. Humanitarian aid is seen

as a moral responsibility. The second reason is political strategy, in terms of one country

acting as a mediator to maintain its relationship to another country or keeping political

alliances. Political strategy may be part of the motivation for getting involved in international

mediation, as the country then also serves its self- interests. The third reason to mediate can

be a concern for security and a stable political environment. Having a stable political

environment internationally has positive effects for all countries, as instability can mean

terrorism or problems related to refugees to mention some possible effects. One is often also

afraid of spillover effects in the region where there is instability, in that conflict can spread to

neighboring countries.

2.2.2 How and when to get involved

To start mediation, it requires the willingness of the parties and certain conditions to be in

22

place. The timing of the initiative is considered very important. Mediating too soon or too late

may have consequences. The mediator must also have enough knowledge of the conflict, the

actors and the context. An understanding of and sensitivity to the history of the conflict and

the grievances of the parties is necessary. The mediator must also be willing to commit to the

process and invest time and resources in this. Persistence and a will to continue the process

even if obstacles are there is important. (Elllis, 2006:184)

In conflict theory there is, as earlier mentioned, a notion of “conflict ripeness”. This concept

refers to the existence of conditions conducive to conflict resolution. The theory of ripeness

was proposed by Zartmann and later elaborated by himself and his colleague Stephen

Stedman. Zartmann argued that a conflict is ripe for resolution when: “ there exists a situation

of deadlock that creates a mutually hurting stalemate, that unilateral solutions are blocked and

joint solutions are conceivable and that the party that previously had the upper hand in the

conflict has lost the advantage and the weaker part has gained in strength” (Uyangoda,

2006:34). These notions are widely supported by policymakers today. As this theory has

developed, it is now believed that mediators should “await the development of a hurting

stalemate perhaps accompanied with the event of an approaching mutual catastrophe”. (Ibid)

Stedman (1991) argues that the model of a hurting stalemate puts too much emphasis on the

power relationship between the two parties and fails to take into account changes within the

parties or changes in the context. Moreover, it has been argued that there should be a

distinction between ripeness for negotiations to start and for negotiations to succeed. Even if

there is a situation of ripeness it can change and the situation can become “unripe” again.

Ripeness is perhaps best seen as a complex process of transformations. (Ramsbotham et al,

2005:167).

Zartmann also argues that for negotiations to succeed the parties must have valid

spokespersons, a deadline and a vision of an acceptable compromise. Recognition and

dialogue are an important component, as the parties must recognize each other as negotiating

partners. (Ibid) Symmetry is also important in this perspective. If there is asymmetry it needs

to be reduced, because a more equal power balance between the parties is believed to favor

negotiation. (Ramsbotham et al, 2005). In a conflict between a government and an

insurgency, like in Sri Lanka, this would mean that the government has to recognize the

insurgent as a negotiating partner.

23

There is sometimes a misconception that a mediator can bring two conflicting parties to the

negotiating table and impose a settlement on them (Uyangoda, 2006:31). In macro-political

conflicts, such a solution would not work as it has shown itself in the Sri Lankan conflict as

well. It is the parties themselves that should ultimately find a solution, which is acceptable to

both sides. They may however need a third party to make this possible. If the two parties want

a settlement, they might still not trust each other enough to work it out on their own and this

is where the mediator comes in. A third party can then facilitate communication between the

two sides (Uyangoda, 2006:32). Trust is important, especially trust in that the mediator is

neutral and does not favor one of the parties. Neutrality is at least seen as a favorable

condition for a good result of mediation. The mediator can play a role in working out the

settlement agreement and in proposing solutions or alternatives when the parties are

disagreeing. It is important to note that the mediator needs the consent of both parties to the

conflict. If not, the mediator might be seen as supporting one party or as threatening the

sovereignty of a state (Uyangoda, 2006:33). Trust in the mediator may also be connected to

the person/persons acting as a mediator and their interpersonal skills. Important factors

include respect, communication skills and strategic skills (Ellis, 2006:184). Communication

skills are important in terms of overcoming psychological barriers such as feelings of

disrespect and humiliation between the parties (Ibid). Parties to deep-rooted conflict such as

in Sri Lanka may find it difficult to work together because they don’t want to confer

legitimacy on one another. The mediators must then find ways of overcoming this. They must

gain the trust of the parties and help them build a common understanding.

A mediator or facilitator can help change the pattern and flow of communication between the

parties. Ellis (2006) states six core communication responsibilities of a mediator and how

they can contribute to a positive peace process. The first one, being that the mediator must

have a certain control over the procedures for the meetings. In this lies the responsibility of

controlling meeting arrangements and agendas in such a way that it promotes a constructive

process. The second is establishing a positive context for the mediation. Bringing in a

mediator can change the atmosphere of a conflict by “adding a new voice to the issues,

altering the status and attention to the conflict, changing the levels of hopefulness and

enthusiasm for resolution” and altering the flow and pattern of communication between the

parties” (Ellis, 2006:185). The third responsibility of a mediator is to know how to clarify

24

conflicts, so that the parties have a clear picture of the issues. The fourth responsibility that

Ellis mentions is the responsibility of anticipating problems and keeping relationships

constructive. This entails recognizing destructive behaviors and to have strategies of handling

this. It relies on a mediator’s ability to switch roles and behavior according to the situation.

The fifth responsibility is maintaining the positive face of each party. This entails taking into

consideration the need of all parties to receive recognition and confirmation and not loose

face. Humiliation can be a major factor in the hardening of positions and maintaining the

positive face of all parties can help avoid this (Ellis, 2006:186). The last communication

responsibility of the mediator is that the mediator must manage the media and external

environments. Protracted conflicts, such as the one in Sri Lanka, are linked to an external

environment that includes regional and international audiences. Interested parties or groups

can be helpful or cause trouble. Having a smart strategy in relation to the media can help this

situation. This will be discussed more in the fifth chapter.

Acting as a mediator entails anticipating and overcoming obstacles that can arise in a peace

process. Part of successful mediation is then to be aware of the challenges of conflict

resolution. Management of spoilers can be very crucial to the resolution of a conflict and to

peace processes. Spoilers can be described as actors that are against the resolution of a

conflict, as it is in their interest to continue it (Wallensteen, 2007:46). Stedman (1997) argues

that some actors may exist that are not satisfied with the outcome or a peace agreement and

can then sabotage the conflict resolution. He argues that there are also ripe moments for

destruction of the peace and that spoilers have to be handled before they start attacking the

peace agreement and exploit minor disagreements to their advantage. Implementation of the

peace agreement is important in this regard. The peace agreement has to be implemented as

soon as possible and as unchanged as possible, to avoid the window of opportunity for

spoilers. This shows the fragility of a peace process and can be related to the issue of

exclusion of actors in a peace process, as they might be potential spoilers (Ibid). The different

approaches that have been mentioned have different answers to the inclusion of such actors in

a conflict. The dynamic approach would be positive to the inclusion of potential or actual

spoilers and the rational calculation approach would be negative to this. An inclusion of all

actors might entail loosing some of the urgency in solving the conflict and energy being spent

on including actors that might not have a positive effect on the outcome. One way of solving

the problem of including spoilers is to create a second channel for participation of such actors.

25

(Wallensteen, 2007:46)

2.2.3 Power and mediation

Many studies on current mediation processes are influenced by the kind of mediation that was

traditionally carried out between sovereign independent states. Before the end of the Cold

War, the mediators were generally the superpowers that could use pressure to achieve results.

Such a model, the model of the influential and powerful mediator has existed since the world

of Greek city –states, where great powers like Sparta would mediate in conflicts between

smaller states. But in the nineteenth- and twentieth- century diplomacy, new mediator models

have developed. The end of the Cold War changed this typical structure and many variations

are common, such as mediation by small states and mediation by eminent persons, such as

Nelson Mandela, or organizations like the Jimmy Carter Foundation. The methods and

approaches to outside mediation have been debated in recent years. Much of the debate on the

role of mediation in intrastate conflicts is on who is the most appropriate in such a role and on

which strategies should be employed. (Darby & MacGinty, 2003:77-78)

The question of power and mediation is central to Norway’s role in Sri Lanka, as Norway is

generally not seen as a powerful actor in the international context. There has been a trend of

small countries acting as mediators in intrastate conflicts, exactly because they are not

powerful and will then be more impartial. A mediator with no vested interest in the country

and conflict is considered valuable in producing a positive outcome of the conflict resolution

process.

There is a division between coercive and non- coercive third party intervention. A powerful

mediator is seen as one who has political, military and economic resources. Such third parties

try to influence the parties and use persuasion as a tool to find an agreement. They can also

alter the power balance and affect the behavior of the parties through using incentives and

disincentives. This kind of strategy might create badly designed agreements that are likely to

fail (Zartmann& Faure, 2005:280). Most third parties are however not in a position to use that

kind of pressure. Mediation using non- coercive strategies is today more common. Non-

coercive mediation can entail improving communication and interaction by arranging the

surroundings of meetings, being a messenger between the parties and introducing alternative

tracks of communication than the official channel. Some scholars have argued that small

26

states are particularly suited to fill such a role. The argument is often that small states are

generally perceived as non- threatening and trustworthy. (Ibid: 281)

Another important aspect concerning a powerful third party is that it may support one

outcome rather than the other. A powerful third party may then become a full party to the

conflict (Ramsbotham, 2005:18). India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s peace process is an

example of the latter. This is why the third parties that act as “pure mediators” are often

favored. They are there to aid the communication and not to influence the outcome to suit

their own interests. Of course, this is a simplification as all actors have some self -interest.

Norway’s interest has often been described as an interest in creating a stable, political

environment. As mentioned before, a mediator can employ different strategies and these often

rely on the power of the mediator. A powerful mediator will be inclined to use more

manipulation strategies than one who is less powerful. Norway often takes on a mediation

role using mainly facilitation strategies. This will be discussed further in the fourth and fifth

chapters.

Chapter 3: Methodology This chapter will give the reader insight into how this study was conducted, how data was

collected and analyzed and finally how the findings can contribute to existing knowledge and

theory. Another purpose of this chapter is to show the reader how the research process was

conducted and in that way increase the study’s reliability and validity.

3.1 Research strategy and design

This study has used a qualitative research strategy. Qualitative research involves an

interpretative, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that the researcher tries to study

phenomena “in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena

in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003:5). Qualitative

research puts emphasis on the constructed nature of reality. The qualitative approach

combines an interpretivist, epistemological orientation with a constructionist ontology,

meaning that it understands the social world thorough an examination of the interpretation of

that world by its participants and views the social world as a product of individuals rather

than something beyond them (Bryman, 2004: 3). In this type of research the theory is

supposed to be an outcome of the research. It is deductive in that theory guided the research to

27

some extent, but mostly inductive in that my findings have supplemented that theory. This

study seeks to understand human behavior in conflict and sees phenomena and their meanings

as being socially constructed.

This study is on Norwegian peacemaking in general and Sri Lanka as the case. Case studies

have become a very common way of doing qualitative studies. The purpose of a case study is

to represent the case, not the world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003:134). Case study research is

concerned with the complex nature of the case chosen and its particular features, in which

there is something to learn. This study can be described as an exemplifying case, using

Norway’s mediation in Sri Lanka as an example of international peacemaking and third party

mediation in an intrastate ethno- nationalist conflict. It is important to note that findings of

qualitative research are to generalize to theory rather than to populations and this is the

aspiration of this study as well.

3.2 Data collection and fieldwork

My fieldwork was conducted both in Oslo and in Sri Lanka. Before starting the fieldwork I

had acquired literature on the topic of the Sri Lanka conflict and on Norway’s efforts for

peace in an international context. These were used to enhance my understanding of the

conflict and of Norway’s role and helped me in developing interview questions and in guiding

my further literature and secondary data search.

3.2.1 Method of data collection

The main tool used for data collection in this study was analysis of secondary data such as

books, reports and newspaper articles on the study’s topic. I also used semi- structural

qualitative interviews and some informal interviews and participant observation. I developed

an interview guide, which was adapted to the different informants and the information they

could provide. Each person I interviewed had been chosen for their personal competence and

the interview guideline had to be adapted accordingly. Some of the interviews were held as an

informal conversation as the interviewees did not want to be quoted. The informal tone of

these interviews allowed the conversation to run freely and for the informants to reveal

information that would not have been given if the respondent were making an official

statement. This was helpful in my understanding of Norway’s role and guided my further

search for information.

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This study used convenience sampling, which is a type non-probability sampling, where the

sample is one that is simply available to the researcher by accessibility (Bryman, 2004:100).

The choice of persons whom I chose to interview relied a lot on their availability. Another

consideration was that I wished mainly to supplement my findings from the secondary data

analysis. This is why I chose only a few, key informants who could give me accounts of their

understanding of the conflict and the fifth peace process. It was important for me to choose

persons who had been a part of that process or who had studied it closely. In combination

with the accessibility of such persons, I ended up with interviewing several respondents. One

was a researcher who had been stationed in Sri Lanka for several years and had written

several reports on the conflict, the political dynamics and the peace process. I also

interviewed a professor who is very active in the public debate in Sri Lanka and

internationally on how to solve the protracted conflict. A local researcher who helps present

policy alternatives to the decision-makers in Sri Lanka was also interviewed and was

especially used to supplement the achieved understanding I had of the Sri Lankan people’s

attitude towards the peace process. A representative from the Norwegian embassy was

interviewed to give an account of the Norwegian perspective. Lastly, the Norwegian special

envoy for peace to Sri Lanka was interviewed to have the perspective of a person who had

been very actively involved from the Norwegian side. The perspectives of these respondents

helped me supplement my findings from the secondary data analysis and achieve a better

quality of understanding of the case. Quotes from these interviews also provide an interesting

element in the analysis.

My interviews were tape recorded and transcribed during the fieldwork. I made notes of the

most important findings and possible quotations I could use in my analysis. Using a tape

recorder allowed me to pay more attention to the informants during the interviews. It also

helped in that I could return to the interviews if needed and check if my notes contained

accurate and correct information.

During my fieldwork in Colombo I was able to locate several books, which are not available

outside Sri Lanka. These were mainly found in the Sri Lankan academic bookshop Vijita

Yapa, at the Center for Ethnic Studies and at the Social Scientist’s Association. I also was

able to access several research reports through the Center for Policy Alternatives in Colombo.

29

As mentioned, I had started acquiring and analyzing secondary sources before my fieldwork

and this was continued through my fieldwork as well. The literature that had been reviewed

helped me structure my findings and make sense of them.

Participant observation was used to some extent in this study, mainly in trying to grasp the

situation in Sri Lanka and to develop my perceptions of the different actors. I attended a

conference on the topic of peace and visited some organizations engaged in peace work. I also

observed the daily life of Sri Lankans in Colombo and their reactions to the conflict and its

everyday manifestations in people’s lives. Observing and taking notes helped me in getting

insight on the opinions held by different actors and stakeholders in the peace process.

3.2.2 Fieldwork

In the beginning of November 2007 I went to Sri Lanka to commence my fieldwork. I stayed

there for a month to interview key informants and locate relevant secondary sources needed

for analysis. My master thesis advisor, Prof. Shanmugaratnam assisted me in finding some

preliminary contacts and accommodation. My external advisor was Professor Uyangoda,

Head of the Department of political science at the University of Colombo. He helped me in

finding relevant literature and establishing contacts. He also works at the Social Scientist’s

Association (SSA) in Colombo. The SSA provided me with a place to sit and do my research,

when I was not busy doing interviews. A small bookshop on the premises also became a

valuable resource in terms of books on the conflict in Sri Lanka, several of which could not be

acquired in Norway. Prof. Uyangoda has been very active in writing about the conflict and its

resolution, both in books and in newspaper articles. These resources were made available to

me and we also discussed the issues I was interested in examining. He provided me with

valuable advice and understanding of the complex nature of the conflict, especially the

political dimensions.

The persons I interviewed during my fieldwork in Sri Lanka was my advisor Prof. Uyangoda,

Mr. Alan Keenan, researcher for the international Crisis Group, Mr. Jehan Perera from the

National Peace Council, Ms. Bhavani from the Center for Policy Alternatives and Mr. Erik

Nürnberg from the Norwegian Embassy. Some of the interviews were informal and the

interviewees did not wish to be quoted and these are for that reason not included in the text.

They were however valuable in supplementing my analysis.

30

I participated a conference held by the National Peace Council (NPC) of Sri Lanka. This

helped me get in contacts and informants and gave me insight into the complexity of actors

and stakeholders in the peace process. The conference was about the situation in the East of

the country, in the areas mainly controlled by the LTTE and where much of the fighting

between the adversaries takes place. A representative from the Norwegian Embassy attended

the conference and I was able to schedule an interview with him. I also met the Director of the

NPC, who had invited me for the conference, and arranged a meeting with him as well. He

presented me to several others attending the conference, both politicians and religious leaders

from the Sinhalese and the Tamil community. That was a learning experience and an

interesting lesson in seeing that there are many who continue to work for peace and

reconciliation in Sri Lanka. People seem to be willing to cooperate and meet in forums such

as this conference, without any difficulty in terms of disturbances or violence. This gave me

the understanding that the Sri Lankan people want peace and that the hopelessness that is

often expressed in newspaper articles or research reports is highly overstated. There are

possibilities and willingness to find compromises. Attending this conference gave me useful

information, but these findings have only to a small extent been used in the text of the study.

It was rather utilized as a means of understanding the conflict and its actors.

I visited some organizations to see how they work for peace in Sri Lanka, among them the

National Peace Council and the Centre for policy alternatives. I also visited the Sri Lanka

Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to better understand the work they are doing and its impact in

the resolution of the conflict. The SLMM was a Nordic mission set up to monitor the

conditions of the CFA. I was interested in seeing their work as some of my informants and the

literature that I had examined, expressed that it was perhaps not appropriate for Norway to be

a part of the monitoring mission in addition to their work as a mediator. My visit showed me

that the monitoring mission had done a lot of valuable work in being a communication

channel back and forth between the parties in the conflict and especially in providing accurate

and unbiased information on the breaches to the CFA and violent acts committed in the areas

where the mission had its offices. It was also clear that the work of the mission was no longer

as important, as the CFA was in many ways not valid anymore. It still existed on paper, but

the signs were clear that the mission had lost its original purposes and were seeking other

ways to contribute. Information was their main task when I visited and not long after, the

31

mission was shut down as the CFA was resigned by the GOSL and there was nothing left for

them to monitor. It should be mentioned that the staff at the SLMM were very clear in that the

role of Norway in the mission and as a mediator were to distinct areas and that it was seen as

important not to mix these role sin any way. I chose not to examine this further, as it would

have been a comprehensive study on its own.

There were some limitations to this study that should be mentioned. Some information was

not available to me during my research. I hoped to get access to relevant information on the

Norwegian efforts form the archives of the ministry of Foreign Affairs. I had a meeting with a

contact at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo who made it clear that these documents

were considered classified and could not be made available to me at this point in time. I have

however tried to compensate for this through reading and analyzing interviews, statements

and reports from the Norwegian officials, which have been published and get relevant

information in that way. I also interviewed one of the main persons involved in the process

from the Norwegian side and these complementing approaches gave me the information

needed to understand Norway’s perspective. Other limitations were of course the time limit

for which this study was conducted. The topics investigated could easily have been spent

several years on researching, but this was done within the timeframe of a master thesis.

3.2.3 Reliability and validity

Considerations were made in terms of the choice of research methods to ensure the reliability

and validity of the study and its findings. There were some limitations to the access of

information, as mentioned. The reliability and validity of the study were however upheld by

using methods such as triangulation and describing the methods used to give transparency. To

ensure the trustworthiness of the study I used triangulation to crosscheck my findings. I used

several methods including observation, interviews and analysis of secondary data to ensure

that my research would be valid. Triangulation is using more than one method or source of

data to study a social phenomenon (Bryman, 2004:275).

Replicability and generalizability is difficult in qualitative studies as it is impossible to freeze

a social setting. Generalizing from a case study is also considered difficult, as what is found

in one case may not be true in a similar case. It may however contain valuable lessons for

similar cases even if one can’t say that the answers found in this study will apply to all such

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cases. In this study, the attempt is made to learn from the case of mediation processes in Sri

Lanka to the wider topic of international peacemaking. I would claim that an examination of

conflict processes in one case can help understand other similar cases and that it as such is

possible to withdraw general lessons from this case. It is not claimed though, that a similar

case study of the same case would find what this study has found. This is because research is

not objective and value- free and because social settings constantly change. (Bryman,

2004:273)

Chapter 4: Norway’s approach to international peacemaking This chapter will examine the Norwegian approach to peacemaking. It will first briefly

examine the history and characteristics of Norway’s peacemaking efforts. Then it will assess

the motives of Norway’s involvement in international peacemaking. This will be related to

the criticism of Norway’s approach.

4.1 Previous efforts in peacemaking

Norway has since the early 1990s been engaged as a facilitator in several peace and

reconciliation processes. One of the first processes where Norway was involved was in

Guatemala, with the support of the United Nations. The involvement was initiated through a

Norwegian NGO, the Norwegian Church Aid, who had been engaged in Guatemala on a

humanitarian basis. Norway has also been in involved in the peace process in the Philippines,

where Norway facilitated negotiations between the government and the National Democratic

Front of the Philippines. Norway also participated in peace talks in Sudan, with the UK and

the US. Colombia and Haiti are other countries where Norway recently has engaged in peace

processes. (Hanssen -Bauer, 2005) The most well- known Norwegian peacemaking effort is

perhaps the peace process in the Middle East. In 1992, Norway was asked to facilitate the

peace process of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. The initial contact was between the parties

and FAFO, a Norwegian research institution who were already involved in the region. Such a

close co- operation with the Norwegian NGOs has been a part of the typical Norwegian

model of peacemaking. The Norwegian efforts in peacemaking also takes on several forms, in

being the official facilitator as in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, to sponsoring backchannels

as in the Middle East or being an actor in an international coalition like in Sudan. Norway’s

peace initiative is also often described as part of a larger effort and as building on a tradition

33

of humanitarian action and development co-operation. (Hanssen-Bauer, 2005; MFA Peace

and reconciliation efforts, 2008)

4.2 The Norwegian approach

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway has developed a “Norwegian model” for

peacemaking. These are the characteristics of the model and the claimed advantages that

Norway brings in terms of peace and reconciliation processes: a long – term will to assist in

such processes, as a rich country it has the economic resources necessary to commit long-

term, a close co- operation with the Norwegian Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs),

experience, enjoying a good relationship with major international actors, the fact that Norway

does not have a colonial past and lastly that Norway has an aim to be a peace helper not a

peacemaker. The first point refers to Norway’s consistent politics and that there is political

consensus on Norway’s peacemaking efforts. Norway has the will to commit to such

processes. The second point refers to the fact that Norway also has the resources necessary to

commit. Norway has both economic and human resources available to aid such processes. It

has also been a consistent policy to have a connection between work for peace and giving

economical aid to the countries in conflict. The third point has been a prominent feature to the

Norwegian model: the MFA’s co- operation with Norwegian NGOs. In many cases the NGOs

have been the way of entry into the peace processes where Norway has contributed. The

NGOs have often had a presence in places where the official Norway has had little presence,

and this has created the space for co- operation. The fourth point refers to Norway’s good

relationship with major political actors on the international arena, like the US, EU, Russia and

India. Norway’s relationship to the UN and its large contributions to development aid gives

Norway credibility in the global community. The fifth point refers to Norway not having a

past as a colonial power and is claimed an advantage in relation to other countries that do

have such a past. It refers to the special role that can be played by a small state such as

Norway, in comparison to the major powers. In comparison with many of the major powers,

Norway does not have a history of exploitation as the former colonial powers do and has

more legitimacy for involvement because of this. The last point mentioned by the MFA is that

Norway claims to be a “peace helper”, not a peacemaker. This is a way for Norway to express

that it is the parties to the conflicts that hold the key to solving the conflict and that the

responsibility lies with the parties, not with Norway (MFA, 2008).

34

As mentioned in the theory chapter, Norway is considered a small state that is able to act as a

neutral and impartial mediator, in contrast to the type of role major powers such as the US can

play. The major powers have the ability to pressure the parties, but Norway has little leverage

of this kind and has tried to promote a different mediator role to suit Norway’s characteristics.

The Norwegian approach has become the facilitating mediator who can’t put much economic

or political pressure on the parties in the conflict, but who helps in arranging meetings

between the parties and in communicating to find a common ground for negotiating.

Norway’s foreign policy on peacemaking is based on the advantages of being a small country.

This approach had its beginning in Jan Egeland and his writing on the role of small states. Jan

Egeland has today participated in many peace processes across the world, both on behalf of

the Norwegian state and working for the United Nations. He has written a number of reports,

studies and articles on conflict resolution. In 1988 he wrote that Norway was a country

“where the norms and principles have come to occupy an exceptionally prominent position

among its foreign policy” (Egeland, 1988:171). He is here referring to democratic and

humanitarian ideals and norms, dating back to the labor movement, and Norway’s long

tradition of advocating international peace. The Norwegian people and its politicians have

long favored a foreign policy based on moral principles. In his book he suggests that this

foreign-policy moralism can be traced back to democratic political traditions. He compares

the foreign policies of the US and Norway and reveals its differences and similarities. He also

points to Norway’s foreign policy in connection with its strategic and economic interests.

Norway has an interest of maintaining good relations with a number of countries, as it has

national security interests and in relation to that the interest of keeping important countries as

allies, and economic interest in protecting its investments and getting access to markets and

raw materials (Egeland, 1988:180) Egeland writes about how Norway doesn’t have a leading

role in international conflicts or dilemmas and how this enables Norway to focus on the most

important moral challenge of our time: the North-South conflict. He claims that this can be

Norway’s way of standing out in the international community. In contrast to the selfish

interests of the superpowers, Norway has been able to position itself as having altruistic goals.

In many countries there is a limitation to how much funds are available in terms of foreign aid

and assistance to building peace. Norway is a country rich on oil and has the ability to allocate

quite large sums to such causes. In being a rich country, Norway also has a moral obligation

to provide foreign aid and assisting in peacemaking. In relation to this, Norway has according

to him, a foreign- policy moralism that suits this role. His main argument is that countries like

35

Norway, the Netherlands, Canada and Sweden can play a different role in peacemaking than

what has traditionally been done by the major powers. These countries characteristics make it

possible to act as an impartial and trustworthy peacemaker, according to Egeland.

In Sri Lanka, Norway’s approach has been a long- term effort, with development assistance

and with co- operation with some of the larger international actors. Norway has a long history

of political commitment and development assistance to Sri Lanka. The history of

development co- operation goes all the way back to the 1960s. Norway’s role has not been

ambiguous, because of no history of colonial exploitation and no apparent conflict between

good intentions and economic or security interests. As such, Sri Lanka has been referred to as

a good example of the ability of Norway as a small and relatively interest free state in

providing support to countries in conflict. Norway has not been involved alone in Sri Lanka,

but has enjoyed support from the group of co- chairs: the EU, Japan and the US. They

constitute the group of donors who are acting as the international political support group of

the peace process. A suspension or withdrawal of aid has been seen as a power that Norway

could have used in the Sri Lankan case. This peace conditionality was however not been used

to pressure the parties in the fifth peace process.

Norway seems to have found its own niche in the peacemaking agenda. In the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs there is a division called the peace and reconciliation unit, where the experts

and advisors on these issues sit. Norway also tries to draw on the expertise of Norwegian

research institutions and to collect advice on mediation strategies from experts. A Norwegian

approach definitely seems to have been shaped over the years. The Norwegian approach is

also changing, perhaps in relation to the assessments of previous peacemaking efforts. In

terms of theoretical approaches to conflict resolution, policymakers in Norway have

traditionally viewed conflict as an outcome of rational calculation. The concept of rationality

entails that the parties will end a war if it is a rational choice. In this way the parties can be

influenced by outside forces to see the rationality in ending the conflict. This type of realist or

neo-realist thinking is now changing. Policymakers are opening up for a more dynamic view

of conflict. According to the rational calculation approach, timing is important and the focus

is on seizing opportunities and a few, determined actors do this. This is in many ways an

appropriate description of Norway’s earlier approach to peacemaking, also in Sri Lanka. In

the Middle East, Norway seemed to use some elements from the needs- based approach, as

36

Norway then favored secrecy and little media access. This behavior has changed and conflict

is now viewed more as a dynamic process that takes time to change. This can also be related

to the development of a new international understanding of peace and conflict. Merely ending

the fighting does not solve a conflict. It is important to agree to respect each other and live

together and to include larger values, such as the presence of justice. In one of my interviews

I found that Norway is now interested in bottom- up process for solving conflicts such as the

Sri Lankan. This is a field where Norway wants to develop more knowledge on how it would

work in practice and how Norway could help such a process.

“If I should sum up our approach in two sentences, I would say that Norway believes in the

strength of a soft- powered, or weak if you prefer, facilitator. Also, Norway believes more in

building coalitions of complementary good offices that can together nurture and facilitate a

process of building peace, than to engage on the basis of one single, all-purpose, mediator.”

(Hanssen- Bauer, speech 2008)

This was expressed in a recent speech from Norway’s Special Representative to Sri Lanka. It

shows how Norway is now moving towards a shift in their approach, with more focus on the

building of peace as a process that requires many parties to participate. There is also more

focus on co- operation between large and smaller actors and how they can complement each

other. One party can use pressure and the other is good at helping communication and can be

a trusted, impartial party. Mr. Hanssen- Bauer was interviewed for this study and commented

on this change in the approach:

If we look at Norway’ participation in peace processes today, one can see that we have made

a dramatic change in our course. We are no longer talking about our tasks as we were doing

during the Oslo channel. We are always talking about the UN track and that we need to be

several actors working together. We are also more concerned about human rights issues.

(Interview)

This also shows that the connection with the UN has become increasingly more important in

recent years. The MFA has expressed that Norwegian peace diplomacy is first of all anchored

in the United Nations, as it is a universally accepted institution in dealing with conflicts in the

international context. The United Nations was not an option in terms of Sri Lanka, as the

37

parties have strongly resisted its participation. Norway, however, seems to understand that it

is easier for them to operate as a facilitator with the UN backing them, or at least a larger

international organization. The Sri Lankan peace process is where Norway has held one of its

most prominent positions in the young history of its peace engagement.

4.3 Norway’s motives and related criticism

Norway’s reasons for engaging in peace efforts can be explained by the rapid

internationalization of conflict resolution that started in the 1990’s. It marked a beginning of

the major powers seeing intrastate conflicts as a threat to global security. The new conflicts

that arose in the Post Cold War era were intrastate conflicts. The majority of casualties in

these conflicts were civilians, unlike in previous conflicts. A mainstream view at this time

was that intrastate conflicts were manifestations of social regression and the failure to

modernize. In this period international interventions to resolve conflicts became justified on

the basis of such views. A liberal peace agenda emerged with policies for development in

war- torn countries (Paris, 2004). The major powers promoted peace, democracy and a market

economy as a success formula for the conflict torn countries. Aid was given to rebuild

countries ruined by conflict, but with certain conditionalities. The peace conditionality was

also added to the other development aid conditionalities. This conditionality sees peace or at

least attempts for peace as being a precondition for receiving aid. It links development aid to

conflict resolution and has opened up spaces for donors to be active stakeholders in peace

processes in aid-dependent countries. Criticism relating to this aspect claims that donor

countries from the Western part of the world are trying to force their ideologies and way of

developing on poor, undeveloped countries in conflict- ridden areas in the world (Jung 2003).

This perspective argues against the perception of democracies as absent from war and shows

how democracies do fight wars, just not in their own country. It claims that protracted internal

warfare is often the result of international interventions claimed to promote democracy and

market structures. (Jung, 2003:13) This is a criticism of the world -view held by many

policymakers in the world today, also in Norway, and relates to an ongoing debate in the field

of international relations on the emergence of a new world order. Here the world is viewed as

divided into two zones, one of peace, including the highly developed capitalist democracies

and the other, of conflict, including parts of the world where political power is frequently

contested by force. It is argued that it is important to examine intrastate wars from their

political economy and ethno- nationalist conflicts are seen as reflecting the violent process of

38

global modernization. According to this perspective countries like Norway should not engage

in the kind of peacemaking that is done today. Norway does however argue that its

involvement does help in countries like Sri Lanka and that such criticism is incorrect and

unjustified. The Foreign Minister and Development Minister of Norway have replied to

criticism of Norway’s approach in this way:

“Norwegian and international efforts have produced results.(..)There is a need for better

coordination of international development efforts. (..) There have been many examples of

donors being guided by their own economic and political interests. International development

cooperation can sometimes impede the development of sustainable local institutions.(..) We

welcome the debate on and analysis of Norway’s peace and development policy, because this

helps us to improve our efforts. But the best debate will be on how we best can contribute, not

on whether we should contribute at all”

(Solheim, Newspaper article, Dagbladet, 06.12.06).

Norway’s response has been that this type of criticism is too simplistic and that it does not

address the positive effects in terms of peace and creating democratic states with a respect for

human rights. In a larger world- view it can be criticized that the world we live in is not fair

and certain involvements can be criticized as having negative effects in the long run. On the

other hand, it is also a world where each country has to fend for itself. Norway can be seen as

trying to maintain its own interests and still adhere to larger moral incentives. The Foreign

Minister points to what would happen if countries did not get involved in peacemaking

efforts:

“What would have happened in South Africa if the international community had not

condemned apartheid and supported the liberation struggle until wise leaders like Mandela

and de Klerk joined forces in the reconciliation efforts? We believe that a proper review of

our efforts would show that international engagement has prevented wars, and has resulted in

fewer people living in absolute poverty today than ten years ago.”

(Newspaper article, Dagbladet, 06.12.06).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Norway’s two main reasons for engaging in peace

39

processes is a wish to save lives and secure human decency and because of global security

concerns (MFA, 2008). In this lies a connection with taking care of humanitarian ideals, but

also serving the Norwegian people and protecting Norway from the effects of conflicts

abroad. A stable, political environment is considered in the interest of all countries in the

world today, as globalization has resulted in us being more connected than ever before.

Norway is a country concerned with how it is viewed by the rest of the world. Norway has

also been in need of a more distinct national identity. Norway’s niche diplomacy can be

described as a strategy to do this. Norway’s Foreign Minister Mr. Jonas Ghar Støre, set up a

national forum in 2007. The goal of this forum was to strengthen the country’s international

reputation and create strategies to improve Norway’s reputation. The foreign minister stated

that: “a good national reputation has a lot to do with our impact overseas, both culturally,

economically and politically” (Aftenposten, 2007). It has been stated that Norway’s top

“signature export” is peace (Bruni, 2002). Major donor countries’ attitude towards internal

conflicts in recipient countries has generally been conditioned by the country’s political

significance to their national interest both in a global and geopolitical level. Norway’s reasons

for involvement are self interested to some part. Former head of research at NUPI, the

Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Sverre Lodgaard, has claimed that Norway doesn’t

have a choice and that it would be seen as a greedy nation if it didn’t get involved in

peacemaking (Aftenposten, 04.02.05). He pointed out how Norway discriminates poor

countries through trade- barriers, its restrictive immigration politics and the substantial

incomes Norway has received through holding on to its rights of the resources at sea.

Lodgaard went on to claim that there is no such thing as pure altruism and that a state will

always have some interest in its actions. Norway’s niche diplomacy has been claimed to give

Norway a voice and presence on the international stage (Moolakkattu, 2005:387). This is also

reflected in statements made by government officials, where they admit the importance of this

factor in being involved in peacemaking:

“The efforts of peacemaking has contributed to strengthening Norway’s network

internationally and has made us a more interesting discussion partner for the superpowers”

Secretary of State, Vidar Helgesen (Aftenposten, 04.02.05).

“The involvement in peace processes creates interest in Norway with other major countries of

40

the world.”

Interview with Erik Solheim (Rupesinghe, 2006, Vol. 2:334)

Norwegian politicians have experienced becoming more visible in the international

community, as a result of its efforts in peacemaking. It has opened doors in places of power,

such as Washington and Brussels. One person who has been critical to Norway’s motives in

peacemaking is Arne Ørum who is a known Norwegian Middle East expert. He has claimed

that a lot of the efforts are connected with the experience that Norwegian politicians and

diplomats have become more visible internationally (Aftenposten 04.02.05). He has criticized

Norway in not having an especially successful record in making peace. Ørum further claims

that Norway doesn’t hold special knowledge on the areas where we have been involved. He

also points out that Norway is often invited to broker because they are willing to and because

it is often combined with generosity in terms of monetary aid. Several Norwegian researchers

and academics have been critical to Norway’s involvement, especially Norway’s efforts in the

Middle East and the Oslo- channel (Waage, H.H., 2004; 2005). Norway has received criticism

for trying naïvely to “save the world” through its peacemaker profile and large donations of

foreign aid (Østerud, 2006.) The criticism of Norway’ s foreign policy profile has however

not been substantial in Norway, due to the large consensus on the values the policy is built on.

Building political capital is important for any state and establishing itself as a peacemaker in

the world has had its positive effects for Norway. It puts Norway on the map and makes it

know for more than its oil resources. An image of a peace- loving nation can be used as a

strategy for politicians to create a profile for Norway abroad and also to stimulate Norwegian

interest in a way that reflects the Norwegian population’s values, through promoting

humanitarian and democratic ideals. Norway can, as such, be claimed to have political

interests and motives for engaging in peacemaking. The Middle East is an example of an area

where Norway has interests, as its future will have a direct effect on Norway. Conflicts in the

area might increase the global competition on scarce energy resources and this might increase

the need to extract resources in the Northern areas. Norway has been accused of using their

peacemaking profile to protect its oil interests and promoting Norwegian companies abroad.

Norwegian officials claim that economic interests are not a reason for their involvement, that

it is rather a concern for a stable, political environment. In asked whether Norway has vested

interests in promoting peace in the areas of engagement, the Minister of International

41

Development has stated:

“These assumptions are completely absurd. There is absolutely no link between Norwegian

fishing and oil interests and recent efforts at peacemaking.(..).If a country is experiencing

internal tensions, it is likely that these will extend to other peaceful countries, such as

Norway. ”

(Interview, Erik Solheim. Rupesinghe, 2006, Vol. 2:333)

In a recent speech to the Norwegian National Assembly, the Foreign Minister stated that

Norway is a nation of excess, both in a political sense and in the economical sense, which has

capacity and strength (MFA, 20.05.08). He stated that the world views Norway as a

privileged country with large incomes and peace and stability, and that this entails that

Norway should take responsibility in creating a more secure world. In his address, he also

reflected on why the Norwegian involvement in peacemaking is important for Norway. The

reasons he gave were that poverty, climate changes, migration, conflict and instability which

effects international peace and security also affects Norwegian security. He also stated that

Norway’s international involvement has opened up doors to central decision- makers and

arenas of decision- making that Norway needs to be a part of. As he stated, being a country

outside the EU makes it especially important for Norway, as the EU is: “perhaps the most

important regional decision making arena the world has seen”. (MFA, 20.05.08)

“Modern politics is about the ability to understand the extent of the global community of

interest that we are part of” (MFA, 20.05.08). Gahr Støre admits here that interests are always

part of a state’s politics and that Norway operates in the way that the global context requires it

too. It is in the Norwegian interest for its involvement to be strategic, but also based on

values, as this has become a trademark of Norway. Gahr Støre has several times claimed that

the “politics of engagement” needs to be anchored in values, to be sustainable and effective

(MFA, 20.05.08; Dagbladet, 06.12.06). Norway’s values have traditionally been solidarity,

human rights and promoting international peace. Norway’s foreign policy strategy appears to

be promoting communication and understanding, both for protecting certain values and self -

interests and for having a distinct Norwegian profile internationally. This study views Norway

as using mediation as a policy tool to advance specific interests and protect certain values.

42

Chapter 5: Assessing Norway’s efforts in the fifth peace process

5.1 How and why did Norway become involved?

Norway was formally invited to mediate in the Sri Lankan conflict by President Kumaratunga

in 2000. Several characteristics were in place that made Norway suitable for the task. They

had no immediate political or economical interest in the country or region and they were

willing to play the role of a soft- powered facilitator. India, the US, the EU and the country’s

largest donor, Japan, were all backing the process and Norway’s role. Norway was perceived

as a small state that would employ different mediator tactics than Sri Lanka had seen before.

The failure of India’s involvement, as previously mentioned, opened up for a country like

Norway that was seen as non- threatening and trustworthy. In Sri Lanka, several conditions

were in place that made negotiations possible. The parties were experiencing war weariness

and a military mutually hurting stalemate, where both parties were hurting and saw no end to

this conflict. The conditions for engaging in negotiations improved with a regime change in

2001. The attacks of 9-11 and the US declaring a war on terror also had its impact on the

LTTE and their incentives to seek a negotiated settlement to the conflict. In the context of this

pro- peace conjuncture, Norway was able to negotiate a ceasefire between the LTTE and the

GOSL that was signed in February 2002.

The ties between Norway and Sri Lanka had developed before 2000, beginning with Erik

Solheim’s personal encounters on a visit to the island. Erik Solheim, who was to become the

Special Envoy to Sri Lanka, traveled there in relation to writing a book on Norwegian

politics. Through NGOs and primarily Arne Fjørtoft, a former Norwegian politician, Solheim

met several Sri Lankan politicians during his stay (Rupesinghe, 2006 Vol.2: 335). In Norway,

there is a community of Tamil diaspora, which was a link between the countries from the

outset of the mediation process. Erik Solheim was approached by representatives of the Tamil

diaspora in Norway with a request to help the political spokesperson of the LTTE, Anton

Balasingham. He was very ill and in need of a kidney transplant and the MFA had been

approached to help him. Erik Solheim was then approached to ensure that it reached a higher

level, as he was a member of the foreign policy committee at that time. This gave Norway a

special position in that it was suddenly in direct contact with the inner circles of the LTTE

(Höglund & Svensson, 2008). No other party was in such a direct contact with the LTTE,

which was a strict military and non- transparent organization. Norway developed into one of

43

the few actors who have good knowledge of the LTTE and enjoyed a good relationship with

them. This was part of the reason to why Norway got involved in Sri Lanka. They had access

to both sides of the conflict, the LTTE and the GOSL. The fact that Norway had good

relations to both parties, was important in the choice of Norway as a mediator, in addition to

both parties wishing to maintain control over the outcome (Rotberg, 1999:153). Using a

mediator with Norway’s characteristics was believed to give the parties more control over the

outcome, than what would have been possible if a stronger third party was involved.

Norway was chosen in part because of its impartiality and previous peacemaking efforts.

Through former efforts as a mediator Norway had established an image as the neutral,

trustworthy mediator who would not attempt to pressure the parties to find an agreement. As

mentioned, the weaker type mediator was preferred in Sri Lanka. The reason for this was both

the Indian involvement and a general skepticism by the GOSL in bringing in third parties

from outside. The GOSL and its politicians originally asserted that the struggle with the

LTTE was a domestic problem and that the meddling of outsiders was not wanted (Rotberg,

1999: 152). Norway had no apparent interest in the conflict and was preferred to a stronger

type mediator, like the UN or US. Norway’s advantages were perceived as explained by

Solheim, the Special Envoy, in an interview:

“When it comes to a small country like Norway, one can argue that there is a problem that we

cannot enforce peace. If the parties in a conflict don’t want peace, there’s nothing we can do.

But the advantage of being a small country is that if the parties do want peace, we can assist

them; they will not believe that we will force them into an agreement.”

Interview, Erik Solheim (Rupesinghe, 2006:334)

5.2 Norway’s role

There were several motives for Norway to decide to engage in peace brokering in Sri Lanka.

One motive was to continue pursuing the Norwegian image as an international peacemaker

and promoter of democratic and humanitarian ideals. As discussed in the previous chapter,

Norway had established itself as a peacemaker or “peace- helper” as the MFA has called it.

This entailed a low profile and secrecy around the negotiations. The peace brokering in Sri

Lanka also started this way, before a decision was made to publicly announce Norway’s role.

This decision was made before elections in the New Year 1999/2000 and following an

44

attempt to assassinate President Kumaratunga.

The peace brokering in Sri Lanka became, after a while, one of the most prominent roles

Norway has had in terms of peacemaking. A lot of responsibility was put on Norway in its

role as a broker. Norway’s role was defined as being impartial and at the same time gaining

the trust of both sides. Norway was criticized for not confronting the parties with the many

human rights abuses, with having a dual role as a mediator and the leader of the Sri Lanka

Monitoring Mission and for not including all parties to the conflict in the negotiations. Firstly,

the human rights abuses came from both sides of the conflict. Norway felt that it was not in

their mandate to address this (Hanssen- Bauer Interview, 2008). They were at the time trying

to start with the small issues in the negotiations and were trying to gain the trust of both

parties. Accusations were not considered a part of this and the human rights abuses were not

addressed in the beginning. It became a problem for Norway to explain this, as Norway

portrays itself as promoting humanitarian ideals. In an interview with Hanssen- Bauer, the

current Special Envoy to Sri Lanka, he admitted that Norway should have confronted the

parties with this at an earlier stage:

“The connection between human rights and acting as a peace broker is difficult. But it may

very well be that Norway looked past some of the abuses of human rights because the focus

was on keeping the process on track”

Interview, Hanssen Bauer

Secondly, the dual role of Norway as a peace broker and the leader of the SLMM was an

issue. This was because of the effect it had on the perceived impartiality of the Norwegian

mediators. It could have been stated more clearly by Norway how the different roles were not

considered a problem by the parties.

“None of the parties wanted to change the bilateral or dual model in 2002 and it was the

parties who had asked Norway to host both these roles”

Interview, Hanssen- Bauer

Thirdly, the peace process and Norway was criticized for not being inclusive enough. The

claim was that some parties to the conflict were not included in the negotiations, such as the

45

Muslims. They are the second largest minority group in Sri Lanka and have been severely

affected by the conflict in the North and East. The two party model was used by Norway as it

was their position that there was at the time, only two parties that were in war with each other.

In terms of the CFA and the focus on stopping the hostilities, this was the main focus.

Norway has stated that inclusion of more actors would be considered later on in the process.

Hanssen. Bauer claims that the problem of the Muslim group were incorporated later on:

“The continued peace negotiations were more complex and the inclusion of the Muslims were

an issue. In 2002, there was an attempt to include the Muslims, but it became difficult as the

GOSL wanted them at their side of the negotiating table”

Interview

The issue of incorporating other actors from the Tamil side has also been discussed. This was

however seen difficult as the LTTE claims they are the only credible representative of the

Tamil community. Norway acknowledges these issues and claims a broader inclusion of

actors would follow later on in the process:

“I am convinced that one has to broaden out the inclusiveness of such a process, but that also

entails a lot of compromises”

Interview, Hanssen- Bauer

Overall, Norway’s role became a prominent role, which seems to exceed what one would

expect from a facilitator. The criticism shows the amount of responsibility that was put on

Norway.

5.3 The implications of Norway’s role

The different expectations that the parties held to Norway’s role, was a challenge the

mediators had to overcome. The LTTE and the GOSL had a common agreement that Norway

was suitable, but their motives for accepting Norway were different. On one hand, The LTTE

preferred a mediator that could be more active than passive, as the GOSL might be more

responsive to a powerful mediator. On the other hand, a too powerful mediator might dictate

the outcome and it might then not be favorable to the LTTE. The GOSL was likely to prefer a

less active mediator, like Norway, who would employ facilitation strategies. This would

46

better suit the GOSL’s interests to maintain its sovereignity. As the democratically elected

leadership this would give the GOSL a relative strength in the negotiations (Palihapitya,

2007:43). For the LTTE, an international mediator would mean more credibility. Norway

was also seen as an ally that could help the LTTE gain recognition for their independent

homeland. A clear statement of their role and responsibilities was necessary at the outset of

this mediation process. This was not achieved by Norway. Their role appeared vague. Norway

had a focus on being a facilitator of communication, but should also have been aware of the

expectations to them and what outcome they would bring. Norway has often highlighted that

the outcome is the responsibility of the parties to the conflict. In bringing in a third party

mediator, the parties had certain expectation of what this would entail for them. A clear

specification of how Norway viewed their own role would have been very beneficial, both in

terms of the parties and in announcing this publicly. A vaguely stated role can be seen as

making it possible for the parties to manipulate Norway. If this was not the experience that

the Norwegians had in the negotiating room, this was at least how it was viewed from the

outside.

The issue of impartiality became a problem for the Norwegian mediators. Norway received a

lot of criticism during the period from 2000- 2003. Some of the criticism has already been

mentioned. Much of this could have been avoided had Norway employed certain strategies

and been able to understand the way their actions would be viewed by the Sri Lankan

population. The main criticism was however that the Norwegian mediators were supporting

the LTTE. Because of its early affiliation with the LTTE and the fact that they were the only

actor engaging publicly with the LTTE, the perceptions and suspicions of bias started to be

raised. A lack of clarity on Norway’s role and motives fuelled a lot of criticism, much of it

without grounds. One example was when Norway was accused of training Tamil soldiers to

combat in Norway. Norway chose not to comment on these accusations to the Sri Lankan

media. This turned out to be a bad strategy. Political parties also started engaging in these

accusations. The Nationalist party People’s Liberation Front (JVP) accused Norway of being

biased towards the LTTE. As a mediator, Norway is not required to respond to such

allegations. Norway viewed the situation as unproblematic in that the parties at least knew

that they were impartial. They felt that it was not necessary to address this and that might to

correct. But this was combined with a relatively high media profile and that did not look good

to the Sri Lankan public. A mediator must of course expect criticism as a part of such a role,

47

but handling criticism should also become a greater focus. It can be seen as part of the

communication responsibility of a mediator.

5.4 Why did Norway fail in negotiating peace?

When Norway became involved in Sri Lanka, the conflict was already intractable and had

seen various peace attempts fail. The Norwegian mediators had a challenging task. Bringing

the parties to the negotiating table and creating an environment of perceived trust was an

accomplishment. The CFA was also an accomplishment in that it stopped the hostilities and in

that the parties had actually managed to find some common ground to negotiate from. There

were however several problems and the negotiations entered into an impasse in 2003. Later

on, the peace process collapsed.

The intractability of the Sri Lankan conflict and its long history of animosity have created

difficulties in finding a resolution. Deep identity conflicts are generally difficult to address

and research has shown that negotiating solutions to protracted intra state conflicts is notably

difficult. Another major obstacle to resolution is the political system in Sri Lanka. The

interest of governments in Sri Lanka has been to remain in power as long as possible and to

solve the “problem” of the LTTE, either by minimizing it or eliminating it (Palihapity,

2007:44). Different strategies have been employed by the governments to achieve these

goals. This has resulted in politics characterized by outbidding and appealing to the ethnic

cleavages to mobilize political support. This has many times resulted in an escalation of the

Sri Lankan conflict.

For a peace broker it is difficult to address these issues. A facilitator does not have much

leverage in such a situation. Norway’s strategy became that they would not attempt to design

any solutions. They would strictly be a facilitator who assisted the parties in their

communication and who monitored the CFA. Norway’s position was that a sustainable

outcome could only come from the parties themselves, as expressed by Erik Solheim, the

Special Envoy to Sri Lanka during the fifth peace process:

“If the parties that created the conflict, also manage to resolve it, the solution tends to be

much more stable than if it is resolved through various kinds of pressure by a third party”

Interview, Solheim (Rupesinghe, 2006: 334)

48

The strategies that Norway employed in the negotiating room did however have an impact on

the parties. Norway’s role was to try to persuade the parties to see the rationality in ending the

conflict. Portraying the positive outcomes of a negotiated settlement was one of the main

responsibilities in addition to aiding communication. One factor that might have given

Norway a better ability to persuade and affect the parties would have been if the

understanding of the complex conflict and politics had been better. Then Norway could have

foreseen the obstacles in the process better and planned for how to handle them. The collapse

of the peace process was mainly due to disagreements between the President and the Prime

Minister. A political will for solution was of the essence and was present for a while. When

the President was bypassed in the signing of the CFA, that was great mistake that created a lot

of bad feeling and soured the situation. This is a lesson for Norway’s further engagement in

peacemaking. The focus is often on moving quickly to find a solution and ending disruptive

conflict behavior in such processes, but a different approach might give more sustainable

results. One of Norway’s possibilities for improvement lies in moving away from a rational

approach and in trying to appeal to the reason of the parties, to a more dynamic approach.

Viewing conflict as a dynamic approach that takes a long time to solve will produce better

conditions for lasting resolution of conflicts.

5.5 Norway as a small state mediator and the geo- politics of the region

Being a small state, like Norway, can be an advantage in terms of credibility when engaging

in peacemaking. It can also have its challenges. Norway was perhaps not aware of the

prominent position they would be in, when they decided to engage as a peace broker in Sri

Lanka. In many ways, Norway was alone in Sri Lanka. They had the backing of the Co-

Chairs, as mentioned before, but in terms of public appearance, they remained alone. As

mentioned, this created problems in how Norway was viewed and a lot of pressure was put on

them in terms of the outcome of the process. As a small state, Norway lacks power and

leverage. A possible way of solving this could have been to bring in another party that was

stronger, to back Norway and to compliment the tools Norway had to affect the parties.

India has played a large role in this conflict since the start because of its power in the region

and its historical connections with Sri Lanka. India also had its role in the choice of Norway

as a mediator. India has great influence in Sri Lanka and could have resisted if a more

49

powerful Western mediator had been brought in to broker the peace talks. Politicians in India

have traditionally advocated resistance to great- power mediation. It was in India’s interest to

have a small soft- powered mediator and not a powerful mediator that could challenge India’s

position in the region. India could have played a larger role in co- operation with Norway.

This is an aspect that can still be explored in finding a resolution to the conflict in Sri Lanka.

The ultimate responsibility of the outcome of the peace process of course lies with the parties

to the conflict, but the mediation strategies employed also have an important effect on the

process and its possible outcomes. Norway did not manage to convince the parties that the

benefits of solving the conflict were greater than the benefits of pursuing further conflict.

Alternative strategies from India, in particular, and the Co- Chairs might have created an

environment for a different outcome. Norway has stated that they want more co- operation

with larger actors in future peacemaking involvements. Hanssen- Bauer has stated this on

Norway’s further engagement as a peace broker:

“Norway will continue to arrange meetings and facilitate communication between parties in

smaller conflicts. But when it comes to larger conflicts, Norway wishes to co- operate with

other parties”

Interview, Hanssen- Bauer

Chapter 6: Conclusion and recommendations This study has assessed Norway’s general approach to peacemaking and its efforts in the

peacemaking in Sri Lanka. This has been done through using three research questions to

guide the research. One of the research questions were to reveal if there was a Norwegian

approach to peacemaking and then to look at how this was applied in Sri Lanka. The second

was examining the conduct of the Norwegian mediators and assessing if it suited an

appropriate mediator conduct. The third was to examine Norway’s responses to challenges

and developments in the fifth peace process, from 2000- 2003. Conclusions and

recommendations related to this will now follow.

In terms of theoretical approaches to conflict resolution, policymakers in Norway have

traditionally viewed conflict as a rational calculation by the actors in the conflict. The concept

of rationality entails that the parties will end a war if it is a rational choice. In this way the

parties can be influenced by outside forces to see the rationality in ending the conflict. This

50

type of realist or neo-realist thinking is now changing. Policymakers are opening up for a

more dynamic view of conflict. According to the rational calculation approach, timing is

important and the focus is on seizing opportunities and a few, determined actors do this. This

is in many ways an appropriate description of Norway’s earlier approach to peacemaking, as

in the Middle East. Using a rational approach to conflict resolution is outdated. More focus on

conflict dynamics and bottom up processes should be introduced in foreign policies on

international peacemaking. This study found that Norway is interested in changing its

approach to peacemaking, as shown in the fourth chapter. A more dynamic view of conflict

resolution is a field where Norway wants to develop more knowledge on how it would work

in practice and how Norway could help such a process. Conflict transformation requires the

change of the society, not only the parties engaging in war activities. More inclusiveness is

needed and a focus on addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, before a resolution

can be found.

The fifth peace process in Sri Lanka collapsed because of inability of the parties to

compromise. The parties should take responsibility for this. At the same time, Norway has

some responsibility in affecting the process and its outcome. The Norwegian mediators

employed facilitation strategies that focused on improving the flow of communication

between the parties to the conflict. Strictly focusing on being a messenger between the parties

is not realistic. As a mediator employing facilitation strategies, Norway had the possibility to

affect the parties through showing how ending the conflict would give both parties more

benefits than if they stayed in conflict with each other. Norway also had a direct

responsibility in the mistake that was made in bypassing the President in the signing of the

ceasefire agreement. This was due to Norway looking for a quick solution to end the conflict

behavior. It was in many ways a rushed decision and perhaps one was not informed enough

on the political effects such an action could have. The personal conflict between the President

and the Prime Minister, who were from different political parties, became in many ways the

downfall of the peace process. This could have been prevented by the Norwegian mediators.

In this lies a need to foresee obstacles to the peace process. To do this, the mediator have to

have a thorough understanding of the conflict and its context and actors. Changes in the

actors’ motives and in the context are also important, for a mediator to understand the

implications of what the parties agree on. There is little doubt that mistakes also were made

by the mediators in they way they handled the media and in the way they handled their

51

interactions with the LTTE, not realizing this would affect their appearance as an impartial

mediator.

As shown in the fifth chapter, it is clear that Norway has to improve its strategies in peace

brokering. Norway can not be afraid of criticism in having a role as a peace broker. If Norway

develops strategies on how to handle and prevent criticism, this would make the mediating

role easier. More leverage should also be used and the cooperation with stronger parties

should be explored as a way to get both the strengths of the weak facilitator and the strong

mediator. Impartiality must be upheld as a continuous process and also in evaluating how

Norway is perceived in the countries where it engages as a peace broker. Norway must review

the applicability of niche diplomacy in the furtherance of the country’s national identity and

interests. A great deal of the criticism against Norway in Sri Lanka is due to the ambiguity of

its role. Norway should clearly state its role, both officially and perhaps in terms of strategy

before entering into such a role. The limitations of a strictly facilitating role should be stated

and communicated to stakeholders. Norway can also choose to play a larger role, beyond the

facilitation strategies. In this case, Norway needs to seek greater leverage over the parties and

can possibly do this through co- operation with larger regional or international actors.

In terms of seeking peace in Sri Lanka, this study suggests a change in approach. More parties

need to be included in the process. Attempts for peace need to be part of a larger project of

state reform and good governance. Human rights abuses are a major issue here, as there are

serious violations by both parties. Good governance needs to be addressed in changing the

political system with reforms, to get rid of the flawed and elitist system, which helps

suppression of minorities. Power sharing in some form should be considered in relation to the

LTTE and the areas in the North and the East. A new society needs to be built on more

inclusive terms in Sri Lanka. This is a process that will take time and the actors involved in

this have to realize this fact.

52

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