implications of a changing nato

862019 Implications of a Changing NATO

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullimplications-of-a-changing-nato 161

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the US Army WarCollege and is the strategic level study agent for issues related tonational security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrate-gic analysis

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategicstudies that develop policy recommendations on

bull Strategy planning and policy for joint and combinedemployment of military forces

bull Regional strategic appraisals

bull The nature of land warfare

bull Matters affecting the Armyrsquos future

bull The concepts philosophy and theory of strategy and

bull Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topicshaving strategic implications for the Army the Department of De-fense and the larger national security community

In addition to its studies SSI publishes special reports on topics ofspecial or immediate interest These include edited proceedings ofconferences and topically-oriented roundtables expanded trip re-

ports and quick reaction responses to senior Army leadersThe Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within theArmy to address strategic and other issues in support of Army par-ticipation in national security policy formulation



IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING NATO

Phillip R Cuccia

May 2010

The views expressed in this report are those of the au-

thor and do not necessarily reect the ofcial policyor position of the Department of the Army the De-partment of Defense or the US Government Authorsof Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoyfull academic freedom provided they do not discloseclassied information jeopardize operations securityor misrepresent ofcial US policy Such academicfreedom empowers them to offer new and sometimescontroversial perspectives in the interest of furtheringdebate on key issues This report is cleared for publicrelease distribution is unlimited

This publication is subject to Title 17 United StatesCode Sections 101 and 105 It is in the public domainand may not be copyrighted

Visit our website for other free publicationdownloads

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To rate this publication click here



ii

Several people made key contributions to this monograph anddeserve special recognition Dr Steven Metz provided guidancedirection encouragement and an excellent critical review of thedraft I am greatly indebted to him for his help I also want to thankRaymond Millen Sherwood McGuinnes Stephen Blank JohnDabrowski Alan Stolberg Robert Dorff Paul Massel and MarkTocher for reading reviewing and making excellent suggestions tothe monograph Collectively they represent decades of NATO ex-

perience and I am truly grateful for their insights and constructivecomments Any shortcomings in the work are mine alone

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to Director Strategic Studies Institute US ArmyWar College 122 Forbes Ave Carlisle PA 17013-5244

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may bedownloaded free of charge from the SSI website Hard copiesof this report may also be obtained free of charge by placingan order on the SSI website The SSI website address is wwwStrategicStudiesInstitutearmymil

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewsletter to update the national security community on the re-search of our analysts recent and forthcoming publications andupcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute Each newslet-ter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our researchanalysts If you are interested in receiving this newsletter pleasesubscribe on the SSI website at wwwStrategicStudiesInstitutearmymilnewsletter

ISBN 1-58487-446-5



iii

FOREWORD

This timely Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) mono-graph on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-nization (NATO) provides senior diplomatic-militaryleaders a clear picture of the impact to expect from thenew NATO Strategic Concept The NATO StrategicConcept will be released at the end of this year at the

summit in Lisbon Portugal The author LieutenantColonel Phillip R Cuccia argues that getting the newNATO Strategic Concept right is imperative not onlyfor the US participation and goals within the Alliancebut for the health of the Alliance itself By looking atexternal and internal NATO threats Lieutenant Col-onel Cuccia argues that the biggest threat to NATO

now is the ldquointernal threatrdquo caused by the absence ofconsensus over what the perceived ldquoexternal threatrdquoto NATO is

This monograph focuses on recent trends withinthe Alliance and their implications It provides seniormilitary and political leaders with a discussion ofthese trends and the changing composition (politicalgeography) of the NATO nations and how that could

impact the nature of the AllianceThe monograph goes beyond merely explaining

the problems NATO faces In addition to examiningthe problem Lieutenant Colonel Cuccia explores fourpossible scenarios for the future of NATO and recom-mends conceptual solutions which he argues shouldbe included in the new NATO Strategic Concept

The outcome of the new Strategic Concept willshape the Atlantic as well as the global strategic en-vironment well into the future The Strategic Studies



iv

Institute is pleased to offer this insightful monographas a contribution to the debate on this important At-

lantic security issue

DOUGLAS C LOVELACE JRDirectorStrategic Studies Institute



v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PHILLIP R CUCCIA is currently assigned as the Di-rector of European Studies in the Regional StrategyDepartment of the Strategic Studies Institute He grad-uated from the US Military Academy in 1989 wascommissioned as an armor ofcer and has held a va-riety of command and staff assignments in GermanySaudi Arabia Iraq Haiti and the continental UnitedStates After teaching Military History at the USMilitary Academy Lieutenant Colonel Cuccia trans-ferred to the Foreign Area Ofcer functional area andserved as an assistant Political Advisor and PlanningOfcer at the NATO Joint Forces South Headquartersin Naples Italy His most recent assignment was as

Operations Chief of the Ofce of Defense Cooperationat the US Embassy to Italy Lieutenant Colonel Cuc-cia holds a MA and PhD in Military and EuropeanHistory from Florida State University





vii

SUMMARY

NATO ofcials plan to unveil the new North At-lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Strategic Conceptduring the Alliancersquos summit in Portugal at the endof 2010 This monograph focuses on the impact thatthe Strategic Concept will have on the Alliance Thisanalysis describes recent trends within NATO andtheir implications and provides senior military andpolitical leaders with a discussion of the changingcomposition of the NATO nations and the impact ofthese changes on the nature of the Alliance The mono-graph describes four possible scenarios of what NATOcould look like in the future so as to give senior leadersthoughts to consider while instituting NATO policy

In terms of NATO relevance the prevailingthought at the close of the Cold War was that NATO

needed to nd a suitable common threat to substitutefor the former Soviet Union That role was initiallylled by the threat of destabilization with the crisis inthe Balkans and then by the NATO response to Sep-tember 11 2001 (911) and global terrorism NATOrsquosresponse was guided by a Strategic Concept written in1999 which did not directly address global terrorismThe Strategic Concept was supplemented in 2006 withthe Comprehensive Political Guidance which pro-vided a framework and political direction for NATOrsquoscontinuing transformation and set priorities for all Al-liance capability issues for the following 10 to 15 years

The NATO Alliance has now reached its 60th birth-day and is currently in the middle of updating andrewriting the new Strategic Concept The Alliance

which has grown to 28 countries is facing problemswith changing demographics an awkward relation-ship with Russia a war in Afghanistan and threats



viii

of global jihad Muslim immigration into Europe andpopulation aging will have a great impact on Euro-

pean views of the Alliance NATO must decide howclosely it wants to work and coordinate with Russia infuture endeavors The most important issue at hand ishow NATO is going to fare coming out of the war inAfghanistan The desired NATO outcome needs to bedened clearly It is imperative that the New StrategicConcept address NATO goals in Afghanistan and theways and means of accomplishing those goals De-ned goals will give member nations objectives whileformulating national defense plans Getting the Stra-tegic Concept right is the rst step in maintaining thehealth of the Alliance

This monograph examines four possible futurescenarios for NATO the US leadership relation-ship with NATO continues on the same path the US

leadership in NATO increases the European Union(EU) leadership in NATO increases and the NATOAlliance breaks apart The scenarios present a rangeof short- and long-term challenges for the future Theprominent short-term challenge is consensus on the2010 Strategic Concept If well thought out it will setthe conditions for both short- and long-term success

NATO must decide whether to ldquogo globalrdquo or con-centrate on the collective defense of Europe But thoseoptions are not mutually exclusive US policymakersmust ensure that NATO policy toward Russia is clearNATOrsquos relationship with Russia must be based onopenness both when the two sides agree and whenthey disagree The new Strategic Concept must iden-tify NATO goals in Afghanistan and indicate how

they will be attained The biggest threat to NATO nowis the ldquointernal threatrdquo caused by the absence of con-sensus over what the perceived ldquoexternal threatrdquo toNATO is



1


Everything has to change in order for everything to stay thesame1

Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampeduse

ldquoTransformationrdquo has been a major North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) theme ever since the cre-

ation of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) atthe 2002 Prague Summit2 Due to the accelerating paceof technological political and social changes think-ing about the future of NATO is now more importantthan ever Its very relevance is at stake ACT the in-stitution responsible for studying and recommendingchanges within NATO has as its vision statement thatit is ldquoNATOrsquos leading agent for change driving fa-cilitating and advocating continuous improvement ofAlliance capabilities to maintain and enhance the mili-tary relevance and effectiveness of the Alliancerdquo3 Butexecution of the changes ACT recommends dependsupon the political wishes and collective views of theindividual sovereign governments which compriseNATO The operative question is what changes are

necessary for the transatlantic relationship to functionin the 21st century

NATO is indeed changing In August 2009 thenew Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen an-nounced in his rst press conference that by trans-forming the way NATO does business he wants tosee ldquoNATO reach its full potential as a pillar of globalsecurityrdquo4 His statement is rife with implications Itacknowledges that NATO must continue to trans-form in order to reach its full potential in the area ofglobal security It describes NATO as a global security



2

organization This means it must look outside of itsgeographic borders to consider a wider range of se-

curity and that it is no longer simply a trans-Atlanticalliance It also implies that NATO will work withother security organizations in a global effort as sev-eral pillars rely on one another to support a massivestructure How then will the United States formulatepolicy in the future with regards to this growing taskwhich NATO is taking on

The NATO Alliance celebrated its 60th birthdayin April 2009 and is currently in the middle of updat-ing and rewriting a new Strategic Concept which willbe unveiled at the NATO summit in Portugal in late2010 This reassessment is timely History shows thatan alliance of nations cannot exist without a commonenemy or at least the perception of a common threatThe alliance that defeated Napoleon in 1814 began

to break up soon after the French emperor abdicatedand was exiled to Elba and then quickly reassembledwhen Napoleon returned to Paris reaching its highpoint with the battle of Waterloo Once again afterthe Congress of Vienna in 1815 the alliance slowly be-gan to break apart when Napoleon ldquothe threatrdquo wasexiled to St Helena The alliance which the congresscreated however dened the geopolitical structure inEurope until 1848 when a wave of revolutions sweptEurope and put an end to that alliance structure Thatalliance failed to adapt to the changes taking place inEurope which were clearly visible beginning with therevolutions of 1830 The main structural change whichtook place was within the countries themselves Theldquothreatrdquo was from within The alliance faltered and

became irrelevantIn terms of NATO relevance the prevailing thought

at the close of the Cold War was that NATO needed



3

to nd a suitable common threat to substitute for theformer Soviet Union That role was initially lled by

the threat of destabilization with the crisis in the Bal-kans and then by the NATO response to the events ofSeptember 11 2001 (911) and global terrorism Butwill the current substitute for the former threat prevailin holding NATO together Or is there a developingthreat to the existence of NATO from within Alterna-tively could the divisions over the approach to coun-tering global terrorism and the lackluster response toRussiarsquos invasion of Georgia be simply a symptom ofNATOrsquos growing pains Some analysis and ldquofutur-ingrdquo is in order

NATO-sponsored thinking about its own futurehas been led by the ACT-sponsored Multiple FuturesProject (MFP) In addition the NATO Research andTechnology Organization (RTO) leads the Joint Op-

erations 2030 project5

Nationally US organizationsconducting research concerning the future of NATOinclude the Atlantic Council of the United States theCenter for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)of the National Defense University the Center forTransatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins UniversitySchool of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) andthe Heritage Foundation6 Other NATO countrieslikewise have institutions conducting similar researchon the future of NATO of which the Danish Institutefor International Studies7 the Estonian InternationalCentre for Defence Studies and the Royal United Ser-vices Institute are just a few8 These organizations andothers as well as many individuals have produceda vast array of studies and opinions concerning what

lies ahead for NATO9

This monograph will capitalize on that body ofresearch and present four future scenarios for con-



4

sideration along with recommendations for a wayahead First however the lead section will present a

current snapshot of NATO by examining the currentstate of affairs within NATO and its partners todayThe analysis will then extend into the near future toexamine what is in store for the current NATO mem-bers Then it will look at potential threats to NATOThese are divided into external and internal threatsIn this regard the analysis will take into considerationthe awkward relationship NATO has had with Rus-sia since the 911 attacks It will also look at NATOin Afghanistan and the threat of the global jihadistsIn the second section NATO futures studies will bedescribed and four futures which look out to the year2025 will be presented Conclusions and recommen-dations are given in the third section

NATO IN CONTEXT

Current State of Affairs within the NATO Alliance

The year 2009 saw some signicant changes forNATO For the rst time in the history of the Alliancethe military commander came from the Navy with theUS selection of Admiral James Stavridis as SupremeAllied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Even moresignicant was the selection of a French general asSupreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)In March France rejoined NATOrsquos Integrated MilitaryStructure (IMS) ending a 43-year anomaly initiatedby President Charles de Gaulle

Today NATO may not be performing as the well-

oiled machine that most wish it would be but it cer-tainly is performing a lot better than it was in 2002and 2003 which was clearly one of the most difcult



5

periods of its 60 years of existence Just 2 months afterNATO declared an Article 5 emergency for the rst

time in its history in response to the terrorist attacksof 911 the United States turned aside offers of as-sistance for the invasion of Afghanistan because ofthe perception of lack of political will to employ forceat effective levels In addition some European forceslacked the precision strike capabilities desired even ifthe political will was present to use those weaponsEuropean partners became embarrassed as they wereeffectively marginalized This embarrassment in partled to the 2002 Prague Summit decision to create ACTand launch the NATO Response Force (NRF) but thecontentious intra-Alliance debate over the invasion ofIraq soon caused ssures between the USUK sub-coalition and its German and French counterpart10 In addition diverging views on addressing terror-

ism began to appear publicly in the United States andsome European NATO countries This conformed tothe traditional view of many European countries thatterrorism was more a law enforcement issue than amilitary one Therefore for these countries internalsecurity trumps collective defense and Article 5 hasless signicance For example after the Madrid terror-ist train bombing killed 191 and wounded more than1400 in 2004 Spain did not want to invoke Article 5but instead increased its interior ministry budget11

The Alliance settled on a limited role in Iraq with asmall training mission12 Afghanistan was its priorityThe next time that the Alliance was pressed on a majordecision with regard to an ongoing war was duringthe Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 NATO did

not come to a unied decision for action on the Geor-gia issue Consensus by NATO remains dependent oneach individual member countryrsquos foreign policy



6

NATOrsquos response to such events is made morecomplicated by the fact that its charter was written in

1949 at the beginning of the Cold War It is also guid-ed by a Strategic Concept written in 1999mdash2 years be-fore 911mdashwhich did not address directly the threatof global terrorism13 This Strategic Concept wassupplemented in November 2006 at the Riga Summitwith the endorsement of the Comprehensive PoliticalGuidance (CPG) The CPG provided a framework andpolitical direction for NATOrsquos continuing transforma-tion and set out the priorities for all Alliance capabil-ity issues for the following 10 to 15 years14

NATO Countries Today

With the last round of additions in 2009 (Albaniaand Croatia) NATO has grown to 28 countries and

the door remains open for further expansion NATO isready to invite the Former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-donia into the fold as soon as a mutually acceptablename for that country is agreed to within the UnitedNations (UN)15 In addition Bosnia-HerzegovinaMontenegro and Serbia aspire to become membersand at Bucharest Romania in April 2008 NATO wel-comed the Ukrainersquos and Georgiarsquos desire for mem-bership The summit declaration stated ldquoWe agreedtoday that these countries will become members ofNATOrdquo16 Four months later Russia invaded Georgiaand recognized the breakaway provinces of Abkhaziaand South Ossetia Russiarsquos move effectively preventsGeorgia from joining NATO with its current bordersas recognized by the UN

The 28 nations making up todayrsquos NATO varyin their geography history and national concepts ofsuch things as human rights and views of national and



7

collective defense These differences drive their deci-sions on what organizations they join and how they

contribute to those organizations Figure 1 representscountries which are currently members of NATO theEU the Partnership for Peace (PfP) the Common-wealth of Independent States (CIS) the Collective Se-curity Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO) All of the states inFigure 1 are members of the Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with the excep-tion of China17 While Moscow works to keep the CISwithin its sphere of inuence it is important to notethat all members of the CIS including Russia are alsomembers of the PfP Moscowrsquos inuence however iscontested The presidents of CIS countries UzbekistanTajikistan and associate member Turkmenistan optednot to attend the October 9 2009 CIS Summit in Mol-

dova18

The Ukraine which was one of the three char-ter members of the CIS is no longer ofcially a mem-ber but maintains participant status Georgia left theorganization altogether in August 2009 As far back as2006 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvilirsquos ofceannounced that ldquoGeorgia has taken a course to joinNATO and it cannot be part of two military structuressimultaneouslyrdquo19

If the Ukraine and Georgia do join NATO thenthey will fall into the geo-political alliance structureof those states outside of the EU but within NATOthe United States Turkey Norway Iceland CroatiaCanada and Albania Unlike Estonia Latvia andLithuania they will be the only former Soviet Repub-lics to be part of NATO but not the EU Ukraine and

Georgia then might try to join the EU following in thefootsteps of other former Soviet Republics and EasternBloc countries which went through the same process



8

Figure 1 NATO and the System of Alliances

NATO today has grown considerably and is quitedifferent in its composition from the original 12 char-ter members The newer members have taken theirplace along with the older members in NATOrsquos cur-

rent struggles In a recent Strategic Studies Institute(SSI) study titled New NATO Members Security Con-sumers or Producers Joel Hillison builds on the Dep-uty Secretary General of NATO Ambassador ClaudioBisognierorsquos statement that ldquoburden-sharing is rstand foremost a political issue and has to do with po-litical willrdquo20 Hillison points out that given currenttrends ldquonew member states will be eager to contrib-

ute to the alliance but will be constrained by politicaland military capability shortfallsrdquo21 This will affectburden-sharing decisions With NATO-Russian rela-



9

tions deteriorating many Alliance members have be-come more sensitive to Moscowrsquos increased military

expenditures especially after the invasion of GeorgiaHillison sees two possible outcomes The rst is thatas insecurity and dissension increase NATO mem-bers may become polarized between those seekingto work with Russia on a range of issues and thosewishing to take a more rm stand The second pos-sibility is that the newer Alliance members may shifttheir focus toward territorial defense at the expense ofexpeditionary NATO missions22

NATO Countries in the FutureChanging Demographics

The Alliancersquos members are also changing in-ternally This may create challenges for the EU and

NATO alike According to the Global Trends 2025 sur-vey Western Europersquos Muslim population is between15 and 18 million23 Francersquos population was 8 percentMuslim in 200324 Most demographers predict that theMuslim population in Europe will grow to at least 10percent by 202025 This trend will have a great impacton ldquoOld Europerdquo given that many of the Eastern EUcountries have negligible Muslim populations Thischange will no doubt affect the body politic withinthese countries in the future26 Muslim integration inEurope will likely increase sensitivity to the potentialdomestic repercussions of policies in the Middle Eastwhich include aligning too closely with the UnitedStates on actions viewed as pro-Israel27

Some may be tempted to use statistics to argue that

religion will not have an effect on the future relation-ship between the United States and Europe withinNATO For example a 2008 survey demonstrated that



10

religion does not necessarily shape views of transat-lantic ties Turkish responses indicated that there was

little difference in the desirability of EU leader-ship among those who pray ve times a day regularly(21) sometimes (23) or never (24) nor in the de-sirability of US leadership among those who pray vetimes a day regularly (6) sometimes (9) or never(7) Additionally there were small differences inthe percentages of those who viewed EU membershipas a good thing among those who pray ve times a

day regularly (41) sometimes (41) or never (45)and in those who felt NATO is essential among thosewho pray ve times a day regularly (34) sometimes(39) or never (40)28

But one must be careful with these statistics Thepurpose of the section was to describe only Turkeyrsquosrelationship with the United States EU and the Alli-

ance29

NATO is viewed negatively in the Middle East

This stems from the collective Arab public view thatNATO has no separate identity from that of the West-ern powers which compose the Alliance30 Anotherfactor contributing to that negative image is the factthat Turkey is part of the Alliance Although Turkeyis predominantly Muslim and geographically bothEuropean and Middle Eastern its NATO membershipdoes not improve the Arab view of NATO This is be-cause Turkey is an avowed secular state (which wouldexplain the ambivalent statistics above) and becauseTurkey has had its own imperial dominance in the re-gion when it ruled the area as the Ottoman Empire31

Therefore future NATO political decisions toward a

skeptical Middle East may be shaped by a proportion-ally increasing Muslim population within the NATOcountries making the decisions Already according



11

to Jeffrey Simon of the Institute for National StrategicStudies at the National Defense University ldquoMuslim

immigration has contributed to European NATOrsquosincreasing focus on internal security (rather than de-fense) and will likely have an impact on Europersquos po-litical relations with the external Islamic worldrdquo32

The pace of population aging has brought the de-veloped countriesmdashwith the exception of the UnitedStates and a few othersmdashto a demographic ldquotippingpointrdquo Almost 7 of every 10 people in these developedcountries are in the traditional working years (ages 15to 64) This is the highest level ever and according toexperts it is likely that it will never be so high againIn most developed countries the ratio of seniors (age65 and older) to the working-age population will growat the fastest rate during the next 2 decades (2010s and2020s) This will in turn increase the nancial strain on

senior benet programs In 2010 there will be roughlyone senior for every four working-age people in thesedeveloped countries and this ratio will increase to oneto three or higher by 2025 In Western Europe pre-dictions show that the United Kingdom (UK) FranceBelgium the Netherlands and the Nordic countrieswill likely maintain the highest fertility rates but willremain below two children per woman The rest ofWestern Europe probably will stay below the 15 childper woman fertility ratemdashfar below the replacementlevel of 21 children per woman33 This overall changein the population of Europe will have an effect on thepolitical makeup of the countries As more money isdiverted to care for the elderly less money may beavailable for defense budgets

The overall declining population of Europe becauseof the low fertility rate will also affect the makeup ofthe military structures within the countries of the al-



12

liance Given current trends the US working popu-lation will increase from 186 million in 2005 to 255

million in 205034

In stark contrast European NATOmembers will experience a population decline and arise in median age to 47 in 2050 The number of peopleat the age for military service will fall considerablyand some European allies may have to make signi-cant changes to be able to maintain a viable military35

The political leaders of NATO countries in the fu-ture will make decisions based on the composition oftheir electorates which will reect the demographicpredictions outlined here A shrinking and aging elec-torate in European countries could result in smallerarmies and more money devoted toward senior medi-cal programs A growing Muslim population wouldmore than likely inuence decisions about NATOrsquosapproach toward intervention in predominately Mus-

lim countries This will have an impact on the num-ber and location of NATO out-of-area operationsIt is probable that the Muslim electorate in Europewould discourage those NATO out-of-area militaryoperations viewed as anti-Muslim The views of thecollective electorate may even cause the policymakersto cast doubt on the need for NATO as a collectivesecurity organization and thus present a threat fromwithin to NATOrsquos continued existence

Potential Threats to NATO

Threats to NATO can be conceptualized as twotypes The rst external are nations or a collectionthereof which threaten war or at least ill will to-

ward the NATO nations Another external threat isinstability of a nonmember state which challengesNATO members directly (Afghanistan) or indirectly



13

(Kosovo) or potentially destabilizes an area of con-cern (Sudan) The second type internal comes from

an event political decision or series of these whichthreatens the integrity of the Alliance This secondtype is a much more serious threat NATO out-of-areastability operations are debated within the AllianceThe question is what level of force is NATO willingto engage to conduct these operations NATO hashad its problems with caveats and the level of kineticforce it is willing to employ It is time that the mem-ber states accept that NATO is an entity of 28 nationswhere decisions are based on consensus NATO has toacknowledge that there is little political will in manymember states to use kinetic force in these out-of-areaoperations NATO can agree however that it can con-tribute much in the area of humanitarian assistance inthese operations

The biggest threat to NATO now is the ldquointernalthreatrdquo of the absence of consensus over what the per-ceived ldquoexternal threatrdquo to NATO is The most pressingcurrent threat to NATOrsquos existence is clearly the ongoingwar in Afghanistanmdashnot the impending destruction ofNATO forces on the battleeld but the weakening ofthe Alliance over the political controversy associatedwith a way forward in Afghanistan

Some states appear to be a threat to NATO but inreality do not rise to that status The SCO establishedin 2001 has been touted as an anti-Western alliancespringing up in the middle of Eurasia to provide themember states Russia and China an opportunity forregional dominance if they convince India and Iran to join But this is far-fetched as the SCO has not become

more than the sum of its partsmdashtwo of the largestcountries in the world The SCO is not like NATO asit is not an alliance and it has no permanently commit-



14

ted military capabilities or command arrangements36 It is better described as an intergovernmental mutu-

al-security organization which conducts combinedmilitary exercises The next exercise entitled ldquoPeaceMission 2010rdquo will be held in Southern Kazakhstan37

Russia sees the SCO as a useful tool to advance itsinterests in Central Asia Moscow which remainsdeeply suspicious of Beijing shares only a few goalswith China in Central Asia China has been contentto let Russia and the United States provide militarysecurity in the region while it focuses on its economicprogram38 Iran has observer status in the SCO and hassought to join it while picking up support from bothMoscow and Beijing39 The SCO could become moremenacing but this is not likely

An apparently stronger argument for a potentialrival to NATO in the form of a bona de military al-

liancemdashwhich also involves Russiamdashis the CSTOThis organization chartered in 2002 grew out of anearlier arrangement introduced in 1992 as a collectivesecurity organization for the CIS (see Figure 1) Witha history of states joining and leaving the organiza-tion it now consists of Armenia Belarus KazakhstanKyrgystan Russia Tajikistan and Uzbekistan40 OnFebruary 4 2009 Russian President Dmitry Medve-dev announced that the CSTO would set up a rapid-reaction force based in Russia and that it would be just as good as comparable NATO forces41 Howeverthe CSTOrsquos rst Rapid Reaction exercise for their Col-lective Operational Reaction Force (CORF) got off to adiscouraging start in August 2009 because of deep di-visions concerning the creation use and development

of the force42 Uzbekistan refused to send any troops tothe CSTO and also scaled back on an SCO military ex-ercise43 More recently however the Russian business



15

daily Kommersant reported that Moscow had made apotential diplomatic breakthrough in that the CSTO

intends to sign an agreement with the UN within 18months that would allow the CSTO to act beyond itsborders in future joint peacekeeping and counterter-rorist operations The CSTO Secretary General evenstated that this might draw the organization closer toNATO The plan similar to the NATO-UN agreementsigned in 2008 allows cooperation across a spectrumof security issues which include counternarcoticsglobal terrorism transnational crime arms trafck-ing and peace-support operations Although Moscowwants to limit NATO expansion eastward it has pro-posed CSTO-NATO cooperation which the Alliancehas been unwilling to accept A UN-CSTO agreementmight open the door for future CSTO-NATO coopera-tion Moscow as the leader of the CSTO wants it to

cooperate with others including the EU the OSCEand NATO The CSTO therefore is not a real threatto NATO44

Any effective counteralliance would strengthenNATO The competing alliance would provide thevisible potential threat against which NATO couldrally In a way the emerging alliance would ll thevoid left by the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc Butfor the near future this is unlikely Let us now exam-ine some threats to NATO from internal sources

The development of differing views concerning security priorities among the NATO nations undoubt-edly poses the greatest threat to NATO as an alliance Such development can be viewed as a threat fromwithin One of the predominant threats in this area is

the divergent view on what constitutes an Article 5ldquoarmed attackrdquo For clarity Article 5 states



16

The Parties agree that an armed attack against oneor more of them in Europe or North America shall beconsidered an attack against them all and consequent-ly they agree that if such an armed attack occurseach of them in exercise of the right of individual orcollective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of theCharter of the United Nations will assist the Party orParties so attacked by taking forthwith individuallyand in concert with the other Parties such action as itdeems necessary including the use of armed force torestore and maintain the security of the North Atlanticarea Any such armed attack and all measures takenas a result thereof shall immediately be reported to theSecurity Council Such measures shall be terminatedwhen the Security Council has taken the measuresnecessary to restore and maintain international peaceand security45

Given the pace of developing technology cyberattacks have become more pervasive The 2006 Com-

prehensive Political Guidance acknowledged that theevolving security environment will put a premiumon improvements ldquoto protect information systems ofcritical importance to the Alliance against cyber at-tacksrdquo46 The next logical step is for NATO to clearlydene what it views as a ldquocyber attackrdquo and to inte-grate that view into the new Strategic Concept

In addition the NATO discussion concerning secu-rity priorities and potential threats needs to work to-ward a common understanding of what constitutes aterrorist attack meriting retaliation The operative ques-tion should be ldquowhat has changed to warrant reformrdquo

The political predominance of the United Statesin Western Europe which symbolized the Cold Wardid not seem to change much during the process of

European integration after the Maastricht Treaty of1992 This consolidation was slow but deliberate inmaturation However the EU lacked the ability to act



17

as a bloc toward the conict in the former Yugosla-via on its own Later the 2003 US intervention in Iraq

demonstrated that individual European nations werenot like-minded as the United States had hoped SomeEuropean states participated some remained neutraland some actively opposed the ldquoCoalition of the Will-ingrdquo47 The rupture seemed to heal somewhat withthe NATO operation in Afghanistan but the potentialfor major differences between Europe and the UnitedStates persists particularly concerning relations withRussia48

The Awkward Relationship with Russia

Russia is currently undergoing a dramatic popula-tion implosion while its oil production growth uctu-ates and its ability to meet natural gas contracts weak-

ens Given these conditions Russia may invest in itssociety and transform its economy from within or itmay seek outside help Alternatively it may continueits traditional method of deecting attention frominternal problems by emphasizing external threatsIf Russia tries a combination of these two diverse ap-proaches it will become less predictable in its foreignrelations49 NATO must take this into considerationAs recently as August 3 2009 the new Secretary Gen-eral of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated in hisrst press conference that next to success in Afghani-stan his second priority is NATO-Russia relations50

Following the 911 attacks Russian PresidentVladimir Putin offered Russian support to the USght against terrorism which further opened the door

to NATO-Russian discussions In May 2002 the Alli-ance formed the NATO-Russia Council which madeprogress in the area of joint peacekeeping but little



18

improvement on issues such as proliferation51 The re-lationship was originally outlined in the 1997 NATO-

Russia Founding Act and solidied at the 2002 RomeDeclaration In 2008 relations broke down followingRussian attacks on Georgia and Moscowrsquos subsequentrecognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regionsof Georgia as independent states As recently as the2009 Summit NATO vocally condemned Russia forthese actions52

NATOrsquos awkward relationship with Russia con-stantly shifts The September 2009 White House deci-sion to scrap the missile shield in the NATO nationsof Poland and the Czech Republic led to greater coop-eration in dealing with Iranrsquos aggressive nuclear pro-gram53 Whether or not this will last is uncertain Theannouncement demonstrated NATOrsquos willingness tolink the United States NATO and Russian missile

defense systems in the future It also encouraged theRussian Federation to take advantage of US missiledefense cooperation proposals54 The day after Presi-dent Barack Obama halted the East European MissileDefense Plan Ramussen stated ldquowe should explorethe potential for linking the US NATO and Russianmissile defense systems at an appropriate timerdquo55

NATO-Russia Theater Missile Defense as a conceptwas agreed to as early as 1997 in the NATO-RussiaFounding Act56

It is highly questionable whether or not Russiatruly wants a comprehensive partnership with NATOThe Russian political-military elite continue to viewNATO and the United States for that matter as ad-versaries even though Russian leaders speak posi-

tively about a NATO-Russia partnership57 In fact thesystemic Russian problem of geopolitical rivalry inEurasia never fully subsided and therefore its true at-



19

titude toward the NATO relationship is ambivalence58

One recurring question is whether NATO should in-

vite Russia to join The question is unnecessary In2005 Putin praised the NATO-Russia relationship yetstated that Russia could not join NATO because doingso would threaten Russiarsquos sovereignty and restrictits freedom of action59 The Russian-Georgian warin August 2008 stopped discussion on this issue andended nearly 2 decades of Western attempts to recre-ate a transatlantic security environment with Russiaas the easternmost pillar60 This war came on the heelsof Moscowrsquos decision to suspend participation in theConventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to protestNATO expansion eastward US missile defense plan-ning in Europe and the NATO decision to hold treatyratication hostage to the nal departure of Russiantroops from Georgia and Moldova61 Russia recog-

nized South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 Georgianadmission into the Alliance within its internationallyrecognized borders would put NATO in danger of di-rect conict with Russia which does not acknowledgethose borders62 Since Russian policymakers tend toview security and interests in tangible terms ratherthan as ideas or values they see NATO expansion intoUkraine and Georgia as a threat on two fronts Firstit allows foreign values to mature in Russiarsquos declaredldquoprivilegedrdquo sphere of interests and second it chipsaway at their physical security and control of oil andgas markets further west63

Russia believes that NATO rejects the legitimacy ofits interests Hence NATO remains for all intents andpurposes an anti-Russian military alliance64 Likewise

NATO cannot recognize Russia as an equal to NATOand simultaneously recognize it as a state equal toother states within the Alliance65 Russiarsquos resurgence



20

has been focused on countering US leadership par-ticularly through military posturing and controlling

energy supplies to its neighbors Russiarsquos desire to ad-dress international security challenges outside of itssphere of inuence is dubious given its policy towardthe Iranian nuclear program66

Russia has had a track record of entering into ne-gotiations but connes these to the partnersrsquo sphereof inuence Although Russia has actively participat-ed in the NATO-Russia Council Russia is not inter-ested in working toward the goals and objectives ofNATO Logic would say the Alliance therefore needsto stop dealing with Russia But NATO cannot takethat course Discussions concerning NATO member-ship should only begin with a petition from Russia to join However NATO must keep Russia at the tableand continue dialogue to work in areas where NATO

and Russia agree NATO needs to approach this justas Secretary General Rasmussen put it ldquoNow Irsquom nota dreamer It is obvious that there will be fundamentalissues on which we disagree We have to insist forexample that Russia fully complies with its interna-tional obligations including respecting the territorialintegrity and political freedom of its neighborsrdquo67 ThisNATO dialogue with Russia needs to be open frankand candid This can be best attained by laying out theNATO policy toward Russia in the Strategic Concept

NATO and Afghanistan and the Threat of theGlobal Jihadists

The most important issue at hand is how NATO

is going to fare coming out of the war in AfghanistanMuch attention has been given to this issue In 2009the seventh Global Strategic Review of the London-



21

based International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) argued that the US leadership role in NATO is

waning as indicated by the difculty it has in persuad-ing Alliance partners to boost the number of troopsthey send to ght a resurgent Taliban68 In the collab-orative study Alliance Reborn An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century Daniel Hamilton convincingly makesthe case that NATO needs to reach a consensus on anew long-term strategy if it is to remain relevant Inthe argument for a new transatlantic compact Ham-ilton states that the discussion will be moot if the al-lies stumble in Afghanistan or are unable to devise acommon approach to Russia69 He goes on to say thatEuropean efforts in Afghanistan are necessary not asa gesture of support for Americans but because Euro-peans are directly threatened70 In addition he arguesthat increasing doubts about political resolve and mil-

itary capability to sustain the effort in Afghanistan arealso eroding NATOrsquos credibility The effect is a scram-ble for bilateral security assurances from Washingtonwhich only further deteriorates NATOrsquos credibilityand mutual defense commitments71

George Friedman allocates the second chapter ofhis new book The Next 100 Years to the terrorist jihad-ist movement72 He dismisses the probability that themovement will have any impact on the world stagedecades from now He posits that the US invasionof the Islamic world did not seek victory in the tra-ditional sense but rather disruption73 He puts it likethis ldquoThe US-Islamist war is already ending and thenext conict is in sightrdquo74 Given his denition of the jihadistsrsquo goal of re-creating the Caliphate it is indeed

true that the jihadist did not win and there is littleprobability they will75 Looking at the US-Islamistwar through the historical lens in which one would



22

examine the Vietnam War as a campaign of the largerCold War strategy of containment it becomes clear

that the Islamic war is merely a transitory event76

Ac-cording to Friedman US defeat or stalemate in Iraqand Afghanistan is likely and both wars will appearto be a serious defeat but by causing disruptions in theIslamic world the United States will have achieved itsstrategic goal77

Even if Friedman is correct his projection is toofar in the future to dismiss the global jihadist threatto the United States and NATO Defeat for NATO inAfghanistan would certainly not bode well for main-taining a strong and relevant Alliance But ldquodefeatrdquoshould be described as not achieving the desiredNATO outcome The desired NATO outcome needs tobe dened clearly It is imperative that the New Strate-gic Concept address NATO goals in Afghanistan and

the ways and means of accomplishing those goals De-ned goals will give member nations objectives whileformulating national defense plans Getting the Stra-tegic Concept right is the rst step in maintaining thehealth of the Alliance and keeping it relevant

Summary

Demographics will play an important role in thefuture NATO selection of out-of-area operationsNATO should acknowledge the lack of political willto use kinetic force in these operations and insteadseek ways for these missions to be as effective as pos-sible in the areas of political agreement The biggestthreat to NATO is the internal threat over mission and

purpose The short-term challenges for NATO are acomprehensive Strategic Concept and a way forwardfor Afghanistan NATO needs to clearly dene Article5 in the Strategic Concept



23

NATO needs to lay out clearly its policy towardRussia in the Strategic Concept so that those within

the Alliance those aspiring to be in the Alliance andthose dealing with the Alliance (Russia in particular)can clearly chart a path for the future NATO needs toalso dene its goals and level of ambition in Afghani-stan along with the ways and means to accomplishthose goals

FUTURING NATO

This section examines several NATO future stud-ies and then presents four possible futures out to 2025The futures rely heavily on the near-future possibilitiesdiscussed in Part I This section is designed to informthe reader about potential long-term consequences ofdecisions taken in 2010 during the development of the

New Strategic ConceptFuturing does not have the goal of predicting the

future but instead of improving the future Seriousstudy and thinking about the future in general be-gan only after World War II when computers atomicbombs and advances in aerospace engineering aswell as the quickening pace of events forced strategicthinkers to reect on the impact of these technologiesand events on the future These ldquofuturistsrdquo as theywere called in the 1960s recognized that the futureworld develops out of the present and that the keything to watch is not independent events in the newssuch as sudden developments or 1-day occurrencesbut trends like long-term ongoing shifts in popula-tion land use technology and governmental systems

Herman Kahn and his colleagues at the RAND Corpo-ration the rst ldquothink factoryrdquo developed a scenariotechnique as a way to explore future possibilities in an



24

organized and logical manner His work on the hor-rible consequences of future thermonuclear exchanges

should have won him the Nobel Peace Prize but in-stead provided the model for the wacky atomic scien-tist in the movie Dr Strangelove78

NATOrsquos View of the Future

In April 2009 ACT published the ndings of its Multiple Futures ProjectmdashNavigating towards 2030 (seeAppendix) This project was the result of a March 2008Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)proposal to the NATO Military Committee whichcalled on the Alliance to consider ldquothat differentviews of future worlds will strengthen our endeavorto develop a more rigorous and holistic appreciationfor future security challenges and implications for

the Alliancerdquo79

The study pointed out that it wouldbe more likely that the Alliance would be threatenedby instability and the weakness of other states thanby invading conventional forces80 The study tendedto focus on the military implications of the future ofNATO and allocated a chapter to recommendationsfor dealing with military implications which it derivedfrom the security implications81 It was not intended topredict the future or presume political decisions thatwould lay out future Alliance roles and required ca-pabilities82

Other NATO nations have also conducted theirown surveys and studies of what NATO could andshould look like in the future At the April 9-10 2009Regional Stability and Security Annual International

Scientic Session hosted by the Bucharest Centre forDefence and Security Strategic Studies Dr Florin Dia-conu the Senior Researcher at the Romanian Diplo-



25

matic Institute made a review of the MFP as well asthe Long Term Requirements Study (see Appendix)

and hypothesized that the ldquofuture has all the chancesto be more inuenced by the political will inside theAlliance than by what MFP calls globalization or ter-rorism or technologyrdquo83 Indeed this is because ACTis a subordinate command and part of the NATO mili-tary structure and was established to implement thepolitical decisions made by the NATO political lead-ers84

Reecting on the Alliancersquos New Strategic conceptthe Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) re-leased a report in 2009 entitled ldquoCome Home NATOrdquoDenmark is the only member of the 27 EU states notpart of the EU European Defense Agency (EDA)85 Al-though EDA does not determine missions the Danesare particularly interested in the types of missions

NATO will perform The DIIS report presents threearguments concerning the new strategic direction forthe Alliance The rst argument is that ldquothe Strate-gic Concept serves several functions it codies pastdecision and existing practices it provides strategicdirection and it serves as an instrument of public di-plomacyrdquo The second argument is that ldquothe new Stra-tegic Concept must balance the push and pull of twocompeting visions of NATO one being lsquoCome homeNATOrsquo the other being lsquoGlobalize stupidrsquordquo The nalargument is that ldquoalthough the agenda of globaliza-tion is being questioned NATO will continue downthe path of global engagementrdquo86 The DIIS study gavea comprehensive history of the NATO Strategic Con-cept The Alliancersquos Strategic Concept issued in April

1999 was simply a revision of the 1991 Concept andtherefore the word ldquonewrdquo was eliminated from thetitle87 After the 911 attacks and the US response



26

in Afghanistan many felt that the Strategic Conceptneeded to be revised again but because of the lack of

political agreement the effort was relegated to a docu-ment agreed to in 2006 which came to be known asthe Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG)88 TheCPG was mainly a military update but its second andthird paragraphs addressed the strategic context89 Thesecond paragraph of the CPG states that ldquoTerrorismincreasingly global in scope and lethal in results andthe spread of weapons of mass destruction are likelyto be the principle threats to the Alliance over the next10 to 15 yearsrdquo90 In the Danesrsquo review of the MFP theyfound a widely shared assessment that ACT is poorlyintegrated into the overall NATO organization Theymaintained that

In sum and put crudely NATOrsquos military organiza-

tion is bedeviled by multiple agendas and poor coor-dination [The] M[ilitary] C[ommittee] in Brussels ishostage to the national politics of capability planningA[llied] C[ommand] O[perations] is busy running op-erations and impatient with the MC and [the] ACThas so far been hanging loose thinking about the fu-ture91

The DIIS study suggests two options Tighten up

the political guidelines that underpin the military re-quirements which reect the Strategic Concept or re-shape the organization Throughout the study whichemphasized the difference between NATO states pre-ferring to go global and those wanting to return to theterritorial defense focus the authors place the onuson the globalist camp to move things forward92 They

predict that in the short run the current disagreementsabout the primary threats to NATO and its key tasksare too pronounced to allow for a Strategic Concept



27

that varies widely from the current one Howeverthey maintain that NATO will continue on the global-

ization trajectory They also claim that it is likely thatthe United States with the help of the UK Denmarkand the Netherlands will be able to push for fewerreferences to the Euro-Atlantic area in the StrategicConcept and thus promote a global reach but sub-stantial changes are improbable93

The study of the new Strategic Concept performedby the Estonian International Centre for Defence Stud-ies contends that the meaning of ldquocollective defenserdquoagainst Russia remains ldquounspecied and thus politi-cally hollowrdquo94 Estonia believes that the need to strikea new balance between a defensive regional allianceand a global intervention force has been made obvi-ous by the Russian attacks in Georgia95 The Estonianstudy concludes that what is really needed is a com-

mon analysis and agreement on a response to the re-emerged regional security dilemmas for NATO Thismeans that a further clarication of the NATO-Russiastrategic relationship and the future basis of NATOrsquosenlargement policy is needed That is the questionmust be asked ldquoDoes NATO continue with an openlyvalue-based course for enlargement or consider statesthat fall short but could buttress the territorial defenseof NATOrdquo96 Not surprisingly the same Estonian grouppublished a policy paper titled ldquoNATO MembershipAction Plan A Chance for Ukraine and Georgiardquo inpreparation for the Bucharest summit of 2008 which ad-vocated extending Membership Action Plans (MAPs) toUkraine and Georgia97 At Bucharest the rest of NATOwas not ready to antagonize Moscow But the deliberate

decision not to extend invitations to join NATO did notprevent Russia from going into Georgia 4 months later



28

NATO Future Scenarios

Today the most common method of future analy-sis is the scenario technique which is used by govern-ments and businesses globally to understand possi-bilities and develop options to inuence the futureThese scenarios are outlines that describe distinct nearor long-range futures For the most part they consistof knowable thingsmdashtrends and circumstances in agiven environment that when projected into the fu-ture evoke new ideas about change Given that sce-narios are neither predictions nor forecasts they arestill useful to planners decisionmakers and policy-makers98 Scenarios can either project current trendsinto the future or explore alternative ones includingldquowild cardsrdquo99

This study utilizes some of the techniques devel-

oped by Charles W Taylor in his seminal 1993 work Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations This monograph describes and develops four sce-narios to overcome the deterministic and predictiveapproach of single-scenario analyses and to provide amore plausible conceptual framework The scenariospresented encompass a transition of trends and theirconsequences over the last decade with respect toNATO and the plausible evolutionary changes overthe next 40 years (see Figure 2) This monograph willconcentrate on the 2025 focus plane The focus planeis a selected time in the future where the developmentof the scenarios are evaluated against each other Thethought process for this transition of trends forms atheoretical cone which encompasses the passage of

time Inside the cone cause and effect relationshipsdene NATOrsquos existence Although the use of thecone does not increase the accuracy of the forecast ofthe scenarios the tracking inside the cone establishes



29

the validity of the scenarios and the logic of their de-velopment This is called ldquoThe Cone of Plausibilityrdquo100

Using such a diagram like Figure 2 is a mental exercisewhich logically graphs the range of plausible futuresThe narrow portion at the bottom is dened as todayIt is not a single point because there are indeed conict-ing views of what ldquotodayrdquo looks like and it is there-fore described as a plane The cone gets wider as timemoves forward and the knowable futures become lesscertain and increasingly obscure101 This NATO coneof plausibility is not intended to be a comprehensivestudy but a forum for further study Analysts coulduse the technique to extend the analysis to a focusplane further into the future However looking out to2025 is sufcient to present both short- and long-termchallenges to NATO The four scenarios are (a) USleadership relationship with NATO continues on the

same path (b) US leadership in NATO increases (c)EU leadership in NATO increases and (d) The NATOAlliance breaks apart

Figure 2 The Cone of Plausibility



30

The trends that shape or ldquodriverdquo the future of US

foreign policy and NATO countriesrsquo foreign policy arepolitical economic social technological and militaryelements of power The most important driver in thisscenario is political since NATO is rst and foremosta political alliance The trends described by the 1999Strategic Concept and the 2006 Comprehensive Po-litical Guidance conveniently provide drivers for thefour scenarios The primary driver however for thescenarios is the Strategic Concept to be released in2010 This was chosen as the primary driver since itis the one item that will most affect the political willof the Alliance That political will can be describedby the four scenarios These scenarios only present apossibility and are not to be interpreted as an outrightprediction of the future

Scenario A US leadership relationship withNATO continues on the same path Scenario A theldquoContinuation Scenariordquo presupposes that the re-lationship between the United States and the otherNATO nations will remain the same relative to eachother as we move from today to the year 2025 Ad-ditional countries may join NATO and conceivablysome may even leave NATOmdashin the same mannerthat Georgia joined the CSTO in 1994 and withdrewin 1999 or more precisely when France departed fromthe NATO IMS in 1966 and rejoined in 2009 Othernation-states or collections thereof may form alliancesto counter NATO such as those discussed in ldquoPoten-tial Threats to NATOrdquo but again the US leadershipwithin the Alliance remains the same

Scenario A 2025 The USEU relationship re-mains constant Russian suspicions of NATO continuedespite efforts by the Alliance to be open and trans-



31

parent The Strategic Concept in 2010 was open frankand directive The Alliance sustained cooperation in

Afghanistan The openness forced the committeepenning the Strategic Concept to dene terms clearlyand more importantly agreed to the denitions andapproved the Strategic Concept 2010 The clear de-scriptions of the ldquoattackrdquo in Article 5 including cyberattack and resolution on mission and purpose for out-of-area operations allowed individual NATO coun-tries to better project military defense plans ManyNATO militaries were able to sustain a viable forcedespite a decline in the military cohort and smallerdefense budgets

Scenario B US Leadership in NATO increasesScenario B describes an environment where US com-mitment to NATO security goals increases with respectto the European counterparts This scenario is plau-

sible According to Global Trends 2025 ldquodivergentthreat perceptions within Europe and the likelihoodthat defense spending will remain uncoordinatedsuggest the EU will not be a major military power by2025 The national interests of the bigger powers willcontinue to complicate EU foreign and security policyand European support for NATO could eroderdquo102 Thisscenario depends conceivably more on the US will-ingness to take a more involved leadership role withinNATO than any other competing factor This willing-ness would include resourcing NATO operations

Friedman argues that ldquothe world does in fact piv-ot around the United Statesrdquo103 This is not only dueto American power He points out that for the past500 years Europe was the center of the international

system and that the main highway to Europe was theNorth Atlantic Whoever controlled that body of watercontrolled Europe and Europersquos access to the world



32

and hence the ldquobasic geography of global politics waslocked into placerdquo104 He goes on to explain that in the

early 1980s a remarkable shift occurred in that for therst time in history transpacic trade equaled trans-atlantic trade and hence any country that controlledthe North Atlantic and the Pacic would if it wantedto control the global economy He concluded thattherefore whoever controls North America is virtuallyassured of being the dominant global power and thatldquofor the twenty-rst century at least that will be theUnited Statesrdquo105 Friedmanrsquos Mahanian view of seapower in the new globalized world may be incorrectbut even so it is probable that the United States willbe a major power for the foreseeable future The ques-tion is where will the United States focus on foreignengagement Europe Africa Asia the Americas or acombination thereof

Scenario B 2025 A number of socio-economic fac-tors and security perceptions made the European na-tions more receptive to a strong US leadership roleThe Strategic Concept in 2010 did not differ muchfrom the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance Itdid not convey a purpose As 2025 approaches the ef-fects of Europersquos aging population Muslim immigra-tion and diminished military age cohort become morepronounced Stronger views toward international se-curity versus home defense become more clear anddistinct The United States wishing to maintain theAlliance invests more effort and money The UnitedStates also leads the out-of-area operations The netgain is more symbolic than practical in furthering USstrategic goals as those goals become increasingly di-

vergent from those of the EuropeansScenario C EU leadership in NATO increases

Scenario C portrays the United States as leaning to-



33

ward isolationism which forces the EU to assume anincreased leadership role within NATO In John Mc-

Cormickrsquos book The European Superpower he supportsthe idea that American global leadership is on thedecline and that European leadership on the otherhand is in its ascendency106 McCormick rejects thetraditional view that the greatest powers are thosewith large militaries which consciously pursue na-tional interests He argues that globalization and in-terdependence have undermined power politics andsupplanted it with a more nuanced set of internationalrelationships In this post-modern environment theinternational relationships attained by the EU hasmade it a superpower107 This scenario depends heav-ily on greater EU leadership

Scenario C 2025 This scenario develops as USand EU interests continue to diverge and the United

States disengages from Europe The Strategic Con-cept in 2010 did not clearly state a mission and pur-pose US and European views on the way ahead inAfghanistan began to diverge after the 2010 LisbonSummit Some European NATO members disengagedin Afghanistan and the United States turned to othernations and organizations for support The Alliancecontinues to exist and even contributes to stabilizationin areas outside of NATO countries but the thrust isdened by Europeans EU countries lead most opera-tions

Scenario D The NATO Alliance breaks apart Sce-nario D depicts the breakup of NATO as the US nationalsecurity interests diverge from the rest of the AllianceThe strength of the European commitment to the Alliance

inuences the pace of the dissolution of the Alliance Ifthe European countries also develop diverse individu-al notions of their main national or collective security



34

threats then the breakup of the Alliance quickensScenario D 2025 This scenario occurs because of a

combination of events described in Scenarios B and CNational defense and international security prioritiescontinue to diverge between the United States and theEuropean NATO countries The United States movesmore toward isolationism while the EU experiencesthe effects of aging population Muslim immigra-tion and a diminished military age cohort Commoninterests fade The Alliance continues its efforts inAfghanistan with no clear denition of success Thecountries which feel Russia is their main threat oustthe politicians who authorized involvement in Af-ghanistan then withdraw Some begin to leave theAlliancersquos military establishment just as France did in1966 The Alliance already weakened from the threatfrom within starts to feel the pressure from Russian

military training exercises along its borders The east-ern NATO members become less condent in NATOrsquoscommitment to their territorial defense These coun-tries organize their own collective defense alliancefocused on the potential threat of a resurgent RussiaFarsighted transatlantic diplomats tried to reassureRussia of NATOrsquos nonthreatening security structurebut failed Russia seeing the opportunity to strikeclaims Georgia has violated citizensrsquo rights in the con-tested areas and occupies that country NATO contin-ues to lose members while common interests amongthe remaining members diverge For all intents andpurposes it has failed to keep Europe at peace while itfocused on the larger global terrorist threat



35

Summary

These scenarios present a range of short- and long-term challenges for the future The prominent short-term challenge is consensus on the 2010 Strategic Con-cept If well thought out it will set the conditions forboth short- and long-term success Short-term chal-lenges that need to be addressed are describing a mis-sion and purpose for NATO in the 21st century de-ning the relationship with Russia identifying goalsways and means in Afghanistan and clarifying whatconstitutes an Article 5 attack Long-term challengesare effects of the inevitably changing demographics inEurope and consensus on the level of ambition for out-of-area operations The scenarios show that NATOcan continue to exist with a weak 2010 Strategic Con-cept but the resulting NATO may not be what any of

the member countries want A weak Strategic Conceptcould even lead to the failure of NATO as describedin Scenario D A well-planned Strategic Concept willcontribute greatly to overcoming NATOrsquos short- andlong-term challenges

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO Strategic Concept 2010

The NATO 2009 Summit in StrasbourgKehlcommissioned the Secretary General to develop anew Strategic Concept with the assistance of a broadbased group of qualied experts and the North Atlan-tic Council (NAC) The Strategic Concept is the base

document which establishes and reects transatlanticconsensus The process has already begun It involvesthe Euro-Atlantic partnership Council the Mediter-



36

ranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initia-tive along with other organizations worldwide108 On

October 16 the rst of the four main seminars guidingthe development of the Strategic Concept was held inLuxembourg Dr Madeleine Albright who chairs theexperts group presided In his opening speech Dep-uty Secretary General of NATO Ambassador ClaudioBisogniero stated that ldquoNATO has to play an activepolitical role in trying to prevent threats from arisingand in shaping the political environment in which wecan operate successfullyrdquo109 NATO is truly lookingfor inputmdashworldwide NATO has even opened upits website for any internet user to comment on whatNATOrsquos New Strategic Concept should look like It isin Discussion Forum format and can be found at wwwnatointstrategic-conceptindexhtml

Hopefully this monograph has provoked some

thought and concerned individuals will participate inthat strategic discussion

Conclusion

Alliances must either adapt or die The Congress ofVienna lasted only 36 years It did not adapt NATO isnow at a point where it may suffer the same fate if itdoes not adapt

If the United States wants to make NATO truly rel-evant then it is going to have to invest not only timeand money but also to allocate increased human capi-tal and talent to ensure that the envisioned future ofthe Alliance is clearly established as a policy goal andis pursued in a deliberate and consistent manner

Getting the NATO Strategic Concept right is thekey to success The United States must shape this pro-cess As Senator Richard Lugar stated ldquoOur commit-



37

ment to NATO remains the most important vehicle forprojecting stability throughout Europe and even into

regions of Asia and the Middle Eastrdquo110

NATO must decide whether to ldquogo globalrdquo or con-

centrate on the collective defense of Europe But thoseoptions are not mutually exclusive US policymakersmust ensure that NATO policy toward Russia is clearNATOrsquos relationship with Russia must be based onopenness both when the two sides agree and whenthey disagree The new Strategic Concept must identi-fy NATO goals in Afghanistan and indicate how theywill be attained

How will EU countries react The most crucialyears will be in the 2010s and 2020s when the rapidgrowth of seniors to working-age populations in Eu-rope will occur The United States may have to bearmore of the Alliancersquos costs There may be a collective

European political will to have a strong functioningAlliance but the social realities may cause practicalproblems in the execution of joint and combined mili-tary ventures We know these problems will exist inthe future The new Strategic Concept must deal withthem

The biggest threat to NATO now is the ldquointernalthreatrdquo of the absence of consensus over what theperceived ldquoexternal threatrdquo to NATO is

Recommendations

The following recommendations are proposedbull The United States needs to insist on a clear and

actionable NATO common vision of the future in

the new Strategic Concept and address missionand purpose

bull A clear and concise NATO policy towards Rus-



38

sia should provide a common reference pointfor discussions and deliberations Discussion on

possible Russian membership should only beginwith a formal request to join Dialogue betweenNATO and Russia concerning common goalsshould continue

bull NATO must develop goals and objectives in Af-ghanistan and a strategy with ways and meansfor attaining them

bull The Strategic Concept needs to clearly dene themeaning of an Article 5 ldquoattackrdquo in regards to ter-rorist and nonstate actors

bull Given the pace of developing technology Article5 will need to state clearly whether a cyber attackis included in the collective NATO understand-ing of an ldquoarmed attackrdquo

bull NATO should identify its ambition (frequency and

intensity) in conducting out of area operations

ENDNOTES

1 Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampeduse Il Gattopardo (The Leop-ard) Archibald Colquhoun trans New York Pantheon Books1960

2 Report for Congress ldquoThe NATO Summit at Prague 2002rdquoWashington DC Congressional Research Service March 1 2005

3 History of Allied Command Transformation availablefrom wwwactnatointcontentasppageid=240 ACT focuses on ar-eas such as training and education concept development com-prehensive approach experimentation and research and tech-nology and using NATOrsquos ongoing operations and work withthe NATO Response Force (NRF) to improve the military effec-

tiveness of the Alliance Reecting NATO as a whole ACT hasa worldwide presence As well as being collocated with UnitedStates Joint Forces Command in Norfolk VA there is an ACTcommand element located in Belgium







41

22 Ibid pp 36-38

23 Global Trends 2025 A Transformed World p 25 availablefrom wwwacusorglespublication_pdfs3Global-Trends-2025pdf (hereafter Global Trends)

24 An Uncertain Road Muslims and the Future of Europe Wash-ington DC The Pew Research Center October 2005 p 3

25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56

27 Global Trends p 25

28 ldquoTransatlantic Trends Key Findings 2008rdquo pp 20-21available from wwwtransatlantictrendsorgtrends

29 Ibid

30 Mustafa Alani ldquoArab perspectives on NATOrdquo NATOReview Autumn 2005 available from wwwnatointdocu Review2005issue4Englishart3html

31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56


34 Jeffrey S Passel and DrsquoVera Cohn US Population Projec-tions 2005-2050 Washington DC Pew Research Center p 17Working-age is described as adults who are 18 to 64

35 Simon p 55

36 Global Strategic Assessment 2009 Patrick M Cronin ed

Washington DC National Defense University (NDU) Press July2009 pp 256-258



42

37 ldquoSCO Military exercises to be held in 2010 in Kazakhstan-

Russiardquo available from enrianruworld20090429121367596html

38 Global Strategic Assessment 2009 pp 258-259

39 ldquoIran moves to join Shanghai Cooperation Organizationrdquoavailable from enrianruworld20080324102052243html

40 ldquoCollective Security A Timelinerdquo available from central-

asiaforeignpolicyblogscomcollective-security-organization-timeline

41 Available from enrianrurussia20090204119984654html

42 Available from wwwrferlorgcontentCSTO_Rapid_ Reaction_Exercises_Get_Off_To_Discouraging_Start1808735html

43 ldquoRussia Facing Resistance with Allies On CISrsquos SouthernFlankrdquo available from wwwrferlorgcontentRussia_Facing_

Resistance_With_Allies_On_CISs_Southern_Flank1847880html

44 ldquoMoscow Pushes For Formal Cooperation Between UNCSTOrdquo October 16 2009 available from wwwglobalsecurityorg militarylibrarynews200910mil-091016-rferl02htm

45 The North Atlantic Treaty Washington DC April 4 1949available from wwwnatointcpsennatoliveofcial_texts_17120htm

46 ldquoComprehensive Political Guidancerdquo

47 Martin Reichard The EU-NATO Relationship HampshireEngland Ashgate 2006 p 353

48 Global Strategic Assessment 2009 p 447

49 ldquoAlliance Rebornrdquo p 17

50 Anders Fogh Rasmussen ldquoFirst NATO Press Conferenceby Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussenrdquo August 3 2009available from wwwnatointcpsennatoliveopinions_56776htm



43

51 ldquoThe NATO Summit at Praguerdquo

52 ldquoStrasbourgKehl Summit Declaration Issued by theHeads of State and Government participating in the meet-ing of the North Atlantic Council in StrasbourgKehlrdquoApril 42009 available from wwwnatointcpsennatolivenews_52837htmmode=pressrelease

53 Available from newsyahoocomsap20090917ap_on_re_ eueu_eastern_europe_missile_defense

54 ldquoStrasbourgKehl Summit Declarationrdquo Article54 available from wwwnatointcpsennatolivenews_52837htmmode=pressrelease

55 Available from wwwfoxnewscompoliticselections 20090918nato-proposes-link-russias-missile-defense

56 Available from wwwnatointcpsenSID-970C4723-63A4E217natoliveofcial_texts_25468htm

57 Stephen J Blank The NATO-Russia Partnership A Mar-riage of Convenience or a Troubled Relationship Carlisle PA Strate-gic Studies Institute US Army War College 2006 p vii

58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241

62 Dimitri Trenin ldquoNATO and Russia Partnership or PerilrdquoCurrent History October 2009 p 301


64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44


67 Rasmussen ldquoFirst NATO Press Conferencerdquo

68 Avai lable from wwwiissorgconferencesglobal-strategic-reviewglobal-strategic-review-2009 and newsyahoocomsap20090915ap_on_re_eueu_britain_us_power


70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid

72 ldquoThe next 100 yearsrdquo Newstatesman available from wwwnewstatesmancomnorth-america200908power-china-world- japan-poland George Friedman The Next 100 Years A Forecast for the 21st Century New York Doubleday 2009

73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49

78 Edward Cornish Futuring The Exploration of the FutureBethesda MD World Future Society 2004 p xiii

79 ldquoMultiple Futures ProjectmdashNavigating Towards 2030Findings and Recommendationsrdquo p 1 available from wwwactnatointmediaMultiple_Futures20090503_MFP_nalreppdf

80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45

83 Regional Stability and Security Annual International Sci-

entic Session April 9-10 2009 Bucharest Romania p 87

84 Ibid

85 European Defence Agency available from edaeuropaeu genericitemaspxarea=Backgroundampid=79

86 ldquoCome Home NATOrdquo p 4

87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25

94 Maria Maumllksoo ldquoNATOrsquos New Strategic Concept Whatis at Stake for Estoniardquo Policy Paper Tallin Estonia November2008 Part II

95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V

97 Indrek Elling and Merle Maigre NATO Membership Ac-tion Plan A Change for Ukraine and Georgia Tallin Estonia Inter-national Centre For Defence Studies 2008

98 Charles W Taylor Alternative World Scenarios for a NewOrder of Nations Carlisle PA Strategic Studies Institute USArmy War College 1993 p 2

99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4

101 Ibid p 4 Taylor does not advocate using the ldquocontinu-ationrdquo scenario or the ldquoworst caserdquo scenario but Edward Cornishdoes advocate these techniques in his book Futuring the Explora-tion of the Future The four scenarios presented in this monographinclude two such scenarios


103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5

106 John McCormick The European Superpower New YorkPalgrave MacMillan 2006 p 124

107 Ibid p 2

108 NATOrsquos new Strategic Concept available from wwwnatointstrategic-conceptwhat-is-strategic-concepthtml

109 Available from wwwnatointcpsennatolivenews_ 58057htm

110 Richard Lugar Statement US Senate Committee onForeign Relations October 22 2009 opening remarks of the Oc-tober 22 2009 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hear-ing on the NATO Strategic Concept



47

APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF THE MULTIPLE FUTURESPROJECT AND FUTURE WORLD SCENARIOS

The question that was posed in the Multiple Fu-tures Project (MFP) was ldquoWhat are the future threatsand challenges that could pose risk to the interestsvalues and populations of the Alliancerdquo1 This reportmeant to provide Alliance leaders with a broad set ofideas and information to use for future planning pre-sented four plausible worlds in 2030 The rst calledDark Side of Exclusivity describes how globalizationclimate change and resource scarcity affect develop-ing states The second named Deceptive Stabilitypresents a world where developed states attempt todeal with societal change caused by demographics

shifts as their native population ages and youngerimmigrants ll the void The third called Clash ofModernities describes a world where a strong beliefin rationalism buoyed by technological innovationsand ingenuity allows societies to collaborate acrossthe globe but the network is assailed by authoritar-ian regimes The fourth and nal future named NewPower Politics paints a world picture where growingabsolute wealth and the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) have increased the numberof major powers which compete for and block globalaccess to resources2 With each future providing asetting for imaginative analysis the study produceda set of risk conditions spanning the gamut fromldquofailed statesrdquo to the ldquochallenge of conicting values

and world viewsrdquo3 These results were linked to thesix potential Sources of Threat identied in the MFPresulting in 33 Security Implications and 26 Military



48

Implications identied as the Threatening Actions orEvents to a stable world environment These security

implications demonstrated four broad concepts1 The evolving nature of risks and threats to

vital interests will challenge strategic unityand solidarity with the Alliance as well as thecommon understanding of what constitutes anArticle 5 attack

2 Increased interaction with non-NATO nationsand other international actors will createopportunities for the Alliance to extend its rolein enhancing security and stability outside thetraditional areas of engagement

3 Determined adversaries enabled by readilyavailable technologies will attack Alliancevulnerabilities in unexpected ways requiringthe Alliance to consider changes in the character

of military operations and warfare4 Increased interaction and other international

actors will provide the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) the opportunity topositively shape and inuence ideas valuesand events in a globalized world4

By analyzing these security implications the studyproduced military implications for NATO These mili-tary implications pointed to seven focus areas whichthe study eshed out with recommendations forchanges in concepts and doctrine as well as capabil-ity enhancements for each individual focus area Theseven focus areas include

(1) Adapting to the demands of Hybrid Threats(2) Operating with Others and Building Institutions(3) Conict Prevention Resolution and Consequence



49

Management (4) Counter Proliferation (5) Expedition-ary and Combat Capability in Austere Environments

(6) Strategic Communications and (7) Winning theBattle of the Narrative and Organizational and ForceDevelopment Issues5 The MFP study concluded withthe nding that the unpredictability and complexityof the future security environment will strain the Alli-ancersquos most powerful assets strategic unity of valuesand goals solidarity among Allies burden-sharingand commitment to its decisions It also concludedthat a comprehensive approach developed in concertwith other international organizations like the Euro-pean Union and the United Nations is essential to thesecurity of the Alliance6

In a supporting 2006 study called Future WorldScenarios ACT researched the medium and long-termcapability requirements for the Alliance The Long

Term Requirements Study (LTRS) released in 2008had a target timeframe between 2015 and 2030 and afocus on 2025 The study dened four Future NATOsThe study described the rst as the ldquoStrong ToolboxNATOrdquo where the US commitment is strong butEuropean cohesion is weak and limited The secondldquoShared Partnership NATOrdquo depicts a combinationof strong US commitment and a strong coherent Eu-rope participating with a reduced Europe-US capabil-ity gap The third the ldquoFragmented Toolbox NATOrdquorepresents a lukewarm US commitment and mediumEuropean cohesion In this future the United States ismore focused on military threats and Europe is moreconcerned with humanitarian and environmental op-erations In the fourth and nal future NATO is pre-

sented as the ldquoEurope-Centric NATOrdquo characterizedby limited US interest and commitment to NATOwhile Europeans can operate regionally with or with-out US support7



50

The four Future NATOs described were devel-oped by a team of 20 leading experts in areas related

to NATO The Future NATOs were developed fromthe teamrsquos identication of three key drivers plausibletrends which shape the scenarios8

1 Whether or not the United States wouldbe willing in 2025 to demonstrate a strongcommitment in NATO

2 Whether or not the European Union in 2025would be a coherent and therefore fairly strongactor in international politics or a fragmentedand hence weak one and

3 Whether or not in 2025 there would be acommonly perceived threat within NATO9

This study also looked at four distinct Future Se-curity Environments which included an analysis of (a)

Return of World Order (b) Resurgent Middle East (c)Pro-Active China and (d) Globalization and TerrorWhen put into a matrix with the four Future NATOsas rows and the four Future Security Environments ascolumns the analysts had 16 potential Future Worldscenarios to analyze In the interest of feasibility theydecided to analyze the Shared Partnership FutureNATO along the four different future Security Environ-ments10 The result of the analysis was an assessment ofthe level of technology that could be available to NATOas well as to potential opponents This was presented inmatrix form11 The study was a major building block forthe MFP

The MFP was ldquomeant to inform and support the stra-tegic dialogue on challenges the Alliance will face and

the corresponding security and military implicationsrdquo12



51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18

7 Future World Scenarios Supporting Paper to the Long TermRequirements Study April 2006 pp 1-4 available from wwwactnatointmediaMultiple_FuturesACTFutureWorldScenariosApr06 pdf

8 Charles W Taylor Alternative World Scenarios for a New Or-der of Nations Carlisle PA Strategic Studies Institute US ArmyWar College 1993 p 8

9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4

12 ldquoMultiple Futures Projectrdquo p 1



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert M WilliamsCommandant

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

DirectorProfessor Douglas C Lovelace Jr

Director of ResearchDr Antulio J Echevarria II

AuthorLieutenant Colonel Phillip R Cuccia

Director of PublicationsDr James G Pierce

Publications AssistantMs Rita A Rummel

CompositionMrs Jennifer E Nevil




Phillip R Cuccia

May 2010

The views expressed in this report are those of the au-

thor and do not necessarily reect the ofcial policyor position of the Department of the Army the De-partment of Defense or the US Government Authorsof Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoyfull academic freedom provided they do not discloseclassied information jeopardize operations securityor misrepresent ofcial US policy Such academicfreedom empowers them to offer new and sometimescontroversial perspectives in the interest of furtheringdebate on key issues This report is cleared for publicrelease distribution is unlimited

This publication is subject to Title 17 United StatesCode Sections 101 and 105 It is in the public domainand may not be copyrighted

Visit our website for other free publicationdownloads

httpwwwStrategicStudiesInstitutearmymil

To rate this publication click here



ii






ISBN 1-58487-446-5



iii

FOREWORD










iv






v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR







vii

SUMMARY








viii









1










2









3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











ii






ISBN 1-58487-446-5



iii

FOREWORD










iv






v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR







vii

SUMMARY








viii









1










2









3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











iii

FOREWORD










iv






v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR







vii

SUMMARY








viii









1










2









3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











iv






v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR







vii

SUMMARY








viii









1










2









3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR







vii

SUMMARY








viii









1










2









3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE













vii

SUMMARY








viii









1










2









3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











viii









1










2









3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











1










2









3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











2









3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











3










4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











4



NATO IN CONTEXT







5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











5








6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











6









7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











7



dova18






8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











8







9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











9










10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











10





ance29







11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











11








12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











12


million in 205034









13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











13








14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











14









15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











15









16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











16









17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











17










18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











18










19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











19









20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











20










21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











21








22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











22






Summary





23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











23



FUTURING NATO







24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











24





the Alliancerdquo79






25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











25








26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











26










27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











27








28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











28








29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











29







30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











30







31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











31









32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











32








33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











33









34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











34






35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











35

Summary









36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











36





Conclusion






37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











37








Recommendations







38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











38








ENDNOTES











41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE















41

22 Ibid pp 36-38



25 Ibid

26 Simon p 56



29 Ibid


31 Ibid

32 Simon p 56



35 Simon p 55





42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











42




















43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











43








58 Ibid pp ix 1

59 Ibid p 2


61 Ibid p 241



64 Blank p 18

65 Ibid p 24



44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











44





70 Ibid p 15

71 Ibid


73 Friedman p 5

74 Ibid p 6

75 Ibid p 38

76 Ibid

77 Ibid p 49



80 Ibid p 5

81 Ibid pp 8-17

82 Ibid p 1



45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











45



84 Ibid



87 Ibid p 10

88 Ibid p 9

89 Ibid p 11



92 Ibid p 23

93 Ibid p 25


95 Ibid

96 Ibid Part V



99 Cornish p 93



46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




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46

100 Taylor pp 2-4



103 Friedman p 4

104 Ibid

105 Ibid pp 4-5


107 Ibid p 2






47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




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47

APPENDIX







48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




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48












49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




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49








50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




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50












51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




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51

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2 Ibid pp 1-3

3 Ibid p 3

4 Ibid pp 4-7

5 Ibid pp 8-17

6 Ibid p 18



9 Ibid p 4-1

10 Ibid p 5-1

11 Ibid pp 5-3 5-4




US ARMY WAR COLLEGE











US ARMY WAR COLLEGE









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