impact of emerging technologies on the future of ssbns* · the effects of technological...

Impact of emerging technologieson the future of SSBNs*

Report on the Conference on 13th September 2016at the National Liberal Club, Whitehall, London

Authored by: Carol Naughton, Senior Research Fellow, British Pugwash and Sebastian Brixey-Williams, Project Leader, BASIC

The conference, hosted by BritishPugwash, BASIC and LeicesterUniversity, brought together expertsfrom the science, technology, academic,defence and security communities, civilsociety and industry to explore thenature and potency of evolving newtechnologies, how they may shape futurewarfare, particularly for the underseabattle space, what strategic challengesthey will present and how might they becountered.

The conference built on the BritishPugwash Workshop held in May 2016.The workshop included seventeenscientists, technical experts andacademics from the US and UK whoassessed current and emerging underseatechnologies, their likely future directionof travel, and the implications ofdevelopments in sensing, computing andcommunications for the undersea battlespace.

The workshop concluded that: ‘It isclear that the trend is towards increasingtransparency in the underseaenvironment. The goal of thosedeveloping marine robotics, sensing andcommunications techniques is to be ableto map and to be able to sense the entireocean in the next five to ten years. Thisability will impact very significantly onthe ability of submarines to maintain theadvantage of stealth. However, we do notknow how long it will be before thisadvantage is fully compromised, who willget there first and whether effective anddeployable countermeasures can bedeveloped.’

The conference looked at this infurther detail and at the wider impact onthe international security environment.

* SSBNs (Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear) arecommonly known as ballistic missilesubmarines or ‘boomers.’

BASICINT.org le.ac.uk britishpugwash.org

Impact of emerging technologies on the future of SSBNs2

SummaryThe conference marked the two-year milestone ofcollaboration between British Pugwash and BASICon emerging undersea technologies, and definedmultiple avenues for the project’s future work.Beginning with a relatively narrow focus on thepotential vulnerabilities of the UK Successorprogramme and Trident to adversaries’ underseatechnical capabilities, the project has expanded toconsider how the rapid development anddeployment of new technologies could affectstrategic stability: for example by breedingsuspicion and catalysing arms races, byundermining weapons reductions, and byproviding a temptation for the attainment ofstrategic dominance for those states that feel it isin reach.

The term ‘emerging undersea technologies’ isused deliberately as a catch-all to describe a widevariety of developments. The technologiespresented herein describe only a narrow segmentof current developments, and should be viewed assignificant examples of trends rather thandefinitive shifts in themselves. These trendsinclude large increases in range and resolution,such as for sonar and magnetic anomaly detection;increasing autonomy within ever-more-integratedsystems of systems; and the fielding of new typesof detection system not previously used widely inASW, the data from which can be fused andanalysed in real-time using big data techniques.Crucially, while a submarine can only be builtonce, with only a handful of major modificationspossible over its lifetime, ASW technologies areprogressing in a plurality of ways and will likely gothrough dozens or even hundreds of developmentiterations in a new SSBN’s lifetime.

On a national level, participants expressedwidespread agreement that new technologies donot pose an immediate threat to the UK’s SSBNfleet, and some were of the opinion that theywould not be a ‘make or break’ threat to theSuccessor programme. However, many argued thatSSBN ‘invulnerability’ should not be taken forgranted, and that discourse should reflect this byspeaking rather of ‘potential vulnerability.’ BASICand British Pugwash plan to continue to monitortechnologies in this arena, and to communicatethe effects of technological developments simplyand objectively to strategic thinkers.

Democratising understanding of the technicalissues involved will improve public oversight andaccountability of the UK’s nuclear weaponsproject.

On a regional level, emerging underseatechnologies will have heterogeneous impactsdepending on the states by which they aredeployed, the precise areas of deployments, andthe reactions of other states. Present areas ofinterest include the South and East China Seas,the Indian Ocean, and the Arctic Ocean.Understanding these complex technologies andrelationships will likely depend upon a mixture ofstate and civil society vigilance; strategic thinkersmust remain mindful that any deployments at aregional level might eventually be developed foruse in the open oceans.

At the international level, the conferencedemonstrated the need for strategic thinkers toincorporate into their calculations the potentialimpact of undersea systems of systems on strategicstability and strategic dominance. Any deploymentof new technologies by major powers, whether byNATO or other nuclear-armed states, shifts thebalance of power and causes knock on effects.Moreover, even the perception that suchtechnologies are being deployed to underminestrategic potential can drive dangerous reactionsin adversary states, whether or not thoseperceptions are well founded. Dr Williams’apposite assertion in her talk that states facingnew technological challenges can choose to enterinto an arms race, seek arms control negotiations,or find ways to adapt, is a useful generalframework.

British Pugwash and BASIC hope that thisdiscussion will encourage participants thattravelled from abroad, particularly from nuclear-armed or hosting states, to initiate similarconversations at home to improve transparencyand exchange on these issues, and that domesticparticipants will endeavour to explore some of themany new research avenues this project hasrevealed. It remains only to thank all participantsfor the high quality of the preparations andengagement on the day, and invite readers tocontact our organisations if they are engaged orinterested in related research in this area.

3British Pugwash University of Leicester BASIC

Introduction and contextual overview

Sebastian Brixey-Williams Project Leader, BASIC

This is taken from the paper presented to theconference entitled ‘Will the Atlantic becometransparent.’ The paper is included in theappendices.

Mr Brixey-Williams gave a brief history of the'transparent oceans' discourse, which emerged inthe early 1970s at an International PugwashConference on emerging technologies, in whichone scientist reported that new technology‘virtually removes all the technical barriers toocean-wide ASW surveillance.’

The issue was taken up by the strategiccommunity over the next twenty years, whichtypically concluded that it was unlikely that eitherthe US or the Soviet Union would be able todestroy all of each others SSBNs simultaneously,and that therefore a second-strike capabilityremained. This was credited with creating thestrategic stability which is assumed today.

This discourse has re-emerged, over the lastcouple of years, following developments in oceansensing, increased sonar ranges and developmentsin unmanned undersea vehicles and unmannedsurface vehicles.

Mr Brixey-Williams felt that the idea that theoceans could become 'transparent' is toosimplistic, as transparency is always relative, andthat using categories such as 'trailing', 'tracking',and 'open ocean search' are more appropriate todescribe degrees of submarine detection.Submarines can move between these categories,for example, by giving away their position orthrough intelligent manoeuvring.

He pointed out, however, that it is not necessaryto try to continuously sense and re-sense asubmarine in the open sea; rather it is much moreefficient to detect a submarine in ocean 'gateways'or 'choke points' and then to maintain contactwith it. Analysis suggests that, within the nextdecade or so, it may be technically possible to trailsubmarines with a high level of reliability, alikelihood which is likely to increase with time.However, as Mr Brixey-Williams said, there is agreat difference between capability and intention,and whether such systems are fielded at sufficientlevels to significantly affect confidence in stealthwill depend on whether there is the political willto resource and deploy these systems for thispurpose.


Session 1: Impact of emerging technologies on the direction of strategic warfare

Andrew FutterSenior Lecturer in International PoliticsUniversity of Leicester

Dr Futter spoke on potential challenges toconfidence in the UK nuclear weapon systemfrom cyber, and noted that although this issue hadgained more attention in recent months,understanding of its implications remains in itsinfancy.

Dr Futter thought it clear, however,that cyber challenges could affect thewhole UK nuclear enterprise,although cyber attacks varyenormously in reach andimplications, from hacking andespionage to sabotage and attackscausing physical destruction.Moreover, attacks can be direct orindirect, in person and in situ or remote,and disabling or enabling, depending onwhether the aim is prevent function or cause anevent: in the worst case scenario, a missile launch.While most UK nuclear systems are not connectedto the Internet in any meaningful way, thesesystems do rely on networks, with complexsoftware which requires regular updating andpatching.

The biggest risk for submarines, said Dr Futter,is that hackers might sabotage weapons systemseither to cause accidental or unauthorizedexplosion or launch, or more likely to prevent thesystem working as planned. The most likelyscenario is that malware would be introducedduring the procurement phase or during softwareupdates, possibly to be activated remotely, butmore likely to be built in to activate under certainconditions.

Dr Futter added that cyber attacks might targetother systems that could cause the submarine tohave to return to port. State adversaries would bemost likely to target key systems to compromise

the submarine’s stealth, reactor or firecontrol systems. Non-state actors

might seek to cause a launch orexplosion to exacerbate a crisis,

or to target the reactor.The second concern is

interference withcommunications, such asjamming or spoofing with

misleading information, whichcan increase crisis instability. There

is evidence that hackers haveattempted to compromise systems used by

the US Navy, and one can assume attempts havebeen made against UK systems too.

A further concern is cyber espionage: the theftof operational secrets. The past is littered withallegations of this nature, including againstcontractors building the new Successor submarinesand defence contractors in the US.

In summary, Dr Futter proposed that we aremoving towards a much more complex andchallenging nuclear environment, of which cyberis only one of several complicating components;developments in other fields, such as missiledefence, precision targeting and space, will furthercompound future deterrence challenges. While heconcluded that this does not necessitate scrappingTrident imminently, it poses important questionsabout the future security environment in over adecade's time, when the first boat will bedeployed.

There is evidence that

hackers have attempted tocompromise systems used

by the US Navy, and one canassume attempts have been

made against UKsystems too.


Dr Heather WilliamsLecturer, Centre for Science and Security StudiesKing's College London

Dr Williams began her presentation by posingwhat she felt was the fundamental strategicquestion of the conference: whether emergence ofthese new technologies would underminecapabilities and jeopardize strategic stability andwhether there is a framework that we can use toapproach this.

In the 1960s new technology was the impetusfor developing the SALT and the ABM treaty,namely MIRV and missile defences. Anotherimpetus for developing the treaties was the CubanMissile Crisis and the need to improve stability.The third driver was cost. However the biggestissue in negotiating SALT and the ABM treaty wasaccepting parity and defining and acceptingsufficiency on both sides, with the need to satisfydomestic audiences also a key consideration.

Applying this framework for developing pasttreaties, and how that might inform how we dealwith new technologies, she said that there werethree routes that could be taken: an arms race;arms control; adapt; or a combination of all threeof these. Dr Williams' conclusion was thatadaptation was often the best route.

An arms race would mean engaging with anadversary in a 'like for like' race in the pursuit ofsuperiority and so rejecting parity.

Dr Williams stressed that arms control does notequate to disarmament. While it can include a rollback of capabilities and reductions it is essentiallyabout the management of weapons.

The third option is to adapt but, of course, allthree can work in conjunction with each other.

When considering the 'adapt' route Dr Williamssaid we needed to consider what we mean by astable environment and for her it is one wherethere is a low risk of escalation and, within thatsystem, self regulation. Measures such astransparency can be included or developingcountermeasures in response to an adversary'sdefence mechanism. However the key question iswhat is sufficiency and whether we are willing toaccept it.

Dr Williams posed the question of what theseroutes would mean in relation to Trident andSSBNs. An arms race route would mean, forexample, developing similar undersea roboticvehicles capabilities to go after an adversary inpursuit of superiority. This is costly however.The arms control route is complex and it is notclear which countries we are talking about, whichare active in engaging in these new technologiesrelating to SSBNs and what the bilateralrelationships are.

Dr Williams felt that the adapt route is the onethat needs further consideration. What wouldadaption to these emerging technologies look like?She gave an example of how creativity can bepertinent, a low tech answer to a high techproblem in the Netherlands where the Dutchpolice have trained eagles to pluck illegal dronesout of the air!

She also questioned what this would mean forthe US / UK nuclear relationship and whetherthere was a possible collaboration oncountermeasures.


Paul SchulteHonorary Professor Birmingham UniversityInstitute of Conflict Cooperation and SecuritySenior Visiting Fellow, Centre for DefenceStudies, King's College London

The US can be expected to develop technology toimprove sonar stealth in that more challengingPacific environment which the UK could acquireor share. Moreover SSBNs are fast and have nearlimitless range and the only way a UUV couldmatch these characteristics would be by nuclearpower. This would be exceptionally expensive andcreate a set of vulnerabilities.

Mr Schulte questioned what difference plausiblefuture UUV or other detection or trackingtechnologies would make in a significant nuclearcrisis:• Could enemy UUVs really consistently shadow

SSBNs, which have much greater hull length andtherefore theoretical speed?

• Could they be reliably controlled, given thedifficulties of underwater communications?

• Could they be ordered to timely pre-empt anSSBN missile launch?

• Could it be assumed that all the US, UK andFrench SSBNs would be preempted in that samemoment?

This strategy would carry high risk because itwould precipitate precisely the nuclear retaliationit was intended to preempt. By virtue of the waythat these postulated nuclear UUVs would have tooperate, their close presence would, in itself,indicate that a missile launch was in prospect.

These were daunting objections for anyonethinking to activate and continuously maintain afleet of expensive autonomous nuclear UUVs.

He remarked that scepticism about thecontinuing utility of the British SSBN programhad been widely reported in UK antinuclearpublications (and in Russian media seen asinstruments of transnational InformationWarfare.) He suspected that many would like tobelieve in the inevitable doom of UK Trident,despite the lack of conclusive evidence, and thatthis might complicate conscientious assessment ofthe technical risks and vulnerabilities of nationalsecurity arrangements.

Mr Schulte presented a sceptical unclassifiedstrategic analysis of the potential for futureUnderwater Unmanned Vehicles (UUVs) tocompromise SSBNs. He reminded the audiencethat anti-SSBN technologies had been intensivelystudied for the last 40 – 50 years.

The physical parameters of the sea, the vast area,its opaque and absorptive qualities, wouldcontinue to hinder the ability to detect SSBNs,unless there was an extraordinary breakthrough intechnologies: frequently postulated but neverproven. He pointed out that technologicaldevelopments would also include countermeasuressuch as spoofing, jamming, launchable decoys andenhanced detection and destruction of UUVs.Future countermeasures-counter countermeasuresraces are inherently uncertain.

Geography and law would also play a their part.Any hostile UUV caught in territorial waters,within the 12-mile limit, waiting to track anSSBN's exit would create a huge stir in peacetime,and be liable to quick destruction in times ofcrisis.

It is widely believed that no British SSBN hasever been detected, and the Cold War practice of'delousing', ridding the submarine of trackingmechanisms or followers, could be continued.Also during the Cold War, the Soviet Union hadbeen interested in Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW)“keep out zones”, or 'bastions', areas with a higherconfidence of preventing effective ASW. This, ifnecessary, could be one stabilising option tosupport maintaining nuclear deterrence. MrSchulte felt that Russia today was probably moreconcerned than anyone else about the survivabilityof its SSBNs at sea.

He questioned the risk to UK Successor, givenits very low sound levels and the legendary abilityof SSBN captains to manoeuvre. UK SSBNsoperate in the Atlantic which has much morebackground noise than the Pacific where the US,China and others patrol.


Dr Nick Ritchie Senior Lecturer in International Security University of York

Dr Ritchie observed that the practice of nucleardeterrence remains an abstract conceptual system,with only a slim empirical base, and that ourapproach to emerging technologies relies uponpopulating the future by imagining the impacts ofexisting or ‘plausible’ technology. In other words,there is inevitably a great deal of speculation.

Dr Ritchie encouraged us also to consider thepolitical role of Britain's nuclear weaponsdeployed at sea on submarines. The governmentnarrative has narrowed the role of UKnuclear weapons, and their politicalutility, to the idea of last resort.However, he argued that they arecurrently used for other purposes,including coercion and politicalsignalling, intimidation and so on,without necessarily an existentialdimension.

Dr Ritchie considered thepossibility of Russia attempting to holdat risk a UK ballistic nuclear submarine,and thought that these emerging technologieswould not affect the capacity of the UKgovernment to issue a credible nuclear threat intimes of crisis. The Russians would need toconsider an uncertain pre-emptive strike thatwould escalate a crisis, particularly if the UKsubmarine was on alert on 15 minutes to fire (as itwould be in a crisis). He thought this would bebeyond acceptable levels of risk and uncertaintyfor Russia.

The logic of nuclear deterrence, as deployed bythe UK government to justify our continuedretention of nuclear weapons, is very much underthreat, however. The government narrativeroutinely frames the case for Trident in terms ofcertainties, as the ‘ultimate insurance’ and‘guarantor’ of protection from all ‘nuclear nasties.’This rests on the idea of an assured second-strikecapability. However, he argued that this is a falsenarrative, deployed for marketing purposes.Numerous studies have shown that there arefundamental uncertainties associated with thetheory and practice of nuclear deterrence.

What these emerging technologies do is to addto these uncertainties and create new operationaluncertainties on top of existing political ones. Thisgives further weight to existing questions aboutthe deterrence value of UK nuclear weapons.

He added there are compound uncertaintiescreated by cyber capacity to disrupt submarinecommand and control operations and advances inballistic missile interception over the coming 20-40 years. We must be prepared, he said, to

consider the possibility that the technicalfeasibility to confidently secure a

second strike from nuclear weaponsis going to diminish and, on thebasis of that understanding ofnuclear deterrence, the practice ofnuclear deterrence could berendered intrinsically unstable.

This raises questions over theefficacy of nuclear-based conceptions

of national security, and could promptchanges in nuclear practice and

investment in alternative nuclear delivery systems.Dr Ritchie felt that there was insufficient

incentive for substantial investment in a masssystem of detection, tracking and targeting,particularly of SSBNs, in order to hold them atrisk and, more likely, we would see localisednetworked systems to target attack submarines.This could possibly be scaled up in future to anocean-wide surveillance system. However, ifnuclear adversaries could be brought to a sharedunderstanding of deterrence, one that privilegessubmarine-based nuclear second-strike asinherently stabilizing, then we may not see thedevelopment of these technologies in politicallymeaningful ways.

More likely, the direction of travel would be fortechnologically-induced nuclear instability andtherefore insecurity, of the type we see expressedby Russia with respect to the US missile defenceand conventional global prompt strike,compounded by any future US capacity to negateRussian SSBNs.

What theseemerging technologies

do is to add to theseuncertainties and create

new operationaluncertainties on top of

existing politicalones.


Audience and panel discussionAudience members noted that there are UUVsalready developed by the US and China that havethe capacity to match the speed of SSBNs unlessthe submarines broke cover and travelled at higherspeeds, thus compromising their abilities tomaintain stealth. It was also noted that there maybe no need for individual UUVs to 'chase' anSSBN, as instead many networkedsystems, including airborne assets,could be used to track an SSBN andrelay information between assets.The reintroduction of themaritime patrol aircraft (MPA)was an example.

It was suggested that, in future,there could be challenges inprocessing and filtering the sheerquantity of data gathered to make itmeaningful and useful.

Much of the discussion focused on theeffect that this trend towards greater oceantransparency will have on strategic stability. Thisraised the connected question of how perceptionsof strategic stability have changed, are interpreteddifferently by different nations, and now includeareas other than military force, such as culture andeconomics.

It was argued that the speed of development,proliferation and accessibility of this newtechnology will mean that traditional arms controlmodels will also need to evolve, taking intoaccount issues around verification, trust,confidence building measures, the possibilities forasymmetric arms control, and acceptable limits to

arms control. It was felt by someparticipants that this was a

particularly unpropitious momentfor arms control, and that theinternational environment willneed to mellow before therecould be further progress.

However it was noted thatthere is current intellectual

engagement on this new armscontrol architecture that would be

inclusive of perceptions of acceptabilityfrom China and France also.

The supremacy of US advanced conventionalweapons was also raised as a complicating factorin engaging Russia and China in nuclear weaponsreductions.

The complications arising from cyber warfarewere discussed and particularly how it mightdrastically impact the perceptions, understandingand escalation of a crisis situation. The need forinvestment in people and cyber hygiene was felt tobe the key to combating this.

...there may be no need for individual

UUVs to 'chase' an SSBN,as instead many networkedsystems, including airborne

assets, could be used to trackan SSBN and relay

information betweenassets


Session 2: Developments in sensing technologies

Professor Nicholas MakrisMassachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the Laboratory for Undersea Remote Sensing

Professor Makris spoke on developments ininstantaneous acoustic sensing of the underseaenvironment over areas spanning tens ofthousands of square kilometres using active andpassive Ocean Acoustic Waveguide RemoteSensing (OAWRS/POAWRS). These systemsrely on the capacity of the oceanenvironment to behave as an acousticwaveguide, in which soundpropagates over long ranges viatrapped modes. Therefore,generated sound waves sufferonly cylindrical spreading lossrather than the much greaterspherical loss suffered inconventional fish findingtechnologies.

Professor Makris stated that his goal as ascientist is to make the oceans as transparent aspossible, in order to understand it better, focussingon acoustic techniques. As sound travels at1.5km/s in water, Professor Makris noted thatusing OAWRS techniques, his team is able to viewa 100km diameter area in about 90 seconds andupdate the image every 90 seconds to make a'movie'.

They are able to detect different objects in thewater, from herring shoals containing manyhundreds of thousands of fish, to a small manmade object (a long cylindrical inflated fire hosearound 10m long), using different acoustic

frequencies that excite different resonances.While lower frequencies of around

200Hz are typically dominated byshipping noise, using a PassiveAcoustic Array his team can detectand localize many species ofwhales over areas spanning 400km in diameter, from hundreds ofthousands of whale calls each day.

His findings have been published injournals including Nature1 (passive

sensing/whales) and Science2 (activesensing). Sensors can be either bistatic

(sender and receiver separate) or monostatic(sender and receiver at roughly the same location).

2 “Here we use passive ocean acoustic waveguide remotesensing (POAWRS) in an important North Atlantic feedingground to instantaneously detect, localize and classify MMvocalizations from diverse species over an approximately100,000km square region.” Nature, Volume 531, 366–370(March 17, 2006)www.nature.com/nature/journal/v531/n7594/abs/nature16960.html

3 N.C. Makris, P. Ratilal, D. Symonds, S. Jagannathan, S. Lee,R. Nero, “Fish population and behavior revealed byinstantaneous continental-shelf-scale imaging,” Science,Volume 311, 660-663 (February 3, 2006)

...using a PassiveAcoustic Array his teamcan detect and localize

many species of whales overareas spanning 400 km in

diameter, from hundreds ofthousands of whale calls

each day.


Professor David Lane Ocean Systems Laboratory Edinburgh Centre for Robotics Heriot-Watt University

Professor Lane presented on three types ofbiomimetically inspired sensing.

Fish lateral line analoguesAt present, hydrodynamic imaging uses AcousticCurrent Doppler Profiles (ACDP) to measuremotion. However, fish have a sensor down thesides of their bodies called a fish lateral line whichmeasures fluid flow, and allows fish to buildhydrodynamic images of the animals, objects, andwater around them. Through a company called Lakshmi, ProfessorLane’s lab and European partners have beendeveloping a fibre optic cable analogue of the fishlateral line, laid on the sea floor to look at thewater above. Professor Lane gave two examples ofpotential applications: measuring the efficiency ofmarine renewable energy turbines, and cueingvessels in maritime surveillance includingsubmarines. The fish lateral line analogue couldalso be mounted on the side of surface orunderwater vessels.

Its potential ranges and other practical issues areunknown. However, using these technologies, theteam expects to be able to ‘build images that giveus good visibility of what’s happening in the water.’

In a side note, showing a video of a dead troutseeming to swim upstream, Professor Lane alsoobserved that fish bodies could inspire new typesof self-propulsion for underwater vehicles.

Bioinspired sonarDolphin sonar is able to distinguish an object assmall as a ping pong ball at the length of a footballpitch, and also distinguish the density of what itcontains. It also works at low frequencies (10-100Hz), and can therefore propagate over longdistances. By analysing dolphin ‘clicks,’ ProfessorLane and his team discovered that dolphins use a‘double down chirp’ structure: this allows them touse the slope of the down chirp, the timedifference between chirps, and their respectivepower levels to build up a complex picture of thewater space. Moreover, dolphins choose signalsthat will provide the greatest signal resolution eachtime they click. Professor Lane and his team,through a company called Hydrason, have beencreating a bioinspired sonar platform in order tosee inside objects. This is useful for viewing blockages in pipelines,or for sensing mines camouflaged as rocks andother objects that have been designed to blendinto the ocean environment.

Electric sensingAn EU Project called ANGELS (ANGulliformrobot with ELectric Sense), which Professor Lanehelped review, tried to recreate the electric sensethat some fish use to understand theirenvironment. This sense is limited to a fewcentimetres, but it is unaffected by visibility, candistinguish between friends, foe and food, andallow fish to see around corners (due to the natureof electromagnetic field patterns). Fish can alsobend their bodies to improve their sensorprocessing. ANGELS demonstrated that a small,eel-like AUV equipped with an electric sensecould navigate around an electric dipole in a tank,and while in the early stages, this type oftechnology could be applied widely to unmannedplatforms in future.


David HamblingFreelance Science Journalist and author of Swarm Troopers

Mr Hambling presented on what he called 'weirdscience': scientific discoveries that are not fullyunderstood and the future ramifications of whichare unclear, but that could be influential in future.

First, he discussed wake detection, as it is wellknown that submarines leave wakes astern. Themost obvious are the 'V' shaped wakes behind thevessel, and marine commanders are trained to staydeep in order to ensure that these wakes are noteasily picked up by radar or satellite. However, MrHambling told the audience, there are other waysto detect wakes, even at depth. He gave theexample of technology modelled on the ability ofharbour seals to pursue a fish from tens of metersaway using only their whiskers; artificial 'whiskers'of this nature could theoretically be fitted tounmanned underwater vehicles for submarinetracking.

Mr Hambling then discussed bioluminescence,the light emitted by marine micro-organismswhen disturbed. This was recognised as an issuefor submarines in World War I, and today it maybe possible to detect submarines using other kindsof luminescence outside of the visible spectrum.

Mr Hambling went on to discuss the sono-magnetic effect: weak electromagnetic fieldsgenerated by mechanical/acoustic vibrations of aconducting medium in a magnetic field. Though,in theory, it would be possible to detect a movingobject under water using this effect, calculationssuggest that the sono-magnetic effect of asubmarine is around 1,000 times weaker than themagnetic anomaly caused by the submarine's hull,so practical applications seem unlikely. However,in 1996 Dr James Peddle published three paperson unusual magnetic anomalies associated withunderwater objects. While there were no furtherreferences to this work in the literature, Dr Peddlewas soon appointed Technical Leader ofDetections Systems at the US Defense ResearchAgency, and subsequently Head of Sensor Systemsat DSTL and Defense Attaché in Washington. MrHambling felt it reasonable to assume that hisideas have not been entirely ignored.

Dr Peddle was looking at the 'Debye effect',discovered in 1933: the magnetic field generatedby the difference in movements between sodiumand chlorine ions in the sea. The US launched aprogramme to research the application of the'Debye effect' to detect submarines (Phase One),and, if the research proved positive, to build adetector (Phase Two). The company Cortana hasnow been awarded a Phase Two contract,indicating that Phase One was successful. Thiswork on the 'Debye effect' also references 'foreignwork' carried out in this field.

In the 1990s, Russian publications suggested thatwake anomaly detection was easier than magneticanomaly detection; however, Russian claims thatthey could track submarines using their wakeshave rarely been taken seriously in the West. MrHambling speculated that the Russians could havebeen using this capacity to detect submarines forthe last twenty years, unknown to others.Reducing submarine wakes is very challenging,but it is expected that Successor will be muchstealthier with respect to wake than any pastsubmarine.

Finally, Mr Hambling discussed the Aqua-Quad,an amphibious quadcopter drone that can float onthe water’s surface and lower sensors into thewater. It is highly adaptable and can re-chargeusing its solar powered cells, before flyingelsewhere. While currently in prototype stage,tests have been successful to date and it seemslikely that they will be operated by the US Navy inlarge numbers. The Aqua-Quad can also be fittedwith other kinds of sensor, such as hyperspectralsensors, thermal sensors, lateral line sensors, oreven future sensors as yet unknown as it has theadvantage of being able to deploy in the water

Mr Hambling concluded that hiding frominnovative sensing techniques that emerge overthe coming decades will be very difficult, becausethey will not have been anticipated at this stage inthe submarine's design and construction.


Professor David CaplinEmeritus Professor of PhysicsBlackett LaboratoryImperial College London

Professor David Caplin gave a presentation ondevelopments in magnetic anomaly detection.

He began by stating that it has been long knownthat any iron or steel object gradually becomesmagnetised by the Earth’s magnetic field.Submarines are regularly demagnetised(‘degaussed’). The effectiveness of degaussing isclassified, but for the purposes of discussionProfessor Caplin assumes that a submarine weighsabout 10,000 tons and that a highly efficientdegaussing would leave a residual magnetism of0.1%.

He went on to speak in more detail about onetype of magnetometer, the SuperconductingQuantum Interference Device (SQUID), thattypically can detect a small bar magnet athundreds of metres. As it detects magnetic fieldsby measuring the magnetic flux passing through a‘loop’, the larger the loop the more sensitive thedevice. Professor Caplin showed that SQUIDdetectors are being used to detect the tinymagnetic fields associated with electric currents inthe brain in magnetoencephalography techniques.

The magnetic signal from a submarine dropsaway as an inverse cube law, becoming smallerthan the Earth’s field a hundred metres away. Asubmarine’s signal may still be detectable by aSQUID from around 30km, but it would bedifficult to discriminate against the Earth’s field(requiring significant processing power). Thestandard geophysical approach to overcome thisissue is to connect two anti-parallel loops to oneSQUID that cancel the Earth’s uniformbackground field, but pick up the magnetic fieldgradient of the submarine. Spatial and temporalvariations in the complex ocean space would alsobe challenging to overcome.

The ability of a SQUID to sense a submarine isaugmented if the submarine’s magnetic signatureis known, and Professor Caplin suggested thatnaval labs are able to produce bespoke magneticanomaly detectors that are particularly responsiveto the kinds of signals given off by submarines. Infuture, Professor Caplin expects that data frommagnetic anomaly detection will be fused withother kinds of sensing data.

SQUIDs will become significantly more usefulin ASW if air or ocean temperaturesuperconductors are developed. Previouslysuperconductors had to be cooled to near absolutezero temperatures with liquid helium, but inrecent years, high-temperature superconductorshave been developed that work at temperatures of150K; however, this still requires liquid nitrogencooling, which complicates their deployment inanti-submarine warfare. Yet, given the manysurprises in the history of superconductivity, it ispossible that materials may eventually be foundthat superconduct at room or ocean temperatures,which might allow the deployment of very muchlarger flux loops, and so increase sensitivity byorders of magnitude.


Audience and panel discussion

In the discussion with the audience, variouscountermeasures were discussed.

Two methods of degaussing were mentioned:passing the submarine through a coil of wire, andinternal coil loops though which an electricalcurrent can be run, which effectively reduce themagnetic signature of the submarine by about99%. However, it was pointed out that as, forexample, magnetic anomaly detection (MAD)becomes more advanced, improvements tocounter detection will be developed. Yet, itis still very difficult and costly toretrofit a submarine to maintain thebalance of detection and countermeasures.

Countering both active andpassive acoustic detection overlarge distances through noisereduction, jamming andspoofing was also discussed.While noise cancellation ispossible for low frequency noise,such as is used in BOSE headphones,it is significantly more challenging todesign and deploy a system that can cancel allthe high and varied frequencies emitted along thelength of a submarine hull. Acousticdisplacements are tiny and it would be a majorchallenge to implement effective noise cancellationin the case of submarines. One would need tocreate complex active displacements over theentire hull, and, if these are not precisely correct,the submarine will transmit instead, with obviousopposite intention. Spoofing and jamming havetheir own problems; for instance, a suddenincrease in noise would be noted by an opponentand alert them to the presence of a submarine inthe locality. One would need to know exactlywhere the passive sensor is located and theoptimum distance to begin transmitting, and beable to transmit through 360 degrees. Again, itwas thought more likely that attempting jammingor spoofing would be counterproductive.

The practical range for submarine detectionusing the technology developments discussed inthe conference was also discussed. It wassuggested that the future emphasis would be onsmaller distributed sensors with shorter ranges.For example, MAD has a range of only 500 metersif using one aircraft but if using 1,000 smalldrones a much greater area can be coveredsimultaneously. One participant reflected that thetechnologies used 25 years ago had been thought

incredible at the time and inspired awe. In 25years time one can only imagine the

computational speed that will beroutinely possible, and the

knowledge and understanding ofpropagation through oceansthat will be available; it can beconfidently predicted thattechnology then will be verydifferent from what we have

now.Another issue discussed was

sensor fusion, and the differencethat networked systems would make in

future. For these to be effective, multiplesensors will have to have the capability to all workat compatible ranges and resolutions. This is achallenge as some sensors – optical sensors, forexample – work over short range underwaterwhile others – such as low frequency acousticsensors – work over longer ranges. Finding theoptimum overlap range and resolution is the key,and the potential resulting capability was said tobe fantastic when used properly, and very likely tobe crucial in future. There are commercialcompanies who are looking into this; inoceanography, sensor fusion is happening already.

'Big data' and machine learning is another areathat is becoming increasingly important. As anexample, the original Sound Surveillance System(SOSUS) network used to produce paper tracesthat the human staff had to read and analyse.Later, computer analysis became the norm, andtoday, analysis can be done on a smartphone.

While noisecancellation is possible for

low frequency noise, such as isused in BOSE headphones, it is

significantly more challenging todesign and deploy a system that

can cancel all the high andvaried frequencies emitted

along the length of asubmarine hull.


Session 3: Developments in marine robotic vehicles

Professor David Lane Ocean Systems Laboratory Edinburgh Centre for Robotics Heriot-Watt University

Marine and Terrestrial Robotics and Autonomy

In his second presentation, Professor Lanediscussed some of the emerging technologies thatmight influence the next generation of marinevehicle technologies and activities, stating thatautonomy will be the most importantdevelopment.

We can think about control of systems broadlyin three ways: manual control, shared-autonomy,or persistent autonomy. The last is characterised asan operation with limited recourse to the humanoperator for extended lengths of time, adapting toand interacting with unknown environments andrecovering from errors in task executions.

An example of a persistently autonomous vehicleis the Subsea 7, an advanced autonomousinspection vehicle developed by SeeByte and inuse by Shell for deep water inspections. Thisexhibits independent decision-making capabilitiesand the ability to recover from a limited numberof errors. However, the Subsea 7 is not wellequipped to deal with the unexpected and requiresa map of its environment to operate. This requiresrobust control in the presence of disturbances, andthis is developed using machine-learningtechniques.

Professor Lane showed that robots can be taughtskills through real-life training sessions, in whichthe robot is controlled by an operator in a lab.Rather than learning a simple sequence of actions,the robot learns a series of probabilities to enableit to offset unpredictable external disturbancesduring deployments. In a video, one robot wasbeing trained to clean anchor chains, whileanother was autonomously mapping a new andunfamiliar environment off western Scotland andadapting its mission in the presence of new objectsof interest.

Professor Lane’s team has been concentrating onan ‘internet of things’ approach, to allow variousvehicles to synchronise their situational awarenessand collaborate. Since bandwidth is limited in theundersea environment, these networks must besmart and synchronise the most important datafirst. As an example, Professor Lane showed avideo of an aerial drone working in collaborationwith, and providing navigational information for,a drone on the ground that had limited visualinformation about its environment. He stressedthat these vehicles should not be thought about inisolation, but in a systems context and purpose ofdata collection.

Operators cannot always communicateeffectively with a platform on mission under theocean. Professor Lane’s team invented the ‘back tothe future’ engine, whereby the operator is given aprediction of what should be happening under thewater based on vehicle mission plans, untilconnection is re-established and the displays areresynchronised.

Professor Lane predicts that, in future, thehardware of future robotic platforms will becomeincreasingly generic and innovation will movetowards downloadable software that increases thehardware’s capabilities; he draws an analogybetween apps and smartphones. In the marineenvironment, he believes that we will see aconvergence in unmanned surface and underwatervehicle hardware, which could be assignedmultiple kinds of mission.

He finished by quoting Bill Gates: ‘We alwaysoverestimate the change that will occur in twoyears but underestimate the change that will occurin ten.’ Professor Lane felt that change was comingfaster than we know and that in ten years it wouldbe very interesting to see where we are.


Professor Russell WynnChief ScientistMarine Autonomous and Robotics Systems (MARS) National Oceanography Centre (NOC) Southampton

Professor Wynn's presentation focused on theenvironmental research applications ofdevelopments in marine robotics but noted thatthe crossover to defence was self-evident. He saidthat there was a lot happening in this field. Hetalked of the huge discrepancy in cost between, forexample, the National Environmental ResearchCouncil (NERC) vessel RRS Discovery, which cost£75M and upwards of £20K per day to run, andunmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) that aremuch cheaper to purchase and operate. There is ahuge investment at present in marine autonomy,with the long-term goal of gaining more high-quality data at a lower cost to support scientificresearch.

The NERC MARS fleet now operates more than40 marine autonomous systems and the NERCcommunity has the capacity to develop innovativesensors to measure marine environments.

A typical high-powered, short range,autonomous underwater propeller driven vehicle(AUV) can operate at up to 6,000 meters waterdepth for two or three days, and can do manydifferent tasks, from mapping the seabed toperforming biological measuring. These systemshave been in use for a couple of decades.

Another platform is the submarine glider, theUS Navy being the biggest purchaser of these.NERC MARS has 30 of these relatively low-costvehicles. They have a buoyancy engine and cantravel through the water, surfacing every fewhours to transmit data and receive commands.These vehicles move relatively slowly but have anendurance of many weeks.

More recently, a number of unmanned surfacevehicles (USV) have been deployed on high profilemissions collecting data from the earth-seainterface, the most well known being the WaveGlider. Professor Wynn said there was a new USVcoming out almost every month, with manydifferent designs with different utilities, and thatthere would be many new designs in the next fewyears.

However, he added that training is key and thatall these vehicles need experienced pilots tooperate them.

The evolution of these vehicles is in developingdifferent capabilities. One is in increasingendurance from a couple of hours to a few days tomonths at a time. Another is in flexibility, throughplatforms that do not require a ship but that canbe rapidly and easily launched from a RIB or aslipway or beach.

Another development is in increasingcompatibility of AUV to work together with otherplatforms. For example, a long-range AUVworking at depth for a few weeks can transmit to aUSV via an acoustic link and then to the operatingvehicle via satellite, rather than to have to surfaceto transmit data. This procedure also improvesnavigational accuracy of the AUV.

Other combination examples are a USV that canrelease several small AUVs for rapid response;submarine gliders that can be dropped from aplane; or vehicles that can fly to an area and theninto the water to do AUV work. Hybrid vehiclesare frequently coming online.


Professor Wynn said that NOC deliberatelyoperates 'dumb' vehicles, with intelligent pilotsand scientists, but the trend is to have moreintelligence onboard the vehicles. He gave anexample of an AUV at 6,000 meters depth that canrecognise when it has found something interestingand, rather than continue with its pre-programmed mission, will hone in on that featureof interest. Vehicles can also process the hugeamount of data they gather to determine whichdata are of interest for transmission, so keepingcosts down and reducing the burden on theinterpreters at base.

Platforms are reducing in cost, from around£1m for a large deep-water AUV withmultiple high-power sensors to smallerUSVs costing just tens of thousands,with miniaturized platforms evencheaper.

To achieve long endurance,speed has to be kept down, somany research vehicles travel atwalking or running speed for longperiods.

AUVs can now operate under iceand in the deepest parts of the ocean, at6,000 meters for example, and in verychallenging environments. They are able to map acanyon, for example, in 3D in high resolution and,if they note a feature of interest, can be used inconjunction with a Remotely Operated Vehicle(ROV) to obtain a map resolution of millimeters ifneeded. The ROVs can relay this information inreal time.

Another development is in propeller-drivenAUVs that can be deployed for weeks or monthsat a time, dive to 6,000 meters and travelthousands of kilometers. By keeping speed down,with developing battery performance andminiaturizing sensors, efficiency is maximizedenabling the vehicles to occupy choke points forweeks or months at a time. Other vehicles canpotentially be deployed to an area then hibernatefor months, wake up to switch on sensors andthen hibernate again, repeating the process.

NERC MARS assets anywhere in the world canbe controlled from NOC Southampton and any ofthe fleet data can be controlled from an Internet

connection. From his iPhone, ProfessorWynn can see the location of any

member of his fleet and the datathey are collecting, and cancommunicate with the pilots todirect the UUVs as needed inreal time. There is also the abilityto switch sensors on and off, andaccess images and other data via

satellite link-up in real-time.Submarine gliders are particularly

useful for collecting and compressingmany thousands of profiles, while

communicating in real-time. USVs are best usedin hostile open ocean environments with manydifferent types of sensors and data layers,communicating continuously by satellite.

A current aim is to network existinginfrastructure with these new autonomousplatforms and to handle efficiently the massiveamount of data generated.

Professor Wynn mentioned the coming exercise'Unmanned Warrior', in which the NationalMarine Facilities MARS fleet will take part. Hesaid that the stated aim of this exercise is todemonstrate how unmanned capabilities canenhance and potentially replace manned forces fordefence.

By keeping speeddown, with developing

battery performance andminiaturizing sensors,

efficiency is maximizedenabling the vehicles tooccupy choke points for

weeks or months at atime.


Brendan HylandFounder and Chairman of WFS (Wireless For Subsea) Technologies

WFS Technologies builds primarily radio-basedunderwater wireless communications systems thatare branded as Seatooth. Mr Hyland gave apresentation on undersea WiFi and LiFi.

Radio-based communications underwater have ashort-range functionality, akin to Bluetooth orWiFi. Mr Hyland noted that the potential forunderwater electromagnetic (EM)communications has been noted sporadically sincethe Victorian period, but little progress has beenmade until recently. During the Cold War, systemswere developed in the US, UK, France and Russiafor very low frequency radio communications forsubmarines (around 78-82Hz), but work stoppedafter the 1960s, largely because of the challengingnature of EM propagation in water and becausestates were more interested in longer rangecommunications technologies.

WFS Technologies began developing EMcommunications technologies in 2004, and todaysell off-the-shelf products for a range ofapplications, primarily in the oil and gasindustries. Mr Hyland gave the example of an oilplatform in the North Sea, in which his teamplaced around a dozen wireless nodes 30 metresapart to carry out long-term asset integritymonitoring. In the last 12-18 months, they havebeen investigating the possibilities of defenceapplications.

WiFi systems are effective in littoral waters, asthey are not affected by turbidity, bubbles or sea-life; they can easily cross the water-air boundary;they can be easily encrypted at each end; and thesignal ranges can be limited, which could beuseful in defence applications. Using carrierfrequencies in the orders of several kHz or MHz,the propagation velocity of EM is also significantlyhigher than that of an acoustic equivalent, leadingto low latency within systems.

Finally, wireless communication systems arerelatively low cost and resilient. However, EMsystems are relatively short range in seawater, withaggressive attenuation (around 55Db per , orwavelength) and a maximum practical range inthe order of 2 ; the range is, to an extent, afunction of the carrier frequency of the system inwater.

Mr Hyland suggests that EM communicationsare neither better nor worse than acoustic oroptical, but rather, have different functionalitiesand applications. Optical systems can deliver highbandwidth, but require a good line of sight and arerelatively susceptible to turbidity. Acousticsystems, though long range in deeper water,struggle in littoral waters. Accordingly, Mr Hylandadvocates creating fused communications systems,whereby underwater communications nodes usewhatever means are available to transmit the data,just as smart phones swap seamlessly betweenBluetooth, 3G and 4G, without any obviouschange to the user.

WFS Technologies’ EM devices communicatetypically at around 100 bits per second (bps),which is fit for purpose in process control systemstransmitting simple data. With relatively lowpropagation losses, they have ranges of around40m through seawater, 200m through air, or 200-250m through the seabed (but he suggested thiscould increase to around 1km). These types ofwireless communication can penetrate concreteblankets or several meters of ice; Mr Hyland builta demonstrator system a few years ago to find anAUV lost under 5m of ice, with a further range of750m in air. Bandwidth increases to 100,000 bpsin 5m seawater ranges, and WiFi-type devices canbe used to communicate around 10-100m bps atabout 1cm, replacing wet mating connectors.


Mr Hyland presented a number of futurescenarios for these technologies, echoing ProfessorLane’s expectation of a subsea ‘internet of things’.He imagines long networks of wireless sensorsextending for several miles into littoral watersfrom the shore, for environmental and shippingchannel monitoring, and which could evenfunction as undersea ‘landing strips’. He expectsdata processing to take place increasingly on theseabed, to minimise the energy requirements oftransmission. Although these technologies arealready energy efficient, staying in an always-oncondition for 10-20 years on modest battery packs,the technologies will benefit from furtherimprovements in battery technology.

In addition WFS Technologies is working onwireless (inductive) power transfer systems, seeinga need for wireless docking for AUVs permanentlydeployed at the seabed in 5-10 years. He alsoenvisages wireless networks being a key enablerfor collaboration between divers and AUVs,allowing them to communicate, transmit dataincluding video and locate themselves in relationto others. Finally, WFS Technologies is exploringways to integrate existing conventional, above-surface wireless systems with their underwatersystems.

Audience and panel discussion

Optimum systems for undersea communications– and a comparison between acoustics, optics andwireless in terms of data transfer, bandwidth andrange – were discussed. It was felt that userswould keep it simple and match thecommunications solution to therequirements. It was said to be aquestion of systems engineering,designing the architecture for thevehicle's capabilities andcommunications networkstogether. It was noted that it wasinformation, rather than raw data,that was typically required. The'smarter' the vehicle, the less data willneed to be transferred, and therefore, theless bandwidth needed.

For example, in one scenario in which theoperation lasted weeks at a time and at a depth ofthousands of meters, the optimum

communications would be acoustic, givinglow bandwidth but able to maintain

communication for long periods overa long distance. In another

scenario, in a field installation inthe oil and gas industry, wherethere is a seabed infrastructure,ROVs can communicate usingoptical communications using a

high bandwidth over a shortdistance of around 100 meters

maximum. Both these systems arebeing developed at present.

The most likely direction of development forundersea WiFi will be undersea docking stations.At the moment, this is being driven by the USDepartment of Defense with the Office of NavalResearch, and will incorporate various levels ofwireless communications.

One issue that was felt to need more focus forcollaborative effort was in third party softwaresecurity networks for marine vehicles, particularlyfor use in defence.

The most likelydirection of developmentfor undersea WiFi will be

undersea docking stations. Atthe moment, this is being

driven by the US Departmentof Defense with the Office

of Naval Research.


Session 4: Strategic challenges specific to the UK and Successor

Paul Ingram Executive Director of BASIC

Mr Ingram introduced the final session, statingthat it would pick up the discussion from the firstsession on the consequences of this emergingtechnology on strategic related decisions ondeployment, declaratory policy, submarinepatrols, deterrence and arms control.He posed the question of whetherthe future possibility of anemerging capability to neutralizeSSBNs would change thesecurity calculus of nations.Should the US achieve asignificant advantage throughthe deployment of suchtechnology would it, for example,be tempted to pursue a policy ofstrategic dominance, and what effectwould this have on strategic stability?

In the context of the UK and the parliamentarydecision on Successor, he reminded the audiencethat in the 16-17 years until the current predicted'in service' date for Successor, there will be a largenumber of ASW technology iterations. Thetechnologies considered in the conferenceinvolved, sensors, platforms, networked systems,cheap disposable UUVs (but probably not nuclearpowered UUVs), a mix of static and unmannedmobile underwater, and surface and airborneassets.

Taken together, and with manned assets, theseinnovations could lead to a situation in whichenhanced ASW compromises the stealth of SSBNs,to an extent that strategic stability is affected.

Given that the rationale for SSBNs is basedon stealth, this raises the question of

whether SSBNs are the appropriateplatform for UK's nuclear

weapons.The question, he stated, was

about assessing and managingrisk. A challenging judgementto make in a deeply uncertain

future, in which neithercontinued submarine stealth nor a

technical revolution can be reliablyassured. However, one certainty is that

there will be relevant technologicalchanges, and the need to address reducing risksand managing responsibilities was a driver inputting together this conference.

Should the USachieve a significant

advantage through thedeployment of such technology

would it, for example, be temptedto pursue a policy of strategicdominance, and what effect

would this have onstrategic stability?


Dominick JenkinsIndependent philosopher

Dr Jenkins noted that recent historical researchshows that the Admiralty developed a highly-effective machinery for managing publicperceptions in the early twentieth century.

He described how the operations of largebattleships and naval reviews were well reported,yet while the Admiralty was sceptical ofsensationalist claims that German battleships weremaking Britain vulnerable to invasion, theseclaims were not denied publically and Britain’sactual strategy was kept secret.

Resultantly, while the public believed that thebig battleship was the ultimate weapon, men at thecentre of decision making – such as First Sea LordAdmiral Sir John “Jackie” Fisher and his pupil, thecivilian head of the Royal Navy, WinstonChurchill – took a very different view. Rather,they believed that industrialisation had madecountries more dependent on world trade for foodand raw materials.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Liberal Democrat member of the House of Lords

Baroness Miller highlighted the importance of thehumanitarian conferences initiative, bringingtogether many of the nations of the world toaddress nuclear dangers when the nuclearweapons possessors have failed to do so. Shepointed to the 16-year stalemate in the Conferenceon Disarmament, and more recent stalled progressin arms control.

Baroness Miller expressed disappointment in thequality of recent Parliamentary debates, whichwere dominated by the split within the LabourParty, leaving more substantive issues such asemerging vulnerabilities and risk overlooked.

She also said that the younger generation wasdisengaged, even though these decisions willstrongly affect their future.

She drew parallels with the changed approach toclimate change, which originally had beencharacterised by prejudice and fixed positions.This changed with a draft bill to discuss consensusaround climate change that drew out the issues.She called for a cross-party discussion on Tridentaround consensus-building.

Baroness Miller also raised Brexit and attendantuncertainties over Britain’s position in the world,making it difficult to take firm decisions onmilitary and foreign policy.

They developed new technologies – such assubmarines and torpedoes for defence, and fastcruisers and radio to destroy commerce – as a wayof maintaining British naval supremacy, at a timewhen Britain could no longer out-build its rivals.However, in order to gain the necessary funds forthis development, they let the public, Parliament,and ministers believe that more battleships wereneeded to deter a German invasion.

Dr Jenkins questioned whether the machineryfor managing public perceptions of navalcapabilities had been abandoned, or simplyrefined?

His perception was that, in the British case, thereal official view may be that advances in ASWmay have already made nuclear submarinesvulnerable to detection. Indeed, Dr Jenkinsconcluded, in the case of America, naval officialsopenly state that the United States should fundnew ASW and new SSBNs to maintain US navalsupremacy across the world’s oceans, rather thanfor defence.


Tom McKaneFormer DG Security Policy MoD Visiting Senior Fellow LSE Ideas Senior Fellow RUSI

Mr McKane began by defining the UK's currentnuclear weapons policy: one in which a UKnuclear weapon would be fired in only narrowlydefined circumstances. The phrase used by allgovernments has been, and remains,that it is to protect the 'UK's vitalnational interests'. He concededthat it was extremely difficult todefine these precisely in thecurrent domestic orinternational security climate,but still felt that one could notrule out future threats and thatnot having the nuclear deterrentcould place the UK in severe peril.Mr McKane said that thegovernment was not complacent,however, and that there were regular seriousdebates within government looking at differentaspects of nuclear policy and options. He gave theTrident Alternatives Review (TAR) as an exampleof this.

He commented on the assumed correlationbetween studies of the emerging technologiesdiscussed at the conference and the efficacy of

SSBNs. He asked what other nuclear weaponsystem would give a better second-strike

option for the UK. This was not todismiss concerns on the technical

vulnerability of SSBNs, but ratherto note that there was littlereason to consider this arevolution so much as anevolution in the oldcompetition between the

detector and the submarine. Onereason for this is the size of the

oceans and the available space forsubmarines to operate in; these

operational advantages, he stated, areunlikely to be overcome. Continuous at-SeaDeterrence (CASD) would remain the best optionfor all the reasons set out in the TAR, in anycircumstance short of complete transparency ofthe oceans. He agreed with other speakers on thedifficulties of verifying the non-use of these newtechnologies.

This was not todismiss concerns on the

technical vulnerability ofSSBNs, but rather to note that

there was little reason to considerthis a revolution so much as anevolution in the old competition

between the detector and thesubmarine.


Audience and panel discussionThe suggestion of 'bastions' for submarines

discussed earlier in the conference was also felt tobe unrealistic, given the number of othertechnologies available that we had not touched onin the conference and the possibilities of ballisticmissile interception from the boundaries of thebastion; moreover, the development of stealthy

unmanned vehicles such as the US Navy’sGhostSwimmer could penetrate a

bastion covertly.It was felt to be undeniable thatchange is coming, and the issueis how this could be managed.The difference to historicaltechnological changes wasthought to be the speed withwhich technologies are being

developed, the likely unevendevelopment of ASW

technologies compared to thesubmarines themselves, and the

subsequent changing role for submarines.One of the limitations in discussing this issue wasthe secrecy that surrounds it. However, it is clearthat the US is spending a vast amount on bothdeveloping UUVs and in looking at thevulnerability of submarines, while they and othernations are continuing to pursue sea-basedstrategic nuclear arsenals.

It was reiterated that the overarching issue wasone of risk assessment. Analysts approach thisfrom their own perspectives, and often from apolarized conception of risk, with respect to whatnuclear weapons do, both positively andnegatively, to the international system, strategicstability, alliance relationships, global governance,costs and moral calculations. It was recognised tobe a complex issue, and one that until now hadnot been properly debated.

In the final discussion, a number of participantsgave their views on points made throughout theconference.

It was pointed out that the humanitarianinitiative was not intended purely to be adiscussion on the morality of nuclear weapons,but was also intended to awaken the non-nuclearweapon states, as well as the nuclear states,to their responsibilities for multilateralnuclear disarmament. It camethrough a desire for actualdisarmament rather than armscontrol and the initiative hashelped to change the normativeand legal context of nuclearweapons, leading todiscussions in the UN on theprohibition of nuclear weapons.

One participant expressed theopinion that the technologiesdiscussed at the conference wereevolutionary and not revolutionary and thatthere was already in existence a group ofextremely able, independent scientists andtechnical experts in the UK who have a full timerole in monitoring and analysing the vulnerabilityof SSBNs and the countermeasures available.

Various points were made on arms control inrelation to emerging technologies discussed in theconference. It was suggested that ways forwardcould include a limitation on the development and/ or use of these technologies, but this was felt tobe unrealistic because of the dual-use nature of thetechnologies discussed and the difficulties inverification.

The difference to historical technological

changes was thought to be thespeed with which technologies arebeing developed, the likely unevendevelopment of ASW technologies

compared to the submarinesthemselves, and the subsequent

changing role forsubmarines.


About the conference organisers

British PugwashBritish Pugwash is the UK arm of the Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs. We use the best scientific expertise, including from Pugwash'sinternational network, to inform the government and the public about issuesrelating to weapons of mass destruction - especially nuclear weapons andnuclear power - issues of war and peace, the environment and the socialresponsibility of scientists.Address: Ground Floor Flat, 63A Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3BJEmail: [email protected] Tel: +44 (0)20 7405 6661British Pugwash Trust Charity registered in England 297539

britishpugwash.org

BASIC BASIC (British American Security Information Council) is a think tankbased in Whitehall, London, taking a uniquely non-partisan, dialogue-basedand inclusive approach to promoting global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The organisation works closely with policy makers and seeksto facilitate constructive engagement between individuals from differentgeographical, political or cultural backgrounds on traditionally sensitive orcomplex issues, and create space for new and diverse perspectives. Inaddition to emerging undersea technologies, BASIC’s research programmesinclude the UK’s role in multilateral disarmament and the emerging conceptof responsibility in nuclear governance.

www.basicint.org

University of Leicester'The University of Leicester, in association with the UK Economic andSocial Research Council (grant number ES/K008838/1) were proud tosupport this initiative. The University of Leicester is a leading internationaluniversity with a reputation for excellent teaching and world-class research.The newly formed School of History, Politics and International Relations atthe University of Leicester supports a wide range of research intocontemporary nuclear weapons issues, and offers a wide range of bothundergraduate and graduate courses in International Relations and StrategicStudies. The ESRC is the UK's largest organisation for funding research oneconomic and social issues. It supports independent, high quality researchwhich has an impact on business, the public sector and civil society. At anyone time it supports over 4,000 researchers and postgraduate students inacademic institutions and independent research institutes.

le.ac.uk & www.esrc.ac.uk

The organisers are grateful to The Liberal Club for their hospitality.Photo on right (cc) Roberts Cutts

We also wish to thank Network for Social Change, Polden PuckhamCharitable Foundation, and Economic and Social Research Council

(ESRC) for making this event possible.

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