ImaginationFirst published Mon Mar 14, 2011

To imagine something is to form a particular sort of mental representation of that thing. Imagining istypically distinguished from mental states such as perceiving, remembering and believing in thatimagining S does not require (that the subject consider) S to be or have been the case, whereas thecontrasting states do. It is distinguished from mental states such as desiring or anticipating in thatimagining S does not require that the subject wish or expect S to be the case, whereas the contrastingstates do. It is also sometimes distinguished from mental states such as conceiving and supposing, onthe grounds that imagining S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S,whereas the contrasting states do not.

Contemporary philosophical discussions of the imagination have been primarily focused on three setsof topics. Work in philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology has explored a cluster of issuesconcerning the phenomenology and cognitive architecture of imagination, examining the ways thatimagination differs from and resembles other mental states both phenomenologically and functionally,and investigating the roles that imagination may play in the understanding of self and others, and inthe representation of past, future and counterfactual scenarios. Work in aesthetics has focused onissues related to imaginative engagement with fictional characters and events, identifying and offeringresolutions to a number of (apparent) paradoxes. And work in modal epistemology has focused on theextent to which imaginability—and its cousin conceivability—can serve as guides to possibility.

Because of the breadth of the topic, this entry focuses exclusively on contemporary discussions ofimagination in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. (For an overview of historical discussionsof imagination, see the sections on pre-twentieth century and early twentieth century accounts ofmental imagery in the corresponding Stanford Encyclopedia entry; for a more detailed andcomprehensive historical survey, see Brann 1991. For a sophisticated and wide-ranging discussion ofimagination in the phenomenological tradition, see Casey 2000.)