image, issues, and machinery: presidential campaigns in post-1986 philippines

114

Image, issues, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 PhilippinesJulio C. Teehankee

Abstract

This paper will explore the political terrain leading to the 2010

presidential election. It seeks to understand the nature of presidential

campaigns in post-authoritarian Philippines. Utilizing survey data,

it will trace trends that reflect continuity and change in Filipino

voting behavior. Moreover, it will apply the analytical tools of political

marketing, such as market segmentation and candidate positioning,

in identifying the key elements that contributed to a successful

presidential campaign in the three most recent electoral cycles.

The paper notes that electoral campaigns in the post-authoritarian

period have been waged with competing narratives of reformism,

populism and clientelism. The tradition of Filipino-style reformist

politics has been revived in the issue-based anti-corruption and good

governance campaigns. Meanwhile, continued clientelism and money

politics have manifested themselves in the machine-based campaigns

that have eroded the gains of reformism. The failure of reform

politics to address the problem of poverty, coupled by the ascendancy

of the mass media, has fueled the image-based populist campaigns.

Ultimately, the rise of media and public opinion polling as influential

conduits between national candidates and the electorate underscores

the need to find the right mix and astute use of image, issues and

machinery.

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 115

Three presidential elections have been held in the Philippines

since the restoration of democratic rule in 1986. The elections

of 1992 and 1998 have demonstrated the efficacy of a smooth and

legitimate transition of power while the experience of 2004 exposed

the corroding effects of a stolen election. The 2010 presidential

election offers an institutional mechanism for addressing the crisis of

legitimation triggered by the presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

While the familiar elements of 1992, 1998, and 2004 are evident

in the upcoming 2010 campaign, new factors are coming into play.

Consequently, the outcome of the 2010 presidential election is

crucial for political change since the “effects a president has on the

benefits enjoyed by the citizenry go far beyond policies: a president

provides moral and social cues to the country . . . elections integrate

the country and provide the common symbols which inform public

discourse” (Popkin, 1991: 3). Ultimately, how a presidential candidate

wages a campaign, gives some cue to how a president will govern

after victory. And in most instances, “an effective president is one who

has projected an effective image of himself [or herself].” (Philippine

Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004: 5)

This paper is an exposition on the nature of presidential

campaigns in the post-Marcos political period. It seeks to provide a

historical review of Filipino voting behavior since 1992 and analyze

the trends that reflect continuity and change in Philippine presidential

elections. The paper will identify the key elements that contributed

to a successful presidential campaign in the three most recent

presidential electoral cycles. Moreover, it also aims to provide a brief

backgrounder for the coming 2010 presidential election.

Presidential campaigns in the Philippines

Despite the growth in the literature on Philippine electoral studies

through the years, only a handful of works have focused specifically

on a scholarly analysis of Filipino voting behavior in presidential

elections. Thus far, only three significant studies have been written

116

on this area in the past 40 years: Hirofumi Ando’s statistical study of

voting patterns in pre-martial law presidential elections published in

1969; Carl Lande’s geographical and statistical analysis of the 1992

presidential election published in 1996; and more recently, Yuko

Kasuya’s groundbreaking work, published in 2009, on the unstable

effects of single-term presidential elections on the post-authoritarian

Filipino party system.1 This paper would like to contribute to the scant

study of Filipino voting behavior by providing a review of presidential

campaigns in the post-authoritarian period from the perspective of

political marketing. It will draw extensively from data culled by Lande’s

1996 study; the comprehensive survey data compiled by the Social

Weather Stations (SWS) since 1992, and Pulse Asia since 2004.

The marketing of the president

Political marketing offers a more pragmatic framework for thinking

about electoral campaigns that “contrasts with the explanatory and

scientific intent of the traditional academic approach to analyzing

political campaigns” (Mauser, 1983: 2). The application of marketing

principles in politics allow for the use of standard marketing tools and

strategies, such as polling research, market segmentation, targeting,

positioning, strategy development and implementation. From this

perspective, “the voter can be analyzed as a consumer in the political

marketplace using the same models and theories in marketing that are

used to study consumers in the commercial marketplace. And both are

1 Ando’s study analyzed the pattern of Filipino voting in presidential and senatorial elections from 1946 to 1965. He utilized three main independent variables in explaining partisan voting: party identification, linguistic affiliation and socio-economic status. Ando identified linguistic affiliation as having the best explanatory power of the three. Lande, on the other hand, investigated the first presidential election in the post-Marcos era. Using statistical techniques, he correlated the result of the 1992 election with 37 demographic variables of the Philippine census. Similar to Ando’s finding, Lande demonstrated that ethno-linguistic division was a highly significant influence on voting behavior at the dawn of the post-authoritarian era. More recently, Kasuya argued that presidential elections in the post-authoritarian period are characterized by an observed instability of inter-party competition. She identified two factors that have contributed to this instability: 1) the increased number of candidates; and 2) the frequent appearance and disappearance of new parties.


dealing in competitive marketplaces and, as such, need to rely on

similar approaches to winning (but each may have several distinct

options)” (Newman, 1994: 11).

In political marketing terms, there are two crucial factors in

winning votes in an election (see Figure 1). The first is the “push

factor” or the organization that will deliver the votes to a particular

candidate. The other is the “pull factor” or the characteristics that will

attract voters to a candidate. The former is geared towards command

votes, while the latter is aimed at attracting market votes. In applying

these basic marketing principles to political campaigns,

the exchange process centers on a candidate who offers political leadership in exchange for a vote from the citizen. The product in politics is the campaign platform, and marketing would require that research and polling be done to help shape the platform of the candidate. More than the platform itself, the image, or impression, is what the candidate leaves in the mind of the voter. An image is created by the use of visual impressions that are communicated by the candidate’s physical presence, media appearances and experiences and record as a political leader. (Newman, 1994: 10)

Candidate

Pull Factor Push Factor

Figure 1: Pull and Push Factors in Elections

The increased use of political marketing techniques coincides

with the increasing dominance of media, particularly television,

and the growing influence of political consultants in electoral

campaigns around the world. There is a growing trend towards the

118

“hybridization” of campaign practices in media-centered democracies,

or “a combination of modern media-centered campaign practices

with traditional organization-based mobilization strategies, relying on

networks of supporters and activists” (Plasser & Plasser, 2002: 349).

This trend in global political campaigning is also evident in Philippine

electoral politics, which continues to operate according to its own

unique traditional dynamics despite the growing influence of media-

driven campaigns (see Figure 2.)

Command votes, bailiwicks and machineries

In Philippine elections, command votes are blocs of votes that are

gathered and delivered through traditional networks such as political

machines and bailiwicks, usually negotiated through leaders and

gatekeepers.2 Bailiwicks (baluarte) refer to the candidate’s natural

sphere of influence, commonly determined by his or her ethno-linguistic,

regional or provincial attachments. The ethno-linguistic vote, as

demonstrated in the past two presidential elections, is the most secure

source of votes for a national candidate. Hence, a national candidate

must immediately factor it in his or her electoral calculations.

2 The standard approach to analyzing Filipino electoral and party politics has been to view power relations within the context of the patron-client factional (pcf) framework. The pcf framework highlights the interpersonal, specifically the familial and patron-client, nature of Philippine politics in a rural society (Lande, 1965; Kerkvliet, 1995). Another study has concluded that elite-dominated factions and their bifurcated inter-familial rivalries have been replaced by local political machines geared towards multi-factionalism and characterized by the alliance of factions into temporary blocs. This trend was further reinforced by the breakdown of the two-party system and the emergence of a multi-party system (Kimura, 1992). The onslaught of economic transformation and increased social mobilization has largely depersonalized patron-client relations in the rural areas. Thus, the reciprocal relationship between leader and followers has become contractual in nature. The potency of the kinship system as an instrument of patronage has diminished and has been replaced with the emergence of machine politics (Kawanaka, 2002).


Political machines are specialized organizations set up for the

purpose of mobilizing and influencing voter outcome through the

dispensation of social, economic or material benefits. These benefits

are essentially patronage in the form of jobs, services, favors and

money distributed to voters and supporters. There are essentially

three types of political machines in the Philippines – money-based

(organized largely through the use of money), party-based (organized

around local and national political leaders and gatekeepers), and

government-based (organized primarily through access to government

personnel and resources). These three are oftentimes structured on

top of each other.

Market votes, image and issues

Market votes are votes that have to be identified, targeted and

attracted from various segments of the electorate. Similar to the

market, the dominant brand is the most popular one. Hence, market

votes are translated into political support by way of popularity that

is gauged and reflected in regular public opinion surveys. There are

essentially two factors that will draw or repel market votes to a

candidate – image and issues. Image is the general perception by the

Electorate

Comm and Votes Market Votes

Bail iwick Mach ine Popularity

Money Party Government Image Issue

Figure 2: Classification of Votes

Command Votes

120

electorate of a particular candidate (whether positive or negative). On

the other hand, issues are the major concerns of the electorate that they

hope the candidates will address when elected into public office.

Candidates usually attempt to address these concerns through their

campaign message and platform. Again, similar to market competition,

candidates have to distinguish themselves from others by projecting

an ideal image and articulating the proper issue or issues in the hope

of gaining popularity in the surveys. Competition among candidates

to capture large chunks of the market vote is usually waged through

the mass media – both print and broadcast. Moreover, “politics is no

longer just addition. In the age of mass media, politics is image-making.

Amplified by television and advertising, a politician’s image in the

public’s collective mind is greater than the sum of his actual attributes,

assets and accomplishment” (Philippine Center for Investigative

Journalism, 2004: 5). Candidate images are “cognitive representations

and, to a considerable extent, people’s image of things [that] rules the

way they behave, regardless of how close to reality their images are”

(Laylo & Dayag-Laylo, 1999: 3).

The Institute for Political and Economic Reforms (IPER) conducted

two “psychographic” studies that profiled the voting behavior of the

Filipino electorate in 1995 and 2003. In 1995, the top four factors

for voters choice were: 1) popularity, 2) endorsement of traditional

network and organization, 3) characteristics that can be of benefit to

the voter, and 4) party program. By 2003, the ranking of the factors had

significantly changed into: 1) the benefit factor, 2) political machinery, 3)

popularity, and 4) endorsement of traditional network and organization

(cited in Co et al., 2005).

The decision to mobilize either command or market votes relies

largely on a myriad of factors that include political opportunity,

personal attributes and/or resources available to individual candidates

or political parties. The identification of image, issues and machinery

in this paper refers to the predominant electoral strategy waged by a

presidential campaign. Of course, these categories are not absolute


and may actually overlap into mixed strategies in actual presidential

campaigns.

Ascendancy of media

Given the physical, financial and logistical impossibility of

personally facing the electorate in a national campaign, media has

emerged as the most efficient and cost-effective way of communicating

with the public. Broadcast media (radio and television) has emerged as

the primary source of news and information for the public. Broadcast

media, with an audience reach in the millions, has supplanted print

media, which is circulated in the hundreds of thousands. However,

while broadcast media has the most audience reach, it tends to

have less substance since everything is reduced into a two- or three-

sentence sound byte. On the other hand, print media offers much

space for elaborate explanations (Carandang, 2004).

Within broadcast media, television has replaced radio as the

source of information for the masses. This trend has been manifested

since the late 1980s when television sets were sold by the hundreds

of thousands. Programming and language shifted from English to

Tagalog to reach the mass audience. By 1995, some 57 percent of

households nationwide had TV sets. This figure has risen to 85 percent,

as of 2001 (Coronel, 2003). In 2001, a 13-year old law banning political

advertising was lifted, thus opening the floodgates of media-related

expenditures for political campaigns. The 2004 elections “marked the

first time that presidential candidates spent more than half of their

total campaign expenses on advertising” (Gloria et al., 2004: 30) (see

Table 1).

122

Table 1: Commercial and Political Ads from January to May 2004 (in million pesos)

TV Radio Print Total

Nonpolitical Ads 2,216.25 2,016.55 598.17 4,830.97

Political Ads 1,405.67 530.07 53.66 1,989.40

Source: Gloria et al., 2004

The media has eroded the vote-delivery potential of the political

machinery. Traditionally, a well-oiled machinery was relied upon to

deliver 75 percent of a candidate’s vote. The other 25 percent was

delivered by provincial sorties, posters and propaganda materials.

Presently, this equation has been altered with media accounting for

approximately more than 50 percent of a candidate’s votes. Hence,

the communications group composed of image strategists, pollsters,

advertising specialists and media relations experts have become an

integral and important component of any presidential campaign (Gloria

et al., 2004). The advantage of the incumbent is reflected by the budget

that is made available for media advertisement. In 2004, government

spent a total of P6.1 billion on advertisements for a period of five months

prior to the elections (see Table 2).

Table 2: Government Ads in 2004 (January to May)

Government Ads P1.4 billion

Social Concern Ads P2.8 billion

Political Ads P1.9 billion



The 1992 presidential election

The 1992 election was the first democratic election for the

presidency since 1969. It was also the first to be held after the 1986

transition from authoritarianism to democracy. There were seven

contenders: Fidel Ramos, Miriam Defensor Santiago, Eduardo

Cojuangco, Ramon Mitra, Imelda Marcos, Jovito Salonga and Salvador

Laurel. Of these seven, only four were considered serious contenders.

Former Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos won with 23.6 percent of

the national vote (see Table 3). Former Agrarian Reform Secretary

Miriam Defensor Santiago placed second with 19.7 percent, close

Marcos associate Eduardo Cojuangco placed third with 18.2 percent,

and House Speaker Ramon Mitra placed fourth with 15 percent of the

presidential vote.

Table 3: Results of 1992 Election

Candidate Party Votes %

Fidel V. Ramos Lakas NUCD 5,342,521 23.6

Miriam Defensor Santiago

People’s Reform Party 4,468,173 19.7

Eduardo Cojuangco Nationalist People’s Coalition

4,116,376 18.2

Ramon Mitra Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino

3,316,661 14.6

Imelda Romualdez Marcos

Kilusang Bagong Lipunan 2,338,294 10.3

Jovito Salonga Liberal Party 2,302,124 10.2

Salvador H. Laurel Nacionalista Party 770,046 3.4

Source: Commission on Elections, 1992

124

Reformism and issue-based campaigns

Ramos consistently topped the Social Weather Stations (SWS)

surveys from July 1991 to early February 1992 (see Table 4). His closest

rival, Miriam Defensor Santiago, only caught up with him in April 1992,

but her lead was not statistically significant. Ramos’ support was evenly

distributed by age, class, education and location (Mangahas, 1994). He

also capitalized on his role in the 1986 “People Power” revolution and

his staunch defense of the Aquino administration from seven coup

attempts. Consistent with this image, he encapsulated his campaign

message into the slogan – “people’s empowerment”.

Table 4: SWS National Surveys: July 1991 – April 1992

July 1991 November 1991 February 1992 April 1992

1 Ramos 2 Salonga3-4 Estrada & Santiago 5 Laurel6-7 Mitra & Pimentel 8 Cojuangco

1 Ramos2-3 Estrada & Santiago 4 Salonga 5 Mitra 6 Laurel7-8 Fernan & Cojuangco

1 Ramos2 Santiago

3-4 Mitra & Estrada

5 Cojuangco6 Marcos7 Salonga8 Laurel

Undecided 17%

1-2 Santiago & Ramos

3 Cojuangco4-6 Mitra &

Salonga7 Laurel

Undecided 26%

Note: SWS utilized several survey techniques, hence only the rankings can be compared.

Source: Posadas & Sandoval, 1992

Santiago waged a single-issue campaign against corruption and

captured the support of the youth through her unusual image. She

also won the support of the middle class, educated and urban voters

(Mangahas, 1994). Her image was the antithesis of Cory Aquino’s. While

Cory was pensive, dignified and passive, Miriam was shrill, acerbic and

aggressive. This image, however, was used by her opponents to portray

her as unstable and possibly disturbed.


Notwithstanding his national prominence as House Speaker, Mitra

did not rate well in the SWS surveys. He ranked between 6th to 7th in

July 1991, 5th place in November 1991, between 3rd and 4th in February

1992, and between 4th and 6th in April 1992. Ironically, his main power

base – the speakership of the lower house – was also his greatest

liability. The position reinforced his image as a “traditional politician”

or “trapo”. The public had an adverse perception of the House of

Representatives because of a number of scandals that involved its

members. The Speaker himself was implicated in the misuse of the

House printing facilities to support his presidential campaign (Lande,

1996).

Businessman Eduardo Cojuangco languished at the tail end

of the surveys but managed to rise from 8th place in July 1991 to

between 7th and 8th place in November 1991, to 5th place in February

1992, and finally landing oin 3rd place in April 1992. While his image

handlers highlighted his alleged business acumen, he was hounded

by his close association with the ousted dictator and his role in the

controversial coconut levy imposed on coconut farmers by the Marcos

administration. With such an image, his over-all negatives outweighed

his positives.

Rise of the machines

Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr. had the most organized party machinery

– the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). On the eve of the 1992

elections, the LDP boasted that it had the support of 150 out of 200

congressmen, 50 out of 73 governors, 35 out of 60 city mayors, 1,100

out of 1,532 municipal mayors and 70 percent of barangay officials

(De Castro, 1992). In addition, Mitra was publicly endorsed by the

influential Roman Catholic Archbishop, Jaime Cardinal Sin.

On the other hand, Eduardo Cojuangco attempted to replicate

the national pyramidical political machinery of Ferdinand Marcos

by designating a loyal deputy (postes) in every geographical region.

In addition, he utilized his vast financial resources to set up his

126

party machinery. However, he was outspent by Ramos at the tail end

of the campaign. Some of the postes, particularly in Northwestern,

Northeastern and Central Luzon, were effective in delivering the bulk

of Cojuangco’s votes (Lande, 1996). Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) Bishop

Eraño Manalo endorsed his candidacy.3 Except for his home province

of Tarlac, Cojuangco did not benefit much from Tagalog-speaking

provinces. He, however, drew much support from the Ilocano-speaking

provinces, given his close association with former President Marcos.

His combined support from Ilocano and Tagalog provinces was greater,

on the average, than the support he received in provinces dominated by

other language groups (Lande, 1996) (see Appendix 1).

Unlike the other presidential candidates, Mitra did not have a large

linguistic-regional base of his own; he got his strongest support from

the thinly-populated island and frontier provinces (Siquijor, Camiguin,

Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Romblon) that resemble his native Palawan, and

the thinly-populated highlands (Cordillera region) where he grew up

(Lande, 1996). He got additional votes from the populous Cebuano-

speaking Central Visayan provinces, the home of his vice-presidential

running-mate former Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan. This advantage,

however, was limited because of the equally strong support given by the

region to Ramos’ vice presidentvice-presidential running-mate, Cebu

Governor Lito Osmeña (Lande, 1996).

Ramos, a non-politician, entered and lost the Laban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) primaries to Mitra. He then organized

his own political party, the Lakas NUCD, and won the endorsement of

President Aquino. This endorsement translated to access to government

resources through the extra-legal pre-election release of between P600

million to P1.5 billion National Aid to Local Government Units (NALGU)

funds to localities whose leaders campaigned for Ramos (Lande, 1996).

In addition, the LDP charged that portions of an estimated P100 million

3 The Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ) is a Christian sect founded by former Seventh Day Adventist member Felix Manalo in 1914. The sect grew in numbers and became very influential in local and national politics as a result of its practice of block voting.


fund for the Rebel Returnee Program were distributed to local officials

supportive of the Ramos campaign (Balgos, 1998).

Ramos, a protestant and only the second non-Catholic to seek

the presidency, secured the endorsement of two tightly-knit religious

organizations – the El Shaddai of Brother Mike Velarde and Jesus is

Lord of Brother Eddie Villanueva. In terms of regional strength, he

got the bulk of his support from the country’s most heavily populated

regions: Central Luzon and the Cebuano-speaking areas of the Visayas

and Mindanao. In addition, he was exceptionally strong in two

provinces with very large populations, Pangasinan and Cebu (Lande,

1996) (see Appendix 1).

Santiago did not have a political machinery to support her

candidacy. Her People’s Reform Party had no congressional or local

candidates and it had only a partial senatorial slate, which included

five retired generals. It was only in the latter part of the campaign

that she was able to convince Ramon Magsaysay Jr. to be her vice-

presidential running-mate. What she lacked in traditional political

machinery, she made up for with a non-traditional campaign powered

largely by unpaid volunteers, made up of students and civic leaders

(Lande, 1996).

Santiago won in two of the country’s most densely populated

regions: the National Capital Region and its surrounding semi-

urban provinces, and Western Visayas, particularly vote-rich Negros

Occidental and Iloilo (Lande, 1996). While she topped most media and

campus surveys, the SWS surveys from July 1991 to early February

1992 had her running second to Ramos. By April 1992, she was able

to overtake Ramos, but her lead was not statistically significant

(Mangahas, 1994).

Keys to success

In 1992, Ramos consistently topped the surveys, articulated the

proper issue (people’s empowerment) consistent with his image

as one of the EDSA heroes, and had government resources at his

128

disposal to by-pass the traditional party machinery. The phenomenal

performance of Santiago revealed the potential of cultivating the right

image and articulating hot-button issues in attracting the market votes.

However, her campaign suffered from a lack of machinery to protect

her votes.

The tight competition between Ramos and Santiago served to

highlight the important role of ethno-linguistic bailiwicks in a close

election. Nearly ten percent of Ramos’s total tally came from his native

Pangasinan, while the bulk of Santiago’s votes came from the Ilonggo-

speaking provinces. Hence, in a close election, the margin could be

swung according to regional and linguistic bases (Coronel, 2003) (see

Appendix 1).

An issue-focused campaign without the corresponding positive

image and credible machinery can also prove to be disastrous. Jovito

Salonga articulated nationalist and progressive issues and was favored

by a segment of the educated middle class but he suffered from an

image problem due to his age. Both Mitra and Cojuangco relied on their

respective machineries to deliver command votes: Mitra’s machine was

largely party-based, while Cojuangco’s was money-based. The two,

however, suffered from extremely negative images: Cojuangco as the

Marcos crony, and Mitra the trapo.

Mo ney Party Image Issue s

Command Votes Market V otes

Santiago

Salonga Mitra

Ramos

Cojuangco

Gover nment

Market Votes

Figure 3: 1992 Candidate Positioning



The second presidential election saw an unprecedented number

of presidential candidates in Philippine political history (see Table 5).

The eleven candidates who competed for the presidency included:

Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr., Vice-President Joseph Estrada, Senator

Raul Roco, former Cebu Governor Lito Osmeña, Manila Mayor Alfredo

Lim, Defense Secretary Renato de Villa, Senator Miriam Defensor

Santiago, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Santiago Dumlao and Manuel

Morato. Out of this number, there was one frontrunner and three

serious challengers.

Table 5: Results of 1998 Election

Presidential Candidate Party Votes %

Joseph E. Estrada LAMMP 10,722,295 39.9

Jose C. de Venecia Jr. Lakas NUCD-UMDP

4,268,483 15.9

Raul S. Roco Aksyon Demokratiko

3,720,212 13.8

Emilio R. Osmeña PROMDI 3,347,631 12.4

Alfredo S. Lim LP 2,344,362 8.7

Renato S. de Villa Reporma-LM 1,308,352 4.9

Miriam Defensor Santiago PRP 797,206 3.0

Juan Ponce Enrile Independent 343,139 1.3

Santiago F. Dumlao KPP 32,212 0.1

Manuel L. Morato Partido ng Bansang Marangal

18,644 0.1


Vice-President Joseph Estrada won the presidency with 39.9

percent of the vote. House Speaker Jose de Venecia placed second

130

with 15.9 percent ; Senator Raul Roco was on third place with 13.8

percent ; and Emilio “Lito” Osmeña placed fourth with 11 percent of

the national vote.

Populist onslaught

Estrada’s popularity was formidable; his support from the masa

was solid. His popularity compensated for the relative handicap of

his LAMMP coalition vis-à-vis the administration Lakas party. Estrada

dominated the SWS surveys throughout the campaign period. From

January to May 1998, he did not relinquish the top position in the

opinion polls (see Table 6). Although rejected by a small but significant

ABC or middle-to-upper classes, Estrada nevertheless won as a result

of mass support from the D and E classes – the so-called masa vote.

The 1998 election was the first time that the masa came out solidly

behind a single candidate. Estrada captured 38 percent of the class D

and 48 percent of the class E votes (Mangahas, 1998).

The Estrada campaign will be remembered for one of the most

successful campaign slogans in the history of Philippine presidential

campaigns – Erap para sa mahirap (Erap for the poor). The slogan did

not only capture the core message and issue of the Estrada campaign,

it was also in synch with his image as an idol of the masses. He won

the endorsement of the Iglesia ni Cristo, and SWS exit polls indicated

that 81 percent of INC members voted solidly for him. Estada was

also endorsed by El Shaddai; however, only 39 percent of its members

actually voted for him (Mangahas, 1998) (see Appendix 4).

Estrada was subjected to a barrage of negative attacks revolving

around his character and competence. His opponents raised the issue

of morality, particularly regarding his mistresses, his drinking sprees

and gambling habit. His lack of advanced education was also used to

cast doubt on his competence. While these allegations had some basis

in fact, his popularity did not wane. His media strategists even used the

“Erap jokes” that were circulating to further endear him to the masses.


Table 6: SWS National Surveys: January 1998-May 1998

Sep96

Dec96

Apr97

Sep97

Jan 98

Feb 98

Mar 98

Apr 98

May 98

Estrada 19 17 23 19 28 28 28 30 33

De Venecia 1 2 5 3 11 12 14 12 15

Roco 3 6 5 9 10 9 11 10 11

Osmeña - - - 3 17 13 9 13 11

Lim - - - - 14 14 14 13 10

De Villa 1 0.5 3 4 7 6 5 5 6

Arroyo 14 17 22 19 - - - - -

Enrile - - - - - 0.9 2 2 3

Santiago 18 14 13 13 9 5 7 4 2

Marcos - - - - - 2 2 2 0.3

Dumlao - - - - - 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3

Morato - - - - - 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.2

Undecided 0 1 3 14 4 10 7 9 9

Source: Mangahas, 1998

De Venecia struggled to catch up with Estrada’s popularity but he

only placed fourth in January and February; tied for second place with

Alfredo Lim in March; fell to third place in April, and regained second

place in May. On the eve of the elections, he was behind Estrada by 18

percentage points, or roughly 4.5 million votes. Like Mitra in 1992, de

Venecia suffered from a negative trapo image reinforced by his role

as House Speaker.

Roco was popular among women voters and the youth, but he

was eventually outdone by Estrada, even among these sectors. Hence,

socioeconomic class, age and gender did not matter much in the 1998

132

elections (Mangahas, 1998) (see Appendix 5). Brilliant and articulate,

Roco initially projected himself as an incarnation of Ninoy Aquino. He

was adept at discussing and debating policy issues, but was oftentimes

perceived as flowery in delivery and too esoteric for the layperson.

In terms of popularity, as reflected in the SWS surveys, Osmeña

consistently placed a far second to Estrada in the early part of the

campaign period. He fared well in the surveys with strong name

recognition – his family has been active in local and national politics

since the American colonial period. His grandfather, Sergio Sr., had

been a president of the Republic; his uncle, Sergio Jr., had been a

senator and a presidential candidate; his estranged brother, Sonny,

was a long-time senator; his cousin, Sergio III, was also a senator;

and another cousin, Tomas, was mayor of Cebu. On top of his strong

regional backing and wide name recognition, Osmeña ran a single-issue

campaign that resonated with the electorate. His advocacy of greater

decentralization for local government units was a popular issue in the

Visayas and Mindanao where the electorate have strong animosity

against the dominant centralism of “Imperial Manila” (see Appendix

2).

Splintering the reformist votes

Estrada’s machinery was provided largely by the Laban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), which coalesced with the Nationalist

People’s Coalition (NPC), and his own party Partido ng Masang

Pilipino (PMP). The coalition Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino

(LAMMP) served to supplement his popularity with the electorate.

Estrada’s bailiwick was concentrated in the Tagalog-speaking provinces

of Laguna, Cavite, Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan. Regionally, he was strong

in Regions 1 and 2 (Ilocos and Cagayan Valley), Region 3 (Central Luzon),

Region 4 (Southern Tagalog), Region 8 (Eastern Visayas), Regions 9 and

12 (Western and Central Mindanao), Region 10 (Northern Mindanao) and

Region 11 (Southern Mindanao) (Laquian, 1998). In spite of the fact that

he came from San Juan, a small municipality in Metro Manila, Estrada


enjoyed wide margins throughout the country. He even encroached

on the regional bailiwicks of his rivals (Coronel, 2003).

De Venecia had the advantage of money and machinery built around

the administration party, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, whose membership

included majority of the congressmen, governors, mayors and local

officials in the country. He also won the endorsement of President

Ramos after a grueling competition with Defense Secretary Renato de

Villa in the Lakas primaries. Soon after, he was endorsed by the Jesus

is Lord of Brother Eddie Villanueva and the Jesus Miracle Crusade of

Brother Wilde Almeda (see Appendix 3). The main base of support for

de Venecia was his home province – vote-rich Pangasinan. He was

also particularly strong in Northern Luzon (see Appendix 2).

Roco placed third despite a lack of money and machinery. Like

Santiago in 1992, he ran an alternative grassroots campaign anchored

on the miniscule party he founded – Aksyon Demokratiko. Aside from

an unknown vice-presidential candidate, Inday Santiago, his party did

not field a national or local slate of candidates. Roco’s votes came

primarily from his bailiwick – the Bicol Region. He also performed

strongly in the National Capital Region (see Appendix 2). Roco

dominated the votes among the ABC classes but fared poorly among

the D and E (see Appendix 4).

Osmeña ran for president under his own provincial-based party

– the Probinsya Muna Development Initiative (PROMDI). He got the

most number of votes in Cebu, where he had served as governor. He

also did well in the nearby Cebuano-speaking areas in the Visayas

and Mindanao where he repeated his strong performance in 1992 as

a vice-presidential candidate. His campaign reflected the continued

potency of ethno-linguistic ties as the most dependable source of

command votes in a national election.

Keys to success

In 1998, Estrada’s popularity as an actor was reinforced by his

core message (Erap para sa Mahirap), his single-issue campaign,

134

which was consistent with his image, and his machinery that was largely

provided by the LDP and NPC. He managed to secure his frontrunner

position throughout the campaign, which projected invincibility and

resulted in a bandwagon effect. De Venecia had the advantage of

having a well-financed party machinery in the form of the monolithic

administration party Lakas NUCD-UMDP, and the endorsement of

President Ramos which translated into access to government resources.

However, like Mitra in 1992, he was very unpopular and suffered from a

negative trapo image.

Command Votes Market V otes

Image Issues Mo ney Party Gover nment

Estrada De Venecia

Roco

Osme ña

Lim

De Villa


Roco ran a strong alternative grassroots campaign and captured a

portion of the market votes, particularly among the middle class, youth

and women. But as in the “Miriam phenomenon” in 1992, his lack of

machinery weighed down his chances of winning the election. Osmeña’s

campaign revealed the continuing potency of ethno-linguistic ties as

the most dependable source of command votes in a national election.

This was also evident in the strong support from regional bailiwicks

received by de Venecia from Pangasinan and Roco from Bicol. However,

Estrada’s encroachment in his rivals’ bailiwicks revealed that “class

Market Votes


loyalties could overcome regional and linguistic ones” (Coronel, 2003:

10).


In 2004, after a tumultuous three-and-a-half years of completing

the unfinished term of ousted President Joseph Estrada, President

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo sought her own electoral mandate.

Notwithstanding her earlier promise not to seek election, she was

determined to win a full six-year term. Her candidacy served as

a referendum on her administration’s achievements and failures.

There were six candidates for the 2004 presidential elections, namely

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, film legend Fernando Poe Jr.,

former Education Secretary Raul Roco, Senator Panfilo Lacson,

Brother Eddie Villanueva and Eddie Gil. Of the six candidates,

two were serious frontrunners, three were spoilers, and one was a

nuisance candidate. The incumbent won by a margin of 3.4 percent of

the total votes cast or an equivalent of 1,123,576 votes (see Table 7).

Table 7: Results of the 2004 Presidential Election

Candidate Party Votes %

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo K4 12,905,808 39.9

Fernando Poe Jr. KNP 11,782,232 36.5

Panfilo Lacson Independent 3,510,762 10.9

Raul Roco Alyansa ng Pag-asa 2,082,762 6.4

Eduardo Villanueva Bangon 1,988,218 6.2

Total 32,269,782 100


Power of the incumbent

The last time that an incumbent president was re-elected in the

Philippines was in 1969 when Ferdinand Marcos defeated Sergio

136

Osmeña Jr. It would also be the last democratically-held presidential

election in the Third Philippine Republic. Marcos’s attempt to force

an electoral mandate in the 1986 snap presidential election unleashed

the first “people power” uprising. The 2004 election was only the third

time in Philippine political history that a former vice-president who

completed an unfinished term of a predecessor, sought a full mandate

as president. The first time was the controversial victory of Elpidio

Quirino in the 1949 presidential election that nearly resulted in an

uprising by disgruntled followers of defeated candidate Jose P. Laurel

Sr. In 1953, Quirino’s blatant attempt at re-election was thwarted by

a “reformist-populist” candidate, Ramon Magsaysay (Hedman & Sidel,

2000).

Since she assumed office after EDSA 2, President Arroyo has

suffered from an image problem that did not disappear after several

image makeovers. Consequently, she campaigned against herself “on

issues like the vows she broke, the promises she has yet to fulfill, her

flip-flops that need more explaining, and her husband that many say has

been her heaviest political baggage” (Paez, 2004: 26).

The President relied on three parallel machineries to carry her to

victory. The first was the government bureaucracy, an advantage of

incumbency. The second was her party machinery composed of the

ruling Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), in coalition

with the Liberal Party, a faction of the Nationalist People’s Coalition and

the miniscule People’s Reform Party. The third was a network of parallel

support groups organized under the control of the First Gentleman Jose

Miguel Arroyo, the president’s brother Diosdado Macapagal Jr., and the

seasoned political operator – Ronaldo Puno.

Lakas stalwarts and strategists had learned the lessons of the failed

1998 bid of Speaker de Venecia. Despite the advantage of government-

based and party-based machineries, great efforts were made to

organize parallel campaign organizations, in case the party machinery

failed again. In addition, the President was a hardworking and driven

campaigner. She was a veteran of three grueling national elections:


two for the senate and one for vice president. She got the highest

number of votes on her second run for the senate in 1995, and when

she won the vice presidency in 1998. Aside from Pampanga, she also

counted Bacolod, Negros Occidental (her husband’s province) and

Iligan, Lanao del Norte (her mother’s province) as her bailiwicks. In

successive SWS surveys, she consistently scored high in the Visayas,

where she outranked Fernando Poe Jr. She eventually consolidated

her ethno-linguistic base (i.e. Cebuano and Ilonggo) in the Visayas

and Mindanao to counter Poe’s dominance in Luzon (see Appendix

6).

In terms of presidential preference, Arroyo consistently trailed

behind other candidates. Before her October 2003 announcement

that she would seek election, she consistently trailed behind Senators

Noli de Castro and Raul Roco, except in June of the same year when

she placed first with 20 percentage points in the SWS survey. Her

numbers did not pick up after her October announcement. It was only

in January 2004 that she overtook Roco with 27 percentage points,

and placed second to Fernando Poe Jr. She benefited largely from

the decision of survey frontrunner Noli de Castro to withdraw and

become her vice-presidential candidate. By February 2004, she had

become competitive, rising two percentage points and narrowing her

margin with Poe in the SWS survey (see Table 8).

138

Table 8: SWS National Surveys: August 2003 – May 2004

Dec 02

May - Jun 03

Jun 03

Aug03

Sep 03

Nov 03

Jan04

Jan - Feb

04

Feb04

Mar 04

Mar 04

Apr 04

May 04

Arroyo 13 15 20 16 17 17 26.5 28.7 31.8 32.9 31.4 35.3 37

Poe 21 16 15 12 14 25 36.3 37.5 30.5 34.9 32.0 30.8 30

Roco 24 19 19 18 20 18 19.2 17.4 17.9 13.1 15.0 8.4 6

Lacson 6 12 11 11 10 10 11.5 8.4 11.4 11.5 11.2 10.6 11

De Castro 19 22 18 20 28 24 - - - - - - -

Villanueva - - - - - - 1.0 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.8 4.0 4

Gil - - - - - - 0.1 0.2 0.03 0.5 - 0.05 0.3

Others 12 10 15 15 8 - - - - - - - -

Undecided 6 5 3 4 4 6 5.4 6.1 6.6 4.6 7.6 10.9 12

Source: Social Weather Stations, 2004

She managed a statistical tie with Poe in the Pulse Asia and SWS

surveys in that period of time. Compared with Poe, Arroyo gradually

consolidated her hold on the ABC class and made inroads in the D class

(see Table 9 and Appendix 8).


Table 9: Pulse Asia Voter Preference by Socioeconomic Class, in Percent

Candidate/Sector

Nov ‘03(1,200)

Jan ‘04(1,800)

Feb ‘04(1,800)

Mar ‘04(4,800)

Apr ‘04(1,800)

Arroyo, G.M.ABC

DE

212732

283630

333329

323432

333935

Poe, F. Jr.ABC

DE

152732

253343

233039

222741

182841

Lacson, P.ABC

DE

171210

1488

141110

13116

19127

Roco, RABC

DE

413224

252016

171713

191310

1275

Villanueva, E.

ABCDE

---

411

212

443

762

Undecided/None/NR

ABCDE

622

533

1187

6128

178


Populism falters

After 282 movies and 48 years as the undisputed box-office king

of Philippine cinema, Fernando Poe Jr. (popularly known as FPJ)

performed the greatest role of his life by running for the presidency

and following in the footsteps of his best friend, Joseph Estrada.

His candidacy was borne out of the efforts of several sectoral and

140

volunteer groups that urged him to run. His main political vehicle was

the hastily-formed coalition – the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino

(KNP) – composed of the LDP, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas

ng Bayan (PDP-Laban), and the Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP).

FPJ’s electoral strength was both regional and class-based. In

Luzon, FPJ relied on his home province of Pangasinan as his major

bailiwick. He was also particularly strong in Mindanao where he had

a strong following among the Muslim communities. His campaign

hoped to capture the class D and E votes that delivered the presidency

to Estrada in 1998. FPJ’s survey numbers surged initially despite his

late declaration to run for the presidency. However, a series of negative

news stories about him, including a disqualification case filed at the

Supreme Court, succeeded in halting his upward momentum. Moreover,

FPJ’s refusal to articulate his platform or participate in debates fatally

impaired his candidacy. His public appearances were limited to smiling,

waving and saluting to the crowd, and his speeches were limited to one-

liners, which were often taken from his movies.

Despite the huge number of fans who attended his campaign

sorties, the failure of FPJ to mount an insurmountable lead in the

presidential surveys prevented most local politicians from endorsing

his candidacy and discouraged political financiers from infusing funds

into his campaign. In the end, he lost his hold on his core demographic

base – the class D and E votes. Ironically, he captured the youth vote,

but majority of the older voters supported Arroyo (see Appendix 9).

His campaign was also saddled by internal bickering among the

parties and organizations within the opposition coalition. His failure

to unite with recalcitrant opposition candidate Panfilo Lacson further

weakened the political opposition, weighed down his campaign

message of “national unity” and resulted in the withdrawal of support

of the influential Iglesia ni Cristo. In the end, the opposition failed to

provide the political vehicle for the charismatic Poe.

Unlike President Estrada’s Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino

(LAMMP) coalition in 1998, which managed to assemble the requisite


political machinery to convert popularity into votes and have them

counted, the KNP, Poe’s coalition in 2004, fielded only 26 candidates

out of 211 seats (12 percent) for the House of Representatives

and eight candidates for 76 (10 percent) provincial governor seats

(Doronila, 2004).

Keys to Success

Despite serious charges raised by the opposition regarding

the conduct and outcome of the 2004 presidential election, Gloria

Macapagal Arroyo managed to claim a new mandate and was

proclaimed victorious by Congress. On March 29, 2005, the Supreme

Court, sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), dismissed

the election protest filed by defeated opposition candidate Fernando

Poe Jr. “on the ground that no real party in interest has come forward

within the period allowed by law, to intervene in this case or be

substituted for the deceased protestant” (Clapano, 2005). Poe had

died from a stroke on December 14, 2004, with the resolution of his

election protest still pending. The PET dismissed the request of his

widow, Susan Roces, to substitute for her deceased husband since

the rules allowed only the registered candidates who obtained the

second and third highest votes for the presidency to file an election

protest.

The victory of President Arroyo and her running mate, Senator

Noli de Castro, was the first time a presidential and vice-presidential

ticket was not split in the three elections since 1992. The immensely

popular former television newscaster and senator, Noli de Castro,

defeated equally popular fellow newscaster and senator, Loren

Legarda. De Castro, whose name was earlier floated as a presidential

contender, contributed much to the victory of Arroyo in terms of vote

transferability, as the administration’s internal survey indicated that

an estimated 70 percent of those who would vote for de Castro would

also vote for Arroyo. The inclusion of de Castro in the president’s

ticket also allowed Arroyo to communicate with the poor, who

142

comprised the bulk of the electorate and the natural constituency of

Poe (Bergonia, 2004; Gloria et al., 2004).

Command Votes Market Votes

Party Government Money Issues Image

Arroyo Poe

Lacson Roco

Villanueva


Arroyo’s victory was also the first time in Philippine history that

a presidential candidate won the election by winning the southern

islands of Visayas and Mindanao but losing in the traditional locus of

political power – the northern island of Luzon. Despite the fact that

Luzon was Arroyo’s natural bailiwick, majority of its voters indicated

their preference for Poe in successive surveys conducted by SWS and

Pulse Asia prior to the election. Given her political weakness in Luzon,

she relied on the political clans and bosses in the Visayas and Mindanao

to deliver the votes for her (De Castro, 2004). The administration also

succeeded in getting the support of seven out of ten governors in vote-

rich provinces (Go, 2004).

The President’s candidacy was reinforced by the religious command

votes that were delivered by the Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai (see

Appendix 7). According to estimates, each religious group can deliver

between two to four million votes. In 1998, Erap Estrada got the

endorsement of the Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai. The 1998 SWS

exit polls indicated that 81 percent of INC members voted solidly for


Estrada. The El Shaddai also endorsed Estrada, but only 39 percent

of its members actually voted for him (Mangahas, 1998).

The 2010 Presidential Election

The allegation of massive fraud committed by the administration

during the 2004 election was reinforced in June 2005 with the sudden

and mysterious release of wire-tapped conversations between

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Commissioner Virgilio

Garcillano and various personalities led by President Arroyo. The

taped conversations, which allegedly took place from May 17 to June

18, 2004, exposed the cabal of political operators who tampered

with votes upon orders of Garcillano. While the President admitted

to being one of the voices in the taped conversations, she denied

any wrongdoing. Nonetheless, she profusely apologized for the

impropriety of her “lapse in judgment”.

The 2010 presidential election will serve as a referendum on

the nine-year rule of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. It will also be an

opportunity to repair the political institutions damaged by the

legitimation crisis that emerged from the 2004 election. Contested

elections have the effect of weakening legitimacy since they diminish

the belief in democratic procedures as a source of political authority.

Given the impending end of Arroyo’s term of office, and her failure

to extend it by constitutional revision, several political personalities

have projected themselves to be her possible successor in the next

round of presidential elections.

Air and ground war

Fresh from getting the highest number of votes in the 2007

senatorial elections, Loren Legarda topped the first survey on possible

presidential candidates for 2010 conducted that year. Succeeding

surveys showed Vice-President de Castro as the most preferred

choice to succeed President Arroyo. Between September 2007 and

June 2009, however, preparations for the 2010 electoral campaign

144

shifted to the mobilization of party-based local machineries (“ground

war”) and the early saturation of radio and television with expensive

political advertisements (“air war”). Two potential candidates strongly

competed in this regard: Senators Manuel “Mar” Roxas II and Manuel

“Manny” Villar Jr. The former is the grandson of the late president and

Liberal Party (LP) founder Manuel Roxas; while the latter is the steward

of the resurgent Nacionalista Party (NP). Aside from leading the two

oldest parties in the Philippines, both are among the richest legislators

in Congress. Roxas is a scion of the Araneta clan – owners of the Araneta

Commercial Center in Cubao; while Villar is a self-made billionaire who

made his money developing mass housing projects (Lopez, 2007).

According to Nielsen Media Research, in the first three months of

2009, three possible candidates had already spent a total of P230 million in

televised “advocacy ads”. The three are Roxas (P140 million), Villar (P80

million), and Legarda (P10 million). The cost of air time at peak viewing

hours on the two major television networks (GMA 7 and ABS-CBN 2)

can be as much as P475,000 per 30 seconds. (Sisante et al., 2009). By the

second quarter of 2009, Villar had overtaken Roxas in ad placements.

According to Nielsen, Villar logged a total of 603 minutes or 10.5 hours

of television advertisements in the first half of 2009 accounting for 45

percent of the total 1,345 minutes of infomercials during the period.

He was followed by Roxas with 444 minutes of airtime; Makati Mayor

Jejomar Binay with 166 minutes, Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro

with 70 minutes, evangelist Eddie Villanueva with 33 minutes and Sen.

Panfilo Lacson with 30 minutes (Daily Tribune, 2009).

The barrage of television advertisements pushed Villar’s survey

ranking. In May, he reached a statistical tie with de Castro, the

consistent survey leader , and by June 2009, had taken the lead in the

SWS survey. Even as he competed tightly with Villar in media spending,

Roxas failed to obtain the same push in his survey rankings. On the

other hand, Legarda’s survey numbers plummeted after her political

advertisements stopped airing on the major television networks. Vice-

President de Castro managed to compete in media exposure through


his government-sponsored infomercials promoting housing loans.

However, his later actions indicated his disinterest in either pursuing

the presidency or running for re-election as vice-president. His non-

commitment paved the way for the selection of the relatively unknown

Gilbert Teodoro as the standard bearer of the recently merged Lakas-

CMD and Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Kampi) (see Table 10).

Table 10: SWS National Surveys: September 2007 – June 2009

Sep07

Dec07

Mar 08

Jun 08

Sep 08

Dec 08

Feb 09

May 09

Jun 09

Sep09

Aquino - - - - - - - - - 60

De Castro 25 30 35 31 29 31 27 21 19 8

Villar 18 27 17 25 28 27 26 29 33 37

Estrada 5 9 14 11 13 11 13 13 25 18

Legarda 44 23 30 26 26 28 25 14 15 5

Roxas 9 20 16 13 13 10 15 18 20 12

Escudero 13 15 19 14 16 19 23 15 20 15

Lacson 18 13 12 16 17 14 14 12 7 2

Villanueva 0.5 0.4 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.04 0.7 0.8 1

Binay 0.3 1 0.4 0.2 0.3 2 1 2 4 2

Fernando 0.2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1

Teodoro - - - - - 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 4

Others 15.6 14.7 9.3 8.2 10.5 4.74 8 10.1 5.7 0.5

Don’t Know 12 12 11 15 9 7 13 20 18 6

None 6 5 5 8 9 12 7 9 - 4


146

Revival of reformism

At the outset, it became apparent that the 2010 electoral battle was

going to be waged in terms of an expensive media war and a pitched

battle for the mobilization of local political machineries. However, the

massive outpouring of national grief over the death of former President

and democracy icon Corazon C. Aquino on August 1, 2009 reawakened

a sense of collective nostalgia for the democratic struggle against

the Marcos dictatorship. Similar to the events of 1983 after Senator

Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. was assassinated, thousands representing

a cross-section of Philippine society – from street vendors to middle-

aged professionals and their children – literally lined up in the streets of

Manila to pay their last respects to the former president. The tremendous

national grief, coupled with deep frustration over the scandal-ridden

Arroyo administration, rekindled the flames of reformist aspirations.

Suddenly, national attention shifted to Aquino’s son, Senator

Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III, as the bearer of the reformist struggle.

In a repeat of his mother’s path to the presidency, several individuals

and private organizations launched a signature drive urging the young

Aquino to consider running for president under the Liberal Party in 2010.

Recognizing the signs of the times, Mar Roxas graciously withdrew

his presidential candidacy in favor of Aquino. His act – similar to the

withdrawal of Salvador “Doy” Laurel in favor of Cory Aquino – further

reinforced the historical parallelisms with the 1986 campaign for the

snap presidential election. A special SWS survey covering the vote-

rich Lingayen-Lucena corridor was commissioned in September 2009

to test the potentials of a Noynoy candidacy. The poll was taken a day

after Roxas’ withdrawal but weeks before Aquino’s declaration that he

would seek the presidency (see Table 11).


Table 11: SWS Survey on Presidential Preferences for 2010 Election: Lingayen-Lucena Corridor (September 2009)

Total NCR PangasinanRegion

IIIRegion

IV-A

Benigno Simeon Aquino III 50 50 48 49 51

Manuel Villar Jr. 14 14 22 15 12

Joseph Estrada 13 15 5 14 13

Francis Escudero 12 14 10 9 12

Noli De Castro 7 5 14 8 6

Don’t Know 2 1 0 1 3

None 1 1 1 1 2


According to Mahar Mangahas (2009: 15), the Lingayen-Lucena

corridor “extending from Metro Manila to the north into Central Luzon

and up to Pangasinan, and to the south into Southern Tagalog provinces

on Luzon island, is where presidential races have traditionally been

won, with the notable exception of the 2004 election”. In the Lingayan-

Lucena corridor, which accounts for nearly 40 percent of the national

vote. the special survey had Noynoy scoring a phenomenal 50 percent

over his closest rivals.

The question of whether the “Noynoy phenomenon” was limited

to Manila and Luzon was answered by the result of the 3rd Quarter

regular SWS survey (see Table 9) taken from September 18 to 21,

2009, in which Aquino was named by an astounding 60 percent of

respondents as their choice for president. Despite his being off the

political radar in the nine polls since 2007, Noynoy’s ranking took

off from virtually zero to 60 percent (Mangahas, 2009).4 Aquino’s

4 Since 2007, the SWS utilized the “best three” method in tracking the viable candidates for its regular quarterly national surveys. Respondents are asked to name up to three names (plural, as in sinu-sino). The objective is not to approximate actual election day voting but to identify and track the potentially viable candidates (Mangahas 2009).

148

frontrunner status was further reinforced by the result of the Pulse

Asia survey conducted from October 22 to 30, 2009, where he scored

44 percent nationwide, a 25 percent margin over second placer Manny

Villar (see Table 12).

Table 12: Pulse Asia First Choice Presidential Preference for 2010 Election (October 22-30, 2009)

Location Class

RP NCRBalLuz

Vis Min ABC D E

Aquino, Benigno “Noynoy” III 44 47 41 53 41 51 44 44

Villar, Manuel Jr. 19 11 19 24 19 13 20 18

Escudero, Francis 13 17 16 9 9 12 15 10

Estrada, Joseph 11 11 9 3 21 5 9 17

De Castro, Noli 4 2 5 5 4 1 4 6

Teodoro, Gilbert 2 4 1 1 1 4 2 1

Fernando, Bayani 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1

Villanueva, Eduardo 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1

Others 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1

None/Refused/Undecided 3 3 4 4 2 2 4 2

Source: Pulse Asia, 2009

Keys to Success

Some political analysts and opinion columnists have described the

surge in the surveys of Noynoy Aquino as a “game changer”. With the

rise in his numbers in the surveys, it is apparent that the core reformist

issues such as transparency, accountability and good governance have

gained ground as the central issues of the 2010 election. As political

analyst Amando Doronila (2009) observed, “the survey results reflect the

deep and broad resonance of the issue of clean and honest governance


that highlights Aquino’s campaign theme. The groundswell of support

for Aquino following the death of his mother, President Cory Aquino,

flows from the public service record of his mother and his father,

the martyred former Sen. Benigno Aquino, whose honesty and

transparency appear to have been accepted by the Filipino public”.

The entry of Aquino has definitely shifted the momentum of the

campaign from the initial focus on “ground” and “air” wars, to a revival

of the issue-based, middle-class-backed reformist crusade reminiscent

of the campaigns of Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and Corazon Aquino

in 1986. Both reformist campaigns faced critical elections that

“provided unique opportunities for transformist mobilization to ease,

if not resolve the deep-rooted ‘system contradictions’ which had

crystallized into full blown political crises” (Hedman & Sidel, 2000:

20). In the same light, the imperatives of addressing the legitimation

crisis of the Arroyo administration have galvanized reform-oriented

individuals and civil society organizations around the candidacy of

Noynoy Aquino. In effect, the aspirations for “change” and “hope”

and a rejection of “politics as usual” are fuelling the groundswell of

support for Aquino across class, age and region. The main challenge

for the Aquino campaign is to sustain this support into vote-generating

and vote-protecting machineries that will assure him of victory in

2010.

As of this writing, there are four serious contenders for the

presidency: Aquino, Villar, Estrada and Teodoro. This number is

expected to narrow down by the start of the official campaign period

on February 9, 2010. Each candidate is capitalizing on his perceived

strengths in positioning against the others (see Figure 6). In terms of

market votes, Aquino’s closest competitor is Erap Estrada. The former

president, the most media-savvy among the potential candidates, still

attracts a core of solid supporters, but his numbers have dwindled

from his phenomenal rankings in 1998. No doubt, his image has been

greatly affected by his ouster from the presidency, his conviction for

plunder, and more recently, his alleged complicity in a celebrated

150

murder that happened during his controversial administration. He

also faces the possibility of disqualification, given the constitutional

provision on term limits that bans the president from seeking any

reelection.

In terms of command votes, Manny Villar has mobilized his vast

fortune to finance the revitalization of the moribund Nacionalista Party.

Since 2001, the billionaire legislator has been rebuilding the NP to serve

as his vehicle for the presidency. Using the network he has built as

former House Speaker and Senate President, Villar has either directly

raided other parties or quietly secured the support of local and national

politicians. He has invested large amounts in political advertising, which

has translated into positive survey ratings. Despite efforts by his critics

to implicate him in corruption scandals and portray him as a trapo, he is

among the best-prepared candidates to take the reins of the presidency,

given his professional and political experience. With his “rags-to-riches”

story, he offers a compelling narrative to the Filipino electorate that can

rival the masa appeal of Erap.

Equally prepared to succeed the presidency is Defense Secretary

Gilbert “Gibo” Teodoro. A bar topnotcher, three-term congressman,

and known protégé of his uncle Danding Cojuangco, Teodoro shifted

allegiance from the NPC to Lakas-CMD to contest the presidential

nomination of the ruling coalition. He won the nomination almost by

default, after frontrunner Noli de Castro refused to participate in the

primaries. However, Teodoro is a virtual unknown with survey rankings

hovering between 0.8 to 4 percent in the SWS surveys. He is also saddled

with the unenviable task of defending the largely unpopular Arroyo

administration. Adding to his troubles is his less-than-impressive

performance as Chairman of the National Disaster Coordinating Council

(NDCC) during the two recent typhoons that hit Manila and Northern

Luzon which caused massive floods and losses to lives and property.

What Teodoro lacks in terms of popularity, he hopes to make up for

in terms of the almost monolithic machinery of the ruling coalition. The

merged administration parties – Lakas-Kampi-CMD – claim the support


of about 70 percent of governors, congressmen and mayors across the

country (Burgonio & Salaverra, 2009). Out of 219 congressional seats,

Lakas-Kampi-CMD have 146 representatives, or about 66.7 percent

representation. In the gubernatorial race, they have 58 candidates out

of 80 slots, or 72.5 percent of the total available posts. For the city and

municipal mayoral positions, they have 85 out of 120, and 1,112 out of

1,507 positions, respectively (Joven, 2009).

Command Votes Market Votes

Government Money Party Issues Image

Teodoro Villar Aquino

Estrada


Competing narratives of reformism, clientelism and populism

Thus far, electoral campaigns in post-authoritarian Philippines

have been waged with competing narratives of reformism, populism

and clientelism. Thompson (2009), in his contribution to this volume,

argues that these three are but forms of “elite politics”. The tradition

of Filipino-style reformist politics, which can be traced to the

presidential campaigns of Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and Corazon

Aquino in 1986, has been revived in the issue-based anti-corruption

and good governance campaigns of Miriam Defensor Santiago in 1992

and Raul Roco in 1998 and 2004. The same reformist aspirations have

been rekindled to fuel the surging campaign of Noynoy Aquino.

However, the failure of reform politics to address the problem

of poverty, coupled with the ascendancy of mass media, fueled the

image-based populist campaigns of Joseph Estrada in 1998 and

152

Fernando Poe Jr. in 2004. Meanwhile, continued clientelism and money

politics manifested itself in the machine-based campaigns of Ramon

Mitra in 1992 and Jose de Venecia in 1998. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s

successful revitalization of clientelism in 2004 managed to undercut the

threat of a populist restoration (Thompson 2009). But in so doing, she

also triggered a legitimation crisis that nearly toppled her administration

and damaged fundamental institutions.

The last three elections in the post-1986 period “were not a

severance from the past but a continuation – with some surprising

twists” (Coronel, 2003: 11).

A formidable political machinery is not enough to guarantee success

in presidential elections, as experienced by Mitra and de Venecia. The

experiences of Santiago and Roco demonstrate that image and issues

are also not enough to win presidential elections; a candidate needs

the corresponding political machinery to get and protect his votes.

Successful presidential campaigns are characterized by the right mix

and astute use of popularity and machinery.

It has been observed that the Filipino electorate has shifted from

“feudal” to “mass” politics. The successive electoral exercises since 1992

have pointed to the rising inadequacies of relying on strong provincial

bailiwicks in winning national office. The so-called “command votes”

must now be supplemented by “market votes”. Like the mass market, the

electorate must be segmented and targeted. Thus, national candidates

(e.g., presidents and senators) must be packaged to target defined

niches in a highly segmented electorate (Magno, 1992). Ultimately,

media and public opinion polling have emerged as a primary and most

influential conduit between national candidates and the electorate.

These trends will continue to shape and define electoral campaigns in

the Philippines.


References

Ando, H. (1969). A study of voting patterns in the Philippine presidential and senatorial elections, 1946-1965. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13(4), 567-586.

Balgos, C. (1998, January-June). Show me the money. I: The Investigative Reporting Magazine, pp. 25-31.

Bergonia, T. (2004, July 28). GMA election strategy: Blending governance, magic, Noli. Philippine Daily Inquirer, pp. 1, 4.

Burgonio, T. J. & Salaverra, L. (2009). Lakas-Kampi downplays poll result. Inquirer.net. Retrieved from http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20090827-222211/Lakas-Kampi-downplays-poll-results

Carandang, R. (2004). Media, political parties and elections. Unpublished paper.

Clapano, J. R. (2005). Supreme Court junks FPJ, Susan poll protest. Retrieved from http://www.newsflash.org/2004/02/hl/hl101953.htm.

Co, E. A. et al. (2005). Philippine democracy assessment: Free and fair role of political parties. Pasig: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Coronel, S. (2003, October-December). Who wants to be president? I: The Investigative Reporting Magazine, pp. 8-11.

Daily Tribune (2009, September 2). Villar logs 10.5 hours of infomercials in 6 months. Retrieved from http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/20090902hed3.html.

De Castro, I. (1992). Money and moguls: Oiling the campaign machinery. In L. Kalaw-Tirol & S. Coronel (Eds.), 1992 & beyond: Forces and issues in Philippine elections. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs.

De Castro, I. (2004, June 7). Gloria’s classic win. Newsbreak, 4(11), p. 19.

Doronila, A. (2004). The importance of having a party machine. Inquirer.net. Retrieved from http://www.inq7.net/opi/2004/apr/text/opi_amdoronila-1-p.htm.

Doronila, A. (2009). Transparency now a defining issue in the campaign. Inquirer.net. Retrieved from http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20090916-225404/Transparency-now-a-defining-issue-in-campaign.

Gloria, G. M., Tabunda, A. M. L. & Fonbuena, C. S. (2004). Spin & sell: How political ads shaped the 2004 elections. Makati City: Foundation for Communication Initiatives.

Go, M. (2004, January). All bases covered, Newsbreak, 4(1), pp. 19-20.

Hedman, E. & Sidel, J. T. (2000). Philippine politics and society in the twentieth century: Colonial legacies, post-colonial trajectories. London: Routledge.

154

Joven, B. (2009). Lakas-Kampi merger, a win-win situation – party members. Philstar.com. Retrieved from http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=472837.

Kasuya, Y. (2009). Presidential bandwagon: Parties and party systems in the Philippines. Manila: Anvil.

Kawanaka, T. (2002). Power in a Philippine city. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization.

Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (1995). Toward a more comprehensive analysis of Philippine politics: Beyond the patron-client factional framework. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 26(2), 401-419.

Kimura, M. (1992). 1997). Elections and politics: Philippine style (A case in Lipa). Manila: De La Salle University Press.

Lande, C. H. (1965). Leaders, factions and parties: The structure of Philippine politics. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies.

Lande, C. H.. (1996). Post-Marcos politics: A geographical and statistical analysis of the 1992 presidential election. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Laylo, P. Jr. & Dayag-Laylo, C. (1999). The 1998 Philippine presidential elections: Candidate images, media portrayals, and vote intentions. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations.

Lopez, A. S. (2007). 2010: The presidential race is on: Arroyo’s successor will again be a minority president. BizNews Asia, 5(23), 4-12.

Magno, A. R. (1992). From feudal to mass politics. The Manila Chronicle, p. 9

Mangahas, M. (1994). The Philippine social climate: From the SWS surveys. Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc.

Mangahas, M. (1998). SWS surveys on the 1998 national elections. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations.

Mangahas, M. (2009, October 17). Climate change in the 2010 election race. Philippine Daily Inquirer, p.15.

Mauser, G. A. (1983). Political marketing: An approach to campaign strategy. New York: Praeger.

Newman, B. (1994). The marketing of the president: Political marketing as campaign strategy. London: Sage Publications.

Paez, C. (2004, January). The tireless campaigner. Newsbreak, 4(1), pp. 26-28.

Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. (2004, May). The presidency as image. I: The Investigative Reporting Magazine, pp. 5-11.

Popkin, S. L. (1991). The reasoning voter: Communication and persuasion in presidential campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


Posadas, C. L. & Sandoval, G. A. (1992, June 12). How did SWS fare in predicting the May 11, 1992 election results? Social Weather Bulletin.

Plasser, F. & Plasser, G. (2002). Global political campaigning: A worldwide analysis of campaign professionals and their practices. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Pulse Asia, Inc. (2009, October 29). Ulat ng Bayan: Media release on Filipinos’ preference for May 2010 election.

Social Weather Stations. (1998). A report on the SWS 1998 national exit polls. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations.

Social Weather Stations. (2004). ABS-CBN/SWS day of election survey: May 10, 2004. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations.

Social Weather Stations. (2008a). Fourth quarter 2007 Social Weather survey: De Castro, Villar, Legarda and Roxas are the people’s top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/.

Social Weather Stations. (2008b). Second quarter 2008 Social Weather survey: Noli De Castro, Loren Legarda, and Manny Villar are the people’s top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/.

Social Weather Stations. (2008c). Third quarter 2008 Social Weather survey: Noli De Castro, Manny Villar, and Loren Legarda are people’s top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/.

Social Weather Stations. (2009a). Fourth quarter 2008 Social Weather survey: Noli De Castro, Loren Legarda and Manny Villar are still the top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/.

Social Weather Stations. (2009b). First quarter 2009 Social Weather survey: Noli De Castro, Manny Villar, Loren Legarda, and now Chiz Escudero are the people’s top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/

Social Weather Stations. (2009c). SWS surveys on 2010 commissioned in behalf of Senator Manuel Villar, Jr. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/

Social Weather Stations. (2009d). SWS April 16-May 6, 2009 survey: Villar, De Castro and Roxas are the “best leaders to succeed GMA in 2010”. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/

Social Weather Stations. (2009e). Second quarter 2009 Social Weather survey: Villar tops the “best leaders to succeed PGMA in 2010”; Estrada, Escudero, and Roxas gain while de Castro drops. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/

Social Weather Stations. (2009f). SWS confirms survey for Sergio Osmeña III in Metro Manila, Region III, Region IV-A and Pangasinan. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/.

156

Social Weather Stations. (2009g). Third quarter 2009 Social Weather survey: Noynoy Aquino and Manny Villar top the people’s “three best leaders to succeed PGMA in 2010”. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/.

Sisante, J., Marueñas, M., & Severino, H. (2009). Months before campaign, politicians test the power of ‘advocacy ads.’ Eleksyon 2010. Retrieved from http://blogs.gmanews.tv/eleksyon2010/2009/07/months-before-campaign-politicians-test-the-power-of-advocacy-ads/.

Teehankee, J. C. (2002). Electoral politics in the Philippines. In A. Croissant, G. Bruns & M. John (Eds.)., Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia (pp. 149-202). Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Teehankee, J. C. (2006a). Electoral campaigning in the Philippines. In C. Schaferrer (Ed.), Election campaigning in East and Southeast Asia: Globalization of political marketing (pp. 79-101). Aldershot: Ashgate.

Teehankee, J. C. (2006b). Consolidation or crisis of clientelistic democracy? The 2004 synchronized elections in the Philippines. In A. Croissant & B. Martin (Eds.), Between consolidation and crisis: Elections and democracy in five nations in Southeast Asia (pp. 215-276). Berlin: Lit Verlag.

Teehankee, J. C. (2009). Citizen-party linkages: Failure to connect? In M. Herberg, (Ed.), Reforming the Philippine party system: Ideas and initiatives, debates and dynamics (pp. 23-44). Pasig: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Thompson, M. (2009). After populism: Winning the “war” for bourgeois democracy in the Philippines. Paper presented at the conference “Designing Governance for Civil Society,” sponsored by the Keio University, Center of Governance for Civil Society (CDCS), Japan, November 22-23, 2009.


Appendix 1: 1992 Presidential Candidates and Census Variables: Percentage of Variance in Votes Accounted

for by Census Variables

F. Ramos

M. Santiago

E. Cojuangco

R. Mitra

I. Marcos

J. Salonga

S. Laurel

Cebuano 4.97 -4.49 -0.24 0.45 3.84 2.54 -0.32

Tagalog -1.20 -1.46 0.97 0.43 2.29 0.51 20.06

Ilocano -0.01 -4.33 8.09 -1.97 8.51 1.18 1.21

Hiligaynon 1.17 1.15 -0.15 -1.91 4.62 0.44 -0.43

Bicolano 0.00 -0.52 -0.02 0.16 0.01 0.45 0.03

Samar-Leyte -3.20 -3.15 -2.02 -0.07 9.72 10.44 0.38

Pangasinan 14.19 0.01 0.63 -0.15 -2.76 -0.48 -1.05

Major Language

0.91 2.24 -0.01 -0.85 -2.21 1.34 -0.03

Protestant 5.06 0.61 -1.74 0.06 -2.41 0.44 -9.43

Aglipayan -0.90 0.39 -0.15 -2.19 1.66 -1.58 0.94

Iglesia ni Cristo

0.12 0.00 1.46 0.00 -4.79 -0.31 -0.60

Muslim 0.62 0.14 0.00 0.42 -3.52 0.36 -3.75

OtherReligion

-0.99 0.62 -0.27 1.61 -3.06 -0.01 0.01

Rice -3.73 1.72 0.41 -0.75 0.14 0.12 0.75

Corn -5.13 0.12 0.90 0.05 -0.39 -0.75 2.95

Sugar -3.25 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.99 -0.63 17.14

Tobacco -0.29 1.02 -0.55 -0.05 -0.41 -1.42 -1.03

Perm. Crops -0.31 0.54 -0.52 -0.86 -0.34 0.07 8.42

College -0.46 2.99 -2.15 -2.77 -0.02 0.02 10.82

Grade School -1.38 -0.92 -0.28 0.98 1.04 2.50 0.72

No School 0.00 -1.58 -0.74 0.00 4.44 0.33 4.89

Radio 0.00 -0.68 0.00 4.78 0.01 -5.10 0.34

Source: Landé 1996

Language

Religion

Crops

Information

158

Appendix 2: Presidential Votes by Language Based on Social Weather Stations 1998 Exit Polls

TotalRP

(100%)

Tagalog

(34%)

Ce-buano

(25%)

Ilonggo

(8%)

Ilocano

(8%)

Bicol

(5%)

Ka-pam-pan-gan

(2%)

Waray

(3%)

Pang-sin-ense

(2%)

Cha-va-

cano

(1%)

Other Lu-zon

(2%)

OtherVisayan

(4%)

Oth-er

Mind-anao

(5%)

Estrada 38.8% 41.7% 31.1% 43.6% 49.6% 9.9% 44.7% 6.1% 7.9% 52.4% 38.9% 37.3% 52.7%

De Venecia

16.2 10.8 15.4 12.5 24.7 7.2 12.1 14.3 90.6 5.3 26.8 11.1 27.4

Roco 13.4 19.1 3.6 3.0 5.4 80.0 22.2 0.6 1.5 5.3 15.7 4.9 1.9

Osmeña 12.1 1.5 38.8 9.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 8.3 0.0 15.3 8.7

Lim 9.1 13.8 6.6 9.1 4.1 1.0 19.3 11.4 0.0 26.7 3.4 8.8 3.8

De Villa 4.7 10.6 2.2 2.3 1.0 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 1.9 1.2 1.8 2.1

Santiago 3.1 1.8 0.4 19.2 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.2 0.4

Enrile 1.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.0 0.8

Marcos 0.9 0.0 1.7 1.1 .1 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.5

Dumlao 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.1 0.8

Morato 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Appendix 3: Presidential Votes by Religion Based on Social Weather Stations 1998 Exit Polls

TotalRP

(100%)

Catho-lic

(82%)

Iglesia ni

Cristo

(3%)

A g l i -payan

(2%)

Other Christian

(6%)

Muslim

(4%)

Other

(3%)

El Shaddai

(3%)

Jesusis

Lord(1%)

JesusMiracleCrusade(0.3%)

Other Groups(8%)

Estrada 38.8% 37.0% 81.4% 34.7% 29.0% 63.2% 34.7% 39.2% 51.9% 43.2% 33.0%

De Venecia

16.2 14.9 6.4 27.6 26.4 24.7 23.2 11.0 23.4 13.1 15.6

Roco 13.4 14.7 3.4 5.1 11.0 2.3 11.7 20.9 10.0 0.0 14.2

Osmeña 12.1 12.5 2.1 9.3 16.1 1.9 11.5 4.6 6.5 38.0 13.3

Lim 9.1 9.8 3.3 8.2 7.0 3.7 8.2 11.4 8.2 5.6 14.6

De Villa 4.7 5.2 1.7 0.0 3.6 2.4 3.4 10.6 0.0 0.0 4.7

Santiago 3.1 3.2 0.0 8.5 2.9 0.0 2.8 2.4 0.0 0.0 3.0

Enrile 1.4 1.1 3.6 1.6 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6

Marcos 0.9 0.8 0.6 2.9 1.8 0.5 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8

Dumlao 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3

Morato 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Charismatic Group


Appendix 4: Presidential Votes by Socio-Economic Class and Educational Attainment Based on Social Weather Stations

1998 Exit Polls

TotalRP

(100%)

ABC

(9%)

D

(21%)

E

(20%)

ElementaryGraduate

(35%)

High SchoolGraduate

(41%)

SomeCollege(10%)

CollegeGraduate

(13%)

Estrada 38.8% 23.0% 38.2% 47.6% 44.6% 41.6% 30.8% 21.4%

De Venecia 16.2 12.3 1.3 17.7 17.0 16.4 14.8 14.9

Roco 13.4 26.1 13.2 8.5 8.9 12.0 21.0 24.1

Osmeña 12.1 5.7 12.4 13.7 14.0 11.1 10.4 11.8

Lim 9.1 20.1 8.8 5.6 6.1 7.9 12.5 18.2

De Villa 4.7 9.6 4.7 2.5 3.5 5.3 6.7 4.3

Santiago 3.1 1.4 3.7 1.7 2.9 3.2 2.6 3.0

Enrile 1.4 0.8 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.4 0.7 1.2

Marcos 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.5

Dumlao 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2

Morato 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3


Appendix 5: Presidential Votes by Gender and Age Attainment Based on Social Weather Stations 1998 Exit Polls

Total RP

(100%)

Estrada 38.8% 40 38 39 40 39 38

De Venecia 16.2 16 16 16 17 16 16

Roco 13.4 13 14 17 14 12 12

Osmeña 12.1 12 12 11 12 13 13

Lim 9.1 8 10 10 9 8 10

De Villa 4.7 5 5 5 4 6 4

Santiago 3.1 3 3 2 2 3 4

Enrile 1.4 1 2 1 2 1 1

Marcos 0.9 0.7 1 0.7 0.6 1 1

Dumlao 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.04 0.2 0.3

Morato 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.2 0.1 0 0


Socio-Economic Class Educational Attainment

Gender Age

Male Female 18-24 25-34 35-44 45+ (46%) (54%) (16%) (29%) (25%) (30%)

160

Appendix 6: Presidential Votes by Language Based on Social Weather Stations 2004 Exit Polls

TotalRP

(100%)

Tagalog

(34%)

Cebuana

(25%)

Ilocano

(8%)

Ilonggo

(8%)

Bicol

(4%)

Others

(19%)

Arroyo 41% 25% 61% 32% 54% 25% 47%

Poe 32 38 24 36 22 20 35

Lacson 9 15 5 11 6 4 4

Roco 5 6 2 2 4 3 3

Villanueva 5 8 3 5 5 3 3

No Answer 8 8 5 14 9 10 7


Appendix 7: Presidential Votes by Religion Based on Social Weather Stations 2004 Exit Polls

TotalRP

(100%)

Catholic

(80%)

Iglesiani

Cristo

(3%)

OtherChristian

(6%)

Muslim

(4%)

Others

(7%)

None

(0.7%)

Couplesfor

Christ(4%)

ElShaddai

(1.3%)

Jesus isLord

(0.7%)

JesusMiracleCrusade

(0.1)

OtherGroups

(5%)

Arroyo 41% 41 74 29 47 41 34 54 23 24 13 46

Poe 32 32 10 30 44 29 33 22 53 23 63 22

Lacson 9 10 1 8 3 9 10 7 16 0 0 8

Roco 5 6 0 3 3 3 8 6 4 3 0 7

Villanueva 5 3 0 25 0 10 4 1 2 44 0 9

No Answer 8 8 15 6 3 7 10 10 3 5 24 7


Charismatic Group


Appendix 8: Presidential Votes by Socio-Economic Class

and Educational Attainment Based

on Social Weather Stations 2004 Exit Polls

TotalRP

(100%)

ABC D E NoneElementaryGraduate

(20%)

ElementaryGrduate

(19%)

High School

(33%)

SomeCollege

(16%)

CollegeGraduate

(11%)

Arroyo 41% 42 40 43 47 41 39 38 42

Poe 32 20 32 35 33 39 36 25 16

Lacson 9 11 10 7 6 5 9 16 12

Roco 5 7 5 5 2 4 5 8 9

Villanueva 5 12 5 3 2 2 5 8 11

No Answer 8 8 8 8 11 8 6 6 9


Appendix 9: Presidential Votes by Gender and Age Attainment Based on Social Weather Stations 2004 Exit Polls

TotalRP

(100%)Male

(45%)Female(55%)

18-24(14%)

25-34(25%)

35-44(25%)

45-54(17%)

55 & up(19%)

Arroyo 41% 41 41 33 38 44 44 45

Poe 32 30 33 38 33 30 31 28

Lacson 9 11 8 11 10 8 8 7

Roco 5 5 5 8 6 5 3 5

Villanueva 5 5 5 5 6 6 3 3

No Answer 8 8 8 4 6 7 10 12


Socio-Economic Class Educational Attainment

Gender Age

image, issues, and machinery: presidential campaigns in post-1986 philippines

Documents