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Identifying Rogue States and Testingtheir Interstate Conflict Behavior

MARY CAPRIOLI and PETER F. TRUMBOREUniversity of Tennessee, USA and Oakland University, USA

We explore and define the concept of a rogue state based on a statesdomestic patterns of behavior. We combine measures of domestic

gender equality, ethnic discrimination and state repression to identifycharacteristics of rogue states. Once we have identified rogue states, weperform logistic regression to predict whether rogue states are morelikely to be the aggressors during international disputes whetherthey are more likely to use force first during interstate conflict,controlling for other possible causes of state use of force. This researchadds to a growing body of scholarship in International Relationsregarding the behavior of states involved in conflict, which demon-strates that states with higher levels of inequality, repression and

violence exhibit higher levels of violence during international disputesand during international crises. This argument is most fully developed

within feminist scholarship; however, research in the field of ethno-

political conflict has also highlighted the negative impact of domesticdiscrimination and violence on state behavior at the internationallevel.

KEYWORDS discrimination inequality international conflict repression rogue states

IntroductionThe term rogue state has become part of the popular language of foreignpolicy and international relations. This phrase has been used to characterizestates whose external behavior runs afoul of the standards of the inter-national community, typically through actions such as developing weaponsof mass destruction or sponsoring terrorism (Henriksen, 2001; Klare, 1995;Litwak, 2001; Tanter, 1998), or through conspicuous flouting of inter-national law (Chomsky, 2000). More often than not, this description has

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been used to label states that oppose the dominant powers in theinternational system (George, 1993), particularly the United States (Litwak,

2000). Such states are often characterized as despotic dictatorships (Tanter,1998) and are perceived as being undeterrable and unpredictable (Rubin,1999) or crazy (Dror, 1971).

Critics of the rogue state appellation have persuasively argued that thepoliticization of the term has rendered it bankrupt as an analytical category(Litwak, 2000; OSullivan, 2000). With no clear criterion as to whatconstitutes membership in this dubious club, a rogue state is essentially

whoever the United States says it is (Litwak, 2000). To bring some rigor tothe concept and make it useful as an analytical category, we proposereturning to an earlier conceptualization of the rogue state, one rooted inthe liberal tradition of political thought enshrined in the UniversalDeclaration model of international human rights (Donnelly, 1989, 1998,2001; Nickel, 1987). In this conception, rogue state status derives not fromexternal actions that challenge the systemic status quo or violate inter-national norms of non-proliferation or support for terrorism, but ratherfrom a regimes domestic behavior, how it treats its citizens. As Litwakpoints out (2000: 4951), this was the prevailing sense of the term in bothacademic and policy circles prior to the 1980s.

In the current policy arena, rogue states have been identified ad hoc after

such a state establishes a history of international aggression or otherwisetroublesome international behavior. We argue that it is possible to identifyrogue states prior to aggressive international behavior based on domesticcharacteristics of state repression and domestic inequality. While earlierdefinitions of rogue or pariah states made general reference to states which

were guilty of brutal internal repression, such as Pol Pots Cambodia or IdiAmins Uganda (Litwak, 2000: 50), we offer a more specific definition basedon those recognized international norms of human rights that have beenidentified by Frost (1996) as among the settled norms of contemporary

international society.In keeping with the Universal Declaration models emphasis on the rights

of individuals to equal concern and respect, and the responsibility of statesfor implementing those rights (Donnelly, 2001: 1), we propose that roguestates are any states that systematically allow domestic discrimination andinequality on the basis of ethnicity and gender, and perpetrate systematicrepression against their own citizens.1 The relationship between the rights ofindividuals and the obligation of states is an explicit component ofinternational law:

The right to equality and the principle of non-discrimination is the foundationof international human rights law. . . . Where governments are responsible forany form of discrimination, they are under an obligation imposed by

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international law, to end it immediately. (Office of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights, 2002: 5)

At the same time, we also contend that rogue states so defined will bemore likely to exhibit aggression and violence internationally. We make thisclaim on the basis of the wide body of International Relations literaturelinking domestic and international behavior.

Ample literature exists within International Relations scholarship linkingdomestic factors and state behavior internationally. A compelling argumenthas been made that states domestic political culture and norms areexternalized as international behavior (Chan, 1997; Gleditsch and Hegre,1997; Russett, 1990, 1993, 1996; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Wilkenfeld,

1973). This domesticinternational political link is based on the premise thatstates duplicate patterns of domestic politics in the international arena,applying the same political norms in both their domestic and internationalaffairs. In other words, states that typically exhibit discrimination and

violence in their domestic relations, will, theoretically, exhibit similarbehaviors in the international arena, and vice versa.

In particular, the literature on the democratic peace makes this argumentof the linkage between domestic norms and international behavior explicit.The causal mechanism is explained as follows the benign norms, especially

those of non-violent dispute resolution, inherent in democratic societies andsustained within their institutions are transferred to the international arenaand result in the peaceful resolution of international disputes amongdemocracies (Russett and Oneal, 2001). Research on some two dozen so-called peaceful societies from the field of anthropology has similarlydemonstrated that the same norms that govern the resolution of thesesocieties internal conflicts are likewise applied to conflicts with outsidesocieties (Bonta, 1996).

In the area of international relations it is argued that the transference of

positive norms from the domestic to the international arena produces apacific union among democratic states. This has prompted one prominentscholar to write that, Perhaps major features of the international system canbe socially constructed from the bottom up; that is, norms and rules ofbehavior internationally can become extensions of the norms and rules ofdomestic political behavior (Russett, 1996: 114). Such a social constructionof international politics, however, could prove a double-edged sword.

We argue that the transference of norms from the domestic to theinternational arena that the above statement implies cannot be considered a

selective process. In other words, malignant as well as benign norms violent as well as pacific norms should transfer as readily from thedomestic environment to the international. If peaceful societies rely on

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norms of peace in their external relations, then we must assume that violentsocieties would just as readily rely on violent norms in their external

relations. While the democratic peace literature identifies a set of benigndomestic norms and emphasizes their pacifying international impact, theliterature on feminist International Relations theory and on ethno-nation-alism from the fields of comparative politics and International Relationsopens a window on to a much darker set of domestic norms whoseinternational impact would be far more malignant when transferred to theinternational arena.

This paper contributes to the literature on the causes of internationalviolence in two ways. First, we provide a more thorough test of the generaltheoretical assertions concerning the linkage between domestic norms andstate violence at the international level. Second, we believe that thishypothesized transfer of domestic norms to the international arena may bean important causal mechanism linking certain manifestations of domesticdiscrimination and repression and state aggression during interstate dis-putes.

After first laying out the basic theoretical and conceptual argumentsrelevant to this study, we identify characteristics of rogue states. We thenempirically examine using logistic regression the impact of rogue state status,defined as states that exhibit domestic ethnic and gender inequality,

discrimination, state repression and violence, on state behavior duringinterstate disputes. Specifically, we seek to determine whether rogue statesare more likely to use force first when involved in interstate disputes. Anexamination of first use of force rather than other conflict behaviors,particularly conflict initiation, allows us to isolate conflict behavior from thetrigger-response dynamic of tit-for-tat use of violence (Wilkenfeld, 1991).This research supports a growing body of research in International Relationsthat demonstrates that states with higher levels of domestic inequality,repression and violence exhibit higher levels of violence during international

disputes and during international crises.

Norms of Behavior Affect States Domestic and InternationalBehavior

Research over three decades has demonstrated the impact of regime type onthe likelihood of war (Benoit, 1996; Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita andLalman, 1992; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Ray,1995; Rummel, 1983, 1995; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Small and Singer,

1976; Trumbore and Boyer, 2000). The democratic peace thesis is based onthe premise that states duplicate patterns of domestic politics in theinternational arena and apply the same political norms in both domestic and


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international settings. Because democratic states typically utilize peacefulconflict resolution in their domestic affairs, they will, theoretically, rely on

the same tools in the international arena.This emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution is supported by bothdemocratic institutions and democratic political norms. According to theexplanation based on political norms, scholars argue that the methodsemployed in domestic politics are duplicated in international relations. Giventhat the predominant domestic political strategy of democracies is thepeaceful resolution of conflict, democratic states, therefore, will emphasizepeaceful conflict resolution in their foreign relations with other democracies,as each state can predict based on domestic norms the others preference forpeaceful conflict resolution.

The explanation for the democratic peace stressing domestic politicalnorms can readily be applied to our thesis concerning the transfer of normsfrom the domestic to the international arenas. States that repress ordiscriminate against minority groups within their territory exhibit domesticnorms of violence and inequality, which are then transferred to theinternational arena as posited in the literature linking international conflictto domestic politics (Benoit, 1996; Bremer, 1992; Brown, 1993; Bueno deMesquita and Lalman, 1992; Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001;Caprioli and Trumbore, 2003; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Greenfeld,

1992; Levy, 1988; Oneal and Russett, 1997; Ray, 1995; Rummel, 1983,1995; Trumbore and Boyer, 2000; Van Evera, 1997). Unlike the dyadicnature of the democratic peace, however, the logic of norm transfer impliesthat domestically discriminatory states should have an overall greaterlikelihood of aggression, of using force first, during international disputes a monadic phenomenon.

Structural Violence

The influence of domestic discrimination and repression and their under-lying principles should not be underestimated. Structural systems ofdomination are based on norms that require and justify persistent discrim-ination, repression and violence (see Caprioli, 2001). One line of theoreticalinquiry posits the very existence of structural inequality as a precursor toboth domestic and international violence, for structural inequality requires arejection of freedom and equality and embraces hierarchy, domination andthe use of force (Brock-Utne, 1985; Dietz, 1985). Thus physical force orthe threat of physical force is endemic to structural inequality in much the

same way that peaceful conflict resolution is identified as a crucialcharacteristic of democracy. If domestic norms of peaceful conflict reso-lution transfer to the international arena, as liberal peace theorists suggest,


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then so too should the domestic norms of violence inherent to structuralinequality.

Although a large body of literature analyzes the role of women as a targetof discrimination perpetuating hierarchical social structures (Bunch andCarrillo, 1998; Caprioli, 2001; Elshtain, 1987; Humm, 1990; Stiehm,1984; Tickner, 1992, 2001), and gender inequality may be the most obviousand widespread manifestation of hierarchical social structures, discriminationand inequality based on ethnic difference is also commonplace throughoutthe international system. It has been argued that in many states, if not themajority, it is on the basis of ethnicity that political and economic access andpower are limited and inequality is justified and maintained (Bell-Flailkoffand Markovits, 1995). Issues of ethnic membership determine access toresources and control in that a persons social and economic position notonly accords status but also access to political and economic systems (UN,1984: 17).

The treatment of ethnic minorities by the state is thus an importantindicator of a states likelihood to use force internationally (Caprioli andTrumbore, 2003). Any investigation of the connection between domesticnorms and international conflict, therefore, has strong incentive to focusattention on the normative characteristics common to ethno-national statesand ethnic expressions of nationalism. Theorizing and research in the field of

ethno-nationalism has highlighted the connections between domestic ethnicdiscrimination and violence and state behavior at the international level(Gurr and Harff, 1994; Van Evera, 1997). As Kupchan (1995) argues,aggressive ethno-nationalism is predicated on the superiority of an ethnicgroup and its right to domination. When coupled with control over a stateand its institutions, this aggressiveness is expressed domestically as repressionand discrimination against ethnic minorities, and internationally as violenceagainst neighboring states (Carment, 1993; Gellner, 1983; Kupchan,1995).

The elimination of structural hierarchies, which are supported by normsof violence and oppression, should, therefore, result in less violence bothdomestically and internationally as norms of equality and non-violence aretransferred to the international arena (Weart, 1994). Although the state hasthe power to minimize domestic inequalities, and thus to underminestructural inequalities, some states instead exacerbate these inequalities andpower hierarchies through formal policies of state repression. And as Tickner(1992, 2001) argues, international peace cannot be achieved withoutovercoming social relations based upon systems of domination and hier-

archy.Our arguments concerning structural inequality and societal violence as asource of domestic norms affecting state aggression internationally add


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further depth to the established literature pointing to the role of domesticpolitical factors in predicting state behavior internationally. And it is the

norms inherent to structural inequality and violence, we argue, thatdetermine whether a state qualifies for rogue status.

Rogue States

As noted earlier, the principal limitation of the rogue state label as ananalytical category is its status as a pejorative form of foreign policyshorthand used to designate regimes whose international conduct sets themat odds with the United States. This was a change from the earlierconception of the rogue state as one characterized by its objectionableinternal behavior. This current usage of the term can be dated with someconfidence to 1979 when the State Department began its annual listing ofstates accused of sponsoring terrorism (Litwak, 2001), and was reflected inpolicy statements such as then-President Reagans branding of Libyan leaderMuammar Qaddafi an outlaw in the mid-1980s (OSullivan, 2000).

The development and elaboration of the rogue state concept was alsohelped along by the altered strategic situation facing the United States at theend of the Cold War. With no major power on the horizon that couldchallenge the US, the Pentagon began to focus its attention on emerging

Third World states that could pose regional threats to American securityinterests through the illicit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Among the states so identified by military planners were Argentina, Brazil,Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea,Syria and Taiwan (Klare, 1995). Thus by the time of the Gulf War, the roguearchetype that emerged in the 1980s was firmly in place a Third Worldcountry that sponsored terrorism and sought to acquire weapons of massdestruction or the means to deliver them (Litwak, 2001: 377).

While these appear to be relatively objective criteria, the rogue label was

rendered analytically meaningless early on by the selective and inconsistentway in which it was applied to US opponents. One of the clearest and inpolicy terms most authoritative and influential expressions of this selectiveapplication can be seen in the Spring 1994 Foreign Affairsarticle written bythen-National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. Here Lake identified threekey characteristics of rogue states the pursuit of weapons of massdestruction; use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy; and states thatthreaten important American regional interests (Lake, 1994: 456, 55).More important than these characteristics, however, is the specific list of

states that Lake names as rogues Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Cuba.What is surprising about this list is that at the time the article was writtenCuba met none of the criteria that Lake outlined while states which clearly


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fit the profile, namely Syria with its active weapons of mass destructionprogram and long-running membership on the State Departments terrorist

list, were left off.2

This was a reflection not of those countries specificcharacteristics, but rather political concerns. Cuba was included as a sop tothe politically influential Cuban migr community while Syria was excludedfrom the list because it was deemed an important potential partner in thequest for a Middle East peace settlement (Litwak, 2000, 2001; OSullivan,2000).

As OSullivan (2000) notes, the imprecision surrounding the concept ofrogue states has until now precluded the creation of a definitive andobjective list of qualifiers and has instead left us with anomalous, politicized

rogues galleries like that shown earlier, or its more recent axis of evilcounterpart. Given that the current conception of the rogue state ispredicated upon assumptions about these states problematic externalbehaviors, is it possible to objectively define rogue states in such a way as toallow us to identify them before they undertake such external actions? Insome ways this question has already been answered, at least conceptually.

Recall that prior to the 1980s rogue or pariah states were identified on thebasis of their internal behavior, how they treated their own citizens (Litwak,2000, 2001). States such as Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, Uganda

under Idi Amin, or apartheid-era South Africa were rogues because of theirhorrific records ofinternalbehavior, not because they posed a threat to theirneighbors or engaged in other forms ofexternalbehavior that underminedinternational stability (Litwak, 2000: 50, emphasis in original). In short,rogue states were characterized by their egregious violations of recognizedinternational norms of human rights.

As Frost (1996) has argued, international human rights as constituted inthe Universal Declaration model have become part of the fabric ofinternational society, the settled norms of international relations. Consistent

with this reasoning, and in keeping with the original understanding of whatbehaviors made a state a rogue or pariah in the eyes of the internationalcommunity, we argue that rogue states are any states that systematicallyperpetuate or allow domestic discrimination and inequality on the basis ofethnicity and gender, and perpetrate repression against their own citizens.Further, because domestic norms of political behavior are mirrored in statesinternational conduct, we suspect that the external behavior of rogue statesso defined will in some ways approximate the current conception of roguestates as ones which threaten international peace and stability. If domestic

norms help predict international behavior, then rogue states, characterizedby repressive practices of discrimination and violence should evidencesimilarly violent behaviors when involved in interstate disputes.


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In sum, we argue that rogue states can be identified on the basis of theirdomestic characteristics. Once a rogue state is identified, one can predict its

likely behavior during international conflict as being more aggressive, inother words, more likely to use force first. This expected relationshipbetween domestic norms and state aggression during interstate disputes canbe stated as follows:

Hypothesis 1 A rogue state, defined as one exhibiting high levels ofdomestic ethnic and gender inequality, discrimination, state repressionand violence, will be more likely to use force first during militarizedinterstate disputes.

Research Design and MethodologyBeyond theoretical inquiry, this project uses statistical analysis to test theabove hypothesis, which will be analyzed using a cross-national, longitudinalstudy of state behavior, coding for ethnic and gender discrimination and theoverall level of state repression while controlling for other variables knownto predict foreign policy behavior. Our unit of analysis is the state, as we areinterested in predicting the behavior of states in interstate disputes. We usea monadic analysis, as the theoretical foundation for the normative transferthesis suggests that states displaying domestic norms of discrimination and

violence will unilaterally transfer those types of behaviors to the internationalarena. In other words, we are testing whether state policies and practices ofdomestic discrimination have an independent effect on the states inter-national dispute behavior, rather than whether specific characteristics of thetarget state will influence the behavior of the actor. We do, however,introduce control variables into our model to account for certain dyadcharacteristics that have been shown to affect a states likelihood of usingforce in an international dispute. These control variables are described indetail in the following section.

Data for this project come from several sources. Measures of domesticpatterns of ethnic discrimination, transnational distribution of ethnic groupsand ethnic rebellion activity are taken from the Minorities at Risk (MAR)data set (Gurr, 1997). Measures of gender discrimination are gathered fromseveral sources. Measures of state repression are taken from the PurdueUniversity Political Terror Scale (PTS) data set (Stohl, 2002). To test theimpact of these domestic-level variables on state behavior in disputes, dataon international conflict behavior are taken from the Militarized InterstateDispute (MID) data set (Bremer, 1996) and a separate data set on first use

of force in such disputes (Caprioli and Trumbore, 2003).Our quantitative analysis focuses on the period 198092. The time framefor this study is an artifact of the data used in the analysis. While the


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Minorities at Risk data set covers the period 1945 through 1998, PTS theperiod 198096 and MID includes all militarized interstate disputes from

1816 to 1992, the data on first use of force are limited to the 198092period. This is a result of the limitations of the primary database used toconstruct the first use of force data set, Lexis-Nexis, which contains few newsaccounts from the period prior to 1980.3 Given this limited temporaldomain, caution about the generalizability of any findings is warranted.

After creating an index variable from the ethnic discrimination data foundin MAR, the gender data, and the repression data found in PTS, we combinethat index variable with the MID data set, adding our variable for first use offorce and several control variables before running our statistical analysis. Weadd to the analysis controls for other possible influences on state conflictbehavior including ethnic rebellion, democratic homogeneity, major powerin dispute, average economic growth, number of alliance partners, single daydisputes, transnational ethnic ties and contiguity. All of the variablesappearing in the analysis are described in detail below.

Logistic regression4 is performed to test our hypothesis using the MIDdata set, which measures interstate conflict. MID identifies 944 incidences ofstates involved in interstate disputes in which force was threatened, displayedor used, representing the total number of militarized, international disputesoccurring during the period 198092. There were a total of 139 states that

were involved in these 944 disputes. A militarized international disputebetween two states would, therefore, be coded as two disputes, one for eachcountry involved.

This project tests whether rogue states are likely to be more aggressiveduring interstate disputes, that is whether the presence of domestic genderand ethnic discrimination and state repression result in a greater likelihoodthat a state will use force first in a dispute. Interpretation of the substantiveimpact of our significant substantive variables is done using odds asdescribed by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996: 6078). The odds ratio is the

increase or decrease of the odds of being in one outcome category when thevalue of the predictor increases by one unit, adjusting for the impact of othersignificant predictors. Increases in the value of the predictor by more thanone unit increase the odds of being in one outcome category accordingly.

Dependent Variable

First Use of Force. This is a dichotomous variable (see Caprioli andTrumbore, 2003). It is coded 1 if the state was the first to use force during

an interstate dispute, and 0 otherwise. As we mentioned earlier, examiningfirst use of force allows us to isolate conflict behavior from the trigger-response dynamic of tit-for-tat use of violence (Wilkenfeld, 1991).


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First use of force is distinct from dispute initiation. Examining first use offorce rather than conflict initiation allows for a rigorous test of the

connection between domestic policies and practices and the likelihood ofstriking the first blow once a state is already involved in an interstate dispute.In short, we are differentiating between picking the fight and throwing thefirst punch. This data on first use of force are unique and differentiated from

war and/or dispute initiation. States become embroiled in internationalconflicts for any number of reasons, yet most of these conflicts never lead tothe use of militarized violence (Jones et al., 1996). Because of their domesticcharacteristics, we suspect rogue states will be more likely to be aggressiveinternationally, i.e. more likely to be the first to launch violent militaryaction. For the same reasons, we suspect that rogue states will also be morelikely to initiate militarized disputes. This is a separate question, however,that speaks to a different body of literature that on conflict initiationrather than conflict behavior than what we engage with in this project. Itis an important question, however, and one that we intend to pursue insubsequent research.

Independent Variables:

Rogue State Index. This is a composite measure of domestic ethnic and

gender inequality, discrimination and state repression. The rogue state indexis created by summing five separate dichotomous measures of domesticinequality and repression. The resultant variable is a continuous measureranging from 0 to 5, with 0 representing a state having no rogue statecharacteristics and 5 representing a state having all five rogue statecharacteristics, which include two measures of gender equality, two measuresof ethnic discrimination and one measure of state repression. In this paper,

we are interested in the overall impact of patterns of discrimination andrepression rather than attempting to measure the differential effects of

various types or levels of discrimination.

Gender Equality. The gender discrimination component of the rogue stateindex includes measures of female economic and social equality by dichoto-mizing ratio-level variables for percent women in the paid labor force andfertility level in order to create a variable representing either a state of genderinequality or equality. Both gender measures have been used in previousarticles as continuous measures and showed statistical significance (Caprioliand Boyer, 2001; Caprioli, 2000). In this paper, we use a dichotomous

measure of these variables, as we focus on the presence of genderdiscrimination rather than the extent of gender discrimination as a character-istic of rogue states.


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The two measures of gender equality were coded as follows (for a morethorough discussion of each measure see Caprioli, 2000):

Percent Women in Labor Force. This is a measure of womens economicequality. The World Banks statistics on female percent share of the laborforce are used and are recoded as follows:

0 = 40.01 highest percent of women in the paid labor force.1 = 040.00 percent of women in the paid labor force.

Fertility Level. This is a complex measure of interrelated social, political andeconomic aspects of womens lives, which is available from the World Bank.High fertility rates reduce womens health, and are related to lower levels ofeducation, employment and decision-making authority in both the familyand community (UN, 1995; UNDP, 1995). Fertility rate is categorized asfollows:

0 = 04.00 average fertility rate.1 = 4.01 highest fertility rate.

The dichotomous categories for gender discrimination are in some ways

arbitrary decisions on our part given the lack of guidance in the literature asto what levels of paid employment or fertility represent actual genderequality. We believe, however, that our categories are conservative measuresas they allow for a certain level of gender inequality within each state. Ouranalysis relies on normative conceptions of gender equality and the difficultobjective of ending discrimination and achieving social equality.

For instance, women should represent at least 50 percent of the paid laborforce according to theory, for women would naturally represent roughly 51percent of the population in the absence of infanticide and other forms of

violence against women. Having said that, however, there is a certainamount of personal choice, in addition to discrimination, which determineswhether or not women join the formal labor sector. The same argumentsapply to determining a cut-off for a fertility rate that would represent genderinequality and discrimination, as choice and need play a large role indetermining family size. We discuss the effect on our model of changing thethresholds for the gender equality component of the rogue index in theresults section.

Repression. These data come from the Purdue University Political TerrorScale5 (Stohl, 2002), which is an ordinal scale measuring the severity ofhuman rights violations coded as follows:


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1 Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for theirviews, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extra-

ordinarily rare.2 There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent politicalactivity. However, few are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional.Political murder is rare.

3 There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of suchimprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may becommon. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views isaccepted.

4 The practices of Level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders,

disappearances and torture are a common part of life. In spite of itsgenerality, on this level violence affects primarily those who interestthemselves in politics or ideas.

5 The violence of Level 4 has been extended to the whole population. Theleaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness

with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

We recoded the Political Terror Scale6 into a dichotomous variable with 0representing categories 12, and 1 representing categories 35. Once again,our recoding of the repression component of the rogue index is conservative

as it allows for a certain level of repression to be present in a society withoutqualifying for rogue status.

Ethnic Discrimination. The MAR project tracks the political, economic andcultural status and characteristics of more than 200 politically active ethnicgroups for the 194598 period. The data set also contains information onpolitical activity engaged in by these groups. The political and economicdiscrimination scores were first coded for each state as the highest level ofpolitical or economic discrimination for any ethnic group within that state at

the time of a militarized dispute in which the state is involved.7

In theMinorities at Risk project the extent of discrimination, both political andeconomic, is determined for each group relative to other groups in society.The pertinent question is whether members of a group are, or have been,deliberately restricted in their access to economic resources or politicalparticipation and influence in comparison to other social groups (Gurr,1993: 42).

Ethnic Political Discrimination. This component of the rogue state index

measures patterns of formal state policies of political discrimination, up toand including violent repression, as well as remedial efforts, if any, applied bythe state to resident minority groups. MAR uses an ascending five-point


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ordinal scale to measure the severity of political discrimination, from lowestto highest.8

0 = MAR categories 021 = MAR categories 34

Ethnic Economic Discrimination. As with the political discrimination vari-able, this component of the rogue state index records patterns of formaleconomic discrimination and remedial efforts, if any. MAR uses an ascendingfive-point ordinal scale to measure the severity of economic discrimination,from lowest to highest.9

0 = MAR categories 021 = MAR categories 34

As with the gender and repression components of the rogue state index, wechose fairly conservative cut-off points for the ethnic dimension. Some statesare coded as 0 even if resident ethnic minorities experience disadvantagesthere. It is important to note, however, that the discrimination included atthis coding level results from historical neglect rather than formal statepolicies of discrimination or informal discriminatory social practices. Thus,

we would argue that the discrimination evidenced under such circumstances,

while real to those affected by it, does not represent prevailing socialnorms.

Control Variables

Ethnic Alliance. The ethnic alliance variable represents one of two controlsfor the possible effects of transnational ethnic ties. Scholars who havestudied the connections between violent ethnic conflict at the domestic leveland violent interstate conflict have argued that when ethnic boundaries cross

state borders the likelihood of violent conflict between states increases(Brown, 1996; Davis et al., 1997; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Moore andDavis, 1998; Stedman, 1996; Trumbore, 2003; Van Evera, 1997). Theethnic alliance variable, derived from MAR data on the geographicdistribution of ethnic groups, describes the condition in which the ethnicgroup controlling one state in a dispute dyad is an at-risk minority in acontiguous target state. In such cases, ethnic ties act like an alliance,increasing a states willingness to intervene on behalf of its embattled kinand thus increasing the likelihood that the state will become involved in a

conflict against its kins oppressors (Moore and Davis, 1998; Siverson andStarr, 1991). It is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if there is an ethnicalliance, 0 otherwise.


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of six through ten are considered democracies. Finally, states in disputesexclusively among democracies were coded as 1 with all other disputes

coded as 0.

Major Power in Dispute. Literature on interstate conflict shows that disputesamong minor powers are more likely to be violent while disputes with atleast one major power tend to be less violent (Russett and Oneal, 2001). Anadditional body of literature argues that satisfied powers and developedstates are less likely to use force internationally (Brawley, 1993; Kacowicz,1995; Lemke and Reed, 1996; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Rousseau etal., 1996). Major powers are identified by the Correlates of War data asChina, France, Russia, the UK and the US at various points during the time

period under study (Singer and Small, 1993). As states, not disputes, formthe unit of analysis in this project, the major power in dispute variable wascoded for each state on the basis of whether a major power was present whenthe state entered the dispute. For example, MID dispute number 2347began in April 1981 between Honduras and Nicaragua, with the UnitedStates joining the dispute in March 1983. The major power in dispute

variable is coded as 0 for Nicaragua and Honduras and 1 for the UnitedStates.

Economic Growth. This variable introduces an additional control fordiversionary uses of force. Miller (1995) uses declining economic growth asa proxy for regime popularity and finds that when economic growthdeclines, states become more likely to use force in the international arena.This variable was calculated based on information found in the PENN WorldTable by Summers and Heston (1991) and represents the five-year averagepercent change in real GDP per capita calculated annually.

Number of Allies. This variable represents the number of states sharingmembership in a defense pact or an entente. These data are available from

the COW Alliance data set (Singer and Small, 1993). Some scholars arguethat alliance ties diminish the likelihood of war (Bremer, 1992; Bueno deMesquita, 1981; Maoz and Russett, 1992; Weede, 1983), while others(Rousseau et al., 1996) report that alliance ties do not decrease thelikelihood of conflict. The number of alliance partners may help deter attack,thereby reducing the number of militarized disputes in which a state isinvolved. Alternatively, the number of allies can increase the number ofmilitarized disputes a state is drawn into as alliance partners join an ongoingdispute.

Contiguity. Any theory of interstate conflict must control for geographicproximity since the use of force is only possible when at least one state can


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reach the other with its military assets (Russett et al., 2000; Starr and Most,1976). Simply put, states are more likely to become engaged in an

international dispute with a contiguous state (Bremer, 1992; Diehl, 1991;Gleditsch, 1995; Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993;Rummel, 1994; Siverson and Starr, 1991). This is a dichotomous variablecoded 1 if the states involved in a dispute share a land boundary or areseparated by less than 150 miles of water and 0 for noncontiguous states.The data come from the COW contiguity data set (Gochman, 1991).

Single Day Disputes. This variable is necessary to control for uses of force bylocal military units acting on their own initiative or that of individualcommanders that may not reflect actual government policy to use force

within the context of the dispute in question. This is consistent with thepractice of those who study war initiation, in which an attack in strengthcriterion is used to control for the actions of rogue units or small-scalepatrols operating outside central authority (Small and Singer, 1982).

Results

The main hypothesis with regard to rogue states and first use of force duringinterstate disputes was confirmed the higher a states rogue score in

other words, the higher the level of domestic gender and ethnic discrimina-tion and state repression the greater the likelihood that a state will useforce first in interstate disputes.11

As outlined above, the independent variables were the rogue state index,rebellion, democratic homogeneity, major power in dispute, average eco-nomic growth, number of alliance partners, divided ethnic group, ethnicalliance, single day disputes and contiguity. Although the rogue state indexis correlated with rebellion and major power dyad, the inclusion of these

variables does not bias the model. In addition although several of the controlvariables are correlated12, they do not influence the significance or impact ofthe rogue state variable and their inclusion creates a better-specifiedmodel.

Rogue State Index13

The results (see Table 1) show that rogue states those states that arecharacterized by domestic discrimination and repression are more likelyto use force first during interstate disputes. Proceeding along the rogue statecontinuum of no domestic discrimination and repression to high levels of

domestic discrimination and repression, rogue states are more than eight(8.47)14 times more likely to use force first in international disputes. Statesexhibiting four of the five characteristics of rogue states are nearly seven


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(6.77) times more likely to use force first in interstate disputes than are stateswith no rogue state characteristics. In other words, rogue states evidence

more aggressive behavior during interstate disputes than non-roguestates.15

Of the 776 militarized disputes from 1980 to 1992 for which there are no

Table 1The Impact of Domestic Discrimination and Repression on State First Use

of Force Internationally, 198092

Model+ First Use of Force

Rogue state .527****(.078)

Democratic homogeneity .204(.355)

Major power in dispute .439(.230)

Avg. economic growth .001

(.003)# Allies .017*

(.007)Contiguous actors .105

(.226)Divided .372

(.228)Ethnic alliance .566

(.519)Rebellion .846****

(.205)Single day dispute .272

(.185)Constant 2.272****

(.372)Model significance p< .0001N 713% Categorized correctly 75.3Reduction of error 27.35%2 LLR 773.331

Model chi square 165.474Mean of dependent variable .340

+ The SPSS statistical package was used to run the logistic regression. The table includesparameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001


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missing data, 28.5 percent of the disputes involved perfect rogue statesdefined as scoring a 5 which means the state is characterized by all fiveindicators of a rogue state. An additional 20.9 percent of the disputesinvolved rogue states reaching a score of 4 indicating the state had four ofthe five characteristics used to define a rogue state. Thus, nearly 50 percent(49.4) of the disputes involved rogue states (see Table 2 for a list of statesinvolved in militarized interstate disputes meeting the rogue criterion duringthe period 198092). Roughly one-third (46 of 139) of the states involvedin disputes during the time period of this study were rogue states.

As noted in the research design section, we employ conservative estimatesof discrimination and repression to construct the rogue state index.Determining the appropriate cut-off point was most difficult for the gender

Table 2List of States Qualifying for Rogue Status*

Angola MauritaniaArgentina MexicoBangladesh MoroccoCameroon MyanmarChad NicaraguaChile NigerColumbia NigeriaCongo PakistanDominican Republic Papua New Guinea

Ecuador PeruEgypt PhilippinesEthiopia RwandaGuatemala Saudi ArabiaHonduras SenegalIndia SomaliaIndonesia South AfricaIran Sri LankaIraq SudanIsrael Turkey

Jordan UgandaKenya VenezuelaLebanon YugoslaviaMalaysia Zaire

* This indicates states scoring a 4 or 5 on the Rogue State Index at the time of their

involvement in a militarized interstate dispute during the period 198092. Only Denmark,Norway and Sweden earned a score of zero, indicating they had none of the five domestic

characteristics of a rogue state at the time they were involved in a MID.


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dimensions of the index due to the lack of guidance in the existing literature.In short, the literature does not indicate what level of fertility or female

employment would represent gender equality. Our interest in constructingthe rogue index is not in analyzing the severity of gender discrimination butrather its presence. A reasonable question to ask, therefore, is what happensto our findings if the threshold for gender equality is changed.

Raising the bar for gender equality to a fertility rate no higher than 3, andpercent women in the labor force to 50 percent or higher results in the samehigh statistical significance (p< .000) as having the cut-off at 4 and 40

respectively as measured in the model presented. The substantive impact,however, is slightly increased in that incorporating higher standards of

gender equality into the rogue state index results in perfect rogue states,measured as having all five characteristics of rogue states, being nearly nine(8.985) times more likely to use force first in interstate disputes.

Similarly, loosening the standards for gender equality (allowing for higherlevels of gender discrimination before a state qualifies for rogue status) by

incorporating a fertility rate of five or higher and a percentage of women inthe labor force of 30 or higher into the rogue state index results in equallystrong statistical significance and a substantive impact of 8.165 meaning

that rogue states characterized by all five measures of discrimination and

repression are eight times more likely to use force first in interstate disputes.These results illustrate that the categories we assigned to the gender variables

are not biasing the outcome of the model.

Control Variables16

The number of alliance partners helps predict whether or not a state will

behave more aggressively during disputes. The fewer the number of alliance

partners, the greater the likelihood that a state will use force first in interstatedisputes. This is consistent with research arguing that alliance ties diminishthe likelihood of war (Bremer, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1992). The control

variable for rebellion was significant revealing that states experiencingrebellion are more likely to use force first in interstate disputes. This isconsistent with the findings of earlier empirical studies (Trumbore, 2003) as

well as theoretical discussions of the link between ethnic rebellion andinterstate conflict and collections of case studies (see Brown, 1996; Lake andRothchild, 1998) which posit that rebellion can lead to interstate conflict

through a variety of mechanisms such as diversionary uses of force or conflictspillover. The remaining control variables ethnic alliance, divided ethnicgroup, major power in dyad, single day disputes, average economic growth,


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democratic homogeneity and contiguity showed no statistical sig-nificance. As discussed earlier, several of the control variables are correlated

which prevents a meaningful interpretation of their significance.

Conclusions

This project makes an important contribution to the effort to understandthe influence of domestic factors on state bellicosity. We had hypothesizedthat domestic norms of discrimination, violence and inequality wouldtransfer to the international arena, manifesting themselves in a states greater

likelihood to use force first when involved in an interstate dispute. Theresults of our analysis demonstrate that there are statistically significantconnections between the domestic norms reflected in patterns of discrimina-

tion and repression and state behavior at the international level.In general, our findings lend additional credence to the normative

explanation for the democratic peace. Just as benign norms of equality and

peaceful domestic dispute resolution transfer to the international arena, ourfindings demonstrate that malignant norms of discrimination and repressiontransfer to the international arena as well. In sum, we find that states that

perpetrate discrimination and violence against their own citizens are morelikely to use force first when involved in interstate disputes than states in

which those behaviors are not common.

At the same time, our findings bring much-needed clarity and objectivityto the concept of the rogue state and thereby make it much more useful asan analytical category. As noted in the introductory sections of this paper,

the chief criticism of the rogue state label has been its politicization andanalytical softness. We return to the earlier notion of rogue states as thosethat engage in reprehensible internal conduct, and formalize that conception

in reference to recognized international human rights norms of equality andfair treatment under the secure rule of law. We further show that rogue statesso defined constitute a demonstrable threat to international peace andstability.

This analysis is the first step in a larger research project analyzing thebehavior of states based on domestic characteristics. In this paper, we havere-established an objective definition of a rogue state in order to better

predict a states likelihood of using force first during interstate disputes andhave demonstrated a strong link between rogue state status and international

aggression. Before being able to make any concrete policy recommenda-tions, however, we must first examine whether rogue states are more likelyto become involved in and to initiate interstate disputes.


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Notes

1. Donnelly defines the Universal Declaration model as made up of four central

elements the focus on rights; the restriction to individual rights; the balancebetween civil and political rights and social, economic and cultural rights; andnational responsibility for implementing internationally recognized humanrights (2001: 1).

2. It could be argued that Cuba did meet one of Lakes criteria a statethreatening American regional interest. It should be noted, however, that by thetime of Lakes writing Cuba had lost the Soviet patronage that made it such aprominent thorn in the side of Cold War policy-makers, and had largely given upits overseas adventurism in places such as Angola.

3. See Caprioli and Trumbore (2003) for detailed discussion of how this variable

was constructed.4. The SPSS statistical package is used to run the logistic regression.5. The Purdue Political Terror Scale offers two measures of political terror one

based on annual human rights reports from the United States Department ofState and the other based on Amnesty International annual reports. The twomeasures are highly correlated (2-tailed Pearson correlation coefficient of .866,

p< .0001). We decided to use the Amnesty-based terror scale to avoid anypotential political bias that might be embedded in the US State Departmentannual reports.

6. The PTS does not include several states that were involved in MIDs during the

study period, including the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain,Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Denmark and Canada. We coded theUnited Kingdom and Spain as having a terror score of 2 based on their recordsof limited human rights violations in connection with those states securityresponse to ongoing civil conflict in Northern Ireland and the Basque region,respectively. The other seven countries were coded as 1.

7. This practice is followed for all variables taken from MAR. There is an importanttheoretical reason for our decision to use the highest level of discriminationrecorded for any ethnic minority group within the states population. We arguethat these variables reflect the upper limit of the types of policies and practices

that societal norms present within the state will allow. This is also consistent withthe methodology employed by Moore and Davis (1998).8. Values for political discrimination are defined as follows (Gurr, 1993: 47):

0 = None1 = Substantial under-representation in political office, participation or both,

due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designedto protect or improve groups political status.

2 = Substantial under-representation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Nosocial practice of deliberate exclusion. No protective or remedial publicpolicies.

3 = Substantial under-representation due to prevailing social practice by domi-nant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral, or, ifpositive, are inadequate to offset discrimination.


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4 = Public policies, formal exclusion or recurring repression, or both, sub-stantially restrict the groups political participation in comparison with othergroups.

9. The values are defined as follows (Gurr, 1993: 45):

0 = No discrimination.1 = Substantial poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to

historical marginality, neglect or restrictions. Public policies are designed toimprove the groups material well-being.

2 = Substantial under-representation due to historical marginality, neglect orrestrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion.No remedial public policies.

3 = Substantial poverty and under-representation due to prevailing social

practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group areneutral or inadequate to offset active and widespread practices of discrim-ination.

4 = Public policies, formal exclusion or recurring repression, or both, sub-stantially restrict the groups economic opportunities relative to othergroups.

10. Gurr codes the rebellion variable as follows (1993: 945):

0 = None reported.1 = Political banditry, sporadic terrorism, unsuccessful coups by or on behalf of

the group.2 = Campaigns of terrorism, successful coups by or on behalf of the group.3 = Small-scale guerrilla activity.4 = Large-scale guerrilla activity, distinguished from small-scale by a large

number of armed fighters (more than 1000) carrying out frequent armedattacks over a substantial area.

5 = Protracted civil war, fought by military units with base areas.

11. It has been suggested that the results of our rogue state variable may beconfounded by an intervening variable dispute initiation. Although onemight suspect that dispute initiators would be more likely to use force first, this

has yet to be demonstrated in the literature. In fact the scholarly literature issilent on the question of the relationship between dispute initiation and use offorce patterns, including first use of force. This is an interesting question, andone worthy of future study. Incorporating initiation into our model as a control,however, has no effect on the statistical significance of the rogue state variableand actually increases its substantive impact (.443, exponent 1.557 as opposedto .412, exponent 1.510). In short, rogue state status matters.

12. According to several tests, multicollinearity is not affecting the models. Thecondition index (CI), variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance factors(TOL) for the independent variables indicate that multicollinearity is not a

problem based on accepted heuristics (see Gujarati, 2003; Menard, 2002).13. Although the rogue state variable is correlated with democracy (2-tailed Pearson

correlation coefficient of .227, p


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model has no effect on the model or on the rogue state variable. Democracy isinversely correlated with rogue states, i.e. democracies are less likely to berogues.

14. This is calculated by multiplying the odds ratio estimate for the rogue state indexvariable, 1.693 by 5, the number of units of the predictor representing a changefrom a condition of no rogue state characteristics to that of displaying all fiverogue state characteristics.

15. Although some might suspect a potential dependence within the dependentvariable that might affect the significance of our findings, a review of leadingstatistical references (see Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; DeMaris, 1992; Long,1997; Menard, 1991) does not identify this as an issue of concern. Nor has thisissue been raised as a challenge to the validity of other published studies using asdependent variables either first use of force (Caprioli and Trumbore, 2003;Trumbore, 2003) or conflict initiation (see Nevin, 1996; Rasler and Thompson,1999; Reiter and Stam, 1998), which is similar to first use of force in the possiblerelation among outcomes.

16. We argue that rogue state status is but one piece of the puzzle concerning thedomestic sources of interstate conflict behavior, and make no claim as to therelative impact of the independent variables included as controls in the model.

We, therefore, do not interpret the relative substantive effects of all theindependent variables in this paper.

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