IAEA ACTION PLAN & IINTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO

ADDRESS FUKUSHIMA TYPE EVENTS

Thomas Koshy, Head Nuclear Power Technology Development

Division of Nuclear Power

Nuclear Power Engineering Committee January 29, 2014

Outline of Presentation

• IAEA Mission • IAEA Action Plan • IAEA – Fukushima Comprehensive

Report • International Industry solutions • Lessons from History • Concluding Thoughts

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IAEA at a Glance

• Founded in 1957 • 161 Member States • 2300 professional and

support staff • Headquarters in Vienna • 2 scientific laboratories and

research centres

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Three “Pillars” of the IAEA 4

The IAEA and its Mission

Maximizing the contribution of nuclear technology to the world

while verifying its peaceful use

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ASSESSMENT

• The assessment based on the activities presented in this annual report and the 2012 annual report.

• The implementation of the “planned” activities is subject to the availability of funds for the 2014- 2015 period.

• Beyond 2015, the implementation of the Action Plan will be integrated in the regular activities of the relevant IAEA Divisions.

• These activities include the lesson learned from the Action Plan projects and the IEM’s as well as findings from the IAEA Fukushima Comprehensive Report.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Progress in implementation of Action

Completed by July 2013 In progress Planned

2011 2015

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• Safety assessment of nuclear power plants (NPPs)

• IAEA peer reviews • Emergency preparedness and

response • IAEA Safety Standards • Member States planning to embark

on a nuclear power programme and capacity building

• Protection of people and the environment from ionizing radiation.

Key areas of progress in the implementation of the Action Plan

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ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY VULNERABILITIES OF NPPs

Next steps • IEM 3 Protection against Extreme

Earthquakes and Tsunamis • IEM 5 Human and Organizational

Factors in Nuclear Safety

International experts meetings

• Safety Margins • Instrumentation and Control • Safety at multi-unit NPP • Safety culture

Safety Assessment (guidance,

reports, methodologies)

• To Onagawa NPP to examine the possible effects of the Great East Japan Earthquake on SSCs

Expert Missions

• Project on External Event Safety Assessment of Multi-Unit Sites.

• Project on Analyses on issues and trends for (Post-) Accident Monitoring (PAM) Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Projects funded by Government

of Japan

Achievements

IEM on Severe Accident

Management

International Conference

Topical Issues on Defence-in-Depth – Advances and Challenges for Nuclear

Installation Safety

Technical Meetings

Technical report Post-accident

monitoring systems

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STRENGTHEN IAEA PEER REVIEWS Achievements

Member States

hosting peer reviews

• Information continues to be disseminated relating to where and when IAEA peer review missions have been carried out along with the mission results

Transparency of peer reviews

3 IRRS & 5 EPREV 8 OSART & 7 OSART follow up 3 Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) missions 6 Site and External Events Design (SEED) review missions

IRRS Additional guidelines

developed and published Fukushima module’ has been further improved.

OSART 175th mission in 2013

EPREV evaluation methodology and guidance for INIR Phase III developed

INIR Training for potential

EPREV team members carried out.

Next steps Continue the systematic

planning of peer reviews to cover all safety areas

Continue to enhance

effectiveness and transparency

Assess and enhance EPREV

service.

Develop new OSART guidelines

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STRENGTHEN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

• JPLAN - Joint Radiation

Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations

• RANET - IAEA Response and Assistance Network

• REPLIE - Response Plan for Incidents and Emergencies

• Report on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP

EPR Framework

• 35 training courses and workshops • 4 Convention Exercises (ConvEx)

EPR arrangements

• provide advice on strategies to strengthen and sustain sound international preparedness for nuclear and radiological emergencies.

• 16 senior experts from all regions

Expert Group (EPREG)

EPR-series publications

Achievements Next steps

Develop a concept for an upgraded

database on EPR arrangements

Continue establishing Capacity

Building Centres

Promote registration of RANET and RANET review

missions

Continue developing/ upgrading EPR

standards and guides

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REVIEW AND STRENGTHEN IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS AND IMPROVE THEIR IMPLEMENTATION

• Systematic review of the IAEA safety standards

• Confirmed the adequacy of the current IAEA Safety Requirements and that no significant areas of weakness had been identified

• Revisions proposed to strengthen the Safety Requirements and facilitate their implementation

Review of IAEA safety standards

• Revisions are being made through addenda to the IAEA Safety Requirements relating to the safety of NPPs and spent fuel storage

Commission on Safety Standards & Safety Standards

Committees

Safety Guides identified for a pilot review

Achievements Next steps Revise the draft addenda taking

account of Member States

comments

Provide the draft addenda to

Member States for comment

Submit the draft addenda to

Committees and the Commission

in 2014

Complete the pilot program review of

the following Safety Guides

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Safety Standards

Safety Guides

Safety Requirements

Safety Fundamentals

Global Reference Point for a High Level

of Nuclear Safety

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Responsibility for

Safety

Role of Government

Leadership and Management

for Safety

Justification of Facilities and

Activities Optimization of Protection

Limitation of Risks to

Individuals

Protection of Present and

Future Generations

Protective Actions to

Reduce Existing Or Unregulated Radiation Risks

Prevention of Accidents

Emergency Preparedness and Response

IAEA Safety Fundamentals

No Changes to Fundamental Safety Objectives

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Applying IAEA Requirement documents is a way to achieve a high level of safety. IAEA guidelines are helpful to better understand how to fulfil the requirements..

IAEA Safety Standards 14

IAEA Generic Safety Requirements

5 Requirement documents identified as priority for the review

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IAEA Specific Safety Requirements

3 Requirement documents identified as priority for the review

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EMBARKING COUNTRIES

• General Siting Review and Assessment.

• Training on Level 2 PSA. • National Workforce Planning • Regulatory Control Training • International Ministerial

Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century

• Resources Development among Embarking and Experienced Countries

Continued support for embarking countries

• Methodology to support self-assessment of national infrastructures for safety

Integrated Review of Infrastructure for Safety (IRIS)

• Support Member States in using the IAEA Milestones Approach.

• e-learning modules are being developed covering

Packages of supporting

material

• South Africa first MS with existing NPPs to request an INIR Mission.

• INIR methodology is applicable to MS planning to expand their NPP programme

INIR Missions

Achievements Next steps Prepare material for

workshops to strengthen

competences of staff of Regulatory

Bodies.

Make available the Second phase of the

e-learning series

Organise training to assist MS in revising new regulations in

safety areas related to NPPs

Provide training workshops and

expert assistance to regulatory

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PROTECTION OF PEOPLE & ENVIRONMENT FROM IONIZING RADIATION

• Enhance the capabilities of Member States to simulate radionuclide transfer in the environment

• 4 themes : • Remediation of Contaminated

Areas • Uncertainties and Variability • Exposures and Effects on Biota • Marine Modelling

Modelling and Data for

Radiological Impact

Assessments (MODARIA)

• Remediation, decontamination and management of waste.

• Radiological mapping and radiation monitoring of the environment using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Expert mission to Japan

• Decommissioning • Radiation assessment & protection • Waste management • Criteria for food & water • Medicine

Projects funded by the

Government of Japan

Review of the generic criteria for radioactive material in food, animal feed and drinking water

Achievements Among next steps

Second Technical Meeting for MODARIA

IEM 6: on Radiation Protection after the Fukushima Daiichi

Accident

Development and construction of

detector packages for UAVs.

Application and development of

standards related to radionuclides in food and drinking water

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Progress in Implementation of Action 10

Completed by July 2013 In progress Planned

2011

2015

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IAEA Comprehensive Report on TEPCO’s

Fukushima Daiichi Accident

FUKUSHIMA COMPREHENSIVE REPORT

IAEA plays the leading role in producing a comprehensive report based on the understanding of the facts and Agency’s assessment of the accident.

The Report will consist of:

• An executive summary of the report that will be informative and easily understandable for the general public;

• A scientific/technical section that: - includes in an understandable balanced manner, nuclear safety and

radiological aspects focusing on scientific/technical data; - provides a description of the Fukushima accident, its causes and

consequences and address relevant key issues; - will be authoritative, factual and balanced with sufficient technical

depth but easily understandable.

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FUKUSHIMA COMPREHENSIVE REPORT

• Approximately 130 experts from over 40 Member States divided into five Working Groups (WG);

• Each WG is led by an external Co-Chair and at least one IAEA Co-Chair;

• Each WG is responsible for a different chapter;

Chapter 1: Description and context of the accident

Chapter 2: Safety assessment

Chapter 3: Emergency preparedness and response

Chapter 4: Radiological consequences

Chapter 5: Post-accident recovery;

• The experts meet in Vienna every quarter to discuss the progress made and deliberate the way forward in order to finalize the Report by the end of 2014;

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FUKUSHIMA COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 22

International Nuclear Industry Solutions

Chernobyl Unit 4

Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1 - 4

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Source: Convention on Nuclear Safety National Report of Japan, July 2012 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2012/0705_01.html

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Regulatory Independence 24

Places of Possible Leakage

1st TSOF Plenary Meeting 18 Sep. 2012 K. Tomita

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Filtered Venting system

Alternative mobile equipment

Stack

Reactor building

Containment

RPV

Permanently installed system Filter

Containment spray & Filtered venting Water injection system into lower part to prevent CV failure due to molten core (mobile pumps, hoses etc.)

Industry Solutions 26

Containment Pressure & Hydrogen Control

Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners Containment Filtering Vent System

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© Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB

Current Severe accident mitigation system

• Installed after accident at TMI

• Passive and filtered containment pressure release

• Passive short term pressure release at large LOCA

• Possibility to flood containment

• Recovery options in case of lost heat sink

• Mobile independent systems (e.g. for power and hydrogen recombination)

• Transition plans (SSMFS 2008:17 ) add capability to mitigate effects of extreme external events

© Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB

Future Role & Initiatives on LWRs

• Modernisation aim at 50 -60 years life time of Swedish plants

- New regulations to support licensing of new reactors - Regulators estimate 12-15 years from application to

operation - Safety enhancements to support Long term Operation

• Actions after Fukushima

- Power supply: Improved reliability (grid, gas turbine etc) - Spent fuel pool cooling - Independent core cooling - Handle events with all units affected

Measures for Suppressing Release & Dispersion of Radioactive Materials

Assuming CV failure, require outdoor water spraying equipment, . (Suppression of dispersion of radioactive materials by water spraying

to reactor building)

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Enhanced Measures for Earthquake / Tsunami

Breakwater Wall Tsunami Gate

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Alternative injection into RCS & RCS depressurization

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Mobile High & Low Pressure Injection 33

Alternative Injection Into Steam Generators (high & medium Pressure)

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Mobile Equipment and Modifications 35

Event Statistics (1997-2012)

• Failed/Affected Systems: Emergency core cooling - 101

• Loss of safety function - 38 • Significant degradation of safety function -

95 • Failure or significant degradation of heat

removal capability - 85 • Loss of off-site power – 53

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Low Probability / High Consequence Events

• Common-mode failure of electric-driven core cooling system needs to be addressed

• Potential Causes: • Salt water ingress, Tsunami, flooding from

upstream dam failure, excessive rain fall, etc., • Smoke from forest fire or internal fire • Seismic event • Volcanic activity– affects air intakes of EDGs • Geomagnetic Disturbance, Lightning • Sand storm – affects air intakes of EDGs

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Lessons from History

• Diesel-driven fire pump helped mitigation during extended Station blackout

• DC/Battery power controlled steam-driven cooling systems: • Reactor core isolation cooling • Steam driven auxiliary feed systems • Steam isolation condenser / heat exchanger

• Alternate AC sources manually aligned to a fault free bus helped core cooling

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Lessons from History

• Approaches to address low frequency / high consequence events - Loss of Vital AC Power • Increasing diversity in core cooling would be

more effective than increasing redundancy • Non-electric core cooling systems (PUMPS: diesel

driven, steam driven-dc controlled, compressed air-driven, pressurized accumulators etc.,)

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Concluding Thoughts

• Need to eliminate/ mitigate the known vulnerabilities at a reasonable cost

• Aim for greater availability and reliability for safety systems and power generation

• Defence in Depth through Redundancy, and Diversity for CORE COOLING & CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

• Advance design and preparedness for dealing with a potential severe accidents

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Thank you for your attention t.koshy@iaea.org

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