i borrowed some of the figures and equations in this...

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I borrowed some of the figures and equations in this lecture from Yohanes E. Riyanto, an associate professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singagpore

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  • I borrowed some of the figures and equations in this lecture from Yohanes E. Riyanto, an associate professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singagpore

  • Addresses the nonexistence of HotellingequilibriumMajor changes to the model

    a. Market space is a circle, not a line (Salop says an infinite line yields the same results). Circle is of unit mass. One imagery is a tropical island with a mountain in the middle

    b. Firms choose to enter, or not, at a specific location. These are the differentiated goods

    c. Salop has a second, undifferentiated, competitively supplied good that a consumer can buy instead of the differentiated good

    Allows us to look at optimal and equilibrium product diversity

  • Firms

    Firms are located around the circle market, equidistance from each other. Subscript i indicates a specific firm at location i. There are Nfirms.

    There is a fixed cost and constant marginal cost.

    Firms choose output and price to maximize profit given by

    i i i iq p c q f

    ( )c q cq f

  • Consumers

    Consumers are located uniformly around the circle.

    A consumer’s location represents her most preferred brand.

    Each consumer purchases one or no units of the differentiated good (excess income is spent on the homogenous good).

    Transportation costs per unit of distance is t. There are no transportation costs for the homogenous good

    The consumer derive utility from consuming her one unit of the good

    Salop has L consumers. I normalize L1

    V p tx

  • 5

    x

    Salop’s Circle Model (example: N=6)

    Firm 1

    Firm 2

    Firm 3

    Firm 4

    Firm 5

    Firm 6

    1/6 1/6

    1/6

    1/61/6

    1/6

    Firm 1

    Firm 2Firm 6

    p1

    p px

    1/6

    Yohanes E. Riyanto

  • Entry and PricingTwo stage game

    1. Firms choose whether to enter and where to locate. Assume the principle of maximum differentiation – if firms enter they try to be as far as possible from the closest competitors, to increase market power. If N firms enter, they locate equidistance around the circle, so there is 1/N distances between them

    2. Firms set price to maximize profit, given the number of other firms (ie, given the distance to their closest competitors)

    Assume a symmetric equilibrium, so p1=p2=…=pN=p

    Firm has only two competitors, the firms located immediately to its right or left. Why?

  • Consumer choice and firm demand

    Given price p charged by the adjacent firms (left and right) and price p1charge by firm 1 the indifferent consumer is at distance so

    and this give firm 1’s market share (demand) as

    0,1/x N

    11

    1 ( / )

    2

    p p t NV p tx V p t x x

    N t

    1 11( / )

    , 22

    p p t ND p p x

    t

  • Firm’s profit

    Profit of firm 1 is

    Remember p is the price of the adjacent firm. All firms are the same, hence p=p1 and so

    Like Hotelling, price and profit margin increase with transportation cost. Moreover, they decrease with the number of firms in the market

    1

    11 1

    1

    1

    /

    2

    0 2 2

    t p c

    p

    p p t Np c f

    t

    p N

    - t t

    p c p cN N

  • Local monopoliesSo far assumed firms are close enough that the compete for the same consumers. However, if firms are far apart, some consumers may choose to buy none of the differentiated good. This occurs when

    So that price plus transportation cost exceeds the value of the good

    10V p tx

  • Yohanes E. Riyanto 10

    Firm 1

    Firm 2

    p1

    p

    1/N

    xm1 xm1

    xm2xm

    2

    these

    consumers do

    not buy since

    price is higher

    than the value

    obtained (p>V)

    10 V p tx

    1

    V p

    xc

    1 1 12

    2 D p x V pc

    Indifferent consumer gets 0 surplus value from the differentiated good, so

    The demand for firms 1 and 2 is given by

    because they have monopoly over consumers on either side

    1V pxt

    1

    1 1

    2( ) 2 ( )D p x V p

    t

  • Yohanes E. Riyanto 11

    Price

    Quantity

    mp

    monopoly region

    competitive region

    Gives a kinked demand curve

    mp is the price given that

    consumers located at the locations on the previous slide are indifferent between buying the good or not. As any lower price the firm is competing with adjacent firms for those consumers and all consumers .

    xm

  • Where is the kink?

    Demand can never exceed monopoly demand, so the kink must be on the monopoly demand curve. As N increases, the kink moves to the left off the monopoly demand curve

  • Symmetric Zero Profit Equilibrium (SZPE)SZPE is a price, p, and number of firms (brands), N, such that every equally spaced Nash price setters’ maximum profit price earns zero profit.

    In equilibrium, a firm’s demand curve and average cost curve will be tangent (assures zero profit is maximum profit). Three equilibria are possible

  • Monopoly equilibrium, some consumers do not buy the differentiated good. Markets of neighboring firms do not overlap, each firm acts like a monopolist.

    At a kinked equilibrium markets just touch (there is a clear marginal consumer). The monopoly demand lies above the AC curve so what would be the monopoly price (shown by pm) is below the kinked-equilibrium price (pk)

    Competitive equilibrium all markets overlap, not really concerned with it here

  • SZPE SZPE satisfies two conditions:1. MR MC

    2. P=AC

    From symmetry if the equilibrium has no gaps q=1/N (remember we normalized L=1)

    Point G is dominated by F so the equilibrium is at the kink unless AC is exceedingly flat – giving the monopoly equilibrium, or steep, giving the competitive equilibrium (2 slides above)

    and /dp

    p q c p c f qdq

  • Number of firms: Free entry

    Entry takes place until profit is fully dissipated. Since

    Solve for N gives

    Price exceeds MC, but profit=0

    2

    10

    i

    tp c f f

    N N

    -t

    p cN

    and c ct

    N p c tff

  • Equilibrium with sufficient firms for competition

    An increase in fixed cost causes a decrease in the equilibrium number of firms (Nc) and an increase in each firms’ profit margin (p-c).

    When FC 0, Nc

    An increase in transportation cost (t) causes an increase in the equilibrium number of firms (Nc) and an increase in each firms’ profit margin (p-c).

  • Social optimumChoose N to minimize total production and transportation costs

    So

    Profits are positive and equal 3F

    Competitive market has too much entry (too much differentiation) compared to social optimum. Total transportation costs = which decrease in N. Since Ns

  • What is important in the modelWhich of the model innovations were most important?

    The second good and the circle (or infinite line) were tools to remove the discontinuities in the profit function that plagued the Hotellingmodel. They were innovations, but not the focus of the paper

    • Notice how little Salop talks about the outside good. It just enabled demand for the differentiated good to be elastic (buy 1 or 0, depending on price)

    • Equivalent, in a way, to the congestion costs of Ahlin and Ahlin

    • Focus is on product differentiation and competition. That is the research issue of this paper

  • Most important conclusions/contributions1. Competition results in too much differentiation

    2. Explains where a kinked-demand curve comes from

    3. In equilibrium, P>MC but profit still equal 0

    4. Monopoly demand is more elastic than competitive demand

    How important are these conclusions/contributions? Evaluation is not just stating something, it is telling us whether it is good or bad, and why. For example, how valuable is it that we understand where kinked-demand curves come from? Why? Evaluation means assessing what it adds to our knowledge, whether that is valuable, and maybe, as a weakness, where it misleads us