Ho

w th

e C

IA G

ot C

he

BY

AN

DR

EW

ST

. GE

OR

GE

Eve

n th

e ro

mantic

adventu

rer's

clo

se frie

nds

seld

om

knew

where

he w

as o

r what h

e w

as

doin

g

afte

r he le

ft Cuba. A

merica

's Centra

l In

tellig

ence

Agency d

idn't a

lways h

ave an open

line to C

he Guevara.

But as a

n apparatus fre-

quently g

iven to

chasin

g sh

adow

s, the C

IA

knew

pre

cisely w

here

he w

as a

nd h

ow

to h

elp

ru

n h

im d

ow

n a

t the ve

ry end.

ON

MA

RC

H 2

3, 1

967, A

T T

HE

MIS

ER

AB

LE

m

ilitary m

orn

ing h

our o

f 0700, th

e th

ree o

fficers a

nd

twenty-nine m

en of a Bolivia

n a

rmy p

atro

l pickin

g its

way along the N

ancahuazu River stum

bled into some-

thing all had been trained for but none had really ex-pected. H

ere, in the unlikely, ravine-scarred jungle of B

olivia's remote southeastern badlands, w

here a back- 96

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

97

woods cocaine cooker is usually the only thing stirring,

the small infantry patrol ran into an enem

y ambush.

In th

e ta

ctical m

anuals th

at tw

enty-o

ne-ye

ar-o

ld

Lie

ute

nant R

uben A

meza

ga h

ad stu

die

d a

t milita

ry academ

y, enemy fire from

any sort of position was rep-

resented by neatly dotted arcs. But no such thing ap-

peared now. A

crack, no louder than a hard ping-pong serve, snapped from

high up among the boulders on

the steep river gorge, and the patrol guide in front of Lieutenant A

mezaga, a local civilian nam

ed Epifano

Vargas, half-turned in surprise, his arm

outfiung. Then

came a splatter of short explosions; both the guide and

Lieutenant Am

ezaga were killed before they could ex-

change a

word

. With

them

die

d m

ost o

f the d

eta

ch-

ment's lead section. S

ix soldiers and the guide were

killed, four wounded, fourteen captured by the m

yste-rious attackers.

Eight soldiers got aw

ay. With terror-m

arbled eyes, th

ey ra

n cro

ss-jungle

seve

ral m

iles u

ntil th

ey d

are

d

form

up

ag

ain

un

de

r a se

nio

r serg

ea

nt. T

he

n th

ey

loped o

n u

ntil th

ey h

it a n

arro

w d

irt road, w

here

a

petro

leum

truck p

icked th

em

up a

nd to

ok th

em

to

Cam

iri, headquarters base of the Bolivian F

ourth In-fantry D

ivision. T

he division had a radio. The w

ord brought by the N

anca

huazu

's hard

-bre

ath

ing su

rvivors w

ent to

La

Paz, B

olivia's cloud-top capital, via a surplus U.S

. Sig-

na

l Co

rps co

mm

un

icatio

ns tra

iler p

arke

d in

Fo

rt Mi-

raffores, supreme headquarters of B

olivia's armed forces,

where, as if by rem

ote kinetics, people started running, too. A

n officer carrying the decoded message galloped up

to Major G

eneral Juan Jose Torres, the tough, sm

ooth, pin

t-sized B

olivia

n ch

ief o

f staff. G

enera

l Torre

s dashed into the presence of the com

mander-in-chief,

General of the F

orces Alfredo O

vando—a m

easured presence not ever lightly dashed into. B

y then the news

was spreading in every direction.

98 T

HE

SP

IES

A copy of the signal sheet landed on the desk of C

olo-nel Federico A

rafia, the military intelligence chief, w

ho rose as he began reading it and trotted rapidly, still reading, across the M

iraftores quadrangle toward the

back-of-the-base cluster of buildings that housed the U

.S. M

ilitary Assistance A

dvisory Group, know

n as M

AA

G. A

t about the same tim

e, General O

vando got on the direct telephone line to B

olivia's president, R

ene Barrientos.

Within m

inutes, a call went out from

the Presiden-

tial Palace for U.S. A

mbassador D

ouglas Henderson, a

tweedy,

erect, gray-haired career foreign-service

officer, who happened to be driving hom

e in his barge-like lim

ousine cluttered with special com

munications

devices. At his desk P

resident Barrientos—

a heavy-shouldered, florid m

an who had been an A

ir Force

general before he became president and a hot fighter

pilot before that—

and the am

bassador in his car spoke briefly. E

ven as they talked, the limousine w

heeled around and headed tow

ards the U.S

. Em

bassy and its rooftop radio.

In La Paz, intelligence chief C

olonel Araila w

as still deep in conference w

ith the Am

erican military advisers

when a phone began ringing in W

ashington on the desk of W

illiam B

owdler, P

resident Johnson's senior adviser for L

atin Am

erican affair' s. Bow

dier, a tall, in-telligent, very quiet m

an, listened silently, then walked

a few steps dow

n the Executive O

ffice Building corri-

dor to the office of Walt W

hitman R

ostow, the W

hite H

ouse troubleshooter for presidential-sized troubles abroad. T

he balloon, as more than one harassed secre-

tary was to observe in W

ashington during the remain-

der of that day, was definitely u

p. A

n isolated jungle skirmish has seldom

been known

to trigger such topside tensions. But the sudden shoot-

out that killed Lieutenant A

mezaga and practically de-

stroyed his troop was the curtain raiser in the dram

a that brought back on stage the long-vanished E

rnesto C

he Guevara. T

he guerrilla expert had become the

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

99

warrior, personally leading his long-threatened show

-dow

n with "Y

anqui imperialism

." The am

bush set in m

otion a conflict which brought about—

but did not end w

ith--Guevara's ow

n violent death on October 9,

1967. T

he conflict was to live on after C

he in a worldw

ide controversy about the true circum

stances of the leg-endary guerrilla general's dow

nfall. Just exactly what

was the U

.S. role in it? T

here have been accusations that C

he was captured and executed by the ubiquitous

Central Intelligence A

gency; other versions blamed his

death on the Soviet Union and the old-line C

omm

unist P

arty leaders, others still on Cuban strong-m

an Fidel

Castro—

or on Che's ow

n wrongheaded tactics.

To appreciate the difficulty of unraveling such tan-

gled current events as Che's last adventure, one does

not need a degree in modem

history. The outcom

e m

ust be pieced together from the contestants them

-selves—

the men in the field. T

he day-to-day story pre-sented here of G

uevara's side of the showdow

n took shape through m

onths of travel in South A

merica and

more m

onths of poring over handwritten diaries, docu-

ments, charts and logs. T

he U.S

. role proved even more difficult to recon-

struct. Putting it together involved long talks with peo-

ple who w

ere hard to find and others hard to talk to. Som

e of them—

intelligence people and Special Forces m

en—had m

oved on since 1967, and wanted the

whole bad scene forgotten—

the jungle hunt and the killing. A

few felt them

selves still bound by official se-crecy.

Yet in talkg w

ith the men w

ho had held the stakes in w

hat turned out to be Che G

uevara's last gamble, the

story came to life for this w

riter with color and sharp

1 % outline. I had know

n some of the C

uban guerrilla lead-ers from

my years as a m

agazine correspondent in Ha-

vana during the Castro revolution, and I had know

n C

he best of them all. I had m

arched with him

through m

any moonless nights of the bitter jungle cam

paign in

100 T

HE

SP

IES

1957-.58. But ten years later, it w

as an enigmatic, elu-

sive, ch

ang

ed C

he w

ho

se contrad

ictory

beh

avio

r per-

sisted at the heart of the puzzle.

In postwar C

uba the Honorable E

rnesto Guevara de la

Sern

a, M.D

., Ph.D

., had

led a b

usy

life as a govern

- m

ent o

fficial of h

igh ran

k, as a b

ank p

residen

t, dip

lo-

mat, w

orld

traveler, au

thor, p

ublic sp

eaker an

d th

e tw

ice-married

father o

f five ch

ildren

. But it w

as as C

he, the legendary guerrilla general, that he became an

international celebrity and hero of young people every-w

here; it is Che's bearded, burning-eyed poster im

age w

hich

flies ov

er hun

dred

s of in

surg

ent co

llege cam

-puses.

While C

he's doctrine of "confrontation" and "direct actio

n" w

as takin

g h

old

with

the y

oung

, the reck

less, ro

man

tic rebel lead

er him

self had

beco

me a m

an o

f m

ystery

. He h

ad risen

to fam

e as Castro

's right-h

and

man in the trium

phant Cuban guerrilla insurrection of

1958, o

nly

to v

anish

from

sight in

the sp

ring o

f 1965,

hav

ing ren

ou

nced

all his p

rivileg

es in a h

and

written

letter to

Fid

el Castro

. For tw

o y

ears Ch

e's wh

ere-abouts becam

e the world's best-kept, m

ost-guessed-at secret.

Now

here did the Guevara m

ystery set off more edu-

cated g

uessw

ork

than

in W

ashin

gto

n. T

here C

he h

ad

been a fascinating subject of study ever since his emer-

gen

ce in 1

961 as o

ne o

f Cuba's ru

ling rev

olu

tionary

trium

virate. In

differen

t to p

om

p an

d p

ow

er, Che h

ad rem

ained

restless. H

aving been a prime factor in w

inning Cuba,

he tu

rned

to th

e "natio

nal lib

eration" o

f oth

er Latin

republics. H

e organized special guerrilla schools for re-cru

its from

every

country

in th

e hem

isphere, an

d fo

r volu

nteers w

ho co

uld

not m

ake it to

Cuba, h

e wro

te long essays on guerrilla w

arfare, one of which becam

e an international best seller.

Inev

itably

no

t all of C

he's read

ers join

ed h

is fan

club

. In W

ashin

gto

n th

e freshly

-launch

ed N

ew F

ron

-

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

101

tier administration w

as alarmed. L

argely in response to C

he's theories, President John K

ennedy and young At-

torney General R

obert Kennedy revived "special w

ar-fare" as a k

ey U

.S. m

ilitary strateg

y. E

very

United

S

tates ambassador going abroad w

as required to take a co

urse in

guerrilla an

d an

tizuerrilla w

arfare desig

ned

largely around C

he's textbook. It is a little-]mow

n but so

lid fact th

at this asth

matic, so

ft-faced m

edico

wh

o

never went to m

ilitary school or owned a brass button

had a greater influence on inter-Am

erican military pol-

icies than any single man since the death of Josef S

ta-lin. C

he enjoyed the role of big bad wolf. H

e organized param

ilitary co

mm

ands an

d g

uerrilla sch

ools. B

y th

e en

d o

f 1962 h

is alum

ni an

d A

merica's G

reen B

erets w

ere at each other's throats in a dozen countries.

Thousan

ds o

f anonym

ous co

mbatan

ts on b

oth

sides

were k

illed in

far-flung, m

erciless gu

errilla battles.

Am

on

g th

em d

ied q

uite a few

yanquis

never men-

tioned in official dispatches. Che him

self in a coldly fe-ro

cious sp

eech b

efore th

e U.N

. Gen

eral Assem

bly

in

Decem

ber, 1

964, h

inted

at Am

erican casu

alties the

Am

erican public never knew about.

Wash

ingto

n, ig

norin

g th

e con

temp

tuo

us v

erbal as-

sault C

he so

unded

befo

re the w

orld

foru

m ("jack

als . . . h

yen

as . . ."), main

tained

a calm an

d o

stenta-

tiously pacific stance. "Truth to tell, it w

as kind of fas-cin

ating fo

r us to

sit back

for a co

uple o

f years an

d

just w

atch C

he o

perate," o

ne sp

ecial warfare ad

viser

recalled. "Oh, there w

as fighting one place or another practically all the tim

e between 1961 and 1966. W

her-ever the guerrilla team

s moved in—

the Congo, S

anto D

om

ingo, T

anzan

ia, Peru

, Ven

ezuela, G

uatem

ala—our counterteam

s moved in, too. B

ut we kept the fight-

ing on a strictly limited basis.

"Of co

urse, C

he g

ot im

patien

t with

all the M

ickey

M

ouse action. He tried to goad us into a real gam

e, for keeps—

winner take all. C

he found it in Bolivia, poor

49/

rs

102 T

HE

SP

IES

guy. But back in '63, '64, w

hen Che began talking like

a man looking for a show

down w

ith the United S

tates —

and sounding like a man w

ho meant it—

we decided

we n

eeded

to d

o so

me stu

dyin

g b

efore w

e tackled

him

." M

akin

g a stu

dy

of p

eop

le like C

he G

uev

ara is a fu

ll-time jo

b o

f the C

entral In

telligen

ce Agen

cy. It

does so through a PP

S file, som

etimes called the B

P

file. "PP

S" stands for "P

sychiatric Personality S

tudy," "B

P" fo

r "Beh

avio

r Pro

file," and b

oth

mean

essen-

tially the same thing—

a top-secret, inductive, psychia-tric case study of som

eone about whom

the U.S

. must

do some serious thinking.

Having a P

PS

project of one's own is usually a m

ark of distinction. N

either Hitler nor S

talin ever had one (both died before the P

PS

was perfected), but by the

mid-'50's several U

.S. intelligence outfits, including the

Arm

y's experimental 515th M

.I. Detachm

ent, were at

work

on th

e basic in

telligen

ce pro

blem

of try

ing to

predict w

hat foreign leaders might do in certain situa-

tions. C

he G

uev

ara attracted a g

reat deal o

f secret psy

-chiatric attention from

the mom

ent he emerged on the

world scene in 1959. B

y 1965 his case study contained enough carefully pieced-together behavioral data for som

e educated guesses about what m

ade Che run.

"Did you know

that all through his teens and early tw

enties, C

he called

him

self 'Ch

anch

ol T

hat m

eans

'Pig

.' No

t 'Fats' o

r 'Po

rky

' it mean

s plain

Pig

." A

go

vern

men

t psy

chiatrist co

nn

ected w

ith a research

pro

ject join

tly sp

onso

red b

y th

e U.S

. Air F

orce an

d

the CIA

was talking. "T

hat's what his schoolm

ates and friends called him

, you see, because Guevara put on a

big show of being 'disgusting.' H

e wore m

essy clothes, three-day-old shirts, black fingernails. H

e'd slurp his food. O

f course, what G

uevara was trying to do w

as play

the o

utlaw

, even

then

. When

the o

ther k

ids

started calling him 'P

ig,' he adopted the name w

ith rel-ish. W

hen he was eighteen he w

rote an account of a

BO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

103

student's rugby game for a sports paper and signed it

'El C

hancho,' The P

ig. The editor said he w

ould print it if C

he changed that stinky by-line. But C

he hung on he lo

ved

role-p

layin

g th

e outcast, th

e loner, th

e rebel, the pig. F

inally he did something typical of a

certain n

euro

tic typ

e---he ialien

i7ed

' the n

ame. H

e signed the story 'C

hang-cho.' " T

he psychiatrist, with his governm

ent colleagues quietly reconstructing C

he's childhood years, devel-oped a revealing em

otional profile of the angry rebel. "C

he was an asthm

atic; this is what som

e social psy-chologists have com

e to call a 'blemished identity,' "

he said. "Children like that tend to have difficult rela-

tions with their parents, often—

as seems to have been

the case with C

he—w

ith their fathers. In adulthood, the difficulties carry over to society at large. A

ccep-tance, ego m

anagement—

lots of psychic hang-ups are involved. It's definitely a neurotic pattern."

Intelligence analysts, even when they have com

e to th

ink o

f som

eone as a n

euro

tic perso

nality

, cannot

predict what he w

ill do. But they can "project" som

e-thing about the w

ay he will do things, because neurotic

people tend to act in certain repetitive patterns. By the

end of 1964 Che had furnished U

.S. intelligence w

ith a g

reat deal o

f insig

ht in

to th

e modus operandi of his

personal strategy. Washington even knew

where its

basic outline came from

: the CIA

had discovered that C

he's bible, his favorite guerrilla manual, w

as a Soviet

book on special warfare called T

he Clandestine R

e-gional C

omm

ittee in Action.

"In 1963-64 Che staged a big guerrilla operation in

the n

orth

ern p

rov

inces o

f Arg

entin

a—n

ot v

ery far

from w

here he was born," a S

tate Departm

ent intelli-gence analyst recalled. "It w

as led by military and ci-

vilian mem

bers of Che's personal H

avana staff: Jorge R

icardo M

asetti, who w

as Che's p

ress aide, an

d h

is longtim

e adjutant, Captain H

ermes P

ena. These people

were stand-ins for C

he. Masetti, w

ho was the leader of

rr

104 T

HE

SP

IES

the o

peratio

n, to

ok th

e pseu

donym

, `Com

andan

te Se-

gundo,' b

ecause th

e First C

om

man

der w

as, of co

urse,

Che h

imself. G

uev

ara did

every

thin

g to

mak

e this o

p-

eration a su

ccess, excep

t for g

oin

g to

Arg

entin

a and

runnin

g it. It w

as a failure. T

hree o

f Che's clo

sest frien

ds, M

asetti, Pen

a, and a C

uban

cotnandante we

later iden

tified as R

aul D

avila, w

ere killed

. Also

ten

other guevaristas,

mostly

young A

rgen

tinian

s. When

C

he v

anish

ed fro

m p

ublic sig

ht in

Hav

ana sh

ortly

af-terw

ard, in March, 1965, any intelligence analyst could

hav

e giv

en y

ou a stro

ng p

rojectio

n o

f what w

as likely

to

hap

pen

nex

t: an o

peratio

n led

in p

erson b

y a fu

-rious, guilt-torm

ented, vengeful Che."

But fo

r the n

ext six

teen m

onth

s noth

ing d

ecisive

happened. There w

ere frequent reports spotting Che in

Guatem

ala, in V

ietnam

, in A

rgen

tina, ev

en in

the

Congo w

here—as w

e now know

from his ow

n diaries —

he did make several short visits in 1966.

Most of the C

he specialists in Washington's various in-

telligence and special warfare agencies spent this tim

e larg

ely in

a curio

us p

astime: th

ey ex

chan

ged

"smoke"

with their opposition in H

avana. "S

moke" is th

e slang term

for false in

form

ation p

ut

out b

y an

espio

nag

e org

anizatio

n to

mislead

anoth

er espionage organization. D

uring most of 1965 and 1966

Hav

ana p

lanted

clues an

d ru

mors in

dicatin

g th

at Che

bad

disap

peared

or d

ied. W

ashin

gto

n recip

rocated

by

telling people—even journalists and people from

other govern

men

t agen

cies—off-th

e-record

that th

e rum

ors

of Che's death w

ere probably true. It can

now

be to

ld th

at this w

as a long-ran

ge, p

ur-

poseful deception. Washington knew

more about C

he's w

hereab

outs d

urin

g th

is perio

d th

an it ev

er adm

itted,

in p

art becau

se the U

.S. N

avy an

d th

e Natio

nal S

ecu-

rity A

gen

cy jo

intly

main

tain a h

uge co

mm

unicatio

ns

vessel o

ff Hav

ana h

arbor. T

his sh

ip m

onito

rs every

w

ord of radio traffic in and out of Cuba. T

he first inci-den

t which

revealed

som

ethin

g to

U.S

. intellig

ence

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

105

about Che's real w

hereabouts was a series of em

otional long-distance exchanges occasioned by the fatal illness an

d su

dden

death

of C

he's m

oth

er in B

uen

os A

ires in

May, 1965. C

he, the United S

tates learned, was holed

up in

an iso

lated b

ase camp o

n th

e eastern co

ast of

Cuba. F

or n

early a y

ear and a h

alf thereafter C

he stay

ed

out of public sight—quiet, brooding, surely planning.

Durin

g th

is perio

d b

oth

sides ed

ged

tow

ard a sh

ow

-dow

n. The C

uban propaganda line called for guerrilla activ

ities in L

atin A

merica o

n th

e Viet C

ong p

attern;

the aim w

as the creation of a "second Vietnam

" some-

where n

ear Am

erica's land fro

ntiers. F

or th

e United

S

tates, Vietn

am itself w

as pro

vin

g a q

uag

mire; a sec-

ond Vietnam

might upset traditional A

merican politics

altogether. Washington prepared the defense of its ow

n hem

isphere with the tense, secretive concentration of a

serious crisis. C

he began making his m

ove Novem

ber 7, 1966. Fol-

lowed by seventeen senior C

uban army leaders—

among

them eleven flag officers of general rank—

he arrived at a sm

all jungle-edge base camp in southeastern B

olivia. S

etting u

p h

eadquarters, h

e spen

t the n

ext n

ineteen

w

eeks exploring the countryside and recruiting a small

cadre of Bolivian guerrilla trainees.

Bolivian and U

nited States intelligence finally got the

first solid

clue ab

out C

he's m

ovem

ents fro

m th

ese re-cru

its. Three o

f them

deserted

the g

uerrilla cam

p o

n

March

11 an

d ran

straight to

the n

earest Boliv

ian

army p

ost. T

heir sto

ry w

as still under ev

aluatio

n tw

o

weeks later w

hen, on March 23, the lightning-quick at-

tack o

n L

ieuten

ant A

mezag

a's patro

l pro

duced

the

confirmation.

The gunfire of C

he's attack echoed sharply in Wash-

ington, where it set off a m

ajor battle among a dozen-

odd ag

encies, d

epartm

ents, serv

ices and in

ternatio

nal

agen

cies, each o

f which

had

com

e to th

ink o

f Che as

its responsibility.

106 T

HE

SPIE

S H

igh government leaders flocked hurriedly during the

last week of M

arch and the first half of April for short,

secretive palavers at a q

uick

succession

of locations.

Some w

ere held at Arm

y Chief of Staff G

eneral Harold

K. Johnson's conference cham

ber, some at W

alt Ros-

tow's office, som

e at a conference hall adjoining what

was on

ce the E

xCom

m (E

xecutive C

omm

ittee of the

National Security C

ouncil) suite in the Executive O

f-fice B

uilding. The purpose of the hopping about w

as to m

ake sure the meetings did not alert the W

ashington press corps. A

ir-tight secrecy was the one essential pol-

icy all conferees concurred in. Even m

inor State De-

partment officials and m

ilitary officers assigned to such k

ey areas as Bolivia, or to th

e special in

teragency

board

set up

to deal w

ith C

ub

an em

ergencies, w

ere kept in the dark.

A quick State D

epartment survey confirm

ed that-luckily—

only a single foreign correspondent, Murray

Sayle of the London T

imes, happened to be in B

olivia the day C

he struck. Sayle, however, accidentally dis-

covered, before the curtain came clow

n, that there were

daily scrambled radiotelephone conversations betw

een the W

hite House and the U

.S. Em

bassy in Bolivia on

and

after March

23. A season

ed rep

orter, Sayle d

e-cided to check out the scene by accom

panying a Boliv-

ian arm

y comp

any on

a patrol of th

e Nan

ca.hu

azu.

area. Nothing happened to Sayle, but stories w

ere cir-culating now

of a guerrilla band in action. W

hen Sayre returned to La P

az on April 10, he w

as sm

othered under a barrage of amiable reassurances

from U

.S. officials. "

Wh

at the w

hole flap

really m

eans," the British correspondent w

as told b

y a high

U

.S. d

iplom

at in L

a Paz, "

is that th

e Bolivian

s are trying to put the squeeze on us again for m

ore aid."

An even m

ore thorough snake-oil job was done on the

Washington E

vening Star. Intrigued by vague rumors

that "something big" w

as brewing in South A

merica,

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

107

the Star sent veteran correspondent Jeremiah O

'Leary

there to make a quick cross-continental exploration.

O'L

eary, given the full treatment, reported from

Lim

a, P

eru: "U.S. officials throughoU

t Latin A

merica are vir-

tually unanimous in their belief that C

he Guevara . . .

is dead. They believe G

uevara was executed in C

uba b

ecause of p

olicy clashes w

ith C

astro. . . . Th

e most

reliable information available is that the guerrilla band

[spotted in Bolivia] is m

ade up almost entirely of B

o- livians."

To m

ake sure readers realized this was the outcom

e of a th

orough

investigation

, O'L

eary noted

that al-

thou

gh a m

an n

amed

Gu

evara had

been

rum

ored

among the guerrilla chiefs, evidence show

ed this Gue-

vara was sim

ply a local bushwhacker: "G

uevara is a com

mon nam

e in Bolivia."

It was true enough that "dependable sources" had

revealed the identity of a Bolivian guerrilla as M

oises . G

uevara, a comm

unist mine-union organizer. B

ut the sam

e dependable sources—w

hich consisted of a cache of secret guerrilla docum

ents unearthed in a hidden ju

ngle cave—

revealed m

uch

more n

ot disclosed

to O

'Leary: that high-ranking C

uban military leaders,

rather th

an B

olivians, w

ere in ch

arge of the in

sur-

gency. H

arkin

g back

to the situ

ation at th

at time, a h

igh

Wash

ington

intelligen

ce remin

isced: "

Non

e of this

story is apt to sound very creditable or sensible unless it is rem

emb

ered th

at the govern

men

t acted as if it

were under attack because it w

as under attack, and dangerously so. C

he Guevara's strategy called for set-

ting up a guerrilla stronghold, starting a small

jungle w

ar, and then internationalizing the conflict. The key

to Che's plan turned on involving other L

atin Am

eri-can countries and, above all, the U

nited States. Once

foreign intervention had been loosed in Bolivia, C

he had the m

akings of his primary objective—

a second V

ietnam."

10

8

TH

E S

PIE

S

Washington knew

that Guevara's guerrilla strategy w

as far fro

m stu

pid

. The A

rgen

tinian

govern

men

t of G

en-

eral Juan

Carlo

s On

gan

ia beg

an to

prep

are for o

pen

m

ilitary in

terven

tion th

e mom

ent it learn

ed o

f the

gu

errilla outb

reak o

n A

rgen

tina's v

uln

erable n

orth

ern

bord

er. Convin

ced o

f the n

eed fo

r a "prev

entiv

e" ac-tion in B

olivia, the hard-bitten, hard-charging generals w

ho

no

w ad

min

ister Arg

entin

a pro

ved

hard

to d

is-su

ade. T

hey

were d

etermin

ed to

settle the sco

re with

th

e Castro

regim

e for th

e 1963-'6

4 C

uban

-back

ed

guerrilla uprising. And a m

ajor antiguerrilla campaign

of in

ternatio

nal p

rop

ortio

ns w

ou

ld h

ave elev

ated A

r-gentina to the status of leading m

ilitary power in S

outh A

merica.

Arg

en

tinia

n F

ore

ign

Min

ister N

ican

or C

osta

M

endez b

luntly

told

the U

.S. S

tate Dep

artmen

t that

"Argentina had decided to use force." H

is warning w

as back

ed b

y larg

e-scale troop m

ovem

ents all acro

ss no

rthern

Arg

entin

a. Durin

g th

e first half o

f Ap

ril, G

eneral A

lejandro

Lan

usse's T

hird

Arm

y—

Arg

enti-

na's only strategic combat-ready ground forces unit—

was m

obilized

and m

oved

to stag

ing areas less th

an

on

e hun

dred

fifty m

iles from

the g

uerrilla zo

ne. G

en-

eral Artu

ro A

guirre, co

mm

ander o

f the A

rgen

tinian

C

onstab

ulary

, an elite m

obile strik

e force, also

set up

its field headquarters within sight of the B

olivian fron-tier.

"We felt su

re that if th

e Arg

entin

ians fo

und o

ut ex

-actly w

hat we knew

at that point," a State D

epartment

inte

lligence a

naly

st recalle

d in

Wash

ingto

n re

-cen

tly, "th

ey

wo

uld

have a

ttack

ed

. That w

ou

ld

hav

e imm

ediately

pulled

us in

, of co

urse—

and th

e w

hole ball game w

ould have been gone before we had

a turn

at bat."

Wash

ingto

n's d

etermin

ation to

cool th

e crisis and

keep it at m

anageable temperature resulted in loud de-

nials w

hen

New

York

T

imes correspondent B

arnard C

ollier reported from B

uenos Aires that A

rgentina was

prep

aring to

move tro

ops in

to B

oliv

ia for jo

int co

un-

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

109

terguerrilla o

peratio

ns w

ith B

oliv

ian u

nits. C

ollier's

front-p

age rep

ort co

ntain

ed, alo

ng w

ith its m

ajor

scoop, o

ne u

nco

nfirm

ed d

etail—th

at Boliv

ian P

resi-dent R

ene Barrientos had requested A

rgentinian inter-ven

tion—

and th

is pro

voked

the B

oliv

ian F

oreig

n O

f-fice to join the S

tate Departm

ent in knocking down the

story. W

hat h

app

ened

nex

t is no

t yet fu

lly k

no

wn

. It is said

that a co

nfid

ential, h

igh

-level w

arnin

g in

vokin

g

the n

ation

al security

interest fo

und its w

ay fro

m th

e W

hite H

ouse to

Tim

es Foreign E

ditor Seym

our Top-

pin

g's d

esk. In

any case, v

eteran L

atin A

merica re-

porter C

ollier w

as sudden

ly called

off th

e Boliv

ian

guerrilla story, which w

as reassigned to Paul M

ontgom-

ery, a quiet young staffer from the R

io bureau. B

ehin

d th

e scenes, h

ow

ever, P

residen

t Barrien

tos

launch

ed a p

rivate in

terven

tion cam

paig

n o

f his o

wn

via B

oliv

ia's ambassad

or to

Wash

ing

ton

. Julio

San

-jines-G

oytia, a West P

oint graduate with a fluent com

-m

and of Pentagonese, w

as an able and efficient chief of m

ission. W

ealthy an

d ch

armin

g, h

e had

been

a w

arm befriender of m

any southern senators and gover-n

ors. In

his sp

ecial ob

jective, th

e amb

assado

r cou

ld

count on the strategic support of Colonel E

dward F

ox, th

e U.S

. air attache an

d av

iation ad

viser in

Boliv

ia. C

olo

nel F

ox, w

ho h

ad stru

ck u

p a w

arm frien

dsh

ip

with ex-pilot P

resident Barrientos, had becom

e an in- flu

ential ad

vocate fo

r the p

residen

t's view

s in U

.S.

official circles. S

ecure in

his b

ackin

g, th

erefore, A

m-

bassador Sanjines-G

oytia put forth an idea that seemed

to have some advantages. H

e proposed to Secretary of

State D

ean Rusk that the U

nited States do nothing for

the tim

e bein

g ab

out th

e Guev

ara crisis bey

on

d in

-creasing the m

ilitary and financial aid to President B

ar-

rientos. "S

ince the Barrientos governm

ent is obviously Gue-

vara's first target," argued the ambassador, "the logical

first response is to

buttress B

arriento

s. Giv

en th

e

.■• 2,

47 1

1,

110 T

HE

SP

IES

means, the B

olivian armed forces can handle C

he Gue-

vara." T

he ambassador's approach w

as not unattractive. It required no m

ilitary intervention; it limited rather than

"internationalized" the crisis; and it was not scandal-

ously expensive. Barrientos' first request w

as for six m

illion

dollars, tw

o-th

irds in

military

supplies an

d

one-third in dollar funds, with a follow

-up program

aimed at bringing som

e stability to the Bolivian na-

tional budget (estimated to be one hundred fifty m

il-lion dollars in the red in 1967) and som

e benefits to B

olivia's grumbling tin m

iners. Rusk liked the package

well en

ough to

toss it u

p at th

e nex

t secret Guev

ara crisis conference, on A

pril 9, where it w

as promptly

shot down.

This w

as a top-IeveI meeting, crackling w

ith urgency, in

the P

entag

on's Jo

int-C

hiefs-o

f-Staff co

nferen

ce room

. It was attended by A

rmy C

hief of Staff G

eneral Johnson; G

eneral Robert W

. Porter, Jr., four-star boss

of SouthC

omm

(Southern C

omm

and), the joint U.S

. D

efense Headquarters for L

atin Am

erica, based in the C

anal Zone; M

ajor General Jam

es D. A

lger, South-

Com

m's field forces com

mander, lean and haw

k-faced; A

ir Force B

rigadier General W

illiam K

. Skaer, the J-2

(join

t intellig

ence ch

ief) of S

outh

Com

m; S

ecretary

Rusk; A

ssistant Secretary of S

tate (for Latin A

merica)

Covey T

. Oliver, a patient, portly troubleshooter; C

IA

Director R

ichard Helm

s, flanked by two assistant dep-

uty directors and several case officers; Presidential S

e-cu

rity A

ssistant W

alt W. R

osto

w an

d W

hite H

ouse

Hem

isphere Adviser W

illiam B

owdler.

Rusk opened the m

eeting with a brief description of

the Bolivian proposal. H

e had hardly finished when

CIA

Director H

elms took the floor to point out that, in

effect, the B

oliv

ians co

uld

no

t be tru

sted w

ith larg

e sum

s, and he had some convincing evidence. T

he CIA

presentation included a form

idable area study accom-

pan

ied b

y ch

arts and

bar g

raph

s on

an easel, an

d it

•

11

0W

TH

E C

IA G

OT

CIE

111

made sad show

ing of Bolivian accounting custom

s. P

revious U.S

. funds, directly destined to keep up to date the civil service payrolls (including those of the all-im

portant national police force), had plainly gone astray, for governm

ent employees had been unpaid for

months. A

special appropriation for the purchase of cross-country vehicles, essential for sw

ift counterinsur-gency operations, had been invested by the B

olivians in a fleet of M

ini-Mokes, cute little beetles w

hich, how-

ever, tended to bog down in m

ud and could not hope to get w

ithin shooting distance of Che G

uevara's oper- ational area. "A

payoff was reportedly involved in the

acquisitio

n o

f these u

nsu

itable tran

sport craft," re-

marked one of the case officers at the m

eeting, and in the ensuing silence the B

olivian proposal sank out of sight.

General Johnson's aides had another presentation, em

-bodying long-prepared A

rmy plans for just such an

emerg

ency

. They

dealt w

ith th

e setting u

p o

f a test force, called a R

egional Assistance C

omm

and, made

up of counterinsurgency units with special capability to

isolate and crush guerrilla cadres as quickly as they w

ere spotted. "One of the m

ost important lessons w

e have learned in V

iet Nam

," General Johnson said, "is

that guerrilla flare-ups must be sm

othered imm

ediately, w

ithout a m

om

ent's d

elay. A

Reg

ional A

ssistance

Com

mand is being organized under S

outhCom

m right

now, and it is ready to be com

mitted in planned stages

—co

mm

and an

d tech

nical ad

viso

ry staffs, m

obile

training teams and schools, and light com

bat support elem

ents—if absolutely necessary."

Ru

sk in

terrup

ted, n

otin

g th

at State h

ad stro

ng

ly

urged a no-intervention policy on the White H

ouse. "A

mbassador H

enderson, who is standing by at the

radio room in L

a Paz, has been instructed to order the

withdraw

al of all MA

AG

military advisory personnel

from the B

olivian provinces contiguous to the guerrilla zone. I believe this has already been done. H

as it?"

112 T

HE

SP

IES

An aid

e to G

eneral P

orter co

nfirm

ed carry

ing o

ut

the o

rder. "S

ix in

fantry

, artillery an

d sig

nals ad

visers

hav

e been

temp

orarily

reassign

ed fro

m th

e affected

areas to L

a Paz," h

e read fro

m an

info

rmatio

n sh

eet. "W

ell, we u

rge th

at this h

ands-o

ff policy

be m

ain-

tained as far as humanly possible," said R

usk. "I know

that so

meth

ing m

ust b

e done ab

out th

is pro

blem

, but

fieldin

g ev

en th

e first elemen

ts of a R

egio

nal A

ssis-tan

ce Com

man

d w

ould

mean

the fat's in

the fire. P

er-h

aps so

meth

ing less o

bv

iou

s . . ." T

he G

reat Gu

evara P

olicy

Disp

ute w

as on

. Arth

ur

Sch

lesing

er, Jr., the K

enn

edy

histo

rian, m

ay h

ave

turn

ed u

p so

meth

ing

basic w

hen

, bad

gered

by

friend

s ab

out U

.S. p

olicy

zigzag

s in C

ub

a and V

ietnam

he

said: "G

overn

men

t is not th

e monolith

it seems. In

reality

, govern

men

t is intern

al conflict." It is p

opular

fallacy to think that such internal conflicts are resolved along sharp departm

ental lines. What alm

ost invariably em

erges is a co

mpro

mise; th

e action fin

ally ad

opted

usually m

eans there is something for every disputant,

Wh

en, at th

is meetin

g, H

elms rem

arked

, "Th

e first need

seems to

be fo

r more h

ard in

form

ation

on

the

scop

e and

the sh

ort-ran

ge targ

ets of G

uev

ara's op

era-tio

n," n

o o

ne o

ffered a serio

us arg

um

ent. S

everal o

f th

e agen

cies involv

ed—

notab

ly th

e Defen

se Dep

art-m

ent, th

e CIA

and th

e Air F

orce—

had

cond

ucted

jo

int research

pro

jects into

the p

rob

lem o

f acqu

iring

ju

st this so

rt of h

ard in

form

ation

. Du

ring

19

65

and

1966, F

idel C

astro

had m

ade se

vera

l mockin

g

speeches demanding, "If the yanquis are so

anxio

us to

fin

d C

he, w

hy d

on't th

ey sen

d u

p a U

-2 to

take a p

ic-tu

re of h

im?" T

he C

uban

leader w

as unaw

are that

what he offered as a sarcasm

had turned into a serious suggestion: taking an aerial picture of the elusive C

he w

as exactly what W

ashington was w

orking on,

An o

fficial who atten

ded

the crisis d

eliberatio

ns re-

mem

bered

this p

articular m

eeting

well. "D

ick H

elms'

people made a long, im

pressive presentation. If it had

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

113

been

a form

al meetin

g o

f the S

ecurity

Council, it

would have am

ounted to a National Intelligence E

sti-m

ate. Then tw

o colonels from the D

efense Intelligence A

gen

cy's F

oreig

n L

iaison an

d A

rea Analy

sis Bran

ch

gav

e a shorter b

riefing. A

t one p

oin

t they

show

ed

blowups of som

e photographs we'd seen tw

enty min-

utes earlier, in the CIA

presentation. They w

ere photo-graphs brought back by B

olivian patrols from the first

abandoned guerrilla campsite they reconnoitered near

Nan

cahu

azu. A

nd

yo

u k

no

w, th

e secon

d tim

e arou

nd

everyone spotted it alm

ost simultaneously. It w

as like a jo

lt of electricity

all arou

nd

the tab

le. There it w

as, right in the picture, the thing w

e needed, the thing Che

had

overlo

oked

: a familiar, fat o

ld D

ien B

ien P

hu

oven. "W

e just lo

ok

ed at each

oth

er," the g

ov

ernm

ent

man

recalled. "A

nd so

meo

ne said

, soundin

g lo

ud b

e-cau

se the ro

om

had

turn

ed q

uiet: 'D

o w

e hav

e any

-th

ing

po

sitive o

n th

eir mess sch

edule? D

ay ch

ow

or

night chow?' O

ne of the briefing officers said, quick-like, as if he'd expected the question, 'Y

es, we have it

from

defecto

r deb

riefings. P

ositiv

e evalu

ation. It's

nig

ht ch

ow

, sir.' For a m

inute o

r so w

e just lo

ok

ed at

each other, because that was it. W

e were all thinking,

`God, n

ow

we can

find h

im. N

o m

atter what so

rt of

jungle, no matter how

fast he's moving—

now w

e can

really find Che G

uevara.' " T

he Dien B

ien Phu oven, as the nam

e suggests, is a large, round-bellied cooking contraption developed by th

e Vietn

amese g

uerrillas in

the early

'60s. Its m

ain.

advantage is that it gives off virtually no smoke—

the com

bustion gases can be funneled off—and this m

ust have been w

hy it caught Che G

uevara's fancy when he

secretly visited North V

ietnam in 1965. In 1967, how

-ev

er, Che w

as apparen

tly u

naw

are that th

e Un

ited

States h

ad d

evelo

ped

heat-seek

ing

and

imag

e-amp

li-fying aerial reconnaissance techniques w

hich converted high-tem

perature devices, such as camouflaged cooking

-

114 T

HE

SP

IES

pots o

r black

ed-o

ut sh

ortw

ave rad

io sets, in

to telltale

liabilities. F

ew p

eop

le, in fact, h

ave an

y id

ea how

sup

ersensi-

tive th

e new

spy cam

eras are. Usin

g a m

iraculo

usly

high-speed em

ulsion and multiple special-focus lenses,

these infrared image devices stretch the spectrum

and convert heat into visible light so efficiently that a pic-tu

re of a m

an ch

ewin

g o

n a w

arm cig

ar stub

in a

pitch

-black

jungle clearin

g, tak

en fro

m as h

igh as fif-

teen hundred feet altitude, will give the photo-evalua-

tor a good guess about how recently the m

an's face has been shaved.

What u

ltimately

emerg

ed fro

m th

e decisiv

e Guev

ara crisis co

nferen

ce was th

e traditio

nal "situ

ationer" fo

r P

resident Johnson's eyes. It comprised the tw

o long-es-tablished intelligence analysis form

s always subm

itted jo

intly

, bu

t separated

by

main

head

ing

s to k

eep fact

and opinion apart: an "SO

I," the summ

ary of informa-

tion, and a "C&

R," the conclusions and recom

menda-

tions. T

he situ

ationer w

as read an

d ap

pro

ved

at the

White H

ouse in less than seventy-two hours.

A top-secret S

pecial Operations G

roup was set up in

Bolivia, its "safehouses" and cam

ouflaged operational build

ings scattered

all the w

ay fro

m L

a Paz to

som

e oil-co

mpan

y airstrip

s near C

amiri. T

he g

roup w

as placed

under th

e operatio

nal co

mm

and o

f Gen

eral S

kaer, a soft-spoken, graying, utterly unflappable pillar of stren

gth

. Ken

Skaer sp

oke S

pan

ish, k

new

Latin

A

merica an

d L

atinos intim

ately, h

andled

both

plan

es and pilots (including the air-m

inded President B

arrien-to

s) with

skill, an

d w

as steeped

in th

e latest meth

od

s for gathering field intelligence.

SO

G/B

oliv

ia's field o

peratin

g elem

ent actu

ally

comprised tw

o separate groups. One w

as a CIA

"num-

bered

pro

ject gro

up," th

e oth

er a

hush-hush Special

Aerial S

urv

ey D

etachm

ent. A

"num

bered

pro

ject gro

up" is a tim

e-tested C

IA m

anag

emen

t system

for

keeping tight control of the clandestine project person-

110W

TH

E C

IA G

OT

ME

115

nel scattered all over their "target areas." Under it, se-

cret operatives assigned to a project receive sequential co

de d

esignatio

ns, u

sually

a single letter an

d a th

ree-or fo

ur-d

igit n

um

ber, w

ith th

e senio

r case officers in

ch

arge (k

now

n as th

e "field co

ntro

l officers") g

iven

the low

est numbers.

Th

e top

-prio

rity assig

nm

ent b

elon

ged

to th

e Air

Force elem

ent o

f SO

G/B

oliv

ia, and th

e nig

ht b

irds

wen

t to w

ork

with

wondro

us sp

eed. T

he g

uerrilla-in

-fested zone—

a three-hundred-mile corridor estim

ated to stretch from

Santa C

ruz south toward the A

rgentine border—

was m

apped in small, precise grids. N

ight sur-v

ey m

ission

s beg

an im

med

iately at tw

o altitu

des.

Wid

e-win

ged

, hig

h-ran

gin

g g

iant R

B-5

7's flew

over

Boliv

ia out o

f How

ard A

ir Force b

ase in th

e Can

al Z

one, while m

iles underneath dusty little bush planes —

resembling the civilian oil-com

pany craft to which

local folk were long accustom

ed—put-putted back and

forth

, pin

po

intin

g ev

ery sin

gle b

eat source o

n m

iles and m

iles of winding infrared superfilm

. T

he first pair of U.S

. counterguerrilla specialists to arriv

e in

Boliv

ia, h

ow

ever, d

id n

ot b

elo

ng to

S

OG

/Boliv

ia—in

fact, they

preced

ed it b

y ab

out

three weeks. O

n March 27, the com

manding officer of

the Eighth S

pecial Forces G

roup stationed in the Pan-

ama C

anal Z

one, L

ieuten

ant C

olo

nel R

edm

ond E

. "R

ed" W

eber, arriv

ed ab

oard

a military

flight w

hich

took him

directly to Santa C

ruz, near the guerrilla zone. W

ith C

olo

nel W

eber cam

e a sing

le senio

r Sp

ecial F

orces o

fficer from

the E

ighth

Gro

up: M

ajor R

alph

W. "P

oppy" Shelton. It w

as to be Shelton's duty even-

tually to set up an emergency counterguerrilla training

base. B

olivia already had a sizable U.S

. uniformed contin-

gen

t, the M

ilitary A

ssistance A

dviso

ry G

roup. B

ut

MA

AG

's missio

n co

ncern

ed o

nly

conven

tional w

ar-fare. B

oliv

ia had

no sem

blan

ce of a train

ed o

r org

a-nized counterguerrilla force. W

hat it did have was one

71' O

ff !

.

;;!,;.

116 T

HE

SP

IES

of the smallest, poorest, slow

est armies in the w

estern

hemisphere.

Yet th

e Bo

livian

Hig

h C

om

man

d h

ad firm

ideas o

n

wh

at to d

o ab

out th

e Guev

ara un

pleasan

tness. A

s the

two E

ighth

Gro

up ad

van

ce men

quick

ly d

iscovered

,

the B

oliv

ian arm

y ch

iefs wan

ted m

ore U

.S. aid

of

every

descrip

tion—

excep

t trainin

g T

he B

oliv

ians d

id

not want to be told how

to do things, even by the U.S

.

Special F

orces. Rebuffed, the tw

o Special F

orces men

felt disco

urag

ed, u

ntil an

exp

erienced

U.S

. Em

bassy

official explained: "The trouble is, no one has found a

good w

ay y

et to sell train

ing in

the b

lack m

arket"

U.S

. Am

bassador Henderson, how

ever, had a steely

one-sen

tence g

uid

eline to

hold

dow

n th

e big

-thin

kin

g

Boliv

ian b

rass: "The U

nited

States w

ill undertak

e no

action, n

ot ev

en ab

rupt in

creases in m

ilitary aid

, that

cou

ld b

e interp

reted as 'in

terven

tion

.' " Sin

ce Hen

der-

son's calm

appro

ach h

ad all th

e weig

ht o

f the U

.S.

government behind it, the B

olivians decided to accept

training as a fact of life.

On A

pril 2

9 fo

ur o

fficers and tw

elve en

listed m

en

emplaned for B

olivia at How

ard AF

B. T

his tiny group

consisted

of h

ighly

rated S

pecial F

orces v

eterans. A

ll

had

been

han

dpick

ed b

y C

olo

nel W

eber an

d M

ajor

Shelton. A

s a group, they formed w

hat is known as an

MT

T—

a Mobile T

rainin

g T

eam. B

y 1

700 h

ours, th

ey

were in

San

ta Cru

z and h

ad set u

p an

overn

ight b

iv-

ouac. A

s quietly

and u

nobtru

sively

as a big

-gam

e

hunter raisin

g h

is rifle tow

ard a cro

uch

ing jag

uar, th

e

United S

tates had drawn a bead on C

he Guevara.

To talk

of a h

unt, h

ow

ever, calls u

p th

e wro

ng p

ic-

ture. P

appy S

helto

n, settin

g ab

out h

is job in

Boliv

ia,

had nothing of the big-game hunter about him

. Shelton

is cool. H

e has n

o b

ad v

ibratio

ns. W

hat h

e does h

ave

is a throwaw

ay talk style, with only the faintest tw

ang

of a distant Tennessee boyhood; a guitar that has gone

with him

from L

aos to the Panam

a Canal Z

one to Bo-

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

11

7

livia, an

d sh

ow

s it; a smile th

at ligh

ts up

his w

ho

le face.

Pap

py's p

ostu

re is disarm

ing. H

is body seem

s nei-

ther large nor small; his face is neither pale nor ruddy,

but a

neutra

l oliv

e to

ne, th

e c

olo

r of T

ennesse

e

sorghum sod. E

nemy agents w

ould despair of writing

an id

entifiab

le descrip

tion

of P

appy S

helto

n, th

irty-

eight, lifelong soldier (ten years an enlisted man, then

through Officer C

andidate School, and now

ten years

an o

fficer), com

bat in

fantry

man

, ranger, sk

y d

iver,

Special F

orces team

leader, w

ho co

mes o

n lik

e a

youngish country doctor on a people-to-people sanita-tion m

ission. H

e bro

ught w

ith h

im a v

ery sim

ple "p

rescriptio

n,"

written

out o

n h

alf a pag

e of S

outh

Com

m's co

ntin

-gency directive:

"A"

MIS

SIO

N:

1 Rg. B

n. B

IT 6

A

IT 3

B

UT

3

AU

T 5

F

TX

2

"B" M

ISS

ION

: Inf. C

omp.

RIT

4

The cryptic sym

bols meant that P

appy and his train-

ing team w

ere to take in charge six-hundred odd green Q

uechua Indian recruits for nineteen weeks of training

—specifically, six w

eeks' Basic Infantry T

raining; three w

eeks' Advanced Infantry T

raining; three weeks' B

asic

Unit T

rainin

g; fiv

e week

s' Ad

van

ced U

nit T

rainin

g;

and two w

eeks in a Field T

raining Exercise—

thereby turning the recruits into the first crack R

anger Battal-

ion ever seen in Bolivia.

The p

lan also

inclu

ded

refresher in

fantry

trainin

g fo

r

oth

er army

com

plem

ents. B

y en

rollin

g th

ree selected

Bolivian infantry com

panies at a time for a four-w

eek

118 T

HE

SP

IES

course, and repeating the course three times, P

appy's group could then send out nine retrained rifle com

pa-nies to tone up the cadres of the line regim

ents. P

appy's preferred trainees were the R

anger recruits. T

o g

ive th

em a h

om

e, the U

.S. team

took o

ver an

abandoned sugar m

ill sixty miles north of S

anta Cruz,

whose airport becam

e the airborne support point for the entire Special Forces program

. S

upplies began to flood in. "They cam

e in like in-stant C

hristmas," recalled one of the form

er team ser-

geants. "That's how

we first knew

we w

ere on a real special job. U

sually a Special F

orces team goes into

the field with its footlockers and a C

-46 for air supply perhaps tw

ice a month. B

ut here we had a C

-130, and w

e had

it as often

as we called

it. One o

f the first

things Pappy requisitioned w

as a refrigerator, not for him

self but to

get in

good w

ith a lo

cal bush

pilo

t w

hose help we needed. I w

as sure all we'd get back

would be the w

ord 'Cool it: B

ut in twenty-four hours

here's th

is big

bird

coastin

g in

on

the treeto

ps, an

d

what for? T

o bring us the icebox! We just hung there

gaping, until the pilot says, 'Well, you w

anted it, fel-low

s, now pick it up!' "

Once the pipeline had been prim

ed, Pappy used it

for no more kitchen com

modities. H

e was thinking of

other things. "H

ow m

any rounds per rifleman for the course?" he

asked Bolivian C

aptain Julio Cruz, w

ho brought in the recruits.

"How

many w

hat?" "H

ow m

any live bullets," Pappy enunciated in his

utilitarian

Sp

anish

, "do

es yo

ur arm

y issu

e for each

m

an's training?" C

aptain Cruz thought. "I th

ink ten

bullets are au

-

thorized for a recruit." "T

en rounds?" Pappy w

as shocked. "How

can you teach them

anything that way?"

Captain C

ruz had the patient look of a man explain-

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

119

ing ancient verities: "First w

e tell them. T

hen we kick

them."

In the end, Pappy planed in enough am

munition to

allot each

(unkick

ed) riflem

an th

ree thousan

d liv

e training rounds.

Meanw

hile the Bolivian high com

mand w

as restless. It w

anted to announce Che's presence to the w

orld, "internationalizing" the conflict, and to shorten P

appy S

helton's nienteen-week curriculum

. The U

nited States

vetoed both suggestions. "W

e needed every day of that training schedule," S

helton explains now. "W

e built a full-scale Ranger

training camp by hand: an obstacle course, confidence

course, quick-reaction course—w

here jungle footpaths are rigged w

ith pop-up cut-outs of enemy figures—

a river course, a target range. W

e even used Sundays.

On S

undays we had a good sing."

The first S

unday morning, six hundred stone-faced,

taciturn Indian draftees found themselves assem

bled to confront tw

o officers and two senior sergeants playing

music for them

. Shelton had his guitar, C

aptain Leroy

Mitchell, the tall, husky N

egro team exec, tw

anged a w

ashtu

b w

ith a strin

g; th

e heav

y w

eapo

ns serg

eant

played the washboard, and one of the com

munications

sergeants clacked a pair of spoons. The Indian troop-

ers were stunned, puzzled, then w

ildly enthusiastic. "B

y the time I cam

e down from

Panam

a," remin-

isced Captain H

arvey Wallender, w

ho, then a first lieu-tenant, took over the team

's intelligence section in the early fall, "P

appy Shelton had built up a terrific rela-

tionship with the w

hole battalion. The m

en worshipped

him, follow

ed him around. T

hey laughed at his jokes w

heth

er they

un

dersto

od

them

or n

ot. D

ow

n in

the

jungle Che G

uevara kept offering Tw

o, three, many

more V

ietnams,' but w

hat these soldaditos wanted w

as lots m

ore guys like Pappy."

Pappy fought for his Indian constituency in return for

their loyalty. On at least one occasion he fought the

1.

120 T

HE

SP

IES

entire U.S

. Em

bassy. The hassle arose w

hen the U.S

. aid m

ission appeared in Santa C

ruz to help settle some

newly im

migrated Japanese truck farm

ers. Wherever

Japan

ese hav

e been

settled in

Boliv

ia, they

hav

e boosted food production. B

ut the Japanese resettle- m

ent plan required, of course, that thousands of In-dian squatters be evicted from

the lands. The Q

uechua squatters com

plained to the Quechua soldiers; the sol-

diers complained to P

appy. Pappy told U

SA

ID the

project was off.

The U

SAID

officers argued with Pappy; Pappy said,

"No." L

ieutenant Colonel. foe R

ice, senior U.S

. infan-try adviser in B

olivia, came to S

anta Cruz and spoke

soothing words; P

appy said, "No." F

inally the deep voice of A

mbassador H

enderson was heard on the

team's radio. T

he wordless Indian soldaditos squatting

in a circle round the comm

unications shack heard P

appy use the single word they understood: "N

o." P

appy and his soldaditos won that first joint skir-

mish in part because D

ouglas Henderson w

as an able diplom

at who knew

when to yield. B

ut they won it

partly because of sweating together under the tropical

sun, exchanging hundreds of Ranger skills—

how to se-

cure jungle paths with w

arning devices made from

coffee cans and string; how

to fire the 3.5 recoilless rocket; how

to counterattack in an ambush; how

to cross a river; how

to read maps; how

to survive in the jungle on m

onkey meat sm

oked under parachute cloth. A

ll the weeks of the training P

appy and his men w

ere under the w

atchful eye of high authority. Seven cas-

ual-appearing U.S. generals, seldom

seen in attendance at backw

oods encampm

ents, found reason to inspect P

appy's project at one time or another. A

nd when

Pappy flew

up to SouthC

omm

Headquarters in the

Canal Z

one on some m

atter, he often found himself

discussing it in person with S

outhCom

m's top boss,

Robert W

. Porter, Jr., a four-star general. O

n Septem

ber 17 Pappy's pupils form

ed up before him

in the sugar mill's quadrangle for the last tim

e. No

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

ITE

121

longer soldaditos

but Rangers, they w

ere ready to graduate. W

ith Colonel A

lberto Gallardo, the battal-

ion's Bolivian C

O., Shelton w

alked down the line, pin-

ning a silver condor—the R

anger emblem

—on each

man's chest. W

ithin twenty-four hours Shelton w

atched the battalion, on its ow

n completely under B

olivian di-rection for the first tim

e, head for Eighth D

ivision at V

allegrande, to take over a ten-mile sector infiltrated

by guerrillas.

In the months since his high point, things had gone far

from w

ell for Che. T

he aging ?tamer° uno w

as on the defensive. T

he ring drawn around the guerrillas' "R

ed Z

one" had choked off Che's supply and com

munica-

tions routes, and the rebel column w

as taking heavy casualties in fire fights w

ith Bolivian detachm

ents. The

guerrillas were desperate for civilian support and intel-

ligence information. T

heir first-phase strategy had been dislocated by the loss of tw

o key agents, the French-

man R

egis Debray and the m

ysterious girl guerrilla know

n as "Tania."

Debray, a w

ealthy, well-born young P

arisian intel-lectual, author of R

evolution in the Revolution?, w

hich expounds the C

astroite revolutionary line, was sm

ug-gled into guerrilla territory by the ubiquitous T

ania in early M

arch for a vital strategy conference with C

he about "internationalizing" the B

olivian campaign. B

ut though D

ebray had written m

ovingly enough about guerrilla w

arfare to be called its "young eagle" by phi-losopher Jean-P

aul Sartre, face to face w

ith the jungle he m

etamorphosed into a

diminishing succession of

lesser birds: chicken, canary, finally a deadweight al-

batross around Che's burdened neck.

After his first fortnight's taste of the w

ilderness, De-

bray was bursting to get back to civilization. Ills return

trip was a hurried cop-out. B

ut a few hours after his

parting handshake with C

he, poor Debray w

as inter-cepted by B

olivian plainclothesmen the m

oment he en-

tered the first village on his "escape to freedom." A

122 T

HE

SP

IES

few hours after that, D

ebray was reeling under the fists

and boots of raging Bolivian officers. N

ext he found him

self in a small plane w

here, time and again, his B

o-livian escort opened the door in m

idair and kicked and w

restled him halfw

ay out into the sky, to demonstrate

that u

nless h

e talked

rapid

ly an

d co

nvin

cingly

, he

would return to the R

ed Zone as the guerrillas' first

live air-drop. R

egis Debray talked as only a young P

arisian intel-lectual confronting the m

ost vital issue of the day—his

own survival—

can talk. Thus, just about w

hen Pappy

Shelton set up shop in S

anta Cruz, B

olivian military

intelligence picked up a panoramic view

of Che's top-

level strateg

y. A

nd

wh

atever B

oliv

ian in

telligen

ce picked up, U

.S. intelligence received—

and double-checked, largely through the C

IA's field operatives.

As it turned out for D

ebray, the CIA

was nothing like

the bete noire—black beast—

he had so often pilloried in public.

"Under th

e circum

stances, I th

ink th

ey sav

ed m

y

life," Debray told this w

riter in a day-long conversa-tion at C

amiri, w

here he now serves a thirty-year sen-

tence in a former B

olivian military casino converted to

a V.I.P

. jail. "One of the B

olivian officers had taken to em

ptylhg his .45 into the dirt floor between m

y legs. T

he CIA

agents never beat me. B

ut neither did they ever stop asking questions—

or taking notes." A

fter Che lost D

ebray, he also lost in succession his B

olivian courier, Jorge Vasquez V

iana; his Argenti-

nian liaison agent, Ciro B

ustos; and in the end, the one hum

an being who w

as emotionally and physically close

to him in the jungle—

Tania. T

o be precise, first he lost T

ania's jeep; then he lost Tania.

So m

uch

secrecy, sen

sationalism

and sp

eculatio

n

surround Tam

ara H. B

unke, the slim, sexy, superactive

intellig

ence o

fficer wh

o ad

op

ted th

e cod

e nam

e "T

ania" for her Last assignm

ent in Bolivia, that em

i-n

ent o

bserv

ers hav

e gestu

red in

desp

air. Fro

m th

e

HO

W T

AE

CIA

GO

T C

IIE

123

pro

fession

al espio

nag

e view

po

int, T

ania w

as, of

course, simply a hardw

orking, academy-trained career

agent. Born in A

rgentina and raised in East G

ermany,

she sp

ent th

e last years o

f her life in

the serv

ice of

KG

B, the S

oviet intelligence directorate, keeping watch

on the volatile, unpredictable, trouble-prone guerrilla governm

ent in Cuba.

"Not m

any p

eople realize th

at when

it com

es to

Cuba troubles, the U

nited States and the S

oviet Union

have a lot in comm

on," mused a senior U

.S. diplom

at recently at a W

ashington dinner. "I imagine W

ashing-ton and M

oscow have a lot of sim

ilar intelligence re-quirem

ents in their Cuba file. A

nd to fill such high-level E

BI's—

that is, Essential E

lements of Inform

ation —

takes trained, disciplined, professional agents. Tania

was such an agent. S

he did a professional job for the S

oviets in

Hav

ana, an

d k

ept o

n d

oin

g it to

the v

ery

end, even though she did fall in love with C

he Gue-

vara." It has been w

idely rumored that T

ania contributed to C

he's downfall heavily by sloppily forgetting all

sorts o

f incrim

inatin

g d

ocu

men

ts in h

er jeep, th

en

parking it where the B

olivian gendarmes could find it.

Having been perm

itted, by personal dispensation of P

resident Rene B

arrientos and High C

omm

ander Al-

fredo Ovando, to exam

ine all of Tania's original dos-

sier in Bolivia, this w

riter can report that there is no evidence for this rum

or. Tania's role as the rebels' liai-

son chief was initially com

promised by the three guer-

rilla deserters who provided, in early M

arch, the first decisive intelligence breakthrough for the B

olivian gov-ernm

ent. When her garaged jeep w

as located in Cam

-iri, the police found docum

ents in it which w

ere em-

barrassing, but provided no new clues of im

portance about C

he Guevara. W

hen Tania w

as killed in the jun-gle, m

onths later, she died in the crossfire of a Bolivian

army am

bush without uttering a w

ord.

,g1

124 T

HE

SPIE

S

Trapped in a guerrilla cam

p by the deserters' betrayal, w

ith her small rear-guard unit separated from

Che's

column by a day's m

arch of impenetrable jungle, she

died unaware that M

oscow had decided to throw

its political w

eight against

Che's B

olivian venture. And

Che him

self was shot to death exactly one m

onth, one w

eek and one day after Tania's death, apparently un-

aware that his last close com

panion and collaborator had been a covert K

GB

agent, reporting to Moscow

on him

. T

he d

eadly

riverb

ank am

bush

of A

ugust 3

0, in

w

hich Tania perished, w

as one of the last fire fights be-tw

een the guerrillas and Bolivian infantry troopers. B

y m

id-Septem

ber, the crack Rangers trained by P

appy S

helton were taking charge of the chase for C

he. F

irst to go into action were the special intelligence

platoons trained by Pappy's S

-2 officer, Captain M

ar-garito C

ruz, a cinnamon-colored P

uerto Rican spym

as-ter. H

is mission, the battalion's intelligence training,

was the m

ost intense and secretive section within the

whole secret program

. C

aptain Cruz trained a full platoon of intelligence

operatives for every Ranger com

pany. These novice

spooks learned how to perform

intelligence missions

single-handed, in civilian clothes, mixing w

ith the local population. T

hey fanned out quietly through the guer-rilla sector, decisively tipping the balance of potential betw

een Che G

uevara's small troop and the govern-

ment forces. "It w

asn't ju

st a questio

n o

f info

rmatio

n. B

y th

is tim

e we did have a w

hole lot of—uh, w

ell, special in-form

ation on G

uev

ara's whole setu

p," say

s Cap

tain

Wallender, w

ho, like many other m

ilitary men, cannot

yet acknowledge publicly S

OG

/Bolivia's existence,

"But w

hen it came to com

bat intelligence, we attacked

the problem all over again from

the point of tactical requirem

ents. I think this was really the big difference

between C

he and us. Che had becom

e a V.I.P

. and a big executive in C

uba, a world celebrity. H

e thought

HO

W 1

HE

CIA

GO

T C

HE

125

like a four-star general, like a theater comm

ander. He

thought of flanking alliances, vast territories, politics, ideology, propaganda, history. C

he had no time for lit-

tle problems like cam

p perimeter security, or patrol

schedule, or morale am

ong the lowly guerrilla recruits.

But w

e thought of nothing else. Our w

hole plan was

built o

n lim

iting th

ings, o

n k

eepin

g th

ings

tactical. T

hat w

as Wash

ingto

n's scen

ario, an

d I g

uess th

ey

managed to convince everybody, even the A

rgentinian general staff and the B

olivian government, to give the

quiet tactical approach a chance. Of course, it had to

work, and w

ork fast." C

he was in trouble and on the run. B

ut whatever

history's judgment m

ay be on the indomitable guerrilla

general, he was a m

an. His sm

all force exhausted, his radio silent, he circled his jungle killing ground w

ithout attem

pting to escape. Within days, the R

anger intelli-gence scouts had picked up his trail.

In th

e morn

ing o

f Octo

ber 8

—a h

ot, su

n-seared

early S

unday—R

anger Com

pany A, acting on guid-

ance from its intelligence platoon, m

oved out in full com

bat gear to sweep a long, narrow

, wooded ravine

known as the Q

uebrada del Yuro, w

here suspicious m

ovements had been reported the previous night. H

av-ing sealed off every exit, the R

angers began combing

the canyon shortly before noon, and ran into enemy

small-arm

s fire with

in m

inu

tes. ale Gu

evara, w

ho

w

ould never realize his dream of engaging in direct..

combat w

ith the hated yanquis, was finally face-to-face

with the next-best thing—

the Shelton-trained R

angers.

Hurt and cornered, C

he swung across the ravine in a

short semicircle and attem

pted to break out of the trap across the high ground to the rear. T

his was w

here the R

anger Com

pany's young C.O

., Captain G

ary Prado,

had posted Staff S

ergeant Huanca w

ith a flanking fire team

. Now

Sergeant H

uanca began taking the brunt of a furious attack by C

he Guevara's desperate colum

n. "C

he and his column cam

e down on H

uanca's posi-

F.

126 T

HE

SP

IES

Lio

n lik

e a fire storm

," Majo

r Shelto

n recalled

. "H

uanca took Che's charge full blast, and he took cas-

ualties, too, right and left—lots of them

. Huanca m

ust have been scared as hell. B

ut you know, he held that

position. He kept C

he from escaping until the rest of

the co

mpan

y m

oved

up an

d so

meo

ne to

ok aim

and

with

a single b

ullet k

nock

ed th

e carbin

e from

Che's

hand. Then . . . oh, hell, I don't have to tell you w

hat hap

pen

ed after th

at. Let m

e tell you sim

ply

that m

y

Ran

gers d

elivered

the cap

tured

Ch

e alive in

to th

e bands of higher authority, and after that had no say—or part—

in what happened to him

." C

he, who had several noncritical w

ounds at the time

of h

is captu

re, was sh

ot to

death

a day

afterward

on

the personal directive of Bolivian C

omm

ander-in-Chief

Alfredo O

vando. The decision to kill him

—and thus

convert him into a legend—

ran counter to all the U.S

. advice to G

eneral Ovando. Ironically, the C

IA—

one o

f wh

ose field

agen

ts was p

ermitted

to talk

to C

ho

shortly before his execution—

was m

ost urgently inter-ested in keeping C

he alive, if only for professional rea-so

ns. B

ut B

oliv

ia has n

o d

eath p

enalty

—m

ore p

re-cisely, no

legal d

eath p

enalty

—an

d th

e hig

h co

m-

man

der faced

a harsh

choice: to

hav

e Che k

illed in

-stantly, or never.

The fact is that in B

olivia, where m

ore than a hun-dred

govern

men

t men

died

in th

e campaig

n ag

ainst

Che and his sharpshooters, the unw

ritten law for cop

killers is as stark

ly straig

htfo

rward

as in, say

, Co

ok

C

ounty, Illinois. Besides, the B

olivian high comm

and w

as seething with m

emories of the D

ebray trial with its

hundred-headed foreign press section and its pitiless publicity for the B

olivian military, w

ho became know

n as "gorillas" everyw

here from B

angkok to Berlin.

Thus w

hat looked like a crowning credit for the U

.S.

counterinsurgency corps turned into a political liability. T

here w

ere no tru

mpets, n

o b

anners, n

ot ev

en th

e usual self-congratulatory press leaks in W

ashington. S

pecial Operations G

roup found its activities winding

HO

W T

HE

CIA

GO

T C

BE

127

up

in B

oliv

ia every

bit as secretiv

ely as th

ey h

ad

begun. The only visible results w

ere some revealing of-

ficial promotions. W

hite House adviser R

owdier found

himself elevated to career am

bassador—the only high

appoin

tmen

t mad

e by P

residen

t Johnso

n after an

-nouncing his ow

n retirement. G

eneral Alger, the A

rmy

field forces comm

ander whose hand w

as directly on the sw

itch in Panam

a during the entire Guevara crisis,

moved up to becom

e Chairm

an of the Inter-Am

erican D

efense Board. B

ut General S

kaer, who had long be-

fore decided to retire in 1968, saw no reason to change

his p

lans after S

OG

/Boliv

ia was p

hased

out, an

d

these days he wears a bow

tie whenever he lunches in

Washington. W

hatever the exact contribution of Pappy S

helton and his team

to ending the guerrilla invasion, the Boli-

vian government m

ade no attempt to acknow

ledge it in public. It is the official position of B

olivia that U.S

. help

amounted

only

to "a few

ship

men

ts of d

ry ra-

tions." Washington has, as of this w

riting, shown no

wish to argue. P

rivately, Shelton w

as granted a special Diplom

a de H

onor by the Bolivian H

igh Com

mand and, a year

later, he was given the U

.S. Joint F

orces Com

menda-

tion Medal—

about as high an award as the w

arriors of undeclared w

ars ever get. "W

ell, Che w

as dead," Shelton says slow

ly. "And it

occurred to me right afterw

ard that there was only one

thing I really wanted—

I wanted everyone in the team

hom

e for the holidays. I went up to P

anama and spoke

to the boss, and on the 19th of Decem

ber we had our

last breakfast in Santa C

ruz. We w

ere all home—

every one of us w

as home the night before C

hristmas."