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CIA

Malone Pyzdick 

This article deals with activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) related to

terrorism. Especially after the CIA lost its coordinating role over the entire IntelligenceCommunity (IC), it is impossible to understand US counterterrorism by looking at the CIA alone.Coordinating structures have been created by each president to fit his administrative style and theperceived level of threat.

The US has a different counterterrorist structure than other close allies, such as Australia,Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. Each has a structure that fits its particular legal systemand culture; there is no ideal solution. A continuing issue is whether there needs to be a domesticintelligence service separate from the FBI, which has had difficulty in breaking away from itslaw enforcement roots and cooperating with other intelligence services.[1] 

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

[2]

 is no longer in the CIA proper, but is in theOffice of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). NCTC, however, contains personnelfrom the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the Department of Justice, and othermembers of the IC. A counterterrorism center did exist in the CIA before the NCTC wasestablished.

Given the restrictions of the National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA but strictlyforbade it from having any domestic police authority, the role of the CIA still has multipledimensions. The National Clandestine Service (NCS) of the CIA can infiltrate or otherwise gainhuman intelligence (HUMINT) from terrorist organizations, their supporters, or from friendlyforeign intelligence services (FIS). The NCS has a covert operations capability that, possibly in

combination with military units from the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), may take direct action against terrorist groups outside the United States.

Above all, the key CIA counterterror partner is the FBI, which has the domestic operationalresponsibility for counterterrorism, both domestic intelligence collection and domestic policework. In the highly decentralized police system of the United States, the FBI also providesliaison and operates cooperatively with state and local police agencies, as well as with relevantFederal units. For example, the United States Coast Guard has an important role in preventingterrorist infiltration by sea. Military units have a specialized Counterintelligence Force ProtectionSource Operations capability to protect their personnel and operations.

Contents

  1 Intelligence Community view of terrorismo  1.1 Tactics

  1.1.1 Suicide attacks  1.1.2 Weapons of mass destruction

o  1.2 Terrorists by ideology and region  2 Collection approach

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o  2.1 HUMINTo  2.2 SIGINTo  2.3 IMINTo  2.4 FININT

  3 Analytic approach

o  3.1 Regular researcho  3.2 Virtual station and cross-functional team researcho  3.3 Regional analytic operations

  4 Intelligence and terrorism in the 1970so  4.1 1970o  4.2 1972o  4.3 1973o  4.4 1974o  4.5 1975o  4.6 1976o  4.7 1978

o  4.8 1979  5 Intelligence and terrorism in the 1980s

o  5.1 1982o  5.2 1983

  5.2.1 1983 Beirut barracks bombingo  5.3 1984

  5.3.1 Kidnapping of CIA Beirut station chief and US response authorizingpreemption

  5.3.2 Creation of al-Qaeda  5.3.3 Support to the Afghan resistance

o  5.4 1986 

5.4.1 Foundation of the Counterterrorist Centero  5.5 Afghanistan and its consequences

  5.5.1 Bin Laden's early years: terrorist financier  6 Intelligence and terrorism in the 1990s

o  6.1 1990o  6.2 1993o  6.3 1995o  6.4 1996o  6.5 1998o  6.6 1999

  7 Intelligence and terrorism in the 2000so 

7.1 2000  7.1.1 Clandestine intelligence/covert action

o  7.2 2001  7.2.1 Covert action

  7.2.1.1 Paramilitary support  7.2.1.2 Targeted killing in war versus assassination

  7.2.2 Strategic Assessments Branch  7.2.3 World-Wide Attack Matrix

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o  7.3 2002o  7.4 2004o  7.5 2005o  7.6 2006o  7.7 2008

o  7.8 2009  7.8.1 Forward Operating Base Chapman attack 

  8 References

Intelligence Community view of terrorism

Further information: War on Terrorism Further information: CIA transnational human rights actions Further information: CIA transnational anti-terrorism activities

Contrary to popular belief, the US intelligence community was dealing with aspects of terrorismlong before the September 11, 2001 attacks. Those aspects included the support of guerillasagainst the Soviets, in Southeast Asia, and other places where the guerrillas' methods may haveincluded terror. In Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the US worked with government to suppressterror. While government research suggests personality traits that may be common to asubstantial number of terrorists, terror has few other constants. It certainly is not restricted toMuslims. It has taken place on every continent except Antarctica.

In all these cases, intelligence support clearly was necessary. In some of them, clandestineintelligence collection and covert action, by CIA personnel or those they sponsored, dealt withboth sides of the terrorist and counterterrorist roles.

Many studies of the analysis of, and countermeasures to, terrorism remain classified.Unclassified CIA documents on terrorism go back at least into the late 1970s. At that time,Western Europe often had opposing terrorist groups in the same conflict, such as nationalists andseparatists in Northern Ireland, Spanish nationalists and Basque separatists, Turkey,[3] Transnational terrorism was still unusual, with the report noting that the Basque ETA group wasactive in France as well as Spain.

There are relevant observations from government reports by researchers who have various levelsof access into the IC, including the Federal Research Division (FRD) and CongressionalResearch Service of the Library of Congress. A 1999 FRD study examined some changes fromterrorists of the past, especially the emergence of terrorist acts carried out by individuals andmembers of small, ad hoc groups largely unknown to security organizations.[4] Tactics, as well assources, had changed, with the greater use of suicide attacks and attacks by women and children.

A very significant concern was the possible use, by terrorists, of  weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Senate Probe of CIA Tactics:

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The recent investigation of the tactics used by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) veterans wheninterrogating detainees is both invasive and unrealistically biased. The Senate has appointed aspecial committee to look into supposed violations of both the Law of War and the GenevaConvention by the Central Intelligence Agency regarding the treatment of many detainees, bothat Guantanamo Bay and in Afghanistan and Iraq. The actions under question were previously

approved at the White House level, and also should remain classified and not readily available tothe American Public. For those who do not know what is happening with the Central IntelligenceAgency, the agents who performed interrogations affiliated with the Iraq and Afghanistan warsare under investigation based on accusations that they violated the Law of War, GenevaConvention and are possibly guilty of torturing detainees. The Senate committee is in the cross-hairs of two Democratic Senators. (Ghosh 2009). The two politicians who seem to have the mostinterest in the pending investigation are Dianne Feinstein and Patrick Leahy. Things have gottenso dangerous, with the CIA employees drowning in legal garble, their boss has now included fulllegal-liability insurance in their employment packages. (Zagorin 2008). Over the past severalyears in both Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, the CIA has come under fire for their interrogationtechniques. One of these controversial techniques is water-boarding. Water-boarding is a

technique where the prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly belowthe feet. Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner's face and water is poured over him.Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instantpleas to bring the treatment to a halt. The CIA agents were authorized for two sessions per daywith the water being applied up to six times for ten seconds. Every thirty days, the agent wouldhave to apply for more approval on this technique and have it authorized by their chain of command. (Stack 2009). While this technique may seem harsh and unlawful it has an amazingsuccess rate and leads the interrogator to important intelligence. The longest water-boardingsession on record took only between two and two and a half minutes before breaking the source.The CIA agents also kept meticulous logs of each water boarding session, so that they could notonly review and see where they had left off, but also to keep accurate records for use in court andto see how the detainee was responding to it. (Stack 2009). Some former detainees have statedthat they underwent torture or the threat of torture in the forms of sexual humiliation, religioushumiliation, isolation, intimidation by dogs, and exposure to extreme temperatures of hot andcold, alternating over a period of hours. (Zagorin 2008). Still other documents that have recentlybeen released by the CIA into the hands of President Obama state that the CIA agents keptmeticulous records of various forms of interrogations that were used to extract information fromdetainees such as playing up a man's fear of bugs by putting him into a box with one and alsofeeding some of the men a liquid diet and keeping them awake for almost a week. (Meyer 2009).The documents also show the legal steps that President Bush took to ensure that the CIA vetswould be protected for every technique they used. The Senate now has a committee that isdedicated to finding those 'guilty' agents and prosecuting them to the fullest extent of the law.This poses many questions because the actions had been previously approved by formerPresident George W. Bush. Also of concern are the classified documents and videos that couldbe leaked if this investigation continues. Privacy concerns for those involved may pose to be aproblem as well. In the court of public opinion, many of the agents are already seen as guiltytherefore it will be nearly impossible for them to have a fair investigation and trial. The mostastonishing fact about the whole investigation is that neither the current President nor the formerPresident approve of the investigation. President Bush allowed the controversial tactics inquestions under his presidency. Part of the reason for his approval was due to the bleak outlook 

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of operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. (Karon 2003). Before the CIA took over majorinterrogations in support of Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq, almost 60 troops were killedper two weeks and there were almost 30 attacks on coalition forces per day. (Karon 2003). Allinterrogation tactics and techniques used by the CIA and its agents must be approved by thehighest echelon of the chain of command. If in fact these actions were unconstitutional, then why

is the former President sitting in Texas writing his memoirs instead of answering to the Senate‘sinvestigation? Furthermore, President Obama has stated that he wishes the Senate would just―move on‖ and leave the past in the past. He is most definitely not concerned with any supposed

wrong doings of CIA operatives. The tactics that were used by the operatives, such as water-boarding, were well within the guidelines adhered to by the agents and many other three letteragencies. The CIA staffers wonder why they are being singled out when they say that BipartisanCongressional leaders were informed about all aspects of the intelligence policy, including thecontroversial techniques that could be used in a worse case scenario. (Ghosh 2009). Even if thetactics seemed a little harsh to the average civilian, the agents who perform these tasks aresubject matter experts in their field. They spend years in training, to learn how to inflictpsychological pain on a guilty detainee, but not to cause any permanent damage. It would be

hard for a botanist to understand a brain surgeon‘s work, just as it must be equally difficult for anaverage civilian to understand the sensitive, dangerous, and often thankless work of aprofessional interrogator. (McMorris 2009). If the CIA agents really had something to hide, thenwhy were the interrogations allowed to be taped for auditing in the first place? The agents whotaped the interrogations obviously had no worries that it would come back to bite them. Theyknew that they were within their guidelines, and felt no need to hide what was going on atGuantanamo Bay. The only worry that many of the CIA veterans have is that it was released thatthe CIA had destroyed almost 100 of their interrogation tapes that may have shown harshtreatment, even torture, to the detainees. However, this cannot be proven, and it is always best tostick to the facts when it comes to investigations, and not to waste time on speculation. FormerDirector Jose Rodriguez is using his legal insurance to help him deal with the consequences thatcame with the ordering of the destruction of the tapes. (Zagorin 2008). Granted, the tapes areclassified at a high level, but they have been reviewed by many people outside of the need-to-know basis. It is almost as if the Senate committee was searching for ways to prosecute theinterrogators. There is a very big issue at hand with letting the public know about theinvestigation, but doing it while also protecting classified interrogation techniques. If everytechnique was released to the public, then the information could get into the wrong hands. Withthe knowledge of how interrogators handle certain situations, the ‗bad guys‘ could have our play

book! That would be a catastrophic loss, and would put us years behind in our informationgathering services. While privacy concerns for the government are important, the privacy of thefamilies of the agents are also an important concern. If the names of the agents in question aremade public, then their families become a spectacle in the public eye. While the agents havesigned up to serve their country, aren‘t their families just innocent victims? The scrutiny thatwould come from a public investigate is bias and unfair. Most of the CIA veterans that werebeing investigated in the first place, have since moved on and retired from their government jobs.Shouldn‘t there be some sort of statute of limitations when it comes to digging up oldinformation on government employees? While it seems as though the CIA vets have a long, hardroad ahead of them, their new boss is fighting for them, and standing his ground. Leon Panettawas a congressman and the Clinton White House chief of staff. Though he has stated that he doesnot support the investigation and prosecution of his employees, he has agreed to work with the

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Senators on their investigation regardless. (Ghosh 2009). It seems as though there is no reasonwhy a government agency is being exploited and embarrassed, when there is no clear idea of what the end goal is. What good will come of a war on American people by their owngovernment? The agents in the CIA dedicate their lives to the protection of fellow citizens, andthis is their reward? Most American citizens do not realize that this is not the same ground, front

line fighting that took place in World War II. Most of the enemies in the middle east areinvisible. Milt Bearden, a former CIA liaison to the Afghan Mujahedeen wrote that ―there may

be four or five family members ready to sign up with the insurgency to avenge each Iraqi fighterkilled.‖ (Karon 2003). This is urban warfare where the most progress will be made duringinterrogations. The capture of high value targets (HVT) can lead to the breaking of the source(HVT) and save hundreds of innocent civilian and American soldier's lives. ―Regular‖

Americans do not understand what is at stake here. The fact is that before the Abu Ghraibscandal, the war in Iraq was somewhat successful. Violence was winding down and theAmerican troops were trusted and influential. With the capture of Saddam Hussein many otherhigh value targets, the United States was making progress in the middle east, showing the rest of the world what good the U.S. is capable of. After the scandal, nothing has ever been the same,

and it has turned into a war we just cannot win. No good deed goes unpunished, and propagandais hurtful and deceitful, spreading lies to the uneducated populous. Numerous troops get severelywounded every day, but all the public looks at is questionable tactics towards guilty detaineeswho are responsible for disgusting crimes against humanity. The detainees at Guantanamo Bay(GITMO) are the most crazed, murderous and violent of the terrorists. The only reason they aresaying that they were tortured is because they want a few of their demands to be met, in trueterrorist fashion. They either want money from the United States, or they want their fellow―freedom fighters‖ to become more riled up against the coalition forces. With more and more

detainees being released early because of political agreements, more CIA vets will continue to goto court. (Zagorin 2008). These former detainees are not innocent, but are often high valuetargets who have orchestrated terrible crimes against NATO countries. The U.S. does not needany more negative publicity. There is a way to handle this situation, and it is not to publicize andharass the former agents. It seems as though our own government has no concern for itsdedicated employees. These men and women gave up their lives to serve their country and this isthe thanks they get! Just as the Bay Of Pigs scandal made the United States look foolish andunprepared, the detainee torture scandal has the same potential to set the United States yearsback on diplomacy with foreign nations and the trust that those nations have in us. Thisinformation and research goes to show that the Central Intelligence Agency veterans that arebeing investigated for their treatment of detainees in a time of war are being subjected to extremebias and have had their lives invaded. The average American views their acts as cruel andunusual, but this is not the case. These men and women made a lot of sacrifices for you and forme, not because of the pay or the benefits, but because they felt that they should work for thegreater good and make a difference in protecting American lives. Instead they have foundthemselves guilty in the eyes of the public, already being judged before the facts are revealed.President Obama has stated that ―This is a time for reflection, not retribution.‖ (Meyer 2009).

We, as American citizens need to protect our government employees and realize that they aredoing everything in their power to protect us, so it‘s the least we can do for them. For now, the

CIA and President Obama seem to be on the same page. They are working together to protect theagents and to keep the investigation private and classified. (Lake 2009). One can only hope thatit does, for the many reasons listed above. This probe, that may take only one year to conduct,

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will cause innumerable years of damage for the future of American troops on foreign soil,foreign diplomacy and the image of the United States to everyone in other countries.

Works Cited:

1. Ghosh, Bobby. ―CIA Vets Blast Senate Probe of Operations Under Bush.‖ Time March 6,2009: 1 – 3.

2. Karon. ―Good News, Bad News and President Bush's 'Filter'.‖ Time 13 November 2003: 1– 3.

3. Lake, Eli. ―CIA vet Aids Obama on Anti-Terrorism.‖ The Washington Times March 1, 2009:

1 – 2.

4. McMorris, John. Telephone Interview. March 14, 2009.

5. Meyer, Josh; Miller, Greg. ―CIA Interrogation Memos: Obama Unseals Justice Department

documents.‖ Chicago Tribune April 17, 2009: 1– 3.

6. Stack, Liam. ―Is Water - boarding Effective?‖ Christian Science Monitor 20 April 2009: 1– 4.

7. Zagorin, Adam. ―Washington Memo.‖ Time March 20, 2008: 1– 2.

8. Zagorin, Adam. ―Why the Gitmo Cases Are in Disarray.‖ Time May 14, 2008: 1– 3.

Tactics

Suicide attacks

Weapons of mass destruction

Terrorists have already made attacks using WMD. This is not a hypothetical fear, but it also mustbe assessed in terms of possible damage. A 1996 CIA presentation reviewed the history todate.[5] 

Researchers for a 1999 General Accounting Office study had classified access. [6] 

Terrorists by ideology and region

Terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. The Zealots of the first century assassinated bothRomans, and Jews who did not want to revolt against the Romans. In the modern world, there areseveral categories of terrorists, including guerillas who use terror as one of their weapons, groupsthat principally use terror alone, and individuals. Terrorists may be motivated by a politicalideology of extremism, nationalism, religion, or combinations of all.

Collection approach

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HUMINT

One of the most challenges in dealing with relatively small terrorist groups is that the membersare usually known one another, or at least there is a chain of individuals that can vouch for arecruit. These social bonds have led to the refinement of the clandestine cell system in such

groups. The combination of familiarity and compartmentalization make it extremely difficult tointroduce human agents to the groups; it is more likely that human intelligence can be gained bysubverting someone who is already a member, or perhaps is indirectly associated (e.g., a bankeror arms dealer).

Efforts to use HUMINT operations with non-official cover, especially in the areas outside thegroups' staging areas, have been disappointing.[7] Stepped-up efforts to use non-official cover, especially in Europe, began by creating covers in investment banks and consulting firms. Onlyseveral years later was it realized that terrorists would have little to do with such organizations.Another realization is even with excellent cover, the HUMINT successes would be unlikely torecruit people deep inside the terrorist cells.

Where HUMINT had more potential, and where the cover organizations needed to change tohelp find appropriate targets, was on the fringes of the terrorist organizations, either groups fromwhich the group would need goods or services, or from people with awareness of the groups butnot supporting them. Even if a group such as al-Qaeda had its own ships, there are reports that 15cargo ships are linked to al-Qaeda.[8] the activities of those ships, at ports, might draw theattention of security officials, or even low-level dockworkers or craftsmen. .[9] 

Another potential target could be moderate Muslims that do not want to take up an overt roleagainst jihadists, but could supply information. The cover for approaching such persons could beany of a wide range of businesses and institutions.

Foreign specialists in explosives, WMD, and other warfare methods might come to CIA notice intheir countries of origin. By tracking their movements, the specialists-for-hire might lead totrusted persons within the groups. Once a member is identified, other intelligence collectionmethods could be directed at his communications, surveillance of his home and place of work,etc.

There has been significant controversy, without there being classified Congressional views, of black sites for interrogating suspects, as well as the Guantanamo base. A separate role is playedby regional Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers. 

SIGINT

While some information was gained, early in campaigns against terror groups, from SIGINT (communications intelligence), groups have realized that threat and will often give up the speedof electronic communications for the security of messengers, who may carry encrypted messagesthey do not know how to read, or perhaps have memorized messages.

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The actual interception of messages probably is not done by the CIA, but by NSA or possiblyService Cryptologic Elements (SCE): tactical SIGINT detachments attached to military tacticalunits. Important communications intercepts have been achieved, with the results clearly availableto CIA. There are cases, however, where a joint CIA-NSA organization places clandestineintercept equipment.[10] The National Security Archive commented, "In 1987, Deputy Director

for Science and Technology Evan Hineman established... a new Office for Special Projects.concerned not with satellites, but with emplaced sensors – sensors that could be placed in a fixedlocation to collect signals intelligence or measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)about a specific target. Such sensors had been used to monitor Chinese missile tests, Soviet laseractivity, military movements, and foreign nuclear programs. The office was established to bringtogether scientists from the DS&T‘s Office of SIGINT Operations, who designed such systems,

with operators from the Directorate of Operations, who were responsible for transporting thedevices to their clandestine locations and installing them.

While communications intercepts are usually highly classified, they have come up in USCongressional testimony on terrorism. For example, an FBI official testified with regard to the

1998 United States embassy bombings Kenya, and Tanzania, which took place so closely in timethat the terrorist teams can reasonably be assumed to have coordinated their operations in nearreal-time.[11] 

There was independent proof of the involvement of Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and EIJ EgyptianIslamic Jihad in the bombings. First, the would-be suicide bomber, al-Owhali, ran away from thebomb truck at the last minute and survived. However, he had no money or passport or plan bywhich to escape Kenya. Days later, he called a telephone number in Yemen and thus arranged tohave money transferred to him in Kenya. That same telephone number in Yemen was contactedby Usama Bin Laden's satellite phone on the same days that al-Owhali was arranging to getmoney.

They have also been revealed in legal proceedings against terrorists, such as United States vs.Osama bin Laden et al., indictment, Nov. 4, 1998, and updates.[12] 

IMINT

The sort of imagery intelligence ((IMINT), often from satellites, used against nation-states is of limited use in tracking the movement of groups of small size and little physical infrastructure.More success has come from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which are hard to see and hear,to do such things as follow cars, or loiter above a building, photographic traffic in and out, oftenwith low-light or infrared sensors that work in apparent darkness.

The CIA experimented with a small remote-controlled reconnaissance aircraft, the MQ-1Predator, to try to spot Bin Laden in Afghanistan. A series of flights in autumn 2000, overseenby CTC officials and flown by USAF drone pilots from a control room at the CIA's Langleyheadquarters, produced probable sightings of the Qaeda leader.[13] 

FININT

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Financial intelligence  – "following the money" – often can trace the organization behind aparticular attack. Once that organization is identified, value [14] transfers from it can point toother operational cells. The United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign AssetControl (OFAC) has the power to "freeze" the accounts of organizations suspected of fundingterrorist activities.

Terrorist groups use three types of financing, which are increasingly difficult to track by U.S.intelligence including CIA:

1.  Charities, which use conventional financial institutions and value transfer,2.  Informal value transfer systems such as hawala and hindi 3.  "Commodities- or trade-based money laundering includes the smuggling of bulk 

cash and the evasion of federal reporting requirements used to track moneylaundering with commodities such as diamonds, precious metals, gold, andtobacco."[15] CIA is most likely to gain awareness of commodities and tradetransfers outside the United States.

According to the Center for Defense Information, intelligence agencies help OFAC build its"freeze list" by sending it lists of individuals and organizations believed to be associated withterror.[16] Not all such suspects go onto the freeze list, since the intelligence community can usefinancial transactions as a means of tracking them.

One of the challenges of anti-terrorist FININT is that surveillance of transactions only workswhen the value transfers go through conventional, regulated banks and other financialinstitutions. Many cultures use informal value transfer systems, such as the hawala widely usedin the Middle East and Asia, where value is transferred through a network of brokers, whooperate with funds often not in banks, with the value transfer orders through personal

communications among brokers. The brokers know one another and operate on a paperless honorsystem.

A study from the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis [India] describes "narco-terrorism"as "the nexus between narcotics and terrorism...It is recognised as one of the oldest and mostdependable sources of terrorist financing, primarily because of the magnitudes of financeinvolved in both the activities."[17] The study indicates that informal value transfer systems,known "... [in] India it is known as hawala, in Pakistan as hundi, in China fei qian (flyingmoney), in Philippines as black market peso exchange" are important means of transferringfunds to terrorist organizations.

Some hawala brokers have placed some of their reserve funds in banks, where they have beenfrozen by OFAC. On Nov. 7, 2001, the Treasury Department made raids and freezes to shutdown two hawala networks, Al Barakaat and Al Taqwa, both believed to be funneling millionsof dollars from the United States to abroad to support terrorist activities. In addition to theplacement of 62 people and groups associated with the two organizations on the asset freeze list,FBI and U.S. Customs agents raided the two networks' offices in six U.S cities.[16] 

According to CDI,

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The founder of Al Barakaat, Shaykh Ahmed Nur Jimale, is believed to be an associate of binLaden who invested in and is still an owner of the organization. Al Barakaat is a financial,telecommunications and construction group headquartered in Dubai and operating largely out of Somalia. It was founded in 1989 and operates in 40 countries around the world. ... The TreasuryDepartment said the raids on Nov. 7 resulted in the blocking of approximately $971,000 in Al

Barakaat assets.

[16]

 

 Hawala plays an important role in the Afghan drug economy, and in drug trade worldwide.

Analytic approach

The National Security Archive makes the point that the US government and intelligencecommunity did not suddenly come upon terrorism on September 11, 2001.[18] Understanding theIC and political perceptions of the past help predict the future, identify weaknesses, and developstrategies.

...at the beginning of the Reagan administration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig announcedthat opposition to terrorism would replace the Carter administration‘s focus on advancing human

rights throughout the world. Although opposition to terrorism never really became the primaryfocus of the Reagan administration or successor administrations, each of these paid significantattention to the issue and produced many important documents that shed light on the policychoices faced today. Terrorism has been the subject of numerous presidential and DefenseDepartment directives as well as executive orders. Terrorist groups and terrorist acts have beenthe focus of reports by both executive branch agencies (for example, the State Department, CIA,and FBI) as well as Congressional bodies – including the Senate Select Committee onIntelligence and the Congressional Research Service. The General Accounting Office has also produced several dozen reports evaluating the U.S. government‘s ability to prevent or mitigate

terrorist strikes...

CIA's Directorate of Intelligence produces analytic products that can help identify terroristgroups, their structure, and plans. These may benefit from signals intelligence from the NationalSecurity Agency (NSA), from imagery intelligence from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), from the Financial CrimesEnforcement Network  (FinCEN) of the Department of the Treasury, and from other specializedagencies.

Regular research

The Department of State, with CIA assistance, prepares an annual volume called Patterns inTerrorism. FBI reporting is more irregular, but does do problem descriptions as well as specificreports.[19] 

While the Congressional Research Service technically is prohibited from making its reportsautomatically available to the public, several legislative efforts are underway to change this, and,in practice, its reports are often Internet-accessible within a few days of issue, typically on theFederation of American Scientists website.

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Virtual station and cross-functional team research

While the initial implementation, Bin Laden Issue Station, did not work well, there has been anIntelligence Community effort to avoid the problems of  stovepiping, especially where it involveslack of communication between analysts and operators. There is a continuing controversy on

how to be sure Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) information gets to the analysts; the FBIculture has been extremely decentralized, so "dots to be connected" in two field offices were notshared, although they might have been a warning of the September 11, 2001 attacks. 

The overall problems of stovepiping and encouraging cross-functional teams, in the context of terrorism, has been addressed, among other groups, by the House Intelligence Committee.[20] One of their chief recommendations was:

FBI's main problem going forward is to overcome its information sharing failures. "Ensuringadequate information sharing" should be communicated throughout the Bureau as the Director'stop priority, and a clear strategy incorporating the personnel dimension, the technical dimension,

and the legal dimension of the information-sharing problem should be developed andcommunicated immediately.

Their recommendations for the CIA included:

CIA leadership must ensure that HUMINT collection remains a central core competency of theagency, and should develop additional operational tools, in conjunction with other appropriateagencies (FBI, etc,), penetrate terrorist cells, disrupt terrorist operations and capture and renderterrorists to law enforcement as appropriate. More core collectors need to be put on the streets.

ClA should ensure that a management structure is in place to steward the multiyear investments

needed to build new platforms to collect on terrorist targets. CIA must also ensure sufficientnumbers of unilateral CT slots in field stations and bases.

CIA should lead an effort to improve watchlisting to ensure that all relevant agencies, includingFBI, Homeland Security, and others, have access to a common database of up-to-date terroristperson-related data collected by US government agencies and other appropriate sources. Thecreation of a terrorism watchlisting unit at CIA may be a useful first step.

Require all new case officers and analysts to achieve a "level 3" language proficiency prior toinitial deployment, and devise a mechanism for ensuring language skill maintenance isincentivized and directly tied to performance evaluation.

CIA should take immediate and sustained steps to dramatically improve all aspects of its CTtraining program. Establish structures in CTC (Counterterrorism Center) in such a manner thatensures a normal career path for these officers. Incorporate counterterrorism-related skilldevelopment in all appropriate training for case officers and analysts.

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response was ad hoc and poorly executed, resulting in the deaths of all hostages, severalterrorists, and a German police officer. This incident focused world attention on the need forearly warning, hostage rescue, and, with great controversy, preemptive and retaliatory attacks onterrorists.

1973

Black September attacked the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. The terrorists killedthe US ambassador, Cleo Noel and other diplomats.

In Guadalajara, Mexico, the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces killed the US consul general.

1974

At Los Angeles Airport, 17 people were injured and 2 were killed at LAX when a bombexploded near the Pan Am ticket area.

1975

In January, Puerto Rican nationalists bombed a Wall Street bar, killing four and injuring 60; 2days later, the Weather Underground claims responsibility for an explosion in a bathroom at theU.S. Department of State in Washington.

1976

The hijacking of an Air France passenger aircraft, eventually arriving at Entebbe, Uganda pointed to the need for international antiterrorist cooperation, and also demonstrated the ability to

rescue hostages at long range (i.e., the Israeli Operation Entebbe). This became a prototype forother hostage rescue forces.

Terrorism in the US was not necessarily directed at US organizations. Exiled Chilean ForeignMinister Orlando Letelier was killed by a car bomb in Washington, D.C. Subsequentinvestigations suggest the bombers may have had CIA ties in Chile.

"... in February 1976, President Gerald Ford signed Executive Order (EO) 11905 which forbadeall U.S. government employees from engaging in or conspiring to engage in politicalassassination" (Section 5(g)). Ford's EO was superseded by President Jimmy Carter's EO 12036, which tightened restrictions on intelligence agencies. The ban on assassinations was continued

by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, (EO 12333, Sec 2.11) and extended to apply specifically tointelligence agencies. This ban remains in effect today, although challenges have been mountedin each of the last two years by Rep. Bob Barr, R-Ga.[22] 

1978

Also see EO 12036, signed by President Carter in 1978, and the current Executive Order, EO12333, signed by President Reagan in 1981, continued the requirement for oversight to maintain

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the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information by the IntelligenceCommunity, and the protection of individuals' constitutional and statutory rights.

Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro was seized by the Red Brigades later killed. This broughtadditional NATO attention to the problem.

1979

In January, Iranian militants captured the buildings and staff of the US embassy in Teheran. Anumber of CIA operational documents were reconstructed.

In November, there was Muslim-on-Muslim violence with the seizure of the Grand Mosque inMecca. French security forces assisted the Saudis in recapturing the building, indicating that adhoc alliances would form for both terrorism and counterterrorism.

Intelligence and terrorism in the 1980s

It became increasingly obvious, in the 1980s, that there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism, as a unique offense. For example, many discussions of terrorism emphasize it isdirected against noncombatants. World War II kamikaze suicide attacks were terrifying for thesailors against which they were directed, but the attacks were exclusively directed at militarytargets, by the regular military of a nation-state.

Attacks by non-national actors, such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing of US and Frenchtroops under UN auspices, are more problematic. The Beirut attacks are usually called"terrorism" in news reports, but, if terrorism is assumed to be against noncombatants, they maynot qualify. The organizers and attackers might well be categorized as illegal combatants under

the Geneva Convention, but the Conventions do not define terrorism.

During this decade, the US supported Muslim fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Thetraining and arms supplied may have helped start transnational jihadist groups. 

1982

In April 1982, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)30[23] dealing with responses to armed attacks on U.S. citizens or assets. The NSDD created acoordinating body, the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, to develop and assign to variousexecutive agencies specific responsibilities when terrorist incidents occurred. The objective wasto have in place, before an incident occurred, guidelines for such matters as lines of authority,intelligence responsibilities, and response training. A Special Situation Group (SSG) wasestablished to advise the president, and lead agencies to coordinate responses were named.

1.  For international terrorist incidents outside U.S. territory, the State Departmenthad the lead role.

2.  For incidents, the Justice Department was to be the lead agency with the FederalBureau of Investigation (FBI0 in the lead for operational response.

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3.  For plane hijackings within the "special jurisdiction of the United States, the leadagency was the Federal Aviation Administration.

4.  For planning and managing public health aspects of terrorist incidents, the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) was the responsible agency.

Supporting the SSG was a Terrorist Incident Working Group with representatives from theDepartments of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the FBI, FEMA, and theNational Security Staff. It was to give "direct operational support…and to provide advice and

recommendations during an incident" to the SSG.[22] 

In November 1982, following the establishment of the DoD Inspector General, the DeputySecretary of Defense directed that the Inspector General for Intelligence be redesignated as theAssistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (ATSD (IO)). Today, the ATSD(IO) reports on Intelligence Oversight activities at least quarterly to the Secretary of Defenseand, through him, to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), a standing committee of thePresident's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).[24] 

1983

The major terrorist incident was the bombing of a UN observer force in Beirut, which led toconsiderable rethinking of U.S. rules of engagement, the deterrent effect of a US presence, andthe issue of  force protection intelligence. See the Marine rethinking of the role of  SIGINT forforce protection.

1983 Beirut barracks bombing

Suicide attacks in Beirut cost the lives of 241 American and 58 French soldiers, with many

casualties. Often called terrorist attacks, this designation seems to be more a facet of the meansof attack, and that it was carried out by non-national actors, than that it was intended to terrorizea civilian population.

Further complicating the designation is that there is no consensus on who sponsored the attacks.A US court did find Iran responsible, which would make it an attack by a nation-state on militarypersonnel of two other nation-states. In 2001, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated: "But we still do not have the actual knowledge of who did the bombing of the Marinebarracks at the Beirut Airport, and we certainly didn't then." [25] 

Rules of engagement for the Marines were restrictive; they could not set up what would be

considered today a safe perimeter against truck bombs. They carried rifles that had to be loadedbefore use; there were no heavier weapons that could deflect a truck or destroy its engine.[26] 

The Commission termed this a terrorist attack, and raised questions about the intelligencesupport available to it (emphasis added):

Intelligence provided a good picture of the broad threat facing the USMNF [US multinationalforce] in Lebanon. Every intelligence agency in the national community and throughout the

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chain of command disseminated a great amount of analysis and raw data. Key Defense officialsand the military chain of command ere alert to, and concerned with, the insights it providedthem. There was an awareness of the existing dangerous situation at every level, but no one

had specific information on how, where and when the threat would be carried out. Throughout the period of the USMNF presence in Lebanon, intelligence sources were unable to

provide proven, accurate, definitive information on terrorist tactics against our forces. Thisshortcoming held to be the case on October 23, 1983. The terrorist threat was just one amongmany threats facing the USMNF from the many factions armed with artillery, crew servedweapons and small arms.[27]...

The USMNF was operating in an urban environment surrounded by hostile forces without anyway of pursuing the accuracy of data in order to head off attack. The intelligence structureshould be reviewed from both a design and capabilities standpoint. We need to establishourselves early in a potential trouble spot and find new techniques to isolate and penetrate ourpotential enemies. Once established, our military forces (and especially ground forces) need tohave aggressive, specific intelligence to give the commander the hard information he needs to

counter the threats against his force. U.S. intelligence is primarily geared for the support of airand naval forces engaged in nuclear and conventional warfare. Significant attention must begiven by the entire U.S. intelligence structure to purging and refining of masses of generalizedinformation into intelligence analysis useful to small unit ground commanders.

1984

In 1984, the CIA both suffered from terrorism directed at it, and also supported anti-Sovietguerillas in Afghanistan that the Soviets considered terrorists.

Kidnapping of CIA Beirut station chief and US response authorizing preemption

"NSDD 138 was the next known significant Reagan-era action. It was promulgated after theMarch 16, 1984 kidnapping of the Central Intelligence Agency's Beirut, Lebanon station chief,William Buckley. This NSDD, much of which remains classified, permitted both the CIA andthe Federal Bureau of Investigation to form covert operations teams and to use military specialoperations forces to conduct guerrilla-style war against guerrillas. The NSDD reportedly permitspre-emptive operations, retaliation, expanded intelligence collection, and when necessary, killingof guerrillas in "pre-emptive" self-defense. States that sponsored guerrillas, or what today wouldgenerally be lumped under the term terrorists, could be targeted for operations. These includedIran, Libya, Syria, Cuba, North Korea – all identified before Sept. 11, 2001, by the StateDepartment as state-sponsors of terrorism. Nicaragua and the Soviet Union were reportedly also

on the list."

[22]

 

Creation of al-Qaeda

The network that became known as al-Qaeda ("The Base") grew out of Arab volunteers whofought the Soviets and their puppet regimes in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In 1984 AbdullahAzzam and Osama bin Laden set up an organization known as the Office of Services in

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Peshawar, Pakistan, to coordinate and finance the "Afghan Arabs", as the volunteers becameknown.

Azzam and Bin Laden set up recruitment offices in the US, under the name "Al-Khifah", the hubof which was the Farouq Mosque in Brooklyn's Atlantic Avenue. This was "a place of pivotal

importance for Operation Cyclone".

[28]

 

Support to the Afghan resistance

The CIA also channeled US aid to Afghan resistance fighters via Pakistan in a covert operationknown as Operation Cyclone. It denied dealing with non-Afghan fighters, or having directcontact with bin Laden.[29] However, various authorities relate that the Agency brought bothAfghans and Arabs to the United States for military training.[30][31][32][33] 

1986

Foundation of the Counterterrorist Center

Main article: Counterterrorist Center 

In the mid 1980s there was a spate of terrorist activity, much of it by Palestinian organizations.In 1986 the CIA founded the Counterterrorist Center, an interdisciplinary body drawing itspersonnel from the Directorates of Operations, Intelligence, and other US intelligenceorganizations. It first got to grips with secular terrorism, but found the upcoming Islamist terrormuch more difficult to penetrate. In the 1990s the latter became a major preoccupation of thecenter.

Afghanistan and its consequences

In the 1980s the CIA covertly supported the Afghan guerrilla struggle against the Soviets, in anoperation known as "Operation Cyclone". "Blowback" is a CIA term of art referring tooperations, launched against an enemy, which eventually hurt their originators. Variousprograms, either directly supported by, or known to, US intelligence, were encouraged, in the1980s, to train combatants for Afghanistan.

Some of this training and preparation took place in the United States. In the case at hand,blowback into the United States may have come from a pipeline, from Brooklyn, New York, toPeshawar, Pakistan, the gateway to joining the Afghan mujahedin. The Brooklyn end was at the

Al Kifah Refugee Center, funded under the CIA's Operation Cyclone, and the associated AfghanRefugee Service. The Maktab al-Khidamat ("Office of Services") was founded in Peshawar in1984 by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden to finance and support this effort. "Coldwarriors" in the CIA and US State Department looked favorably on these efforts, and consideredthat they should be formally endorsed and expanded, perhaps along the lines of the internationalbrigades of the Spanish Civil War. "Bin Laden actually did some very good things", said MiltonBearden, chief of the CIA's Islamabad station in the later 1980s. "He put a lot of money in a lotof right places in Afghanistan. He never came on the screen of any Americans as either a terrific

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asset or someone who was anti-American." The CIA denied, however, actually assisting the"Arab Afghans" (as the Arab volunteers became known), or having direct contact with BinLaden.[34] 

Arrested in the US, for the embassy bombings, was a former Egyptian soldier named Ali

Mohamed (sometimes called "al-Amriki", the American), who is alleged to have providedtraining and assistance to Mr Bin Laden's operatives. At that time, however, he was a member of the United States Army Special Forces.[28] FBI special agent Jack Cloonan calls him "bin Laden'sfirst trainer".[35] Originally an Egyptian army captain, in the 1980s Mohamed came to the US andbecame a supply sergeant to the Green Berets in Fort Bragg. At the same time he was involvedwith Egyptian Islamic Jihad (which "merged" with al-Qaeda in the 1990s), and later with Qaedaitself. Mohamed boasted of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. He had worked for the CIA inthe earlier 1980s, but the agency supposedly dropped him after he boasted of his relationship.But Mohamed's behavior led his commanding officer, Lt. Col. Robert Anderson, to believe hewas still a US intelligence asset. ("I assumed the CIA", said Anderson.) In 1989 Mohamedtrained anti-Soviet fighters in his spare time, apparently at the al-Khifah center in Brooklyn. He

was "honorably discharged" from the US military in November 1989.

Another individual associated with the Brooklyn center was the "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdel-Rahman, a leading recruiter of mujaheddin, who obtained US entry visas with the help of theCIA in 1987 and 1990.

J. Michael Springmann, head of the non-immigrant visa section at the "CIA-dominated" USconsulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1987 – 88, said he learned that the CIA had a "program tobring people to the United States for terrorist training, people recruited by the CIA and its assetUsama bin Laden, and the idea was to get them trained and send them back to Afghanistan tofight the then Soviets." "Their nationalities for the most part were Pakistani, Palestinian, Syrian,

Lebanese." These "recruits without backgrounds" were given visas over Springmann'sprotests.[36] 

[T]hose directly recruited by the US ... went to Camp Peary — "the Farm", as the CIA's spytraining centre in Virginia is known in the intelligence community ... At the Farm and othersecret camps, young Afghans and Arab nationals from countries such as Egypt and Jordanlearned strategic sabotage skills.[37] 

Bin Laden's early years: terrorist financier

In about 1988 Bin Laden set up al-Qaeda from the more extreme elements of the Services Office.But it was not a large organization. When Jamal al-Fadl (who had been recruited through theBrooklyn center in the mid 1980s) joined in 1989, he was described as Qaeda's "thirdmember".[38] 

Congressional testimony from then-DCI George Tenet speaks of knowledge and analysis of BinLaden, from his early years as a terrorist financier to his leadership of a worldwide network of terrorism based in Afghanistan.[39] 

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According to Tenet, Bin Laden gained prominence during the Afghan war for his role infinancing the recruitment, transportation, and training of Arab nationals who fought alongsidethe Afghan mujahedin against the Soviets during the 1980s. Tenet denied there had been any USgovernment involvement with him until the early nineties. See Allegations of CIA assistance toOsama bin Laden. 

Intelligence and terrorism in the 1990s

The 1990s were characterized by a wide range of terrorist activities, from a religious cult thatused WMDs, to an attack on the World Trade Center by an ad hoc jihadist group, to coordinatedal-Qaeda attacks.

Accounts differ on when the United States recognized bin Laden as an individual financier of terror, as opposed to when al-Qaida was recognized as a group.

In the early 1990s Ali Mohamed, who had been a United States Army Special Forces supply

sergeant, returned to Afghanistan, where he gave training in al-Qaeda camps. According to FBIspecial agent Jack Cloonan, in one of Mohamed's first classes were Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other al-Qaeda leaders.[35] According to the San Francisco Chronicle, he wasinvolved in planning the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Africa [28][40][41] 

1990

Eventually, the Services office and Al-Kifah were also linked to Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, an Egyptian religious leader later jailed for the planned New York bombings. Even SheikhAbdel-Rahman had, apparently, entered the US with the full knowledge of the CIA in 1990.

But by the mid-1990s, America's view of Al-Kifah had changed. It discovered that several of those charged with the World Trade Center bombing and the New York landmarks bombingswere former Afghan veterans, recruited through the Brooklyn-based organisation. Many of thosethe US had trained and recruited for a war were still fighting: but now it was against America. Aconfidential CIA internal survey concluded that it was 'partly culpable' for the World TradeCenter bomb, according to reports of the time. There had been blowback.

Jamal al-Fadl (himself recruited through the Brooklyn center in the mid 1980s) was described asthe "third member". Al-Fadl later "defected" to the CIA and provided the agency's Bin Ladenunit with a great deal of evidence about al-Qaeda.[42] 

1993

The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was a conspiracy, and a group of the conspirators werearrested, convicted, and imprisoned. There has been no strong argument that al-Qaeda wasinvolved, although there have been allegations, including by a former Director of CentralIntelligence, that Iraq supported the operational cell. In October 2001 in a PBS interview, formerClinton CIA Director James Woolsey argued a supposed link between Ramzi Youssef and the

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Iraqi intelligence services. He suggested the grand jury investigation turned up evidence pointingto Iraq that the Clinton Justice Department "brushed aside."

Neil Herman, who headed the FBI investigation, noted that despite Yasin's presence in Baghdad,there was no evidence of Iraqi support for the attack. "We looked at that rather extensively," he

told CNN terrorism analyst Peter L. Bergen. "There were no ties to the Iraqi government."Bergen writes, "In sum, by the mid-'90s, the Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York, the F.B.I.,the U.S. Attorney's office in the Southern District of New York, the C.I.A., the N.S.C., and theState Department had all found no evidence implicating the Iraqi government in the first TradeCenter attack."[citation needed ] 

Claims that Saddam Hussein was behind the bombing are based on the research of  LaurieMylroie of the conservative American Enterprise Institute.[43] 

1995

Only a brief mention of Colombian FARC activity is mentioned in the declassified part of the1995 Terrorism Review.[44] 

March 1995 actions by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated that the use of WMD isno longer restricted to the battlefield. Japanese authorities have determined that the Aum wasworking on developing the chemical nerve agents sarin and VX.[5] The Japanese cult AumShinrikyo, which attacked Japanese civilians with deadly gas just one year ago (March 20, 1995)also tried to mine its own uranium in Australia and to buy Russian nuclear warheads.

1996

The attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia is the only declassified subject in the 1996Terrorism Review[45] Responsibility for the attack was, at the time of publication of the Review,not determined.

Bin Ladin came to the attention of the CIA as an emerging terrorist threat during his stay inSudan from 1991 to 1996.[39] 

The Agency, however, began to be concerned than bin Laden would extend his activities beyondAfghanistan. It experimented with various internal organizations that could focus on subjectssuch as bin Laden specifically and al-Qaeda generally.

Main article: Bin Laden Issue Station 

In 1996 an experimental "virtual station" was launched, modeled on the agency's geographically-based stations, but based in Washington and dedicated to a particular transnational issue. It wasplaced under the Counterterrorist Center (CTC), and, like the CTC, cut across disciplines anddrew its personnel from widely across the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Michael Scheuer, who up to then headed the Center's Islamic extremist branch, was asked to run it. Scheuer, whohad noticed a stream of intelligence reports about Osama bin Laden, suggested the station be

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dedicated to this particular individual. The station began to produce evidence that Bin Laden wasnot only a financier, but also an organizer of terror. Originally dubbed "Terrorist FinancialLinks" (TFL),[46] the unit soon became rechristened the Bin Laden Issue Station. 

Jamal al-Fadl, who defected to the CIA in spring 1996, began to provide the Station with a new

image of the Qaeda leader: he was not only a terrorist financier, but a terrorist organizer too, andsought weapons of mass destruction. FBI special agent Dan Coleman (who together with hispartner Jack Cloonan had been "seconded" to the Bin Laden Station) called him Qaeda's "RosettaStone".[47] 

1998

On August 7, 1998, near simultaneous car bomb attacks struck US embassies, and localbuildings, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya. The attacks, linked to local members of the al Qaeda terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden, brought bin Laden and al Qaeda tointernational attention for the first time, and resulted in the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation

placing bin Laden on its Ten Most Wanted list.

The declassified page of the 1998 Terrorism Review speaks of the release of hostages byColombia's two major guerilla organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Kidnapping is the only threat mentioned, witha warning of continued danger to US interests.[48] 

The Review makes no mention of other countries or threats, but only the cover and one pagewere even partially declassified.

1999

In 1999 DCI George Tenet launched a grand "Plan" to deal with al-Qaeda. In preparation, heselected new leadership for the Counterterrorist Center (CTC). He placed Cofer Black  in chargeof the CTC, and "Rich B" (a "top-flight executive" from Tenet's own leadership group) in chargeof the CTC's Bin Laden unit. Tenet assigned the CTC to develop the Plan.[49] The proposals,brought out in September, sought to penetrate Qaeda's "Afghan sanctuary" with US and Afghanagents, in order to obtain information on and mount operations against Bin Laden's network. InOctober, officers from the Bin Laden unit visited northern Afghanistan. Once the Plan wasfinalized, the Agency created a "Qaeda cell" (whose functions overlapped those of the CTC's BinLaden unit) to give operational leadership to the effort. CIA intelligence chief  Charles E. Allen to set up a "Qaeda cell" was put in charge of the tactical execution of the Plan. i

The CIA concentrated its inadequate financial resources on the Plan, so that at least some of itsmore modest aspirations were realized. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and al-Qaedaincreased significantly from 1999. "By 9/11", said Tenet, "a map would show that thesecollection programs and human [reporting] networks were in place in such numbers as to nearlycover Afghanistan". (But this excluded Bin Laden's inner circle itself.)[39] 

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Al Qaeda operated as an organization in more than sixty countries, the CIA's CounterterroristCenter calculated by late 1999 [a figure that was to help underpin the "War On Terror" two yearslater]. Its formal, sworn, hard-core membership might number in the hundreds. Thousands more joined allied militias such as the [Afghan] Taliban or the Chechen rebel groups or Abu Sayyaf inthe Philippines or the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan....

A heavily redacted CIA document, the 1999 Terrorism Review, reveals concern with Libyansupport of terrorism, through its External Security Organization (ESO). [50] The ESO is describedas responsible for surveillance, assassination, and kidnapping of Libyan dissidents outside thecountry; examples were given from actions in the United Kingdom and Egypt. Libya was alsodescribed as attempting to build influence in sub-Saharan Africa, supporting a range of Palestinian rejectionist groups, and giving funds and equipment to the Moro Islamic LiberationOrganization and Abu Sayyaf  Group in the Philippines. 

In addition, the World Anti-Imperialist Center (Mahatba) and the World Islamic Call Society(WICS) were described as part of terrorist infrastructure. This review does not mention any

country, other than Libya, or non-national actor as a sponsor of terrorism, as opposed to anoperational terrorist group.

Intelligence and terrorism in the 2000s

In late 2000 Tenet, recognizing the deficiency of "big-picture" analysis of al-Qaeda, appointed asenior manager in the Counterterrorist Center to investigate "creating a strategic assessmentcapability". This led to the creation of the Strategic Assessments Branch in 2001.

2000

On October 12, 2000 three suicide bombers detonated a skiff packed with explosives alongsidethe American Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS Cole, which was docked in Aden Harbor,Yemen. The blast blew a hole 20 feet (6.1 m) high and 40 feet (12 m) wide in the ship's hull,killed 17 of the ship's crew and injured 30. "With just slightly more skilled execution, CIAanalysts later concluded, the bombers would have killed three hundred and sent the destroyer tothe bottom."[51] See USS Cole bombing for details of the attack and response to it.

The attack on the USS Cole apparently came out of the blue. However Kie Fallis at the DefenseIntelligence Agency, from "data mining and analysis", had "predicted" in early autumn 2000 aQaeda attack by an explosives-laden small boat against a US warship. And in late September2000 the DIA experimental data-mining operation Able Danger had uncovered information of 

increased Qaeda "activity" in Aden Harbor, Yemen. Able Danger elevated Yemen "to be one of the top three hot spots for al-Qaeda in the entire world" and, allegedly days before the Coleattack, warned the Pentagon and administration of the danger. But the "warnings" were"ignored".[52] 

Clandestine intelligence/covert action

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In 2000 the CIA and USAF  jointly ran a series of flights over Afghanistan with a small remote-controlled reconnaissance drone, the Predator; they obtained probable photos of Bin Laden.Cofer Black  and others became advocates of arming the Predator with missiles to try toassassinate Bin Laden and other Qaeda leaders.

2001

Covert action

Paramilitary support

In the spring of 2001, CIA officers evaluated the forces of  Ahmed Shah Massoud, and found hisstrength less than the previous fall. While the officers gave him cash and supplies, and receivedintelligence on the Taliban, they did not have the authority to build back his fighting strengthagainst the Taliban.[53] 

Targeted killing in war versus assassination

Main article: Targeted killing 

While the US has had a series of Presidential Executive Orders banning assassinations, none of those Orders actually defined assassination.[54] Using dictionary rather than statutory definition, acommon definition is "murder by surprise for political purposes". Jeffrey Addicott argues that if murder is generally accepted as an illegal act in US and international law, so if assassination is aform of murder, the Orders cannot be making legal something that is already illegal.[55] 

The Hague and Geneva Conventions did not consider non-national actors as belligerents ingeneral war. The Conventions do consider spontaneous rising against invasion and civil war ashaving lawful combatants, but there are much more restrictions of the status, as legal combatants,of fighters who came to a war from an external country. This discussion will not address thecontroversial issue of  illegal combatants, but, following Addicott's reasoning, assumes thatviolence, in defense to an attack, is legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Note that before the attackers in the September 11, 2001 attacks were identified, the US invokedthe NATO treaty, without objection, as a member state that had been attacked. "In the War onTerror, it is beyond legal dispute that the virtual-State al-Qa‘eda terrorists are aggressors and that

the United States is engaging in self-defense when using violence against them."[citation needed ] 

Black and others became advocates of arming the Predator with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles totry to kill Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. But there were both legal and technical issues.Tenet in particular was concerned about the CIA moving back into the business of targetedkilling. And a series of live-fire tests in the Nevada Desert in summer 2001 produced mixedresults.

In June 2001, at a test site in Nevada in the US, CIA and Air Force personnel built a replica of Bin Laden's villa in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Predator controllers tested aiming and firing aPredator missile at the house, and post-strike analysis showed it would have killed anyone in the

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targeted room. The significance of this demonstration was called a "holy grail" by oneparticipant. A weapon now existed which, at long range, could kill Bin Laden shortly afterfinding him. Practice runs proved reliable, but, according to the Washington Post , the BushAdministration refrained from such action. On September 4, a new set of directives called forincreasing pressure against the Taliban until they either ejected al-Qaeda or faced a serious threat

to their continued power. No decision on using this capability had reached President Bush bySeptember 11.[53] 

Tenet advised cautiously at the Cabinet-level Principals Committee on September 4, 2001. If theCabinet wanted to empower the CIA to field a lethal drone, he said, "they should do so with theireyes wide open, fully aware of the potential fallout if there were a controversial or mistakenstrike". National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice concluded that the armed Predator wasrequired, but evidently not ready. She advised the CIA to consider re-starting reconnaissanceflights. The "previously reluctant" Tenet then ordered the Agency to do so. The CIA wasauthorized to "deploy the system with weapons-capable aircraft".[56][57] 

Strategic Assessments Branch

The Counterterrorist Center, which Tenet had assigned to advise on setting up a strategicassessment capability, reported back in March. "In [an] early Spring 2001 briefing to the DCI,[the] CTC requested hiring a small group of contractors not involved in day-to-day crises todigest vast quantities of information and develop targeting strategies. The briefing emphasizedthat the unit needed people, not money."

The Strategic Assessments Branch of the Counterterrorist Center was formally set up in July. Butit struggled to find personnel. The branch's chief reported for duty on September 10,2001.[58][59][60] 

World-Wide Attack Matrix

After 9/11, the CIA came under criticism for not having done enough to prevent the attacks. DCIGeorge Tenet rejected the criticism, citing the Agency's planning efforts especially over thepreceding two years. His response came in a briefing held on September 15, 2001, where hepresented the Worldwide Attack Matrix, a classified document describing covert CIA anti-terroroperations in eighty countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The actions, underway orbeing recommended, would range from "routine propaganda to lethal covert action in preparationfor military attacks." The plans, if carried out, "would give the CIA the broadest and most lethalauthority in its history."[61] 

Tenet said that the CIA's efforts had put the Agency in a position to respond rapidly andeffectively to the attacks, both in the "Afghan sanctuary" and in "ninety-two countries around theworld".[62] 

At the Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001, Tenetwarned of the dangers of a controversial or mistaken strike with an under-tested armed drone.

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After the meeting, the CIA resumed reconnaissance flights, the drones now being weapons-capable but as yet unarmed.[63][64][65][66] 

2002

Starting on September 11, the strategy was no longer steady escalation, but multiple attacks onmultiple fronts. On 5 November 2002, newspapers reported that Al-Qaeda operatives in a cartravelling through Yemen had been killed by a missile launched from a CIA-controlled Predatordrone (a medium-altitude, remote-controlled aircraft).

In 2004, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's (ABC-TV) international affairs program"Foreign Correspondent" investigated this targeted killing and the involvement of then U.S.Ambassador as part of a special report titled "The Yemen Option". The report also examined theevolving tactics and countermeasures in dealing with Al Qaeda inspired attacks. Transcript at:http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2004/s1054112.htm 

2004

In June 2004, the U.S. killed Nek Muhammad Wazir, a Taliban commander and al-Qaedafacilitator, in an apparent Predator missile strike in South Waziristan.[67][68][69] 

2005

On May 15, 2005, it was reported that another of these drones had been used to assassinate Al-Qaeda explosives expert Haitham al-Yemeni inside Pakistan.[70] 

In December 2005, Abu Hamza Rabia, an Egyptian who was reportedly al-Qaeda's third in

command, was killed in a surprise drone attack in North Waziristan.[71][71][72][73] 

2006

On January 13, 2006, the CIA launched an airstrike on Damadola, a Pakistani village near theAfghan border, where they believed Ayman al-Zawahiri was located. The airstrike killed anumber of civilians but al-Zawahiri apparently was not among them.[74] The Pakistanigovernment issued a [75] protest against the US attack, which it considered violated itssovereignty.

2008

n January 2008, Abu Laith al-Libi, one al-Qaeda's senior figures, was killed in a targeted killingPredator rocket attack in Pakistan.[76][77][78] Some intelligence sources describe him as the numberthree leader of al-Qaeda.[79] 

In July 2008, Abu Khabab al-Masri, suspected leader of al-Qaeda's chemical and biologicalweapons efforts, was killed in an attack by U.S. drone-launched missiles on a house in SouthWaziristan in Pakistan.[80][81] 

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In October 2008, Khalid Habib, al-Qaeda regional operations commander in Afghanistan andPakistan, was killed by a missile launched by a Predator in South Waziristan,Pakistan.[82][83][84][85] 

In November 2008, Rashid Rauf , British/Pakistani suspected planner of a 2006 transatlantic

aircraft plot, was killed by a missile launched from a U.S. drone in North Waziristan.

[86]

 

2009

1998 U.S. embassy bombing in Kenya

In January 2009, Usama al-Kini and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, alleged orchestrators of the1998 United States embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, were killed in a Predator strike innorthern Pakistan.[87] 

In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), was killed in aU.S. drone missile attack in Waziristan.[88][89][90][91][92][93] 

Forward Operating Base Chapman attack

See also: Forward Operating Base Chapman attack  

On December 30, 2009, a suicide attack occurred at Forward Operating Base Chapman, a majorCIA base in the province of  Khost, Afghanistan. Eight people, among them at least six CIAofficers, including the chief of the base, were killed and six others seriously wounded in theattack. The attack was the second most deadliest carried out against the CIA, after the 1983United States Embassy bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, and was a major setback for the intelligence

agency's operations.

References

1.  ↑ Fine, Glenn A., Inspector General of the US Department of Justice (November 5,2003),  Inspector General’s List of the Most Serious Management Challenges and 

 Responses: Top Management Challenges 

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2.  ↑  National Counterterrorism Center  3.  ↑ National Foreign Assessment Center (April 1980),  International Terrorism in 1979, 

Central Intelligence Agency, PA 80-10072U4.  ↑ Hudson, Rex A. (September 1999), The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: who

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12. ↑ Lumpkin, John (January 11, 2006), "Osama bin Laden satellite phone calls Yemen", Globalsecurity.org 

13. ↑ "chapter 6, "Afghan Eyes"",  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the

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Prior to 9 – 11: A Report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority

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Palastra, Joseph T., Jr. (December 20, 1983),  Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut 

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Palastra, Joseph T., Jr. (December 20, 1983), "Part Four. Intelligence",  Report of the DoD

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29. ↑ Coll, Steve (2005), Ghost Wars, Penguin, p. 8730. ↑ Foden, Giles (September 15, 2001), "Blowback Chronicles", Guardian (London)31. ↑ Cooley, John (2002), Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism 

(3 ed.), Pluto Press32. ↑ Cooperative Research transcript of Fox TV interview with J. Michael Springmann

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your history with Al Qaeda?", PBS Frontline (PBS), October 18, 200536. ↑ Springmann, J. Michael (February 5, 2003), "Policing the Borders: Old Fears, New

Realities", Centre for Research in Globalisation 37. ↑ Giles Foden, "Blowback Chronicles", Guardian (UK), Sept. 15, 2001; referring to John

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38. ↑ Peter L Bergen, Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (Weidenfield & Nicholson, 2001), p.65.

39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 39.2 Tenet, George (October 17, 2002), Written Statement for the Record of the

 Director of Central Intelligence Before the Joint Inquiry Committee 40. ↑ Williams, Lance; McCormick, Erin (November 4, 2001), "Al Qaeda terrorist worked

with FBI: Ex-Silicon Valley resident plotted embassy attacks", San Francisco Chronicle 41. ↑ [ Jack Cloonan interview], Frontline, PBS, Oct. 18, 2005.42. ↑ Mayer, Jane (September 11, 2006), "Junior: The clandestine life of America‘s top Al

Qaeda source",  New Yorker  

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43. ↑ Bergen, Peter, Washington Monthly,http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0312.bergen.html 

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p. 100.47. ↑ Jane Mayer, "Junior: The clandestine life of America's top Al Qaeda source",  New

Yorker , Sept. 11, 2006.48. ↑ DCI Counterterrorism Center, 1998 Terrorism Review, Central Intelligence Agency49. ↑ Tenet, At The Center of the Storm, pp.119, 120.50. ↑ DCI Counterterrorism Center, 1999 Terrorism Review, Central Intelligence Agency51. ↑ Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 edn), p.537.52. ↑ Able Danger timeline, Cooperative Research.53. ↑ 

53.0 53.1 Gellman, Barton (January 20, 2002), "A Strategy's Cautious Evolution", Washington Post : A01

54. ↑ Bazan, Elizabeth B. (January 4, 2002),  Assassination Ban and E.O. 12333: A Brief 

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56. ↑ Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 edn), p.581.57. ↑ Tenet statement to the 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004, pp. 15, 1658. ↑ 9/11 Commission Report , chapter 11, p.342 (HTML version).59. ↑ Tenet statement to the 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004, p.8.60. ↑ Joint Inquiry Final Report, part three, p.387.61. ↑ Woodward, Bob; Balz, Dan (January 30, 2002), "At Camp David, Advise and Dissent", 

The Washington Post  (The Washington Post) 62. ↑ George Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm (Harper Press, 2007), pp.121 – 2; cf. p.178.63. ↑ Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005), pp. 580 – 8164. ↑ Tenet statement to the 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004, pp. 15-1665. ↑ Barton Gellman, "A Strategy's Cautious Evolution", Washington Post , Jan. 20, 2002,

p.A0166. ↑ 9/11 Commission Report , chapter 6, pp.210 – 14 (HTML version); ibid, Notes, p.513,

note 258 (see note 255) (HTML version) 67. ↑ "CIA beefs killer drone force". The Standard. Retrieved May 20, 2010.68. ↑ "Department of Homeland Security IAIP Directorate Daily Open Source Infrastructure

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72. ↑ "Blast in Pakistan Kills Al Qaeda Commander: Figure Reportedly Hit by U.S. MissileStrike". Washington Post  author=Whitlock, Craig and Khan, Kamran. December 4, 2005.pp. A01. Retrieved February 10, 2008.

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73. ↑ "Blast 'kills al-Qaeda commander'". BBC News. December 3, 2005. Retrieved May 20,2010.

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93. ↑ Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role, Bob Woodward, Washington Post,November 18, 2001, Page A01

Central Intelligence Agency of the United States 

Geographicactivities

the Americas ·  Africa ·  Asia/Pacific ·  Near East, North Africa, South andSouthwest Asia ·  Russia and Europe 

Transnationalactivities

Terrorism ·  Arms control, WMD, and proliferation ·  Crime and illicit drugtrade ·  Health and economy ·  Human rights ·  Influence on public opinion 

Divisions Directorate of Science & Technology ·  National Clandestine Service ·  Special

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Activities Division 

Official reports by the US Government on the CIA