how do language and thought influence each other?original paper udc 1:81(045) doi: 10.21464/sp32206...

OriginalpaperUDC1:81(045)doi:10.21464/sp32206

Received:September4,2017

Ljudevit Fran JežićUniversityofZagreb,FacultyofHumanitiesandSocialSciences,IvanaLučića3,HR–10000Zagreb

[email protected]

How Do Language and Thought Influence Each Other?A Reconsideration of Their Relationship with Parallel

References to the History of Philosophy and Cognitive Linguistics

AbstractThe paper explores the relationship of language and thought with respect to their mutual determination or influence. Two questions are considered crucial: how do we learn the meanings of conventional linguistic signs, including those for abstract concepts, and how do we express our original insights, thoughts and feelings through not-yet-conventional lin-guistic means. These are followed by succinct answers and extensive elaborations referring to opposite views and linguistic examples from the history of philosophy and cognitive lin-guistics. It is argued that linguistic expressions, including metaphors, mostly incorporate how people represent (or once represented) the world to themselves through imagination and present (or once presented) the world to others through language. Hence language neither directly shows how we conceive and understand the world nor how we construct it in our thoughts. On the other hand, symbolization through metaphor and metonymy, as well as innovative verbalization, enable our cognition to communicate novel as well as abstract and philosophically demanding meanings.

Keywordslanguage,thought,cognition,conceptualmetaphor,verbalization,symboliccognition,Ari-stotle,ImmanuelKant,philosophyofcognitivelinguistics,GeorgeLakoff,MarcJohnson

Introduction

In social couple dances it is very important to know which dance partnerleadsandwhichfollows, lest theharmoniousdancebereducedfromorderto chaos.1 In the theory of language and the everyday practice of using alanguageitisequallyimportanttoknowwhetherthoughtsandintentionsorlinguistic signs and socialnormsof communicationhavea leading role inconversationsandotherverbalexpressions.DoIspeakandcommunicatemy

1

Thispaperhasgrownoutofaconferencepa-perheldat the25th Days of Frane Petrić inCres, theannual topicbeing“LanguageandCognition”.Sincethetimeatmydisposalwasverylimited,Ihadchosentheshortestwaytomakemypoint,andthatwasinformofques-tions, problems, and possible approaches tosolvingthem.Thebasicstructureofpresenta-tionhasalsobeenkeptinthispaper,although

vastly extended and elaborated. Thoughtsconveyed in thispaper are,however, a con-densed product of several years of explora-tionandponderingonthesubject,especiallyduringmyparalleluniversitystudiesofphi-losophy and linguistics. I am very gratefulbothtotheparticipantsoftheconferenceandtothetwoanonymousreviewersofthispaperfortheirhelpfulremarks.

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp32206

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(349–369)

Lj.F.Ježić,HowDoLanguageandThoughtInfluenceEachOther?350

thoughts toothers through languageordoesourcommon language“speakwithitself”2throughus?Speakingmorecommonly in termsofmodernWesternphilosophy, it isofbasic importance to know whether and to what extent our language deter-minesourthoughts,andviceversa.Isthereanydeterminationbetweenthetwo?Andifthereisone,isitastrictdeterminationoronlyalooseandpartialdetermination(morenaturallytermed“influence”)?Moreover,isitaone-waydetermination(unidirectional,eitheraslinguisticdeterminism3orasdecisivelinguisticindeterminism),oratwo-waydetermination(bidirectional,eitheraslooseinterdeterminationorasstrictparallelism)?Thispaperisnottheplacetoexplorealltheconceptualpossibilitiesofthisdivisionalschema,butrathertoclarifysomedecisivepointsofthetopic.Themostcommonlyandreasonablyheldviewisprobably that there isa looseformofbidirectionaldeterminationbetweenlanguageandthought.4Thisfor-mulation,however,stillneedsclarificationandpreciseexplanation.InthispaperIwillrestrictmyselftoaconsiderationofsomecentralfeaturesoftherelationshipbetweenlanguageandthoughtandlanguageandcognition.Thisconsiderationwillfollowintwosteps,eachintheoppositedirection:onefromlanguageasasociallynormedsystemofsignsthatwelearn(appropri-ate)throughmentaleffort,andtheotherfromourthoughtverballyexpressingoriginalinsightsandconceptsthroughthepotenciesofapreviouslymasteredlanguage.Thiswillbedonethroughformulationoftwocorrespondingsetsofspecificquestions,andtheirsuccinctanswerswithensuingelaborativerefer-encesbothtothehistoryofWesternphilosophyandtothetheoreticalworkoftwooftheleadingmembersofcognitivelinguistics.ByreconsideringanddifferentiatingtheviewstheygiveonthisissueIhopetoshedsomelightonthisimportantandintriguingsubject.Twooverallquestions that I findcrucial in this respectmaybeformulatedthus:Does language enableus to conveymeaning toothers, bothhabitualorconventionalandnewornon-conventional,ordoesitnot?Doeslanguageconstructthemeaningwecommunicatetoothers,ordowesignifythemean-ingwewanttoexpressbyusinglinguisticsignsasmeansofexpression?

First question: learning conventional signs and designating abstract meanings

Howdowe learnwhichconventional linguisticexpressionsofaparticularlanguagecommunityareascribedtospecificmeanings?5

Forthesakeofsimplicityandclarityoftheargument,Iwillabstractherefromthedistinctionbetween first and second languageacquisition, and say thatwelearnwhichconventionallinguisticexpressionsofaparticularlanguagecommunityareascribedtospecificmeaningsbyobservinghowaparticularlanguagecommunityspeaksaboutarepresentativevarietyoftopicsandbyappropriating thisuseof linguisticsigns intoourownspeech.Speaking inKantianterms,6wewilltherebyfindsomeofthemeaningsascribedtotheseexpressionsinourexternalorspatialintuitions,e.g.“near”and“far”,“front”and“back”,andsomeinourinternalortemporalintuitions,e.g.“earlier”and“later”,orinourinternalflowofthoughtsandfeelings,e.g.“sad”or“happy”.This,however,doesnotsufficetoexplain–fromaKantianperspective–howcanweassociatecertainlinguisticexpressionswithabstractconceptsnotrep-resentableinourintuitions.



Theanswer to thisquestion is closely related toor evendependenton thequestionconcerningtheoriginofourcognition.Iwillthereforefirstbrieflyoutline twopossible answerswith the aidof bothKantianphilosophy andcognitivelinguistics.Since there isnocognition(andhencenomeaning) forus inany intuitiontakenalone,aconceptmustcometoouraidtoletusseewhatisgiveninthemanifold(multiplicity)ofexternalorinternalintuitions.Theconceptwillor-derthematerialgiveninsenseimpressionsorpureintuitionsandmakeitcog-nizable.Thisraisesthequestionastowherethesebasicstructuringconceptscomefrom.Twobasicanswersweregiven inphilosophy: fromwithinourmindorreason(as“innateideas”inthecontinentalrationalisttradition)andfromwithoutourmind,inexternalsenseimpressionswhichprovideuswithexperience(as in theEnglish-speakingempiricist tradition).BothpositionswerebroughttoahighersynthesisbyKant.Accordingtohisposition,senseimpressionsarenecessarytriggersofpureconcepts(i.e.non-empiricallyde-rivedconcepts)whichenableourunderstandingtoformexperienceoutofthematerialgiventothesenses(asaffectedeitherfromwithinorwithout).Iwillgofurtheranddaretosaythatthispositionmayalsobeaviableexplan-atorybasisforananswertothestartingquestionastohowweascribespecificmeaningstospecificlinguisticexpressionsinaparticularlanguagecommuni-ty.Namely,weassociatecertainexpressionsweseeorhearotherspeakersusewiththewaystheypresentorcommunicatecertainthings,statesofaffaires,thoughtsorfeelings,eithertous,oramongthemselves.Inthiscasetheiruseoflanguageenablesustomakeconnectionsbetweencertainexpressionsand

2

Asparadoxicalasthelatterclaimmayseem,itisneverthelessboldlyelaboratedeveninthissame journal issue throughan interpretationof Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Grammar(Josip Oslić, Verstehen und Nichtverstehen in der praxisbezogenen Hermeneutik Ludwig Wittgensteins).

3

Popularly (although questionably) under-stood, as present in Wittgenstein’s famousdictum:“Die Grenzen meiner Sprachebedeu-tendieGrenzenmeinerWelt.”/“The limits of my languagemean the limitsofmyworld.”LudwigWittgenstein,Tractatus logico-philo-sophicus, translated by D. F. Pears, B. F.McGuinness,Routledge&KeganPaul,Lon-don1963(11921),5.6(pp.114–115).

4

A fictitious and general but already matureanswercouldbepositedasfollows:“Yes,tosome extent, my thoughts are directed andshapedthroughthelanguageIspeak.Andyes,tosomeextent,thelanguageIusewasandisbeing cultivated and developed through thecommunicative, cognitive and poetic effortsofpreviousgenerationsofitsactualspeakersandevenspeakersof languages ithascomeintocontactwith.”

5

By formulating the question thus, I do notintend to reduce language to nomenclature,

i.e. a list of names for things and events,butonlytostatetheproblemforthepresentpurpose as clear and simple as possible. Ido not constrain meaning to (extralinguis-tic) reference (inFrege’sdistinctionofSinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference); Frege’sfamousexampleisthatthemorning star andtheevening star havedifferentsensesbutthesame meaning/reference, namely the planetVenus. See: Gottlob Frege, “Über Sinn undBedeutung”, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik,VerlagvonC.E.M.Pfeffer,Leipzig1892,pp.25–50.Meaningcan be found in various fields of our expe-rience, not to exclude those stemming frominward intuition, abstract reasoning,medita-tionorcontemplativespeculation.Moreover,meaningsarenotconveyedbyisolatedwords,butthroughsentences,themselvesdependentonsomecontext.Linguisticexpressionsmayacquire different meanings in different con-texts.

6

ImakemypointintermsofKant’sCritique of Pure Reason (11781, 21787) for two rea-sons. The first is that one finds here manybasicandcrucialconceptualdistinctionsthatwerepreviouslyandagaintodayblurred,andthesecondisthatthey,aswellasKant’sphi-losophyingeneral,arestillverypresentinto-day’sdebatesandsupposedtobewellknowntoastudentofWesternphilosophy.



certainmeanings.Maybewecanfigureoutwhatisthemotivationbehindaparticular couplingof expressions andmeanings, but ingeneralweaccept(tacitlyinaccordancewiththeSaussureanprincipleofthe“arbitrarinessofthelinguisticsign”)7thatanypossiblemeaningcouldbeascribedtoanypos-siblelinguisticexpression.Basically,thisshouldbethewayhowwemasterconventionalsignsortheconventionalusageofcertainlinguisticexpressionsinaparticularlanguagecommunity.However, there is another possible and maybe even wide-spread answeramong today’s Western scholars that is boldly presented in cognitive lin-guistics,atleastbytheirrenownedrepresentativesGeorgeLakoffandMarcJohnson.Thesetwoscholarshaveinvestedmucheffortinformulatingasortofphilosophicalbasisforthecognitivelinguisticenterprise.Notalloftheircolleagueswouldopenlygivefullconsenttotheirtheoreticalunderpinningswhichholdanunmistakableandstrongnaturalisticandevolutionisticworld-view.8However,mostofthemseemtoshareandimplementtheviewofthesetwoscholarswhenitcomestotheoperativeleveloflinguisticanalysis.LakoffandJohnsonholdthattheabstractconceptswehavecalledKantianpurecon-ceptsofunderstandingarenotjustoccasionedbyimpressionsandintuitionsbutmoreoveremergedirectlyfromourinteractiveexperiencewiththeworld.In Metaphors We Live By (1980) they called this position experientialism,strictlydistinguishingitnotonlyfromrationalismbutalsofromempiricism,i.e. from twopositionswhich,according to theseauthors,botherr in theircommonmythofobjectivismandtheirclaimtoabsoluteknowledge.9

Later,asinPhilosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenges to Western Thought (1999), theyputevenmorestressonbodilygroundingandtheall-pervasivenessofwhattheycallconceptualmetaphors.Thecogni-tivisthypothesisoftheembodied mindnowexplicitlysupposesourmeaningtobe“groundedin”ororiginatingfromtheevolutionarypastofourbodies,fromourbodily(sensory-motor)experienceandfromourinteractionwithourphysicalandsocialenvironment.Accordingtothesetwolinguists,evenprin-ciplesandbasicconceptsofmathematicsandphysicsaregroundedoremergefromourbodilyexperienceviametaphoricalmappings,10e.g.thecounting,addition, and subtraction of numbers emerge from a child’s experience ofthecounting,addition,andsubtractionofobjects inexternalobjectcollec-tions(e.g.pilesofdifferentfruits),whilecausalityandforceemergefromachild’sexperienceofmanipulatingobjectsinitsenvironment.11WhatintheKantianviewwereoccasions toactivateconceptsinherent inourmindarehereunderstoodascausesororiginsoftheseconceptsthemselves.Iconsiderit important to notice this difference between the two, and the major rolemetaphorhereplays.Tobetterunderstandthepresuppositionsandscopeofthisinfluentialcogni-tivistview,alookshouldbetakenattheplaceofmetaphorsintheirfamousgroundwork.Alreadyintheirclassicalworkofcognitivelinguistics–Metaphors We Live By (1980)– LakoffandJohnsonclaimed1)tohavediscoveredthat“metaphorispervasiveineverydaylife”,and2)tobeabletorevealhow“ourordinaryconceptualsystem”ismetaphoricallyfoundedbytakingacloserlookat(theEnglish)languageofordinarycommunication.Thepresuppositionofthisap-proachisclearlystatedthus:

“Sincecommunicationisbasedonthesameconceptualsystemthatweuseinthinkingandact-ing,languageisanimportantsourceofevidenceforwhatthatsystemislike.”12



Whatishintedatheresoonbecamethenormincognitivelinguistics,namelythatlanguageisnotinvestigatedsomuchforitsownsake,i.e.tounderstandanddescribelanguageanditsstructures,asforthesakeofdiscoveringandde-scribingstructuresofhuman-specificcognitive(perceptual,conceptual,etc.)processesreflectedinlanguage.13

7

“Lelienunisssantlesignifiantausignifiéestarbitraire,(…)le signe linguistique est arbi-traire. (…) Le mot arbitraire appelle aussiuneremarque.Ilnedoitpasdonnerl’idéequele signifiant dépend du libre choix du sujetparlant: (…)nousvoulonsdirequ’ilest im-motivé, c’est-à-dire arbitraire par rapport ausignifié, avec lequel il n’a aucune attachenaturelle dans la réalité.” See: Ferdinandde Saussure, Cours de linguistique géné-rale,ÉditionsPayot&Rivages,Paris1967,pp. 100–101. English translation (tr. WadeBaskin, ed. Perry Meisel and Haun Saussy,ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork1959,pp.67–69):“Thebondbetweenthesignifierandthesignifiedisarbitrary.(…)thelinguis-tic sign isarbitrary. (…)Thewordarbitraryalsocallsforcomment.Thetermshouldnotimply that the choice of the signifier is leftentirelytothespeaker;(…)Imeanthatitisunmotivated, i.e. arbitrary in that it actuallyhasnonaturalconnectionwiththesignified.”

8

That there is no official “philosophical po-sition of Cognitive Linguistics” is stressedby Peter Harder: “No consensus has beenachieved, either inside or outside Cogni-tive Linguistics, on the precise status andproperties of mental entities, including theirrelation both to the human body that gener-ates them and to the outside cultural andphysical environment.” See: Peter Harder,“Cognitive Linguistics and Philosophy”, in:DirkGeeraerts,HubertCuyckens(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics,Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, p.1242. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxford-hb/9780199738632.001.0001. Interestinglyenough,eveninacognitiviststatementasre-servedasthisone,it isstill thehumanbodywhich“generatesmentalentities”.LetusalsotaketwoillustrationsofLakoffandJohnson’srather crude evolutionism: [1] “Categoriza-tionisthereforeaconsequenceofhowweareembodied.Wehaveevolvedtocategorize;ifwehadn’t,wewouldnothavesurvived.Cat-egorizationis,forthemostpart,notaproductofconsciousreasoning.Wecategorizeaswedobecausewehavethebrainsandbodieswehaveandbecauseweinteractwiththeworldthewaywedo.”[2]“Wehaveevolvedwithintheselimitationstohavethecolorsystemswehave,andtheyallowustofunctionwellintheworld. Plant life has been important to ourevolution, and so the ability to place in onecategorythethingsthataregreenhasapparentvalueforsurvivalandflourishing.Thesame

goes for blood and the color red, water andtheskyandthecolorblue,andthesunandthemoonandthecoloryellow.Wehavethecolorconceptswedobecause thephysical limita-tions constraining evolution gave evolution-aryadvantagestobeingswithacolorsystemthatenabledthemtofunctionwellincrucialrespects.”See:GeorgeLakoff,MarcJohnson,Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought,BasicBooks,NewYork1999,p.18,25.

9

“The myth of objectivism has dominatedWesternculture,andinparticularWesternphi-losophy,fromthePresocraticstothepresentday.Theviewthatwehaveaccesstoabsoluteand unconditional truths about the world isthecornerstoneoftheWesternphilosophicaltradition.The myth of objectivity has flour-ished in both the rationalist and empiricisttradition,whichinthisrespectdifferonlyintheiraccountsofhowwearriveatsuchabso-lutetruths.Fortherationalists,onlyourinnatecapacitytoreasoncangiveusknowledgeofthingsastheyreallyare.Fortheempiricists,all our knowledge of the world arises fromsenseperceptions(eitherdirectlyorindirect-ly)andisconstructedoutoftheelementsofsensation.” See: George Lakoff, Marc John-son, Metaphors We Live By, University ofChicagoPress,Chicago1980,p.195.

10

“Metaphoricalmapping” isperhapsbestun-derstood as “in themathematical sense of asetoforderedpairs,where the first elementofeachpair is fromthesourcedomain,andthe second is from the target domain.” See:Ray Jackendoff, David H. Aaron, “Reviewof More than Cool Reason:A Field Guideto Poetic Metaphor by George Lakoff andMark Turner”, Language 67 (2/1991), pp.320–338, p. 335, footnote. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/415109.

11

Cf.George Lakoff, Rafael ENúñez,Where Mathematics Comes From. How the Embod-ied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being,Ba-sicBooks,NewYork2000.

12

G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By,p.3.

13

“… an important reason behind why cogni-tive linguistsstudylanguagestemsfromthe

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199738632.001.0001https://doi.org/10.2307/415109



AsitisclearfromAristotle’sRhetoric,14thereasonwhyevenancientrhetoricencouragedusingmetaphorsinpublicspeecheswastheawarenessthatpeo-pleordinarilyconverseinmetaphorsasmuchasindirectorpropertermsforthings.Byappropriatingsuchcharacteristicsofconversationallanguagetheoratorwillsoundnaturalandachieveagoodoratoricalstyle.That“metaphorsarepervasiveineverydayspeech”isinsofarnodiscoveryofthelate20thcen-turydisciplineofcognitivelinguistics.Ontheotherhand,thatdistinguishedpoetsandrhetoriciansandnotcommunicationonthestreetsandmarketplacesweretraditionallyregardedassourcesofclearandexemplaryuseofmeta-phors,isonlyunderstandable.Toassumethecontrarywouldbetoexpectthatevenscholarsbeforeushadtofollowtheenterpriseofcognitivelinguisticsasifitsviewswereuniversallyself-evidentanditsmethodsandgoalsself-sup-porting,andnotmoreoverarisingfromveryspecifichistoricalandculturalcircumstancescoupledwithtechnologicaldevelopmentandscientifictrends.Theseriousdivergentpointofcognitivelinguistics,however,istheembodi-ment hypothesis.Incognitivescience,whoseconstituentdisciplineiscogni-tive linguistics, ithasvariousmore-or-lesscongruent formulationsandap-plications,buttheoneusedinLakoffandJohnson’sgroundworkisofspecialinterestforourtopic.AccordingtoTimRohrer,itcouldbedescribedas“astrongdirectionalityconstraintonmetaphoricalmappings”:

“…theyclaimthatwenormallyprojectimage-schematicpatternsofknowledgeunidirection-allyfromamoreembodiedsourcedomaintounderstandalesswellunderstoodtargetdomain.”[emphasisLj.F.Ježić].15

Inotherwords,theyclaimthatweunconsciouslystructureandhenceunder-stand theconceptuallymoreabstract in termsof theconceptually (i.e.per-ceptually)moreconcreteorembodied.Inthewayweunderstandthingsandaffairsthereisthereforeanasymmetricmappingorunidirectionaldetermina-tionofexperientialdomains,e.g.theemotionalortheabstractintermsofthephysicalorthespatial.Theymaketheirclaimwithrecurrentrecoursetotheordinaryuseof (theEnglish) language.Theirownlinguisticexampleswillthusbestservetoelucidatetheirclaim.ForLakoff and Johnson, the concept INdirectly emerges fromour spatialexperience,e.g.“Harry is in thekitchen”.Theuseof thisconcept inotherdomainsofourexperience,e.g.socialandemotional,ishowevermetaphori-cal,aswhenonesays“HarryisintheElks(abasketballteam)”,or“Harryisinlove”.16Thisdoesnotmeanthatphysical(spatial),socialandemotionalexperiencesarenotequallybasic,onlythatthelattertwoare–forspeakersofEnglishatleast–structuredthroughtwometaphoricalconceptsintermsoftheformer:SocialGroupsAreContainersandEmotionalStatesAreContain-ers,respectively.

“Theword‘in’andtheconceptINarethesameinall threeexamples;wedonothavethreedifferentconceptsofINorthreehomophonouswords‘in’.WehaveoneemergentconceptIN,onewordforit,andtwometaphoricalconceptsthatpartiallydefinesocialgroupsandemotionalstates.What thesecasesshowis that it ispossible tohaveequallybasickindsofexperiencewhilehavingconceptualizationsofthemthatarenotequallybasic.”17

As we see, the “conceptualization” of someone’s membership in a socialgroupandofsomeone’semotionalstateisgroundedinahuman-specificcon-ceptemergingfromahuman-specificperceptionofsomeone’spresenceinaboundedspace(e.g.aroom).Thereasonisthatthelatterhasaclearboundaryorimageschema(in-out)theformertwolack.18Thisconclusionconcerningthedirectionofhumanunderstanding(metaphoricalmapping)isdrawnfrom



(aninterpretationof)linguisticdata,i.e.thewaywethinkfromthewaywespeak.Sincemetaphorsarepervasiveinoureverydayspeech,theyalso,ac-cordingtothisaccount,determinethewaywethink.Thisaffectsnotonlyordinarypeopleineverydayconversations,butalsothemostdistinguishedthinkersintheirabstractreasoning.InthesecondpartofPhilosophy in the Flesh (1999)LakoffandJohnsonwereeagertoshowhowand which metaphors directed or even predetermined the scope and limitsof the philosophical views of the Presocratics, Plato,Aristotle, Descartes,Enlightenmentthinkers,Kant’sethics,modernanalyticthinkers,andNoamChomsky–withoutanyofthesebeingawareofthemetaphorsatwork!ForLakoffand Johnson, this is sobecausemetaphorsarenot amatterofhowwespeak,butamatterofhowourunconsciousconceptualsystemfunctions.Theyholditevidentthatpriortoempiricalinvestigationsintothecognitiveunconsciousbasedontheembodied-mindhypothesisnothinkercouldhavehadaninsightintothatsystem.Boththecognitivisthypothesisandmethodol-ogy,andthecorrespondingempiricalinvestigations,werelacking.

“Traditional methods of philosophical analysis alone, even phenomenological introspection,cannotcomeclosetoallowingustoknowourownminds.”19

assumptionthatlanguagereflectspatternsofthought. Therefore, to study language fromthis perspective is to study patterns of con-ceptualisation. Language offers a windowinto cognitive function, providing insightsinto the nature, structure and organisationof thoughts and ideas.”See:Vyvyan Evans,MelanieGreen,Cognitive Linguistics: An In-troduction,EdinburghUniversityPress,Edin-burgh2006,p.5.Also:“Weviewlanguageasprovidingdata thatcanleadtogeneralprin-ciples of understanding.The general princi-plesinvolvewholesystemsofconceptsratherthanindividualwordsorindividualconcepts.Wehavefoundthatsuchprinciplesareoftenmetaphoricinnatureandinvolveunderstand-ingonekindofexperienceintermsofanotherkindofexperience.”See:G.Lakoff,M.John-son,Metaphors We Live By,p.116.

14

Thesupportingcitation(Rhet.1405a)ispro-videdlaterinthispaper,inthestandardtrans-lationundertheeditorshipofDavidRoss.

15

TimRohrer,“EmbodimentandExperiential-ism”,in:D.Geeraerts,H.Cuyckens(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics,pp.25–47,p.29.doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199738632.013.0002.

16

G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By,p.59.

17

Ibid.,p.60.

18

Image schemas,atermcoinedbyLakoffandJohnson in 1987, can be defined as “recur-ringpatternsofoursensory-motorexperience

bywhichwemake senseof that experienceandreasonabout it,andthatcanalsobere-cruited to structure abstract concepts and tocarry out inferences about abstract domainsofthought.”See:MarcJohnson,“ThePhilo-sophicalSignificanceofImageSchemas”,in:BeateHampe(ed.),From Perception to Mean-ing: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics,MoutondeGruyter,Berlin2005,pp.15–33,p.17.doi:https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110197532.1.15.AsanticipatorsoftheirideaJohnsonnames(p.15)ImmanuelKant,MauriceMer-leau-Ponty,WilliamJames,andJohnDewey.HowKantscholarshipandcognitivelinguis-ticsmaybothbenefitfromadetailedcompar-isonofKant’s“transcendentalschemata”andcognitivist “image schemas” is examined inthisjournalissuebyDanielaKatunar&IgorEterović,“Kant’sNotionof theSchemaandItsBasisinLinguisticAnalysis”.

19

The statement is elaborated on the two fol-lowingpages:“Thecognitiveunconsciousisvastandintricatelystructured.Itincludesnotonly all our automatic cognitive operations,butalsoallourimplicitknowledge.Allofourknowledge and beliefs are framed in termsofaconceptualsystemthatresidesmostlyinthe cognitive unconscious. Our unconsciousconceptual system functions like a ‘hiddenhand’ that shapes how we conceptualize allaspectsofourexperience.Thishiddenhandgives form to the metaphysics that is builtintoourordinaryconceptualsystems.(…)Itconstitutes our unreflective common sense.Whatisstartlingisthat,evenforthesemostbasicofconcepts,thehiddenhandoftheun-consciousmindusesmetaphor todefineourunconscious metaphysics – the metaphysicsusednotjustbyordinarypeople,butalsobyphilosopherstomakesenseoftheseconcepts.

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Asaconsequence,“philosophicaltheoriesarelargelytheproductofthehid-denhandofthecognitiveunconscious”.20

Oneand,ifonlyitweretrue,far-reachingexamplemaysufficeforillustra-tion.ForLakoffandJohnson,Aristotlegaveaclassicalformulationof“con-tainerlogic”whichformsthebasisofallsubsequentformallogic,butwhichisitselfsimplyaconsequenceofthemisleadinghiddenmetaphorCategoriesAreContainers(fortheirmembers):

“…AristotleacceptedthemetaphorEssenceIsForm.Asaresult,hissyllogisticlogicisaformallogic.Itisalogicofspatialcontainmentthatismetaphoricallyapplied,viathemetaphorthatCategoriesAreContainers,toallcategories,regardlessoftheirspecificcontent.Itistheformofthesyllogismthatmakesitvalid,regardlessofitscontent.Thisidea,thatlogicisuniversalandformalandindependentofallcontent,hascomedowntousincontemporaryformallogic.”21

TheirclaimisthatAristotlethoughtofpredication(i.e.categorization intheAristoteleansense)intermsofspatialcontainmentviaimageschemashewasunawareof.OnemayperhapsarguethatitwasalreadyAristotlewhogavethebasisforthesettheorydeveloped22centurieslater.ThisclaimseemstobesupportednotonlybytheplacefromAristotlethatLakoffandJohnsoncite,22butalsobythelastbooksofMetaphysics.However, thatthereisanimageschemacalledcontainer,andthatAristotleuseditunawareofwhathewasdoing,ishighlyquestionable.23Independentlyoftheinterpretativeoutcome,theissueamountstowhetherwedifferentiatebetweenlogicalformsandtheir(intuitive/graphical)representations,e.g.inVenndiagrams,ornot,confound-ingthemsothatoneofthetwomaybereducedtotheother.InLakoffandJohnson’scase:TheAristotelianlogicalrelationsbetweentermsinuniversalpropositionsisreducedtorelationsofspatialcontainmentbetweenobjectsinspace.WiththeaidoftheevolutionisticexplanationsLakoffandJohnsonarefondof, thereductionwouldgoall thewaydowntosensory-motor“infer-ences”weimaginetobepresentin“lower”animals.24

IfLakoffandJohnson’spositionwereputintermsfromthebeginningofourpaper,wemaysaythatthelanguagewespeakpartiallydetermineshowwethinkandactonthelevelofconsciousintention,andismostlydeterminedbyor reflectshowour conceptual systemworkson theunconscious level.Ontheotherhand,abetterunderstandingofthisunconsciouslevelcomingfrom the cognitivist exploration of, inter alia, language and its metaphori-calexpressions,couldperhapsenableustobettermanipulateotherswithits“hiddenhand”,or,statedmorepositively,tointentionallyimprove(partiallydetermine)howweandothersthinkofor“conceptualize”certainphysical,social,political,economicormentalphenomena.25

The second question: creating non-conventional meanings and expressions as cases of metaphorization and verbalization

Wemaynowmoveontothesecondquestionwhichfallsintotwosubques-tions:a)Howdoweascribenewornon-conventionalmeaningstoconven-tionalexpressions,andb)howdoweusenon-conventional(i.e.not-yet-con-ventional) expressions to express our own original insights, thoughts andfeelings?Originalthoughts,feelingsandinsightsoftenrequireoriginallinguisticex-pressionsortheoriginaluseofconventionallinguisticexpressions.Becausespeakers of a language areunequally consciousof its nature and structure(howitisbuiltandhowcanitbefurtherdeveloped),andbecausethey,more-over,donothavethecognitiveandaestheticneedsthatgobeyondthearray



ofconventional linguisticexpressionsandphrases,onlysomeof themwilluseitcreativelyandtherebyenhancethepotentialtoexpressawiderrangeofmeaningsinthecommonlanguage.Thisisthusanissueofspecialimportanceforcreativepoets,philosophers,mysticsandscientists,whotrytoverbalizeexperiences, thoughtsor insightswhich arepresent in their consciousness,but are not straightforwardly communicable by available linguistic means.Sinceallconventionalsignswerenon-conventionalonce,answeringthesec-ondsubquestioncangiveussomeideaofwhatitmayhaveoriginallylookedliketogivethefirstnamestothings.Astraightforwardanswertothefirstsubquestion(2a)wouldbe:thishappensmostlythroughtheconsciousandconstructiveuseofmetaphor,metonymy,and,moregenerallyspeaking,symbols.Itthereforeraisesthequestionastothenatureofmetaphorization anditsuseinsymboliccognition.Thecasedenotedbythesecondsubquestion(2b)isperhapsbestexemplifiedbytheinnovativeuseoflanguageinphilosophy,whichIwillcallverbaliza-tion.That the latterwas regardedby JohnsonandLakoff inPhilosophy in

Aswewillsee,whatcountsasan‘intuitive’philosophical theory is one that drawsuponthese unconscious metaphors.” See: G. La-koff, M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh,p.12.

20

Ibid.,p.14.

21

Ibid.,p.382.

22

Theplaceatstake is foundat thebeginningofPrior Analytics,24b28–30.See:“Foronetermtobewhollycontainedinanotheristhesameasfor the latter tobepredicatedofalloftheformer.”Aristotle,The Categories, On Interpretation,Prior Analytics, translatedbyHughTredennick,HarvardUniversityPress,Harvard1938.Theword“contained”isseem-inglypointingtocontainerasanimagesche-maAristotle uses.A more literal translationwouldbe:“Thatonetermisinthewholeoth-eristhesameasthatonetermispredicatedofallof theother.”AnAristotelianexamplecouldbe:thatanimalnatureispresentinthewholeofhorsekind(ormankind)isthesameasthatanimalityispredicatedofallhorses(ormen),i.e.“Allhorses(ormen)areanimals.”Containerlogicviaimageschemas?

23

Aristotle used the phrase “is predicated of”(κατηγορεῖσθαι) interchangeably with “be-longs/applies to” (ὑπάρχειν). One couldthereforeequallyargue thatheconceivedofpredicationintermsofbelonging.Moreover,Aristotle regularly used symbolic presenta-tionsforhissyllogismswithcapitalletters(A,B,C,etc.)standingas(abstract)variablesforconcreteterms.“Logicisnotascienceaboutmenorplants,itissimplyapplicabletotheseobjectsjustastoanyothers.Inordertogetasyllogismwithinthesphereofpurelogic,we

must remove from the syllogisms that whatmaybecalledmatter,preservingonlyitsform.This was done byAristotle, who introducedlettersinsteadofconcretesubjectsandpredi-cates.”See:JanLukasiewicz,Aristotle’ Syllo-gistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic,Clarendonpress, Oxford21957,p.2.

24

“Reason is evolutionary, in that abstractreasonbuildsonandmakesuseof formsofperceptual and motor inference present in‘lower’animals.TheresultisaDarwinismofreason,arationalDarwinism:Reason,eveninits most abstract form, makes use of, ratherthantranscends,ouranimalnature.”See:G.Lakoff,M.Johnson,Philosophy in the Flesh,p.4.

25

Couldconstrainsposedonour languageusethrough,e.g., thepolicyofpolitical correct-ness affects our society’s views on relatedaffairs and corresponding inherited values?An example of a new metaphor Lakoff andJohnsongiveinMetaphors We Live By (1980,p. 139) isLove Is aCollaborativeWorkOfArt.Theexplanationofthisphenomenonrunsasfollows(p.145):“Newmetaphorshavethepowertocreateanewreality.Thiscanbegintohappenwhenwestart tocomprehendourexperienceintermsofametaphor,anditbe-comesadeeperrealitywhenwebegintoactin termsof it. If anewmetaphorentersourconceptual system that we base our actionson, it will alter that conceptual system andthe perceptions and actions that the systemgivesriseto.Muchofculturalchangearisesfrom the introduction of new metaphoricalconceptsandthelossofoldones.Forexam-ple,theWesternizationofculturesthroughouttheworldispartlyamatterofintroducingtheTIME ISMONEYmetaphor into those cul-tures.”



the Flesh(1999)asaproductofthesubconsciousmetaphoricalmind,i.e.asanotherinstanceofmetaphorization,wasintroducedearlierinthispaper.Inthefollowingonlymydifferingaccountwillbesketched.Inordertogiveananswertothesecondquestioninbothofitsparts,Ithinkweneedtomakeadistinctionwhichistodayoftenoverlooked.Itssimplestlinguistic expression lies in the difference between concepts and (intuitiveandimaginative)representations.26Theorderwefindincorporatedintocon-ventionallinguisticexpressionsisprimarilytheorderofhumanintuitiveandimaginativerepresentation.Languageandlinguisticexpressionsshowus,forthemostpart,howweashumansrepresent(oroncerepresented)theworldtoourselvesthroughourimaginationandhowwepresent(oroncepresented)ourexperienceswiththeworldthroughlinguisticsignstoothers.However,itneitherdirectlyshowshowweconceivetheworldnorhowweconstructit inour thoughts.Thisstatementholdsforusbothas individualsandasalanguagecommunity.Asanexampleofhowalinguisticexpressionofanabstractreligiousorphilo-sophicalconceptmayclearlypointtotheoriginalrepresentationalmodeofthoughtthroughwhichtheconceptwasgraduallyreachedandlinguisticallypresented,wemaytakethenounspirit.AlthoughitsoriginallymeaninginLat-inwas“breathing”and“breath”(Latinspiritus fromapossiblyonomatopoeicverbspirare “toblow”,27analogoustotheOldGreekπνεῦμα“wind,breathedair,spirit”fromπνέω“tobreathe,blow”,andanalogoustotheCroatianduh “spirit”relatedtoduhati “toblow(ofmouthandofwind)”anddah “breath”),ithastakenearlyon,undertheinfluenceofStoicphilosophy,themeaningofanaerialbutintelligentanddivineall-pervadingactiveprinciple,andlateron,undertheinfluenceofJewishandChristianSacredScripturesandtheology,themeaningof the thirddivinehypostasisof theTrinity (“HolyGhost”or“HolySpirit”asSpiritus Sanctus).Despite thelinguisticformationof theirexpression,neitherthephilosophicalconceptofspirit,asinHegel’sPhenom-enology of Spirit (GeistinGerman),northetheologicalconceptof theHolySpirit, are conceived of as metaphors or metaphoric concepts.And we donot,hopefully,takerecoursetotheconceptofphysicalbreathinginordertorightlyconceptualizethem.28JustashowinChristianiconographythedepic-tionoftheHolySpiritasdovedoesnotsuggestweoughttoconceptualizetheHolySpiritasamemberofthisbirdspecies,butservesasahandysymbolicrepresentation(anicon)ofanotherwisenon-depictableconcept,sodoesthelinguisticexpression“HolySpirit”symbolicallypointtoanon-representableconceptofaspiritualbeingviaanoriginalrepresentationofbreathorbreeze.That this concepthasbeen symbolically representedby thebreathand thedoveratherthan,say,bybodyodourandavulture,showsthatsomemotiva-tionliesbehindaspecificcouplingof linguisticor iconicexpressionswithconcepts.Theyarenotautomaticallyorrandomlycoupledbyourcognitiveunconscious,butchosenwithawarenessandforethought.29

Wecouldalsoquestionwhetheretymologicallyrelatedterms,suchasartistic inspirationorexpiry date,areintoday’susageconceivedofasmetaphorsormetaphoricconcepts,althoughtheirformationsupposesametaphoricexten-sionfromtheiroriginalmeanings“breathingin”and“breathingout”,respec-tively.The termconcept(ion) itself, aswell as itsconceptualbrethrenperception,comprehension,andapprehension,apparentlyalloncepassedametaphoricalextension fromsomemeaningofphysical collectingorgrasping tooneofmentalgrasping.Asfarasweknow,theywerenotservedbyour“cognitive



unconscious”(e.g.LakoffandJohnson’smetaphoricconceptUnderstandingIsGrasping),butbyancientGreekphilosophy,atleastsincetheStoics.30Cic-eroevenreportshowZenoofCitium,thefounderoftheStoicschool,usedtodescribewhatcomprehensionisbyagestureofaclosedfist,andthatthenamewasinfactchosenbyresemblancetothisnon-verbaldemonstrationofaclosedfist.31Anunconsciouslyworkingmetaphor?Itdoesnotseemtobeoneoriginally,andeventodayonlywell-educatedspeakersareawareoftheLatinetymologyandexactmeaningofthesefourterms.Theirorigininhis-

26

In Greek (approximately): ἔννοια andφαντασία; in Latin: conceptus and visum (Cicero)orrepraesentatio (later);inGerman:Begriff and anschauliche or eingebildete Vorstellung (viz.Anschauung orEinbildung).

27

“Possiblyanonomatopoeicformationimitat-ingthesoundofbreathing.Therearenodirectcognates.”See:MichieldeVaan,Etymologi-cal Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2008, p.581. Cf. alsoAlfred Ernout,Alfred Meillet,Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latin,Klincksieck,Paris2001,p.642.

28

Ifanythingismetaphoricaboutthem,itistherepresentationalshiftstilldiscerniblebehindtheirlinguisticformation.Undertherepresen-tationofbreathandairafittingsymbolwasfoundforaspiritualbeing.Incasethewordspirit was in fact formed by onomatopoeicimitationofthesoundofbreezeorbreathing,itcouldhonourablystandforasuccessstorya linguistic sign may only hope to acquire:fromitshumblebeginningsofimitatingnatu-ralsoundstothepeakofitscareerindenotingthehighestconceptsofphilosophyandtheo-logy.Interestingly,aparallel“success”inIn-diancultureandphilosophywasachievedbythe Sanskrit term ātman-. Originally mean-ing“breath”(cognate to,e.g.,GermanAtem “breath”),itacquiredthevenerablemeaning“Self”inthephilosophicalsystemofAdvaitaVedanta (theSelfwhich is alsoBrahmanorGod,eitherinfullnon-dualismofŚaṅkara, orin “qualified non-dualism” of Rāmānuja).Theintermediatemeaningwas“soul”,whichcould also be used as a reflexive pronoun(“self”).

29

LakoffandJohnsonconsiderthisiconograph-ic symbol,aswellasallother“culturalandreligioussymbolism”,asaspecialcaseofme-tonymybecausethedove’snaturalhabitatisthesky,andtheskymetonymicallystandsforheaven,thenaturalhabitatoftheHolySpirit.See: G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By,p.40.

30

Cicero not only translated Plato’s Timaeus,butalsocoinedphilosophical terms inLatin

aftertheGreekmodel.Hethusconsequentlyused the Latin comprehensio to stand for avery prominent Stoic epistemological termκατάληψις, both of them having verbs de-notingsomeact(s)ofgraspingin theirroots(com-prehendere and κατα-λαμβάνω). “…concipiō (=συλλαμβάνω):contenir, recueil-lir;spécialementconcipere sēmina,Cic.,Diu.2, 10, 26, etc., d’où ‘concevoir’ (sens phy-sique et moral, concipere animō, Cic., Leg.1, 59); conceptiō (depuis Cic. technique) =σύλληψις,M.L.,2115(…)Laplupartdecesverbessontaccompagnésdenomsouadjec-tifs dérives en -tus, -tiō, -tor (-trīx), -tīcius,-tīuus, formés vraisemblablement sur lesmodèlesgrecsen-ληψις,-ληπτός,-ληπτικός,quiappartiennentpresquetousàdeslanguestechniques (droit, grammaire ou rhétorique,philosophie) et n’apparaissent guère avantCicéron.” See: A. Ernout, A. Meillet, Dic-tionnaire étymologique de la langue latin,p.96.TheLatinapprehensio seemstobemod-elledafterGreekἀντίληψις.

31

“Yes, but you deny that anyone knows any-thing, except the wise person. Zeno used todemonstrate this with gestures [gestu confi-ciebat].Whenhehadputhishandoutflatinfronthimwithhisfingersstraight,hewouldsay: ‘An impression is like this [visum hu-ius modi est].’ Next, after contracting hisfingers a bit: ‘Assent is like this [adsensus huius modi].’ Then, when he had bunchedhis hand up to make a fist [Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat], hewouldsaythatthatwasan‘apprehension’or‘grasp’[conprensio/comprehensio].(Thisimagealsosuggested thenamehegave to it,katalêpsis [lit.‘grasp’],whichhadn’tbeenusedbefore.)[qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat,κατάληψινimposuit]Finally,whenhehadputhislefthandontop,squeez-inghisfisttightwithsomeforce,hewouldsaythat scientific knowledge [scientia] was likethat:astatenonebutthewiseenjoyed(…).”See:Cicero,On Academic Scepticism, trans-latedbyCharlesBrittain,HackettPublishingCompany, Indianapolis, Cambridge 2006, p.84 (II.145). For the (inserted) Latin text s.AnthonyA.Long,DavidN.Sedley,The Hel-lenistic Philosophers,vol.2,Greek and Latin Texts With Notes and Bibliography, Cam-bridgeUniversityPress1987,p.254(41A).



toryofphilosophyispresentinthemindsofevenfewerscholars.Ofcourse,onecouldstillhearasentencelike“Icouldn’tgrasphisargument.”32Andthisexpressionmaybeconnectedtothefourmentionedabove.Nevertheless,fortoday’sordinaryspeakersofEnglishtheexpressioncouldhardlybe“trans-ferred”(i.e.metaphorical)fromtheoriginalmeaninginthephysicaldomainofourexperience,asitpresumablymighthavebeenforthosewhointroducedittothearrayofmeaningsexpressiblebyconventionallinguisticsigns.Itnowfunctionsas(ifitwerealways)ahandyliteralexpressionfortwomeanings:physicalgraspingandmentalgrasping(comprehension),dependingonthein-tentionofthespeaker,andthecontextoftheutterance.Sincebothexperiencesofgraspingareimmediateandbasic,onecanhardlygiveprioritytooneovertheother.Todothiswouldrequiresomeinterpretation,andthisinterpretationwoulddependonanexplicitorimplicitphilosophicalpositionorworld-view.Anaturalistandanevolutionistcouldclaim,asLakoffandJohnsonregularlydo, thatphysicalgrasping is thesourcedomainandmentalgrasping is thetargetdomain, thefirstenablingnaturallyevolvedbeingscalledhumanstostructureandconceptualize thesecond.Anidealistcouldclaimexactly theopposite.33Heorshecouldevengrantthatinthisorsomeotheranalogouscasethedenotationinthephysicalandempiricaldomainprecededthatinthepurelymentalorabstractdomain(accordingtothedevelopmentofourunder-standinginthetemporalorder),andstillclaimthatthelogicalorconceptualordergoestheotherwayaround.Anundevelopedbutverbalizedrepresenta-tionofanexternalobject(e.g.apyramid)couldbothlogicallypresupposeandbydevelopmentbe resolved intopurely intuitiveandconceptualstructures(e.g.geometricalandlogical).Moreover,ourconsciousnesshasprecedenceoveranypossibleobjectofconsciousness.Howwillitdeterminethedirec-tionalityofmetaphoricalextensionsorevenmappings?Bytheprincipleofcommonsense?Technicalutility?Profitabletrendsinthescientificcommu-nity?Orbythetruthfulnessandbestinsightreachedsofar?Thereisalsoathirdpossibilityinthisdirectionalityquestion,anditwashint-edatbysomecriticsofcognitivelinguistics:“…itisjustasplausibletosupposethatspace,time,andotherconceptsareorganizedbyacom-monsetofabstractprinciplesthataresimplymoretransparentinspatiallanguagethaninotherlinguisticdomains(…).”34

Thecharacterization“transparent”shouldalsoremindusthatspatialdetermi-nationsaremoredirectlyrepresentableinourintuitionandimaginationthantemporaldeterminations, letalonethosewhicharepurelyconceptual(onlyintelligible).Assuch,spatialdeterminationscouldnaturallyservetorepresentnotonlytheirownbutalsosomemoreabstractmentalstructures(commontotwoormoredomains).Thiswouldhaveanimmenseeffectonourlanguageif,accordingtotheabovehypothesis,linguisticexpressionsdirectly(viz.fromtheirformalside)showhowwe(once)represent(ed)theworldtoourselvesthroughimagination,andnothowwe(now)thinkofitorconceptualizeit.Therefore,even though“acommonsetofabstractprinciples”mayberep-resentedinlanguageintermsofspatialdeterminations,itisnotnecessarilyderivedfromthelatter.Itcouldconsistofconceptualstructurescommontoheterogeneousdomains.Thispossibilitywasexcellently(clearlyandshortly)explainedintheearly1790sbytheearlyPost-KantianHumeanscepticSalomonMaimoninadis-cussionwiththeBerlinscholarandacademicJohannGeorgSulzer.Linguisticexpressionswhichareapt fordenotingheterogeneousdomains, anddesig-natetranscendentalconcepts,weretermedbyhimtranscendental expressions



(Germantranscendentale Ausdrücke).SinceSulzer’sopinionabouttheper-vasivenessoftropes(metaphors)inlanguageisnotwithoutsimilaritytothepositionofcognitivelinguistics,35bothMaimon’scritiqueandhisownsolu-tionsoundveryrelevantandup-to-dateforourtopic.Thebulkoftheargu-mentisworthcitinginfull:

“Ineverylanguagethereare transcendentalexpressions, i.e.expressions thatarecommontobothmaterialandimmaterialthings,asforexample,themovementofthebodyandofthemind[Bewegung des Körpers und des Gemüts],grasping[fassen] abodyandgraspingathoughtandthe like.Further,weknowfrom thehistoryofhumandevelopment that sensible representa-tionsandconcepts(withrespecttoourconsciousness)precedeintellectualones.Fromthisweinferthatthesetranscendentalexpressionsareoriginallyandproperlyintended[bestimmt] forthedesignationofsensibleobjects,butsubsequentlydiverted[or:derived,German:abgeleitet]fromthisapplicationtodesignate thesuper-sensible; thisnotionis thesourceof theopinionabout the tropes that Imentionedabove.Bycontrast, I claim that, evenassuming thiswerecorrectwith respect to thehistoryofour cognitionandof itsdesignation (language), it stilldoesnotfollowfromthisassumptionthatthesetranscendentalexpressionsshouldnotbejustasproperlyusedforimmaterialthingsasformaterialthings,ormoreprecisely,thattheyshouldnotbeproperlyusedforthetranscendentalconceptcommontoheterogeneousthings(howeverIwillneveracceptthisassumption[ascorrectwithrespecttothehistoryofourcognition],sincethecognitionofparticularmatters[Materiellen] presupposesthecognitionofuniversalforms[Formellen], underwhichtheyaresubsumed,andthroughwhichtheircognitioniseffected).

32

“Take, for example, a metaphor like UN-KNOWN IS UP; KNOWN IS DOWN. Ex-amples are ‘That’s up in the air’ and ‘Thematterissettled.’Thismetaphorhasanexpe-rientialbasisverymuchlikethatofUNDER-STANDINGISGRASPING,asin‘Icouldn’tgrasp hisargument.’Withphysicalobjects,ifyoucangraspsomethingandholditinyourhands,youcanlookitovercarefullyandgeta reasonably good understanding of it. It’seasiertograspsomethingandlookatitcare-fullyifit’sonthegroundinafixedlocationthanifit’sfloatingthroughtheair(likealeaforapieceofpaper).”–Thismaybeacleverexplanation on their presuppositions. How-ever, if theirpresuppositionsarearbitraryordownrightfalse,thiscollectiveexplanationoftreelinguisticutterancesviaacommonexpe-riential basis is as arbitrary and artificial asanyad-hocexplanation,whichdoesnottakethe diachronic perspective into account: theetymology andhistoryof usageof such ex-pressions.

33

Cf.thequotefromHegelbelowinthisarticlewhere representations are said to be “meta-phorsforconcepts”.

34

Matthew S. McGlone, “Concepts as Meta-phors”, in: Sam Glucksberg (ed.), Under-standing Figurative Language. From Meta-phors to Idioms, Oxford University Press,Oxford2001,pp.90–107,p.103.

35

Sulzer’s views were much more moderatethan Lakoff and Johnson’s, but his follow-ing claim was still provocative enough for

Maimontoresponse:“Itcaneasilybeshownthatthegreatestpartofeverylanguagecon-sist of tropes, although most of them havelost their tropical force [tropische Kraft],andareregardedasproperexpressions.(…)What all tropes have in common is that theconceptorrepresentationwhichonewantstoevoke is not being evoked immediately, butthrough another concept or representation.Thisreplacementhappenseitheroutofneces-sity,becauseonedoesnothaveawordwhichwouldbethedirectexpressionofthematter,orintentionally.Outofnecessityonedenotesinvisiblethingsusingnamesofvisiblethings.However,assoonasonegetssomewhatusedtothesetropes,theylosetheirforceandfunc-tion as proper expressions. With regard toexpressionsgrasp[fassen],see[sehen],com-prehend[begreifen],represent to oneself[sich vorstellen], deliberate [erwägen], it comesveryrarelytoourmindthatthesearetropes.”See:JohannGeorgSulzer,AllgemeineTheo-rie der schönen Künste, vol. 2, Weidmann&Reich, Leipzig 1772, p. 811. Lakoff andJohnson also claim that metaphors pervadeourordinarylanguage,buttheydonotagreethat conventionalized metaphors lose theirmetaphoricvirtueandbecomeequaltoproperterms.“Thefactthattheyareconventionallyfixed within the lexicon of English makesthemnolessalive.”See:G.Lakoff,M.John-son, Metaphors We Live By, p. 55. Namely,wasting time,attacking positions (inanargu-ment),andgoing our separate ways (outofaloverelationship)arerespectiveconventionalexpressionsoftheallegedlylivemetaphoricalconceptsTime Is Money,Argument IsWar,andLoveIsaJourney.



Forexample,wecannotsaythatifinparadiseAdamfirstsawaredcherryandcalleditred,andthenaredappleandcalledthatredaswell,itfollowsthathefirstusedaprosaicexpression,andthenapoetic[expression],andthattheexpressionredisproperwithrespecttocherry,butim-proper(andhenceatrope)withrespecttoapple;infacttheexpressionreddoesnotmeancherryanymorethanitmeansapple;insteaditsignifieswhatiscommontoboth.Itisjustthesameinthefollowingcase.Movementmeanschangeofdeterminationsintime,butwiththedifferencethatinphysicalmovementboththedeterminationitselfanditschangeareouterspatialdetermi-nations;whereasinmentalmovementstheyareinnerrelations(ofidentityordifference).”36

What inMaimon’s timewasbeingdistinguished (in theAristotelean tradi-tion) as proper and improper expressions or terms, were, in other words,literalandtropic(viz.metaphoricormetonymic)expressions.Oneandthesameexpressionwasliteralforonemeaningandtropicforanother.Maimonwasfondofsystematicallyresolvingcross-domainormetaphoricexpressionsintotranscendentalconcepts,andmetonymicexpressionsintowhathecalled“rhetorical figures”, where one expression originally and properly belongstooneoftwomeanings,andisdivertedorderived(Germanabgeleitet)fromtheretotheother.Hisfirstexampleofwhatistheonlyrealtypeoftropeconcerningsingularex-pressionscanalsoserveasanillustrationofhowanewmeaningcanbegiventoanexpressionviametonymy.InGermanAbend signifiesboththetimeofthedaywhenthesunsets(“evening”),andthedirectionorregion(“theWest”,morecommonlytermedAbendland)inwhichthesunistobefoundbeforeitsets.Sincethetwodonothavesomethingcommontoboth(similarityorter-tium comparationis),37butonly“refertooneanotherandreciprocallyprovidedistinguishingmarksforoneanother”,onemeaningistheoriginalandproperandtheotherderivedandimproper.InMaimon’scleveraccount,inthiscasethetemporaldeterminationgivesitsexpressiontothespatial(directionalorgeographical)determination.38

ItisnoteworthythatinMaimon’sviewlanguagesdonotlackexpressionsforabstractconcepts,sincetranscendentalexpressionsarethemostabstract(be-ingidenticalfordifferentdomains),butoftenlackexpressionsforconcreteconcepts(moredeterminedthantranscendentalconcepts,andhenceconfinedtoonedomain).Wehave,e.g.,anexpressionformovementingeneral,butnotforphysicalormentalmovement!39AppliedtoLakoffandJohnson’sexampleoftheconceptINmentionedabove,wehaveacommonEnglishexpressionforspatialcontainment,groupmembership,andthepresenceofanemotionalstate(“tobeinlove”),butnotforeachoftheseseparately.Spatialcontain-ment may be the intuitively (sensibly) most perspicuous or transparent ofthethreeandhencethefirsttobeverbalized(linguisticallyrepresented).Butaretheothertwo,towhichtheexpressionisbeingmetaphoricallyextended(“transferred”), thereforeimproperlydenotedorconceptuallydependentonthefirstone?Inpassing,weshouldpointout thatMaimon’sconcernwithproperunder-standing anddistinguishingbetween tropes and transcendental expressionslies not within linguistic investigations per se, but in demonstrating in the“interestsof reasonand truemorality” thatexpressions for immaterialandpurelyintelligibleobjectsarenotimproperortropicalexpressionsdependenton those formaterial and sensibleobjects, and that therefore “imaginationdoesnottriumphoverreason”.40Wecouldsaythat,inprinciple,imaginationhasalwaysservedthepurposesofreasoninphilosophy,occasionalerrorsandabusesnotwithstanding.IntheAgeofEnlightenment,whichwasonitswaneinMaimon’stime,thisstillseemedtobeobvious.



Moretypicalexamplesfromcognitivelinguisticscanalsoclarifyhownewmetaphorsmaybringnewmeanings to linguisticutterances.ThearticleofPanther&Thornburginthissamejournalissuecitesaniceexampleofhowsuggestivemetaphorsmayhaveanemotionalandimaginativeimpactonpeo-ple’sapproach tosolvingasocial issue.Namely, thearticleofThibodoeauand Boroditsky (2011)41 which describes a psychological experiment inwhichthemetaphorCrimeIsaViruswassystematicallyusedtodescribetheincreasedcrimerateinonegroupofparticipantsandthemetaphorCrimeIsaWildBeastwassystematicallyusedforthesamepurposeinanothergroup.Thequestionofhowtoreducecrimeinthecitywasansweredbyparticipantsin the firstgroupbypointing to theneedofbetter education, reductionofpoverty,andsocialreform,andinthesecondgroupbydemandinglawen-forcement,apolice force,andprisonsentences.42Suchwas thesuggestiveforceof two imaginativeandemotionally saturated representationsevokedthroughsystematicallyrecurringmetaphoricexpressions!Weretheproblemofcrimeinthecityconceptualizedintheexactphilosophicalmeaningoftheterm,i.e.elevatedtoorresolved/formedintoaconcept(“afullmentalgrasp”,i.e.aclearanddistinctnotion),asavirusprobleminthefirstgroupandasawild-beastprobleminthesecondgroup,participantswouldprobablyaskforhelpfromvirologists,andfromzookeepers,huntersoranimalliberationists,respectively.Theythemselveswouldperhapsbeconsideredbypeopleoutsidethetwogroupsasinneedoflinguisticorevenmedicalassistanceforthink-ingthatcrimeisasortofvirusoraspeciesofwildbeastsjustbecauseitwas

36

SalomonMaimon,Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, translatedbyN.Midgley et al.,Continuum, London – New York 2010, pp.159–160. In thefirstGermanedition(1790)pp.306–307.

37

Thesimilarity(ὁμοιότης)betweenthemean-ingsoftheliteralandthe“transferred”(meta-phorical) expression is, even in Aristotle’sview, characteristic of metaphors because itisinaway,theconnectinglinkbetweenthesetwomeanings.“…ametaphormakesthesig-nified somehow [more] known through thesimilarity, for those who metaphorize [/usemetaphors/transferexpressionstonewmean-ings]alwaysdosoaccordingtosomesimilar-ity.”/ἡμὲνγὰρμεταφορὰποιεῖπωςγνώριμοντὸσημαινόμενονδιὰτὴνὁμοιότητα·πάντεςγὰρ οἱ μεταφέροντες κατὰ τινὰ ὁμοιότηταμεταφέρουσιν·Topica140a10–12(Aristotle,Posterior Analytics, Topica, translatedbyE.S. Forster (modified), Harvard UniversityPress,London1960.

38

S. Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Phi-losophy,p.163.Thateventhepropernamesof regionsandcountriesmaybegivenfroma similar principle, is clear from the namesAnatolia forAsiaMinor andNippon for Ja-pan.Thefirst,“the landfromwherethesunrises”,isgivenfromtheviewpointofancientGreeks (Gr. ἀνατολή from ἀνατέλλω “tocome/rise from”).The second, “Landof theRisingSun”, isgivenfromtheviewpointof

ancient China (although now also depictedontheJapanesenationalflag):日本Nihon or Nippon. Thecharacternichi(日)means“sun”or“day”,whereashon(本)means“base”or“origin”. Cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan (accessed on January 20, 2018). ThesameholdsfortheEnglishwordsorient andoccident,takenfromtheLatin.

39

S. Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Phi-losophy,p.161.

40

Ibid.,p.157.

41

PaulH.Thibodeau,LeraBoroditsky,“Meta-phors We Think With: The Role of Meta-phor inReasoning”,PLoS ONE 6 (2/2011):e16782. doi: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0016782.

42

Part of the conclusion of Thibodeau andBoroditsky (ibid.) is worth citing here: “…despite the clear influence of the metaphor,we found that participants generally identi-fiedthecrimestatistics,whichwerethesameforbothgroups,andnotthemetaphor,asthemost influential aspect of the report. Thesefindings suggest that metaphors can influ-ence how people conceptualize and in turnapproach solving an important social issue,even if people don’t explicitly perceive themetaphorasbeingespeciallyinfluential.”

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0016782



talkedaboutfigurativelyasifitwereavirusorawildbeast.Thiswouldbeacaseofconceptualconfusionatthemeetingpointofliteralandfigurativelanguage.Whatisatstakeinthisexampleareinfactnotdifferentconceptu-alizations,butratherdifferent“imaginativeemotionalizations”,i.e.differentemotionalengagementsofourimaginationinforminganattitudetowardtheproblemofincreasedcrimerateinthecity.43Finally,Iwillpointoutsomeattestedexamplesofaphilosophicallycreativeusageofavailablelinguisticmaterial,ofwhichsomeauthorsgiveusabundantexamples,e.g.PlatoandAristotle.WhenPlatoneededanexpressionforthehighestconceptswhichareconceivedasarchetypesofallphenomenaintheword,heusedtheexpressionἰδέα (idéa)orεἶδος (eîdos), meaningoriginally“sight”or the“visibleexternalshapeofsomething”,andafterwards“kind/species”,toexpressthatnewmeaning.WhenAristotleneededanexpressionsignifyingthematerialwhichreceivesitsshapetoformaconcreteobject,hegeneralizedthemeaningofthewordὕλη (hýlē) “wood”tocoverthemeaningofmaterialingeneral(aninstanceofsynecdocheorparsprototo).Heevenspeaksofπρώτηὕλη(prṓtē hýlē) “primarymatter”whichcanonlybegraspedbytheintellect!Anotherexampleisthetermοὐσία(ousía)derivedfromτὸὄν(tò ón)“being”andmeaning“thatbywhichsomethingorpersonsubsists”:itcanbeunderstoodinthematerialsenseas“property,possessions”,orintheconceptualsenseas“essence”.Sincephilosopherstrytofindouttheessenceofthings,ousía canbeunderstoodasdenotingtheanswertothequestionτίἐστι(tíesti) “Whatisit?”,sothisquestionwasusedbyAristotlemetonym-icallyinthenominalizedformτὸτίἐστι (tò tí esti) inthesamesenseasousía whichistheanswertothisquestion.Aristotlefamouslycoinedmanynewterms,someofwhichweredemandingbothlinguisticallyandphilosophically,andarehencegoodexamplesofwhatIhavecalledverbalization.Onesuchisἐντελέχεια(entelécheia),whichcouldbeparaphrasedintoitscompoundpartsasτὸἐντέλειἔχειν“tobeandpersistin (thenaturallypurpuseful) completion” (lit. “toholdoneself inoneself’sperfection”).Entelechy isthefinalormaturestateanaturalbeingbynaturetendstoattain,andbringsitinaprocess(alsocalledἐντελέχεια)frompotency(δύναμις,potentia) toactuality (ἐνέργεια,actus).The termwas sounusualandcomplextotheancientLatinwritersthatnosastisfactoryLatintranslationwasfoundabovethatofactionoractuality(actus),andtheuntranslatedtermentelechia wasalsoused.CiceroevenseemedtothinkthatAristotlegavethisactionthenameἐνδελέχεια“consistency”(quanda continuata motio et peren-nis)aswereitsomepreviouslyunnamed“fifthnature”thatthemind(mens)consistsof.44WhenHermolausBarbarusfinallyfoundasatisfyingtranslationinperfectihabia inthe15thcentury,arumouremergedthatheaskedtheDevilhimself“toremovetheconfusion”aroundthetermand“providehimwiththeexactequivalentinLatin”.45Suchwastheperceptionoftheperplexityofthetermcoinedbyanextraordinaryphilosophicalmind!Aristotlewashimselfawarethatmetaphorspervadeoureverydayspeechandhewasawareof theneed tocreate terminologyandways toachieve itbyusingmetaphors (although this is, admittedly,not alwaysevident fromhisextantwrittenjudgmentsconcerningmetaphor).“Inthelanguageofprose,besidestheregular[τὸκύριον]andproper[τὸοἰκεῖον]terms46forthings,metaphoricalterms[μεταφορὰ]onlycanbeusedwithadvantage.Thiswegatherfromthefactthatthese two classes of terms, the proper or regular and themetaphorical–theseandnoothers–are used by everybody in conversation[πάντεςγὰρμεταφοραῖςδιαλέγονται].Wecannowseethatagoodwritercanproduceastylethatisdistinguishedwithoutbeingobtrusive,andisatthesametimeclear,thussatisfyingourdefinitionofgoodoratoricalprose.”(RhetoricaΓII,6.;1404b32–36;emphasisandinterventionsLj.F.Ježić)47



“Further, in using metaphors to give names to nameless things [τὰἀνώνυμα],we must draw themnotfromremotebutfrom kindred and similar things [ἐκτῶνσυγγενῶνκαὶτῶνὁμοειδῶν],so that the kinship is clearly perceived as soon as the words are said.(…)Goodriddlesdo,ingeneral,provideuswithsatisfactorymetaphors:formetaphors imply riddles, and therefore a good riddle can furnish a good metaphor.” (RhetoricaΓ II, 12; 1405a33–35; emphasis andinterventionsLj.F.Ježić)48

Ihopethattheseexampleshaveillustratedsomewaysofthecreativeuseofconventionalandnewexpressionstocovernew,abstractandphilosophicallydemandingmeanings.Interestingly, theviewthat thecreationofphilosophical termsina langua-geusesametaphorizationofaccessiblelinguisticexpressionsandsomenewverbalizations,seemstobeempiricallyconfirmedbyPlutarch’sdescriptionofCicero’swayofcreatingLatinphilosophicalterminology:

“Hemadeithisbusinessalsotocomposeandtranslatephilosophicaldialogues,andtorenderintoLatin the several termsof dialectics andnatural philosophy; for he itwas, as they say,whofirst,orprincipally,providedLatinnamesfor‘phantasia,’‘synkatathesis,’‘epokhe,’and‘katalepsis,’aswellasfor‘atomon,’‘ameres,’‘kenon,’49andmanyotherslikethese,contriving partly by metaphors and partly by new and fitting termstomakethemintelligibleandfamiliar.”[emphasisLj.F.Ježić]50

Tosee,inaddition,howfarphilosopherscouldunderstandmetaphorsinadif-ferentwaythantheoneprevailinginlinguistics,letuslookatHegel’sremarkin§3ofhisEncyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences:

43

Itmaybeworthytonoteinpassingthatthisshowsthatourrelationshiptoavirusproblemismuchmorebenevolentlyandconstructivelyrationalthantoaproblemofwildbeasts.Con-frontedwiththefirst,wereact,sotosay,likeacultivatedphysician(howtocure),whilethesecondstillevokesareactionofanattackedcaveman(howtoovercomebyforce).

44

M.TulliusCicero,Tusculanae disputationes (ed. M. Pohlenz, 1918, Leipzig: Teubner),I.22(I,§10).

45

AsexplainedinLlyodStrickland,2014,Leib-niz’s Monadology. A New Translation and Guide,EdinburghUniversityPress,p.111.

46

Orperhaps:“theproperandthedomestic/na-tive/idiomatic terms”. Cf. the Latin transla-tionof the16th century rhetoricianAntonioRiccobono: “... proprium autem et domesti-cumettranslatiotantumprosuntadnudorumsermonum elocutionem. signum vero est,quod his solis omnes utuntur: omnes enimtranslationibusloquunturetdomesticisetpro-priis.”See:Aristotle,Aristotelis opera,EdiditAcademiaregiaBorussica,volumentertium:Aristoteles Latine interpretibus variis,GeorgReimer,Berlin1830,p.720.

47

Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle. Vol. IX: Rhetorica, translated by W. Rhys Roberts,ClarendonPress,Oxford1946.

48

ἔτιδὲοὐπόρρωθενδεῖἀλλ᾽ἐκτῶνσυγγενῶνκαὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰἀνώνυμα ὠνομασμένως ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλόνἐστινὅτισυγγενές (…)καὶὅλωςἐκτῶνεὖᾐνιγμένωνἔστιμεταφορὰςλαβεῖνἐπιεικεῖς:μεταφοραὶ γὰρ αἰνίττονται,ὥστε δῆλονὅτιεὖμετενήνεκται.See:Aristotle,The Works of Aristotle.

49

“In Latin, respectively, visum (conception),assensio (assent), assensionis retentio (with-holding of assent), comprehensio (percep-tion), individuum (atom), vacuum (void);‘ameres’ (indivisible),with itsLatinequiva-lent, does not occur in the extant works ofCicero(Gudeman).”

50

“ἐκεῖνος γάρ ἐστιν, ὥς φασιν, ὁ καὶ τὴνφαντασίαν καὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν καὶ τὴνἐποχὴνκαὶτὴνκατάληψιν,ἔτιδὲτὸἄτομον,τὸἀμερές,τὸκενὸν,ἄλλατεπολλὰτῶντοιούτωνἐξονομάσας πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα Ῥωμαίοις,τὰ μὲν μεταφοραῖς, τὰ δ᾽ οἰκειότησιν ἄλλαις γνώριμα καὶ προσήγορα μηχανησάμενος.”[emphasis Lj. F. Ježić]. See: Plutarch, Plu-tarch’s Lives, translated by Bernadotte Per-rin,Cambridge,London,HarvardUniversityPress,WilliamHeinemannLtd.,Ch.40.



“Sincethedeterminaciesoffeeling,ofintuition,ofdesire,ofwilling,etc.,aregenerallycalledrepresentations,insofarastheyareknown,itcanbesaidingeneralthatphilosophyputsthoughtsandcategories,butmorepreciselyconcepts,intheplaceofrepresentations.Representationsingeneralcanberegardedasmetaphors of thoughtsandconcepts.But tohaverepresentationsdoesnotmeantoknowtheirsignificanceforthinking,i.e.,tohavethethoughtsandconceptsofthem.Conversely,itisonethingtohavethoughtsandconcepts,andanothertoknowwhataretherepresentations,intuitions,andfeelingsthatcorrespondtothem.”51

Herewefindanexplicitand–consideringHegel’soverallphilosophyoftheself-developingidea–veryfittingexampleoftheviewpointmentionedaboveasgivingtheconverse logicalorderofmetaphoricalextension:representa-tions are metaphors for thoughts and concepts.Althoughthisclaimhasaspe-cialmeaningwithinHegel’ssystemofphilosophy,italsoholds,inasense,formostofWesternphilosophy.Imaginativerepresentationsandmodesofthink-ingareinterpretedorreplacedbyphilosophersbyamorepurelyconceptualwayofdealingwithsubjects,asfarasitgoes.Theyareusuallymuchmoreawareofthedifferencebetweenthetwothanotherpeople,andtheymakethistransitionwith intent.AsHegelalsopointedout in thequote, this includesanawarenessoftheneedtoknowwhichrepresentationscanstandfororarefittingforwhichconcepts.Thesearetheirsymbolseitherbyconvention,ormoreoverbysomenaturalmotivation.Howphilosophers“putconceptsinplaceofrepresentations”,regardingthelattertobesymbolsfortheformer,isperhapsbestillustratedbytheworkofPhiloofAlexandria,themostfamousandinfluentialJewishphilosopherofclassicalantiquity.Philoisthefirstthinkerknowntouswhosystematicallyinterpretedgreatportionsof thePentateuchasanallegoryof“Moses’phi-losophy”.Tobesure,fromourperspective,Philo’sMosesdrawsabundantlyon(mostly)Platonicand(sometimes)Stoicphilosophy.Nevertheless,Philo’swork excellently exemplifies how (Jewish religious) representations couldbethoughtofassymbolsfor(PlatonicandStoicphilosophical)concepts.LetuslookatsomeexamplesinhisAllegorical interpretation of Genesis II. and III.:52

“‘Andtheheavenandtheearthandalltheirworldwerecompleted.’(Gen.ii.1).(…)Forus-ingsymbolical languagehe[i.e.Moses]calls (συμβολικῶςκαλεῖ) themind(ὁνοῦς)heaven(οὐρανός),sinceheavenistheabodeofnaturesdiscernedonlybymind,butsense-perception(ἡαἴσθησις)hecallsearth(γῆ),becausesense-perceptionpossessesacompositionofamoreearthlyandbody-likesort. ‘World,’ in thecaseofmind(κόσμοςνοῦ),meansall incorporealthings,thingsdiscernedbymindalone(τὰἂσωματακαὶνοητὰπάντα):inthecaseofsense-perception(κόσμοςαἰσθήσεως)itdenotesthingsinbodilyformandgenerallywhateversenseperceives(τὰἐνσώματακαὶὅσασυνόλωςαἰσθητά).”(Alleg. interpr. I.1.)“‘AndGodplantedapleasaunce[i.e.pleasure-garden]inEdentowardthesun-rising,andplacedtherethemanwhomHehadformed.’(Gen.ii.8)(…)Virtueisfigurativelycalled‘pleasaunce,’(παράδεισοςμὲνδὴτροπικῶςεἴρηταιἡἀρετή)(…)ForGod,beinggoodandtrainingourracetovirtueastheoperationmostpropertoit,placesthemindamidvirtue,evidentlytotheendthatasgoodgardeneritmayspenditscareonnothingelsebutthis.”(Alleg. interpr. I.45–47.)

Anotherexample.OnPhilo’sallegoricalinterpretation,GodcreatedEveafterAdamintheMosaicaccountbecauseitformsalogicalsequencetocreatetheactualsense-perception(ἡκατ᾿ἐνέργειαναἲσθησις)afterthemind(νοῦς),sotheformermaybethehelperofthelatter.AndGodmadeEvewhenAdamwasasleepbecauseperceptionbeginswhenthemindhasfallenasleep(i.e.whenfullawareness,whichpreventstheinflowofimpressions,startstoretreat).53PhiloassumesthissymbolismofAdamandEvetobefurtherconfirmedbythemindbeinganactivefacultyandthesense-perceptionapassive(recep-tive)faculty,analogoustomanbeingsymbolicallyimaginedastheactivepart



andwomanasitspassivecounterpart.54Inordertobringbothofthemtogeth-erintheapprehensionofsensibleandintelligibleobjects,athirdwasneeded,“abondofloveanddesire,undertheruleanddominionofpleasure(ἡδονή),towhichtheprophetgavethefigurativenameofaserpent(συμβολικῶςὄφινὠνόμασε;lit.‘which/pleasure/hesymbolicallynamedserpent’)”.55

Concluding remarks

Painandpleasureorsorrowandthrillexpressthemselvesnaturallythroughinarticulatesounds.Themindexpressesitselfthroughlanguage.56However,themind’sarticulationthroughlanguagedoesnotmakeitindistinguishablefrom its own means of expression. It may be influenced by language, butcanalso influence it, enhance it, or even transcend it throughotherverbalandnon-verballinguisticandsymbolicmeansofcommunication.Masteringa language throughknowledgeandcreativeusagemakesusmoreresistanttoitspossiblesubconsciousinfluenceonourthoughtsandattitudes,and,ingeneral,moreconsciousoftheboundariesthelanguageweusesetsbeforeusincommunicationandcognition.Ameans toanend isnot tobemistakenwith theend itself. If thehumanlanguagehasevolvedtoservethecommunicativefunction,itmustbeabletoconveymeanings.Theseareformostpeople’sneedsandformostofthetimeexpressiblebyconventionallinguisticmeans.However,atothertimes,somepeople,especiallypoets,philosophers,scientists,andmystics,alsoneednon-conventionallinguisticmeans,eithertoconveyaseeminglywell-knownbutworn-outmeaningafresh,ortorenderanoriginalorcompletelynewmeaningexpressiblethroughtheirlanguage.Inthispapermanyexampleshavebeen

51

Translated from this original German text:“IndemdieBestimmtheitendesGefühls,derAnschauung, des Begehrens, des Willensusf., insofern von ihnen gewußt wird, über-hauptVorstellungengennantwerden,sokannimallgemeinengesagtwerden,daßdiePhi-losophie Gedanken, Kategorien, aber näherBegriffe andieStellederVorstellungensetzt. Vorstellungen überhaupt können als Meta-phern derGedankenundBegriffeangesehenwerden.Damit aber, daßmanVorstellungenhat, kennt man noch nicht deren Bedeu-tung fürdasDenken,d.h.nochnichtderenGedanken und Begriffe. Umgekehrt ist esauch zweierlei, Gedanken und Begriffe zuhaben, und zu wissen, welches die ihnenentsprechenden Vorstellungen, Aunschau-ungen, Gefühle sind.” See: Georg WilhelmFriedrich Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philoso-phischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse,Fe-lixMeiner,Hamburg71969.

52

Philo,Philo.Volume I. With an English Trans-lation F. H. Colston and G. H. Whitaker,MITPress,HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,London1929.

53

“Weare rationalbeings,on theonehandasbeingpartakersofmind,andontheotherhand

asbeingcapableofdiscourse.Well, there isanotherpowerorfacultyinthesoul,closelyakintothese,namelythatofreceivingsense-impressions (ἡ αἰσθητική), and it is of thisthattheprophetisspeaking[asofEve].Forhisimmediateconcernisjustthis,toindicatetheoriginofsense-perception.Andlogicalse-quenceleadshimtodoso.Foritwasrequisitethatthecreationofmindshouldbefollowedimmediately by that of sense-perception, tobeahelperandallytoit.(…)Howisit,then,produced?Astheprophethimselfagainsays,itiswhenthemindhasgonetosleepthatper-ceptionbegins,forconverselywhenthemindwakesupperceptionisquenched.”Philo,Al-leg. Interpr.,II.23–25

54

Philo,Alleg. interpr.,II.38–39.

55

Alleg. Interpr. II.71–72.

56

“Languageisa(…)non-instinctivemethodofcommunicating ideas, emotions, and desiresbymeansofasystemofvoluntarilyproducedsymbols.”See:EdwardSapir,Language. An Introduction to the Study of Speech, RupertHart-Davis,London1970,p.8.



presented of how philosophers found expression for their concepts, eitherthroughthe“transference”(metaphoricextension)ofconventionallinguisticexpressionstonewmeanings,orbycoiningnewtermsoutofavailablelin-guisticmaterial(“verbalization”).Asanewandprogressivescientificdisciplinewithincognitivescience,cog-nitivelinguisticshasbroadenedourhorizonsinthelastdecadesbynewandexcitingwaysofunderstanding languageandcognition,especially throughthelensofmeaning(cognitivesemantics).However,whenitmakespreten-sions toa fullandonlyviableexplanationofhumancognition,downplay-ingandreplacingphilosophy,variouserrorsmayoccur.Someerrorsontheconceptuallevel,withreferencestoblurredphilosophicaldistinctions,werediscussedinthispaper.Whennotspeakingmetaphorically(pars pro toto),conceptualizationcannotmeanformationofanykindofmentalrepresentation,buttheformationofacompletementalgrasp,i.e.ofaconcept.Literalandmetaphoricalexpressionsofalanguagedonotdirectlyshowushowtheirspeakersconceiveorconcep-tualizetheworld,butonly–andthroughparticularcases–howthey(once)57imaginativelyrepresentedtheworldthroughlanguageinordertocommuni-catetheirexperienceandcognitionofit.However,theseimaginativerepre-sentationscouldserveandhaveservedassymbolsforconcepts,whichfinallyenabledpeopletostructureandorderalloftheirexperiencesandknowledgeintocoherentwholes,bothinphilosophyandinspecialsciences.

Ljudevit Fran Ježić

Kako jezik i mišljenje utječu jedno na drugo?Razmatranje njihova odnosa uz usporedno

uključivanje povijesti filozofije i kognitivne lingvistike

SažetakU radu se istražuje odnos između jezika i mišljenja s obzirom na njihov mogući uzajamni utje-caj. Dva se pitanja uzimaju za ključna: kako učimo značenja konvencionalnih jezičnih znakova, uključno s onima za apstraktne pojmove, i kako izražujemo naše izvorne uvide, misli i osjećaje još nekonvencionaliziranim jezičnim sredstvima. Na pitanja se sažeto odgovara, a potom se odgovori razrađuju pomoću suprotstavljenih gledišta te jezičnih primjera iz povijesti filozofije i kognitivne lingvistike. Zastupa se stav da jezični izrazi, uključno s metaforama, pretežno u sebe ugrađuju kako si ljudi predočavaju (ili su nekoć predočavali) svijet uobraziljom i kako ga takva drugima jezično predstavljaju (ili su ga predstavljali). Jezik zato ne pokazuje izravno niti kako svijet poimamo i razumijevamo niti kako ga konstruiramo u svojem mišljenju. S druge strane, simbolizacija posredstvom metafore i metonimije te tvorba novih riječi i izraza (verbalizacija) omogućuju našoj spoznaji da priopći nova te apstraktna i filozofski zahtjevna značenja.

Ključne riječijezik,mišljenje,spoznaja,konceptualnametafora,verbalizacija,simboličkaspoznaja,Aristotel,Imma-nuelKant,filozofijakongnitivnelingvistike,GeorgLakoff,MarcJohnson



57

Adiachronicperspectiveinlinguisticsisnec-essaryifwearetounderstandtheoriginalandhencealsothepresentmeaningsoflinguistic

expressions,andingeneraltogainaninsightinto how language functions by looking athowitcomesintoexistenceandevolves.


Wie beeinflussen Sprache und Denken einander?Eine erneute Erwägung ihrer Beziehung mit parallelen

Bezugnahmen auf die Geschichte der Philosophie und kognitive Linguistik

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Artikel wird die Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Denken in Hinsicht auf ihren wech-selseitigen Einfluss untersucht. Zwei Fragen werden als besonders wichtig in Betracht genom-men: Wie lernen wir die Bedeutungen von konventionellen sprachlichen Zeichen, einschließlich derjenigen für abstrakte Begriffe, und wie drücken wir unsere originellen Einsichten, Gedan-ken und Gefühle durch noch-nicht-konventionelle Sprachmittel aus? Auf diese Fragen folgen komprimierte Antworten Antworten und danach längere Ausführungen auf der Basis von Bei-spielen aus der Geschichte der Philosophie und kognitiven Linguistik. Es wird argumentiert, dass sprachliche Ausdrücke, einschließlich Metaphern, die Art und Weise verkörpern, wie die Menschen die Welt durch Einbildungskraft sich vorstellen (oder vormals vorstellten) und – zum Behuf der Mitteilung – den anderen durch Sprachsymbole wiedergeben (oder vormals wieder-gaben). Die sprachlichen Ausdrücke zeigen daher unmittelbar weder wie wir die Welt begreifen und verstehen, noch wie wir sie in Gedanken konstruieren. Symbolisierung durch Metapher und Metonymie sowie kreative Verbalisierung unserer Erkenntnis, neue sowie abstrakte und philo-sophisch anspruchsvolle Bedeutungen zu vermitteln.

SchlüsselwörterSprache,Denken,Erkenntnis,konzeptuelleMetapher,Verbalisierung,symbolischeErkenntnis,Aris-toteles,ImmanuelKant,PhilosophiederkognitivenLinguistik,GeorgeLakoff,MarcJohnson


Comment la langue et la pensée s’influencent mutuellement ?Une reconsidération de leur relation avec références

parallèles à l’histoire de la philosophie et la linguistique cognitive

RésuméCe travail interroge le rapport entre le langage et la pensée sous l’angle de leur possible in-fluence mutuelle. Deux questions sont considérées comme centrales : comment fait-on l’ap-prentissage de la signification des signes langagiers, incluant également ceux qui se rapportent aux concepts abstraits ; et comment exprime-t-on nos idées originelles, pensées et sentiments à travers des outils langagiers encore non-conventionnels. Nous répondrons aux questions de manière concise, puis nous développerons nos réponses à l’aide de points de vue opposés et d’exemples de l’histoire de la philosophie et de la linguistique cognitive qui portent sur le langage. Nous défendons la position selon laquelle les expressions du langage, métaphores comprises, forgent en leur sein de façon essentielle la manière dont les gens se représentent (ou se représentaient autrefois) le monde à travers l’imagination, et la manière dont ils le présentent (ou le présentaient autrefois), à travers le langage, aux autres. Pour cette raison, le langage ne montre de manière directe ni le monde tel que nous le concevons et comprenons, ni tel que nous le construisons dans notre pensée. Toutefois, la symbolisation par le biais de la métaphore et de la métonymie, mais aussi la verbalisation, permettent à notre connaissance de communiquer des significations nouvelles ou abstraites et philosophiquement exigeantes.

Mots-cléslangage, pensée, connaissance, métaphore conceptuelle, verbalisation, connaissance symbolique,Aristote,EmmanuelKant,philosophiedelalinguistiquecognitive,GeorgeLakoff,MarcJohnson

how do language and thought influence each other?original paper udc 1:81(045) doi: 10.21464/sp32206...

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