PART VI

The Turning Point: Guadalcanal

CHAPTER 1

Background and Preparations ]

Scarcely had Admiral Yamamoto pulledhis Combined Fleet away from its defeat

at Midw’aybeforetheU. S.,Joint Chiefs ofStaff began reconsidering basic Pacificpolicy. They wanted an ~flensive whichwould aid containment of the Japanese ad-vances toward Australia and safeguard theU. S. communication lines to the Anzacarea. As early as 18 February, Admiral

‘ Unless otherwise noted the material used inPart VI is derived from 1st MarDiv FinalRept onthe Guadalcanal Operation, Phases I through V,issued June-August 1943, hereinafter cited as1,’tnalRept ( with Phase h’o) ; action reports, wardiaries, and journals of the various units whichserved with or as part of the 1st MarDiv; MarineAir Hi.storg; Strateyic Planni??q; W. F. Cravenand J. L. Cate (eds.), T1/e Pacific: Guadalcanatto Saipan—The Army Air Forces in Warld War11 (Chicago : L-niversityof ChicagoPress, 1%0) ;J. ~liller, Jr., Guudakx/nal: The First Offensioe—

.Vt~itcd States Arm?t ia World War II (Washin~-ton : HistDiv, 11~ 1949), hereinafter cited as.l[ilter, Guadalcanat; S. E, Morison, The Stru@c

{or Guadalcana l—Hi$tory of United States b’aval

Operations in World War II (Boston: Little,Brown and Company, 1950), hereinafter cited asStruggte for Guadalcanal; Capt H. L. Eferillat,The I.stand (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,1944 ), hereinafter cited as The Island; MaJJ. L.Zimmerman, Thc Guadalcanal Operatiw (Wash-ington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1949) ; VAdm R. Tanakawith R. Pineau, “Japan’s Losing Struggle forGuadalcanal,” two parts, USNI Proceedings, Julyand August 1956, Copyright 1956 by the U. S.Naval Institute, hereinafter cited as Tanaka

.4rticte. Specific citations of material, in addition

to direct quotations, taken from Fi.nalRept have

been noted where the information presented may

be of special interest.

Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief ofthe L’. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Opera-tions, told Chief of Staff George C.Marshall that he considered it necessary togarrison certain South and SouthwestPacific islands with Army troops 2in prep-araticm for launching U. S. Marines on an

early offensive ag%inst the enemy: Andshortly after the Battle of the Coral Sea,General MacArthur advanced plans for an

attack against the Japanese at Rabaul.For this move he requested aircraft car-riers, additional troops, and more planes.4But Nimitz rejected this plan. His car-riers were too precious for commitment inwaters so restricted as the Solomon Sea, he

told the general. Besides, the admiral hada plan of his own. He wanted to captureTulagi with one Marine raider battalion.5Admiral King’s reaction to this plan wasinitially favorable, but on 1 June he sidedwith Marshall and MacArthur that thejob could not be done by one battalion.(See Map 11)

‘ CoxninChltr to CofSA, lSFeb42 (located atNHD).

SSpecificmention of Marines for assault workcame after k~arshallquestioned King’s plans andasked why these FklF troops could not performthe garrison du@. CofS~ ltr to Cominch,24~eb42; CominCh ltr to CofSA, 2&~ar42(lo-cated at NHD).

‘ CinCSWPAmsg to CofSA, 8hIay42(located atOCillH).

‘ CinCPacltr to CinCSWPA,28May42 (locatedat NHD).

235

236 1’EARL HARBOR T() GUAL)ALC:AATAL

But now time and the victory at Midwayhad improved the U. S. position in thePacific, and on 25 June Admiral King ad-vised Nimitz and Vice Admiral Robert L.Ghormley, Commander of South PacificForces: to prepare for an offensive againstthe Lower Solomons. Santa Cruz Island,Tulagi, and adjacent areas would be seizedand occupied by Marines under CinCPac,and Army troops from Australia thenwould form the permanent occupationgarrison.7 D-Day would be about 1August ,

The task seemed almost impossible.Ghormley had just taken over his Pacificjob after a hurried trip from Londonwhere he had been Special hTavalObserverand Commander of LT.S. Naval Forces inEurope: the Ist, Marine Division, slatedfor the Solomon landing, was making anadministrative move from the UnitedStates to New Zealand; and Marshall andKing continued to debate matters of com-mand. The general contested the Navy’sright to command the operation. The arealay in the Southwest Pacific, Marslmllpointed out, and so MacArthur ought to bein charges

Never mind arbitrary geography, King’sreply seemed to say. The forces involvedwould not come from MacArthur, but fromthe South Pacific; and King doubted thatMacArthur could help the operation mucheven if he wanted to. The Southwest

6Two days earlier a message from Nimitz gaveGhormley the Midway victory tally and suggestedthat the carriers now might be made available forsupport of. an operation against the SolomonIslands. ComSoPac W’ar Diary, June 1942

( located at NHD ).

‘ CominCh disp to C’inCPac and ComSoWesPac-l’or, 25Jun42 ( located at NHD).

‘ CofSA ltr to CominCh, 26Jun42 (located atNHD)

Pacific’s nearest land-based bomber fieldwas 975 miles from Tulagi. The commandsetup must be made with a view towardsuccess, King said, but tbe primary con-sideration was that the operation be begunat once. He stated unequivocally that itmust be under h’imitz, and that it could notbe conducted in any other way.’

The Joint Chiefs resolved this conflicton 2 July with issuance of the ‘(tJoint Di-rective. for Offensive Operations in theSouthwest Pacific Area Agreed on by theUnited States Chiefs of Staff.” The direc-tive set the seizure of the h’ew Britain-NewIreland-New Guinea area as the objectiveof these operations, but it broke this god

down into three phases designed to resolvethe dispute between MacArthur andNimitz. Phase One would be the seizureof the islands of Santa Cruz and Tulagi,along with positions on adj scent. islands.Nimitz would command this operation,with MacArthur concentrating on inter-diction of enemy air and naval activity tothe west. And to remove MacArthur’sgeographic claim on the Phase One targetarea, the Joint Chiefs shifted the boundarybetween the general and Admiral Nimitzto place the Lower Solomons in the ad-miral’s South Pacific area. MacArthurthen would take command of Phase Two,seizure of other Solomon Islands plus posi-tions on New Guinea, and of Phase Three,the capture of Rabaul and adjacent basesin New Britain and New Ireland. Ques-tions of timing, establishment of taskorganizations, and arrangements for com-mand changes from’ one area to anotherwould be governed by the Joint Chiefs.

Preparation of this directive in Wash-ington had prompted King’s warning

‘ CominCh ltr to CofSA, 26Jun42 ( located atNHD) .

13ACKGROITND AN]) PRE1’AR.%TIONS 237

order which Ghormley received on 25,June; and when the directive arrived inthe South Pacific tl]e force commanderthere already was making his plans forPhase One, which Washington labeledOperation WATCHTOWER. But, validas was the Chiefs’ of Staff determinationto lose no time in launching this first olfen-sive, problems facing Ghormley and hTim-itz were so grim that the pseudo code nan]efor the undertaking soon became ‘lJpera-tion Shoestring,”

JAPANESE SITUATION

Since Pearl Harbor the Japanese hadexpanded through East Asia, the Indies,and much of Melxnesia to a gigantic lineof departure which menaced Australiafrom the Indian Ocean to the Coral Sea.Lae, Salamaua, and Finschhafen on NewGuinea’s north coast had been occupied,and a force for the capture of PortMoresby-a New Guinea town just acrossthe north tip of the Coral Sea from Aus-tralia’s Cape York Peninsula—stoodpoised at Rabaul in the Bismarcks, a posi-tion taken by the ,Japanese on 23 January1942.

A month later the Japanese took 130ug-ainville Island in the Northern Solomons,and on 4 May they took a 300-mile stepdown this island chain to capture Tulagi,which lay between the larger islands ofFlorida and Guadalcanal. This startedthe Japanese encirclement of the CoralSea, a move that was thwarted by AdmiralFletcher in the naval battle that precededthe fight, at Midway (see Part V,(’hapter 1).

I)efeat of their fleet at Midway forcedthe ,Japanese to alter many of their an~bi-tious plans, and on 11 July they g~ve upthe idea of taking New Caledonia, Fiji, and

Samoa. But if Admiral Yamamoto real-ized that the failure of his fleet at Midwayspelled the doom of Japanese ambitions inthe Pacific, L’. S. fighting men were to meeta number of his countrymen who did notget t]le word, or ~v}lo \\-erebent orl convincin-

g Yamarnoto that he was wrong. Rabauland Solomons positions grew strongerafter the Battle of Midway, and reductionof Fortress Rabaul would occupy efforts ofthe Allied South Pacific forces for nearlytwo years. Operation WATCHTOWER,which turnecl out to be the landing againstTulagi and Guadalcanal, was the firstAllied step toward Rabaul.

In 1942 the Australian garrison at‘Magi consisted of a few riflemen of theAustralian Imperial Force, some membersof the Royal Australian Air Force, a mem-ber of the .Lustralian Naval Intelligence,the Resident Commissioner, the civil staff,and a few planters and missionaries, Mostof these people evacuated the area after aheavy Japanese air raid of 1 May, and thesubseqllent sighting by coastwatchers ofenemy ships en route toward the SouthernSolomons. Among those who remained inthe Solomon area were the coastwatchers,courageous old island hands who now re-tired into the bush and hills from whichthey would observe Japanese movementsand report regularly by radio to theirintelligence center in Australia.ll

The 3d Kure ~Ypecial Landing Forcemade the Tulagi landing from the cruiser-mine layer Okinoshima which flew the flag

of Rear Aclmiral Kiyohide Shims. Onegroup of these ,Japanese ‘(marines’>-a ma-chine gun company, two antitank gun

“ For an excellent a{,eount of the work of thesemen see Cdr E. A. Feldt, IMN, !7’hc Ooa.st/catchers

(New York and Melbourne : Oxford UniversityI’ress, 1946), hereinafter cited as Coastwatcher.s.

238 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCAN.4L

platoons, and some laborers-occupiedTulagi while a similar task organizationfrom the 3d li7wre Force went ashore onGavutu, a smaller island nearby. Theymet no opposition, except that from Ad-miral Fletcher’s planes in the action an-cillary to the Battle of the Coral Sea, anddefensive installations were set up immedi-ately to protect the base construction andimprovement work which soon goh under-way. The Japanese set up coastwatchersttitions on Savo Island at the northwestend of the channel between Florida andGuadalcanal, and on both tips as well asthe south coast of Guadalcanal.

Tulagi has an excellent harbor,= and in-itial efforts of the Japanese landing forceimproved this and developed a seaplanebase there. The enemy took no immediatesteps to develop airfields, and a full monthpassed before surveying parties andpatrols crossed the 20-mile channel toGuadalcanal where they staked out anair strip site on the plains of the LungaRiver. They finished this survey late in<Juneand began to grade a runway early inJuly.

With a scrapping of the plans to occupySamoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia, and withthe importance of Rabaul thus increased,Japanese holdings in the Lower Solomonshad gained in value. Tulagi with its ex-cellent harbor, and Guadalcanal with itsbroad plains suitable for airstrips, wouldbe an important outwork to Rabaul. Anew offensive likewise could be mountedfrom the Bismarck-Scdomon positions, toerase the Coral Sea and Midway setbacks.

“ Earl Jellicoe, the British admiral who com-manded at J’utland, recommended after a SouthPacific inspection trip following World War Ithat the Tulagi harbor be developed as a majorfleet base.

Japan still had her eye on Port Moresby.The troops slated for that occupationalready waited at R abaul, and now a newfleet, the Eighth, under l’ice AdmiralGunichi Mikawa, was created to help lookafter this southern end of the Japaneseconquest string. This fleet, with the helpof aircraft from Rabaul and the LowerSolomons, would protect the ferrying oftroops to Buns, and the subsequent over-land march of these troops across NewGuinea’s Owen Stanley Mountains to cap-ture Port Moresby. Thus Australia wouldbe well blocked if not completely isolated;and maybe if the Japanese did not thinkabout the defeat at Midway the stingwould just go away and everything wouldbe all right again.”

After reinforcing the Anzac lifeline (seePart II, Chapter 3), the U. S. began edg-ing toward its Solomon Islands targetarea. Near the end of March some 500Army troops from Major General Alex-ander M. Patch>s America Division inNew Caledonia went up to garrison Efatein the lower New Hebrides. On 29 Marchthe 4th Marine Defense Battalion and Ma-rine Fighter Squadron 212, diverted fromtheir deployment from Hawaii to Tonga-t.abu, also landed on this island. TheseMarines and Army personnel built an air-strip for the fighter squadron. Navalforces also began to arrive during thistime, and in April other elements of Ma-rine Air Group 23, parent organizationof Squadron 212, came to the island. Theprewar seaplane base at Vila, Ef ate’s larg-

‘SFor an idea of the pains taken by official.Ja~anto hide the facts of the Nfidwaydefeat, seethe preface of llitsuo Fuchida in Battle ThatDoomed Japan, xiii–xv.

BACKGROIJND AND 1’REPARATIONS 239

est town, was improved, and another suchbase was built in Havannah Harbor onthe island’s northwest coast.

This was a. hazardous and rather un-nerving extension of defensive lines forthe meager American force of that period.The Japanese were just 700 miles to thenorth in the Lower Solomons, and thisfact gave these New Hebrides islands andwaters that same hostile, “creepy” feelingthat members of the unsuccessful Wake re-lief expedition had sensed while on thatventure deep into the enemy zone. TheJapanese made a few air raids into thisarea, but the greatest opposition came fromthe anopheles mosquito.

In the New Hebrides American troopsof World War II had their first wholesaleencounter with this carrier of malaria, andthe field medical units were not preparedto cope with the disease in such propor-tions. Atabrine tablets were not yet avail-able, and even quinine was in short supply.By the end of April there were 133 casesof malaria among the 947 officers and menof the 4th Defense Battalion, and by thetime of the Guadalcanal landing early inAugust the entire New Hebrides force re-ported the disease in even greater propor-tions. Medical units were dispatchingrequests for “an enormous amount ofquinine.” 1’

In May both General Patch and AdmiralGhormley recommended that a force besent even farther north, to Espiritu Sante.An airfield there would put the Alliedplanes 150 miles closer to the Solomons,and the force there would be a protectiveoutwork for Efate until that first offensivestarted. Admiral Ghormley also recom-mended that the Ellice Islands, betweenthe Samoan group and the Gilberts, be oc-

‘4MedRept, 4th DefBn, March-August 1942.

cupied as an additional outpost of thecommunication lines to Australia. Thismove was postponed, however, and it wasnot until October that Marines landed atFunafuti in the E]lice group. EspirituSanto was immediately important to theSolomons operation, however, and on 28May a force of about 500 Army troopsmoved from Efate to the larger New He-brides island farther north. The first at-tempt of these troops to build an airfieldthere bogged down in a stretch of swampand new outbreaks of malaria.

By this time, plans for the WATCH-TOWER landings were firming up, and

the effort at. Espiritu Santo was reinforced

so that the airfield would be completed in1

time. On 15 July a detachment from the ~4th Marine Defense Battalion went up toSanto with a heavy antiaircraft batteryand an automatic weapons battery. Theairfield was completed in time, but theArmy troops and Marines were mostlywalking cases of malaria by then. How-ever, important islands had been rein-forced, new garrisons formed to protectthe communication lines, and these dis-placements toward enemy bases had beenaccomplished. The time had come tostrike back at the Japanese.

PLANS FOR BATTLE

When Admiral Ghormley received theWATCHTOWER warning order on 25,June, the 1st Marine Division, commandedby Major General Alexander ArcherVandegrift, was en route from the UnitedStates to Wellington, New Zealand. Theadvance echelon had arrived on 14 June,and the rear was at sea. It would land on11 July. Until 26 June when informationof the operation reached the division staff,Vandegrift had planned to continue

-.. PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL24U

training his division in New Zealand.”The division, the Marine Corps’ major unitavailable for employment on such shortnotice, wm understrength by about onethird because of detachment of the rein-forced 7th Marines to Samoan duty.

.Lrmy troops inthearea, originally un-der Ghormley’s command, could providelittle more than moral support to thelandings. This shoestring venture would

not remove the need for garrison forceselsewhere in the South Pacific. Besides,Ghormley lost his direct control of thesetroops on 1 July when Major GeneralMillard F. Harmon, USA, became Com-manding C~eneral, South Pacific Area, tohead all Army forces in the theater. Eventhough Harmon would be under Ghorm-ley’s command, the admiral at first dis-liked this command setup. But he latercame to regard Harmon as one of the finest

administrators and coordinators he hadever met.lG

Admiral Ghorrnley’s job in the Sol~thPacific seemed almost to resemble that ofa traflic director more than it did the roleof a commander. According to plans,Nimitz would order task force command-ers, with their missions already assignedthen), to report to Ghorrnley when they\Yere going to carry out missions in his

area. Ghormley then would direct thesecommanders to execute the missions Nimitzhad assigned them, and he could not in-terfere in these missions except when tasks

‘5 Gen Vanclegrift was under the impressionthat his division would not be called for combatduty prior to early 1943.

‘“ Adm R. L. Ghormley personal notes, n. d.,hereinafter cited a.s {}11ormlrv .~f~; ~f:lj .J. L. Zim-merman interview with Adm R. L. Ghormley,January 1949.

were opposed by circumstances of whichNimitz was not aware}’

To complete the picture of command forWATCHTOWER, Rear Admiral Richm-ond K. Turner arrived from Washingtonon 18 July and reported to Ghormley ascommander of the amphibious force.Ghorrnley, under Nimitz, was in over-allstrategic command, but he would remainat his headquarters in 3Toumea. AdmiralFletcher would command the joint expe-ditionary force. But in practice Fletcher

!confined himself almost completely to pro-vialing air cover from his carriers, and thisleft. Turner, in addition to commandingl’andegrift and his division, in charge ofalmost everything else as well.

This command setup which placed Van-degrift under the hTavy’s amphibious forcecommander rankled until nearly the timeof the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Divi-sion from Guadalcanal fighting. It wasnot a case of small jealousy about controlor any sort of petty peevishness on the partof either Vandegrift or Turner. Ratherit was a clash of serious opposing convic-tions about how such an operation shouldbe conducted. Turner and many otherNaval authorities looked upon the landingforce as just a detachment from the forceafloat, and still connected to the Navy’samphibious force by firm command lines.That was a traditional view from anearlier age.

But this was the beginning of a big newwar, and Marines had experience andthinking time enough in amphibiousmatters to have definite studied opinionsabout how these intricate over-the-beachoperations should be conducted when theyreached the proportions which would be

‘7(’em SoPac War Diary, 9May42 (located atNHI) ) .

BACKGROL’XD AXD PRIIE’ARATIOXS 241

necessary in the Pacific. Vandegrift,faced with the task of putting thesestudied opinions and experiments intopractice, wanted z clear-cut commandright, free from any vestige of dividedresponsibility shared with the commanderafloat. (hce firmly established ashore,Marine opinion held, the landing forcecommander should command his own landoperation. His training and position onthe battleground made him more qualifiedfor this job than was the amphibious forcecommander. It took some arguing, andthis matter finally had to be taken to thetop of military hierarchy, but the Navyeventually saw the point and agreedwith it.

Turner’s second in command was Rear

Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, RN, whosecovering force would include eight cruise-rs (three Australian and five l’. S.) andfifteen destroyers (all U. S.). These shipswere to provide naval gunfire support andantiaircraft protection. In all, the navalcontingent included three aircraft, carrierswith a strength of 250 planes; a number

of light and heavy cruisers; two newbattleships; and the available screen ingvessels and auxiliary craft. Transportsand cargo vessels were at a premium, andwould continue so for some time.

In addition to the approximately 250carrier aircraft, Ghormley could musteronly 166 Navy and Marine Corps planes( including two Marine squadrons—vMF-212 and VMO-251), 95 Army planes, and30 planes from th’e Royal New Zealand AirForce. These 291 aircraft—all unfortu-nately based beyond striking range of thetarget area—were under the command ofRear Admiral John S. McCain whose titlewas Commander Aircraft South Pacific.

He was instrumental in bringing about theconstruction of the Ikpiritu Santo airfieldand seeing that it was available for air-craft on 28 ,July, in spite of all the troubleswhich befell the force in the New Hebrides.

VMO-251 came in to Noumea on 12 Julyon board the USS Heyzuood. The outfitbarely had time to setup camp at Tontoutaand uncrate its aircraft before it got theword to go up to that new field at Santoand back up the landing. On 2 Augustthe unit began to arrive at this northernNew Hebrides field, and within nine daysI&UtWLEHlt Colonel John h’. Hart had hissquadron inst ailed there with its sixteenF4F–3P long-range photographic planes.Hart still was short his wing tanks forlong-range flying, however. These werefinally flown out from Pearl Harbor andarrived on 20 August.

MacArthur’s contribution to the Guadal-canal operation consisted of about sixteen11–17’s which flew reconnaissance overthe area west of the 1ti?th meridian east

(the boundary between the South andSouthwest, Pacific Areas for air search)and attempted to put a stopper on theenemy air from Rabaul.

Thus Ghorm]ey could rely only on the-~services of z small, highly trained strikingforce of fluctuating but never overwhelm-

ing power. He had no assurances of re-serve ground troops, although plans wereunder way to release both the 7th and 8thMarines from their Samoan defense mis-sions,lg and he had been advised that gar-rison forces would have to come from thetroops already within his area on base de-

‘*Relief for 7th Mar. was to leave the U. S. on

20 July and that for the 8th Mar on 1 September.

ComSoPac War Diary, June 1942 (located at

NHD) .

242 PEARL HARBOR T(} GUADALCANAL

fense duty}’ The 1st Base Depot had setup an advance echelon in Wellington on21 June, and other supply bases were to beestablished later at Noumea and EspirituSante.

The general structure organized to em-ploy these resources against the Japanesewas laid down in Nimitz’ order to Ghorm-ley of 9 July, and Ghorrnley’s OperationPlan 142 of 17 July 1942.20

Ghormley, exercising strategic com-mand, set up his organization in threemain groups:

Carrier Forces (Task Force 61.1 ), com-manded by Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes,was composed of elements of three taskforces from Nimitz’s area—n, 16, and 18.It would include three carriers, Saratoga,Enterprise, and WcMp, the fast new battle-ship North Carolina, five heavy cruisers,one so-called antiaircraft cruiser, and 16destroyers.

Amphibious Force (Task Force 61.2),

commanded by Rear Admiral RichmondK. Turner, included the Marine landingforce carried in 13 attack transports, fourdestroyer transports, and six cargo ships;a fire support group of one antiaircraftand three heavy cruisers plus six de-stroyers; a screening group of one lightand three heavy cruisers as well as nine

“ Adm King’s effort to secure quick release forthe assault troops was not successful. TheArmy’s commitments to the European Theater

were such that no units were available for suchmissions. Initially assured that air support and

air replacements would be available, King was

advised on 27 July by LtGen Joseph C. McNarney,

acting Chief of Staff, that commitments in other

areas would not permit further air reinforce-ments of the South Pacific-a dictum which

King protested strongly. CominCh memo toCofSA, lAug42 (located at NHD).

20Ghorrnley MS, 54, 58.

destroyers; and a small mine-sweepinggroup.

Shore-13ased Aircraft (Task Force 6:3),under Rear Admiral J. S. McCain(ComAirSoPac), included all aircraft inthe area except those on carriers.

Complicating this symmetrical structurewas the tactical command role played byVice Admiral Fletcher. He was in over-all command of TF 61 which included theforces of Noyes and Turner.

Ghormley called for a rehearsal in theFiji area and directed that all task forcecommanders arrange to hold a conferencenear the rehearsal area. He himself wouldmove from Auckland to h~oumea about 1August. in order to comply with his ordersto exercise strategic command within theoperating area.zl

By this time the plans and orders wereformed, the target selected, the forces or-ganized, and the Navy given leeway to op-erate without poaching in the territory ofthe Southwest Pacific. Only the detail of alanding date remained unsettled. Vande-grift pointed out to Ghormley that thelate arrival of his second echelon, and astretch of bad weather, had so complicatedhis loading problem as to make it impos-sible to meet the date of 1.kugust. Ghorm-ley and Nimitz agreed that an additionalweek was needed, and King consented topostpone the landing until 7 August.King warned, however, that this was thelatest date permissible and that every ef-fort should be made to advance it.

ACCLJiW U_LATION OF

lNTELLIGEA7CE

From an intelligence point of view, theGuadalcanal-Tulagi landings can hardly

“ Ibid., 59.

be described as more than a stab in thedark. When General Vandegrift receivedhis initial warning order on 26 June 1942,neither his staff nor the local New Zealandauthorities had more than the most gen-eral and sketchy knowledge of the objec-tive area or the enemy’s strength and dis-position, and there was but a month avail-able before the scheduled date of mount-ing out, 22 ,July.

*ls in the case with most tropical back-waters, the charting and hydrographic in-formation was scanty and out of date.Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, In-telligence Officer of the 1st RJarine Divi-sion, therefore set out to locate traders,planters, shipmasters, and a few minerswho had visited or lived at Guadalcanalor Tulagi. A number of likely sources re-sided in ,\ustralia, and while his subordi-nates tabulated the formal data available,Goettge left for Australia on 2 ,July. Hereturned to New Zealand on the 13th.

Long after the conclusion of the cam-paign, it was learned that Colonel(ioettge’s efforts deserved better successthan they had enjoyed. During his hur-ried trip to Australia, he arranged with theSouthwest Pa&c Area for maps to bemade from a strip of aerial photographsand to be delivered prior to the sortie ofthe 1st Marine Division. The maps weremade, but were not received because ofclert ain oversights and confusion in mount-ing out the division.

From Buka and Bougainville in thenorth, the Solomons form a double columnof islands streaming southeast betweenlatitudes five and twelve degrees south.Looking northwest toward Bougainville,the large islands on the right are Choiseul,Santa Isabel, and Malaita. In the columnto the left are the islands of the New Geor-

gia group, the Russells, Guadalcanal, andSan (‘ristobal. Buka and Bougainville atoutbreak of the war were part of the Aus-traliail Mandated Territory of NewGuinea ; the remainder of the double chainformed the British Solomon Islands Pro-tectorate. In all, the islands number sev-eral hundred, with some 18,600 squaremiles of land area. (See Map 11)

Florida, the largest island of the NggelaGroan, lies between Malaita and Guadal-cmal; and between the northern tips ofGuadalcanal and Florida is the small,nearly-conical island of Save. Indispens-able Strait separates Florida from neigh-boring Malaita to the east, and the twenty-mile-wide strait between Florida andGuadalcanal to the south is known gen-erally as Sealark Channel. (See Map 1.3,Map Section)

Nestled into the northwest rim of ajagged bight in Florida’s south coast liesTulagi, seat of the British Resident Com-missioner. Tulagi Harbor, the water be-tween the two islands, is the best anchor-age in the Southern Solomons.

In the middle of Florida’s bight, gen-erally east southeast of Tulagi, lie thesmaller causeway-connected islands ofGavutu and Tanambogo. Gavutu was thelocal headquarters of Lever Brotherswhich operated coconut plantations in thearea, and this island, as well as Tanambogoand Tulagi, possessed some docks, jetties,and other developments for shipping,management, and copra processing.

Mostly volcanic in origin and lyingwithin the world’s wettest area, the Solo-mans are jagged, jungle-covered, andsteamy with humid tropical heat. Loftypeaks and ridges cross-faulted by volcanicaction and dramatic erosion cuts fromswift rivers chop the islands into conflict-

PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

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BACKGROUND AND PREPARATIONS 245

ing terrain that became a nightmare for

military operations.Guadalcanal, some 90 miles in length

and about 25 miles wide, presents a variedtopography ranging from plains and foot-hills along the north coast to a mountainbackbone dropping rapidly to the south

coast. Rainfall is extremely heavy, andchanges in season are marked only bychanges in intensity of precipitation.This, together with an average tempera-ture in the high 80’s, results in an un-healthy climate. Malaria, dengue, andother fevers, as well as fungus infections,afflict the population.

Rivers are numerous and from the mili-

tary point of view’ may be divided arbi-trarily into two classes. The first of these

is the longj swiftj relatively shallow river

that may be forded at numerous points.

Generally deep only for a short distance

from its mouth, it presents few I)roblems

in the matter of crossing. F,xamples of

this type on (luadalcanal are the Tenarul

the Lunga, and the 13alesuna. The second

type is that of the slow and deep lagoon.

Such streams are sometimes short, as in

the case of the Ilu Ri~er, and some lagoons

are merely the delta streams of rivers of

considerable size, as in the case of the

~~atanikau. This type, because of depth

and marshy banks, became a military

obstacle.Although such accumulation of data af-

forded much enlightenment, beyond the

little previously known, it included corre-

sponding minor misinformation and many

a~gravatin~ gaps? for detailed informa-

tion in a form suitable for military oper-

ations was mainly lacking.In spite of the number of years -which

had elapsed since initiation of the system-

atic economic development of the islands

by the British, not a single accurate or

complete map of @adalcanal or Tulagi

existed in the summer of 1942. The hy -

drographic charts, containing just sufi-

cient data to enable trading schooners to

keep from grounding, were little better,

although these did locate a few outstand-

ing terrain features of some use for mak-

ing a landfall or conducting triangulation.

Such locations were not always accurate.

~Iount ilusten, for example, was assigned

as an early landing objective, but the land-

ing force discovered that instead of being

but a few hundred yards away from the

beaches, the mountain actually lay several

miles across almost impassable jungle.n

.Ierial photographs would have been a

profitable source of up-to-date informa-

tion, but the shortage of lQng-range air-

craft and suitably located bases, and the

short period available for planning, cornq

bined to restrict availability of aerial

photos in the quantity and quality nor-

mally considered necessary.

Perhaps the most useful photographic

sortie carried out prior to the Guadal-

canal-Tulagi landings was that under-

taken on 17 July by an Army B–17 air-

craft in which Lieutenant Colonel Tferrill

1% Twining, assistant operations officer of

22This was the so-called “Grassy Knoll” as-

signed to the 1st Marines. Guadalcanal residentsdescribed it as lying virtually within the pwim-eter area ultimately occupied and defended byGen Vandegrift, whereas its true location wassix miles to the southwest. This discrepancy,

unexplained for years, has given much cause forspeculation to historians of the Guadalcanal cam-paign, some of whom have raised the questionwhether Mount Austen was really the “GrassyKnoll” which Goettege’s informants had in mind.This school of thought suggests that a featurewithin the described limits which might answerthat description would have been the high groundlater to become known as Edson’s Ridge.

RACKGROLXL~ ASD PREPARATIONS 247

the 1st Rfarine Division, and Major Wil-linrn H. McKean, member of the staff ofTransport Squadron 26, conducted a per-sonal reconnaissance of the landing areas.They assured General Vandegrift tha ttile T~mg:x beaches appeared suitable forlanding.23

The coastal real) of G~~acialcnnal finallyadopted by the 1st Marine Thvision (andemployed, with such corrections as couldlater be developed, throughcampaign ) was traced f lvll-l a11 il

the.erial

entirestrip-

map obtained by Colonel Goettge on hismission to Australia. It was reasonablyaccurate in general outline, but containedno usable indications of ground forms orelevations. The Goettge map was supple-mented by aerial photos of Tulagi, Gavutu,and Tnnambogo Islands, and these con-stituted the sum of the Marines knowledgeof Tulagi and Guadalcanal prior to thelandings.24

In format ion concerning the enemy’sstrength, dispositions, rind activities wascollected by the ?-. S. plamiers from coast-watcher report s.25 Strength figures wereby no means as definite or convincing aswere the factual accounts of the defenses.Various intelligence estimates, prepwed

during ,July, +‘(rzve figures as high as 8,400.A~dn~iral Turner’s Operation Plan AS-42,

x HistSec, HQJIC interview with Co1 W. I<.JIcKean, lSFeh4S.

“Two aerial photos, taken on 2 August hy aC’onMrSoI’;~c R-l i and developed ahoard theU S S Errto-prisc, were forwarded to DivisionHeadquarters. They showed Tnlagi tlefensil-cpositions iii sharp detail, and verifiecl the reportsof coastw:c tchers al~ont the rapidly al)proachingc’onll)letion of the airstrip in the Lungn plains.

” “The invaluable service of the SolonlonIslands coastwatching system . . . cannot ljet o o h i g h l y collliileiidc~d.” Firrrr7Rcpt, Phase I ,Ames E, 2.

448TiT O--58--17

issued at the Koro Island rehearsals in theFijis on 30 July, estimated that 1,850enemy would be found on Tulagi andC*arntu-Tanambo,rro, and 5,275 on Gundal-canal. 130th figures were high. A countof enemy dead in the Tulngi and Gavutuarea placed the number of defenders atabout 1,500 (including 600 laborers),\vhile study of positions, interrogation ofprisoners, and translation of enemy docu-ments on G~~aclalcnnnl proper indicatedthat about 2,230 troops and laborers hadbeen in the Lunga area at the time of tlieMarines landing.

Close and determined combat was antici-pated with these forces; and on 17 *July,Admiral Kimitz notified Adnlir:tl Kingthat it would be unsafe to assume that theevenly would not at tempt to retake thearea to be attacked, and tlmt, if insuficientforces were assigned, the Marines mightnot, be able to hold 011.~”

For the dun1 l:mclilq operation, Geuclxl‘I’andegrift divided his organization intotwo forces. The uni ts landing on theFloricla side of Se:~lark Channel (GroupYoke) were to he commanded by Hrigadiel(:ener:ll William H . Rupertus, t h e a s -sistant division conmxmcler (AD(?), whileVnntlegrift hiwrelf would exercise conl-mand over G r o u p X - R a y l a n d i n g a tI~tinga Point. (See Map 13, Map Section)

It was expected that the Florida-sidelandings would be more severely contestedby tlie Japanese, and to tlint landing groupthe general assigned his best-trained units :tlie 1 s t M a r i n e R a i d e r Ikttnlion, com-

26 CinCI’ac disl) to (“onlin(‘h, 17.JulX2 (locatedat NHI)).

248

manded by Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A.Edson; the 1st Parachute Battal ion ofMajor Robert H. Williams; and the 2dBattalion, 5th Marines under LieutenantColonel Harold E. Rosecrans, all withtheir reinforcing units att’ached. Edsonwould be the commander of the Tulagilanding force ; Williams the commanderat Cravutu-‘I’nnambogo. The Guadalcanalgroup included Colonel Clifton 13. Gates‘1st Marines and Colonel Leroy P. Hunt’s5th Marines (less 2/5), both reinforced.l)lus the balance of the division special andservice ti~00ps.27

The Tulagi plan called for the 1stRaider Battalion and 2d Ratt alion, 5thMarines to land in column on the island’ssouth coast, turn east, and attack downthe long axis of the island. This wouldbe followed by 1st Parachute I3attalionlandings on Gavutu and Tanambogo, and atwo-company sweep along Florida Island‘scoast line fronting Tulagi Bay. (See Map15, Map Section)

The Guadalcanal scheme envisagedlanding the 5th Marines ( less 2d Bn)across a benc’h some few hundred yardseast of the Lunga Point area where theJapanese were expected to be concentrated,and there to establish ‘a beachhead. The1st Marines then would come ashore in acolumn of battalions and pass through thisperimeter to take Mount Austen. The

” At this t ime, the later-used phrase “wgi-nleutal cwrnbat team” (RCT) had not come intouniform use. This we would currently style a“regimental landing teRnI” (RLT). What(:uad;~kannl I\Iarinw labeled a “wmbat group”in~ludrtl a rifle reginimt with its dirwt-supportartillery battalion, engineers, signal, medical, andother supportilig elements. \l’ithin the so-diedcwnibut groulx similar battalion-sized aggrrega-tions were designated conlbat teams. This usagewill be followed throughout this nnrratire.

primary goal was to establish a beachheadin an area not strongly defended.“”

To make up for the division’s manpowershortage caused by the detached duty ofthe 7th Marines in Samoa, ,1dmiral Kingon 27 ,June had proposed that Vandegriftbe allotted the 2~1 Marines of the 2d Ma-rine Division. ,\ccordingly this unit (re-inforced) sailed combat loadecl from SanDiego on 1 ,J~dy.~” The regiment ~~oulcl be

the landing force reserve.3”While staff planners contemplated a tar-

get area nearly as unfamiliar to them asthe back side of the moon, other membersof the la ncling force wrestled the monu-mental chore of preparing for the move-ment to combat. “Seldom,” General Van-degrift said later, “has an operation beenbegun iunder more disadvantageous cir-cumstances.” 31

When the decision to land on enemybenclles reached the 1st Marine Division,the command post and tile 5tll 1IariilrRegiment were in Wellington, Sew Zea-land; the 1st Marines and the 11th Xa-rines, less two of its battalions, were at seaen route to Xew Zealand; service and spe-cial troops were split between the forwardand rear echelons ; the 2d Regiment was on

” 1st MarDir OpOrtl T-12, 2O.Jul42. See Ap-1)endis E.

” Original plans called for this unit to c+nrr>out projectetl landings at Ndeni in the SantaCruz 1sl:mds. Seedless to say, these were nevernlatle, although occulmtiou l)lnns for that island.:~lwags involving ?tlarine forces, continue to nl)-pear i n Ad111 Turner’s record unti l Oc*tohr1104”.

3o “It is most desirable that 2d ?tlarinw he re-inforcwl and cwnh;it unit loaded and ready upon;irrirnl this area for eulplo;rulent in landing ol)-erntions :lc; ilL L r e i n f o r c e d regiulental conibatte;i111: COII~SOI%C War Di;lry. 27Jun-42 ( l()(a;lte(lilt SIII)).

” Fi?lalh’cpt, Phase V, 1.

BACKGROIJND ANI) I’REI’ARATI( }NS 249

the way from San Diego to the South Pa-cific; the 1st Raider Battalion was in Sa-moa, and the 3d Defense I]attalion was inHawaii. Preliminary plans and moveshad to assemble these widely scatteredunits into u fighting force which couldmake an amphibious landing, one of themost intricate of military maneuvers.From the understanding that it would bethe nucleus for the buildup of a forcewhich would be trained for operationswhich might come late in 1942, the 1stMarine I)ivision had to shift at once intohurried preparations to mount out foract ion.

Most, of the ships transporting units ofthe division had been loaded organization-ally for the voyage to New Zealand, butfor the proposed amphibious assault, thesupplies had to be reshuffled and shipscombat loaded so that, items first needed intile fighting would be. readily at hand inthe holds. The reloading and re-embark-ing of Combat Group A (5th Marines,reinforced) went smoothly, uncomplicatedby the necessity for simultaneous unload-ing and reloading which plagued the rearechelon. The group began embarkation on2 ,July and remained on board its transportto await, the arrival of the rear echelon.

This second echelon arrived on 11 ,July,and had eleven days to empty and reloadits ships. hTotroops were disembarked ex-cept those who were to remain in NewZealand as rear echelon personnel. Allothers, who already had been in crampedquarters during the long trip across thePacific, were put to work in eight-hourshifts, and parties of 300 men were as-signed to each ship.3’

“ The passage from the United States to NewZealand had been particularly trying for theofficers and men on board the Ericsson., a com-

Aotea Quay at Wellington was the sceneof this squaring away. It was inadequatein all ways save that it could accommodatefive ships at a time. Labor difficulties withthe highly unionized stevedores resultedin the entire task being undertaken andcarried through by Marines. Because ofsecurity regulations, no appeal to patriot-ism could be made to the regular dockworkers since care was taken to have civil-ians believe that all the flurry was merelypreparation for a training exercise. Dock-side equipment was meager, and there wasno shelter close at hand.

As the gear began to be juggled fromship to dock and back again, a cold, wet“southerly>’ settled down to lash hTew Zea-land. But in spite of the weather, workhad to continue around the clock. Carton-packed food and other supplies “deterior-ated rapidly,” the division later reportedby way of an understatement, and themorale of troops followed the direction ofthe down-slanting rain.

!on the dock, cereal, sugar, and other ra-

tions mushed together with globs of brownpulp that once had been cardboard boxes..L great ~lum~r of ~vet cartons that ~vere

rushed to the hopeful safety of wool ware-houses later gave way under the weight ofstacking. I.ieutenant Colonel Randolph

McC. Pate and his logistics section had a

herculean task in managing this unloading

mercial ship under charter. Lack of proper

food, and use of oil substitutes for shortening, re-sulted in loss of weight of as high as 23 poundsper man. Two meals only were ser~’ed during

the greater part of the passage, and one ofthese often consisted of soup or soup and bread.Medical ofilcers estimated the daily calorie con-tent of meals at less than 1,500. The ship’s per-sonnel enjoyed a full and well balanced dietduring the same period. Ibid., Phase I, Annex11, 1,

y~(-) PEAR1> H.IRFIOR TO G~l.kI).\J,(:AXAI,

andreloading. Transport quartermastersof the various ships supervised work onhoard while a relay of ottkers from tl~edivision took charge of the eight-hourshifts dockside. The ISew Zealand Armyfurnished 30 flatbecl lorries and 18 ten-

w}leelers to transfer fuel, small-arms am-nlunition and explosives to dumps severalmiles away.

There was not enough hold space for alltile division motor transport. Most of thequarter- and one-ton trucks were put onboard, but 75 percent of the hetavier rol]ingstock was set aside to stay with the rearechelon that would be left behind when thedivision sailed for the Solomons.

Engineers loaded \vhat 1ittle dirt -mm-ing equipment they owned, but it lYilS someager that they hoped the ,Japanesewould have most of the airfield built bythe time it was captured. The engineerbattalion also loaded bridging material,demo] itions, and all available water SUP-

ply equipnlent. hTo nlajor constructionwas contemplated in early phases o f theoperation, lloweverl and equipment andsupplies for sucl~ work were not taken.

With the lJ–4 or an assistant in constanttouch with the dockmaster, order began toappem from the chaos of strewn gear,swelling cereal, wilting cardboard cartons,and frayed tempers. But there were stillserious prob]ems. Supplies and equipmentpiled on docks often made it difiicmlt fortrucks to negotiate the narrow passages toreach all areas of the stacked gear, andduring this mounting out certain modifica-tions of the logistical plan became neces-sary. As finally loaded, the Marines car-ried 60 days sl~i)l)lies, 10 units of fire forall weapons, the minimum individual b:tg-gage actually required to live and fight,and less than half the organic motor tr:~ns-port authorized.

Regardless of the difficulties, however,the force sailed as schedu]ed at 0900 on22 .July, under escort of cruisers of Ad-miral Turner’s Ti~sk Force 62.3:+ GeneralYandegrift, despite his request for a vesselbetter suited ill communications and ac-commodations, had been directed to em-bark his command post in tile USSMc(7o loley.

8Z7HEARSALS .4fYD 1710T’EMENT

TO THE OB.7E(7TZVE

In accordance with orders received fromNimitz on 1,July,34 Ghormley had directedtlmt all forces involved in the assault makerendezvous at i~ position south of Fiji, outof sight of land so that there would be noClliillce of observation by enemy agents andno chance that an inadvertent tip-of wouldbe made by friendly observers.” At thatpoint there would be a conference betweenthe commanding otlicers who had not asyet been able to discuss in person the vari-ous Ispects of the operation.

The components of the assault force notpreviously in New Zealand with the divi-sion were converging upon the rendezvouspoint from many directions. (:olonel ,JohnM. .krthur’s !2dMarines (reinforced), em-barked in the Crrescent City, President.4dunz.~,P~e.w2ient Hayes, President Jack-,\on~and ~47hena, steamed south under es-

cort of the carrier Wasp and a destroyer

‘3 Adul Turner assumed the title of Chmnander,Amphibious Force South Pacitie on his arrival inthe South Pacific on 24 July.

“ Cin(Xac OpOrd 34-42, cited in (’iu(’Par WarDiary. July 1!M2. By terms of this order also,Fletcher, C’TF 11, had been ordered to assunlecommand of the combined task forces at therendezvous, and Ghorndey had been put in con-mand of the operation.

3’ Glf or)7df’?/ Jf~! 64.

$252 PEARL HARBOR TO GITA1)ALCANAL

screen.:{’ The 1st Raider Battalion, in thefour destroyer transports of TransportDivision 12, had been picked up atNoumea.

The 3d Defense Battalion (ColonelRobert H. Pepper) on board the L-SSZ~ete!geu~e and Ze~7in was en route fromPearl Harbor where it had been stationedsince the outbreak of the war. It wouldmeet the remainder of the force on 2August . The Carrier Force, built aroundthe .!aratoga and the Enterpm”se, withFletcher flying his flag in the former, like-wise was on its way from Pearl Harbor.Rendezvous was made as planned, at 1400on 26 July, some. 400 miles south of Fiji.The conference convened at once on boardthe Nara.toga. Ghormley, unable to attend,was represented by his Chief of Staff, RearAdmiral Daniel J. Callaghan and hisCommunications Officer, Lieutenant Com-mander L. M. LeHardy.

The conference pointed up several seri-ous problems. General Vandegrift learnedhe would not have adequate air and surfacesupport for the completion of the unload-ing phase of the operation. Fletcherwanted to retire within two days after thelanding, and this meant that transportshipping would have to clear out withinan unreasonably short period. The Marinegeneral also learned that the 2d Marines,counted as his reserve, actually would beused for the proposed operation at Ndeniin the Santa Cruz islands. Admiral Cal-laghan reported Fletcher’s retirementplans to Ghormley: “This sounds toosanguine to me,?’ Callaghan reported, “butthey believe it can be done. . . . AKs

[cargo ships] may not be unloaded for

‘o The regiment had been on board since 1 June,

lying in the harbor of San Diego.

three or four days.” 3’ Ghormley, too, be-lieved that the ships could not be pulledout that soon.

Landing rehearsals at the island of Koroin the Fijis were conducted from 28through 30 July, but Vandegrift labeledthem a waste of time and effort. “A com-plete bust,” he observed later.” Necessityfor conserving landing craft made it im-possible to conduct the practice landingsin a realistic way, although the men in-volved were given additional training indebarkation,3g and attack force ShipS were

able to practice their gunfire support.On 31 July, as night was falling, the

ships weighed anchor and departed fromKoro. The carrier task force proceedednorth and west while the transports andtheir screen plodded steadily toward theSolomons. Almost 19,000 Marines. wereembarked in the 19 transports and fourdestroyer-transports.m

All circumstances favored the advanc-ing convoy. Weather conditions duringthe final two days were extremely favor-able: sky topped by a low ceiling andwinds gusty with intermittent rain SCIUdk.

There was no sign of enemy aircraft orsubmarines, and no indication that theapproach was observed. In fact, enemy

a’ Ghormley MS, 67.

m Statement at Princeton, N. J., 12Mar48.“ Gen Vandegrift noted at the time that the

precious landing craft were not in the best ofcondition in any event—12 of them were inoper-ative on one ship alone. Gen A. A. Vandegriftltr to CMC, 4Feb49.

a A seemingly irreconcilable discrepancy offigures between those of the Amphibious Force,South Pacific, and the 1st Marine Division pre-vents a wholly accurate statement as to the num-ber of troops embarked then or landed subse-quently. The amphibious force lists a fLgure of18,722, while the division records list, variously,19,546 or 19,105.

BACKGROUND AN’D PREPARATIONS 253

patrol planes were grounded It Ilatmul on5 and 6 August because of bad weather.41

Tlw convoy headed genendly west fromFiji and well to tl~e south of the Solomonschain. The course gradually shifted tothe northwilrd, and the night of 6–7.Iugust found the entire group of shipsdue west of the western extremity oft%adalcana].

Task Force 62, commanded by .kdmiralTurner, was divided into two TransportGroups. Transport Group X-Ray (62.1 )commanded by Captain Lawrence F. Reif -snicler, with the C~uadalcanal forces em-barked, consisted of four subgroups, asfollows :

Transdiv .4: Fuller, America% Legion, Bellutrix.

Transdiv B : MPCOWICV, Barnett, Elliot, Libra.

Transdiv C : Hunter Ligflett, .4tchil]a, Fomal -

haut, Betelgeu$e.Transdiv I) : Crescent City, President Hffyefi,

President .4da?ns, Al?tena.

Transport Group Yoke (62.2 ) commandedby Captain George B. Ashe, and carryingthe assault troops for the Tulagi landing,consisted of the following subgroups:

Transdiv E : A’6>1.!ll(,,Xrilit),Hcywood, Pre8iti(’nt

.Iaclwon.

Transdiv 12: Calhoan, Gregory, Littlf’, MrKea??.

(the destroyer transport group ) .42

.it0;+10, 7 August, the force was direct] ywest of Cape Esperance with an intervalof six miles between groups and a speedof 12 knots. Transport Grolq] X-Raysteamed in two parallel columns of eight,

“ Cdr J. Shaw ltr to Ma.j J. L, Zimmerman.February 1949.

“ CTF 62 OP1an A3-42!, 30Ja142,

and seven snips each with a distance of750 yards between ships and an intervalof 1,000 yards between colLunns. Therugged outline of the (+uadalcanal hillswas just visible to starboard when thecourse was shifted to 0400, and a fewnlinutes ltiter the two groups separatedfor the completion of their missions.X-R~y, shifting still further to starboard,set tied on course 0750, which took it alongthe Guadalcanal coast, while Yoke, oncourse 058°, crossed outside Savo Island,toward Florida. The final approach tothe transport area was made without inci-dent, and there was no sound until, at 0614,the supporting ships opened fire on theisland.43

There are some indications that the(hadalcanal operation on D-Day morningwas something of a minor Pearl Harborin reverse for the ,Japanese. A recentstudy of ,Japanese wartime messages indi-mt es the enemy was aware that a U. S.force had sort ied from Hawaii. Warn-ings were issued to (’eutral Pacific out-posts; Rabaul and points south were to benotified for information only. Convmander of the ,Japanese Twenty-Fourtl.4ir Floti[la (Marshall-Gilbert -Wakearea ) relayed his warning message souththe next morning-at 0430 on 7 August.It was too late. Less than an hour laterhe received Tulagi’s report that the LT.S.striking force had been sighted in SealarkChannel at 0425.44

* CT(; 62.1 ActRept 7–%4ug42, 3.“ Capt. E. T. Layton, USN, ltr to HistBr.

G–3, HQMC, .June 1955.

CHAPTER 2

Guadalcanal, 7-9 August 1942

TIIZ>’ L.4 YD1,V(+

When ‘l’ask Groups X-Ray and Yokeseparated northwest of (Xpe Esperance at0240, the former grol~p made for the Ret{lleach transport area off Guadalcanal in a(Iouhle col~unn at 12 knots. No enemy ac-t ivity was ohservecl, and the preliminaryl~aval bombardment of the coastal area,which began at 0613, aroused no response.The <X-Ray shippiug reached its transportarea at 0645 and begym to lower the land-ing craft. Across the channel, Groupl“oke 1ike~vise arrived at its assigned areaotf Tulagi without incident at 0630 andstraightaway got the word from CaptainAslle that H-hour would be 0800. Theunits slated for Floricla Island would hittheir beaches first, as will be described inthe next chapter.

The division’s commancl post in the Mc-(;aw?ey broke radio silence at 0519, andeight minutes later C~eneral Vandegriftset the 11-hour for his side of the landingat o91o. ‘1’he bombardment sl~ips workedthrough their fire plans, and then as newsof the successful lanclings on Florida and‘Magi reached Vandegrift, the first wavesof assault, troops moved toward the beach.( See Map 14, Map Section)

Three planes fronl the .l.!toria flew liai-son missions iu tl~e (hldalcanal area whilethree from the T’inwnrws performed thesaule duty above Tlllagi. All additionalthree aircraft, from the Q’uincy, wereavailab]e for artillery spotting over CTuacl-alcanal. During the ship to shore phase,

~~s~

these aircri~ft nmrked the beach flanks\vitl~smoke to assist nnval gunfire and toguide the landing boats. Vmndegrift, andhis division air ofiicer held this use to beunwarranted and unnecessary.

13[lt.Idmiral Turner considered it neces-sary to “accurately mark the extremitiesof the laudi]lg beaches’> as directed by theoperation or(ler, and he marked them fortwenty minutes. The planes nlade. eightr(uls at extremely low altitlldes, four runson each beach extremity. Vandegrif tI)oiuted out tlmt this woLIlcl result in aseriolls if not complete loss of planes iftile. beacl]es were defended-this loss at atinle when aircraft are critically neededas “eyes” to gain illfornl:ltion abol~t the

I)rogress of a landil~g..kctually the liaison planes over Guadal-

canal’s random clouds zncl splotchy junglefurnished Van(legrift precious little infor-mation. It was not the fault of the pilots,however, since there was very little tosee anyway. 1n the. tense period of thisfirst landing on a hostile beach, the sinswere more often those of commissionrather than omission. One pilot reported“many enemy troops’? only to admit, underquestioning for more explicit information,that his “troops” were, in fact, cows.

other than the cows there still were nosigns of :lctil~ity ~rollnd I,lmga at 0859,11 ulinl~tes before F-hour, when an ob-serwltiol~ plane from the .4 storia reportedthat no ,Japanese could be seen in thatarea. Rut 15 minlltes later the same pilotspotted some trucks moving on the rJLUIg(L

256 I’NALL1, HARBOR T() (l[lAI)AI.t’ANAI,

airfielcl several thousand yards west ofthe landing beach.

Meanwhile the 5th Marines (less 2d Bat-talion) had crossed its line of departureancl moved into the 5,000-yard approachto the heacll. Naval gunfire lifted inlandas the craft neared the shore, and minllteslater, at 0910, the assault wave hit thebeach on a 1,600 yard front and pushedi~~to tile slmrse jungle growth beyond.V’itll I.ieutenant Colonel William E. Max-well”s 1st Battalion on the right (west.)and Lieutenant Colonel Frederick C. Bie-bush’s 3d Battalion on the left, the beach-l)ead expanded rapidly against no opposi-tion. .i perimeter some 600 yards inlandsoon established a hasty defense. The lineanchored on the west, at the Tenaru River,on tl~e east at the Tenavatu River , andl’eachml oll the south an east -~vest brznchof the Tenalw.1

Re.ginlental lleadqllartem came ashoreat 0938 to be followed two miliutes laterby heavy weapons troops. Landing of thereserve regiment, Colonel Cates’ reinforced1st Marines, already was underway. Be-ginning at 0930, tliis regiment came ashorein a column of battalions with 2/1 in the

tl~e van followed by the 3d and 1st Bat-talimls in tl~at order.

.lrtillery came next, and the units par-tially bogged down. The howitzer menadmitted later that they had taken tooInucll gear ashore with them. Prime nlov-ers for the 105mm howitzers did not getashore initially because there were notenough ramlJ boats for this work, and one-to]l trucks I)roved too ,light to handle the

‘ In emrly maIJS the names of the Tenaru andIlu Ri~ers were incorret.tly transposed. In thisaccount the names will be applied to the correctrivers, but the name, “Battle of the Teuaru,”will be retiline(l to identify the August battle atthe mouth of the Ill],

tiel{l pieces. Needed were t~vo-:~l~cl-:~-llalf-toll six by sixes and ramp boats to put,tl~ese ~ellic]es on the beach simultaneolls]ywit]l tile howitzers. .Such prime moverswere authorized, but so were a lot of othertl~il~gsthe Marines did not have.

In spite of these troubles, the artilleryunits reached their assigned firing posi-tions by making overland prime moversout of amphibian tractors that began towallow ashore heavy with cargo.z Oncein position, however, the gunners foundthe amphibian was a creature of mixedvirtues: tracked vehicles tore LIp the

cor~llll~l~lic:ltiol~swire, creating early thepattern of combat events that became toofanliliar to plagued wirernen.

Meanwhile the light 75mm pack howit-zers had made it ashore with little trouble,and the advance toward the airfield gotunclerway. At 1115 the 1st Marines movedthrough the hasty perimeter of the 5thMarines and struck out southwest towardMount Austen, the “Grassy Knoll.” Cate.sput his regiment across the Tenaru at anengineer bridge supported by an amphib-ian tractor, and the 1st Marines pro-gressed slowly into the thickening jung]e.Behind, to extend the beachhead, 1/5crossed the mouth of the Tenaru at 1330and moved toward the Ilu. Neither ad-vance encountered enemy resistance.

zThe amphibian, later to be used to transport

assalllt trool)s from shil~ to shore, started its war(,areer here in a modest manner. Its “useful-

ness ex(weded all expectations,’” the Marines re-Iwrtwl, but at the time nobody considered thestrange (q-aft capable of mneh more than anlphib-

ious drayage, The fo~lowin~ day ( 1)-PIus one)on Gavnt\l i]n anlphibiiln would create rather

dramatir history by tittavking a hostile cave, but

such br:~very was never recommended, even later~vhen these craft entered the hey(lay of their moreimportant role.

(; IT.kD.kJ,cANAL, 7–9 AUGI:ST 1942 257

Colonel Cates realized almost at oncethat it wollld be impossible to reach MountAusten as his day’s objective. The so-called Grassy Knoll, visible from the ships,could not, be seen from the beach. It com-manded the Lunga area, but it lay muchfarther inland than reports of formerplanters and schooner pilots had indicated.

Under heavy packs, sometimes excessiveloads of ammunition, and with insufficientwater and salt tablets,3 the 1st Marin!s bylate afternoon had struggled but a milewhen General Vanciegrift ordered theregiment to halt, reorient, and establish in-ternal contact. The men dug in a perim-eter in the jungle, some ;~,~()()yards southof the Ilu’s mouth where 1J5 had endedits advance, to set up for the, night.

In spite of the breakneck pace withwhich the shoestring operation hadmounted out and thrown itself in the pathof the Japanese advance along the Solo-mon chain, the landing was a success. Al-though the lack of opposition (on tl~eGuadalcanal side only) gave it. somev-llattile characteristics of a training maneuver,the need for additional training that Van-degrift had hoped to give his men in NewZealand became apparent. The generalcriticized the “uniform and lamentable” 4failure of all units to patrol properly theirfronts and flanks.

Logistical difficulties were worse. Move-ment of supplies from the landing craft tothe beaches and then to supply dumps soonbegan to snarl. Admiral Turner blamedthis on the Marines’ failure to understandthe number of troops required for such

3Medically speaking, the weight of individualequipment was excessive in most cases for menwho had hew cooped so long in steamy holds ofships aud fed short, and sometimes inferior,rations. Ftna7Rept, Phase II, 6.

‘ Ibid., 10.

work, failure to extend the beach limitspromptly enough and, to some extent, alack of control and direction over troopsin the beach area. Rut the trouble and itscauses were neither as clear-cut nor asdamning as that. Marine planners hadforeseen a dangerous shortage of manpower at this critical point, but under theuncertain circumstances on this hostilebeach they felt they could allot no moremen to the job than the 500 from ColonelGeorge R. Rowan’s 1st Pioneer Battalion.Vandegrift did not want working partiesto cut the strength of his fighting units toa level which might risk getting them de-feated.

Hindsight now makes it clear that thesupplies mounting up as a juicy beach tar-get jeopardized the operation more thana call for additional working parties wouldhave done. There were hardly enough.Japanese fighting men ashore on the islandto bother the Vandegrift force, but if en-emy planes from Rabaul had concentratedon hitting the congested beach they wouldhave played havoc with this whole venture.Marines were aware of this risk, but theyalso expected to run into a sizable Jap-anese force somewhere in the thickeningjungle. The people in the shore partywould just have to work harder.

Sailors joined the pioneers but the beachremained cluttered in spite of this help.Needed, division officers reported later,were “additional personnel in the propor-tion of at least 100 men for each vesseldischarging cargo across the beach.” 5 Itwas not that this problem had never beenthought out and planned for in fleet exer-cises over the years. It was just that thiswas “Operation Shoestring.” The situa-tion became so bad during the night of 7-8

5Ibid., Phase V, 7.

.~ugust th:lt the I:lnding force had to ask

tlw sl~ips to stop unloading. There hadbeen air attacks that afternoon, and morewere expected on the 8th. The exhaustedworkers ueeded time to clear the beachesccl~dspread out the, gear so it would be lessof a target.

Fortunately the air attacks during theclay had concentrated on the shipping. Atabout 1100 on the ~th a coast watcher inthe Upper Solomons passed the word ontl~e watchers’ l~etwork t l~at about 18bombers were on tile way to Guach~lcanal.This warning was relayed to Ckadalcanaltluougll Brisbane within 25 minutes, andtile planes arrived at 132!().The destroyerMugfcwd sutfered 20 casualties under a250-pouncl bomb hit, but it was the onlyship struck by the attack. ~intiaircrafttire downed two of the twin-engined Tylw97’s. Later in the afternoon, at about 1500,1() Aichi dive bombers had no luck :at all,but tire from the ships scratched anothertwo ,Japanese planes. Other planes fromboth these attacks were downed byFletcher’s carrier aircraft.

At 2200 011 7 August, Vandegrift is-sued his attark order for the following day.Plans l~ad been changed. Since Mount.Iusteu was out of reach, and because only10,()(}() troops were available in the Lungsarea, he ordered an occupation of the air-field ancl est abl islmlent of a defensive linealong the IAlnga River. Positions east

aucl southeast of Red Beach would be]llaintailled temporarily to protect supplies

:111(1unloadiug until sl~ore party activitiescou]d be established within the newperimeter.

At 0930 on 8 .iugust tile 1st Batt alion,5th Marines a]ld (’ompany A, 1st TankRatt a]ion crossecl the Ilu River at

its nlouth al~d acivaucecl cautiously west-

W;II’(l :tlollg tile l)eil(>ll toward tl)e I.uuga..lt tl]e same time tile 1st Marines moveclfrom its uigllt l)erimeter. (’outact betweenlll~its within this reginwnt was falllty, butby nig]ltfall I.iel~te]]allt (’olonel I.enarcl13. ( ‘resswell’s 1st Ihltt aliol~ l)a(l o~’erruutile field ancl re:wlled the I~unga. Tl~e othertwo batt a]ions, slowed by ditlicult terrain,advanced about, 500 yards an hour andbivouacked for the night south of theairfield.

Along the beach, 1/5 and the tanks metthe first scattered resistance as they passedthrot@l the area in which the main ,Jap-anese force had been located. A few pris-oners were taken, and intelligence indi-cate(l that the e~~emy was in no positionto attack the superior Marine landingforce. Cent inued lack of resistance else-where seemed to confirm this, and at 1430the hlarines contracted their front, crossedthe Imnga by a bridge immediately northof the airfield, aud advancec{ n~ore rapidlytoward tile Kukum River, a stream iu tl~ewestern fan of the I,unga delta.

N’ith Compauy D leading, this advancecanle upon the main ,Japanese encan~pmentarea at 1500.” The enemy force, obviouslysmaller tllau anticipated, had retreated inevident haste and confusion. I.arge quan-tities of undamaged food, ammunition,engineering materiml, elect l’ical gear, andradio ec~uipment had been left behind. Al-tllougll some improperly indoctrinatedMarines began to destroy this gear, thattendency SOO]lwas halted, and in the nextfew weeks these men would lose their con-tenlpt for this windfall of material.

Except for token resistance from sonwof the straggling ,Japanese attempting to

flee west, air action constituted the enemy’s

only etfort to hamper the N[arines. .%t

about, 1100 (Toast watcher Cecil ,John N1a -

(:11.\ D.\ I.C.\hT.\I,,7–9 .II’(; ITST 1W2

son, Pilot otlicel’, R.l.i F, wnrnecl fronl hisBoug:iillville hi(le-oltt tll:lt :1 l:lyge lltlln-

her of l)l:llles Tverewinging toward ~rll:td:ll-(’til)al. In another l~ollr sonle 4{) twill-ellgine torpedo pl:lnes :lppe:ared over tilenrea to tind the task force, :~lerted by tilew:lrlling, maneuvering at tol) speed whileell)l)loying evasive txctirs.

-k torpedo sent the destroyel’ .larl~i.s

linlping sonti~e:~st for the brew 1 lebrides.

,Slw was s~lnk next day by nn enen~~ air

:ttt:~ck. ‘I’he tr:tnsport i’:’lziott, set afire

when Nn enenly I)lane crashed flboarcl, htlcl

to be be:tc]ied and destroyed by her sister

shil}s. survivors went 011 bo:trd the

fltlnter l~qqett.

Snip mlti:lircraftj tire and tigl~ter plnnesf rorn .4drni ml Noyes’ carriels sl~ot down12 ,J:tpill)ese planes, :~nd sllore-base(l amti:lircrail :~ccountec{ for t\vo nlore. Stillothers were splashed by c:~rrier-bmedfighters west of the transport nren. Atotal of seven -inlerican planes were lost.’

Tf~K ,7.4 PiliVE,YK A?KTAL[A~ TK

These early :tttacks hampered Marineoperations nnd unlo:lcling, but the be:wh-lle:~d continued to grow. The ,Japanesehad no intentions of giving up their posi-tions in tile Southern Solonlons \vitllollt:~ fierce tight, however, :uld e:lrly on 8.~ugust a t:wk force of five heavy and twolight cruisers LLllda destroyer n]:tde re:~clyto strike ~lnleric:~n shipping ill Seal:lrkCll:mnel.

After rendezvol]sing at St. George’s(;hannel off R:tb:~ul, this f(lrce ste:lllledsouth along Ilougainville’s ei~st coast untilit sighted :m .tllied patrol plane observingits course. Reversing, the sl~ips made

‘ CinCPac. “Preliminary Report, Solomon Is-lands Operation,” .ku~ust 1942, 4.

259

b:~ck 11]) tile islill](l co:lst Ul)ti] tl)e l)l:~ne(lel)+trte(l. ‘1’llei~turning agxill, they s:liledbet\veell Bollgnillville and (yl~oise(ll north-e:~st of the Shorthands :lnd set course(1OJVI1“The Slot” tow:~rd (}ll:lc]:tl~:lll:ll.

Word of this :lppronching folce re:lched.I(ll]]i]itl Tl~r]~~l :~t 1800,” :~1](1,~yl]pl] ~$(1-l~~ir:llFletcher llotitiecl him Slloltly there-:\fter tlmt the mrrier force was to be witll-(lr:~wl~, Turner c:illed Vmldegrift to thefl:tgsllip .lIcCc/lo7e,7/a]~clinformed the gen-eral tlmt, de])rivecl of c:lrrier protection,the tr:~llsports mtlst le:lve :tt 0600 the next(l:ty.

~~searly ns 2 .fugust .kdmir:al ~xllormleyl]:td kuowll of Fletcher’s intentions to re-tire the carriers befow 1)-D:Iy plLH three.’

At 18~~ on 8 .iu~ust Fletcher cited fuelsllort:lge nnd l)lalle losses th:~t ]Md reducedhis fighter cr:tft from 99 to 78 nnd :tg~tinreq[lested pernlissiol] to withdraw nntilsllfflciel}t I:tncl-lmsed :tircmft :lnd fuel were+~wlil:lble to support shipping.~ It seemsthat Ghormley hld not really expecteclthis I)roblenl to come llp, in spite ofFletcher’s announcement :nbout t]lis nmt-ter :ttj the Fiji rel~e:usals. ]~Llt 11OIY

that Fletcher W:lS nl:lking the request,~T]~orn~le~ gxve his :lpI)rov:il. Gllormle-yexl)l:lined l:lter:

When Fleteher, the man on the spot, infornwlme he hall to withdrnw for f~lel, I :~pprored. Heknew the situatit~n in (letail : I (lid not, This re-sulted in my {Iirevtinx Turner to withdr:lw hissurface form+ to prevent their destruction. IW:ISwithout deti~ile(l information as to Turner’ssituati{)n, but I knew that IIis forces had hmdwl:Irld that our major problem \vonl(I beconle oneof girin~ every suI]port possible to Vundegrift.g

‘ ( ‘t)lllSol’+Lc lYar I )i:lry, 2z\ug42 ( located atNHD).

“ Ibid., !).lng42. For n (letiiile(l diw.ussion {)f.%(1111Flett.her’s lvith(lr:l~val of his (.arriers seeilk) hftrllf/fJIC for (lt(od(rlcmal, 27—X+,117.

“ (:11 orwlry .1[s, 93,

260 I’EARL HARBOR TO GITAI)ALCAATAI,

lTandegrift held that retirement of theships would leave him in a “most alarm-ing” position.’” Division plans assumedthe ships would remain in the target areafour days, and even then all available sup-plies would prove scanty enough, such wastl~e haste with which the assault mountedout with less than the normal minimum inbasic allowances. But a withdrawal earlyon !) .iugust would take much of the sup-plies and equipment away in the holds ofships and leave beach dumps in a state ofchaos. The ‘(shoestring” of this first Alliedotiensive seemed to be pulling apart. Thiswas the first of the operation’s many darkhours. ( See Map 14, Map Section)

Tlrhile Vandegrift. conferred withTurner, the ,Japanese ships, elements ofthe enemy’s Bighth F7eet, approached,Savo Islancl undetected by destroyersRalph Talbot and Blue on picket dutynorthwest of that small island. Theyslipped past these ships toward the twoAllied cruisers, HJWAS Panberra and the1’SS Chimgo, and destroyers 11SS Bagleyand Pattemon which patro]]ed the watersbetween Savo and Cape Esperance. Far-ther north cruisers IJSS T~incennes,.4stor+a, and QuAcy and destroyers I?e[tnand Wi/.son patrolled between Savo andFlorida. Down the channel two cruiserswith screening destroyers covered thetransports.

With seaplanes up from his cruisers toscout for the Allied ships, ZJighth FleetCommander Rear Admiral Gmnichi Mi-kawa steamed southeast until he sightedhis enemy at about the same time Alliedships in Sealark Channel received reportsof one or more unidentified planes. RutAdmiral Mikawa’s surface force still wasundetected at 2313 when these reports

‘0 Finalltept, Phase II, 13.

came in. .fdmiral Turner had estimatedthat, the ,Japanese ships would hole up inRekata Bay on Santa Isabel Island andstrike at the amphibious force with tor-pedo-carrying floatp]anes.

.it 0316 Mikawa ordered independentfiring, and torpedoes leaped from theirtubes two minutes later. Japanese float-planes illuminated briefly. The Canberracaught two torpedoes in her starboard side,the Pfiimgo lost part of her bow, and thenthe ,Japanese turned toward the Alliedships between Savo and Florida.

The resulting melee was one of the worstdefeats ever suffered by the IT. S. hTavy.The Vkcenfle.s and the Quincy were lost;the Australian Canberra burned all nightand had to be abandoned and sunk; de-stroyer Ralph Talbot was damaged, and.4storia went down at noon the next day.Fortunately Mikawa retired withoutpressing his advantage in an attack on theamphibious shipping farther down thechannel, and Admiral Turner, delayinghis departure, ordered unloading to con-tinue. Late in the afternoon the trans-ports got underway for Noumea, leavingthe Marines on their own with four unitsof fire and 37 days’ supply of food.

Even when loaded in Wellington thelevel of supplies and ammunition had beenconsidered slim. ‘That original loading

of 60 days’ supplies and 10 units of fire w-asrespectively 33 and 50 per cent below the90-day and 20-unit levels then considerednormal for operations of this kind.’l Nowthe ships had taken part of these loads

“ Division staff officers admitted later that suP-plies for 60 days represented more gear thantheir slim fighting outfit could handle logisti-cally at the beach. They recommended thatlevels should be pegged at 30 days for generalsupplies, 50 days for rations. The lower level

GUADALCANAL, 7.9 AUGUST 1942 261

away, leaving a most inadequate fractionbehind. And with air support so sketchy,there was no way to know when the trans-ports could come back again. The stacksof captured ,Japanese rations began togain in importance if not in palatability.

.kccording to the war diary of the Com-mander, Task Force 62, the followingtroops were left in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area when the transports and—supply ships withdrew:

.4t Gwdalcanal:Division Headquarters Company (less de-

tachments )Division Signal Company (less detachments)5th Marines (less 2d Battalion)Ist Marinesllth Marines (less Battery It, 1st and 4th

Battalions )1st Tank Battalion ( less detachments)1st Engineer Battalion ( less detachments)1st Pioneer Battalion (less detachments)1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less de-

tachments)1st Service Battalion (less detachments)1st Medical Battalion (less det achu]ents )1st Military Police Company2d Platoon, 1st Scout ComlamyI-nits, 3d Defense BattalionLocal Naval Defense ForceTotal on (ltiadalcanal, a ~wut 10,NX)

.4t Tatagi:1st Raider Battalion1st Parachute Battalion2d Battalion, 5th Marines ( 2d Platoon, Conl-

pany .+, 1st Pioneers attached)lst, 2d, and 3d Battalions, 2d MarinesBatteries H and I, 3d Battalion, 10th MariuesDetachment, Division Headquarters CompanyDetachment, 2d Signal Company3d Defense Battalion (less detachments\Company A, 1st Medical BattalionCompany A, 2d Engineer Battalion (2d Pla-

toon, Company A, Ist Engineer 13att:tlionattached )

Company C, 2d Tank Battalion

of 10 units of fire was just right, they added; noattempt should be made to carry 20 units intofuture landings. Fina7Rept. Phase II, 17.

(’(mLIIany A. Xi .Imphihiau Tra{tor Battalion(2d Platoon, Company A, Ist An)phibian‘lYactor Battalion attached)

(’o]mmny D. 2d Medieal BattalionL’ompany A, 2d Pioneer Battalion (2d I’latoon.

Company A, 1st l’ioneer Battalion attached)Battery E, llth 31arines(’ompauy C, 2d Service BattalionLoval h-aval I)efense ForceTotal o?~ Tulagi, 6,075

Total personnel left in. area, about 16,073

The $M Marines under Colonel ,John M.Arthur had formed the division reserveand was originally slated for the occupa-tion of Ndeni, but all its battalions nowwere in action in the Tulagi area. Theregimental headquarters remained afloat,however, as did working parties from allcompanies, most of the Headquarters andService Company, Regimental ‘JJ7eaponsCompany, administrative units from thevarious battalions, and (1 and Headqu:lr-ters and Service Batteries of 3/10.

The sudden withdrawal of the trans-ports carried these units, which totaledabout 1,400 oflicers and men, back to Es-piritu Santo where they were used to “re-inforce the garrison there, ” according tothe reports of Admiral Turner. On 14.~ugust, Turner ordered Colonel Arthur toreport for dnty with the CommandingGenera], Espiritu Sante. But a few dayslater Colonel Arthur and a small numberof his otficers and men got back up toTulagi}2

There seemed no question in Turner’smind about his unrestricted claim of “pos-session” of the Marines in his area. Ifhis handling of Colonel Arthur was arather ungenerous bypass of GeneralVandegrift’s command territory, the ad-miral’s plan for those Marines who re-mained at Ikpiritu Santo was an even

“ CTF 62 War Diary, September and October1942.

PE.tRL H.\RBOR TO G[’A]}ALCAN.%J.

more glaring example of his theory ofpersonal command possession. He orderedthose “idle’> 2d Marines to form a “2dProvisional Raider Battalion.” Then hewrote to Admiral (lhormley recommend-ing an overhaul of all Marine regimentsin the Amphibious Force, South Pacific.Al] regiments then would contain raiderbattalions which could be sent out onspecial missions. Turner said he did notthink Marine regiments would be suitedto operations in the Pacific. ‘(The em-ployment of a division seems less likely,”the admiral added. He would use raiderbattalions like building blocks, and fit thelanding force to the special problem. Ob-viously, he expected the Pacific war to hesmall and tidy.

.Idmira] (lhormley answered thatTurner ought to hold up such reorganiza-tion until he found out. what the Com-mandant of the Marine Corps thought, of:111 this. .idnliral (lhormley then senttl~is letter and his endorsement to the(’commandant via .Idrniral NTimitzat PearlHarbor. Nimitz agreed with Cihormley,iilld he stressed that ‘extemporized organ-

imtion of Marine Forces should be madeonly in case of dire necessity.?> Nimitzthen forwarded this correspondence on toI,ieutenant C~ener:d Thomas I-lolcomb,Marine ( ‘ommandant.

(+meral Holcomb respol~ded to Nimitzthat tl~e latter’s objections had surelystopped Turner’s plan viithout the need forthe (’commandant to add other objections,but Holcomb noted “with regret” thatTurner had not, seen tit to ask GeneralVanclegrift abollt this plan to reorganizehis troops.

This reaction from N“imitz, and the ar-rival at about that time in the New Heb-rides of the “authentic’> 2d Raider Bat-tal ion of Lieutenant Colonel Evans F.Car]son, caused Turner to halt his plan toturn all .hphibious Force Marines intoraiders. But it took the admiral muchlonger than this to abandon his theory thatthese Marines were direct, “possessions” ofhis.”

“ ( ‘omPhibForSoPac ltr to ComSoPa@’or,2!).Ang42; (’on] SoPacFor ltr to (’inCPOA, 6Sep42;(’inCP~.l ltr to CM(’. 24 Se#2: CMC ltr to(“inCI’().A, 30ct42.

CHAPTER 3

Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo

Ti7_L.4(7Z: THE FIRST DA 1’

.~fter Task Group Yoke separated fromthe larger body of ships at 0240 on D-Day,its apllroach to Tulagi was accomplishedwithout, incident. All elements of thegroup :Irrived ill positic~n at :lbol~t 06;301

and made ready for the landing..is the ships approached the transport

area, 15 fighters and 15 dive bombers fromWasp strafed and bombed the. target area;setting fire to seaplanes that were caughtill the harbor.3 (See Map 15, Map Section)

Five-inch navzl gunfire from the de-stroyer ilfonwen, opened up at a promon-tory of Florida Island, west of Tulagi,and 60 rollnds were expended on the targetbetween 0727 and 0’732. In the meantime,both the Buchanan and San Juan (an

antiaircraft cruiser) pumped 100 roundseach into nearby targets. Buchanan con-

centrated on a point of land east of Haleta,on Florida, wl~ile the AS{77?.,7UWL blasted

‘ At (MM, Tulagi sent its message to Japanesestations to the north that an enemy surfaceforce had entered the channel. Tulagi CommBmsg of ‘i.4ug42 in 2,5th AirFlot War Dairy,.\ngust-September 1!)42, hereinafter cited as 25th.4i?’ >’k)t Diar~].

2 ComWaspAirGru Rept to CO Wasp, 10Aug42.In general, during the first day Wa,sp planesol]erated over the Tnlagi area while JS’arctoflaplanes gave comparable support to the mainlanding off Beach Red at Guadakmnal. Enter.prise planes ga~-e protection to the carriers andflew patrol missions.

‘ “063WA11 flying boats hare ken set atire

by the bombardment, ” (X’F 18 ActRept,6-10.%ug42, 1, hereinafter cited as C7’F 18 AR.

448777 0—58—1??

a small island south of the same point ofland.’

.It 0740, 20 minutes before H-hour,Company B (reinforced) of the 1st Bat-talion, 2d Marines, under command ofCaptain Edward tJ. Crane, landed onFlorida near Haleta to protect the leftflal~k of the Tulagi Force. The landingwas unopposed, although enemy troopshad been reported in position there on 25,July.’ Crane, his company reinforced bythe Ah platoon of Company D and 21 menfrom Headquarters Company, reached hisobjective within 40 minutes. The 252 otli-cers and men went ashore in eight landingboats and were guided to their objectiveby one of the several Australians on dutywith the division.e

While this covering force deployed in-land from its Florida beach, the remainderof the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (Lieu-tenant Colonel Robert E. Hill) made asimilar security landing at Florida’s

Halavo Peninsula near Gavutu andTanarnbogo. The craft drew some firefrom Gavutu but there were no casualties,and no enemy forces were encountered onthe peninsula. These Marines later re-turned to their ships.

At, Tulagi not a single landing craft ofthe first wave was able to set its passengersdirectly ashore. All of them hung up on

‘ Ibid., 2.

5 ComSoI’ac War Diary, 25Ju142 (located atXHL)).

‘ IICol H. R. Thorpe ltr to CMC, 19Jan49,

263

264 1’13AR1, H.\RROR TO GUAI).ALCANAL

coral formationsat dist:tllces v:tryil~gfrorn30 to well oyer 100 yar(ls from the beachline, and the assault personnel of raiderCompanies PI and 1) waded ashore againstno opposition, tlmough Witter initiallyfrom waist to armpit deep.’

Meanwhile the enemy defense forces,concentrntecl iu the southei~stern third oftl~e island, realized that an all-out assault\~its under ~~ay. Between 072!5 and 074!),

the Tu7Qgi C’o~)~)))~(nic(~tior~Ii’~[sz notifiedtl~e (’on] manding Officer of the Tuwnty-Fi~tfi Air F70ti77a at Rabaul that Tulagiwas under bombardment, that the landingshad begun, and thatthe senders were de-stroying all equipment immediately. At,0800 the ,Jzpanese messages said shells werefalling near the radio instnl]ation. Tenminutes later, the final message went out:“Enemy troop strength is overwhelming.We will defend to the last man.” *

Companies B and D had reached thebeach, and the landing craft carryingraider Companies A and C now began tollting upon tl~e coral. The Weapons (’on-pany (Captain George W. Herring) ofthe raider battalion, whose 60nm mortarshad been attached to the assault com-l)anies,’ headed ashore to assume respon-sibility for beachheatl security.

Assaulting, Marines crossed the beachand moved up the face of a steep, heavily-wooded coral slope, the southwestern por-tion of the 350-foot ridge that forms analmost unbroken wall along the island%entire length. Major Lloyd Nickerson’sCompany B pushed on to the far coast ofthe island where it captured, without oppo-

‘ }Ia.j J. ~. Erskine interview in HistDiv,HQklC, l~~lar~~.

825th AirFlot I>iaru.‘ klajs J. 13.Sweeney, H. Stiff, W. E. Sperling

interview in HistDi~, HQMC, 4Feh49, herein-after cited as Sweeney Znterb+eto.

sition, the native village of Sasapi. Thiscompauy then swung to the right. and, ty-ing in with Major ,Justice (Mambers’ Com-pany D which had gained the high ground,began moving southeast. The advance ofthese two companies was steady and with-out opposition until Company B reachedCarpenter’s Wharf, halfway down the eastshore of the island, where it encountereda series of enemy outposts.

Meanwhile a d d i t i o n a 1 raiders hadlanded. Captain Lewis W. Walt’s (’om-pany A, landing to follow the leadingcompanies, swung right atop the ridgespine, and tied in on the left with (’onl-pany D. Major Kenneth Bailey’s (Xonl-pany C also swung right, tied its left flankto Company .%, and echeloned itself to theright rear to the, beach. Spread out acrosstlle island, the raiders swept sout l~eastagainst little o~,position until Phase Line.%, from the ]ligb ground northwest of Hill281 to (Xarpeuter’s Wharf, was reachedat 1120. Here Major (’llambers waswounded by IIlortar tire, it]]d (‘apt ainWillianl F,. Sperling assumed command of(“ompauy D.

By this time Colonel Edson, command-ing the 1st Raider Battalion, was ashoreand ready to begin a coordinated attack tothe southeast. Confronting him was tilemore thickly settled portion of tl~e islandwhere the 13ritisl~ governmental activitieshad centered. This area is a saddle be-tween the ridge first swept by the raidersand a smaller hill mass at the is]and:ssoutheastern end.’”

After directing a preparatory fire of in-fantry weapons into the area to their front,

‘0 The raiders had been well briefed on the ter-

rain of the island by Lt H. E. Josselyn, RANR,

a former resident of the area who had intimate

knowledge of it. Ibid.

T(TLAGI ASI) GAVUTI:-T.kNAMBOGO 265

the raiders moved out toward the highground beyond the saddle. Company C,on the right flank of the attack, drew firealmost immediately from Hill 208, a knobforward of the ridge that had just beencleared. The bulk of the Japanese resist-ance concentrated in the seaward face ofthe high ground, and Company C wascaught by fire from enemy infantryweapons as it tried to pass between thehill and the beach. The raider companythen turned its attack toward the hill andfought for nearly an hour before the Jap-anese positions were silenced.

Radio communications between Edsonand General Rupertus deteriorated rap-idly after this attack was launched, but theraider commander remained in contactwith his fire support ships, Operationorders called for the various fire supportsections to provide the landing force withnaval gunfire liaison parties, and two ofthese were in Edson’s CP with theirradios.11 When the other raider companiescame under fire from Hill 281 while Com-pany C fought against Hill 208, Edson putthese naval gunfire teams to work. The,$”an.Juan fired a seven-minute, 280-roundconcentration of 6-inch shells onto Hill281. When it lifted the raiders advancedwith a steady pressure against the enemy.

Four hours later, at 1625, Edson notifiedRupertus that 500 enemy had broken con-tact with his force and had withdrawn intothe southeastern ridge.

The advance continued slowly untildusk. At that time Company E (raiders ),relieved of the beach defense mission by2]5 which had landed at 0916, reported toits parent organization. Company D, nowon the extreme left flank, had met little

u CTF 18 AR, 2; Lt A. L. Moon ltr to LtCol R. D.Heinl, Jr., 13Feb49.

opposition since midmorning, when thefirst enemy encountered were flushed nearCarpenter’s 1$’harf by Company B. Afterthis contact Company D pushed southzlong the eastern beach and at duskreached the crest of Hill 281. MeanwhileCompany B moved up again, now on theright of Company D, and gained highground overlooking the cut of a cross-island roadway through the saddle be-tween Hills 281 and 230. Company D, onthe far side of the road and to the left ofB, took up night defensive positions withits right flank resting on the southernbrink of the cut. Company B, augmentedby elements of Headquarters Company,rested its left flank on the cut and extendedits lines generally westward along thebrink.” Both companies put listeningposts forward of the lines.

Companies .4 and C (less one platoon)meanwhile encountered the terrain featurewhich harbored the islandk most seriousresistance. In the forward slope of Hill281, a deep ravine lay almost parallel tothe raider advance and debouched severalhundred yards southeast of Hill 208. Itssides were precipitous, and within it theenemy held strong positions which madeassault hazardous. Maps which had beencaptured and translated during the dayconfirmed that this ravine would containthe core of enemy resistance.

With further action against the pocketimpossible at the time, all battalion ele-ments went into position for the night.Company E was placed on Company B’sright, while Companies A and C (less oneplatoon) respectively tied in from theright of Company E. The positions ex-tended along high ground facing the ra-

“ Sweenev Interview.

vine’s long axis, and listening posts wereestablished.13

During Edson’s sweep down the island,the i?d Battalion, 5th Marines (Rose-cnwns), had landed 1,085 officers and menand committed its units to various tasks.(’ompany F scouted the northwest sectionof the island but met no opposition. At,1000 Company E was ordered to operategenerally in support of Company B (raid-ers), and one hour later the 3d Platoon of~’ornpany H (weapons) went forward toassist, (Yompany C (raiders) in the latter’sattack against Hill 208. 13y 1300, whenthe raider battalion began its attack fromPhase Line A, Conlpany G moved downthe trail along the ridge line and supportedthe raider battalion. Rosecrnns’ com-mand post later displaced southeast fromnear Beach Blue toward the scene of thisaction.

TLI’L.4GI—TIIE F[12LST iVIGIJT

AND SUCCEEDING DAY

The first night on Tulagi set the patternfor many future nights in the Pacific war.During darkness, ~our separate attacksstruck the raider lines, and, although mi-nor penetrations occurred, the enemy madeno attempt to consolidate or exploit hisgains. The first attack, which met withsome initial success, hit between (’on~-panies C and A. Outposts fell back to themain line of resist ante ( MLR), and tiletwo companies were forced apart. Theattack isolated Company (7 from the restof the battalion, but the company was notmolested again. Company .% refused itsright flank and awaited developments.

They were not long in coming. Shift-ing the dil~ection of his attack tolvard his

right front, the enemy attempted to roll

back Walt’s men from the refused flank.Rut the flank held, killing 26 .Tapanesewithin 20 yards of the MI~R.

Tlmt ended the concerted attacks of thenight. Thereafter, enemy efforts consistedentirely of attempts at quiet infiltration ofthe Marine positions. Individuals andsmall groups workecl from the ravinethrough the raider lines and launched fiveseparat,e small-scale attacks against tilecommand post, between 0030 and 0530.These were repulsed, and efforts on thepart of two other enemy groups to skirtthe beach flanks of Companies D and Clikewise were turned back.

On the morning of 8 August, two com-panies of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,moved up to assist in the sweep of thesoutheastern part of the island. Compa-nies I? and F, 5th Marines, passed throughCompany D raiders, attacked down theforward slope of Hill 281, and swung righttoward the enemy pocket in the ravine.

h’ow flanking this troublesome terrainfeature on three sides, Marines laid down aheavy mortar concentration from the60mm weapons of the raiders and 2/5’s81s. By midafternoon the preparationwas complete, and at 1500 the raiders and(lnnpany G, 5th Marines, pushed throughthe ravine to wipe out remaining resist-ance. This ended organized opposition 011the island, and by nightfall of 8 AugustTulagi was labeled secure. For severaldays, however, individual Japanese andsmall groups continued to be flushed fromhiding places and hunted down by patrol-ling Marines.

THE Z.4.WDZ.7’GLS ON

GA VL?TL7-T.4N.4MB0 (70

These islets, each dominated by a low,precipitous central hill of coral, are joined“ Ibid.

267

by a 50(J-yard causeway. Gavutuqs hill,1M feet in height, stands some 25 to 30 feetl)igher tluu~ Tanambogo’s highest point,a]ld (+arntu th~~s became the main ob-jective of the landing which aimed at thel~igher ground.

The plans” called for tile landing tostrike the northeast coast after an ap-proach from the east, and since Tanan-bogo lies approximately northwest ofGavutu tl~e assault force faced the possi-bility of flanking fire from that island aswell as frontal resistance from the mainobjective. opposition from both islandswas expected from tile terrain dominatingthe flat beach.

Naval gunfire and close air support bySBD’s from the Wmp were expected toIleutralize most enemy emplacements ontl~ese hills, but the fire plan did not reckonwith the coral cave. Caves of this typebegan to appear as serious obstacles forthe parachute battalion on Gavutu at abouttile same time the raiders began to en-counter them on Tulagi.

Surprise was impossible. There werenot sufficient craft for simultaneous huld-ings, and the hour of assault was estab-1ished in General Vanclegrift’s Operationorder Number 7–42 as H-plus four hours.So four hours after the raider li~nding onTulagi, tile parachute battalion made itsfrontal mssault in the face of tire from analerted garrison which was supported byfires from a flanking position.

The battalion went ashore in three

waves, one company per wave. The thor-

“ 1st Mar I)iv (lpord No. 742, 20.Ju142 See1,’inalRf,pt, Phase II, Annex E, 2. Gavutu’s in]-i]{)rtance stemn)ed from the islet’s numerous in-stallations whirh iIICIUded machine shops, jetties.

and a radio station. VSN XL) Hydro, T“ol. Z—Suiling I)iwctions For tltc Paci/ic Islands,

( \Vashington : GPO, 1938, 4th ed, ), 323.

Oug]llless lyitll ~yhich the antiaircraft,

cruiser Nan ,lua~, lmd carried out l~er tiresupport mission-280 rounds of (i-inck fireagainst Gavutu in four minutes ‘s—andthe intensity of the Wa.sp’,S dive-bombers’preparatio]l caused heavy damage to theenemy installations, but this destructionactually worked to the disadvantage. ofthe parachute battalion in one instance.The unit intended to land on a seaplaneramp from which the beach could be easilyreached, but the ramp had been reducedto an unusable mass of rubble. obserwing this, the landing wave commanders al-tered course slightly to the north wherecraft became even more vulnerable toflanking fire. Part of the troops, scram-bling over a concrete pier that jutted fourfeet out of the water, were exposed to firefrom both islands. General Vandegriftestimated that troops landing in this areasuffered ten per cent casualties.

Company A, the first wave, got ashorewithout casualties to work inland againstno serious opposition. The four boatscarrying Company B and the final wave,with Company C and miscellaneous at-tachments, came under fire as they nearedthe island. The landing succeeded, hovr-ever, and Company B, moving left andworking toward Gavutu’s southern end,gtined some protection from enemy fireand continued to attack.

Pinned down on the beach under heavyfire, the other companies made no advancesuntil Company B gained high ground fromwhich its fire assisted in getting the attackoff the beach. Hill 148, Gavutu’s highground, was plastered by naval guns andassaulted on the east and southeast. By1430, M:ljor (Xllar]es -~. Miller, who hadsucceeded the wounded Major Robert H.

‘5CTF 18 AR, 2.

268 I’E.<RL HARB(.)R TO G1~AI)AI,CANA1,

Willimrns in command, controlled most ofthe island. Partially defiladed positionson Hill 148’s west-southwestern slopes,however, still were active, and enemy em-placements there znd on Tanambogothreatened further advance. Miller re-quested reinforcements to complete thecapture of both islands.

In anticipation of their arrival, Milleralso requested an air strike and naval gun-fire on Tanambogo, and Wasp planes fur-nished a lo-minute strike while Bucha,mznand Mcmssen, in position south of Gavutu,tired over that island and subjected theexposed faces of the hill on Tanarnbogoto an intense concentration of 5-inch shells.

By this time mllforces availnb]e to Gen-eral Rupertus had been committed, butsince Captain Edward Crane’s CompanyB ( 1/2) had met. no opposition on Floridanear Tulagi, this unit was ordered to re-port to Miller. The message reached thecompany just as landing craft arrived towithdraw the Marines from their Floridabeach.”

Embarked in six landing craft, the com-pany arrived at (lavutu at about 1800, AndMiller directed Crane to land on Tanam-bogo and seize that island. Told that, onlya few snipers held the island, Crane guidedhis overcrowded craft around the eastshore of Tanambogo according to direc-tions provided by Flight Lieutenant Spen-cer, RAAF, and under cover of darknessattempted a landing on a small pier on thenortheastern tip of the island. (One boat ~containing the 2d I>latoon, hLmg up on acoral reef at @Lvutu and took no part inthe Tanambogo assault. )

The first boat landed without incident,and tl~e men deployed along the beach;b~~tas the second hoat discharged its men,

‘“ l,t(’[jl W. B. Kyle ltr to ~11~, 10B’etj4!).

a shell from one of the fire support shipsignited a nearby fuel dump, and the result-ing glare 1ighted the lancling area andexposed the Marines. The enemy openedup immediately, taking all boats underrifle and machine-gun tire. Casualtiesmounted among the Marines ashore andstill afloat, but the boat crews, being ex-posed, suffered most heavily. C)ne. crewwas completely wiped out and a Marineassumed control of the craft.

The reinforcing machine-gun platoon(4th Platoon, Company I)) in the secondboat managed to set up two of its weaponson the pier, but. intense enemy fire forceda withdrawal.

Ill the meantime, (l-me and about 30men had gone ashore. The intensity ofresistance, however, made withdrawal in-evitable, and Crane sllcceeded in reembark-ing all wounded and all but 12 of the mblesllrvivors. The boats withdrew, some toGnvutl~ where they reported the event, andothers direct to ships where the woundedwere put aboard. Two of the men leftashore managed to return to Gavutu atabout 2200 in a rowboat? while Crane andI.ieutenant ,John ,J. Smith, leader of the2d Platoon, and the remainder of the dozennlen made their way around the beach andover the causeway to arrive at Miller’sGamtu comnxmd post xbout midnight.

.it 2200, lmving been informed of theabortive attack on Tanarnbogo, GeneralRupertlls requested the release of an addi-

tional combzt team. This request reachedVandegrift during his conference with.idmiral Turner on board the I~SS .Mc-Pawley, and Vandegrift, Turner concllr-riug, released the remaining two battalionsof the Division Reserve. At 0330, 8

.kugustj tile ITSS I>re,szdent E?aye,s andPwsidm t Adams, with the 1st and 3d Bat-

TIT.AGI AN1} GAVI’TI;-T.W’JAYIBOGO 26!)

Ealions, M hlarilles ( reinforced) em-barked, were ordered to cross from thetransport area oil’ (+uadalcanal’s BeachI{ed to tile Tulagi transport zrea. Sinlul-ianewlsly battalion commanders receivedorders to land their troops at lleach]Jlue on Tulagi and report to GeneralRupertus.’7

Upon arrival at the transport area offBeach lllue at 0730, the 3d Batt:dion wasdirected to pass to (ktvutuj reinforce thetroops engaged there, and seize Tananl-bogo. (lrders for the 1st Battalion werecancelled and this unit did not land.

l’he 3d IIattalion, under LieutenantColonel Robert G. Hunt, landed on Gavutuin a succession of boat waves, with com-panies in the following order: CompanyL, with Mb Platoon, (’ompany M attached,at 1000; Company K, with 4th Pl:ltoon,(’ompany M attached, at 1025; (YompanyI, with M Platoon, (’ompany M attached,at 1050; Company M, less 3d, M, and 5thPlatoons, with Headquarters (’ompal~y, at1120.

Troops deployed initially to eliminate(kwltu opl)osition and to take Tananl-bogo under fire. (’ompany 1,, for exmnple,assumed positions generally around thebase of Hill 148 facing Tanambogo, while(’ompuny K moved up the hill to relievel)arachute battalion elements in positionsthere. .ft 1330 Company K had justaccomplished its mission when an ,SBDpilot dropped a bomb within companypositions on the northwest nose of the hill.Three men were killed and nine wounded.

“ CWO T, W. Hustotl ltr to (XC, 2M)ec48.Orders to report to Rulwrtus did not go throughCol J. M. Arthur, CO XEWir. Ei~~h battalioncommander wm notified direct, and it was notuntil he rvached Espiritu Santo that Arthurknew which of his trool)s had been committed.(’01 R. 11. Hill interview at HistI)iv, lSApr49.

Eight of tile casualties were men of thes(lpportill,g l)latoon of Company M.

.ft 1W5, Captain W. B. Tinsley, com-l~landiilg (’ompany 1, was ordered to pre-pare for a lancling on Tanambogo. Hewould have the support of two tanks from(’ompany (.” of the 2d Tank Battalion(one of the reinforcing units of tile AIMarines ), and his attack would be pre-ceded by a lo-minute naval gllnfirepreparation by the Buchanan. The com-lNLnywould not be accompanied by its sup-porting machine-gun platoon, which wasto stay in position on Gavutu and laydown supporting tires from there.

At 1315 the tanks landed on Gavut.u.I.ieutenant E. ,J. Sweeney, commandingthem, was ordered to land at 1615 on Tan-ambogoj llsing one tank to cover the southside of the hill on that. island and theother to cover the eastern slope.

The naval gunfire preparation began at1600. Twenty minutes later the assaultCOlll])illl~j following the tanks, made itslanding. Lieutenant Sweeney was killed,but his tank rendered valuable support tothe riflemen. The other tank, getting toofar ahead of the assault troops, was dis-abled by an iron bar and set afire by oil-soaked rags employed by Japanese rifle-luen. The entire enemy group was wipedout; 42 bodies were piled up around the(Iisabled tank.

.4t 1620 Company I landed and formedtwo attack groups. (he worked up thesouthern slope of the Tanambogo hillwhile the other, moving to the right andthen inland, attacked up the eastern slope..Japanese fought fiercely from caves anddllgouts, and the eastern group drew firefrom a few enemy riflemen and machinegllllners on (+aomi, a tiny islet a few hun-dred yards east of Tanarnbogo. N’aval

270 PEARL HARBOR TO GCADALCANAI,

gunfire. from ~TSS @ri~ley was directecl

upon Gaomi at 1’700 and positions on the

small island were silenced. .lt this time

the 1st platoon of Company ~ attacked

across the causeway from Gccvutu, secured

the .Tanambogo end of the causewa-yj and

took up positions for the night.

By 21oo, the southeastern two-thirds of

the island had been secured, and at 2300

a light nmchine-~un platoon from (20m -

pany &l reported to company I for sup-

port against enemy counterattacks. Con-

siderable close-in fighting took place dur-

ing the night between the ~larines and

,Japanese who sallied from foxholes and

dugouts. No change in position occurred,

however, and by late the next day con-

tinued attacks had secured the island.

l~hile Gavutu and Tanambogo were

mopped up, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d

13farines unloaded at Tulagi. The 1st

Battalion, unen~agecl since its 7 Ilugust

lancling on Florida, went ashore at 13each

Blue at 0900 on 9 .lu~ust. The 2d 13at-

t alien ( Nfa jor orin K. Pressley ) followed

an holu- later.

Here, as at Guadalcanal, the amphibian

tractor emerged as a versatile piece of

equipment whose importance ancl utility

could hardly be overestimated. From

noon of 8 .~ugust throughout, the follow-

ing night, five of these vehicles of the 3d

Platoon, company .\, 2d ;Imphibian

Tractor Battalion (one of the reinforcing

elements of the 2d klarines ) operated be-

tween Gavutu and the President Adam .Y.

They carried water, supplies, ammunition,

ancl personnel to shore and evacuated

wounded on the return trips. C)n one oc-

casion a tractor movecl some distance in-

land to attack a ,Tapanese position that, hacl

pinned down ancl wounded a number of

I%riues. ITsing their two machine guns,

one .30 and one .50 caliberj the tractor%

crew neutralized the enemy fire and then

evacuated the wounded ~Iarines.ls The

five tractors of the platoon were taken

hack on board the Adcz)n,s before sundown

011 ~ .< U~LISt.

lVith the fall of Tanambo~o, the last

effective resistance in the Nggela islancl

group ceased. Subsequent operations

consisted of mopping up, consolidating

defensesj and occupyin~ several small

peripheral islands including M:zk:m~bo,Mbangai, Kokomtumbu, and Songonan-gona.”

The mission of clearing out these smallis] ands fell to various units of the 2dBattalion, 2d hlarines. hlakambo was

taken by ~ompany )3, ~~ban~ai by Com-

pany F, and Kokomtambu and Son~onan-

goni L,by Company G. occupation of all

these smaller islands was completed

cluring the morning of 9 .Lugust. In :L1lcases> opposition was sl@t.

Occupation of the entire island group

ancl destruction of the ,Tapanese garrison

had been accomplished in three days. The

few prisoners taken were questioned and

sent to rear areas. lfost of them finally

were placed in a prisoner of war camp

near Featherstone, New Zealand.

(Comparatively, the ~lmerican losses

were not excessive. .<n early report by

Rl~pertus to the effect that the parachtlte

18 ,,. . this was an emergency undertaking

only as it is not considered that the tractor isa tactical combat vehicle.’) Final Rept, Phase 11,16,

‘“ Sl)elliug of place names are those whichappear in AyailinflDirections for tltr I’ocific Is-lattd.s, op. cit. The versions given there differ innumerous cases from those used in official reI]ortsof the campaign. I<okolllti~]llb~l, for instance,al)pesrs in at least three different guises, whileS{)llg(lrl:lllg(~l]:l sllrrendered its musical name toelner~e as “Singsong” Island.

271

battalion had suffered 50-60 per centcasualties can only be explained in termsof inadequate communications betweenhim and his troops ashore.

The exact number of ,Tapanese casualtieswill never be known. An estimated 750-800 enemy were present in the Tulagi-Gavutu-Tanambogo area at the time ofthe landings. Twenty-three prisonerswere taken, and an intelligence summarygives 70 as the approximate number ofsurvivors who escaped to Florida.

Immediately after organized resistanceceased and the isolated defending groupswere rounded up or wiped out, Tulagi andits satellite islands were organized for de-fense against counterattack. The 1stParachute Battalion, depleted by its ex-perience on Gavutu, moved from thatisland at 1700 on 9 August to Tulagi, whereit went into position in the Governmentbuilding area, The 2d Battalion, 5thMarines occupied the southeastern sectorof the island, while two battalions of the2d Marines took over the defensive mis-sion in the northwest. The 1st Battalionoccupied the extreme end of the islandwhile the 2d Battalion established posi-tions at Sasapi. Third Battalion, 2dMarines, took over the occupation anddefense of (lavutn, Tanambogo, andMakanlbo.2”

The logisti{ problem on Trrlagi was aminiature of that encountered on Guadal-C:lIla], although certain details were pe-culiar to Tulagi. The beachhead, forinstance, was severely restricted by theabrupt ridge and, there were no usab]e

mCO1 (’. I’. t-an Ness ltr to (~ilf(’, 12.Jan49.I)efense initially was oriented against, an antici-pated attack from Flori{lii and artillery positionswere selected with this, as well as the ]mssihilityof a sea-borne attack, in view, r.t(:ol M. 1,.Curry interview at lIistI)iv, 28.Tan4!).

roads. only ilfter noon of the seconcl daywas it possible to move supplies ashore atthe piers on the eastern coast. BothGavutu and Tanambogo were so small thaton] y ammunition and water were 1andeduntil the islands were secured.

Naval gunfire on this side of the Solo-mon Islands operation had more of a work-out, than it had received across the channeliit (luadalcanal where opposition was atfirst light,, but it was not an unqualifiedsuccess. As a matter of fact it was “verypoor,” according to naval headquarters inWashington.2’ But this failing was causedmostly by lack of intelligence and time forplanning and coordinated training. Im-proper ordnance made for another failing.Only armor-piercing shells could haveblasted the Japanese from their caves, butthe ships repeatedly fired high-capacitybombardment projectiles. Although manyNaval officers were still of the opinion thata ship was a “fool to fight a fort,” somebegan to agree with the Marine Corps thatnaval gunfire properly employed could bea big help in an amphibious assault. ItW;W a case of the gunfire ships needing tomove in closer for their fire missions. Thecommander of one ship reported:

It was observed that the enemy had not beendriven from the beach at Gavutu by the shellingand bombing preceding the landing. Further-more Tanambogo withstood two days of inter-mittent bombing and straffing and was not takenuntil a destroyer closed in to point blank rangeand shelled it for several minutes. It was evi-dent that this fire was necessary to insure thecapture of Tanambogo without fllrther heavycasualties.;’

Taking into account the indications that,these shortcomings would be corrected in

2’ CominGh, “Battle Experiences, Solomons Is-land A(>tion, ”’ I>)forln<!tion /??illrti)? ATO.2 ( located:LtAWL)), Chap .X, 10.

“ l-SS fIcv/{’ood Ilept . l~~UK#~, 3,

TULAGI AND GAVUTU-T.4NAMBOG0 273

later operations, the Marine Corps wasgenerally satisfied with the ships’ fire.“The operation did not invol~7e a realtest . . . [but] nothing developed dur-ing the operation to indicate the need forany fundamental change in doctrine.” 23

After these three days of fighting in theTulagi area, this side of the operation re-mained quiet. Enemy planes bypassed itto strike at the more tempting Guadal-

2’ Final Rept, Phase V, 6.

canal airfield and perimeter. Surfacecraft shelled Tulagi occasionally, but neverwas it subjected to the kind of bombard-ment that struck Guadalcanal in October.There is no record that enemy reinforce-

ments landed either on Tulagi or on Flor-ida Island. With this sharp fighting outof the way, the division could give all itsattention to things on the larger island ofGuadalcanal. There the picture was not

a bright one.

CHAPTER 4

The Battle of the Tenaru

With naval support gone, about the onlyhope was the airfield. Shipping wouldneed air cover before regular runs couldbolster the Marines’ slim supply levels, andtime was of the essence. If the Japanesestruck hard while the landing force wasabandoned and without air support, theprecarious first step toward Rabaul mightwell have to be taken all over again. Van-degrift centered ]lis defense :lt t]le field

and gave completion of the strip top pri-ority equal to the task of building the per-imeter’s MLR.

On 8 August, almost as soon as the fieldwas captured, Lieutenant Colonel FrankGeraci, the Division Engineer Officer, andMajor Kenneth H. Weir, Division AirOfficer, had made an inspection of the ,Jap-anese project and estimated the work stillneeded. They told Admiral Turner that2,600 feet of the strip would be ready intwo clays, that the remaining 1,178 feetwould be operational in about two weeks.Turner said he woLdcl have aircraft sent inon 11 August. But the engineer officer]lad made his estimate before the trans-ports took off with his bulldozers, powersl~ovels~ and dump trucks.’

Again, however, the Marines gainedfrom the ,Japanese failure to destroy theirequipmewt before fleeing into the jungle.

‘ “The failure to Ian(lengineer equirmeut andI]}ac,hineryseverely handi(,nl]lwl our etiorts t<)complete the airfield and its defenses. Construc-tion equiruueut and personnel are not a luxurybut. an nbsolute neccwsity in modern warfare. ”Fi)ial l/czJi,I’base III, 12–13,

Already the U. S. forces were indebted tothe enemy for part of their daily twomeals, and now they would finish the air-field largely through the use of enemytools. This equipment included nine roadrollers (only six of which would work),two gas locomotives with hopper cars on anarrow-gauge railroad, six small generat-ors (two were damaged beyond repair),one winch with a gasoline engine, about 50hitnd carts for dirt, some 75 hand shcwels,

and 2?80 pieces of explosives.

In spite of this unintentional assistance

from the Japanese, the Nlarine engineers

did not waste any affection on the previous

owners of the equipment. The machinery

evidently had been used continuously for

some time with no thought of mainte-

nance. Keeping it running proved almost

as big a job as finishing the airfield, and

one of the tasks had to be done practically

by hand, anyway. The ,Japanese had

started at each end of the airstrip to worktoward the middle, and the landing hadinterrupted these eiforts some 180 to 200feet short of a meeting. Assisted by a fewtrucks and the narrow gauge hopper cars(wllicl~ had to be loaded by hand), engi-neers, pimleers, and others who could be

spared moved some 100jOOOcubic feet oftill and spread it cm this low spot at mid-iield. .1 steel girder the ,Japanese hacl in-tende(l to use in a hangar served as a drag,aJ)d a .Jalxmese road roller flattened anclImcked tl]e fill after it had been spread.

THE BATTLE OF THE TEN’ARU 275

Problems facing the infantry troopswere just as great. There had been no im-pressive ground action on Guadalcanalsince the landing, but intelligence in theimmediate vicinity as well as in the SouthPacific in general was not yet able to indi-cate when, how, and where ,Japanese re-action would strike. Estimating acountermanding to be the most probablecourse of Japanese action, General Vande-grift placed his MLR at the beach. Therethe Milrines built a 9,600-yard defensefrom the mouth of the IIL~ River westaround Lungs Point to the village ofKukum. The Ilu flank was refused 600yards inland on the river’s west bank, andat Kllkurn the left flank turned inlandacross the flat land between the beach andthe first high ground of the coastal hills.The 5th Marines (less one battalion) heldthe left sector of the line from Kukum tothe west bank of the Lunga, and the re-mainder of the line (inclusive of theLung-a ) was held by the 1st Marines. (SeeMap 16)

The line was thin. The bulk of the com-bat forces remained in assembly areasinland as a ready reserve to check attacksor penetrations from any sector. Inland(sol~th) of the airfield, a 9,000-yard stretchof rugged jllngle terrain was outpostedby men from the artillery, pioneer, engi-

neer) and amphibian tractor battalions.These men worked during the day andstood watch on the lines at, night.

The workers on the airfield as well asthose on the thin perimeter were underalmost constant enemy observation. Sub-nlnrines and destroyers shelled the area at\yill day or night. Large flights of high-

! level bombers attacked the airfield daily,‘1 :~nd observation planes were continually

intruding’ with light bombs and strafing

attacks. .~t night the enemy patrols be-came increasingly bold, and troops on theMLR mounted a continuous alert duringthe hours of darkness. South of the air-field the ol~tpost line had to be supple-nlented by roving patrols.

In spite of this harassment, the perim-eter shaped up. The 1st Special Weap-ons Battalion dug in its 75mm tank de-stroyers (half-tracks) in positions inlandfrom the beach, but kept them ready tomove into prepared positions near thewater. Howitzers of the llth Marineswere situated to deliver fire in all sectors.Tile 2d and 3d Battalions of the artilleryregiment had 75mm pack howitzers andthe 5th B~ttalion had 105mnl howitzers.nThere were no 155mm howitzers or guns ~for counterbattery, there was no sound-flash equipment for the location of enemybatteries, and the 3d Defense Battalionhad not hacl a chance to unload its 5-inchseacoast ~LIns or radar units prior tothe departure of the amphibious shipping..1 ir defense within the perimeter also wasinadequate. There were $lOmm antiair-craft guns inshore, but the restricted sizeof the perimeter kept them too close to thefield for best employment.

It was a hazardous and renlote toe-holdwhich the Marines occupied, and withinthe Pacific high command there were somegrave doubts whether they could hang on.31ajor General Millard F. Harmon said toGenernl Marshal] in a letter on 11 August:

The thing that impresses me more than any-thing else in connection with the Solomon actionis that we are not prepared to follow up. . .We have seized a strategic position from whichfuture operations in the Bismarcks can bestrongly supported. Can the Marines hold it?There is considerable room for doubt.z

‘ (’GSoPac ltr to CofSA, 1lAug42 (located at0(’MH )

2?6 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANTAL

Admiral Ghormley, also concernedabout the precarious Marine position,3 on12 August ordered Admiral McCain’s TF63 to employ all available transport ship-ping to take aviation gasoline, lubricants,ammunition, bombs, and ground crews toGuadalcanal. To avoid Japanese air at-tacks, the ships were to leave EspirituSanto in time to reach Sea]w-k Channellate in the clay, unload under cover ofdarkness, and depart early the followingday.

For the “blockade run” to Guadalcanal,Admiral McCain readied four destroyertransports of TransDiv 12. They wereloaded with 400 drums of aviation gaso-line, 32 drums of lubricant, 282 bombsfrom 100- to 500-pounders, belted ammu-nition, tools, and spare parts. Also onboard were five officers and 118 Navy en-listed men from a Navy construction base(Seabee) unit, Cub-1. Under the com-mand of Major C. H. Hayes, executiveofficer of VMO–251, this unit was to aidthe Marine engineers in work at the fieldand to serve as ground crews for fightersand dive bombers scheduled to arrivewithin a few days.

McCain’s ships arrived off Guadalcanalduring the night of 15 August, and theequipment and men were taken ashore.By this time the Marine engineers hadfilled the gap in the center of the landingstrip and now labored to increase thelength of the field from 2,600 feet to nearly4,000 feet. Work quickened after the Sea-bees landed, but there was no steel mattingand the field’s surface turned to sticky

3He warned Adms King and Nimitz that Guad-alcanal might again fall to the Japanese if carriersupport and reinforcements were not made avail-able. ComSoPac msgs to (’inCPac and CominCh,16 and 17.%ug42, in SoI’ac Iyar Diary (located atNHD)

mud after each of the frequent tropicalrains.

General Harmon blamed a faulty plan-ning concept for the serious shortages oftools, equipment, and supplies. The cam-paign, he said, “. . . had been viewed byits planners as [an] amphibious operationsupported by air, not as a means of estab-lishing strong land based air action.” 4

But in spite of these shortages at theairfield and elsewhere, the Lunga Pointperimeter was taking on an orderly routineof improvement and defense. Motortransport personnel had put their meagerpool of trucks into operation shortly afterthe landing, and they had added some 35.Tapanese trucks to the available list.Pioneers had built a road from the airfieldto the Lunga River where they erected abridge to the far side of the perimeter.Supply dumps also had been put in order.The pioneers cleared the landing beach,moving gear west to the Lungs-Kukumarea, and sorted and moved Japanese sLlp-plies. The old ,Japanese beach at Kukumwas cleaned LLpand reconditioned to re-ceive U. S. material.

Most of the work of moving the beachdumps to permanent sites was completedin four days. There was a great amountof tonnage to handle in spite of the factthat only a small portion of the supplieshad been landed. Amphibian tractors andall available trucks, including the .Japa-nese, were used. The Government Track(the coastal road to Lungs) was improvedand streams and rivers bridged to speedtruck traffic. The amphibians carriedtheir loads just otfshore through shallowsurf, and farther out to sea the lightersmoved from old beach to new and back

‘ CGSoPac ltr to CGAAF, 23Aug42 (located at0C7MH).

THE BATTLE OF THE TENARU 277

again. The amount of supplies at eachof the new classified dumps was kept lowto avoid excessive loss from bombardment.

Captured material included almost,every type item used by a military force—arms, ammunition, equipment, food, cloth-ing, fuel, tools, and building materials:

As the division was acutely short of every-thing needed for its operation, the captured ma-terial represented an important if unforeseenfactor in the development of the airfield andbeach defenses and the subsistence of the gar-risons

The landing force was particularly shortof fuel, but in this case the supply leftbehind by the Japanese garrison was notas helpful as it might have been. Marinesfound some 800 to 900 drums of Japaneseaviation gasoline on (%adalcanal, but this9@octane fuel was not quite good enoughfor our aircraft, and it was too “hot” andproduced too much carbon in trucks andHiggins boats unless mixed evenly withU. S. ‘72-octane motor fuel. Likewise some150,000 gallons of ,Japanese motor fuel of60 or 65 octane proved unreliable in ourvehicles although some of it was mixedwith our fuel and used in emergency innoncombat vehicles.

So critical was the sLIpply of gasolineand diesel fuel that the divisiorl soonadopted an elaborate routine of ‘Lofficialscrounging>’ from ships that came into thechannel. Rows of drums were lined bungLIp on old artillery lighters, and these craftwould wallow alongside ships where Ma-rines would ask that a hose from the ships’blllk stores be passed over so they couldfill the drllnls one at a time. This methodhelped the Marines’ fuel sLlpply, but notrelations with the X:Lvy. SImLll boats tak-

ing off supplies had ditiiculty negotiati]]g

‘ l’i)ullh%pt, Phase III, 4.

their passes alongside with the unwieldy1ighters in the way, and ships officers quitefrequently took a dim view of draggingalong such bulky parasites when they hadto take evasive action during the suddenair raids. But the system often workedwell when early preparations were madewith particularly friendly ships.

This over-water work in Sealark Chan-nel, maintaining contact between Tulagiand Guadalcanal as well as meeting thesL~pplyships which began to sneak in morefrequently, pointed to another serious de-ficiency: there was no organized boat poolavailable to the division. More often thannot the personnel and craft that the divi-sion used in those early days had merelybeen abandoned when the attack force de-parted, and there was no semblance oforganization among them. Even thecreation of order did not solve all theproblems. A high percentage of the boatswere damaged and crewmen had no repairfacilities. The situation was graduallyimproved but was never satisfactory.

At last, on 18 August, the engineers andSeabees had a chance to stand back andadmire their work. The airfield was com-pleted. On 12 August it had been declaredtit for fighters and dive bombers, but nonewere immediately available to send up. AXavy I’BY had landed briefly on the stripon that date, but this was before AdmiralMc(’ain made his initial blockade run, andthere was very little fuel for other planesanyvv:Ly. But by the 18th the fill in themiddle had been well packed, a grove ofbanyan trees at the end of the strip hadbeen blasted away to make the approachless steep, and newly-arrived gasoline andordnance were ready and waiting for thefirst customers. In the South Pacificd[ming that period of shoestring existence,

THE BATTLE OF THE TENARIJ 2T9

however, “readiness>’ was a comparativething. There were no bomb handlingtrucks, carts or hoists, no gas trucks, andno power pumps.

The state of readiness had a way offluctuating rapidly, too, and the breathingspell for the workers did not last long.W’ith most sadistic timing, a large flightof Jtipanese planes came o~er ancl scored17 hits on the runway. (he engi~leer waskilled, nine were wounded, and tile field“was a mess.’: G

‘Ike runwwy damage was disquieting butnot altogether a surprise. .iir raids hadbeen frequent, shelling from offshore sub-marines likewise was common, and planesdroned overhead frequently during thehours of darkness to drop small bombshere and there at well-spaced intervals.After the big raid on the 18th, the well-l]racticed repair teams merely went towork again. In filling the craters, theengineers and Seabees first squared theholes with hand shovels and then air ham-mered the new dirt solid by tamping everyfoot and a half of fill. They had foundthat this system kept settling to a mini-nJum and prevented dangerous pot holes.

Two days l~ter Henderson Field, namedafter Major Lofton Henderson, a Marineaviator killed at Midway, wzs ngainready. And this time the planes arrived,The forward echelon of Marine AircraftGroup 23, the first arrivals, numbered19 F4F’s and 12 SBD-3’s. The UNits were

under the command of T.ieutenant (YolollelCharles 1,. Fike, executive otlicer of tl~eair group. The F4F’s, a part of MarineFighter Squadron 223, were commandedby Major ,John I.. Snlith, and the 12l)ouglas dive bombers fron] Marine Scout-

“ Ibid., Annex C, 2.

448777 ()—58-–—1!1

Bomber Squadron 232 were led by Lieu-tenant Colonel Richard D. Mangrum.

Arrival of planes ended an era for the(iuadalcanal defenders—the hazardollsperiod from 9 to 20 August when the land-ing force operated entirely without air orsurface support. During this period linesof communications were most uncertain.~“othing was known of the general navalsituation or the extent of losses at sea, andlittle information was received from aerialreconnaissance from rear areas. Ashore,patrolling was constant, but the terrainwas such that much could be missed. Shortrations, continuous hard work, and lackof sleep reflected in the physictd conditionof the troops. Morale, however, remainedhigh.

Formed in March of 1942 at Ewa, Oahu,M.4G-23 remained in training there, withmuch shifting of personnel and units, untilthis two-squadron forward echelon sailedto the South Pacific on 2 August on boardthe escort carrier Long Islancl. Smith’smen had just been issued new F4F’s withtwo-stage superchargers, and Mangrum’sunit had turned in its old S13D-2’S for thenewer 3’s with self-sealing gasoline tanksand armor plate. The remaining twosquadrons of the group, Captain Robert E.(laler’s JTMF-224 and Major Leo R..Smith’s WWSB-231, would sail from theI1awaiian area on 15 August.

,John .Smith’s VMF-223 ancl Mangrum’sVMSB-232 came down by way of Suva inthe Fijis and Efate in the hTew Hebrides..it Efate, Smith traded some of his young,]ess-experienced pilots to Major HaroldTV. l+nuer’s ~T&lF–212 for some fliers with

more experience. ()11 the afternoon of 20.Illgust, the Z.ony Is7cmd stood 200 milessoutl~east of G(ladalcanal and lzunclledthe planes.

280 Pll~RL H.4RBOR TO GU~DAIJCANAL

Two days later, on 22 August, the firstArmy Air Force planes, five P-400’s 7 ofthe 67th Fighter Squadron, landed on theisland. On 24 August, 11 Navy dive bomb-ers from the battle-damaged Enterprisemoved to Henderson Field to operate forthree months, and on 27 August nine moreArmy P-400’s came in. Performance ofthese Army planes was disappointing.Their ceiling was 12,000 feet because theyhad no equipment for the British high--pressure oxygen system with which theywere fitted, and they could not reach thehigh-flying enemy planes. Along with the,Marine SBD’S, the P400’s spent their timeduring Japanese air raids off strafing andbombing ground targets, and they returnedto Henderson after the hostile planes de-parted.

A short while later-early in Septem-ber—supply and evacuation flights wereinitiated by two-engined R4D’s ( C47’S)of Marine Aircraft Group 25, Flyingdaily from Espiritu Santo and Efate, thecargo planes each brought in some 3,000pounds of supplies and were capable ofevacuating 16 stretcher patients.

Although this increased air activity atHenderson Field w-as of great importanceto the operation in general and the combatMarines in particular, the field still wasnot capable of supporting bombers whichcould carry attacks to Japanese positionsfarther to the north. On 20 August Gen-eral Harmon voiced the opinion that itwould be too risky to base B–17’s at Hen-derson until more tighter and antiaircraftprotection were available. *

7Early P–39 “klunkers” converted for exportto the British. They could carry one bomb,werearmed with a 20mm cannon, two .50 caliber, andfour .30 caliber machine guns.

nCGSoPac Summary of Situation, 20Aug42(located at SHD).

Early in September he suggested thatheavy bombers stage through the Guadal-canal field from the New Hebrides andthus strike Rabaul and other Japanesebases; but a closer investigation pointedup the impracticality of this plan. Itwould have meant hand-pumping morethan 3,500 gallons of gasoline into eachbomber landing at Guadalcanal on the1,800-mile round trip from the NewHebrides to the Northern Solomons; andalthough this manual labor was not toogreat a price to pay for an opportunityto strike at the Japanese, it was impossibleto maintain ‘a fuel stock of that propor-tion at Henderson Field.

GROUND ACTION

Combat troops meanwhile probed thejungles with patrols, and early reconnais-sance indicated that the bulk of Japanesetroops was somewhere between the Matan-ikau River, about 7,000 yards west of theLunga, and Kokumbona, a native villagesome 7,500 yards west of the Matanikau.General Vandegrift wanted to pursue theenemy and destroy him before the Japan-ese could reinforce this small, disorganizedgmrison, but no substantial force could bespared from the work of building the MLRand the airfield.

Minor patrol clashes occurred almostdaily, but many of these meeting engage-ments were with wandering bands of uni-formed laborers who only confused at-tempts to locate the main enemy force.This patrolling gradually revealed thatthe area between the Matanikau and Ko-kurnbona was the main stronghold, how-ever. Stiff resistance continued there witheach attempt to probe the area, and this

‘ CGSoPac ltr to CofSA, 9Sep42 (located atNHD) .

THE B.4TTI,E OF THE TENARU 281

pattern had started as early as 9 Augustwhen one officer and several enlisted menwere wounded while trying to cross theriver. This patrol had reported the westbank of the river well organized for de-fense. The enemy kept shifting his posi-tion, thOLlgh, to maneuver for anadvantage against the patrols which cameto seek him out. Final confirmation ofthe enemy location came on 12 Augustwhen a Japanese warrant officer capturedbehind the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines saidthat his unit was between the Matanikauand Kokumbona.

Under questioning, the prisoner admit-ted that possibly some of his fellow garri-son mates were wandering aimlesslythrough the jungle without food and thatsome of them might surrender. FirstSergeant Stephen A. Custer of the divisionintelligence section made plans to lead anamphibious patrol to the area. Mean-while, a Marine patrol reported seeingwhat it took to be a white flag west of theriver. Hearing these reports, LieutenantColonel Frank Goettge, division intelli-gence officer, decided to lead the patrolhimself.

The original plan had called for an earlystart so that a daylight. landing could bemade. The patrol then would work inlandalong the west bank of the Matanikau andbivouac for the night far back in the hills.The second day was to be spent in a cross-country return to the perimeter. The pri-mary mission of the patrol would be thatof reconnaissance, but it was to be strongenough for combat if it ran into a fight.

Colonel Goettge’s new plans delayed de-parture of the patrol about 12 hours andcut down its combat potential by includingamong its 25-man strength LieutenantCommander Malcolm L. Pratt, assistant

division surgeon, Lieutenant Ralph Cory,a Japanese linguist, and several membersof the 5th Marines intelligence section.The boat got away from the perimeter atabout 1800 and landed after dark at 2200at an undetermined point west of theMatanikau. The Japanese, instead of sur-rendering, attacked the patrol and cut offfrom the beach all but three men whoescaped back into the surf to swim andwade to safety.

One of these men, Sergeant Charles C.Arndt, arrived in the perimeter at about0530 on 13 .4ugust to report that the patrolhad encountered enemy resistance. Com-pany A, 5th Marines set off immediatelyas a relief patrol to be reinforced later bytwo platoons of Company L and a lightmachine-gun section. Meanwhile, theother two escaped patrol members, Corpo-ral ,Joseph Spaulding and Platoon Ser-geant Frank L. Few, came back at 0725and 0800 respectively and revealed that theremainder of the Goettge patrol had beenwiped out.

The relief patrol landed west of PointCruz, a coastal projection a short distancewest of the Matanikau% mouth. CompanyA moved east along the coastal road backtoward the perimeter while the reinforcedplatoons of Company L traveled over thedifficult terrain inland from the beach.Company A met brief Japanese resistancenear the mouth of the river, but neitherforce found a trace of the Goettge patrol.’”

This action was followed a week laterby a planned double envelopment againstthe village of Matanikau. Companies Band I, of the 5th Marines would carry out

‘0Goettge’s position as Division G–2 was filledon 14 August by l.tCol E. .J.Buckley, formerly ofthe Ilth Elarines. Fi.nalRept, Phase III, AnnexF, 5.

THE BATTLE OF THE TENARU 283

this attack while Company I of the sameregiment made an amphibious raid fartherwest, at Kokumbollil, where it. was hopedthat any Japanese retreating from Matani-kau could be cut off. (h 18 August,Company I. moved inland, crossed theMatanikau some 1,000 yards from thecoast, and prepared to zttack north intothe village the next day. Company )3, toattack west, moved a]ong the coastal roadto the east bank of the river.

h’ext day, :Lftt?rpreparation fire was laidCIOWn by the 2d, 3d, and 5th Battalions ofthe 1lth Marines, Company 1, launched itsattack. Shortly after j uml~ing oH, scoutsdiscovered a line of emplacements along aridge some 1,000 yards to the left flank ofthe company front. The platoon on thisflank engaged the small enemy force inthese emplacements while the remainder ofthe company moved on toward the village.In this action ofl the left flank, Sergeant~JohnH. Branic, the acting platoon leader,was killed. The company executive offi-cer, I,ieutenant George H. Mead, Jr. nexttook command. When he was killed ashort, time later Marine Gunner EdwardS. Rtlst, a liaison officer from the 5th Ma-rines headquarters took command. Thisp]tLtOOll continued to cover the advance ofthe remainder of the company.

Company B, thwarted in its attempt tocross the river because of intense Japanesefire from the west bank, cou]d only SLIpport the attack of its sister company byfire. Company L managed to reach theoutskirts of the native vi]]zge at about1400, however, and one platoon entered the.settlement. This platoon lost contact withthe remainder of the company, and whenthe other platoons attempted to enter thevillage they were met by a strong Japanesecounterattack which caused the separatedplatoon to withdraw to compmy lines.The M~rines were nearly enveloped and

succeeded in repulsing the attack onlya,fter close-range fighting. Defending indepth, the Japanese drew up on a linewhich extended from the river some 200

yards west through the village. Whilethe Marines maneuvered for an attack, the,Japanese tire became more sporadic, andan assault at about, 1600 revealed that the

enemy pocket had dispersed.

Meanwhile the amphibious raid of Com-

pany I also aroused opposition. Two

enemy destroyers and a cruiser lobbed

shells at the landing craft while they

swung from the Marine perimeter to Ko-

kurnbona, and the raiding party escaped

tl~is threat only to be met at the beach

by Japanese machine-gun fire. The land-

ing succeeded, howeverj and the enemy re-

sistance began to melt. By the time a

Marine attack swept through the village,

tlm defenders had retired into the jungle

to avoid a conclusive engagement. The

three companies killed 65 ,Japanese while

suffering the loss of four llarines killed

and 11 wounded.

Althou@ these actions served only to

locate the general area into which the

ori@nal ,Japanese aarrison of Guadal-

canal had withdrawm in the face of the

Marine landing, another patrol on 19 Au-

gust indicated the pattern of things to

come on the island.

The patrol and reconnaissance area as-

signed to the 1st Marines lay east andsoutheast of the perimeter where the plainsof the Lunga fan into a grassy tablelandwhich is nearly eight miles wide near thecoastal village of Tetere. Some thoughthacl been given to the construction of anairfield there, and on 12 ~kugust. a surveyparty went out with a platoon-sized secur-ity force under Second Lieutenant John,J. ,Jachym. Passing through a native vil-]age on l;~ August, this group encounteredFather Arthur C. Duhamel, a young Cath-

284 1’IMRL HARBOR TO GU~D~LC~hT.4L

/

F’@/

THE BATTLE OF THE TEXARU 285

olic priest from Methuen, Massachusetts,l]who related native rumors of an enemyforce along the coast to the east.

Two days later a partial verification ofthe priest’s information was made by Cap-tain (of the British Solomon Islands De-fense Force ) W. F. M, (Martin) Clemens,the district officer who had withdrawn into

the hills to become a coast-watcher when the,Japanese entered his island. On 14.%ugust Clemens left his watching stationnear Aola Bay with his 60 native scouts 12

and entered the Marine perimeter.Clemens and his scouts reported seeingsigns of a new Japanese force. And onthe heels of Clemens’ reports came wordfrom .idmiral Turner that naval intelli-g-ence indicated a .Japanese attack in force.

To investigate, Captain Charles H.Brush, ,Jr. took a part of his Company Aof the 1st Marines and at 0700 on 19.~ugtlst began a patrol eastward along thecoastal track toward Koli Point andTetere. At about noon near Koli Point

the patrol spotted a group of four ,Jap-

anese oficers and 30 men moving, with nosecurity to front or flanks, between the

road and the beach. Captain Brush struckfrontal]y with a part of his unit whileLieutenant Jachym led an envelopment

around the enemy left flank. In 55 min-

utes of fighting7 31 of the ,Japanese were

killed. The remaining three escaped into

“ Father Duhamel, as well as Father HenryOude-Engberink and Sister Sylvia of France, andSister Odilia of Italy, were later tortured andkilled by the Japanese.

“ Including Vouza, a retired sergeant majorof police and native of the Tetere area whopreviously had volunteered additional service tothe Crown and Capt Clemens. A veteran of 25years in the native constabulary, the “reacti-~ated” Vouza provided valuable assistance to thecoastwatchers and to the Marines.

the jungle. Three Marines were killedand three wounded.

It was clear that these troops were not

wandering laborers or even members ofthe original garrison. Helmets of thedead soldiers bore the Japanese Army star

rather than the anchor and chrysanthe-

mum device of the special landing force.

A code for ship-to-shore communications

to be used for a landing operation also was

found among the effects, and the appear-

ance of the uniforms indicated that the

troops were recent arrivals to Guadalcanal.

There appeared little doubt that, the Japa-

nese were preparing an attempt to re-

capture their lost :Iirfield. And Brush

founcl they had already completed some

excellent advance work:

With a complete lack of knowledge of Japaneseon my part, the maps the Japanese had of ourpositions were so clear as to startle me. Theyshowed our w7eak spots all too clearly.*?

1~’bile these patrols searched for the

enemy on Guadalcanal} another force of

approximately 200 Marines moved into

enemy waters farther north and raided a

Japanese atoll in the Gilbert Islands.

Companies A and B of Lieutenant Colonel

Evans F. (’arlson’s 2d Raider Battalion

went, from Oahu to Makin atoll on board

submarines ~ rgonctut and Nautilus andlanded on the hostile beach early on 17 Au-gust. The raid was planned to destroyenemy installations, gather intelligencedata, test raiding tactics, boost homefrontmorale, and possibly to divert some Japan-ese attention from Guadalcanal. It was

partially successful on all of these counts,

but its greatest asset was to home-front

morale. At a cost to themselves of 30 men

lost, the raiders wiped out the Japanese

garrison of about 85 men, destroyed radio

“ Maj C’. H. Brush, Jr. ltr to CMC, 15Jan49.

286 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GUADALCANAL

stations, fuel, and other supplies and in-stallations, and went back on board theirsubmarines on 18 August for the returnto Pearl Harbor. This raid attractedmuch attention in the stateside press butits military significance was negligible.Guadalcanal still held the center of thestage in the Pacific and attention quicklyturned back to that theater.14 (See Map12)

BATTLE OF THE T,L?NARU ‘5

The picture that began to take shape asthese bits of intelligence fitted togetherprovided an early warning of Japaneseplans that already were well underway.On 13 August, Tokyo ordered LieutenantGeneral Haruyoshi Hyakutake’s f7even-teenth Army at Rabaul to take over theground action on Guadalcanal and salvagethe situation. The naval side of this rein-forcement effort would be conducted byRear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, a wily Im-perial sea dog who was a veteran of early

landings in the. Philippines and Indonesia

and of the battles of Coral Sea and llid-

way. Ivith no clear picture of his oppo-

nent’s strength, Hyakutake clecided to re-

take the Lunga airfielcl immediately with

a force of about 6,000 men. On the eve-

ning of the 15th of August, while Tanaka$s

ships of the reinforcement force were load-

“ ~TF 7.15 Rept, 24Aug42; 2dRdrBn Rept ofOps on MakinIs, 19Anx.12 ; WDC Japanese Docu-ments No. 161,013. 161,110, and NA 12053, “Rec-ords of Various Base Forces” and “Base Force(lnard [Tnits and Defense Cnit Records, ” 17–22.Aug42 ( located at NHD ),

“ Actually the Ilu. But as previously ex-I)lained, Marines of the di~ision identified theseri~-ers incorrectly throughout the campaign andthe action to be described has thus become knownhistorically and to the Imrticipants as the Battleof the Tenaru.

kg supplies at Truk, the admiral gotorders to hurry down to Rabaul and take900 officers and men to Guadalcanal atonce. Hyakutake had decided that theattack would begin with a part of the 7thDivision’s f38thInfantry Regiment and thel’okost~ka Npecial Naval Landing Force.

These units would be followed by the 35tJ~Brigade.

Admiral Tanaka thought he was beingpressed a little too hard, considering thatthe Eighth Fleet under which he operatedhad just been formed at Rabaul on 14 July,and that the admiral himself had hardlybeen given time to catch his breath afterhurrying away from Yokosuka for his newjob on 11 .Ingust. The admiral reportedlater:

lVith no regard for my opinion . . . thisorder called for the most difficult operation inwar-landing in the face of the enemy—to hecarried out by mixed units which had no oppor-tunity for rehearsal or even preliminary study.. . . In military strategy expedience sometimestakes precedence over prudence, but this orderwas utterly unreasonable.

I could see that there must be great confusionin the headquarters of Eighth Fleet. Yet theoperation was ordained and underway, and sothere was no time to argue about it.”

Backbone of the initial effort would con-sist of the reinforced $M Battalion., 28thlnj’antvy, n 2,000-man force of infantry,artillery, and engineers under the com-mand of Colonel Kiyono Ichiki. Thisforce had been en route to Midway whenthe defeat of the Japanese carriers causeda change to Guam. ~7 Later the ZchikiForce was en route back to the home is-1ands when the Marine landing in theSOlonlons brought another change of

“: 7’(ln//kQ .4/tic/c, I, (490. Excerl)ts from thisaccount are {4noted in this volmne with the l)er-mission of the L’. S. Naval Institute.

“ See I’art V of this ~-olmne.

THE BATTLE OF THE TENARU 287

,

-:

z-

-s

..

288 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

,Japanese plans. The unit was diverted toTruk where it landed on 12 August andwas attached to the 35th Bm”gade whichthen garrisoned the Palau Islands. Thebrigade’s commander was Major GeneralKiyotake Kawaguchi. The 900 or 1,000men which Admiral Tanaka loaded for hisfirst reinforcement run to Guadalcanalwere from this Ichiki unit.

The reinforcement ships landed ColonelIchiki and this forward echelon at TaivuI’oint on Guadalcanal dlwing the night of18 August. While this force landed atthis point some 22 air miles east of theLLU~ga, some 500 men of the YokosukaFifth Special .Waval Landing Force ar-rived at Kokumbona. This was the firstof many runs of the Tokyo Express, asMarines called the ,Japanese destroyersand cruisers which shuttled supplies andreinforcements up and down The Slot inhigh-speed night runs. Brush’s patrolhad encountered part of Ichiki’s forwardechelon, and the Japanese commander,shaken by the fact that he had been dis-covered, decided to attack at once.

.it that time the Marines had five in-fantry battalions available for defense ofIJunga Point. Four battalions were com-mitted to beach defense, one was withheldin division reserve. (h 15 AUgLLStworkhad begun on a new extension of the rightflank by refusing it inland along the westbank of the Ilu River (then called theTenaru) for a distance of 3,200 yards.This plan involved road and bridge con-struction as well as extensive clearing be-fore field fortifications could be built. .isof 18 .iugust little progress had beenlllade. ( See Map 17 )

In the face of the threats pointed out byintelligence sources, the division consid-ered two courses of action: first, to sendthe division reserve across the IIL~to locate

and destroy the enemy, or, second, to con-tinue work on defensive positions whilelimiting actions to the east to strong pa-trols and outposts. The first course, Gen-eral Vandegrift realized, involved accept-ing the premise that the main Japaneseforce had landed to the east and that itcould be dealt with by one Marine bat-t:Llion. But if Brush’s patrol had en-countered only a small part of the newenemy unit while the bulk of the forcestood poised to strike from another direc-tion, or from the sea, absence of the reservebattalion would become a serious man-power shortage in the perimeter. Theintelligence Vandegrift had gleaned fromall sources was good, but there wasn’t,enough of it. So the division sat tight toawait developments. Work continued onfield fortifications, native scouts workedfar to the east, and Marines maintained astrong watch on the perimeter each night.

The Marines did not have long to wait.Colonel Ichiki had wasted no time pre-prrrin~ his attack, and during the night

of 20–21 August Marine listening posts on

tlte east bank of the Ilu detected enemy

troops moving through the jungle to their

front. A light rattle of rifle fire was ex-

chwnged, both sides sent up flares, and the

~larines withdrew across the river mouth

to the lines of their battalion, I~ieutenant

colonel Edwin A. Pollocks 2d Battalion,

1st Marines. They reported that a strong

enemy force appeared to be building up

across the river.ls

“ At about the srrme time the native scoutVonza entered the commrrnd post of 2/1 to warnI.tCol I’ollock about the Japanese buildup. Badlywcwnded, VonzrI had been captured by the IchikiTowe, knifed about the face, throat, and chestwhen he wouldn’t talk, and then left for dead bythe Japanese. This report to Pollock was one ofthe many services for which Vrmza later was citedby the .kmericans iind British.

II

80I

811

82

83

I1

84

85

8;

“a~

8

BATT

LEO

FTH

ETENARU

21AUGUST

1942

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290 PEARL HARBOR TO GU.4D.4LCANAL

By this time Ichiki had assembled hisforce. on the brush-covered point of landon the east bank of the river, and all wasquiet until 0310 on 21 August when acolumn of some 200 Japanese rushed theexposed sandspit at the river mouth. Mostof them were stopped by Marine small-arms fire and by a canister-firing 37mmantitank gun of the 1st Special WeaponsBattalion. But the Marine position wasnot wired in, and the weight of the rush-ing attack got a few enemy soldiers intoPollock’s lines where they captured someof his emplacements. The remainder ofthe line held, however, and fire from thesesecure positions kept the penetration incheck until, the battalion reserve could getup to the fight. This reserve, Company G,launched a counterattack that wiped outthe Japanese or drove them back acrossthe river.

Ichiki was ready with another blow.Although his force on the east bank hadnot directly supported this first attack, itnow opened up with a barrage of mortarand 70mm fire, and this was followed byanother assault. A second enemy companyhad circled the river’s mouth by wadingbeyond the breakers, and when the firelifted it charged splashing through thesurf against the 2d Battalion’s beach posi-tions a little west of the river mouth.

The Marines opened up with everythingthey had. Machine-gun fire sliced alongthe beach as the enemy sloshed ashore,canister from the 37mm ripped gapingholes in the attack, and 75mtn pack howit-zers of the 3d Battalion, llth Marineschewed into the enemy. Again the attackbroke up, and daylight revealed a sandybattlefield littered with the bodies of the

,Japanese troops who had launched (2ua-dalcanal’s first important ground action.

Although outnumbered at the actualpoint of contact, Pollock assessed the situ-ation at daybreak and reported that hecould hold. His battalion had fire superi-ority because of the excellent artillerysupport and because the course of the rivergave part of his line enfilade tire againstthe enemy concentration in the point ofground funneling into the sandspit. Inview of this, General Vandegrift orderedPollock to hold at the river mouth whilethe division reserve, the 1st Battalion, 1stMarines enveloped Ichiki. While this bat-talion prepared for its attack, CompanyC of the 1st Engineer Battalion went for-ward to Pollock’s command to help bolsterdefensive positions. During the morningthe engineers built antitank obstacles, laida mine field across the sandspit, and helpedthe 2/1 Marines string tactical wire andimprove field fortifications. They wereunder intermittent rifle fire during mostof this work.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel LenardB. Cresswell’s division reserve battalionhad reverted to parent control and re-ported to Colonel Gates to receive theattack plan for the envelopment. Before0700, Cresswell crossed the Ilu upstream,posted elements of his Company D (vveap-ons ) to cover a possible Japanese escaperoute to the south, and then turned northtoward the Zc&%i Force. By 0900 his com-panies crossed their lines of departure inthe attack against the Japanese left andrear.

Company C on the right along the coastmet one platoon of the enemy near thevillage at the mouth of the Block FourRiver, and the Marines moved to encirclethis force and isolate it from the remainderof Ichiki’s unit farther west. The othercompanies moved north with little opposi -

THE BATTLE OF THE TENARC 291

tion, Aontheright and Bon the left. Asthe advance continued, the enemy wasforced into the point of land on the Ilu’seast bank. By 1400 the enemy was con-fined completely by the river, the beach,and the envelopment from the left andrear. Some of the ,Japanese made un-successful attempts to escape through thesurf and along the beach; another groupburst out temporarily to the east but ranhead-on into Company C moving up fromits battle at the mouth of the Block Four.

The fight continued, with (lesswelltightening his encirclement, and more ofthe Japanese attempted to strike throughto the east. These breakout attempts gavethe new Guadalcanal fliers, On the islandless than 24 hours, a chance to fire theirfirst shots in anger, and the F4F pilotsfrom VMF–223 gave Cresswell’s Marinesa hand with strafing attacks that destroyedthe ,Japanese or turned them back into theinfantry trap.

To conclude the action by nightfall,I’andegrift ordered” a tank attack acrossthe sandspit and into what now had be-come the rear of the Ichiki Force. Theplatoon of light tanks struck at 1500, firingat the enemy with canister and machineguns. Two tanks were disabled, one byan antitank minel but the crews wererescued by the close supporting action ofother tanks and the attack rolled on intothe ,Japanese positions. It was over by1700. Nearly 800 .Japanese hi~dbeen killedand 15 were taken prisoner while only afew esci~ped into the jungle. Disgracedby the debacle, Colonel Ichiki committed

suicide.The action cost the Marines 34 dead and

75 wounded. .i policing of the Japanesebattlefield gleaned the division ten heavyand 20 light machine guns! 20 grenade

throwers, 700 rifles, 20 pistols, ml unde-termined number of sabers and greuacles,three 70mm guns, large quantities of ex-plosile charges, and 12 flame throwers.The flame throwers were not used in theaction.

Admiral Tanaka later had this to sayabout the disaster:

I knew Colonel Ichiki from the Midway opera-tion and was well aware of his magnificent lead-ership and indomitable fighting spirit. But thisepisode made it abundantly clear that infantry-men armed with rifles and bayonets had no chanceagainst an enemy equipped with modern heavyarms. This tragedy should have taught us thehopelessness of ‘bamboo-spear’ tactics. ‘“

BATTLE OF THE EASTERNSO LO MO.WS

While Colonel Ichiki prepared for hisill-fated attack, Rear Admiral Tanaka andVice Admiral (lunicbi Mikawa, the E;ghthFleet commander, worked to get the colo-nel>s second echelon ashore for what theyhoped would be an orderly, well-coordi-nated effort against the Marines. Thesetroops were on board the Kinryu Mcwu andfour destroyer transports, and they wereescorted by the seaplane carrier (7hitosewith her 22 floatplanes and by Tanaka’sDest~oyer Squadron 2, which Tanaka ledin light cruiser Jintsu. A larger navalforce operated farther to the east outsidethe Solomons chain. In all, the Japanesetask forces included three aircraft carriers,eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, twolight cruisers, and 22 destroyers in addi-tion to the five transport vessels,

At this time Admiral Fletcher’s forceof two carriers, one battleship, fourcruisers, and ten destroyers operated to thesoutheast of the Lower Solomons conduct-

“ lyanaka ~rtielc, I, 691,

292 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCAiYAL

ing routine searches to the northwest.

Fletcher believed the are~ to be tempo-

rarily safe from Japanese naval trespass,

and he had sent the carrier l~atsp off to

refuel. This left him only the ~nterprise

and the ,Sarwtoga for his air support.

On !23 .iugust, two days after the Battle

of the Tenarul .Imerican patrol planes first

sighted the ,Japanese transports and the

Tanaka escort some 350 miles north of

(luadalcanal. Marine planes from Hen-

derson Field attempted to attack the troop

carriers, but a hea~7y overcast forced them

back to Lungs. The fliers had a better day

on the )Mth, however. .\t 1420 the F4F

pilots intercepted 15 ,Japanese bombers

being escorted toward Guadalcanal by 12

fighters from the carrier Ryujo. Marinesbroke this raid up before it got close.They downed six of the Zeros and tenbombers in what was VMF-iZ23’s first bigsuccess of the war. Captain Marion Carlsplashed two bombers and a Zero, and twoplanes each were downed by LieutenantsZennith A. Pond and Kenneth D. Frazier,and Marine Gunner Henry B. Hamilton:

This was a good day’s work by the fighterpilots of lWF-223. It is necessary to rememberthat the Japanese Zero at this stage of the war\vasregarded with some of the awe in which theatomic bomb came to be held later, . . The~actus [Guadalcanal]fighters made a great con-tribution to the war by exploding the theory thatthe Zero was invincible; the lIarines started theexplosion m 24August.20

Three Marine pilots die{ not return fromthe action, and a fourth was shot down butmanaged to save himself by getting ashoreat Tulagi. In plane strength, however,the Cactus Air Force (as the Guaclalcanalfliers called their composite outfit ) gained.This was the day, as mentioned earlier inthis chapter, that the 11 S131)’s came in

‘“ .ltnp~tl(>,Lit’ Hixtory, 81.

from the damaged Enterprise. At thetime the ship was struck, LieutenantTtlrner Caldwe]l, USN, was t~p with his“Flight 300,” and, low on gM, he led hisfliers to Guadalcanal w-here they more thanpaid for their keep until 27 September.

Meanwhile .%dmiral Fletcher’s carrierplanes located the enemy task force in theEastern Solornons at about the same time,Japanese planes spotted Fletcher. Likethe Battle of Midway, the resulting actionIVNSan air-surface and air-air Contmt.Surface vessels neither sightecl nor fired ateach other.

The Ry//jo, whose Zeros had fared sopoorly with John Smith’s F4F pilots, tookrepeated hits that finally put her out ofcontrol and left her hopelessly aflame.one enemy cruiser and a destroyer weresunk; a second cruiser was clamaged; theChitose sustained severe wounds but man-aged to limp away; and 90 Japanese planeswere shot down. On the American side,20 planes were lost and the damagedEn ferpri.ve lurched away to seek repair.

This action turned back the larger Jap-anese attack force, and Fletcher likewisewithdrew. He expected to return next dayand resume the attack, but by then theJapanese had moved out of range. Theescorted transports with reinforcementsfor the late Colonel Ichiki continued toclose the range, however, and early on 25August SBD’S from VMSB-232 and theEnterprise Flight 300 went up to findthem. The Battle of the Eastern Solo-mons had postponed Tanaka’s delivery ofthese reinforcements, but after that carrierbattle was over the admiral headed hisships south again late on 24 August.

.it 0600 on 25 August, Tanaka’s forcewas some 150 miles north of Guadalcanaljand there the SBD’S from Henderson

THE BATTLE OF THE TENARU 293

Field found him. The Jintst~ shook underan exploding bomb that Lieutenant Law-rence Baldinus dropped just forward ofher bridge, and Ensign Christian Fink ofthe Enterpri~e scored a hit on the trans-port Kinryu Maru amidships. .4dmiralTanaka was knocked unconscious by theexplosion on his flagship, and a number ofcrewmen were killed or injured. The shipdid not list under the bow damage, how-ever, and she still was seaworthy. WhenTanaka recovered he transferred his flagto the destroyer Kagero and sent theJ intsuto Truk alone .Z1

Flames broke out on the Kinryu .llaruwhich carried approximately 1,000 troopsof the l’okosula 5th AS’ATLF,and the de-stroyer Illu2uZi went alongside to rescuesurvivors. At just that moment this shipbecame “one of the first Japanese warshipsto be hit by a B–17 since the war began” 22when these big planes from the llth Bom-bardment Group at Espirit.u Santo arrivedto lend a hand to the Cactus fliers. TheMuzuki sank at once. ~lllother ship thenmoved in to rescue the survivors from thisdestroyer while two destroyer transports

“ Tanaka .4rtick?, I, 693,“ Mam’??e Air History 81. See also Ta?l aka

Artit’lr, I, (i94 : Stt,a[j:ll(> for G aa du[vanul, 10,i.

went. to the rescue of the men from theXinryu Maru. These men were picked upjust as the .Varu also went to the bottom.Meanwhile another pass at the ships hadresulted in light damage to the destroyerUzu?ci, and .4dmiral Tanaka turned backfor Rabaul. Many of the SNLF men hadbeen lost, and his force was badly shakenand disordered:

MY worst fear for this operation had come tobe realized. Without the main combat unit, theYokosmka 5th S1)ecial Xaval Landing Force, itwas clear that the remaining auxiliary unit of

about 300 men would be of no use even if it didreach Guadalcanal without further mishap.zi

Thus had tile 1st Marine Division

gained some valuable time to prepare forthe next ,Japanese attempt to dislodge itsLunga defense. T?’itb air support on Hen-

1

derson Field and with a tenuous sL~pplyroute established to the S’TewHebrides, the

division’s grip on Guadalcanal was muchin~proved at nlonth>s end. But it still was ...a long way from being completely secure,

especially now that Ichiki’s act of hara-Mri had pointed up for the tJapanese theimpropriety of trying to dislodge the land-ing force with only 900 or 1,000 men.

W Tanaka Article, I, 694.

CHAPTER 5

The Battle of the Ridge

General Vanclegrift and his staff wereaware that the defeat of the lchiki Fo~’celeft the division’s position on the islandonly temporarily improved. Obviouslythe ,Japanese could be. expected to mountlarger and better planned attacks a~~instthe small Marine perimeter; air and navalactivity at Guadalcmxd indicated nowaning enemy interest in the South Solo-mons area. A noon-hour visit from Ra-baul bombers was an almost daily occur-rence, and enemy warships and submarinesentered Sealark Channel nearly everynight to shell Henderson Field.{’” Although the Battle of the Eastern~Solomons gave Allied shipping from Es-;piritu Santo an opportunity to increasekhe flow of supplies to the beleaguered Ma-rines, the Lungl defenders still operatedon a hand-to-mouth basis.

The Cactus Air Force performed beyondall proportion to its facilities and equip-ment, and the 3d Defense Battalion finallywas able late in August to bring in the 5-inch guns of its two seacoast batteries;but there were not enough Marines on theisland to enlnrge the perimeter for an ade-quate defense. General Vandegrift be-lieved that, positions along 45 miles of(hadalcanal’s north coast would have to beheld before the ,Japanese could be re-strained from landing and attacking Hen-derson Field and before air defenses wouldhave sufficient room for deployment. The

general did not have that kind of man-power.

Since Major John Smith and Lieuten-ant Colonel Mangrum arrived with theirF4F’s and SBD’S on 20 August, the airfieldhad taken on a more proficient and pernm-nent look. By the end of August a dailyroutine of scheduled patrol flights hadbeen initiated. Four-plane fighter patrolsflew from 0545 to 0830 each morning andfrom 1400 to 1830 each afternoon, andmixed fighter-bomber squadrons fre-quently made night, searches for enemysl]ipping to the northwest. Cactus avia-tors flew cover for the .Ulied shipping tothe island, and went Llpon intercept duringthe .Japanese raids.

The U. S. fighters did well against theenemy bombers, but their only chanceagainst the highly maneuverable Zero wasto pair L~pin mutual support. In this waythey could protect themselves when theZeros came down to drive them away fromthe bombers. They found that the Grum-man did have certain advantages over theZero, however. It had great fire power,and it could stay in the air with more holesin it than the more flimsy ,Japanese fightercould endure. During the first ten daysof Cactus operations, U. S, fliers shot down56 ,Japanese planes at a cost of 11 of theirown craft.

Marine engineers rigged a system of1ights from captured ,Japanese equipment

to outline the field for emergency nightlandings, and, when dump trucks andpneumatic tampers came in Izter, workerscould fill [L 500-kilogram-bomb crater in 30

294

THE RATTLE OF THE RIDGE 295

minl~tes. Dump trucks were kept loadedwith gravel and sand, and “flying squads”of engineers rushed out to repair any dam-age immediately after the departure of.Japanesebombers.

Ilut not even counting enemy ilCtiOll,Henderson personnel still had plenty ofproblems. iin early method of fuelingemployed drums strung up in the raftersof partially built Japanese hangars, andeven when gasoline trucks arrived laterthe fuel had to be hand pumped fromdrums to the trucks, There was no steelmatting, and the field was completely atthe mercy of the whimsical tropicalweather:

Henderson Field was a bowl of black dustwhich fouled airplane engines or it. was a quag-mire of black mud which made the take-offresemble nothing more than a fly trying to risefrom a runway of molasses.’

When engineers and Seabees had nobomb craters to patch, they still had to fixLIpthe field in the wake of the early SBD’Swhich had hard-rubber tail wheels de-signed for landing on the sturdy decks ofcarriers. On the Henderson earth thesewheels “. . . chewed up the runway likea plowshare. ” z The sorry condition ofthe field added serious operational lossesto the troubles of the small Cactus forcewhich was nearly always outnumbered i1~the air. occasionally :t plane was grippedso persistently by the mud that it failedto take otf and crashed at the end of therunway; ruts and the beginnings of pot-holes were hazards on dry days, and onone foggy wet afternoon in early Septem-ber a landing F4F crashed into a bulldozer.

But in spite of everything the installa-

tion grew and slowly improved, and this

was a period when i~mericau fighting menwere thankful for small favors. on 20ikugust the transport WiZ/ia7}2Wurd I{ur-ro 20scame up from the New Hebrides wit 1~the forward echelon ot’ MAG-23. .W themen find some of the gear were put ashore,but then the ship scurried across SealarkChannel for Tulagi when the word came inthat a ,Japanese cruiser force was expectedthat night. h-ear Tulagi the transportwent aground and much of the equipmentstill on board had to be jettisoned to floather free.

Next day Colonel William ,J. Wallace,group cornmancler, came up to Hendersonwit h more planes: 19 F4F’s of MajorRobert E. Galer’s V? MF-224, and 12S131~-3’s of VMSB-231 commanded byMajor Leo R. Smith. That brought theCactus strength to 86 pilots and 64 planes,10 of them Navy and three Army.

On 1 September the ground crews gotmore help. Five officers and 387 men ofthe 6th Naval Construction Battalion(Seabees) landed with two bulldozers.They would “. . . help make an airfieldout of Henderson and . . . clear a shortgrassy strip a mile to the east calledFighter 1.”3 But next day came one ofthe infamous Henderson disasters that,zlways loomed :LSa threat to much of thebackbreaking effort that had gone before.

J$7iththe frequent raids, fire was alwaysa. cbmgerous possibility, and a field firebrigade had been organized around two,Japanese trucks which had been repairedby the 1st Marines. They got their bap-tism on 2 September when a bomb from aheavy Japanese raid hit an armed SBDparked at the edge of a coconut. grovewhere ammunition was stored. The. bombcould not be removed from the burning

‘ Jlorine .Air Hi8tory, 82.‘ Ibid., 83.

44S777 0—58——20

‘ Ibid.. 84,

THE BATTLE OF THE RIDGE ~g~

SBD, and when it exploded it spewedflaming gasoline in all directions. (lne90nml shell dump was ignited, ancl the firebrigade could l~ot do its best work withall the explosions that resl~lted. Several

of the fire-fighters were injured, and the

trucks seemed to be making little heaclway

since they had to take turns clashing off to

tl~e Lungs River, the closest supply of

water. If the fire expanded mucl~ more

it would set otl’ a chain reaction and all

the ammunition in the area would be lost.

Had not the situation been so grim, some

olcl hancls might have been reminded of tile

Chinese fire drill of ancient. Blurine legend,

The blaze was eventually brought under

control, however, and the loss was serious

but not critical. .ifter this, large water

tanks from coconllt plantations were

spotted around the ammunition dumps;

but this fire proved to be the most serious

ot’ the campaign. Subsequent losses

occurred in division dumps as a result of

naval she]ling at nig%tj. These losses were

ne@gible since the ammunition by that

time had been buried,

This b.ombin~ raid had arrived at 1135,

and while the fire department below

worked to save the ammunition dumps,

Cactus fliers were LIp among the bombers.

They shot down three of the twin-engined

craft al~d four Zeroes without a single loss

of their own.

On 3 September the command echelon

of the 1st hlarine .kircraft ~Wing arrived.

This group included Brigadier General

Roy S. Geiger, commanding general of the

w-ing; his chief of staff, (llolonel Louis E.

l~oods; and Lieutenant Colonel John C.

~~LInn, wing intelligence officer. ~Tsing the

31.IG–23 staff as his wing staff, Geiger

established] his command post near tlmt

of (leneral ~~anciegrift. Liaison in the

form of daily conferences betw’een the two

generals was established, and lCenneth H.

1~’eir, now a lieutenant colonel, at last hacl

a well-orgallized air headquarters withwhich to deal as division air oficer. ~

Fueling and arming of the planes con-tinl~ecl in a make-shift manner fo~ sometime, and :LS late :LSNovember bombs haclto be manhandled. Radio communicationslikewise posed problems. Army and N:Lvy

receiving channels did not mesh) and the.irmy planes of the Cactus Force coldd notreceive Navy tmtlic. (lperat ions resolvedthis by employing the ~ildio from agrounded .$rmy P--4OOalongside the Navyset and thereafter nmking simultalieousbroadcasts over twin microphones. Thiswas a big l~elp, but communications stillwere far from satisfactory. 13eyond 20miles the planes could not depend on re-ceiving the field, but the field could nor-mally read the planes’ messages from asfar as 100 miles.

,Sil~cethe fight against Ichiki; there haclbeen little opportunity for close air supportof ground troops, b~~tMarines continnec{to plan for this sort of air-ground team-work. (’communications was the big prob-lem here, too. At that stage of operationsonly visuul signa]s were used, consistingmainly of colored panels which the groundtroops had, but they left much to be de-sired, Planes now flew higher and fasterthan they had in the banana wars andmanellvers, and this macle it more difficultfor pilots to read the panel messages, evenif they coLlld catch a glimpse of the coloredmarkings. .Ind more often than not inGuadalcannl’s thick jungle and tall grass,they coldd not even see them. Guaclal-canal Marines had hefird about coloredsmoke grenades which were being testedback in the States, and they thought. these

4As mentioned in the lmevious chapter, Weir’stirst look at the field had come on 8 August whenhe and the division engineer officer had esti-mated how much work they would have to add tothe early Japanese efforts to make the stripusable.

298 PEARI. H.4RBOR TO G~.kD.kLC.\NAL

might be helpful for air-ground signals,

But, what they really had their eyes out forwere some radio sets. That seemed to bethe only pron~ising solution for air-groundcoordination. Radios initially availableto the division would not serve the pur-pose, and it would not be until Octoberthat Vandegrift could detail an officerand suitable radio equipment znd person-nel to train as ‘(air forward observers”from each infantry regiment and therebypioneer in whzt later became an importantphase of Marine combat operations.

While Geiger built up his air arm,Vandegrift likewise added strength to the.Lungs perimeter. With Tulagi quiet, hebrought some of General Rupertus’ troopsacross the ichannel to (luadalcanal. The2d Ilatt,alion, 5th Marines made the moveon 21 .~ug~M, and the 1st Raider 13nttalionand the 1st Parachute Battalion crossedto the Guadalcana] side on 31 August. Inearly September, when a detachment of the5th Defense Battalion came ashore atTulagi, a 90mm battery of the 3d DefenseBattalion joined its parent organization inthe Henderson Field area.

From all indications these additionaltroops would be needed. Aerial observa-tion and native scouts piled L~preports oftJapanese landings on both sides of theperimeter, and staff officers estimated abuild-up of some 200 or 300 well-equippedenemy troops near the village of Tasim-boko some 18 miles east of Lungs Point.Native scouts placed the enemy strengthmuch higher, but Marines suspected suchcolmts to be exaggerated.

Patrolling continued in all sectors, andon 27 August the 1st Battalion, 5th Ma-rines under Lieutenant Colonel William E.Maxwell met a strong body of troops nearthe village of Kokumbona, west of theperimeter. The battalion had made an

amphibious landing without incident at:~bo(~t0730, but later ran into the ,Japaneseforce dug into positions throughout anarrow coastal gorge. Maxwell was be-yond artillery range of the perimeter, andalthough the 2d and 5th Battalions of thellth Marines fired diversionary missionseast of him in Matanikau village, the Jap-anese facing the infantry Marines seemedinclined for once to make a strong standrather than to slink OH into the brush asthey had frequently done in other suchengagements.

Faulty communications and other diffi-culties bogged the Marine attack, andLieutenant Colonel Maxwell withdrew hisforce to comply with a.portion of his patrolorder which required him to return to theperimeter by nightfall. But the regi-mental commander, Colonel Hunt, orderedthe battalion back into the fight, relievedMaxwell of command, and soon thereafterarrived on the scene himself. Major Mil-ton V. O’Connell sl;cceeded to commandof the battalion, but the attack was notresumed until the predawn hours of thefollowing morning. A few Japanese werekilled, but most of them had withdrawn.The Marines retired to Matanikau vil-lage and l~ter returned by water to theperimeter.

On 2 September two companies of theraider battalion patrolled Savo Islandbut found no enemy. Following this theraiders and parachutists, consolidated intoa provisional battalion, moved into defen-sive positions on the south rim of the per-imeter, inland from the airfield. Whilethey dug in, Colonel Edson and his staffmade plans for an amphibious raid to theeast where the enemy build-up was re-ported around the Tasimboko area.

The landing was made just east ofTasimboko before dawn on 8 September,

THE RATTLE OF THE RIDGE 299

and the raiderss advanced west into therear of the reported ,Japanese positions.At about 0630 planesof MAG-23 bombedant{ strafed the suspected strong point, andtwo destroyer transports, Manley and Mc-A-can, opened u.p on the area. At 0830Edson made contact ag~inst light resist-ance, and his advance overran two artil -lery pieces. He still could not determinethe strength of the enemy, but the forceappeared to be withdrawing toward thevillage, and he requested that supportingdive bombers remain on station in theevent that the enemy pocket could be local-ized for an air strike. General Vandegriftordered ten planes to remain in contin-uous support and placed another squad-ron on call to Edson.

By 1045 the resist ante had sti tlened, andthe raiders requested that more troopsland to the west of the village and supporttheir attack. Not wanting to weaken theperimeter, division replied that such amove was not feasible. Vandegrift sug-gested that the raiding force reembark andreturn to the perimeter if the Japaneseproved too strong to handle. Edson re-mained, however, and 45 minutes later hadoyerrun more artillery pieces as the bat-~alion advanced slowly against a heavyvolume of fire. The colonel estimated theenemy as about 1,000 well-armed and vvell-equipped troops, and the force now seemedinclined to make a stand. Portions of Ed-

son’s advance drew fire from field artilleryat point-blank range.

Some of the raider units had lost in-ternal contact. during the stiffening battle,but these faults were corrected at about1100, approximately the same time that

5There was a shorti~ge of landing craft and theparachute battalion would not leave the perimeteruntil shortly after 0800.

the parachute battalion reported to Edson,and the commander decided to make a co-ordinated attack against the firm opposi-tion. The colonel called in a P+OO straf-ing attack and then followed this with anenvelopment inland by his raiders whilethe parachutists protected his flank andrear. ‘1’he assault carried the village, butagain the ,Japanese had elected to breakcontact, and prepare for an attack at a timeand place of their own choosing.

The village was deserted, but the ap-pearance of the abandoned encampmentindicated that reports of native scouts hadbeen most accurate. Edson estimated thatsome 4,000 ,Japanese had been in the vicin-ity until shortly before his attack, thathis force had met only outposts and rearguarc]s of a newly arrived unit which ob-viously was preparing a strong attack onHenderson Field. Twenty-seven Japa-nese had been killed. Marine casualtiesnumbered two dead and six wounded.

Edson’s estimate of the Japanesestrength was a.little low, but he was rigl~tabout the enemy’s intentions. Just as the1st Marines had previously scouted ele-ments of the Zchz%i Force it later met atthe mouth of the IIL~ River, so ColonelEdson had located the gathering Ka.u~a-guchi Fovce his men would meet later ina bitter stand before the airfield.

Rabaul had kept .4dmiral Tanaka’s re-inforcement, ships busy. The adn~ira] hadtaken over the cruiser K;n.ugma to replacehis damaged ~&atsu, and early on 29 Au-gust Admiral Mikawa had ordered Ta-naka to begin transporting reinforcementsby destroyer. The remnants of Ichiki’srear echelon would be taken down to Guad-alcanal as would the Kawaguchi Force,due. to arrive later that day from Truk onboard the transport ,$’ado Matw. Tanakaloaded supplies on board the ships of De-

300 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADAJJCANAL

THE BATTLE OF THE RIDGE 301

strvyer Division z4, and put, the troops ofIchiki’s rear echelon on board two de-stroyer transports. Then he stood by fortile arrival of Kawaguchi.

Kawaguchi’s %’th l~r;~f(f~e. a part of tile1$’tA l)~u;s;o?? in C’hi~lii, was built aroundColonel .M{inosuka oka’s 12Jth ZnfuntryReqi7n en t. ~rom (Xhina the unit hacl

moved in December 1941 to 130rneo. In

l~arch 1942 it moved to (’ebu in the Philip-

pines, in .~pril to l~indanao, and in June

to Palau. .flerted for a ~Tew (%~inea

operation that never came oH, the force

remained in the Palau Islands until late in

;iugust when it began to stage in echelons

through Truk for the Rabaul area. lyllen

it arrived for this new mission it was

formed up to inclucle the rear echelon of

the gd Battalion, .429th Znf an try (Icfiiki

Force), the 12’hth. Infmtry, the 2?d llat-

~a/;on, ~th l?lfantry, and units of artillery,engineer, signal, and antitank troops. Inthat form the l{mwaguch i Fo~ce nllmbereclmore than 6,000 n~en.G

.idmiral Tanaka had his destroyers allready when Kawag~~chi arrived. The ad-miral met immediately with the generalto hurry things along, but he ran into dif-ficulty at once. Kawaguchi was a bargeman, and he did not care much for thisidea of going down to GLladnlc:uH~lin de-stroyers. He had once moved his unit 500miles by barges to make a distinguishedlanding on Borlleo. XON- he wanted toknow how it would be if he ~vent ml downto C,izo Harbor just north of New Georgiaon board l}is A’ado ilf(~)~tl,and then trans-

ferred to barges for the remainder of the

t-rip and for the ]anding at Guadalcana].

Kawaguchi’s subordinate oficers nodded

:~~rreemellt to this iclea. T’hey were barge

men, too. The impatient Tanaka referredthis dispute to Mikawa of the A’ighth Fleet

and Hyakut ake of the ,Se?’enteenth .4 rT~/y.

These oflicers prevailed upon Kawaguchito temporarily curb his wnrm regard forbarges. I[e would make all of the trip onT:lnaka’s destroy ers,. and land on Guadal-canal from them, besides.7

For the build-ul) on Guadalcanal, Kawa-guclli split his commancl. The generalwould land in the Tasimboko area withthe Ichiki rear echelon and the Istand t?a!A’attaliom, 1~.$th 171/’an try Regiment.{;olonel (lka would lancl with the remain-

der of the force—the Ed Battalion, l.%jthZnfwn try—west of Lungs Point near Ko-kumbona. Each of the two forces wasreinforced by a share of the artillery,engineers, and other special troops. Therewas only one hitch in the reinforcementeflorts, even if Kawaguchi might have beenuneasy without a barge under him, but thisbobble had no serious over-all results.Captain Yonosuke Murakami, command-ing Destroyer Squadron .Z~. was to clearthe w:Ly for the landings by going downThe Slot on the night of 29 .~ugust to at-tack a U. S. task force which was reportedto be off Lungs Point. Instead, Murakamicame steaming back up The Slot for thecomfort of the Shorthands. The night skyaround Guadalcan al,he explained, was toofull of a bright moon and U. S. aircraft.“He was transferred shortly to the. home-land,” Tanaka reported later.’ The ele-ments of the Kuwaguchi Fowe landed dur-ing the nights of 30 and 31 i~LlgLISt,nt

about midnight in both cases.In spite of the fact that the commanders

were separated by a distance of some 30miles, Kawagucl~i p]annecl a difficult

‘ Tajtakt[ .Irticte, I, 693, 697.8Ibid., 696.

30$2 1’EARL HARBOR TO GTJADALCAA-AL

manellver that proposed to strike theI.unga perimeter in a three-jawed envel-opment from the west,, south, and south-east. It was to be a coordinated attzckwith air and naval support. To thel~ormal problems inherent in such an in-volvedp]an, Kawaguchi imposeduponhisforce the additiol~a] tmk of cutting a trailover the steep jungle-covered ridges andgorges from tl~e Tasimboko area to a pointsouth of Henderson Field. The jungletrail, planned as a route which wouldenable the ,Japanese to escape observation,was begun about 2 September by Kawa-guchi’s engineers. Infantry, artillery, andother units followed the engineers alongthis hand-hewn jungle route toward their1ines of departure for the attack againstthe Marines.

YHZ3 BA TTLZ7 OF THE R[DGL’

Kawag-uchi’s fade-out into the jungle\VtLS successful. He was not spotted byMarines again until he was ready to at-tack, but it soon became apparent to theI.unga defenders that he would have im-posing support from Rabaul. Far-rang-ing intelligence sources reported a Japa-nese naval build-up in the Truk and Palauareas and greatly increased air activityaround the 13ismarck .krchipelagro.

“The situation as I view it is verycritical,” Admiral Ghormley messagedNimitz.’ “Our transportation problem in-creases steadily as Japs perfect theirblockade methods.” ,Japanese. poundingof (luadalcanal picked L~p; the defendersclearly were being softened up for a bigattack, and while the South Pacific scur-ried to get them more planes the men atI.unga hoped that the field would staydry for the important day.

“Quoted in I[ari},e ~l~rHistor~, 88-89.

On 11 September, the pace of the attacksquickened. Twenty-six bombers and eightZeros came over at 1210 to pock the field,kill 11 Marines, and wound 17 others, andclestroy one 1’%00 parked beside the strip;and a heavy cruiser and two destroyerswere sl)otted steaming south about, 100miles to the northeast. But on the sameday (he (~actlls Air Force added to itsstrength. At 1620 a flight of !24 F4F’sthat h:Ld been idle since their carrier~~(~ru.to!yahad been torpedoed on 31 Augustcame Llp to Henderson from EspirituSanto under the command of LieutenantCommander Leroy C. Simpler. Beforenoon the next day (12 September) Simp-ler’s men got their chance to learn Cactusoperations, Twenty-one of them went upwith 11 ‘{old” Cactus fliers to shoot down12 bombers and three fighters out of a42-plane .Japanese strike that came overat 1100.

Meanwhile patrols from the 2d Bat-talion, 1st Marines began to encounterfreqnellt opposition east and southeast ofthe perimeter. Native scouts brought,word of large. bodies of troops that clearlywere not wandering remnants of Ichiki’sact ion. The troops had an air of purposeand direction apparent even to the localnatives who begin to flee from their vil-lages to the Marine perimeter. By 10September native reports indicated thatthe enemy was less than five miles east of

the perimeter and that he. was cutting aroad to the south.

The perimeter by this time had beenimproved ind strengthened. The. 1st Ma-rines right (east) flank was refused forsome 4,000 yards inland from the mouth ofthe IIL1,and on the west the 5th Marines,with a strong reserve in the form of its 2dBattalion just over from Tulagi, refused

THE BATTLE OF THE RIDGE 303

its flank inland for approximately halfthat distance. The space inland betweenthese flanks still posed a serious problem,but it had been partially solved by theestablishment of well-prepared strongpoints and outposts. (See Map 18)

Troops from the 1st Amphibian Tractornnd Pioneer Battalions maintained posi-tions south (inland) of the 5th Marinessector west of the Lungs, while east of theLungs a 4,000-yard outpost line was main-tained by the 1st Marines, artillerymen,the engineer battalion, the bulk of the pio-neer battalion, and the raider-parachutebattalion. General Vandegrift had or-dered the raiders and parachutists out ofdivision reserve to augment, this line bypreparing positions on a long low ridgethat extended south of Henderson Fieldand parallel to the Lungy River. Thethousand-yard-long ridge was but a milesouth of the airfield and, unless well de-fended, offered the Japanese an invitingavenue of approach to the field,

The pioneer battalion (minus its com-pany west of the I.unga) held positionsjust south of Henderson Field betweenthe Lungs and the north spur of the ridgeoccupied by Edsonk force. Farther to theeast—and across the ridge spur from thepioneers-was the area of the engineerbattalion. Between the two positions was

the division command post which recentlyhad been moved from its former, bomb-pocked position near the airfield.

on the 12th, the same day the Saratogafliers went into business with the Cactuscircus, Edson and his executive officerswalked out on their ridge to decide on a

location for defenses. The officers drewsmall-arms fire from the jungles to thesouth, and Edson called up his troops todig in across the southernmost knoll on the

ridge. This was forward of the flanks ofengineers on his left (east) and the pio-neers on his right, but Edson wanted tohold all the ground he could and to launchan attack against the enemy the next day.

At about 2100 that, night a Japaneselight cruiser and three destroyers enteredSealark Channel to shell the airfield, andat about the same time the enemy groundforce probed lightly at the raider-para-chute force on the ridge. Fighting wassporadic all along the line, and althoughone desultory Japanese attack actuallymade a slight penetration of the Marineline, the enemy made no attempt to con-solidate or expand this gain.

Early the next morning (the 13th) Ed-son launched his counteroffensive, but hefound the enemy too strong and well-prepared to be thrown back. In the after-noon the Marine officer withdrew his ex-hausted men north of the positions theyhad held the previous night and estab-lished a stronger line on a higher portionof the ridge closer to the engineers andpioneers to his left and right rear. C)n theright, in the jungle between the ridge andthe Lungs, a sketchy contact was madewith the pioneer battalion; on the left(east ) the raider-parachute flank dangledopen. (See Map 19)

While Edson’s force sweated under thehot sun cm the grassy ridge, HendersonField was having more than its share ofaction. The Japanese raids started at0950, came back at 1300 and again at 1730.The mixed Guadalcanal force shot down11 of the enemy planes during the daywhile losing five of their own number. Butagain the U. S. air strength grew.

Navy pilots from the Hofwet and Waspbrought in 18 F4F’s, and in the afternoonmore Saratoga fliers and planes came up

1’IIMRL HARBOR TO GUADALCASAI,

.: t ““Henderson Field’----.: 1700 Yard6”-

-- I/ ...”: b :.’II :

; II >-* II :-.

~ II :II :

N

t

EDSON’S RIDGEFIRST PHASE

-. NIGHT OF 12-13 SEPTEMBER 1942

,~#ji ‘--~ - Moin enemy thrust

w - Marine front lines

P -Command posts

Scaleo 100 200 300 400 500

Yards

MAP 19

THE 13.kTTI.E OF THE RIDGE

from Espiritu Sallto. Ninlitz and ElhormI-

ley were doiug all tl~ey could to bolster

tl~e Solomons toe hold against the Japa-nese attack tlmt was coming. IJater in tileday Lieutenant Comnmnder Louis ,J. Kimbrollgllt in a flight of 12 SBD’S of ~~S-3and the field also got its first torpedoplanes when I,ieutennnt Harold H. Larseu,ITSAT,flew in leading six TBF’s of VT-8,’Ol~llt while tile Henderson flying forcegained by 60 planes during the ]Jer’ioc{ of11–13 Sel)t ember, Rabald’s zir powerjumped an adclit ional 140 phmes cm 12September alone.

Taking periodic cover from sniping andbombing raids, Edson’s men ccmt inued todig in for one more night on the ridge; onthe morning of the 14th they were to bel’elieved by tile $2clBattalion> 5th Marines.But it looked as if the night wo~lld be theworst they had seen yet; scouting planesspotted seven destroyers coming down TileSlot, evidently to acid their bou~bardmentto the grolmd attack that appearedshaping LLpin the jungle to the soLtth.

During the afternoon the reserve bat-ttdiol~ (2,/5) movecl to an assembly areaeast of the Lunga and between the airfieldand F.dson’s Ridgej and otlicem of thisbattalion had gone forward to I?dson’slines to look over the area they would con-trol the following day. The 105n~m how-itzers of the 5th Battalion, llth Marineslay in direct support of the IMson force,and elements of the special weapons bat-talion had an observation post on the ridge.The Guadalcantd defense was as ready asit could get.

‘0 After this day account-keeping pretty wellbroke down. Records defy determination of whoflew from Cactus on any given day. In the pressof fighting, often with “staff” officers in the airns much as anybody else, adrninistration andoffire work were marked by extreme c asualuess.

Eclson’s (Iisl)ositioll })lace(l IIis two para-chute Conll)anies OIL the exposed let+ flankand tied them ill on the right with raider(“OllllXlll~11 which helcl the ridge knoll intile center of the Marine line. ~OIIl~l:LIl~

A of the raiders extended down tl~e westslope of the ridge toward the Lungs and tothe makeshift contact with the pioneers.Raider Company C, on LLhigh knoll to thenorth (rear) of Company B, was Edson’sreserve.

At sunset units were organized in smallcombat groups of about platoon strengthdisposed at intervals along the main lineof resistance. There were. open fields oftire only in the center of the position wherethe MLR crossed the grassy ridge, but evenhere the abrupt slopes and broken groundmade coordination of fires difficult. Intile last hours of day] ight the troops inl-pro~ecl their foxholes and the fields of tire,but, the resulting positions were neithercontinuous nor complete.

In the first hours of darkness, Louie theLouse, or Washing-Machine Charley/’chugged over to drop his inconsistentscattering of bombs, and about 2100 he letgo a flare that hung over the field as aregistration point for the destroyer taskforce that now opened up from SealarkChannel.

As if in answer, a flare went up fromthe troops south of 13dson, and withoutartillery preparation Kawaguchi drove atwo-battalion attack against the center andl“ight of the raider-parachute line. Com-

“ Familiar bLltunaffectionate names by whichGuadalcanal defenders identified the nuisanceraiders that droned around aLmost nightly. Tech-nically, “Charlie” was a twin-engine night bomberfrom Rabaul, ‘“Louie” a cruiser float plane whosignalled to the bombardment ships. But theharassed Marines LISedthe names interchange-ably,

306

pany B’s central sector on the high knollcaught most of this first assault and turnedit back, but the other attack column foundan opening to the west and came throughto cut otf and envelop Company B’s rightplatoon. While the Japanese drovethrough this gap between Companies Aand B, the isolated platoon fought its wayback along 250 yards of the ridge to joinCompany C on the knoll to the north.Still engaged and nearly overpowered,Company ~ refused its right flank alongthe ridge’s west slopes. (See Map 20)

Edson had been calling in fire from5/11’s howitzers since the beginning ofthe attack, and as the Japanese continuedto hammer at his men the colonel directedthe artillery closer and closer until it wasfalling within 200 yards of the CompanyB lines. But still the Japanese came on,and by 2200 Edson estimated that the twounderstreugth parachute companies andCompany B (less the withdrawn platoon)were opposed by at least two enemy bat-talions attacking in full force.

Japanese infiltration parties were takingover some of the Company B foxholes,communication ]ines wrere cut throughoutthe area, and the Japanese now began todrum the ridge with heavy mortar fire.Following a violent barrage at 2230, the,Japanese attack shifted to the east whereit struck the thin flank held by the para-chute troops. Screaming in English, “Gasattack ! Gas attack !“, the Japanese cameout of the jungle through a smoke screenand drove the parachutists back alongthe ridge to expose. the left flank of Ccm-pzny B.

Tl~is left the 1; company raiders, nowcut to approximately 60 men, exposed onboth flanks as well as their front, andEdson called for them to pull back to alast-ditch stand with Company C. Com-

pany .1 would join the force there, andEdson ordered his men to hold at all costs.It was tile last dominating terrain featuresolltb of the airfield.

Screening the withdrawal of the twocompanies with artillery fire, Edson col-lected his men as they filtered back andbuilt them up in what he hoped would be a1ine strong enough to make the final stand.The colonel and his officers ironed out theconf~lsion of setting in the new defense indarkness and under fire while holding offrepeated ,Tapauese assaults. In all, theenemy struck more than a dozen timesthroughout the night, the Kawaguchi mengrinding themselves into the fire fromMarine artillery, mortars, machine guns,it]~d rifles in vain attempts to dislodgelhlson from his final knoll of BloodyRidge.1~ ,Japanese flares “telegraphed”each attack, pro~iding the llth Marinesgunners with reference points for their all-night tiring in which they expended 1,992rounds of 105mm projectiles, some atranges as short at 1,600 yards.

At 0400, with the ,Japanese attacks stillin progress, companies of reserve battalion2/5 began to move singly through thedarkness and into positions on the raider-parachute left, flank. T)arkness and un-certainty about Edson’s new locationbrought confusion to this reinforcementeffort, but the companies succeeded ingaining positions from which they aidedin standing off the final Japanese attacks.

While the action on the ridge was inprogress, another Japanese unit (possiblythe Ichiki rear echelon) struck farther tothe east where the right flank of the 3dBattalion, 1st Marines lay exposed near

the Ilu River inland. Striking with a

‘2 The name, used interchan~eal)ly with “Ed-son’s Ridge, ” was employed after the battle, toidentify this terrain feature.

THE RATTLE OF THE RIDGE307

ED SON’S RIDGEFINAL PHASE

NIGHT OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1942

--khin effort by Knvog.chiDetachment

@ -Enemy secondq ot+.cks& - Marine frant lines as of dusk

- Finol defensive line held byMorines

- Routes of retirement on finol

defensive poeitian

MAP 20

308 I’1.:.iRI, HARB(-)R TO CJIT.kD.+TJ(’.\3”.iI,

force of about two reinforced companies,the ,Japauese engaged the Marines in anight-long tire tight bnt failed to penetratetile line.

In another, lesser action of the night apatrol of some 30 .Japanese, evidently fromthe force that penetrated Edson, wanderedinto mthin line of Company C, 1st FJngi-neers in the arem east of the division CPand near 5/11’s Headquarters and ServiceBattery south of the airfield. The linehad been thinned earlier in the night when(’ompany .k of tile engineers l]ad beencalled hack to aid tile CT’ defense, and theJapanese patro] which struck at 05;30 snc-ceeded in taking two left flank n]achine-gun positions before headqltarters a]ldservice al’tillerymen came llp to bolster theline and help evacuate wounded. The,Tapallese heckled the 1ine for the shorttime remaining u]]til daylight, then retiredinto the jungle. Four engineers werekilled an(l 14 were wounded. Ten ,Jnp:vnese bodies were buried in the area.

.%Iso by daylight (14 September) tileattacks on F.dson>s Ridge. and the 3/1 linehad dwindled to sporadic sniping, and illthe Edson Ridge sector the disorganized.Japanese were bombed and strafed intoretreat by three 1’–400’s from HendersonField. Survivors remaining near theridge were hunted down and killed.

.ifter this the only enemy still in actionwas a force of about battalion strengthwhich fired across the Ilu plain some dis-tance east of Bloody Ridge and harassedthe Marines of 3/1 (Lientenant ColonelWilliam h’. McKelvy, Jr. ) who held thatportion of the Marine. line. Tanks werecalled up against this enemy force, andafter a hasty reconnaissance six of thesevehicles moved forward without infantrysupport toward the Japanese line in thefringe of jungle by the Tenaru. Two

tanks were hit almost at once by a Japaneseantitank gun. Another tank chargedacross the plain and over a grass hut onlyto plunge down a 3tl-foot bank into the‘l?el~aru; all four crew members were killed..l fourth tank was hit by this antitank gunshortly after this, tile fifth tank returnedto the infal~try lines, and tile sixth tank\vas stopped by a wrecked track ,50 yardsin front of the ,Japanese gun. The n~el~inthis tank bailed out. and returned to theill falltry position. The tank attack llacl tobe chalked off as a costly failure, but the.Japanese caused little trouble in the areaafter this. .1 desultory fire fight con-tinued across the plain until 16 Septemberwl~en the enemy withdrew.

Tactically the entire Kau~aguclt; FwcecoLdd be scratched. .Ibout 400 of theIchiki rear echelon subsequently reachedKoli Point as did some troops of the .%lBattalion, @h Infantry, hut these werehardly more. than stragglers. The remain-der of the force—the larger element whichhad struck Edson’s Ridge—reduced itselfto a rabble while cutting z tortuous jungletrail over the southern slopes of Mount.Iusten, across the up-country Matanikauterritory, and finally to Kokurnbona.~Tounded died along the route and equip-ment was abandoned by the weakened, ex-hausted survivors.

The Marines had turned back a seriousthreat to their precarious (hadalcanal po-

sition, but again a part of the thanks couldgo to ,Japanese bungling+n the battle-

field as well as in plimning at higher eche-lons. Although I{awaguchi salvagedenough pride to spare himself the hara-

kiri fate of Colonel Ichiki, he still wasonly a slightly stronger boy whom Tokyoand Rabaul hopefully had sent away ona man’s job.