hist. materialism

8/14/2019 Hist. Materialism

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/hist-materialism 1/15

Towards a Reconstruction of Historical MaterialismAuthor(s): Jürgen HabermasSource: Theory and Society, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 287-300Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/656775

Accessed: 01/11/2010 02:59

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Theory and Society.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer

http://www.jstor.org/stable/656775?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp



http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/656775?origin=JSTOR-pdf




287

TOWARDSA RECONSTRUCTIONOF HISTORICAL

MATERIALISM*

JURGEN HABERMAS

In the present paper I will analyze the merits and limitations of historical

materialism o the extent that it can be considered a theoreticalexplanation

of social evolution. I would like to begin by introducing and critically

scrutinizing the fundamental concepts and main hypotheses of historical

materialism.Moreover,after indicating some of the problems, I shall also

propose and illustratea possible solution. First, I will dealwith the concepts

of social labor and historyof the species,

1. Socially organized labor is the specific way through which humans as

distinguished romanimalsreproduce heirlife:

One can make the distinction between man and animal by virtue of

consciousness, religion or whatever else one may choose. Man himself

begins to differentiate himself from the animals as soon as he starts to

produce his own means of subsistence. By producinghis own means of

subsistence he indirectly produces his material life. (Marx, Deutsche

Ideologie)

This concept of social labor canbe analyzed n terms of three differenttypes

of rules - rules of instrumental, trategic,and communicativeaction. What s

decisive is the aspect of the purposeful reforming of materialaccordingto

rules of instrumental ction.

Max Planck Institut, Starnberg

* This paper has been translated by Robert Strauss. It is a shortened version of a book inGerman which is four times is long and contains an extensive bibliography andfootnotes. The book, which is by Klaus Eder, is called: Die Entstehung vorkapitalisti-scher Klassengesellschaften. Ein Beitrag zur Konstruktion einer Theorie der sozio-kulturellen Evolution. MS, MPIL, Starnberg, 1975 (forthcoming).



288

Naturally Marx understands by production not merely the instrumental

actions of a single individual,but more the cooperationof several ndividuals.

The instrumentalactions of these variousindividualsbecome socially coor-

dinated accordingto the purposeof production;thus, the rules of strategic

action which guide this cooperation are an essential element of the labor

process. It is unimportant hat the means of subsistenceare only produced n

order to be used, since the distributionof its products, as well as labor, are

socially organized.But the rulesof distributionhave still another structure,

for it is not a question here of the transformationof material or of the

purposeful rational organizationof means,but of the reciprocalconnection

of behavioralexpectations or interests.The distributionof productsrequires

normsthat are intersubjectively ecognized rulesof communicativeaction.

We call a system which socially organizes abor anddistributionan economy;

thus Marx s convincedthat the economic mode of the reproductionof life

is specific for the humanstageof development.Here,a significantquestionis

whetherthis Marxian oncept of social labor sufficiently determines he form

or reproduction of human life. If we consider this in the light of recent

anthropological indings, it appears hat the concept of social labor extends

too deeply into the scale of evolution: not only homo sapiens,but even the

hominids are distinguished from other primates in that they reproduce

themselves throughsocial labor and develop an economy. This is the period

of hominization: beginningwith a common ancestor for both chimpanzee

and man, and reachingover homo erectus to homo sapiens. Here,amongthe

hominids,the adult men form hunting groupswhich (a) dispose of weapons

and tools (technology), (b) cooperatethrougha division of labor(cooperative

organization)and(c) collectivelydistribute he prey(rulesof distribution).

The Marxist concept of social labor is thus suitable for distinguishing he

mode of life of the hominids from that of the primates;however, t does not

hold for the specificallyhumanmode of reproductionof life. What s specific

for human beings is that they are the first to break up the social structure

which had emerged from the vertebrates;only they break up that one-

dimensional status order in which each animal has a single status in the

hierarchy.As far as we know, the hominid societiesbased on sociallaborhadnot yet been organized n kinship relationships.Only a family system allows

status, in the adult male'ssystem of the hunting group, to be linked(via the

father'srole) to statusin the systemof the female-and-young,hus integrating

functions of social-laborwith functions of nurtureof the young. Further-

more, this integratesmale huntingfunctions with female collecting activity.

It seems, then, that we can refer to the reproductionof human ife in homo



289

sapiens only when the economy of the hunt is supplementedby kinship

structures. This process has lasted several million years; it represents an

importantreplacementof the animalstatus system. Amongthe primates his

status system is based on a certainkind of symbolicinteraction;but the role

system of kinshippresupposes anguage.For the fundamentalanthropological

assumptionsof historicalmaterialismhis could imply the following:

The concept of social labor is fundamentalbecausethe socialorganization

of labor and distributionobviously precedesthe developmentof explicit

linguisticcommunicationwhich, in turn, precedesthe formationof social

role systems.

However, the specifically human mode of life can only be adequately

described f we unite the concept of social labor with that of the kinship

structure.

The structures of role behavior mark a new evolutionary threshhold

compared to the structures of social labor; the rules of communicative

action, that is intersubjectivelyvalid norms of action, cannot be reduced

to rules whetherof instrumentalor strategicaction.

Productionandsocialization,the life processes n the sphereof social labor

and child-rearing,are of equal importance for the reproductionof the

species. The kinshipstructure,which controls both the integration of the

externalas well as the internalnature s, therefore,basic.

2. Marx links the concept of social labor with that of the history of the

species. This signalsabove all the materialistmessage hat naturalevolutionis

now continued within the range of one single species by different means,

namely through the productive activity of the socialized individuals them-

selves. The key to a reconstructionof the history of mankindis offered by

the idea of the mode of production.History is then conceived as a succession

of different modes of production, which in their pattern of development

reveal the direction of social evolution. For Marx, of course, a mode of

production is characterizedby a particular tage in the developmentof theproductiveforces andby particular ormsof social exchange, that is, relations

of production. The productiveforces consist (a) of the labor force of the

producers; (b) of the technical knowledge, insofar as it is converted into

production techniques; (c) of organizational knowledge, insofar as it is

efficiently employed to set labor power in motion, to produce skilledlabor,

and to coordinatespecializedlabor (mobilization,qualificationandorganiza-

tion of laborpower). The productive orces determine he extent to whichwe



290

can control natural processesand exploit naturalresources.The relations of

production, on the other hand, are those institutions and social mechanisms

which specify in what way laborcan be combinedwith the availablemeans of

production. The regulation of access to the means of production or the

channels of control of socially utilized labor also indirectlydeterminesthe

distribution of the social wealth. Hence the relations of production express

the distribution of power; they determine the distributional pattern of

opportunities and thereby the interest structure which exists in society.

Historical materialism, hen, proceeds from the assumption that productive

forces and relations of production do not vary independently of each other,

but rather form structureswhich (a) internallycorrespondand(b) produce a

finite number of developmentalstages homologous in their structure so that

(c) the successionof the modes of productionreveal a developmental ogic.

( Thehand-millproducesa society of feudallords,the steam-mill,a society of

industrialcapitalists. )

The orthodox version differentiates between five modes of production: the

primitivecommunal mode of production of the band and tribe; the ancientmode of productionbased on slave-holding;he feudal; the capitalist; inally,

the socialist mode of production.A discussion,centered on the classification

of the ancient Orient and the ancient Americasled to the insertion of an

Asiatic mode of production, with which the development of civilization

begins. These six modes of productionshoulddefine universal tages of social

evolution. This means that, from an evolutionarystandpoint, the economic

structureof every distinctive society can be analyzed in termsof the various

modesof

production whichhave entered into a hierarchicalassociation in

that society.

In primitivesocieties, labor and distributionare organizedthrough kinship;

there is no privateaccess to natureand to the means of production(primitive

communal mode of production). Administered by the priesthood, the

militaryandthe bureaucracy, hereexists in the earlycivilizationsof Mesopo-

tamia, Egypt, ancient China, ancient India and ancient America landed

property belonging to the state which is superimposedupon the residueofvillage community property (the so-called Asiatic mode of production). In

Greece, Rome and other mediterraneansocieties, the private landholder

combines the status of slave-holder n the context of his domestic economy

with the statusof citizen in the politicalcommunityof town or state (ancient

mode of production). In medievalEurope,feudalism s based on largeprivate

landed estates allotted to manyindividualholders.The landholders nterinto

variouspolitical and economic relationsof dependency (even serfdom)with



291

the feudal lord (feudal mode of production). Finally, in capitalism he labor

force becomes a commodity, so that the dependenceof the directproducers

upon those who own the means of production becomes legally institu-

tionalized through the labor contract and economically through the labor

market.

The dogmaticformulationof the concept of the historyof the speciesshares

a set of weaknesseswith the models of a philosophyof historyrooted in the

eighteenth century. However, historical materialismneeds to presupposea

macrosubjectto whom the evolutionary process is assigned.The bearersof

evolution are society and its members. Evolution can be read from those

structures which, following a rational pattern, are replacedby ever more

comprehensive tructures.In the course of this structure-creating rocessthe

social entities involvedalso change. In addition where is the question of the

sense in which one can interpret the emergenceof new structuresas move-

ment; certainly only the empirical substrata are in motion, that is, the

societies and their individuals.The most disputed area is teleology, which

historical materialismsees as inherent in history. By evolution, we refer to

cumulative processes which allow a direction to be perceived. Neo-evolu-

tionist theories considerincreasingcomplexity as a reasonablecriterion.The

more states a system can choose, the more complex the environmentwith

which it will be able to cope. Marx also ascribed great importance to the

social division of labor. This refers to the processes that enhance the

adaptivecapacity of a society. However,historicalmaterialismdoes not judge

progressby this criterionof complexity, but according o the developmentof

productive forces and to the maturationof forms of social integrationthat

enable increased participation in politically relevant decision-makingpro-

cesses. These two dimensions are not selected arbitrarily. Since further

productiveforces andnew formsof socialintegrationare a result of the social

implementationof technical and moral-practical nowledge, the selection of

both these dimensionsin the last analysis s determinedby two related claims

to validity: namely, by the truth of its propositionsand the justifiability of

its norms. I would thereforedefend the position that the criteriaof historical

progresswhich historical materialismdistinguisheswith the developmentof

the productive orcesand the emancipationof social constraintarecapableofa systematicjustification.In any case, I assumethat the idea of the history of

the species can be reformulatedto meet the objections against the idea of

one-dimensionalnecessaryandirreversibleocialevolutionof a reifiedspecies

subject.

Having elucidated the concepts of social labor and of history of the

species, I shall now briefly turn to two of historical materialism'sbasic



292

assumptions: first, to the theory of base and superstructure, nd second, to

the dialectic of production forces and the relationsof production.

3. In every society productive forces and the relationsof productionform an

economic structure by which the other subsystems are determined. For a

considerable engthof time an economisticversionof this thesis has prevailed.

The context in which Marxpropoundshis theory makes it clear that the

dependence of superstructureon base is valid only for the critical phase

duringwhich a social system is passingonto a new developmental evel. What

is meant is not some ontological constitution of society, but rather the

guiding role which the economic structureassumes n social evolution. Thus

the thesis purportsthat evolutionary nnovationssolveonly suchproblemsas

may ariseat the substructural evel of a society and which demanda change

within the base. The identificationof substructurewith economic structure

could lead to the assumptionthat the substructural evel is equivalent o the

economic system. That is, however,valid only for modern societies. Relations

of production are defined by their function in regulatingaccess to the means

of productionandindirectly the distributionof social wealth. This function is

assumed n primitive societies by kinship systems and in traditionalsocieties

by political institutions. It is not until the market,in addition to its cyber-

netic function, also takes over the function of stabilizingclass relations that

the relationsof productionassumea purelyeconomic form.

The particular nstitutionalcore that takesover the functions of the relations

of productiondeterminesthe dominant form of social integration.I use this

term in the Durkheimiansense of integrationthroughnorms and values.If

systems problems, e.g., ecological, demographic,economic problems,can no

longerbe solved in accord with an existing form of social integration, f this

itself must be revolutionized n orderto create lattitude for the solution of

problems, the the identity of the society is challenged and society itself is

thrown into a crisis. Marxsees the mechanismof this crisis n the dialectic of

productive orces andthe relationsof production.

This thesis can be interpretedin the following way; an indigenous learningmechanismexists which providesfor spontaneous growthof technical know-

ledge and for the development of the productive forces. In this context, a

mode of productionis only in a state of equilibriumwhen structuralhomo-

logies exist between the developmental stages of the productiveforces and

the relationsof production. Correspondingly,his meansthat the indigenous

developmentof productive orcesgeneratesstructural ncompatibilitieswhich

in turnevoke imbalances n the existingmode of productionandtherebylead



294

The question remains: how is this step possible? The descriptive reply of

historical materialismanswers this with the mechanisms of social conflicts,

political struggle, and social movements. But only an analytic reply can

explain why a society moves to another evolutionary level and how social

movements under particularconditions lead to a new form of social integra-

tion, and therewith to a new developmental evel for the society. The answer

which I would like to suggest is this: the species not only learns technical

knowledge relevant or the developmentof the productiveforces, but also the

decisive dimension of moral-practical nowledgewhich can be embodied into

structures of interaction. The rules of communicative action do not auto-

matically follow changes in the field of instrumentaland strategic action;

they develop rather by virtue of their own dynamics. I will add only a few

remarkson the dynamics of the development of moral-practical onscious-

ness.

4. The evolutionary learningprocessescannot be ascribedexclusively either

to society or individuals.Certainlythe personality system bears the learning

process of ontogenesis, and to a certain extent, learning is done only by

individuals.However, social systems can form new structuresby utilizing the

learning capacities of its membersin order to cope with systems problems

which threaten the maintenanceof the self. In this respectthe evolutionary

learning process of societies is dependent on the competence of the single

members.These in turn do not acquire heircompetencesas isolatedmonads,

but by growing nto the symbolicstructureof their social world.

If we follow this process from the perspectiveof the socializedchild, social

reality acquires new depths. Ar first, actions, motives and actors are still

observedon a single level of reality. At the next stage,actions and norms are

perceived separately;the norms, together with the actors and their motives,

then move on a level which lies behind the level of observableactions. At the

final stage, principles from which norms of action can be produced and

criticized are distinguishedfrom the norms themselves. The principlesto-

gether with the actors and their motives are withdrawneven furtherbehindthe norms,that is, behind the established nteractionsystems.

In this manner we emerge with the basic concepts for a genetic theory of

action that can be used in two ways: either as concepts for an individual's

competence in speech and action in a symbolic universe;or as concepts for

this veryuniverse.



295

Now, insofar as conflicts of action are not resolved by force or strategic

means, but on a consensualbasis, structurescome into play which determine

for the individualmoral consciousness,and for society, moral beliefsandthe

legal system. The concept of good and evil crystallizesaroundthe idea of

reciprocitywhich lies at the base of all interactions.In the research radition

of Piaget these are developmental stages of moral consciousness. At the

pre-conventionalevel whereactions, motives,andactorsarestill perceivedon

a single level of reality,only the manifestconsequencesof action areassessed

in the case of behavioralconflicts. At the conventionallevel the motivescan

be assessedindependentlyof the concrete consequencesof action;the inten-

tional conformity with social expectations and existing norms is decisive.At

the post-conventionallevel these norms lose their traditionalauthority and

require justification through recourse to universalcriteria. I would suggest

that such individualcompetencescan also be used for the solution of systems

problems and for the innovationof legalinstitutions.Thisis what is meantby

socio-evolutionarylearning processes in the sphere of moral-practical on-

sciousness.

I consider as a first step in the analysis the attempt to differentiatebetween

levels of social integration. I doing so, I shall deal with the institutional

system, the world-view,and moralbeliefs separately rom the legalsystem.

Neolithic societies: (a) conventional differentiationof level between actions

and norms, mythical world-view still enmeshedin the system of action. (b)

Resolution of conflicts accordingto preconventionalcriteria:assessmentof

the consequences of action, restitution of the formerstatus quo, i.e., com-pensationfor damagescaused(feuding law, court of arbitration).

Archaiccivilizations:(a) conventionalinteractionsystems,but the formation

of a differentiated mythical world-view which can assume functions of

legitimation for political authorities. (b) Resolution of conflicts from the

standpointof a conventionalmorality dependent on the ruler:assessmentof

the intentionsof the actor;punishment n relationto culpability.

Developed premodern civilizations: (a) conventional interaction system;

formation of a rationalizedworld-view(ethical system founded on cosmo-

logies or monotheism); legitimation of the political system independent of

the ruler's person. (b) Resolution of conflicts from the standpoint of a

developed, conventionalmorality; system of jurisdictionto whichthe ruler s

subject on principle, punishment for deviance from traditionallyjustified

norms.



296

5. I shall illustrate how this approachworks by selectingthe problemsof the

origin of class societies, since I can rely on a study by Klaus Eder in this

regard.

(1) Class societies arise within the framework of a political system; social

integrationhere no longer needs to proceed through the kinshipsystem, but

can be taken over by the state. There have been a numberof theorieson the

originof the state which I would first like to mention and criticize.

(a) The subjugation heory explainsthe emergenceof political rulersand the

establishment of a state apparatus through nomadic, pastoral tribes con-

quering settled agriculturalpeasants. This theory today has been refuted:

since nomadism occurs later than the first civilizations, he emergenceof the

state must have had indigenouscauses.

(b) The division of labor theory is usually stated in a complex way. Agri-

cultural production achieves a surplus and permits (in combination with

demographicgrowth) the release of labor for its purposes. This leads to a

social division of labor. The various social groups which thereby emerge

appropriate ocial wealth differentiallyand form social classes, at least one of

which assumes political functions. This theory, in spite of its apparent

plausibility, is not consistent. An argument s missingwhich would show why

political functions originate from differentiated interests rooted in profes-

sional specialization. Actually, the social division of labor occurs as much

within the politically dominant classes (between priesthood, military and

bureaucracy)as within the working population (e.g., between farmers,and

craftsmen).

(c) The theory of social inequality traces the emergence of the state to

distributionproblems.A surplusarisesfromthe productivityof labor,and the

increasingwealth differentials result in social inequalities with which the

basically egalitariankinship system cannot cope. The distributionproblems

demand a different, that is, political organizationof social exchange. This

thesis could, if true, explain at least the origin of systems problemswhich

were solvedby state organization.Nevertheless, t would not be sufficient toexplain this new form of social integration. Furthermore, he assumptionof

automaticgrowth in the productive orces is not true for agricultural roduc-

tion.

(d) The irrigationhypothesis explainsthe integrationof severalvillagecom-

munities into a political unit by reason of their need to master drought

through large-scale irrigation systems. These huge construction projects



297

require an administration hat becomes the institutional core of the state.

This assumption has been refuted empirically, because in Mesopotamia,

China, and Mexico, the formation of states preceded irrigationprojects.

Furthermore, his theory would only explainthe originof systems problems,

not the mannerof theirsolution.

(e) Thetheory of populationdensity explainsthe origin of the state primarily

by ecological and demographic actors. An indigenouspopulation growth is

assumed that normally leads to a spatial expansion of segmentarysocieties

(i.e., emigration into new areas). When, however, the ecological situation,

neighbouring mountains, the sea or the desert, barrentracts of land, etc.,

hamperedemigrationor flight, conflicts arose due to population densityand

land scarcity. They allowed of no other alternative han for largesectionsof

the population to submit to the political rule of the victorious tribe. The

complexity of the densely populatedsettlementscould only be controlledby

state organization.Even if population problemsof this kind could be proven

to have existed in all formercivilizations,this theory does not explain why

andhow suchproblemshavebeen resolved.

None of the theories mentioned differentiates between systems problems

which overstrainthe steering capacity of the kinship system and the evolu-

tionary learning process, which might explain the change to a new form of

social integration. Only with the help of learningmechanismscan we explain

why some societies find solutions to their problems at all, and why the

particular solution of a state organization was chosen. I shall therefore

proceedfrom the following main hypotheses:

Normally the interactive and the cognitive development of a child pro-

ceeds in stages, so that the child reachesa new learning evel at each stage.

In ontogenesis, it is not the learningprocesses,but the learning nterrup-

tions andretardation hat must be explained.

A society can learn evolutionallyby solvingthe problemswhich overstrain

its ready steering capacity through convertingand implementingthe sur-

plus of individual earningcapacities into new institutionalarrangements.

The first step in the social evolutionary learningprocess is the establish-

ment of a new form of social integrationwhich permitsan increase n the

productive orces andan expansionof the system'scomplexity.

Guided by these hypotheses, we shall submit the following explanatory

sketch for the origin of class societies:



298

(a) The phenomenon to be explained is the origin of a political order that

organizesa society so that its members can belong to different lineages.The

function of social integration moves from kinship to political system. The

collective identity is no longer embodied in the figureof a common ancestor,

but rather n the figureof a commonruler.

(b) Theoreticaldescription of the phenomenon: A ruling position is distin-

guished in that the position per se confers legitimacy on the occupant.

Legitimacyno longerdependson a former status quo that must be restoredas

soon as it is upset. On the contrary, t is attached to a position that empowers

the holder to administerjustice without having to limit himself to the

evaluationof concrete actions and consequencesof actions. He is thereby not

directly bound to actualconstellationsof powers. At the same time, mythical

belief systems which interpret genealogically he ruler'sprivilegesassumefor

the first time, in addition to their explanatory functions, functions of

legitimationas well.

(c) Thegoal of the explanation:the differentiationof a rulingposition means

that the ruler practices jurisdiction at the level of conventional morality.

Consequently, the origin of the state should be explained by the structural

changeof legal institutions movingfrom the preconventional o the conven-

tional level of consensualsettlementof conflicts.

The followingis the explanatorysketch in greaterdetail:

(d) Theinitial state: I take the neolithic societieswhere the complexity of the

kinship system has greatly increased to be the evolutionarily promising

societies.

They in a way institutionalize political roles already. But the chieftains,

kings or leaders are still judged by their concrete actions; their actionsare

not legitimateperse. Such roles areonly temporarily nstitutionalized e.g.,

for warfare)or limited to special tasks (e.g., to providea good harvestor

rain).These roles have not yet advanced nto the centre of social organiza-

tion. [Eder]

(e) Particularsystems problems: In the evolutionarily promisingneolithic

societies systems problemssometimesarisewhich cannotbe controlledby the

steering capacityof the kinship system. The may devolveupon problemsof

land scarcity and population density or of unequal distributionof social

wealth. These problems are perceived when they lead to conflicts that

overburden he archaiclegal institutions(court of arbitration, euding law).



299

(f) The testing of new structures: n societies which are underpressure rom

such problems, the already available conventional structuresof individual

moral consciousnessare used to test the administrationof justice on a new,

but conventional, level. So, for example, the war chief is empowered to

adjudicate n cases of conflict not only according o the contingentconstella-

tion of power, but accordingto socially recognized raditionalnorms. Law is

no longerrestricted o that on which the partiescanagree.

(g) Stabilizing the innovations: These roles can become the pacemakersof

socialevolution.However,not all promisingexperiments ead via suchjudicial

functions to a permanentauthority,that is, to an evolutionarysuccess. Thisis

shown in the example of the Barotse.Only if other conditions arepresentas

well, for example, the military victory of a dominant tribe or a huge

construction project, can such roles stabilize and become the core of a

political system.

Such a developmentmarksoff the successful societies in evolutionaryterms

from those that aremerely promising.

(h) Emergence of class structures: On the basis of political authoritythe

material process of production can then be uncoupled from the limiting

conditions of the kinship system and reorganized by political relations.

[Eder] The ruler assures the loyalty of his officials, priests, and warrior

families by providingthem privilegedaccess to the means of production

(temple andpalace economy).

(i) Development of theforces of production:

The forces of production, which were already found by the neolithic

revolution, can only now be used on a largerscale: the intensification of

agricultureand stock-farmingand the expansion of craft are the resultsof

the extended steeringcapacityof the class society. Thus emergenew forms

of cooperation (e.g., in irrigational arming) or of exchange (e.g., in the

marketexchangebetween town and country). [Eder]

The explanatorysketch which I submitted above may cause surprise n view

of the subject, for at no point does the sketch refer to a particularmode of

production. Instead, the two forms of social integration are describedin

relatively abstract terms of interactionaland moral structures. In fact, its

advantage ies preciselyin this abstraction,for applicationof the scheme of

six modes of productionhas resulted n numerousdifficulties. Duringthe last

few decades discussions have concentrated mainly on the demarcationof



300

paleolithic from neolithic society; on the incorporationof the Asiatic mode

of production;on the differentiationbetween archaicand developedciviliza-tions; and on the interpretation of feudalism. These discussions in no way

suggest the barrennessof the researchprogramof historical materialism,but

they do clearlydemonstrateone point: the concept of the mode of produc-

tion is not abstract enough to encompass the universalsof developmental

levels.

I propose therefore a need for abstract principles of organization.These

principles of organization should comprehendthose innovations that would

institutionalize a new level of learning for each case. The organizational

principle of a society opens the range of options. In particular, t determines

the limits within which structural changes in the institutions can occur. It

further defines to what degree the availablecapacities of productive forces

can be socially employed, or to what degree the development of new forces

of production can be stimulated. Through hese determinations t is also able

to ascertainhow far the complexity of a system's steering capacities can be

raised.

Theory and Society, 2 (1975) 287-300

? Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

hist. materialism

Documents