hiroshi nakaso financial markets department bank of japan
DESCRIPTION
Banking Crisis Resolution (Japan's case and the role of central banks). Hiroshi Nakaso Financial Markets Department Bank of Japan. 1. Overview of Japan’s Crisis in Late 1990’s. Number of Failed Depository Institution. Number of Failed Depository Institutions. (FY 1992 - FY 2004). - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Hiroshi NakasoFinancial Markets Department
Bank of Japan
Banking Crisis Resolution(Japan's case and the role of central banks)
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1. Overview of Japan’s Crisis in Late 1990’s
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Number of Failed Depository Institution
Number of Failed Depository Institutions(FY 1992 - FY 2004)
Banks 20
Credit unions 27
Credit-cooperatives 134
TOTAL 181
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Magnitude of Non-Performing Loans
2.9%
13.2%
2.5%
7.8%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
USA (1991) Sweden(1992) Japan(1931) Japan(1999)
NPLs / Nominal GDP
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NPL Ratios
NPL / GDP ASSET / GDP NPL / ASSET
USA(1991)
2.9% 63.3% 4.5%
Sweden(1992)
13.2% 130.1% 10.1%
Japan(1999)
7.8% 217.4% 3.6%
Notes:
NPL / GDP= Asset / GDP × NPL / AssetNPL : For the US, past due loans, loans in non-accrual status, and restructured loans. For Sweden, gross problem
loans. For Japan, risk management loans.
Asset : For the US, assets held by commercial banks, saving banks, and S&Ls. For Sweden, assets held by large banks. For Japan, assets held by all deposit taking institutions.
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Cost of Disposal
Notes:
1) Losses include those arising from debt-forgiveness and loan restructuring.
2) For FY92-94, figures are for City Banks, Long-term Credit Banks and Trust Banks.
Source: FSA, DIC.
All Japanese banks, billion yen
FY92-94 FY95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 Total
Loss 10,744 13,369 7,763 13,258 13,631 6,944 6,108 9,722 6,658 5,374 93,572
Provision 3,493 7,087 3,447 8,403 8,118 2,531 2,732 5,196 3,101 1,616 45,724
Write-offs 5,322 5,980 4,316 3,993 4,709 3,865 3,072 3,975 3,520 3,734 42,484
DIC financial assistance - 473 117 81 1,936 4,006 4,431 1,041 241 0 12,326
DIC asset purchase - - - 208 2,412 1,097 478 226 154 0 4,576
Capital Injection - - - 1,816 7,459 575 387 184 0 1,960 12,381
Total 10,744 13,842 7,880 15,363 25,438 12,623 11,404 11,173 7,053 7,334 122,855
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Use of Public Funds
USA Expenditure to RTC1
Expenditure to liquidate FSLIC2
Interest payment for bonds issued by REFCORP3
$$$
81.942.776.2
billionbillionbillion
Total $ 200.8 billion ( 3%)
Sweden Capital injection and loans4 SEK 65.0 billion ( 4%)
Norway Capital injection5 NOK 24.9 billion ( 3%)
Finland Capital injection6 FIM 82.7 billion (17%)
Japan7 GuaranteesCashable bonds8
¥¥
5713
trilliontrillion
Total ¥ 70 trillion (14%)
Notes: 1. Resolution Trust Corporation 2. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 3. Resolution Financing Cooperation 4. Total expenditure until July 1994 5. Total expenditure until Dec. 1993 6. Total expenditure until Dec. 1995 7. Japan’s figures are for FY 2000 8. Assigned for loss coverage
( ) ratio to nominal GDP
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Crisis of Autumn 1997
Oct. 14 Failure of Kyoto Kyoei Bank
Nov. 3 Sanyo Securities files application for corporate rehabilitation
Nov. 17 Failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank
Nov. 24 Yamaichi Securities announces suspension of operations
Nov. 26 Failure of Tokuyo City Bank
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Profile of Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan
Failure announced October 1998 Financial data
(consolidated basis, as of March 1998, in \ billion) Total assets : 26,565 Capital : 390 Debentures : 12,268 Deposits : 5,955 Derivatives : 50,000 (notional principal basis)
Branches : 39 (24 domestic, 15 overseas) Employees : 3,346
Crisis of Autumn 1998
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Safety Net Framework (after April 2002)
Purchase and Assumption (P&A)
Failed bank
Systemic RiskException
Assuming institution(s)
Capital injection
Full loss coverage
Temporary nationalisation
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Credit Premiums for Banks
Spread of 5-year Bank Bonds Yield over 5-year JGB yield
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Mizuho Corp
Tokyo-Mitsubishi
Mitsui-Sumitomo
UFJ
CY
(bps)
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Banknotes in Circulation
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
(y/y, %)
CY
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2. “Lender of Last Resort” – Japan’s Case
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Types of Lender of Last Resort Function
Emergency liquidity assistance to a failed deposit taking institution
Provision of liquidity to interbank markets
Emergency liquidity assistance to a failed non-bank financial institution
Provision of risk capital to a financial institution
Emergency liquidity assistance to a temporarily illiquid financial institution
Type 1 :
Type 2 :
Type 3 :
Type 4 :
Type 5 :
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Outstanding of the LoLR Fund Provision
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
1997/1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1998/1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1999/1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2000/1Q
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
Article 38 Loans(left scale)
(billion yen)
Ratio to totalBOJ asset
(right scale)
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Loss Experience from the LoLR Function
Legal basis
(A)
Period of experience
(B)
Peak outstanding
(C)
Loss
(D)
Ratio
(D)/(C)
Type 1 Article 38
Bank of Japan Law Aug 1995
2,858 billion
(Feb 1998) (0%)
Type 2 Article 33
Bank of Japan Law Nov 1997 – Dec 1997
22 trillion
(Dec 1997) (0%)
Type 3 Article 38
Bank of Japan Law
Nov 1997
Liquidity support to
Yamaichi Securities
1,200 billion
(Nov 1997) 111.1 billion (9.3%)*
Establishment of Tokyo
Kyodo Bank
Jan 1995-Mar 1999
20 billion 16.4 billion (82%)
Subordinated loans to Midori
Bank
Jan 1996 – Jan 2006
110 billion (0%)
Capital injection to NCB
July 1997 – Dec 1998 80 billion 80 billion (100%)
Type 4 Article 38
Bank of Japan Law
Total 210 billion 96.4 billion (45.9%)
Note*: Subsequently covered by MOF.
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3. Questions Out of Japan’s Experience
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(1) Solvency or Liquidity?
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Solvency or Liquidity?
General principle: LoLR assists solvent but illiquid financial institutions
Differentiation of solvency from liquidity does not make much sense in a real crisis
Many banks went under in what might be called a vicious cycle to insolvency, triggered by funding difficulties
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Vicious Cycle to Insolvency
Sound assets Deposits
Asset sales Deposit withdrawal
NPLs
Capital
Sound assets Deposits
NPLsCapital
A troubled bank faces deposit withdrawal due to deterioration of credit standing (e.g. down grading).
In order to meet the imminent funding requirement, the bank sells sound assets.
The sales of sound assets results in deterioration of asset quality.
This leads to further loss of confidence in the bank, triggering another round of deposit outflow.
The bank runs out of sound assets and NPLs erodes capital leading to an eventual insolvency.
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(2) What Should be the Scope of the LoLR Function?
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Case of Large and Complex Financial Institution
Yamaichi Securities
Creditors
Bank of Japan
flow of funds
LoLR support
Bank in GB
Bank in CH
Bank in DE
Bank in NL Ring fencing
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Bank A
Case of Cross-Border Banking (eg. Asian Crisis)
Home country’s Central Bank
Bank B
Branch
Bank C
Bank D
Bank E
Bank F
Tokyo Interbank Market
Bank of Japan
flow of funds
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(3) Is “Constructive Ambiguity” Constructive?
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Four Principles in the Actual Provision of LoLR Assistance
(a) There must be strong likelihood that systematic risk will materialize.
(b) There must be no alternative to the provision of central bank funds.
(c) All parties involved are required to take clear responsibility to avoid moral hazard.
(d) The financial soundness of the Bank of Japan should not be impaired.
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(4) Will Private Sector Solutions Always Work?
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Will Private Sectors Solutions Always Work?
A scheme orchestrated by private firms based on commercial interests (without the use of public funds)
Supervisory agency or the central bank may be involved as honest broker (e.g. LTCM in 1998)
Prisoners’ dilemma for the related private sector participants
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Risks to a Private Sector Solution
Related parties are diverse and the exposure is unforeseeable but could potentially be large
Legal risks for the related parties
Legal or reputation risks for the public sector
Could only be successful when the case is an isolated event
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(5) Any Role for Monetary Policy to Address Financial Crises?
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Quantitative Monetary Easing
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
01/3 01/7 01/10 02/1 02/5 02/8 02/12 03/3 03/6 03/10 04/1 04/5 04/8 04/12 05/3
(%)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40CA target5 trillion
yen
above 6trillion yen
10-15 trillionyen
15-20trillion yen
6 trillionyen
Uncollateralized O/Ncall rate (Left Scale)
Current accounttarget (Right scale)
17-22trillion
yen
27-30trillion yen
22-27trillion
yen
27-32 trillionyen
30-35 trillionyen
(trillion yen)8/14 12/19 4/110/309/18 4/30 5/20 10/10 1/20
Current account targeting
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Intended Policy Effects
Support economic recovery --- encourage bank lending and facilitate corporate
financing
Maintain financial system stability --- ensure banks’ liquidity positions
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Sign of Economic Recovery
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04CY
(year on year, %)Real GDP growth
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Underbidding
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
01/1
/4
01/3
/1
01/4
/25
01/6
/21
01/8
/15
01/1
0/10
01/1
2/4
02/2
/4
02/4
/1
02/5
/28
02/7
/19
02/9
/11
02/1
1/8
03/1
/8
03/3
/5
03/4
/30
03/6
/24
03/8
/18
03/1
0/14
03/1
2/9
2004
/2/6
2004
/4/1
2004
/5/3
1
2004
/7/2
3
2004
/9/1
5
2004
/11/
12
05/1
/12
05/3
/8
05/5
/6
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35Number of Under-Bidding (left scale, times/month)
Current Account Outstanding(left scale, tril. Yen)
Required Reserve (left scale, tril. Yen)QuantitativeEasing Policy
Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate (right scale, %)
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Market Function -1
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67
TB1Y rate, %
Total Outstanding Balances of Short-term Fund-supplying Operationstrillion yen
Data: From January 2004 to May 2005.
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Market Function -2
Outstanding of Uncollateralized Call Market
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
(trillion yen)
ZIRP : Zero Interest Rate PolicyQEP: Quantitative Easing Policy
ZIRP QEP
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Outright Purchase Scheme for Asset-Backed Securities
< Outline of the Scheme >
(1) Types of eligible assets ・ Asset-backed securities (publicly-offered) ・ Synthetic-type securities (publicly-offered credit-link notes) ・ Asset-backed commercial paper (including dematerialized commercial
paper)
(2) Underlying assets
・ 50 % or more of the total value or the total number of individual assets in underlying assets shall be composed of assets related to small and medium-sized enterprises.
Bank of Japan
loansloan sales
sale proceeds
Investors(markets)
SPC(Pools of SME risk)
Banks, etc.(originators)
sale proceeds
sale of receivable
SMEs
Senior security(low risk portion)
Senior security(low risk portion)
Mezzanine security(middle risk portion)
Mezzanine security(middle risk portion)
Equity(first-loss portion)
Equity(first-loss portion)
Bank of Japan
loansloan sales
sale proceeds
Investors(markets)
SPC(Pools of SME risk)
Banks, etc.(originators)
sale proceeds
sale of receivable
SMEs
Senior security(low risk portion)
Senior security(low risk portion)
Mezzanine security(middle risk portion)
Mezzanine security(middle risk portion)
Equity(first-loss portion)
Equity(first-loss portion)
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ABS Purchased by BOJ
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5
(tril. Yen, as of end of month, accumulated amount)
Revision of the eligibility standard
2003 2004 2005