Nanyang Technological University

Block S4, Level B3, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

Tel: +65 6790 6982 | Fax: +65 6794 0617 | www.rsis.edu.sg

Norman Vasu and Terri-Anne Teo

Policy ReportJuly 2020

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM IN SINGAPORE

Policy Report

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM IN SINGAPORE

Norman Vasu and Terri-Anne Teo1

July 2020

1 Norman Vasu is a Senior Fellow and Terri-Anne Teo is a Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

Executive Summary 1

Introduction 2

Hindu fundamentalism 3

Twelve goals of modern Hindu fundamentalism 4

Core questions 5

Methodology 5

Findings 7

Do Hindu fundamentalist goals as defined above exist among different groups of Hindus in Singapore? 7

If these goals are subscribed to by particular groups, where are the sites of tension? 10

Policy implications 10

About the Author 11

About the Centre of Excellence for National Security 12

About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Executive Summary

This report examines the presence of Hindu fundamentalism in Singapore as determined by expressions of support for the 12 goals of modern Hindu fundamentalism. Although no group or individual interviewed supported all the 12 goals, there was some benign support for five of the goals. Benign support refers to support unanchored to a Hindu fundamentalist agenda. Conversely, malignant support refers to support rooted in a Hindu fundamentalist agenda. While benign support for goals in Singapore could be traced to cultural, practical, and personal reasons, there were also respondents who did not support these five goals.

Three policy implications follow from the findings:

i. The five goals with some benign support would be worthy of deeper study.

ii. The impact of Hindu fundamentalism would be felt in Singapore should benign support turn malignant.

iii. It would be prudent to establish a policy position on these goals, and plan for scenarios where benign support turns malignant.

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2 The authors would like to thank Shashi Jayakumar, Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, RSIS, for his thoughtful input and comments towards improving this report.

3 For a discussion on Hindu fundamentalist groups reaching out to the diaspora in the West, see Christophe Jaffrelot, Religion, Caste, and Politics in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

4 Julius Lipner, Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices (New York: Routledge, 1994), 1–5.5 Alex Michaels, Hinduism: Past and Present (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), i. 6 Lipner, Hindus, 6.

1. Introduction2

This study examined the presence of Hindu fundamentalist views among different groups of Hindus in Singapore. The demographic included Indian-Hindus born in Singapore (citizens), long-term residents from India (new Singapore citizens, permanent residents (PRs), and Employment Pass (EP) holders, as well as new migrants from India (EP/S Pass and Work Permit (WP) holders). This project was conducted based on the understanding that modern Hindu fundamentalism is marked by 12 goals. The presence of Hindu fundamentalist views was measured through expressions of support for these goals.

No group or individual interviewed during the study supported all the 12 goals. However, five of the 12 goals received benign support. Support is considered benign when unanchored to a Hindu fundamentalist agenda. Support is considered malignant when rooted in a Hindu fundamentalist agenda. The interview respondents who showed benign support for the five goals did so mainly due to cultural, practical, and personal reasons, rather than political or scriptural ones aligned with Hindu fundamentalism. At the same time, there were respondents who did not support these five goals. Findings of this report are particularly salient for Singapore as groups associated with Hindu fundamentalism in India have actively courted the Hindu diaspora.3 Moreover, nation-building in Singapore’s multicultural context may be slowed if religious identity superseded national identity.

Hinduism is a “vastly complex”, diverse, and “plural phenomenon”4 that defies definitive definitions. It comprises a diversity of gods, castes, languages, and dialects, and entails a wide range of rites and practices.5 Hinduism does not lack in form or substance. Rather, its “distinctive characteristics are distributed in overlapping ways such that we may identify each of these traditions as belonging to the same cultural family.”6

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7 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, “Introduction,” in Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance, vol. 3, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 3.

8 Michael Schied, “The Turn to Fundamentalism: The Significance of Religious Ideology in State-Formation and Nation Building in South Asia,” in Fundamentalism in the Modern World Volume 1, Fundamentalism, Politics and History: The State, Globalisation and Political Ideologies, ed. Ulrika Martensson, Jennifer Bailey, Priscilla Rongrose, and Asbjorn Dyrendal (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011), 80.

9 V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva, 5th edition (Bombay: Veer Sarvarkar Prakarshan, 1969), 34, 46.10 The nation, to Savarkar, was rooted in the geographical sacredness of India, the ancient land of

Aryavarta located in the “area beyond the Indus River, between the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean” where Hindu civilisation flourished in the Vedic golden age. Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), “Vinayak Damodar Savarkar,” in Hindu Nationalism: A Reader (Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2007), 86.

11 Julius Lipner, “Hindu Fundamentalism,” in Fundamentalisms: Threats and Ideologies in the Modern World, ed. James D. G. Dunn (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016), 106.

12 Ibid, 99. Lipner cites Purushottam Nagesh Oak (1917-2007) and Dayananda Sarasvati (1824-83) as prominent figures of scriptural fundamentalism.

1.1 Hindu fundamentalism

Hindu Fundamentalism, like other forms of religious fundamentalism, aims to preserve a distinctive identity through “a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past.”7 Hindu fundamentalism, or Hindutva, could be labelled a fundamentalist expression of Hinduism, because its proponents actively called for a religio-cultural understanding of India and Indians based on a particular Hindu identity.8 Effectively, Hindu fundamentalism seeks to calcify something fluid through a confluence of political fundamentalism and scriptural fundamentalism to arrive at a common Hindu identity.

Through political fundamentalism, Hindutva ideology holds the Indian subcontinent sacred to the “Hindu race”, seeking to unify Hindus under this ideal by creating a strong and prosperous Hindu nation.9 V.D. Savarkar, who formulated the political philosophy of Hindutva, expressed the essential characteristics of Hindutva as “a common nation (rashtra),10 a common race (jati) and a common civilisation (sanskriti).”11

Scriptural fundamentalism broadly refers to Vedic fundamentalism. Vedic scriptural fundamentalism propounds that all truth and knowledge is found in the Vedas, and more recent Hindu texts such as the Mahabharata provide a glimpse into the “Golden Age of Vedic India”.12 Hindu scriptural fundamentalism is thus located in the emergence of Hindu revivalism, which focuses on redefining Hindu scriptures, rituals and traditions as philosophically and spiritually superior, while being modern and rational.

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13 These goals were derived through a distillation of academic studies on Hindu fundamentalism. Sources include but are not limited to: Julius Lipner, “Hindu Fundamentalism,” in Fundamentalisms: Threats and Ideologies in the Modern World, ed. James D. G. Dunn (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016) and Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), Hindu Nationalism: A Reader (Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2007). The analysis also included rhetoric of organisations under the Sangh Parivar (Family of Organisations) that forms the umbrella organisation incorporating the major organisations embracing or created for the purpose of spreading Hindutva. These organisations include the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; National Volunteer Corps), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP; World Hindu Council), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) amongst others. This analysis was conducted by Pravin Prakash, who at the time of writing was an Associate Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University

1.2 Twelve goals of modern Hindu fundamentalism

Hindu fundamentalism in its modern form is marked by the following goals:13

i. Create a powerful and prosperous Hindu Rashtra.

ii. Promote Hinduism as modern, sophisticated and rational.

iii. Create an image of Hinduism as masculine and aggressive, and capable of thwarting threats.

iv. Create a narrative that extols a golden age of Vedic India.

v. Create a strong national identity based on Hindutva.

vi. Identify Muslims and Christians as foreigners who can never truly be part of a Hindu nation.

vii. Homogenise the diverse practices and beliefs that make up Hinduism.

viii. Prevent defections and return non-Hindus to the Hindu fold.

ix. Develop a distinctly Islamophobic worldview that is intolerant and disdainful of other faiths as well.

x. Politicise perceived slights to the Hindu community and mobilise the community.

xi. Create a disciplined political outfit, grassroots network and cultural organisations that will work together to promote and protect Hindutva.

xii. Evangelise and mobilise the Hindu diaspora to spread Hindu fundamentalist propaganda globally and to support the primary goal of creating a Hindu Rashtra in India.

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1.3 Core questions

Research question:

Do Hindu fundamentalist goals as defined above exist among different groups of Hindus in Singapore?

Sub-questions:

i. Are the above goals held by different groups of Hindus (local-born Singapore citizens, new Singapore citizens, PRs, EP/S Pass holders, and WP holders) in Singapore?

ii. If these goals are subscribed to by particular groups, what are the sites of tension?

iii. What are the policy implications of these findings?

1.4 Methodology

Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were conducted from April to May 2019 with 159 members of the Hindu community. Respondents included Singapore citizens and non-citizens across residency statuses. The study involved three phases:

• Phase 1: Pilot interviews were conducted to test and refine the discussion guides for Phase 2.

• Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of the Hindu community to understand (i) if they subscribed to the aforementioned goals of Hindu fundamentalism; and (ii) the resulting sites of tensions for those who did.

• Phase 3: Focus group discussions were held to (i) validate the findings from Phase 2; and (ii) understand the sites of tensions.

Table 1 below expands on the demographics of the groupings within each phase. Other than the WP holders, each group had a mix of male and female respondents.

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14 The semi-structured interviews from Phase 2 determined how the focus groups in Phase 3 were organised. Specifically, findings from Phase 2 had suggested that segmentation by residency status was not the most optimal way to group the respondents, as factors like residency status, region-of-origin, and social standing (e.g. Brahmin caste among the EPs and PRs) appeared to influence the opinions that were shared. As such, respondents in Phase 3 were segmented into eight groups based on these identifiers, with the exception of the EPs and PRs who were clustered together as their views did not vary in Phase 2.

Phase 1: Pilot interviews (N=9)

Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews (N=110)

Phase 3: Focus group discussions (N=40)

Five groups interviewed, comprising:• Citizens-by-birth (n=2);• New citizens (citizenship

acquired in the last five years) (n=2);

• Permanent Residents (PR) (n=2);

• Employment Pass (EP) holders (n=2); and

• Work Permit (WP) holders (n=1).

Six groups interviewed, comprising:• Citizens-by-birth (n=20);• New citizens (n=20);• PR (n=20);• EP and S-Pass holders (n=20); • WP holders (n=20); and• Shopkeepers in the Hindu community

(n=10). • There were 20 respondents each

for five groups. Each interview took two to three hours, including home and temple visits.

Eight focus group discussions segmented by the following identifiers: • Tamil citizens (more than 10 years) (n=5);• Non-Tamil citizens (more than 10 years)

(n=5);• Tami l and Non-Tami l new c i t izens

(citizenship acquired in the last five years) (n=5);

• Tami l and Non-Tami l new c i t izens (citizenship acquired in the last six to 10 years) (n=5);

• Tamil Brahmin PR/EP holders (n=5);• Tamil non-Brahmin PR/EP holders (n=5);• Non-Tamil PR/EP holders (n=5); and• WP holders14 (n=5).

Table 1: Demographics of the interview groups within each study phase.

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2. Findings

2.1 Do Hindu fundamentalist goals as defined above exist among different groups of Hindus in Singapore?

The semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions revealed no group supporting all 12 goals of Hindu fundamentalism.

However, of the 12 goals, five were found to have varying levels of benign support. An analysis of the support for each of the five goals, together with choice quotes from the respondents, can found below. Support for the five goals was considered benign as they were unanchored to a Hindu fundamentalist agenda. Rather, the benign support could be motivated by, for example, cultural or practical reasons. Support is considered malignant if it is rooted in a Hindu fundamentalist agenda — this observation did not emerge in the findings.

There were respondents who were unsupportive of these five goals. These respondents saw India as a secular state, fundamentalist views as a political tool, and Hinduism as a syncretic religion. Some were ignorant of the Vedas or did not see Hinduism as being threatened.

There was no support among the respondents for the other seven goals. Reasons included, but are not limited to, the acknowledgement of India as a secular and multicultural state, the appreciation of diversity, and/or the lack of alignment between the fundamentalist goals and Hinduism as a syncretic religion.

Goal 2: Promote Hinduism as modern, sophisticated and rational

Respondents demonstrated benign support for this goal for two reasons:

i. Hindu canons such as the Mahabharata and Bhagavad Gita were understood literally. For instance, respondents stated that “whatever science there is in terms of planet[s] 20,000 years ago, Indian scriptures have it” and “in Ramayana and Mahabharata, there were missiles”. Hence, Hinduism was seen as scientific and rational with the belief, for example, that missile technology and astronomy were discovered by Hindus well before modern science.

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ii. A desire for their children to receive religious education in school, in the hope that Hinduism would be transmitted to future generations. Respondents described Hinduism as “modern and scientific”, and should therefore be taught in schools. Thus, the desire to promote Hinduism in schools here was not founded on a scriptural fundamentalist agenda of presenting Hinduism as modern and rational, but rather, a desire for it to be passed down through education to preserve the religion.

Goal 4: Create a narrative that extols a golden age of Vedic India

Likewise, respondents’ benign support for Goal 4 was not motivated by a particular political or scriptural agenda aligned with Hindu fundamentalism. Rather, they mainly took pride in what they believed were Vedic contributions to science. To illustrate, they described “Vedic mathematics [as] a strong methodology”, referring to the conceiving of zero by Aryabhata and the benefits of following routines found in the Vedas.

Goal 5: Create a strong national identity based on Hindutva

There was limited support for this goal and benign support emerged in two forms:

i. Respondents associated the creation of a strong national identity based on Hindutva in accordance with India’s specific demographic. Thus, this association was only referenced to India and not Singapore, which they recognised for its multi-religious composition.

ii. Respondents believed that if Pakistan could be a Muslim state, India could declare itself a Hindu nation. For instance, a respondent said that Hindus were a majority in India and should be a Hindu nation as “Pakistan is a Muslim majority country and they are ignorant about the Hindus, so why should we think of the Muslims?” In this way, India as a Hindu nation was perceived as a means through which Hindus could be protected from the external threat of Pakistan.

Goal 7: Homogenise the diverse practices and beliefs that make up Hinduism

There were three practical reasons underlying benign support for this goal, as opposed to a Hindu fundamentalist agenda seeking to establish a standardised Hinduism as a tool to strengthen Hindu nationalism. Moreover, there was no support for its imposition on those who had different beliefs and practices.

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i. Some respondents felt that a homogenised Hinduism would facilitate the preservation of Hindu culture across generations. There were concerns that “future generations” would be “confused” about Hinduism if “some standards” and “principles” were not set for them to follow. Others cautioned that “guidelines and disciplines” were necessary to avoid “[losing] our culture generation wise”.

ii. Some respondents believed that a homogenised Hinduism would be easier to practice, citing Christianity and Islam with their more rigid forms of practice that were viewed as a strength. There was also a desire for a “stronger teaching of Hinduism” like other religions, so that Hinduism could provide a “healing and personal touch”. Suggestions included introducing standardised religious texts, like the Bible and Koran, that could be studied for a better understanding of the “basics of [the] religion”.

iii. Some respondents supported this goal to help others better understand Hinduism, which is difficult to convey due to its complexity. Respondents referenced Abrahamic religions as having a fairly standardised “way of following” and believed a similar approach to standardising Hinduism would help people appreciate it better.

Goal 10: Politicise perceived slights to the Hindu community and mobilise the community.

Limited and benign support for this goal emerged in two ways. However, there was no indication that the community should be mobilised.

i. Some respondents felt that Hinduism came under threat due to conversions or other religions that “would either destroy our religion or kill our religion”. Notably, respondents had articulated a fear of change rather than a call to arms.

ii. Others agreed that Hinduism was on the decline, but attributed it to the diversity of Hindu knowledge and practices as compared to those who “believed in one form, and that would make it [maintaining a religion] so much easier”. One respondent suggested “having a class and telling the kids to get involved in it”, with parents playing key roles in encouraging this practice.

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2.2 If these goals are subscribed to by particular groups, where are the sites of tension?

As discussed above, the 12 Hindu fundamentalist goals were not held by any one group or individual in totality. Instead, there was sporadic support for some of the goals, and some support for five of the goals. However, this support had been deemed as benign because they were not anchored to a Hindu fundamentalist agenda (the derivation of an exclusivist Hindu nationalist identity from scriptural and political fundamentalism). Rather, the support had been present mainly due to cultural, practical, and personal reasons.

Hence, there were no sites of tension between the studied groups stemming from a Hindu fundamentalist agenda.

2.3 Policy implications

Findings revealed three policy implications:

i. Five of the Hindu fundamentalist goals had some traction amongst the respondents, who were divided by residency status in Singapore. As respondents either did not have an opinion on, or rejected the other seven goals, it would be worthy to look deeper into the five fundamentalist goals in question, even if the support was not grounded in a Hindu fundamentalist agenda.

ii. If Hindu fundamentalism were to impact Singapore, it would be when the current benign support becomes malignant. This alteration has not happened yet, if it ever will. Regardless, it would be advisable to monitor how these goals are supported (whether benign or malignant), as the RSS and VHP are actively reaching out to the diaspora for support.16

iii. It would be prudent at the policy level to take an upstream approach by deciding the national position on these goals in relation to Hinduism in Singapore, and how Singapore would attend to a scenario should benign support turn malignant. While existing support finds no anchor in a Hindu fundamentalist agenda, neglecting them altogether would be remiss given the potential for benign support to turn malignant.

15 For a discussion on Hindu fundamentalist groups reaching out to the diaspora in the West, see Christophe Jaffrelot, Religion, Caste, and Politics in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

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About the Author

Norman Vasu is Senior Fellow and Deputy Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore. He is the author of How Diasporic Peoples Maintain their Identity in Multicultural Societies: Chinese, Africans, and Jews (Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), co-author of Singapore Chronicles: Multiracialism (Institute of Policy Studies and Straits Times Press, 2018), editor of Social Resilience in Singapore: Reflections

from the London Bombings (Select Publishing, 2007), co-editor of Nations, National Narratives and Communities in the Asia Pacific (Routledge, 2014), Immigration in Singapore (Amsterdam University Press, 2015), and DRUMS: Distortions, Rumours, Untruths, Misinformation, and Smears (World Scientific Press, 2019). His research on multiculturalism, ethnic relations, narratives of governance, citizenship, immigration, and national security have been published in journals such as Asian Survey, Asian Ethnicity, Journal of Comparative Asian Development and The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, and in a number of edited volumes. He was a Fulbright Fellow with the Center for Strategic Communication, Hugh Downs School of Human Communication, Arizona State University in 2012, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Takshashila Institution, Bangalore, India, in 2016 and at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii in 2018.

Terri-Anne Teo is a Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She holds a PhD in Politics and an MSc in International Relations from the University of Bristol, UK. Her research interests include multiculturalism, citizenship, migration and identity politics. Her most recent publications include a monograph titled Civic Multiculturalism in Singapore: Revisiting Citizenship, Rights and Recognition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), a

co-edited volume titled Postcolonial Governmentalities: Rationalities, Violences and Contestations (Rowman and Littlefield International, 2020) and journal articles in Global Society and Asian Studies Review on multiculturalism and perceptions of meritocracy in Singapore respectively.

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About the Centre of Excellence for National Security

The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS’ raison d’être is to raise the intellectual capital invested in strategising national security. To do so, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis across a range of national security issues. CENS is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporeans and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs. Besides the work undertaken by its full-time analysts, CENS boosts its research capacity and keeps abreast of cutting edge global trends in national security research by maintaining and encouraging a steady stream of Visiting Fellows.

For more information about CENS, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg/cens.

About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a think tank and professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. An autonomous school, RSIS’ mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. With the core functions of research, graduate education and networking, it produces research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies, Non-traditional Security, Cybersecurity, Maritime Security and Terrorism Studies.

For more details, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg. Join us at our social media channels at www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-social-media-channels or scan the QR code.

Nanyang Technological University

Block S4, Level B3, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

Tel: +65 6790 6982 | Fax: +65 6794 0617 | www.rsis.edu.sg

Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Block S4, Level B3, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

Tel: +65 6790 6982 | Fax: +65 6794 0617 | www.rsis.edu.sg