hermann, paper, ecpr, 2014-08-19€¦ · constructing and deconstructing legitimacy isabella...

Isabella Hermann September 2014

8th ECPR General Conference

University of Glasgow 3 ‐ 6 September 2014

The international media echo to the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela – constructing and deconstructing legitimacy

Isabella Hermann

Abstract:

The so called “Bolivarian Revolution” and the concept of “socialism of the 21st century” initiated by

Hugo Chávez in Venezuela have not only polarized Venezuelan society tremendously, but also the

entire hemisphere and even beyond. The question of whether the policies under the label of the

Bolivarian Revolution ‐ including a number of controversial social programs ‐ can in fact be evaluated

positively or negatively according to certain standards appears to be a highly ideological one. This

paper focuses on who frames and constructs the Bolivarian Revolution as good or bad and how this is

done. It examines different media discourses in Latin America, the US and Europe and finds that

media which position themselves as rather conservative delegitimize the Bolivarian Revolution from

the start, while media which position themselves as rather liberal establish it as legitimate.

Table of Contents:

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1

Social Policy and the Bolivarian Revolution ............................................................................................ 2

The Media and Venezuela ....................................................................................................................... 6

Negative constructions of Chávez, his policies and the Bolivarian Revolution ................................... 8

Differentiated constructions of Chávez, his policies and the Bolivarian Revolution ........................ 10

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 13

References ............................................................................................................................................. 14


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Introduction

When Hugo Chávez was elected as Venezuelan president in 1998, the political system of the oil-abundant country of Venezuela changed from a former liberal-representative democracy based on a party pact of 1958 – the so called Punto-Fijo-democracy – to a social-participatory democracy with the proclaimed objective of serving the social interests of the people. The election of Chávez was a response to the Venezuelan economic decline due to falling oil prices in the 1980s, and the subsequent social-political decline in the 1990s. Back then the officially democratic but highly elitist system displayed bankrupt since it was characterized by ample corruption and inability to provide for the people resulting in a loss of trust and legitimacy (A. Romero 1997). Drawing from a certain conception of the liberator Simón Bolívar as fighter for independence and social equality, Chávez tried to initiate with the “Bolivarian Revolution” a radical-left political project towards independence from oil, social inclusion, fight against corruption, reduction of poverty and improvement in education.1

Despite the fact that many of the announced objectives like fight against corruption and independence from oil have not been reached, there can be no doubt that the area of social policy went through significant changes. Chávez started to transform the social structure of Venezuela towards a system of inclusion by cutting down the benefits of the privileged elite and by redistributing the money coming from the oil industry to the poor and marginalized (López Maya and Lander 2009). Since the very beginning these policies have provoked heavy criticism from all former dominant camps, such as the oppositional parties, the private sector, business associations, trade unions, the church and last but not least the U.S. Department of State (Buxton 2003: 130; Zeuske 2007: 182). Therefore, only in the first seven years of Chávez’s rule “Venezuelans have endured a long-lasting process of extreme polarization, a controversial constitutional reform, the dissolution of Congress, two general strikes, a failed coup d'état led by conservative businessmen and generals, many massive demonstrations, violent upheavals, the dismissal of about 18000 oil workers from the parastatal PDVSA, and dozens of deaths for political reasons” (Álvarez 2006: 24). And the situation has all but not changed so far when looking for example at the campaign period of the presidential election 2012 as one more culmination point of political polarization (Hermann 2012) or at the severe protests against the government of Chávez’s elected successor Maduro in several Venezuelan cities at the beginning of 2014 (Mijares 2014).

Yet, not only does the Bolivarian Revolution heavily polarize Venezuela, making people even speak of “two Venezuelas” – a chavista and an oppositional one – with different political realities, different media and different social lives, but also the global community and global media. The

1 Beyond the fact that Chávez was rightfully elected, there has been a debate whether one could in fact speak about a “revolution”. According to Ellner (2005) there actually could be identified two strands within the chavismo movement even though they lack ideological clarity. The first are “hard‐line chavistas” who basically see a “revolutionary opportunity” in building up parallel structures for a new society while eliminating the old ones. The second, the “soft‐line chavistas”, favor a “non‐revolutionary transformation” where old structures are not purged but rather controlled within the frame of a political fight.


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common critique of Chávez’s supporters is that Chávez’s opponents including the “major” international media have a quasi monopoly in the debate resulting in intentionally putting forward a negative image of Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. Even more, tangible successes like in the area of social policy would be negated or ignored or, if mentioned, successes would be denounced. However, since the data on the successes, effects and sustainability of chavismo social policy is contested and probably will never and can never be answered with certainty, the question of interest is rather what kind of media relay negative information about the Bolivarian Revolution and how this is justified.

Therefore, in this paper I research into the question whether or not the “major” media understood as opinion leading “Western” and “Latin American” newspapers indeed unanimously report negatively about the Bolivarian Revolution and the corresponding social policies, whether there can be found a political polarization regarding those newspapers and how constructions of Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution are justified and legitimized. Interestingly enough, as the analysis will show, indeed not all of the “major” media reports negative about the policies of Chávez. In line with the enormous political polarization it is not geography which turns out to be the dividing line between negative and rather moderate or positive accounts on the Bolivarian Revolution, but if the medium perceives itself as “left”- or “right-oriented”. In the following I will first provide some accounts on the social policy concept of the Boliviarian Revolution before coming to the analysis regarding selected newspaper editorials on Chávez’s death in March 2013.

Social Policy and the Bolivarian Revolution

Generally, the Latin American tradition rather follows the principles given by Rousseau and Bolívar in subordinating the individual’s position to the state and society than Lockean liberal principles as promoted by the US, which accentuate the individual rights against a state that might abuse its power. Because of this, there is an underlying criticism towards Latin American countries from US and other Western states, which blame them to be a host of systemic illnesses such as clientelism, paternalism or even violation of (liberal) human rights. The fact that chavismo created a new constitution negating Lockean principles, such as limits to presidential power or political exclusion of the military, naturally strengthened US and Western disapproval (C. Romero 2004: 131). From the start Venezuela under Chávez emphasized a type of social human rights such as the right to education, right to housing, the right to work or right to health care which are commonly marginalized in Western states and Western dominated organizations (Casado Gutiérrez 2013).2

Laying out the basis for the Bolivarian Revolution, after having been elected, Chábez kept the main promise given during his electoral campaign, namely the creation of a new constitution. The

2 This fight for social human rights can also be seen in the frame of an ideological battle between socialist‐Marxist views and neoliberal‐capitalist ones. Thus, the marginalization of those rights would be inherent in the dominating system of state‐centric capitalism/neoliberalism against which a new Latin American left has positioned (Monedero 2011: 10).


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“Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela” was worked out by an elected constituent assembly and was passed by a peoples’ referendum by the end of 1999. The “Bolivarian Constitution” installed direct-democratic/participatory elements for the people, strengthened social rights in general and explicitly equipped formerly excluded social groups such as the indigenous people with increased rights. This opened up new political spaces, but at the same time Chávez worked towards a centralization of power by transferring more competences to the executive branch, particularly to the office of the president, and diminished civilian control over the military (Azcargorta and Paulus 2011; I. Hernández 2011). 3 Referring to the set-up of the constitution but also to Chávez’s political style, which is criticized for deliberately using democratic legitimacy obtained by winning elections to pursue antidemocratic policies in order to maintain power, experts spoke and continue to speak of a “hybrid regime” or “hyperpresidentialism” (Corrales and Penfold 2011: 14-46).

The constitution was thought to provide the basis for the Bolivarian Revolution as radical political conception with the objectives of diversifying the economy and reducing dependence on the oil industry, fight against corruption, as well as a social participatory democracy and thus social inclusion of the former marginalized in various ways. However, the aim of diversifying the economy has not made any gains, since the GDP even if growing still hinges strongly on the oil industry resulting in a dependence on oil rents as high as prior to Chávez’s election without feasible approaches for a structural solution to that problem (Boeckh 2011; Welsch and Briceño 2011: 117).4 This means that equal if being socialist or capitalist, Venezuela in any case remains rentist (López Maya and Lander 2009). Additionally, in spite of the fact that Venezuela has high potential for production, the country is far removed from being able to produce its own food or even become an exporter of foodstuffs. Quite the contrary, Venezuela – characterized by economic mismanagement and the characteristics of being a petro state – suffers from scarcity of goods and is importing the majority of needed eatables and other commercial items. The problem of corruption has not only not experienced improvements, but according to World Bank Governance Indicators even worsened, nor did the fight against inflation prove successful since it is among the highest in the world moving between 20 and 30 percent in the years of 2007 to 2013 (BCV 2014; Kaufmann et al. 2009). Furthermore, the precarious security situation in Venezuela with almost 50 homicides per 100.000 persons is still one of the greatest challenges the country faces (UNODC 2011: 94).

However, according to official numbers the Chávez government achieved great successes in the social area especially in comparison to the final years of the Punto-Fijo-period. According to data published by ECLAC, poverty in Venezuela diminished from 48.6 percent in 2002 to 27.8 in 3 The Bolivarian Constitution, valid since 1999, diminished checks and balances as it for example increased presidential powers by allowing direct re‐election and expansion of the presidential term from five to six years, eliminated the two chamber system for one National Assembly and let go of a clause which defined the military as non‐political. However, there were introduced two new public powers to the existing executive, legislative and judicial power, namely the electoral power “poder electoral” and the citizens’ power “poder ciudadano”. While the former is responsible for the proper execution of all elections, the task of the latter is to control the administration and the fight against corruption. Furthermore human rights were strengthened and special rights for workers, women and indigenous people defined. And naturally, the possibilities of direct participation for the people were heightened in several ways, e.g. by enabling a recall of elected officials – including the president – through referendum (GoV 1999; I. Hernández 2011; Sainz Borgo and Paz 2005). 4 For a different view, see Parker (2005, 2009).


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2010 (ECLAC 2011: 17) and 37.1 percent in 2005 to 23.9 percent in 2012 respectively (ECLAC 2014).5 The Gini coefficient also fell by more than 3 percent during the time period between 2002 and 2008, and by more than 2 percent in the time period from 2008 until 2010 (ECLAC 2011: 52) which makes Venezuela one of the economically most equal countries of Latin America (ECLAC 2011: 50). Furthermore, going back to data published by UNESCO, from 2000 onwards over 90 percent of boys and girls were enrolled in primary schools in contrast to 85 percent in 1999, and whereas in 1999 50 percent of boys and girls were enrolled in secondary schools this number constantly grew to almost 60 percent in 2003, over 70 percent in 2009 and almost 75 percent in 2012 (Unesco 2014). Even more, Venezuela can finally count as a literate country with 95.5 percent older than 15 years are being able to read and write as of 2009 (Unesco 2014).

How were the supposed successes achieved? As already mentioned, the basic political approach was to redistribute the oil rents from the privileged elite to the poor and marginalized majority with the aim of a social inclusion. This included a change of employment policy and (agrarian) ownership structures, but most of all a “(parallel) institutionalization of its own (“una institucionalidad propia (paralela)”) (Estrada Álvarez 2012: 144). What is meant by this institutionalization of its own are the famous “missions” (“misiones”), a broad array of different social programs, which the Venezuelan government has set up starting from 2003 and being financed with money coming from the oil industry.6 Missions cover all kinds of social aspects and basic needs incorporating among others nutrition, healthcare, education, housing, environment and employment. Famous ones are for example “Misión Barrio Adentro” providing free healthcare, “Misión Robinson” teaching adults how to read and write, “Misión Ribas” and “Mission Sucre” providing higher education for adults or “Misión Mercal” providing for food to discounted prices. The services of the missions are provided by the communities thus counting on the commitment of the people themselves. Also the Armed Forces participate in the missions thus strengthening the civic-military alliances which also characterizes the Bolivarian Revolution (López Maya 2008; López Maya and Lander 2009).7 Commonly known the missions also count on Cuban assistance, above all “Misión Barrio Adentro” would not work if not because of the Cuban doctors and nurses which Venezuela pays off either directly, or indirectly with preferential oil deals (C. Romero 2010: 108f.).

While experts by and large agree on the poor performance of the Chávez government regarding economic diversification and fight against corruption, the discussion is very controversial and multifaceted when it comes to the social policy approach of the Bolivarian Revolution. While one side cannot see “any evidence that Chávez has reoriented state priorities to benefit the poor” (Fernandes 2008: 42), others call the Bolivarian a “benign revolution” praising the social programs (Alvarez Herrera 2006) and name social reforms of the Chávez government as the first and foremost success because they had stopped the impoverishment of the Venezuelan people 5 A person is regarded as poor if she cannot afford a certain basket of basic goods and basic services specified for the country she lives in (ECLAC 2011: 44) 6 This brought about renewed increase of popularity for Chávez, which enabled, in 2004, a decisive victory in a recall referendum initiated by the opposition to remove him from office. 7 The will to incorporate the military more into politics and social development can be also seen in the so called Plan Bolívar 2000 at the beginning of Chávez presidency making 45.000 soldiers wor on public projects such as repairing schools or roads (McCoy 2000: 68).


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(Zelik 2011: 45). An illustrative example for that makes the 2008 fall edition of the ReVista Harvard Review of Latin America on Venezuela. There, renowned experts of Venezuela in one and the same journal conceive of the social policies of the Bolivarian Revolution as differently as calling the missions a “trick” (Pedro España 2008: 48) to being more moderate in admitting that regarding social policy “the Chávez government has managed to create an alternative system of welfare intervention and redistribution that conflicts with the neoliberal policies of his predecessors (Fernandes 2008: 42), to defending the official data calling “large reduction of poverty” a “significant achievement” which would intentionally not be noticed since the debate would dominated by government’s opponents “who have a near-monopoly of the debate about Venezuela outside the country” (Weisbrot 2008a: 36).

The last comment directly points to the immense political polarization regarding the country which turns the question of lauding or negating the social successes to a question of the personal political and ideological conviction of generally supporting or not supporting the alternative approach of the Bolivarian Revolution which openly seeks to challenge the current predominant social-economic structures in general. Consequently, accepting some successes of the social policies, one might state that the former social polarization with high poverty rates, inequality of income distribution and lack of education has given way to a political polarization as battle between two different political systems (Ellner 2003: 21-25). This led to Venezuela being described as one of the most polarized countries ever in Latin America (Corrales 2005: 105). The situation is quite paradoxical since it appears to depend exactly on the political polarization how one perceives and interprets the success of certain policies in the first place, and this polarization set in even before actual policies were defined thus “at least during the crucial 1998 electoral campaign, class cleavages and economic issues were less important than political changes and political polarization between anti-system and system parties” (Álvarez 2006: 19).

However, there indeed are serious points of criticism on the social policy approach of the Bolivarian Revolution which are justified with not being sustainable. Firstly, the financing of social programs – even if being successful – would be to dependent on the high oil price which makes them very dependent on external factors that cannot be influenced by the government (Fernandes 2008: 42; Stefanoni 2012: 33).8 But even more, secondly, there are voices stating that instead of solving the social problems structurally – which would lead to the need of missions in the first place – “the missions seem inarticulate, that is, they fragment social problems into so many areas that they disregard their multiple causes“ (Pedro España 2008: 49). For that reason, the existence of the missions would be the proof of the failure of the social policy and even more so since evidence suggests that the missions would not benefit as many people as proclaimed by the government. Thirdly, the fact that the social projects were exactly initiated when support for Chávez was diminishing in 2003, Chávez is also blamed for populism (Castañeda 2006; Castañeda and Morales 2009). For that reason, and since the missions would not change the social problems structurally one could reckon that Chávez by means of the social programs only tried to hold a broad electoral basis by creating clientelistic structures (de la Torre 2013: 8; Shifter 2006: 51). However, such a concentration on numbers and dependence on oil, and negative aspects of

8 Beyond, one might even state that there does not exist any independent success of the social programs since “most health and human development indicators have shown no significant improvement beyond that which is normal in the midst of an oil boom” (Rodríguez 2008).


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populism would ignore advances like “inclusion and participation” (Ellner 2010: 29) and positive benefits for the people “not only in terms of material gains, but in terms of the personal sense of empowerment that results from involvement in community-based work” (Fernandes 2008: 42). And even more, the merit of Chávez would also be that he opened up a powerful discourse by having put the issues of poverty and inequality and the necessity to find measures to confront and surpass them not only in Venezuela but in Latin America as a whole on the political agenda (Ellner 2010: 29; Estrada Álvarez 2012: 136). But how do the media respond to the Bolivarian Revolution, the supposed successes and points of critique?

The Media and Venezuela

There are indeed examples of the media being biased on Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. In the first six months after Chávez had assumed office, the picture of him as conveyed by Western and particularly US media was opposing and negative, describing him among others as “populist leftist”, “firebrand” or “Venezuela’s rambunctious president” and his policy as comprising “anti-American elements” (Ellner 2003: 22; Werz 2001). Later on, there were hardly any comments on the new participatory opportunities in Venezuela, but a strong inclination to portray Chávez as dominant “strongman” gathering all power to himself (Cannon 2009: 137-138). Even before, but particularly during the coup attempt against Chávez in 2002 the leading Venezuelan media joined by international ones played a very problematic part in conveying deliberately wrong and even fake information to the public and openly taking sides for the putschists (Castillo Briceño 2003; J. A. Hernández 2004; Stoneman 2008) as well as constructing the Chávez supporters as dangerous and uncontrolled masses and in that way delegitimizing them (Duno Gottberg 2004). During the course of events the relationship between the Chávez government and the major media in the country has deteriorated beyond recovery, (Cañizález and Lugo-Ocando 2008), and this even more so when in 2007 Chávez did not renew the broadcasting license for the private TV channel RCTV which had played an “openly subversive” role together with other TV channels during the coup in 2002 (Gott 2011: 247).

Generally in Latin America the relationship between the media – which is characterized in many countries by oligopolistic or monopolistic structures – and the governments is either difficult as in the case of Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Columbia, or openly confrontational and even antagonistic in cases where the media clearly supports the opposition against governments of the “new left” as in Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia (Rincón 2013). Therefore, the negative account on the Bolivarian Revolution and the socialism of the 21st century by Venezuelan conservative and private media “of the kind that exist in most Latin American countries” would be due to the fact that they “reflect the generally backward-looking ideas of the commercial and financial elite, and express warm sympathy and support for the political and cultural world of the United States” (Gott 2011: 245). International media refer to and rely on Latin American media and such biased information be it for ignorance and negligence, a lack of a correspondent network or because it fits well the standpoint of the corresponding medium.9 This

9 See for an account on the specific problematic of distorted reporting about Lain America in Germany Karnofsky (2007) and Neuber (2007).


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would specifically be true for the US and British opinion leading news coverage (Orihuela 2009) which might lead to the paradoxical situation that “those who follow the news coverage of Latin America here [in the US] can end up with less understanding than those who ignore it (Weisbrot 2008b).

Bearing this in mind it seems as if not only the Latin American media, but also the US and European one is united in a critical and depreciative opinion particularly on the new Latin American left governments such as Venezuelan and Bolivia – which are perceived as the “bad” left in contrast to a “good” left such as Brazil or Chile (Castañeda 2006; Lupien 2013). Thus, because of ignorance and misreporting there would be produced “even more exaggerated editorials denouncing Latin America’s new democracies as ‘authoritarian’ and worse” (Weisbrot 2008b) leading in the cases of Venezuela and the close ally Bolivia to “relentless ideological attacks by both domestic and international media outlets in an effort to discredit these administrations’ challenge to the status quo” (Lupien 2013: 227). This opinion applies particularly to Venezuela, which strongly polarized makes some even speak of a “media war” (Gott 2011: 245-248) and which is perceived and had stylized itself as avant-garde and leader of a new left movement. As already mentioned there is also particular critique on the fact that even positive outcomes of the Bolivarian Revolution like the social policies are responded negatively by reputable media. When formulating such critique there is oftentimes referred in general terms to the “mainstream media” (Lupien 2013: 231), “Western media” (“medios occidentals”) (Fernández 2004) or “major media” (Weisbrot 2008a: 36). But is it really true that all “major” media report negatively about Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution?

In the following I will not only show that there exits indeed differentiated accounts on the Bolivarian Revolution, but also how different identities of Chávez and his policies are constructed in order to justify a different perception. For the purpose of this study I did not engage in a quantitative analysis of media reporting, but in a discursive-qualitative analysis of how reality is constructed in selected newspaper articles. In order to do this, I referred to a discourse analytical model in the tradition of Lene Hansen, which for this rather small study means to search for webs of meanings and sense in the texts that construct certain identity representations which again legitimize and justify certain perceptions (Hansen 2006). This is no limitation to the study, since the aim is to provide an account on the different possibilities of media reporting, to show tendencies and provide a starting point for further research. Therefore, I concentrated on comments of the so called leading Latin American, US and European newspapers on Chávez’s death in March 2013. I chose the event in question because it made such a global and severe sensation that is was responded to worldwide by newspapers thus there exist comparable statements containing a quasi final evaluation of the policies of the Bolivarian Revolution. Even more, I concentrated specifically on leading articles and editorials since they should exactly respond to the event in a concentrated form of the newspaper’s general political-social conviction.

Hence, within the selected mainstream newspapers one can distinguish two groups: On the one hand editorials commenting solely negative on Chávez and his legacy, but on the other hand also newspapers evaluating the policies rather differentiated and moderate and even partly positive. Either perspective is justified with constructing Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution as either absolutely illegitimate or as partly legitimate. I found that legitimacy might best be grasped as


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input legitimacy understood as the democratic fundament and style of Chávez and his government, and output legitimacy understood as the concrete policies including social policy.10

Negative constructions of Chávez, his policies and the Bolivarian Revolution

The newspapers commenting solely negative about Chávez and in this way not even presenting the social policies of the Bolivarian Revolution in a positive light deny both: input and output legitimacy. This happens firstly by means of neither recognizing Chávez’s status as democratically elected president nor his democratic conviction and secondly by means of rejecting his policies as failed, ineffective and inefficient, as well as denying his government capacity.

Regarding “input-legitimacy”, Chávez is linked to events, procedures and historic and contemporary personalities and movements, which portray him as anti-democrat denying any legitimacy of Chávez from the start. In this way, both of the two great Venezuelan oppositional newspapers start their corresponding editorials with references to the coup attempt under Chávez’s leadership in 1992 as proof of his undemocratic disposition. Consequently the coup was directed against a “constitutional government” (El Nacional 2013) and carries the “burden of violence and death” (El Universal 2013)11; also the Brazilian Folha de São Paulo starts the editorial with a reference to the 1992 coup attempt against an “elected government” as does the leading Brazilian newspaper O Globo (O Globo 2013). Interestingly, neither one mentions the common view that at that time the political system of Venezuelan was bankrupt and the coup highly supported by the people nor the violent oppositional coup attempt against Chávez in 2002.

Despite the fact of having been elected several times as president, this construction of Chávez being illegitimate is also held up by referring to his style of rule being “polarizing, sectarian and aggressive” (El Universal 2013) which would again characterize him as anti-democrat. Chávez as epigone of Castro, Perón, Vargas, Napoleon and Louis XIV is described as populist who would get the votes of the popular masses by means of demagogy, charisma, seduction, promises and welfare gifts. Consequently he would not only be a putschist, but also a caudillo in the authoritarian tradition of Latin American strongman and military dictators. If not for regular elections he would have been like any other Latin American dictator (Folha de São Paulo 2013) and his rule would even resemble the past military dictatorship in Brazil (O Globo 2013). Clarín, the largest Argentinian newspaper, starts the editorial admitting that Chávez emerged from the “profound failure” of the Venezuelan political system, however, Chávez’s style would be autocratic and his movement “bonapartist” (Kirschbaum 2013). The Spanish El Mundo describes Chávez’s personality containing “autocratic tendencies, megalomania, hyperactivity, and his art of seduction” and more than Gaddafi and Castro, he would resemble Domingo Perón who had left

10 Since this paper focuses on the perception of domestic and especially social policies I left out the policy output of regional and international policy. Yet, as I showed in another article, the first group also described the foreign policy approach as solely negative rather dividing the Latin American hemisphere and closing lines with pariah states like Iran, while the second group – in spite of being critical – recognized Chávez’s integrationist efforts (Hermann 2013). 11 Translations from other languages into English were done by me as the author of this study.


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a “similarly confusing and doctrinaire amalgam” (Sahagún 2013). The French Le Figaro concentrates on the close ties between Chávez and Castro thus describing Chávez negatively as Castro’s epigone, who tried to imitate as “former putschist” Castro’s ideology and style (Rousselin 2013) which led according to the Argentinian La Nación to a setback of public liberties resembling the worst of the Cuban regime (La Nación 2013). Also, there is referred many times to Chávez trying to use democratic institutions to undermine democracy itself by annulating parliamentary and judiciary control, concentrating all powers in his hands, as well as intimidating the opposition and media, as done by O Globo and Folha de São Paulo , and also the leading Spanish newspaper El País, and one of the German opinion leaders Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (El País 2013; Oehrlein 2013).

Chávez’s legitimacy is not only denied for his alleged missing democratic conviction, but also for his very bad political, economic and social performance. Neither the oil-financed social programs nor economic policies based on an antiquated socialist conviction would be sustainable but wasteful, unproductive and ineffective. Still the country would be poor and increasingly insecure, and the economy would not be diversified at all but more than ever dependent on oil. In this sense, the Bolivian daily El Diario writes in its editorial that Chávez has not reached his aim of doing away with poverty in Venezuela despite the high oil price, but rather spoke for long hours instead of keeping with his promises while blaming US imperialism for the still existing poverty in the world (El Diario 2013). Furthermore, his economic concept of the socialism of the 21st century would be antiquated thus the worst legacy of Chávez would be next to constraints to freedom of speech an “economy in tatters” (O Globo 2013) since the oil money was not invested sustainably in the country, but within an old fashioned socialist model which resulted unproductive, ineffective and corrupt and was characterized by a limitless and exaggerated bureaucracy (Oehrlein 2013). But nonetheless, “the power of petrol” had enabled policies which awakened an “adhesion without limits” of the popular classes backing him beyond all “autocratic measures” (Kirschbaum 2013) thus the deceased would stay in the heads of the people because his rule coincided with an oil boom which covered his misguided economic policy (Rousselin 2013). For that reason, he is also described as “narcissist” and “snake charmer” whose proclaimed social success is covered by negative developments like the deep polarization of the country, the persecution of political opponents and dissidents and the closing of critical media (Sahagún 2013). Thus, Chávez remained in power for 14 years by means of personal charisma and populist rhetoric, but he was not able to solve the problems of “enormous economic inequality, every-day scarcity of goods, ample corruption and rampant urban crime” (El País 2013).

However, in spite of standing clearly in opposition to Chávez, it seems that the power of the social discourse of the Bolivarian Revolution cannot be neglected entirely since some articles in view at least in one short sentence admit to successes of chavismo social policy even if putting the comment immediately back in relation. O Globo admits for example that the social policies had not only been “social welfare for demagogic reasons”, but that they neither had any long-term effects which could be seen by the high insecurity and criminality in the country (O Globo 2013), La Nación that Chávez had stopped the indifference towards the marginalized sectors of society, but that he was populist and authoritarian (La Nación 2013), and Frankfurter Allgemeine


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Zeitung that he gave word and voice to the masses not being noticed by the former government, but that his social programs remained only patchwork (Oehrlein 2013).

But all in all, we find a web of sign and meaning that construct Chávez and also the social policy approach as illegitimate that consists of the negative predominant construction of identity representations authoritarian/autocratic/anti-democratic and megalomaniac/narcissist referring to the input and ineffective/inefficient and populist/clientelistic/seductive referring to the output.

Figure 1: Web of meaning constructing Chávez and the Boliviarian Revolution as illegitimate.

Differentiated constructions of Chávez, his policies and the Bolivarian Revolution

Looking at above examples one might agree with those blaming the “mainstream” for campaigning against the Bolivarian Revolution and not acknowledging even the social successes of Chávez. However, there exists a second group of “major” newspapers reporting rather moderate and distinguished and when reporting positively about the Chávez government and the Bolivarian Revolution refer particularly to the social policies.

But indeed, these leading articles and editorials of the second group also criticize authoritarian tendencies and the inefficient economic policy, but they do this with no such strong attributions. Even more, Chávez and his political measures are justified and constructed as legitimate on principle even if misguided, failed, incompetent or unproductive. For that reason, Chávez was elected several times clearly and rightfully as president and had to undergo an illegal coup attempt by the opposition in 2002, which would be one reason of his radicalization in the first place. He is portrayed as if the improvement of the lives of the previously excluded and marginalized people of Venezuelan society was an honest concern which he pursued with all his heart by means of his social programs. This primer concern for a just society is articulated as legitimate


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political claim and not categorically as populist measure in order to create clientelistic structures securing the voter base.

One of the greatest Colombian newspapers El Espectador finds it is difficult to make a realistic judgment on Chávez and admits that there are always two ways of looking at him and his policies. For that reason, he was the “great revolutionist transformator attending to the poorest” and a “spendthrift populist” who wasted the oil wealth, he was a “democratic leader”, who understood the necessities of his people and an “autocrat who arrogated personal powers”, he was an “invincible winner of all elections” and an “authoritarian leader” who used the laws according to his liking. So only time would show if he enters the “holy halls of the Latin American left” like “Sandino, Ché Guevara, Allende or Fidel” (El Espectador 2013). The greatest Colombian daily El Tiempo begins with the great legacy of Chávez referring to his “profound reforms” with which he established the “socialism of the 21st century” for which his charisma was as important as the oil resources. Even though there would be objections, it would be necessary to make clear that “the welfare of the less favorable and the search for a more equal society were always his greatest preoccupation”. His ambitious plan to turn over the Venezuelan society resulted in an inevitable polarization, given the emotional style of his government characterized also by authoritarianism. (El Tiempo 2013). Interestingly, this means in fact that the enormous polarization in Venezuela would not only be due to some aggressive and undemocratic style of Chávez, but a consequence of his plan to transform society.

The British The Guardian also refers to the international polarization on Chávez, according to which the weeping crowds in Caracas, the left leaders of Latin America and left circles of even Europe would tell he had been a great man – in total contrast to official faces in Washington, London and other capital cities. The truth would be that “there was indeed something of greatness about Chavez”. Therefore, his efforts and ambitions “revealed a man with very big ideas” standing against his possibilities and his capabilities as administrator which he compensated by “rhetoric and theatre”. However, this was not all Chávez’s fault since “Venezuela displays the classic dysfunctions of a wealthy oil country”. For that reason, “money spent on education, and Chavez spent a lot, prepares people for work that may not be there”. The editorial counts also the negative aspects of Chávez’s presidency, however, it ends in saying that Chávez “had a big heart, and he will leave a big hole in the hearts of millions of poor and ordinary folk not only in Venezuela but elsewhere in Latin America, and beyond” (The Guardian 2013).

The French Le Monde is not as positive as The Guardian, yet, it also aims at providing a differentiated account. The article also refers to the polarization on Chávez and his policies describing his presidency as an “eventful, undivided, flamboyant and controversial, charismatic and provocative reign”. Chávez had cut in half poverty in the country which would count now as most equal in Latin America and had “really thought to give sense to the Bolivarian Revolution and invented nothing less than the socialism of the 21st century”. Thanks to the oil wealth and by controlling the economy Venezuela could initiate social programs subsidizing food and education, healthcare and housing. However the article counts also the negative sides of the oil wealth like patronage and corruption resulting in the fact that Chávez had left behind a weakened country. He had reduced poverty but “he not taken advantage of the oil resources to invent an original and sustainable development model”. Also the German Süddeutsche Zeitung takes a more


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nuanced view. According to the editorial, with his last electoral campaign Chávez wanted “to show them all” and proclaimed “a battle of the truth against lie, of the people against the bourgeoisie, of socialism against capitalism”. The comment provides a very laconic description of the polarization on Chávez, however it counts always both sides, that Chávez tried to overthrow the government, but that he himself was also overthrown, that his enemies condemned him as populist militarist, but that his friends praised him like Jesus or Bolívar, that he used the oil wealth instinctively for his own fortune, but that he indeed gave voice and money to the common people. At the end the article describes him as “borderline democrat” who in fact did win presidential elections and referenda - no one but the cancer could defeat him (Burghardt 2013).

Even the greatly criticized The New York Times takes a more differentiated view writing that Chávez’s “redistributionist policies brought better living conditions to millions of poor Venezuelans“ and that he “won elections by devoting a substantial share of the country’s oil income to building public housing, creating health clinics and making affordable food available to the poorest citizens” next to hinting to the fact that “there have also been shocking levels of corruption, shoddy construction, chronic shortages of basic goods, and neglect in the investment needed to maintain and increase oil production” (The New York Times 2013). However, very remarkably, at the end the comment confesses that the reputation of the US in Venezuela was “badly damaged” when the Bush administration “unwisely blessed a failed 2002 military coup attempt against Mr. Chávez”.

To recap, in spite of not concealing negative aspects of Chávez rule, in the leading articles and editorials of the second group we find a web of sign and meaning that construct Chávez and also the social policy approach as legitimate on principal. The predominant construction of identity representations are elected/semi-democratic/authoritarian and ambitious/extreme/radical regarding input legitimacy and ineffective/inefficient but social/preoccupied referring to the output.

Figure 2: Web of meaning constructing Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution as legitimate on principal.


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Conclusion

As the paper shows it is not all of the international media that at least in the context of Chávez’s death report only negative about Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. However, what all have in common is the perspective that in Venezuela democratic principles are in danger and that economic policies have failed. However, there is one part of “mainstream” opinion leading media discourse that does not recognize Chávez and his policies at all and another part of partly justifying Chávez regarding input legitimacy by winning elections, standing in a left-oriented tradition, having to fight enormous constraints, and output legitimacy by means of his social policies and his real concern for the marginalized. This leads to the question whether one can identify a certain tendency which newspapers have a negative or rather moderate conception of the Bolivarian Revolution. What can be seen is that the dividing line is not geography understood as a different view between Latin American and European/US newspapers, but the tendency that the leading articles and editorial comments respond to the event in a concentrated form of the newspaper’s general convictions. This means that the articles on Chávez’ death in question represent in all but a few cases the leading “political-ideological” orientation of the corresponding medium. Newspapers which can be described as rather “center-right” or “liberal-conservative”, owned by a large media conglomerate or generally in opposition to Latin America’s left report negatively about the deceased president and the Bolivarian Revolution while newspapers attributed to be center-left or liberal/social-democratic report rather moderately.

Thus, the first group consists of the two great Venezuelan oppositional newspapers El Nacional and El Universal, the Bolivian conservative daily El Diario, the Argentinian Clarín published by the largest media conglomerate Grupo Clarín, and its main also conservative, center-right competitor La Nación, the conservative O Globo being the leading Brazilian newspaper and part of the largest media conglomerate of Brazil, and its main competitor Folha de São Paulo, the French conservative Le Figaro, the German center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and also the center-right Spanish El Mundo and even the Spanish newspaper El Páis published by Spain’s largest media corporation, which counts in fact as social-democratic/center-left but whose rejection of Chávez fit in an all-over Spain heavy opposition against Chávez. In contrast, the second group contains newspapers which can be described as rather “center-left”. This includes the Colombian daily El Tiempo which despite the fact of having been purchased by the Spanish media group Planeta claims to be independent, the rather critical Colombian El Espectador, the British social-democratic The Guardian, the French center-left-liberal Le Monde, the German center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung, as well as the US liberal-critical The New York Times.

Finally, what these articles show is that the evaluation of the Bolivarian Revolution thus whether Chávez’s social policies were a success and a real concern, or only a populist measure for building up clientelistic structures appears not to respond to the facts but to beliefs. The question remains if one defines those different views as principal differences or rather gradual ones. But after all they remain differences which correlate remarkably with the corresponding political/ideological orientation of the newspapers.


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