hdr - indonesia 2001 - towards a new consensus

INDONESIAHUMAN DEVELOPMENTREPORT 2001

BAPPENAS

BPS CATALOGUE: 1156

The diagram on the cover page depicts the correlation betweendemocracy and human development. The white dots locatedifferent countries according to their attainments on the humandevelopment and democracy indices. Indonesia's position isindicated by the yellow circled dot.

INDONESIAHUMAN DEVELOPMENTREPORT 2001

Democracy and human development in Indonesia

Towards

BPS-Statistics IndonesiaBAPPENASUNDP

a new consensus

Indonesia Human Development Report 2001Towards a New Consensus: Democracy and Human Development in Indonesia

ISBN: 979-598-865-4

Publication Number: 04400.0115

BPS Catalogue: 1156

Size: 210 x 297 mm

No. of Pages: 156

Manuscript: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, Bappenas, UNDP

Cover design: Bharata Kusuma

Published Jointly by BPS-Statistics Indonesia, Bappenas and UNDP Indonesia

iii

Foreword

This is the first National Human Development Report for Indonesia. It has been preceded by

National Human Development Index Reports in 1996, 1997 and 1999. As before, this has been a

collaborative effort between the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), Statistics

Indonesia (BPS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The National Human Development Report is being published at an important juncture in Indonesia's

history, when the country is consolidating its nascent democracy while simultaneously striving to

overcome the economic and financial crisis that overtook much of East Asia in 1997. The timing of

this Report has dictated its concerns and contents. The primary focus is on the interrelationships

between human development, democracy and economic progress in Indonesia. This Report is an

ambitious and innovative undertaking compared to many other national human development reports,

which focus on a single theme.

This Report poses a question that is very much on the agenda of policy-makers in Indonesia: How

can Indonesia achieve steady progress in all indicators of human development as it restructures its

economy, refashions its governance institutions, and devolves decision-making to regions and localities?

The answer, this Report argues, lies in building a new social consensus for Indonesia - a consensus

that renews a shared commitment to human development, establishing that all Indonesians - as citizens

of Indonesia - are entitled to nationally mandated standards of human development. Despite the odds

confronting Indonesia, which this Report spells out in some detail, it is optimistic that current challenges

can be surmounted.

The Report is enriched by a wealth of new statistical tables. These include the Human Development

Index, along with its complementary measures: the Human Poverty Index, the Gender-related

Development Index, and the Gender Empowerment Measure. These data are now available not just at

the national but also at the provincial and district levels, allowing key human development issues and

priorities to be publicized and debated throughout the country.

These detailed statistics will be invaluable as Indonesia decentralizes much of the responsibility for

development planning and policy to hundreds of individual districts. As with all such composite

measures, however, the various human development indices need to be applied with care. Although

they offer broad signposts toward human development needs and priorities, they must also be

supplemented with all other quantitative and qualitative information that local authorities should have

at their disposal.

iv INDONESIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001

This Report has been prepared jointly bya UNDP-Bappenas Project commonly known as UNSFIR and BPS-Statistics Indonesia

Team Leader:Satish C. Mishra.

Drafting Team:Anis Chowdhury, Iyanatul Islam, Widjajanti I. Suharyo,

Moh. Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Puguh B. Irawan.

Statistical Team:Wynandin Imawan, Arizal Ahnaf, Uzair Suhaimi, Tono Iriantono, Tolkhah Mansyur, Nurma Midayanti,

Zuraini, Ahmad Avenzora, Yulin Haniati, Aldian Taloputra.

Administrative and Secretarial Support:Brasukra G. Sudjana, Diana Venturini, Syane Luntungan, Rosana Erinaldi, Cut Dian Rahmi.

Editor:Peter Stalker.

Desktop Composition and Production Management:Bharata Kusuma.

The analysis and policy recommendations of this Report do not necessarily reflect the views of BAPPENAS, BPS-Statistics Indonesia or UNDP. The Report was commissioned by UNDP under project INS/99/002 commonly knownas UNSFIR (the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesia Recovery). The principal partner and executing agencyof this project within the Government of Indonesia is Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS). Thepresent report is the outcome of a series of open consultations around an initial draft prepared by an UNSFIR team ledby Satish C. Mishra. The statistical tables of the indicators and indices presented in this Report were computed by ateam of BPS-Statistics Indonesia.

Jakarta, 17 October 2001

Bo AsplundResident Representative

UNDP Indonesia

This Report owes much to the many people and institutions that have taken part in numerous

consultations contributing to its contents. Not all will agree with all of the argument or conclusions

presented here. But we hope that readers will find the contents of this Report a compelling contribution

to the policy debate on human development in Indonesia.

Soedarti SurbaktiChairman of

BPS-Statistics Indonesia

Kwik Kian GieState Minister for Development Planning/

Chairman of BAPPENAS

v

Acknowledgements

This Report has evolved as a collaborative processthat has benefited from the skill, energy and commitmentof many people, including those directly involved in itsproduction and many others who have generously offeredtheir time to comment and contribute at various stages.

The Report benefited greatly from the general supportof BAPPENAS in its preparation – reflecting its keennessto adopt a wider consultative process. BAPPENAS alsofacilitated a major consultation meeting to discuss the mainideas in the Report and helped to put this report in thebroader policy setting. The team also expresses itsgratitude to the BAPPENAS staff who offered ideas andinputs throughout the drafting process, in particular toMr. Djunaedi Hadisumarto, Mr. Soekarno Wirokartono,Mrs. Leila Ratna Komala, Mr. Dedi M. Masykur, Ms. NinaSardjunani, Mr. Arum Atmawikarta, Mr. Daroedono, Mr.Bima Wibisana, Mr. Bambang Prijambodo, Mr. LukitaDinarsyah Tuwo, Mr. Bambang Widianto, Mr. JoyoWinoto, Mr. Max H. Pohan, Mr. Ikhwanuddin Mawardi,Ms. Yohanawati, Mr. Guntur, Mr. Sanjoyo and theircolleagues in BAPPENAS.

The team is especially grateful for the closecollaboration with BPS-Statistics Indonesia. BPSshouldered the responsibility of preparing the humandevelopment indicators and indices presented in thisReport, and also organized workshops on data refinementand verification. Thanks in particular to Mrs. SoedartiSurbakti, Mr. Kusmadi Saleh, Mr. Wynandin Imawan, Mr.Toto E. Sastrasuanda, Mr. Uzair Suhaimi, Mr. TolkhahMansyur, Ms. Nurma Midayanti along with other staff atboth the central and regional offices who have contributedto the refinement of the data.

Many individuals and institutions have activelyparticipated in the discussions or consultations and sharedtheir views and comments. Lack of space precludesnaming all of them here, but we would like to recognizeespecially the contributions of Mr. Fachry Ali (LSPEUIndonesia), Mr. H.S. Dillon (Poverty Commission),Mr. Iqbal Djajadi (Sociology Laboratory, University ofIndonesia), Mrs. Mayling Oei Gardiner (UI), Mr. Peter

Gardiner (Insan Hitawasana Sejahtera), Mr. AntonGunawan (Citibank), Mr. Andi Hakim Nasution (STTTelkom), Mr. Halide (Hasanudin University), Mr. Jim Hope(USAID), Mr. Terry Hull (ANU), Ms. Jacqueline Pomeroy(World Bank), Ms. Haning Romdiati (PPT-LIPI), Mr.Satoto (UNDIP), Mr. Firdaus A. Siddik (RothschildIndonesia), Mr. Hananto Sigit (BPS), Mr. Soekandi (PPK-UGM), Ms. Nunik Sriyuningsih (PSW DiponegoroUniversity), Ms. Emmy Susanti (PSW AirlanggaUniversity), Mr. Bambang Heru Susanto (BPS East Java),Ms. Mely G. Tan (Unika Atmajaya), Mr. Soni Sumarsonoand Ms. Nining (Ministry of Home Affairs) and Ms. RahmiUntoro (Ministry of Health). The team must also expressits special thanks to the discussants in the BAPPENASconsultation: Mr. Ichlasul Amal (UGM), Mr. SugengBahagijo (INFID), Mr. Fasli Djalal (Ministry of Education),Mr. Tommy Legowo (CSIS), and Mr. Soekirman (IPB).

The team also wishes to thank many individuals fromthe various UN agencies, who commented on the draft,including: Mr. Iftikar Ahmed (ILO), Mr. Stephen C. Hill(UNESCO), Mr. Rolf C. Carriere and Mr. Stephen J.Woodhouse (UNICEF), Mr. Shafiq Dhanani and Mr. AsifHasnain (UNIDO). From the Human Development ReportOffice in New York, Mr. Omar Noman and Mr. RichardPonzio offered helpful comments on the drafts.

From the inception of the Report many people inUNDP-Indonesia have offered suggestions and support.We would like to mention in particular Mr. Andre Klap,Ms. Bona Siahaan, Mr. Kevin Evans, Mr. Carl Hessic,Ms. Mette Jensen and Ms. Barbara Brouwer. We owespecial thanks to Mr R. Sudarshan for his consistentinterest in the Report and his spirit of intellectualengagement. This has helped us refine many initialhunches and ideas. Last but not least, the team is especiallygrateful to Mr. Ravi Rajan, former UNDP ResidentRepresentative, who initiated the preparation of the reportas well as provided useful comments on an early draft.We thank Mr. Bo Asplund, the current UNDP ResidentRepresentative, for his continuing interest andencouragement.

vi INDONESIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001

Abbreviations

BAPPENAS : Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional - National Planning Board

Bimas : Bimbingan Masal - Mass (Agriculture) Extension Programme

BMI : Body Mass Index

BPS : Badan Pusat Statistik - Statistics Indonesia

GEM : Gender Empowerment Measure

GNP : Gross National Product

GDP : Gross Domestic Product

GDI : Gender-related Development Index

GRDP : Gross Regional Domestic Product

HDI : Human Development Index

HDR : Human Development Report

HPI : Human Poverty Index

Inmas : Intensifikasi Masal - Mass (Agriculture) Intensification Programme

Inpres : Instruksi Presiden - Presidential Instruction

NGO : Non-Government Organization

PKK : Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga - Family Welfare Movement

Puskesmas : Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat - Health Centre

Sakernas : Survai Tenaga Kerja Nasional - National Labour Force Survey

Susenas : Survai Sosial Ekonomi Nasional - National Socio-Economic Survey

SSN : Social Safety Net

UNDP : United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF : United Nations Children's Fund

vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYTowards a new consensus 1

CHAPTER 1Human Development Challenges in a Democratic, Decentralized Indonesia 5Achievements in human development 6Poverty 7Inequality 8

Gender disparity 8Inter-provincial disparity 9

Impact of the crisis 10Challenges of human development 11Annex 1.1: Trends in human development at provincial level: 1990-1999 14Annex 1.2: Monitoring human development and human poverty indicators, 1990-1999 15

CHAPTER 2Consolidating Indonesia's Democracy 16Trading freedom for progress 17The road to democracy 17The democratic tide 19Democracy under strain 20

Weak political parties 20The escalation of social conflict 21The demise of social consensus 22

Is democracy a luxury? 22The democratic dividend 24Annex 2.1: Human development, democracy and economic growth 25

CHAPTER 3Understanding Indonesia's transformation 27Decades of transformation 28Employment 29

Contents

viii INDONESIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001

Income inequality 29Education 29Health care 30Food Policy 31Protection of the development budget 32Income poverty 32The disappearing miracle 32

A changing production environment 32A new macroeconomic environment 33

CHAPTER 4Rebuilding the Indonesian miracle 35A collapsing economy 35Shrinking employment and incomes 36Income distribution maintained 37A dip in human development 38Keeping children at school 38Cuts in the health budget 39Stagnation in human poverty 39Reworking the miracle 39Coping with globalization 40Investing in human development 41

CHAPTER 5Putting people first: A compact for human development 43Responsibility passes to districts 44A compact on human development 46A mission statement 47Human development standards 47

The minimalist approach 47The universalist approach 48Can the regions catch up 50

Public deliberation 51A new consensus 51

Endnotes 52

Bibliography 55

BOXES1.1. What human rights add to human development 71.2. Human Development Index 101.3. Women in Indonesia 13

ix

1.4. Impact of the Crisis on Females 132.1. Democratic transitions in Southeast Asia 202.2. Principles of good governance in Indonesia 234.1. Indonesia's financial crisis in historical perspective 365.1. Decentralization 445.2. Outcomes of decentralization around the world 455.3. Applying the Human Development Index in Indonesia 46

TABLES1.1. Population below selected poverty lines, 1996-99 112.1. Elections in Indonesian History 182.2. Social violence, 1945-1999 213.1. Indonesia: Gini ratio of household expenditure across provinces, 1976 - 1999 304.1. L-index of per-capita household expenditure, 1990-1999 374.2. Poverty severity index, 1996-1999 374.3. Number of teachers (thousands) 384.4. School enrolment and adult literacy, 1993-1998 384.5. Children's use of health facilities 394.6. Public expenditure on health and education 415.1. Years required for provinces to reach 1999 national average based on past trends 485.2. Time required from 1993 to reach selected international development goals, based on

1993-1999 trends 495.3. Time required in years to reach selected universal targets based on 1990-1999 trends 50

FIGURES1.1. Human Development Index (HDI), 1975-1999 61.2. Indonesia: Human Development Indicators 61.3. Trend in Poverty, 1970-1999 81.4. Trends in Interpersonal Inequality of Expenditure, 1975-1999 81.5a. Percentage of Illiteracy by Gender (Total) 91.5b. Percentage of Illiteracy by Gender (Age 10-14) 91.6. Relationship between Rank of HDI and GDI, 1990 and 1996 111.7. Selected Social Indicators in 1995 111.8. Human Development Index of selected ASEAN countries 121.9. Public Expenditure on Health, 1996-98 (as % of GDP) 121.10. Public Expenditure on Education, 1996-98 (as % of GNP) 122.1. Urbanization and Literacy, 1930 - 2000 172.2. Global picture of democratic governments elected by universal suffrage 192.3. Democracy and income 222.4. Democracy and the human development index 223.1. Long-term real GDP growth, 1951-2000 283.2. Employment by sector 293.3. Education and health expenditure, 1969 - 1998 303.4. Primary enrolment in Southeast Asia, 1965-1990 30

x INDONESIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001

3.5. Infant mortality and life expectancy 313.6. Maternal mortality, 1988-1993 313.7. Real and nominal wages in manufacturing, 1986-1989 324.1. Per capita GDP growth scenarios 364.2. Inter-districts disparities, 1998 Lorenz curves 374.3. Gini coefficients above and below the poverty line, 1996-1999 384.4. Access to safe sanitation 415.1. Literacy rate by province, 1999 47

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND INDICESThe concept and measurement of human development 64What do the human development indices reveal? 711. Human Development Index (HDI) by Province, 1996 and 1999 782. Gender-related Development Index (GDI) by Province, 1996 793. Gender-related Development Index (GDI) by Province, 1999 804. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) by Province, 1996 and 1999 815. Human Poverty Index (HPI) by Province, 1995 and 1998 826. Human Development Index (HDI) by District, 1996 and 1999 837. Gender-related Development Index (GDI) by District, 1999 908. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) by District, 1999 979. Human Poverty Index (HPI) by District, 1998 10410. Health Condition by District, 1999 11111. School Attendance by District, 1999 11812. Housing Condition by District, 1999 12513. Economic Performance by District, 1995-1998 13214. Labour Force and Poverty Conditions by District, 1999 139Technical notes 147Definitions of statistical terms 154

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Towards a new consensus

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report puts people first. It argues thatprogress in human development is not just

essential in itself but also lays the foundations for astable and unified democracy, and promotes thetransition towards a rules-based market economythat can permit sustained economic growth. In acountry as large and diverse as Indonesia, however,this can only be achieved through extensive nationaland regional consultations – leading to a newconsensus and a shared commitment to humandevelopment.

Until the onset of the financial crisis Indonesia hadtaken enormous strides in many aspects of humandevelopment. From 1975 to the second half of the 1990sthe country's human development index (HDI) rosesteadily, until the sudden dip in 1998. But the HDI tellsonly a part of the story. If it also reflected the extent ofhuman rights and freedoms, the trajectory would lookmuch less impressive, because for three decades the NewOrder regime had forced Indonesians to trade politicalfreedom for economic progress.

The purpose of this National Human DevelopmentReport is to assess Indonesia's democratic and economictransitions – to demonstrate why the country is unlikelyto make enduring economic progress, or consolidate itsdemocracy, unless it can make a firm commitment tohuman development. A consensus among the regions oncitizens' rights to human development can also act as acentrifugal force for national unity.

Achievements and challenges

Over the past three decades Indonesia has had laudableachievements in human development. These range fromreductions in poverty and inequality to increases in lifeexpectancy and literacy. Infant mortality, for example,declined substantially, following improvements in accessto health care and sanitation. At the same time there havebeen considerable improvements in the status of women:male-female gaps have been narrowing at all levels ofeducation, and women's earnings have been increasingas a proportion of earned family income. Meanwhiledisparities between the provinces have also been shrinking.

The sudden and unexpected crisis of the late 1990sdealt a serious blow to Indonesia's journey to progress.For most people the immediate and sharpest impact ofthe crisis has been through inflation. Between 1997 and1998 inflation surged from 6% to 78%, while real wagesfell by around one-third. As a result there was a sharpincrease in poverty. Between 1996 and 1999 the proportionof people living below the poverty line jumped from 18%to 24%. At the same time, poverty became more severeas the incomes of the poor as a whole fell further belowthe poverty line.

The crisis seems to have affected women and childrenmore adversely. For many families where both men andwomen were working before the crisis, women wereforced to work longer hours as men lost their jobs.Declines in income also reduced families' access to healthcare and other basic services. There is some evidence ofincreased domestic violence due to economic stressfollowing the crisis.

The overall impact of the crisis was reflected in thedeterioration of Indonesia's human development index(HDI) – largely the result of the drop in real incomes.Meanwhile, although the Human Poverty Index (HPI)remained stable, there were reductions in access to healthservices.

In the aftermath of the economic crisis, Indonesia facesserious challenges of human development. The long-termoutlook for public services is poor. Because of the decisionto bail out the banks the government is now deep in debt.Effectively the population as a whole has assumed amassive burden that will require them to pay higher taxesand have less effective public services.

In the short-term, the tight-budgetary situation posesa threat to social spending. Any cut in social spendingwill have serious long-term implications, especially sinceIndonesia has historically lagged behind her neighbours,and a large number of people remain vulnerable to poverty.

Consolidation of Indonesia's democracy

Indonesia has already experienced several forms ofgovernment, and different shades of democracy – themost recent change being the collapse of the autocraticNew Order regime and the successful elections

2 INDONESIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001

of June 1999. Is this just another swing of the pendulum,to be followed soon by another swing backwards?Certainly there is no cause for complacency: The twentiethcentury saw dozens of democratic openings that wereextinguished by coups and military takeovers. But the tideof history is in the other direction. Now that Indonesiahas joined the democratic fold, the proportion of worldpopulation enjoying democratic government has risen to63%.

However, Indonesian democracy still remains fragile.The political parties are weak and inexperienced. Severalprovinces are being torn apart by social conflict. Addedto this is the country's ambitious schedule fordecentralization that will make government an even morecomplex affair.

The political parties are weak because they are basednot on distinctive principles or policies but on sectionalinterests and personalities. Different governing coalitionsseem therefore to be alternative permutations of wiseindividuals. Party formation is also weak in the country atlarge, and there are few channels through which peoplecan bring pressure to bear on the institutions of the state,especially the state bureaucracy.

In these circumstances, people vent their frustrationsin other ways. In such a large and diverse country thereis always the danger that conflicts over employment, orland, or other natural resources will cleave along ethnicor religious lines. When the New Order governmentdisappeared, a new political landscape opened up, allowingmany old disputes to resurface. This is having a deeplycorrosive effect – undermining confidence in politicalinstitutions and damaging the prospects for continuingIndonesia's economic reforms.

It might be argued that the most practical option is forIndonesia to unite once more behind a single charismaticfigure. But this could prove even more dangerous. Ratherthan ensuring national integrity a military-backed autocratis more likely to provoke the kind of determined resistancethat will sever national ties across the archipelago forever.And the economic implications are equally chilling. Theinternational companies on which Indonesia's economydepends are now under intense consumer pressure onlabour rights. If Indonesia's international human rightsratings take a dive, so too will its economy. Nowadays itis human development grounded in democracy that payseconomic dividends.

Understanding Indonesia's transformation

Until the outbreak of the economic crisis in 1997,Indonesia was one of East Asia's miracle economies,combining high growth with an equitable distribution ofincome – first with the green revolution in rice in the

mid-1970s, then with a rapid expansion of labour-intensiveindustries in the mid-1980s, and later with theestablishment of a manufacturing export base in the 1990s.

At the outset Indonesia had the advantage of a relativelyequitable distribution of income. In the rural areas thiswas because land ownership had traditionally beenfragmented. But urban areas were not much wealthier.Although nominal incomes were higher these were offsetby high housing costs.

Moreover this income distribution was largelymaintained. Even in the late 1980s when growth averagedover 8% annually, there was no serious increase ininequality. Meanwhile, standards of education and healthhad been rising, thanks in part to the government's effortsto protect the development budget even when its incomefluctuated along with the price of oil. The government'sfood policy also helped reduce poverty and inequality –on the one hand establishing a floor price to supportfarmers, on the other hand stabilizing prices at a reasonablelevel for urban consumers. This combination of rapideconomic growth and equitable distribution of incomeresulted in a steep reduction in income poverty – fromover 40% in 1976 to 11% in 1996.

By the second half of the 1990s, however, there werealready signs that the golden age of Indonesian economicgrowth was coming to a close. There were two mainsets of issues: the first was the changing productionenvironment; the second the changing macroeconomicenvironment.

A changing production environment

Indonesia's former structure of production could nolonger be relied upon to produce steady growth. Neitheragriculture nor industry could continue in the samefashion.• Stagnating agriculture – One of the features of theearlier period was a steady increase in agricultural pro-ductivity. But land is now scarcer, and it will be difficultto drive rice yields up much further.• More capital-intensive production – Many industries,including textiles, wood products and food are becomingsteadily more capital intensive.• Slower export growth – By the end of the 1980s thetrading environment was becoming tougher, partly as aresult of recessions in the importing countries, as well asfiercer competition from other low-wage economies.• Growth of the formal labour market – The increase informal employment has raised new issues of social pro-tection. Without unemployment insurance, people wholose their jobs can also see their skills erode if they haveto resort to work in the informal sector or agriculture.

3

A new macroeconomic environment

At the same time Indonesia was increasingly exposedto the demands and moods of the international moneymarkets.• Savings and investment – In the 1990s Indonesia'ssavings-to-GDP ratio reached an upper ceiling of around29%. Further investment will probably have to come fromforeign portfolio investment – with the attendant risks ofvolatility.• Exchange rate management – The more Indonesiadepends on foreign capital the more its exchange rate andits growth rates will fluctuate.• Monetary and fiscal policy – Efforts to control infla-tion have concentrated on constraining public expendi-ture – with serious implications for human development.It might be better to accept a higher level of inflation whichmight hurt the poor less than cuts in public services.

Rebuilding the Indonesian miracle

If Indonesia is to rekindle both economic and humandevelopment, it will have to build a different economicstructure. Thus far the government has resisted thetemptation to try to insulate itself from global pressuresand has shown a resolute determination to maintain openregimes. This is the only feasible option. If Indonesia isto progress economically it will have to engage in a thirdround of industrial diversification, stepping up thetechnology ladder to produce goods that embody higherlevels of productivity. And most of this innovation willhave to come from the stimulus of foreign investmentand technology transfer.

With an open and more capital-intensive economy,however, Indonesia is almost certainly going to see a furtherincrease in inequality. And if the current pattern ofdistribution of industrial activity remains the same – withmost concentrated in Java – then there are likely to begreater disparities between different provinces anddistricts.

Rekindling Indonesia's economic miracle will meanachieving higher levels of productivity but also doing sowithin the kind of stable social and political environmenton which productive enterprises rely. Fortunately bothobjectives can be achieved through the same basic policy– substantial and sustained investment in humandevelopment. Without a more highly qualified workforce,Indonesia will be unable to benefit even from the lower-level spin-off effects of higher technology production.And without delivering better standards of health and othersocial services, social unrest is likely to persist.

This will require much greater investment in education.Indonesia is spending only around 1.4% of GNP on

education, compared with a global average of 4.5%. Healthshould also be a priority. This is not just a question ofproviding better health services. Even some of the morebasic needs like sanitation are not being met –compromising not just the health but also the nutritionalstandards of Indonesia's children. Another emerging issueis social protection, and in particular some form ofunemployment insurance.

Indonesia now has to pursue human development,while deep in debt, restructuring its economy, and copingwith a more competitive and unstable economicenvironment. The key, however, is to recognize how allthese issues connect – the social, the economic and thepolitical – and to bring this recognition to the forefront ofpublic consciousness.

Putting people first: A compact for regionaldecentralization

Indonesia urgently needs to build a new socialconsensus. Already there has been a fundamental shift invalues and perceptions – and an explosion in expectations:millions of people sense the possibility for a different kindof future both for themselves and for Indonesia in theworld. In short they have become more aware of theirrights – not just political rights but ‘economic’ rights – tofood, say, or to health, or to work. When people emphasizetheir regional or ethnic identity they are not just demandinggreater autonomy or political freedom, they are also sayingthat some of their most basic social and economic rightshave yet to be fulfilled.

How can the Government of Indonesia possibly affordto fulfil such rights? Similar doubts have arisen in poorcountries all over the world, where the promotion ofeconomic rights has foundered on the hard question ofwho has a duty to fulfil them. But all rights do not have tobe paired with corresponding duties. A better approach isto see the assertion of rights as the first step towardsfulfilment and of building acceptance and support.

In future, more of these rights are going to have to befulfilled at the district level. Indonesia has embarked on aradical programme of decentralization that has raised ahost of difficult questions – particularly about the fiscalrelationship between the centre and the regions – as wellas the prospect of widening gaps if the better endoweddistricts can pull further ahead of the rest of the country.

How can Indonesia ensure that decentralization doesindeed cement national cohesion and deepen nationalcommitment to human development? One option is toestablish a new social compact: an agreement that allIndonesians – as Indonesians – are entitled to nationallymandated standards of human development. With these

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


in place, regional cultural and ethnic diversity are notdivisive elements but rather the building blocks of a strongand coherent nation.

Such a compact should be based on a clear missionstatement that establishes the primacy of humandevelopment, while highlighting the importance of aproductive partnership between central and regionalgovernments.

The compact must also be based on a set of standardsto which all districts should aspire. The best approachwould be to adopt the international standards and normsthat have been established as a result of a series of UnitedNations conferences held during the 1990s – on poverty,for example, education, gender disparities and health.

Indonesia has already incorporated many of these intoits national plan documents. Now these goals could beregionalized and merged with other important universalgoals – to achieve 100% literacy, for example, and 100%access to safe water. Another possibility is to includeIndonesia's stated intention to have all children completenine years of basic education.

Extrapolating from recent progress suggests thatIndonesia as a whole could reach these targets within the

international target date of 2015. But when broken downby region the picture is less optimistic: in the case ofpoverty, for example, 18 provinces will miss the 2015target date. This underlines the importance of drawing upa human development compact. If these are basic rightsthen they must be achieved by all Indonesians.

Democratic values and norms can only emerge fromdeep and extensive consultation, especially when vitaldecisions are scattered across more than three hundreddistricts of a vast archipelago. One way to trigger suchdeliberations would be to hold a ‘National Social Summit’– to agree on national standards, the entitlements for eachregion, and the necessary plan of action.

In sum, Indonesia faces enormous and diversechallenges – consolidating democracy, addressingregional conflicts, and regenerating the economy. Buta common thread runs through them all. They willonly be achieved if they are based on common valuesand a new consensus – on a shared commitment tohuman development.

5

The outbreak of the economic crisis in late 1997triggered a comprehensive economic reform

programme in Indonesia. The elections of 1999turned economic reform into a systemic overhaul.Three major challenges came to characterize theIndonesian transition: the consolidation of democraticgovernance, political and economic decentralizationand the creation of a non-patrimonial, rules-basedmarket economy. By undertaking all three, in asimultaneous and interwoven series of reformmeasures, Indonesia is launched on an endeavour aschallenging as any attempted by countries emergingout of the tunnel of the cold war and authoritariansocialism in countries of the former Soviet Union.The National Human Development Report forIndonesia, therefore, focuses on the contribution ofboth the idea and practice of Human Development ineach of the constituent elements of the Indonesiantransition.

July 1999 saw the successful completion of free andfair parliamentary and presidential elections in Indonesia.Thus Indonesia entered, for the second time in less thanfifty years, the ranks of those countries whose politicalsystems make this century unique in human history. The“Democratic Century”1 is now considered by many tobe the most significant feature of our age, a somewhatsurprising claim given the major technological andcommunication progress over the last quarter of thecentury. This assessment reflects not only an appreciationof just how truly remarkable the advent of democracy asa political system across a wide spectrum of countries is,but also a re-evaluation of the intrinsic worth of humanrights and freedoms in the modern world2.

A major tenet of the recent advent of democracy inmany developing countries, the so called ‘third wave’ 3,is that democratic governance is not a luxury good suitableonly for the richer industrialized nations of the world. Itis a system with universal appeal and application. AmartyaSen captures this change in perception as follows:

In earlier times there were lengthy discussions onwhether one country or another was yet ‘fit for

democracy’. That changed only recently, with therecognition that the question was itself wrong-headed:a country does not have to be judged fit for democracy,rather it has to be become fit through democracy. Thisis a truly momentous change4.

The notion of a universally applicable political systemhas, as UNDP's Human Development Report (HDR) 2000points out, a close affinity with the recognitionof a universal structure of human rights.5 Thisacknowledgement is not only a theoretical or philosophicalconjecture. It is now embodied in a series of internationalconventions and agreements ranging from Rights of theChild to those on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

This human rights approach to development has a closeaffinity to the ideal of human development enshrined insuccessive Human Development Reports since 1990. Theimplications are spelled out in HDR 2000 :

Rights also lend moral legitimacy and the principle ofsocial justice to the objectives of human development.The rights perspective helps shift the priority to themost deprived and excluded, especially to deprivationsbecause of discrimination. It also directs attention tothe need for information and political voice for allpeople as a development issue – and to civil andpolitical rights6 as integral parts of humandevelopment7.

The National Human Development Report for Indonesiabuilds on the now considerable literature on thecontribution of human development to the consolidationof democracy and economic growth. It argues that in thecurrent Indonesian context, human developmentrepresented by an irreducible core of universally availablepublic goods (such as basic education, access to safedrinking water, access to basic health services and soforth) will directly strengthen the foundations ofIndonesia's new democracy8. This will create a securebase on which reform of economic institutions can besustained. These in turn will lend certainty to propertyrights, create an impartial judicial system, and curb theprivate misuse of public resources – all essentialingredients in the alchemy of prolonged economic growth.

Attention to the promotion of human development in ademocratic polity also sheds new light on the possible

Human Development Challengesin a Democratic, Decentralized Indonesia

CHAPTER 1

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN A DEMOCRATIC, DECENTRALIZED INDONESIA


design and course of decentralization. This approach isused here to establish both the feasibility and thedesirability of a “social compact” for Indonesia by whichevery province and district is brought to a nationally agreedthreshold of human development. The social compacttherefore seeks to balance claims of equality of opportunity(typically made by Indonesia's richer provinces) with theuniversality of human rights and capabilities, andcontributes to national cohesion9.

Overall, the National Human Development Report seeksto add to the new, emergent, development paradigm. Thisnascent consensus, while recognising the contribution offree markets to economic prosperity, emphasises thecontribution of economic institutions, democraticgovernance and social capital in nurturing durable, freeand competitive markets. Such a multidimensionalapproach to the successful solution to ‘the Indonesianproblematique’ also spells a realisation that such deep andpotentially socially divisive transitions require broad publicparticipation and support over a considerable period oftime10. Forensic investigations over the causes andremedies for one or other policy choices need to be filteredthrough the lens of public consent and interest11 beforethey can be part of a democratic policy arsenal. Thissentiment lies at the heart of the new developmentparadigm. That is the spirit that permeates this particularHuman Development Report for Indonesia. It is a spiritthat was spelled out by Mahbub ul Haq as early as 1992as follows:

The central thesis of these reports is that it is peoplewho matter – beyond the confusing maze of GNPnumbers, beyond the curling smoke of industrialchimneys, beyond the endless fascination with budgetdeficits and balance of payments crises – it is peoplewho matter.

In sum, we put a shared commitment to humandevelopment at the core of democratic consolidation,sustained economic prosperity and national unity indiversity.

Achievements in human development

Indonesians can derive confidence from pastsuccesses. Until the onset of the financial crisis Indonesiahad taken enormous strides in many aspects of humandevelopment. Between 1960 and 1999 the infant mortalityrate dropped from 159 to 45 per thousand live births, andthe adult illiteracy rate fell from 61% to 12%. There hadalso been a dramatic boost in incomes – average per capitaincome more than quadrupled.

This progress is captured graphically in Indonesia'shuman development index (HDI) – a composite measurethat reflects not just income, but also life expectancy and

educational attainment. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1.The longer time series in this figure is based on the data inthe global human development report and shows anuninterrupted ascent from 1975 to the second half of the1990s. The second line is calculated by StatisticsIndonesia, Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS); this uses differentand more recent data and better captures the damage doneby the economic crisis after 1997.

Figure 1.2 provides trends in some individual

7

components of the HDI, namely life expectancy at birth,adult illiteracy and infant mortality for an in-depthappreciation of the enhancement of human development.Life expectancy at birth increased from 41 years in 1960to 66.2 years in 1999. Over the same period, both theinfant mortality rate (the number of infants who die beforereaching one year of age, per thousand live births) andthe adult illiteracy rate (the proportion of people over theage of 15 who cannot read and write) declined dramaticallyfrom 159 to 48 and from 61% to 11.6%, respectively.

Poverty

Perhaps the most powerful indicator of Indonesia'sachievement in human development is the degree ofpoverty reduction. The trend is shown in Figure 1.3. Therehas been some controversy about the calculation of thepoverty line, notably about whether it adequately reflectsnon-food consumption. And in 1996 BPS changed thepoverty line to take this into account. Recalculating thefigure for 1996 increased the estimate of the proportionliving in income poverty from 11% to 18%. Applying the

same criteria to previous years would have shifted theline up by a similar amount. Even applying this correction,however, the period 1970-96 clearly produced a steepdecline in poverty. This is a commendable result, but thereare some qualifications. The first is that in Indonesia manypeople are clustered just above the poverty line, so amarginal change in the poverty criteria would push evenmore people into poverty. The second that this outcomewas probably more a by-product of economic growththan a deliberate strategy of poverty alleviation. The thirdis that, by the late 1980s and early1990s, the reduction inpoverty was tapering off because growth was by thenbeing concentrated in the more capital-intensive industriesthat absorbed fewer worker12. Finally, these indicators donot measure the “severity” of poverty. Poverty is muchsevere for those who are at the very bottom end of theincome/expenditure distribution and significantly belowthe poverty line. For example, 22.4 % of households inthe lowest quintile of the expenditure distribution havechildren without basic education as opposed to the nationalfigure of 12.5 %. Likewise the ratios of access of the

Box 1.1What human rights add to human development

Assessments of human development, if combined with the human rights perspective, can indicate the duties ofothers in the society to enhance human development. For example, to assert a human right to free elementaryeducation is to claim much more than that it would be a good thing for everyone to have an elementary education—or even that everyone should have an education. In asserting this right we are claiming that all are entitled to a freeelementary education, and that, if some persons avoidably lack access to it, there must be some culpabilitysomewhere in the social system.

This focus on locating accountability for failures within a social system can be a powerful tool in seeking remedy.It certainly broadens the outlook beyond the minimal claims of human development, and the analysis of humandevelopment can profit from it. The effect of a broader outlook is to focus on the actions, strategies and effortsthat different duty bearers undertake to contribute to the fulfilment of specified human rights and to theadvancement of the corresponding human development. It also leads to an analysis of the responsibilities of differentactors and institutions where rights go unfulfilled.

If a girl is not schooled because her parents refuse to send her to school, then the responsibility for the failure—and the corresponding blame—can be placed on the parents. But if she cannot be sent to school because thegovernment forbids her going there (as, regrettably, some governments have excluded girls), then the blame cancome down not on the parents but on the government. The failure may be more complex when the girl cannot goto school for one, or some combination, of the following reasons:

• The parents cannot afford the school fees and other expenses.

• The school facilities are inadequate. For example, the school may be unable to guarantee that teachers will beregularly present, so that the parents think that it would be unsafe for the young girl to go there.

• The parents can afford the school expenses but at the cost of sacrificing something else that is also important(such as continuing the medical treatment of one of their other children).

The attribution or sharing of blame can be quite important here, and it is important to recognize how the effectsof different inadequacies in a social system tend to aggravate one another. The willingness of parents to makesacrifices for their children’s schooling will often be diminished when they have reason to doubt that this schoolingwill significantly benefit their children. The sacrifice of human development is much the same in all these cases, butthe analysis of rights, duties and responsibilities must be quite different. In this respect, concern with dutiesenhances the ways of judging the nature and demands of progress. Since the process of human development ofteninvolves great struggle, the empowerment involved in the language of claims can be of great practical importance.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report, 2000



poorest section of the population to that of the richest toadequate water sources, adequate sanitation and electricityare 0.33, 0.18 and 0.71, respectively13.

The recent poverty assessment literature hasincreasingly focused its attention on techniques that tryto delineate the non-income dimensions of poverty bydrawing attention to such basic needs as access to safewater, education and health care. Thus, a broader measureof poverty is UNDP's human poverty index (HPI) whichcombines indicators on life expectancy, illiteracy,malnutrition, and access to safe water and health services.As annex 1.2 shows, the HPI fell from 27.6% in 1990 to25.2% in 1995, and kept steady at this level until 1998. Itshould be noted that the HPI is not a ‘headcount’ index.This is because the underlying indicators do notcorrespond to the same groups of people: those who areilliterate are not necessarily those without access to safewater (for example, one could be an illiterate millionaire).Since the overlap between these different groups of peopleis unknown a composite HPI of 24.2% cannot beinterpreted to mean that 24.2% of the population are livingin human poverty. Nevertheless the HPI does offer avaluable indication of trends in human poverty over time.It also permits comparisons between countries, andbetween different provinces in the same country. WithinIndonesia the HPI ranges from a high of 47.7% in thedistrict of Jaya Wijaya in Irian Jaya, to a low of only8.3% in North Jakarta.

Inequality

One of the hallmarks of East and Southeast Asianeconomic transformation was the reduction in inequality14.The conventional measure of inequality is the Gini

coefficient, which varies from zero (absolute equality) toone (one person owns everything). In the case ofIndonesia, the Gini coefficient declined from 0.35 in theearly 1970s to 0.32 in the late 1980s (Figure 1.4). As inthe rest of East and Southeast Asian economies, the Ginirose during the early 1990s15. However, it dropped againto 0.32 in 1998.

Gender disparity

There has also been commendable progress in genderrelated issues. For example, between 1990 and 1999 theshare of females in the labour force increased from 25%to over 37%. The labour force participation ratio of femaleto male rose from 0.4 in 1970 to 0.7 in 199716. Thefemale illiteracy rate declined from 69% in 1961 to 17%in 1994 (Figures 1.5a-b). The mean years of schoolingfor females also rose, from 4.7 years in 1990 to 6.1 yearsin 1999. The female enrolment ratio at the primary levelreached 100% in 1980. Between 1980 and 1996, the grossenrolment ratio of females at the secondary and tertiarylevels rose from 23% and 35% to 41% and 50%,respectively. In 1996, female students constituted 48%,45% and 35% of the total students at the primary,secondary and tertiary levels, respectively. The gendergap in education declined at all levels. The number offemales per 100 male students rose from 85.9 in 1976 to92.8 in 1996 at the primary, from 65.1 to 95.0 at thesecondary and 56.7 to 88.2 at the tertiary levels17. Theproportion of female teachers at the primary level rosefrom 33% in 1980 to 52% in 1996. The figure stood at40% for the secondary and 30% for the tertiary level in1996.

9

and pregnancy services which affect women. Domesticviolence of one form or other is also an issue of concern.In a survey of husband-wife relations in 1997, about 11%of the 339 male respondents admitted having abused theirwives; 19% admitted to psychological intimidation. The362 female respondents reported on being beaten (16%),kicked (9%), spat on, or burned by a cigarette19. Child(less than 16 years of age) marriages are quite prevalent,and were as high as 16% in West Java according to the1998 SUSENAS. Estimates of the maternal mortality raterange from 350 to 390 per 100,000 live births. Womenalso face high risks of maternal morbidity due to inadequateaccess to health facilities and poor maternal nutrition.Pregnant women also face discrimination at the workplace.The BAPPENAS/UNICEF study also notes that workingwomen and girls face harassment and abuse, low wagesand occupational health and safety risks. In 1997, only18% of women received wages higher than Rp. 300,000a month compared with 31% of men.

Inter-Provincial Disparity

Provincial level data show that the fruits of economicprogress were more equitably shared among the regions.The regional disparities in most components of the HDIeither declined or remained unchanged. For example,regional dispersions, measured by the co-efficient ofvariation, in life expectancy declined from 0.059 to 0.045and that for the literacy rate dropped from 0.10 to 0.082between 1990 and 1999. Regional dispersions in infantmortality and mean years of schooling remained mostlystable during 1990-99. District level dispersions in humandevelopment indicators also declined.

We also find that improvements in HDI rank correlatewell with improvements in the gender-related developmentindex (GDI) across the provinces20. This implies that gainsin regional human development have generally translatedinto gains in gender equality.

Decomposition of inequality shows that betweendistricts (Kabupaten/Kota) inequality accounts for only20% of total inequality. This implies a modest districtlevel income disparity. If the incomes from oil and gassectors are excluded, regional output inequality dropssignificantly. For example, the Gini ratio based on district-level (excluding 13 enclave districts) differences in non-oil, non-gas gross regional domestic product (GRDP)drops to 0.26 in 1998 as opposed to 0.41 when oil andgas incomes and the enclave districts are included21. Thisshows the sensitivity of output inequality to oil and gasincomes.

The pre-crisis female labour force participation rateof around 40% in Indonesia stood out quite well comparedwith the average of 38% in middle-income countries (thatinclude Indonesia), 33% in South Asia and 26% in theMiddle East and North Africa. According to SUSENAS1997 statistics, 39% of women in urban areas and 51%in rural areas were economically active. But only 0.3 %had managerial and administrative responsibilities, 4% didclerical and related work, 5% were professionals, 12%were factory workers and 23% worked as sales persons.In the early 1990s, women held roughly a third of thecivil service positions including some at the very highestlevels. Women's representation at the ministerial level wasabout 6% in 1999 which is comparable with Thailand andSingapore. However, Indonesia lags behind other countriesin the region in female representation in the lower houseof parliament (8% as opposed to 10%-11% in thePhilippines and Malaysia).

Despite these achievements the status of women inthe society still generally remains a matter of concern. Asnoted in a recent BAPPENAS/UNICEF study, there is alack of political will to implement gender-sensitive issues18.The country's paternalistic culture still regards men asthe primary decision-makers in the household, exercisingauthority over decisions in matters such as family planning,



Impact of the Crisis

Despite variations in estimates by various researchersand BPS, they all indicate a rapid rise in the incidence ofpoverty during the crisis22. BPS estimates show that theincidence of poverty rose from 19% in February 1996 to37% in September 1998 at the height of the crisis. Theincrease in poverty in the urban areas was more markedthan in rural areas. However, there two aspects here –inflation-induced and recession-induced (loss of job)increases in poverty23. Since the BPS measure of thepoverty line is consumption-based, it is sensitive to theloss of purchasing power due to both inflation andrecession. Once inflation was brought under control, the

incidence of poverty declined to 23% in February 1999.But the incidence of poverty is likely to remain high solong as people at the bottom end do not find employmenton a durable basis.

The crisis also caused sharp increases in the severityof poverty. One estimate shows that between February1996 and February 1999 the number of people falling below65% of the poverty line increased by 73% and 63% inurban and rural areas respectively24. More recent datashow that the urban severity index dropped back to thepre-crisis level, although the rural severity index remainedabove the pre-crisis level.

Box 1.2Human Development Indices

The first Human Development Report, in 1990, defined human development as the process of enabling people tohave wider choices. Income is one of those choices, but it is not the sum total of human life. Health, education,a good physical environment and freedom of action and expression are just as important.

The 1990 Report also designed a new measure for socio-economic progress: the human development index (HDI).Since then three supplementary indices have been developed: the human poverty index (HPI), the gender-relateddevelopment index (GDI) and the gender empowerment measure (GEM). The concept of human development,however, is much broader than the HDI and these supplementary indices. It is impossible to come up with acomprehensive measure – or even a comprehensive set of indicators - because many vital dimensions of humandevelopment, such as participation in the life of the community, are not readily quantified. While simple compositemeasures can draw attention to the issue quite effectively, these indices are not substitute for full treatment ofthe rich concerns of the human development perspective.

Human development indexThe HDI measures the overall achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development –

longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living. It is measured by life expectancy, education attainment andadjusted income per capita in purchasing power parity. The HDI is a summary, not a comprehensive measure ofhuman development.

Human poverty indexWhile the HDI measures overall progress in a country in achieving human development, the HPI reflects the

distribution of progress and measures the backlog of deprivations that still exists. The HPI measures deprivation inthe same dimensions of basic human development as the HDI.

The HPI in developing countries focuses on deprivations in three dimensions: longevity, as measured by theprobability at birth of not surviving to age 40; knowledge as measured by the adult illiteracy rate; and overalleconomic provisioning, public and private, as measured by the percentage of people without access to safe water,people without access to health facilities, and the percentage of children under five who are underweight.

Gender-related development indexThe GDI measures achievements in the same dimensions and uses the same indicators as the HDI, but captures

inequalities in achievement between women and men. It is simply the HDI adjusted downward for gender inequality.The greater is the gender disparity in basic human development, the lower is a country’s GDI compared with itsHDI.

Gender empowerment measureThe GEM reveals whether women can take active part in economic and political life. It focuses on participation,

measuring gender inequality in key areas of economic and political participation and decision-making. It tracks thepercentages of women in parliament, among legislators, senior officials and managers and among professional andtechnical workers – and the gender disparity in earned income, reflecting economic independence. Differing fromthe GDI, it exposes inequality in opportunities in selected areas.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2001

11

Table 1.1 shows how this translates into the actualnumber of people below the poverty line – and also thepercentage increase for different population groups.

evidence suggests that the findings of a decline in inequalityduring the crisis failed to distinguish between nominalinequality and changes in the distribution of incomeadjusted for the differential impact of inflation on poorand non-poor households25. In any case, data for mid-1999 indicates that whatever decline there has been ininequality during the crisis, it has been reversed.

It is too early to offer an assessment of the long-termconsequences of the crisis on such aspects as health andeducation as it takes time for these effects to surface. Ifthe incidence of poverty remains high, its long-term effectson basic health and education will be quite adverse. Thus,while much of the gains in human development duringthe rapid growth phase remained by and large unaffectedby the crisis, it cannot be guaranteed to remain so. (Moreon this in Chapter 4).

Challenges of Human Development

Indonesia's progress in human development hasundoubtedly been very impressive. But that should notbe a cause for complacency. A number of concerns needto be kept in mind in formulating policies for the future.First, there is still a vast group of near poor who remainsvulnerable26. Second, Indonesia's achievements should beplaced in the regional context. Its achievements in literacy,health and access to media are still below other second-tier newly industrialising Southeast Asian countries.

Figure 1.7 shows the extent of underperformance ofIndonesia in 1995. This underperformance is captured inthe human development index (HDI) (see Figure 1.8).

This highlights first how the proportional increase inpeople below the poverty line was much greater in urbanthan rural areas. This table also looks at the very poorest– those living below 80% of the poverty line. Theproportional increase of those below 80% was roughlysimilar to the total figure, but it seems that those below65% in the rural areas were hit harder – with a 63%increase in their total numbers as opposed to a 38% overall increase in rural poor.

Estimates based on the mini-Susenas of December of1998 of some robust measures of inequality such as theGini ratio, the Theil index and the L-index show thatinequality fell during the economic crisis. This finding isconsistent with the trend observed during the past LatinAmerican economic crises. However, more recent



Starting from a lower base, Indonesia made fasterimprovements in HDI than Malaysia, Thailand and thePhilippines, and there had been a converging trend untilabout late 1980s. But it has tapered off since 1990. Third,Indonesia consistently had underspent on education andhealth relative to regional norms (Figures 1.9 & 1.10).Finally, there is a lot to be done in improving the status of

women in the society, as “the development of humanresources must begin in the womb”.

As Indonesia struggles to move out of recession andaspires to become a knowledge-based economy in a newera of democratization and decentralization, humandevelopment must take centre stage. As outlined earlier,human development plays a critical role in the threechallenges – democratization, rekindling the economicmiracle and decentralization – that Indonesia faces today.However, the Indonesian government is saddled with ahuge debt – a direct consequence of the economic crisis.Protecting social expenditure in the face of acute pressureto bring government debt to a sustainable level remains aserious challenge and requires much imaginative policymaking. The challenge becomes much harder when thepolitical climate remains uncertain, and public trust inpolitical leaders and national institutions is dented by thelegacy of widespread corruption and centralized control.

13

Box 1.3Women in Indonesia

The rights of women in Indonesia were enshrined in the 1945 Constitution which states that “all citizens haveequal status before the law” (Article 27). Indonesia ratified the UN Convention to Eliminate Discrimination AgainstWomen (in 1990) and ILO Convention No. 100 pledging equal pay for equal work. In 1978, the guidelines of statepolicy for the first time included a chapter specifically addressing the role of women in national development, andcreated a junior ministry for women's affairs which became a full department in 1983. The marriage law of 1974, andenabling statutes adopted in 1975, provided for a minimum age at marriage, protected women from marriage againsttheir will, and gave wives rights to divorce equal to those of husbands.

However, officially sponsored images of femininity during the New Order portrayed women as subordinate to men,within the family and the state. They tried to impose a homogenizing view of female social roles on the diversity ofgender relations across the archipelago. This is very much reflected in the way Indonesian women are commemoratedon the occasions of Mother's day and Kartini Day. They highlight women's differences and distinctiveness as mothersand wives rather than promote equality between men and women. There is also a bias in official documents andpolicies. For example, official surveys assume that household heads are men even when widows are actual heads.However, there were some changes in the official policy rhetoric in the early 1990s featuring a commitment togender equality defined as “companions on the same level” (Kemitrasejajaran) or “harmonious gender partnership”.

Thus, the achievements of women in Indonesia cannot be regarded solely as deliberately policy driven, but arelargely outcomes of overall economic growth. One must also note the negative impacts of economic transformation.One of them is sexualized images of femininity in the media. The increased participation of women in the labourforce while it gave them economic freedom also entrenched gender inequality in the workplace. Prostitution mayhave represented for some women a preferred alternative or supplement to low paid jobs to meet rising expectations,but it also carried high risks of violence and disease.

Source: Robinson, K. (1999), 'Women: Difference versus Diversity', in D.K. Emmerson (ed.), Indonesia Beyond Suharto, New York & London: M.E. Sharpe.

Box 1.4Impact of the Crisis on Women

The impact of the crisis on women cannot be discerned from the unemployment data. In fact, the open femaleunemployment rate declined. This perhaps is due to the fact that females work at the bottom of the wage scale andemployers responded to the crisis by retrenching at the upper-end. This also implies that for many families whereboth husband and wife worked, after the crisis there was only one earning member. The increased burden onfemales for earnings can also be deduced from the increase in the female labour force participation rate fromaround 40% in 1995 to 55% in 1999. Between 1997 and 1998, the number of women having wages less than the povertyline doubled from 11% to 22%, and across Indonesia in 1998, women's real wages were a third lower than men's. Thus,the immediate impact of the crisis on females was long working hours and extra work to make ends meet. Forexample, according to a Jakarta-based foundation, Yayasan Kusuma Burana, the red-light districts absorbed 50 to100 new comers every month in 1998.

The 1997 crisis in Indonesia may have worsened the problem of malnutrition among many women of reproductiveage. An analysis of data from 30,000 households by Helen Keller International (HKI) and Diponegoro Universityshowed that, a year after the onset of the crisis, the mean BMI (Body Mass Index) among women in rural CentralJava had decreased from 21.5 to 21.0 kg/m2. Consequently maternal malnutrition increased from 15% to 17.5%. Amore recent post-crisis health and nutrition survey funded by the Social Safety Net (SSN) programme was conductedin East Java among 19,850 men and women. Data collection was done from December 1998 to January 1999. Thefindings indicated that 18.4% of the women suffered from chronic under-nutrition, as indicated by an average BMIof less than 18.5 kg/m2.

Sources: BAPPENAS/UNICEF (2000), Challenges for a New Generation: The Situation of Children and Women in Indonesia, 2000, Part III. ESCAP (1999),Social Impact of the Economic Crisis, mimeo, obtained from Povertynet website of the World Bank.


Province

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatra

13. West Sumatra

14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatra

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta

32. West Java

33. Central Java

34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

51. Bali

52. West Nusatenggara

53. East Nusatenggara

61. West Kalimantan

62. Central Kalimantan

63. South Kalimantan

64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi

72. Central Sulawesi

73. South Sulawesi

74. Southeast Sulawesi

81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

Indonesia

Lifeexpectancy

(years) (%)

Infantmortality rate

Mean yearsof schooling (thousand

Rupiah)(per thousand

live births)Literacy rate

Adjusted realper capita

expenditure

HDI

19991990 199619991990 199619991990 199619991990 199619991990 199619991990 1996

Source: BPS - Statistics Indonesia, special tabulation

Note:- The Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figures, weighted by population.- The number before each province is the official area code.

66

66

61

66

64

65

64

66

71

62

67

72

62

67

54

61

62

67

60

65

67

60

65

65

63

63

63

66

66

64

67

66

64

64

65

70

63

65

70

64

68

55

62

63

68

60

68

67

61

65

64

63

63

66

68

67

66

68

67

66

65

66

71

64

68

71

66

70

58

64

64

69

61

69

68

63

68

65

67

65

66

46

46

64

43

51

48

52

46

26

64

40

22

61

40

101

64

61

39

72

47

40

72

49

48

58

58

56

37

37

51

33

39

34

36

34

20

47

29

17

52

30

75

51

50

30

55

38

31

57

35

34

47

51

44

39

41

48

38

43

48

49

46

24

53

36

25

48

31

81

56

54

32

67

33

37

60

36

50

40

52

45

85

91

90

89

88

89

87

88

96

85

78

77

74

73

64

75

74

90

88

88

95

88

75

79

91

65

82

90

95

92

93

92

90

92

90

97

90

81

80

78

79

68

79

80

94

90

90

97

90

80

86

93

67

86

93

96

95

96

94

93

93

92

98

92

85

85

81

83

73

81

83

95

93

94

97

93

83

87

96

71

88

5.7

6.2

6.0

5.6

5.4

5.4

5.6

5.0

7.9

5.3

4.8

6.0

4.7

5.3

4.1

4.4

4.2

5.6

5.4

6.1

6.2

5.6

5.0

5.2

5.9

4.4

5.3

7.0

7.5

6.9

6.9

6.5

6.1

6.6

5.9

9.5

6.4

5.5

6.9

5.5

6.3

4.6

5.2

5.2

6.6

6.1

7.2

7.3

6.6

6.1

6.6

7.1

5.0

6.3

7.2

8.0

7.4

7.3

6.8

6.6

7.0

6.4

9.7

6.8

6.0

7.9

5.9

6.8

5.2

5.7

5.6

7.1

6.6

7.8

7.6

7.0

6.5

6.8

7.6

5.6

6.7

511

559

572

563

566

548

565

511

573

565

566

571

568

568

548

417

482

507

562

557

575

551

563

473

540

446

555

576

577

587

579

580

581

581

577

592

592

595

612

594

609

580

544

571

579

587

586

582

581

581

569

574

567

587

563

569

577

580

574

564

577

567

593

584

584

598

579

588

566

577

571

565

577

578

578

569

571

572

577

580

579

62

67

66

67

66

65

66

62

74

64

65

69

61

64

52

49

54

64

63

66

70

62

63

57

64

50

63

69

71

69

71

69

68

68

68

76

68

67

72

66

70

57

61

64

71

66

71

72

66

66

66

68

60

68

65

67

66

67

65

64

65

63

73

65

65

69

62

66

54

60

61

67

62

68

67

63

64

63

67

59

64

Annex 1.1TRENDS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL, 1990 - 1999

INDONESIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 200114

Indicators

1990 1996 1999 1990 1996 1999 1990 96& 1996 99& 1990 99&

Human Development Index 63.4 67.7 64.3 5.9 4.1 3.6 0.87 0.92 0.859.3% 6.0% 5.6%

Life Expectancy (year) 63.2 66.4 66.2 3.7 3.2 3.0 0.89 0.94 0.88

5.9% 4.9% 4.5%

Infant Mortality Rate 56.0 44.0 44.9 15.9 12.6 12.8 0.94 0.81 0.88

28.3% 28.7% 28.5%

Literacy Rate (%) 81.5 85.5 88.4 8.7 8.1 7.3 0.95 0.97 0.96

10.7% 9.5% 8.2%

Mean Years of Schooling 5.3 6.3 6.7 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.95 0.98 0.96

14.9% 15.6% 14.1%

555.4 587.4 578.8 42.8 13.2 8.7 0.85 0.54 0.58

7.7% 2.2% 1.5%

Human Poverty Index b)27.6 25.2 25.2 5.5 4.6 5.1 0.87 0.95 0.88

19.8% 19.3% 20.2%

People not Expected to Surviveto Age 40 (%) 15.2 18.3 15.2 4.3 3.7 5.0 0.91 0.82 0.84

28.6% 30.0% 33.2%

Adult Illiteracy rate (%)b) 18.5 14.4 11.6 8.7 7.8 7.3 0.95 0.97 0.9647.1% 53.7% 63.3%

54.7 53.1 51.9 10.3 11.7 10.8 0.70 0.91 0.7918.9% 22.2% 20.9%

14.0 10.6 21.6 10.2 8.6 9.7 0.86 0.57 0.7372.5% 81.5% 45.1%

44.5 35.4 30.0 8.0 7.2 5.6 0.61 0.54 0.46

18.0% 19.9% 18.5%

Source: Calculated from BPS data

Population without Access to

Safe Water (%) b)

Population without Access to

Health Services (%) b)

Under-nourished Children Under

the Age of Five (%) b)

Note:a) Standard Deviation and Coeficient of Variation (in percentage);

The 1996 and 1999 data refered to 1995 and 1998 data

National Level Provincial Variationa) Rank Correlation

Purchasing Power Parity(Thousand Rupiah)

b)

Annex 1.2MONITORING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN POVERTY INDICATORS, 1990 - 1999

15HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN A DEMOCRATIC, DECENTRALIZED INDONESIA


Indonesia is going through a dramatic period of fluxand uncertainty. But this is also a time of

tremendous opportunity – a chance for Indonesiansto rebuild their economy and society. Achieving thiswith a shared commitment to human developmentwill build new forms of national consensus andconsolidate a vital democracy.

Indonesia over the past four years has been the settingfor a ceaseless drama – sometimes shocking, sometimesheartening, often surprising. The twists and turns in thisstory are being watched closely around the globe. Whathappens over the next few years in the world's third largestdemocracy matters not just to its 200 million people butto its immediate neighbours, and to people all over theworld who are anxiously following events.

In some respects the news agenda, both national andinternational, is predictable – relaying those eventsguaranteed to seize the attention: threats of secession,eruptions of inter-ethnic violence, fresh attacks on thecurrency, continuing struggles for political ascendancy.These are certainly central parts of the drama, but theyare not all of it.

Far from the political spotlight, away from theparliament, and the ethnic and religious confrontations,millions of people are also simply struggling to survive –to find work and make a decent living, to keep theirchildren clothed and fed, to achieve some kind of economicsecurity in desperately difficult times.

None of these events take place in isolation, all areenmeshed and interlocked – the political, the military, theeconomic, the social – each reverberates through all theothers. Political uncertainty undermines confidence in theeconomy. Poverty provokes struggles over land and otherresources that emerge as ethnic or religious clashes. Alegacy of centralized control along with widespreadcorruption has eroded faith in political leaders and nationalinstitutions. In many ways and in many places Indonesia'snational consensus is steadily ebbing away.

All of this is putting hard-won human developmentgains at risk. Human development in its fullest sense doesnot simply refer to better standards of health, say, or

education. The standard definition of human developmentis that it is a ‘process of enlarging people's choices’. Thiscertainly means expanding their capabilities to lead a longand healthy life, to grow in knowledge and understanding,and to be able to achieve a decent standard of living. Buthuman development goes much further. People havemultiple needs and aspirations. They want to live in a secureenvironment and they want to be able to exercise theirhuman right to participate freely and actively in thedecisions that affect their lives. The current cascade ofcrises impinge on all these choices, threatening to narrowmany of these possibilities.

That is one perspective. But there is another. Just as acrisis in one area impacts on all the others, so achievementin one area is transmitted to many others through a seriesof positive knock-on effects. Each small victory triggersa sequence of successes. Indonesia's democratic opening,for example, has opened public debate, and stimulatedthe production of a plethora of new media. This in turnhas raised new questions of public ethics and standards.Corruption may still be extensive but it is far less acceptable– and no longer considered inevitable.

It could be argued too that the economic crisis itselfprovoked many positive responses – not least thedetermination to build a safety net, including effective foodand education programmes, that enabled people to weatherthe initial onslaught – along with Indonesians own spiritof mutual self-help, gotong-royong, that allowed millionsof households under pressure to rely on the support offamily and community.

Human development is driven by positive effects atevery level – national, institutional, personal. Some fourmillion children are born each year in Indonesia. Of allthose children that survive, well fed, with the security ofa supportive family and the stimulus of a full education –every one is a fresh source of confidence and optimism.

As elaborated in the previous chapter, Indonesia madecommendable progress in human development, measuredby standard indicators, such as the HDI. But the HDI tellsonly a part of the story, as with most indices it can measureonly what can readily be quantified. So it can measure thespan of human life and the extent of human knowledge.

CHAPTER 2Consolidating Indonesia's democracy

17

Crucially, however, it does not reflect the extent of humanrights and freedoms. Were it to do so the humandevelopment trajectory would look much less impressive– for over the same two decades Indonesian's democraticchoices were far more confined.

Trading freedom for progress

The New Order regime forced Indonesians to tradepolitical freedom for economic progress – and managedto do so over a period of thirty years. But this eventuallyhad to come to an end. Over the same period Indonesiahad steadily been going through a whole range of economicand social transformations that were destabilizing theautocratic model. It was no coincidence that cronycapitalism and dictatorial rule foundered in quicksuccession, since one propped up the other27.

Even so, many people have yet to shake off the oldassumptions, believing that the current period of politicaland social unrest shows that Indonesia is not yet readyfor full democracy – that the threat of political chaos ornational disintegration yet again demands a firm andautocratic response.

That is yesterday's solution. Times have changed, notjust nationally but also internationally. The new generationof Indonesians have higher aspirations. They are bettereducated, better informed, and more sceptical of simplisticpromises. Meanwhile the outside world too is far lesstolerant of dictatorships. The cold war is receding intohistory, and the rich countries see no advantage insupporting autocratic regimes. Indeed in an era whenhuman rights are asserted universally, the performanceof not just governments but also corporations are comingunder far closer scrutiny. At the beginning of the 21stcentury respect for human rights and democracy is notjust essential in itself it also pays economic dividends.

Can Indonesia display democratic credentials? Likeother countries engaged in similar transitions, Indonesiais discovering that democracy cannot be put on like anew suit of clothes. Participatory democracy involves acomplex package of ideals, institutions, skills, andpractices that have to suffuse the body politic. And theymust constantly evolve to meet ever changingcircumstances.

The same is true of the economy. A flourishing moderneconomy does not suddenly emerge phoenix-like fromthe rubble of collapsing banks and failing conglomerates.Indonesia's business leaders are largely the same peoplewho occupied the board rooms last year and the yearbefore. The lawyers and judges are mostly those whopresided over a legal system that the previous regime hadthoroughly corrupted. Achieving a clean ‘rules-based’economy demands far more than publishing new sets of

regulations, it requires a painstaking and thorough effortto transform the ethos and culture that previously ledIndonesia down such a slippery slope.

The road to democracy

Indonesia is certainly not starting from scratch. In itsfirst half century as a republic the country experiencedseveral forms of government and different shades ofdemocracy. First a brief and unstable parliamentary erafrom 1945 to 1957. Then a period of ‘guided democracy’under Soekarno from 1957 to 1967. Then the autocraticNew Order regime from 1967 to 1998. And now a freshdemocratic opening invigorated by the remarkablysuccessful elections of June 1999.

All of these periods have left their marks – somepositive, some negative – that continue to conditionpolitical life today. Indonesia's parliamentary system datesback to 1950. Initially, however, the seats were filled byappointment, and the first elections were not held untilfive years later. The 1955 elections were carefullyprepared. Over the previous two years the governmenthad developed the laws and carried out an extensive radioinformation campaign to inform people of their rightsand duties as voters28. This was an ambitious undertakingsince at that point the population, although only half whatit is now, was living largely in the rural areas and theliteracy rate was only around 30% (Figure 2.1).

Nevertheless the parties worked hard to gather popularsupport and the elections were duly held in September1955. A remarkable 91% of the electorate turned out to

CONSOLIDATING INDONESIA’S DEMOCRACY


vote. But they did not give a majority to any single party.Instead four parties emerged dominant – a result strikinglyparallel to that in the 1999 election (Table 2.1). At thesame time voters had also chosen the members of aConstituent Assembly who were charged with producinga new Constitution.

Though the voters had played their part, the politicianswere less successful. The first governments were drivenby factionalism and involved a series of unstable coalitions.Meanwhile the Constituent Assembly failed to conveneuntil November 1956 – and dissolved three years laterwithout having drafted a Constitution. At this point theelectorate were in no position to exert much pressure onthe politicians. Under the Dutch, and later under theJapanese, Indonesia had acquired much of the ethos ofan authoritarian paternalistic state. Largely illiterate, andscattered over a vast archipelago the mass of thepopulation had no effective means of demandingaccountability29. Gradually and inexorably Indonesia's firstdemocracy started to fall apart.

The first president, Soekarno, proposed an alternative,a ‘guided’ democracy based not on confrontational liberaldemocracy but on traditional Indonesian principles ofextensive consultation and consensus, in which thegovernment would be advised by a national council of‘functional groups’, representing, for example, the youth,workers, peasants, and religious groups30. In 1957,

Soekarno, dissatisfied with the performance of the politicalparties and also with his own limited opportunities withinthis system brought the brief period of parliamentarydemocracy to a close when he declared martial law. In1959 he decreed that Indonesia would henceforth have apresidential system. Soekarno's regime was popular butmarked by economic chaos and regional strife, and inMarch 1967, the army forced the parliament to appointthe army commander as president.

The new president set aside any calls for democracyand established his New Order regime. Backed by thearmy, this was a highly centralized ‘developmentalist’administration, which soon stabilized the economy andhelped stimulate economic growth. But based as it wason the power of patronage, it also provided fertile groundfor corruption, collusion and nepotism. Politics, business,and governance became so thoroughly intertwined thatthey choked off most routes for accountability, causingformal legal, political, and commercial disciplines to witherand decay. So when the economic shock came in 1997,the whole edifice buckled. Following the May 1998 riots,within two months of being re-elected for a sixth five-year term, the president had resigned.

Indonesia had many previous economic crises. TheNew Order regime itself had faced a number of challengesas a result of sudden falls in international oil prices. Butthis was of a different order of magnitude, more akin tothe situation in 1965 that had provoked the downfall of

19

his predecessor – another period of currency collapseand surging inflation. This time, however, the politicaloutcome was the reverse, not the stifling of democracybut its rebirth.

Is this just an arbitrary swing of the pendulum fromright to left, to be followed soon by a mighty swingbackwards? Certainly there is no cause for complacency.The democratic history of the twentieth century wasscarred by dozens of coups and military takeovers.According to one study, between 1900 and 1985 non-democratic regimes replaced democratic ones 52 times –among them a number in southeast Asia, includingIndonesia in 1967, as well as the Philippines, Thailandand The Republic of Korea31.

The democratic tide

But the tide of history is clearly towards freedom anddemocracy. This is evident from Figure 2.2, which showsthe proportion of countries, along with their share of worldpopulation, that are elected by universal suffrage. Thereis no column for 1900 because the figure in both caseswas zero.

The democratic transitions began for developingcountries after the Second World War, with Indonesiaamong the first. Then during the 1960s and 1970s theprocess accelerated as dozens of countries in Asia andAfrica gained their independence. In many cases, thesedemocracies foundered within a few years. But towardsthe close of the century, especially with the end of thecold war, democracies once again started to flower andto flourish. Indonesia is now one of 120 democraticcountries, and its large population has helped boost theproportion of world population enjoying democraticgovernment to 63%32.

For Southeast Asia the final decades of the twentiethcentury were also a period of spectacular economic andsocial transformation. In less than a human lifespan mostcountries of the region had transformed themselves frompoor agrarian societies to newly industrialized economies– a speed of development unrivalled in human history.

What part did democracy play in all this? Apparentlyvery little. For most of the period of rapid expansion thesecountries had autocratic governments. Indeed their leadersargued that this had been one of the keys to their success:freed from the pressures of democracy, and the need torespond to fickle voters, they could single-mindedlypromote industrial modernization. Rather than cultivatingtheir electorates therefore they developed a closer workingrelationship with the business community which, in returnfor favourable treatment by the government, duly deliveredrapid economic growth.

The styles of government in East and Southeast Asia

may have been similarly autocratic, but there wereconsiderable variations in efficiency. Singapore and Taiwan(China), for example, had relatively strong states thatmanaged to insulate themselves from distributionalpressures and were sufficiently well organized to pursuecoherent and effective policies33. In Southeast Asia, onthe other hand, and particularly in Indonesia, the stateswere far weaker, and often suffered from incompetenceand corruption34.

Yet weak and strong state alike achieved rapid growth.How? This was probably because they were at a stage insocial and economic development that was well suited toautocracy. At the early stages of industrialization,coordination is simpler – the pool of skilled technocratsand sophisticated entrepreneurs is so small that theyinevitably get to know each other well. This offersconsiderable advantages in countries where the legalsystems are nascent and where property rights are difficultto enforce. Instead, personal relationships among arelatively small group can be used to bypass formalchannels while still ensuring a degree of trust. These closerelationships enable financial institutions to assess potentialborrowers' ability to service and repay loans. Where banksdo make mistakes they can always quietly use moreprofitable loans make cross-subsidies35. In any case, thedecisions that governments and entrepreneurs have tomake are more clear-cut at this stage since the opportunitiesfor profitable investment are quite high while investmentfunds are limited36.

But this system eventually becomes more impractical.As the economy develops and the number of entrepreneursand technocrats expands – along with the pool of investiblefunds – the scale of commercial activity overburdens thepatrimonial system which starts to crumple under theweight. In a larger and more complex economy, robustand sustainable business activity has to be based less on



personal relationships and more on clear and enforceableregulations, with property rights and contractualagreements ultimately guaranteed by the force of law. Atthis point the government has to stand further back –rather than itself choosing investment priorities or directingcommercial activities it must instead concentrate oncreating a stable macro-economic and regulatoryenvironment.

This kind of transition is essential for the constructionof a modern market economy and the longer it is delayed,the greater the danger that the economy will degeneratefurther into the opaque and sterile morass of cronycapitalism. The New Order regime in Indonesia was inthe end a victim of its own success. The intricate cross-linked structure it had painstakingly assembled was strongenough to survive while the going was good, but it wasbuilt on a narrow basis with few external checks andbalances and when the economy was shaken by a massivecrisis the whole edifice toppled over.

Democracy under strain

Nowadays most people acknowledge the importanceof having a cleaner and more open system in which

everyone plays by the same rules. But there are still seriousdoubts that Indonesia is yet up to the task of administeringsuch a system. This is understandable. Indonesia'sdemocracy is still in a fragile condition. The political partiesare weak and inexperienced. Several provinces are beingtorn apart by social conflict. And on top of this there isthe likely upheaval entailed in the country's ambitiousschedule for decentralization which will devolve manyimportant functions to more than 340 districts.

All of these factors tend to aggravate an already difficultsituation, making it hard to build the kind of resilient socialconsensus on which democracies ultimately depend. Thisis a disturbing scenario and is worryingly similar to thesituation in the mid-1950s when Indonesia's previousdemocracy was extinguished.

Weak political parties

Many of Indonesia's current problems stem from thecharacter of its political parties. The essential buildingblocks of representative democracy are freely constitutedpolitical parties that can organize people who share acommon interest or purpose. Well organized and welldisciplined parties produce strong governments that have

Box 2.1Democratic transitions in Southeast Asia

The governments of East and Southeast Asia have had many similarities. They all embarked on their processesof industrialization with autocratic regimes, and gradually became more democratic. However there have alsobeen striking differences between them—notably in the effectiveness of their governments. At the risk ofsimplification, this can be represented in the choice matrix below. Taiwan (China), and the Republic of Koreastarted in section G and moved to section I. Malaysia and Singapore remained in E and H, respectively. Thailandand the Philippines started in section A and have moved to F. Indonesia following the economic crisis moved fromA to C. Clearly the most desirable destination is section I, but there is no guarantee that a country will reachthis, and there is always the risk of a reverse movement.

21

a clear sense of direction. In parallel, well organizedopposition parties serve as a line of defence againsttotalitarianism.

Indonesia is still some way from achieving this. Formost of the New Order period, only three political partieswere allowed to operate: the government party, Golkar,and two others that had been formed under governmentsupervision. The government exerted strict control overthese political parties and their selection of candidates, sothere was never any question that Golkar would retainpower, and that its elected representatives would re-electthe president.

When these restrictions were removed after 1998 thenumber of parties mushroomed – to 158. Of these, 48were allowed to contest the election but almost 80% ofthe votes for the legislative assembly, the DewanPerwakilan Rakyat (DPR) were cast for the four mainparties – the PDIP, Golkar, PKB and PPP, who betweenthem received 382 of the seats. Another 44 went to 14other parties, and the remaining 38 were allocated to themilitary and the police. This pattern of vote distributionwas remarkably similar to that in the 1955 elections.

A relatively small number of parties holding most ofthe seats should in theory make for strong government.The problem is that these parties have been based not ondistinctive principles or policies but around sectionalinterests and personalities. During the campaign they alltook fairly populist positions, promising to attackcorruption and to engage in general programmes ofreform. But they had little specific to say about theeconomy, or human rights, or the risks of secession.

This makes government a more unstable and moreunpredictable business. Rather than building a programmebased on compromises between clearly delineatedcompeting interests, it tends instead to make proposalsthat reflect the views of a small number of influentialfigures. Governing coalitions therefore seem but alternativepermutations of wise individuals, and cabinet changes donot signal changes in policy but merely reshuffles inpersonnel.

This tends to diminish the role of government itself.Rather than using the power of the state to establish theprimacy of public interest over sectional demands,government is reduced to management of bureaucracy.

If party formation is weak at the centre it is even weakerin the country at large. The New Order government haddecreed that there could be no political activity below thedistrict level, except by Golkar. And even today most ofthe parties have little or no local organization, or any clearmechanism through which individual members caninfluence policy. As a result there are few channels throughwhich people can transmit their views to members of

parliament or bring pressure to bear on the institutions ofthe state, especially the state bureaucracy.

The escalation of social conflict

In the absence of effective democratic channels ofrepresentation, many people express their frustrations inother ways. Indonesia is a vast and diverse country withmore than 300 ethnic groups. And although more than87% of the population are Muslim, there are also significantnumbers of Christians, Buddhists and Hindus. Under thesecircumstances there is always the danger that conflictsover employment, or land, or other natural resources willcleave along ethnic or religious lines. The New Ordergovernment was alert to these dangers and was determinedto enforce stability. To achieve this it stationed the armyin territorial units across the country ready to interveneas required – and they often did so with considerableferocity.

The disappearance of the New Order governmentopened up a new political landscape. The strong centralfigure had departed the scene and the military no longerseemed so invincible. This allowed many old disputes toresurface, and some new ones to appear. Newspaperheadlines report with depressing detail the violence inAceh, Maluku, Kalimantan and in many other parts of thearchipelago.

Although there is no doubt that the scale of violencehas increased, it has been very difficult to monitor thetrend in a systematic way – or to compare the currentsituation with that prevailing under the New Order periodor before. One attempt to do this is shown in Table 2.2which classifies the forms and extent of violence duringthe three different eras of Indonesia's recent history.



Such a table will inevitably reflect not just a change inthe extent of violence but also more thorough reporting,either through the media or through other organizationsof civil society that are better able to record and documentthese events. Nevertheless it does indicate a clear changein the pattern and particularly a surge in violence betweencommunities. Each of these events has its own distinctivecause making it difficult to generalize on the overallsituation. But the current scale of inter-community violencemay well have been amplified by the expansion of theoverall population and particularly by the growth of morearticulate and demanding urban communities.

The demise of social consensus

The last three years have seen a steady unravelling ofIndonesia's social consensus. During the New Orderperiod social consensus was achieved by a combinationof patronage, fiat, and military force. In the democraticera some of those elements remain. But they are muchweaker and have yet to be supplemented with stronginstitutions of a democratic society.

This is having a deeply corrosive effect. Many peopleare losing confidence in political institutions. Theyappreciate the freedoms that democracy brings, but theyare in danger of losing sight of these advantages. Facedwith the immediate pressures to earn a living, and to tryto ensure minimum standards of health and security, theysee no urgent need to bolster democracy.

The demise of consensus also undermines the prospectsof continuing Indonesia's economic reforms. Theeconomic and political crises have brought to the surfacemany latent distributional conflicts. Not only have they

raised tensions between the regions and the centre, theyhave also divided the investor community into competingsections – debtors and creditors, large and small, domesticand foreign.

Similar weaknesses were evident back in 1955. At thatpoint they contributed to a failure to consolidatedemocracy. Is Indonesia doomed to repeat its history, toopen the door to democracy only to reluctantly close itagain? Some would argue that this is now inevitable –that the experience of the past three years demonstratesonly too clearly that Indonesia has neither the financialnor human resources for a fully functioning democracy.

Is democracy a luxury?

Is democracy a luxury that only the rich can afford?Certainly the richest countries are all democracies. Butthey are not alone. Democracy is not a prerogative solelyof the wealthy. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3 which plotsthe positions of the 174 countries for which data areavailable along the axes of democracy and income. Thedemocracy index is that established by the American NGOFreedom House. Although any such index will always becontested, according to the weight it gives to differentsymptoms of democracy, and the scores it accords toindividual countries, this index does offer a useful overallpicture37.

Figure 2.3 confirms that the vast majority of high-income countries are democracies. But it also shows thatthe low-income countries – those with a per capita GDPsunder $PPP 10,000 – are scattered all along the democracyspectrum. Democracy seems to be possible at any levelof income – and Indonesia, with a per capita GDP in1998 of $PPP 2,360, is positioned around half way.

23

Box 2.2Principles of good governance in Indonesia

Casting a vote is only one step towards the creation of a resilient democracy. People must continue to a have astrong and influential voice in the decisions that affect their lives. National and local administrations must,therefore, govern in a fair and open fashion and ensure continuous participation from the population as awhole. In May 2001, officials from central and local government attended a seminar to consider the elements ofgood urban governance in Indonesia - though most of their conclusions apply at all levels of government. Theyrecommended the following set of principles:

1. ParticipationTo encourage all citizens to exercise their right to express their opinion in decision-making processes,directly or indirectly.

2. Law enforcementTo assure that law enforcement and legal security are fair and impartial (non-discriminating) and supporthuman rights by taking account of the values prevalent in society.

3. TransparencyTo build a mutual trust between the government and the public, the government administrators must provideadequate information to the public and easy access to accurate information when needed.

4. ResponsivenessTo increase the responsiveness of government administrators to complaints, problems and aspirations of thepeople, without exception.

5. EquityTo provide equal opportunities for all citizens, without exception, to increase their welfare.

6. Strategic visionTo formulate an urban strategy, supported by an adequate budgeting system, so that city residents have afeeling of ownership and a sense of responsibility for the future progress of their city.

7. Effectiveness and efficiencyTo provide services meeting the needs of the general public by utilizing all resources optimally and wisely.

8. ProfessionalismTo increase the capacity, skills and morals of the government administrators, so that they will have theempathy to provide accessible, fast, accurate and affordable service.

9. AccountabilityTo enhance public accountability of decision-makers in government, the private sector and communityorganizations in all areas (political, fiscal, budgetary).

10. SupervisionTo enforce stricter control and supervision over public administration and development activities by involvingthe public as well as community organizations.

What about the other question? Does Indonesia havethe human resources to consolidate and build a democraticsystem? One way of assessing this would be to plot thedemocracy index against the human development index.Although the concept of human development itselfincorporates the ideas of freedom and choice, the HDIdoes not incorporate any measure of political freedom,being limited to measures of income, health and knowledge.How is Indonesia placed here? As Figure 2.4 illustrates,there is an interesting correlation between democracy andthe human development index: as the HDI rises so morecountries are democracies (a correlation coefficient of0.6). In this case Indonesia is again towards the middle

of the pack. From this chart one could conclude thatIndonesia is already moving in the right direction and iswell placed to make progress in the future.

Figure 2.4 does not, however, indicate cause and effect.Does democracy lead to higher standards of humanwelfare, or does having a healthier, wealthier, and betternourished population enable people to participate moreeffectively and build a more resilient democracy? Mostlikely, the causality works both ways – democracy andhuman welfare go hand in hand, each reinforcing andstimulating the other to produce higher levels of overallhuman development.



The democratic dividend

Indonesia's elections of 1999 were a remarkableachievement. The country has reached a watershed. Butas with any watershed, the river can flow in one of severaldirections – backwards towards the discipline of autocracyor down the opposite slope towards a more thoroughlygrounded democracy. In the long-term Indonesia will bea fully democratic country. The only question is: when?The wrong choices now could set back both democracyand human development in Indonesia for a generation.

It might be argued that the simplest, and most practical,choice is for Indonesia to again unite behind a singlecharismatic figure who will command respect in manyparts of the country – and overcome opposition elsewherewith military power. But while the concept is simple thepractice is fraught with difficulty. Indonesia has movedfar beyond the conditions of 1967, and a government thatopts for the autocratic path has no guarantee of success.

There are huge obstacles on both the political andeconomic fronts. Politically this would involve turningback a democratic tide that has surged both at national

and international levels. And although it might seem thebest way to ensure national integrity it is more likely tofoster a culture of determined resistance that will ultimatelysever national ties across the archipelago. Such a routewill also court international isolation.

The economic implications are equally chilling. Whilesome national entrepreneurs would welcome theopportunity to do business with a compliant regime,international capital is more likely to take flight. There arenow enormous pressures on the kinds of consumer goodscompanies on which Indonesian investment cruciallydepends. If Indonesia's international human rights ratingstake a dive, so too will its economy.

Nowadays the most productive opportunities lieelsewhere. Now it is human development grounded indemocracy that pays dividends. Human development notonly fulfils people's essential human rights but, as thefollowing chapter emphasizes, also lays the foundationsfor the kind of modern, productive economy on whichIndonesia's future depends.

25

Democracy, in the conventional literature, is seen as aluxury good. That is, demand for democracy rises with arise in per capita income. Related to this is the ‘cruelchoice’ hypothesis between two “Ds” — democracy anddiscipline. Since democracy at the initial stage ofdevelopment is inimical to rapid economic growth, what acountry needs instead is discipline38. The conventionalwisdom also has a ‘trickle down’ hypothesis which arguesthat that rapid economic growth will percolate to humandevelopment. Once the cake grows and becomes biggerthen a society can spend more on human development.On the basis of these two hypotheses the link betweenhuman development, democracy and economic growthbecomes a linear, unidirectional one, where the drivingforce is economic growth. Diagrammatically, this relationshipcan be shown in Figure A.2.1

Annex 2.1HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

The evidence on both cruel choice and trickle downhypotheses is not very convincing. For example, India witha low to moderate economic growth has a durabledemocracy whereas some faster growing economies of EastAsia until very recently had autocratic regimes. Similarly,Benin and Belize, which are not high growth countries,are ranked very highly on indices of democracy. Andcountries such as Sri Lanka, Costa Rica and Trinidad &Tobago have achieved greater human development withmuch lower rate of economic growth. Thus, while fastereconomic growth and high income certainly make it easierto devote resources to human welfare, they are notessential. This is also revealed by Indonesia's achievementin HDI; it ranks higher on HDI (number 102) than GDP (number105). Its per capita income is less than half that of Botswana,yet is ranked 12 places higher.

The endogenous growth model provides an alternativeframework for examining the relationship between humandevelopment, democracy and economic growth. Itpostulates that advancements in infant mortality, andprimary school attainment positively contribute toeconomic growth. Economic growth, in turn, substantiallyraises the probability that political institutions will becomemore democratic over time. A cross-country study by Barrofinds a causal link from infant mortality and education toeconomic growth which also follows from the human capitaltheory39. By establishing that link, Barro effectively rejectsthe trickle-down hypothesis that high human developmentcan only be achieved through economic growth. However,in his framework, democracy still remains a luxury goodwith the implication that poor countries cannot (or perhapsshould not) have democracy. The Barro framework can bepresented in Figure A.2.2.

Bhalla40 brings another perspective to this debate. Hefinds a positive effect of democracy on growth. Therationale for this is that democratic regimes are more likelyto protect property and contract rights which are essentialfor a well-functioning market economy driven by theprivate sector. Although Bhalla does not directly examinethe link between economic growth and humandevelopment, by reversing the causality, his findings implya trickle-down approach to development. The emphasishere is on the durability of democracy. Once democracybecomes durable and well functioning, economic growthwill accelerate which will percolate to human development.

Bhalla's ‘virtuous circle’ can be represented in figureA.2.3.

This National Human Development Report for Indonesiahas argued that human development is an essentialingredient for the consolidation of democracy. Thus, thefacts revealed in Figures A.2.2 and A.2.3 and the argumentscontained in this document enable us to complete thelink between human development, democracy andeconomic growth, where all three variables interact withone another to create a virtuous triangle (Figure A.2.4).

In this virtuous triangle, human development positivelyaffects economic growth both directly and indirectly viademocracy. The "direct effect" of human development ongrowth follows from now a vast empirical literature onhuman capital theory and the endogenous growth model.Research by both the World Bank and the AsianDevelopment Bank find that high literacy, low infantmortality, low inequality and poverty contributed positivelyto rapid economic growth in East and Southeast Asia41.



The "indirect effect" of human development on growthcomes via consolidation of democracy. High levels ofliteracy, good health and equality of opportunity allowpeople to participate in the political process and helpbuild national consensus on goals and trade-offs. These

are essential factors required for political parties andorganisations to be issue-based rather than personality-based as is found in many developing countries with lowlevels of literacy. Participatory democracy provides aneffective vehicle for voice and conflict resolution, andhence promotes social and political stability. If effectivelyimplemented, it creates significant pressures for thecontainment of corruption in public life.

By empowering local communities and initiatives it alsoserves to raise the efficiency of investment choices andservice provision. Open public discourse and freedom ofspeech encourage transparency and access to information.This in turn reduces the probability of repeating pastmistakes of undertaking dubious investments under a systemof political patronage. It also sets the stage for a countryto move from a factor and investment-driven phase to anew, innovation-driven phase of development characterisedby the creation of a knowledge-intensive economy

27

Indonesia's economy was already changing courselong before 1997. In many respects the crisis

came as a traumatic interlude in an ongoingtransformation.

Until the outbreak of the economic crisis in 1997,Indonesia was one of East Asia's miracle economies,combining high and sustained economic growth with anequitable distribution of income – achieving the economic‘holy grail’.

Previously it had been assumed that the initial stagesof development in any country would inevitably causeincomes to diverge – with a sharp rise in inequality. Thisdivergence would be both an outcome of rapiddevelopment, and a necessary condition. It would be anoutcome since the rich would be in a more powerfulposition to seize the benefits of growth. But it was alsothought to be a necessary condition since only the richwould be in a position to accumulate the savings neededfor continuing investment.

The newly industrializing countries of Southeast Asia,including Indonesia, seemed to have defied both theseassumptions. Having embarked with a relatively equitabledistribution of income they managed to sustain this balancefor a long period. Yet these countries also maintained afairly high rate of savings, so that a substantial proportionof funds for investment came from their own citizens.

How did they manage this? Some commentators sayit was because these countries promoted macroeconomicstability while maintaining open, export-orientedeconomies. Others say it was because governmentsintervened to promote the most promising exportindustries, or enforced political stability and labourdiscipline. More controversially, this success was ascribedto cultural factors encapsulated as ‘Asian values’.

Some or all of these will have contributed to someextent in each country. But the essential common factorthroughout was investment in human development. Havingstarted with a fairly equitable distribution of income theythen sustained this through public spending on health andeducation. This investment in ‘human capital’ soon paideconomic dividends, as healthier and more skilled workers

became steadily more productive. This further raisedoutput which could again be invested in humandevelopment in an upward and virtuous circle. Inretrospect their success does not seem so unlikely, thoughthe speed with which this strategy worked took the worldby surprise.

Almost as surprising as the miraculous flowering ofthese economies was their spectacular fall from grace.Scarcely anyone saw this coming. True there had beennotes of caution. A few voices had argued that theexpansion would inevitably tail off because the boost inoutput had come to a large extent not from increasingproductivity but just by injecting extra capital and bytransferring people from agriculture to industry – a processthat was running into natural limits42. Unless theseeconomies invested more in technological innovation soas to boost productivity they would therefore inevitablyexperience diminishing returns. Others, including theWorld Bank, had pointed to weaknesses elsewhere, notablyin the banking systems – an outcome of the wave of bankliberalization in the 1980s. By 1997, Indonesia alone had238 banks, many of whom paid scant attention to thenorms of prudent banking – making many loans of dubiousmerit and holding too little capital to back their loanportfolio.

Even so, the crash came with an unexpected scaleand severity. Hopes that the problem was merely thatcurrency markets had overshot with their correction andwould recover to a more realistic equilibrium rates – weresoon dashed. Only later did people appreciate the full extentof the crisis – exactly how bad it was and how long itwas likely to last.

Just as there were many explanations for the Asianmiracle, so there were multiple diagnoses of the ensuingcollapse. Some people blamed the herd instincts ofinternational institutional investors. Others said that thiswas fundamentally a failure of governance: governmentsand businesses were too closely intertwined, allowingentrepreneurs to operate and manoeuvre outside the normaldisciplines of market forces.

Based on these analyses and others, governments andinternational institutions undertook a number of measures

CHAPTER 3Understanding Indonesia's transformation

UNDERSTANDING INDONESIA’S TRANSFORMATION


of rescue and reform. Although some of these treatmentswere less successful than others, most of the patientshave subsequently revived. The currencies of the Republicof Korea, Thailand and Malaysia are now more stable,and investment and growth have revived. Indonesia is ina more precarious position – although growth is againpositive the country is failing to attract much newinvestment.

What does this imply for Indonesia's future? How badlyhas human development been damaged by the crisis andwhat part will it play in future economic growth? CanIndonesia again expect to achieve rapid and equitablegrowth and if so how?

The subsequent three decades saw a dramaticturnaround. Indonesia managed to diversify its productionbase – in a series of stages: first with the green revolutionin rice in the mid-1970s; then with a rapid expansion oflabour – intensive industries following trade liberalizationin the mid-1980s, and later with the establishment of amanufacturing export base in the 1990s.

The process was by no means smooth or linear. Therewas setback in the period 1982-86, for example, followingthe fall in international oil prices. Nevertheless the periodas a whole saw a fundamental shift in the structure of theeconomy. Over the period 1971-96 agriculture'scontribution to GDP fell from 45% to 15%, whilemanufacturing rose from 8% to 25%.

Decades of transformation

Indonesia's economic achievement over the final threedecades of the twentieth century is evident in the growthrates shown in Figure 3.1. For much of the period betweenthe second half of the 1950s and the end of the 1960sannual growth averaged only 2% – less than the rate ofincrease in population. Indonesia remained a predominantlyagricultural economy. The government had made someefforts to promote heavy industry behind tariff barrierswithin an elaborate regulatory framework. But this hadproduced scant results: by the mid -1960s manufacturingstill only accounted for 10% of GDP. At this point percapita income was less than $50 per year – placingIndonesia firmly in the ranks of the world's least developedcountries. Worse, Indonesia was descending intoeconomic chaos. The government was losing control overmany of the islands on which the country's wealthdepended. By 1966 inflation approached 640% and theeconomy was deep in crisis.

This also signalled a geographical shift in the economy'scentre of gravity towards the major industrial centres. Bythe early 1990s the lion's share of Indonesia's modernindustry, and much of its infrastructure, was to be foundin Java's three metropolitan areas – Greater Jakarta,Bandung, and Greater Surabaya. Overall, Jakarta and Westand East Java generated around 60% of the country'snon-oil and gas manufacturing revenues.

Labour-intensive industry expanded rapidly in the early-1980s, following trade liberalization in 1983 and a 28%devaluation of the rupiah. Between 1982 and 1984, earningsfrom the labour-intensive sector, which includes clothing,woven fabrics, footwear, furniture, toys and sportinggoods increased from $323 million to $826 million; andby 1992 they had reached $9,963 million. Meanwhile thetraditional labour-intensive industries such as foodprocessing that were geared largely towards local demandbecame steadily less important – between 1975 and 1991they fell from 41% to 25% of total industrial output43.

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Employment

Despite the shift towards manufacturing and labour-intensive industries, agriculture remained a vital sourceof employment. Throughout the 1980s it continued toemploy over 50% of the population. As Figure 3.2indicates, it was only towards the end of the 1980s, withthe rise of labour-intensive manufacturing industry, thatagriculture's share began to fall – from 55% in 1985 to50% in 1990 and to 44% by the late 1990s44. This meansthat even today around 35 million Indonesians work inagriculture, with another 17 million in trade andrestaurants.

Income inequality

One of Indonesia's advantages at the outset of the periodof rapid economic growth was a relatively equitabledistribution of income. Although the available data isfragmentary, it is possible to piece together a picture bycombining household surveys (Susenas), labour forcesurveys (Sakernas), and the agricultural survey45. Probablythe most important contribution to a relatively equitabledistribution of income in the 1970s was the distributionof land. Landholding had traditionally been very fragmentedand remained so. The agricultural census of 1973 foundthat for the country as a whole, 46% of holdings wereless than half a hectare. This proportion rose to 57% inJava. This picture of fragmentation was confirmed bythe Sakernas in 1976 which found that only 49% ofhouseholds operated above 0.2 hectares of land46.

Nor were disparities very wide in the urban areas. Urbanworkers had little opportunity for high-productivityemployment in the industrial or commercial sectors. Theirbest chance of earning more was to work for thegovernment – an option open only to those with higherlevels of education. In these circumstances the mostreliable way for households to get a higher income was tohave more people working. In addition to equality withinurban and rural areas there was also a fair degree of equalitybetween them. One survey for 1969/70 found that rural-urban disparities were less in Indonesia than in ten othercountries – including India, Malaysia, and the Philippines47.This was essentially because urban incomes had beendepressed. Urban dwellers had been hit hard by the rapidinflation in the 1960s, and unlike people in the rural areasmost of them did not have the option of retreating intosubsistence production. Urban dwellers were also facedwith escalating housing costs which increased more thantwenty-fold between 1966 and 1977, while costs in therural areas increased far less48.

As a result, people in the rural areas had relatively littleincentive to migrate to the cities and when they did sothey did not go far. The 1971 population census foundthat fewer than 5% of the Indonesian population wereliving outside the province of their birth. The 1973‘Leknas’ migration survey confirmed this, finding that inseven of the 14 cities surveyed in Java over three-quartersof migrants came from elsewhere in the same province.

Despite subsequent rapid economic expansion,especially in the later 1980s when it averaged over 8%annually, there does not seem to have been any seriousincrease in inequality. Quite the reverse, in fact. Ashighlighted in chapter 1, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s the Gini coefficient fell – most steeply in the ruralareas (Figure 1.4). Since then the pattern has been morevariable, rising in the early 1990s until the crisis, thenfalling, then rising again. Much the same could be said ofdistribution across the regions. Table 3.1 shows the trendin Gini coefficients across the provinces. This shows thatthe pattern in many of the provinces matched the nationalpicture.

Education

An important contributor to equitable development inIndonesia, as in the other 'miracle economies' of East Asia,was investment in education. This is indicated in Figure3.3 which shows a rising development expenditures oneducation as a proportion of the development budget. Thegovernment engaged on a massive schools buildingprogramme: between 1973 and 1991 it more than doubledthe number of primary schools49. The outcome is clear inFigure 3.4. Not only did gross primary enrolment climb



steeply it also outstripped that in other countries in theregion. The proportion goes above 100%, indicating thatchildren outside the normal primary age group wereenrolled in primary classes, either starting below primaryage, or more likely having to repeat classes. Even so, theoutcome is impressive. As a result there was a steadydecline in adult illiteracy, which between 1961 and 1990fell from 44% to 11% for men and from 69% to 17% forwomen (Figure 1.5a). This impressive result was possibledespite a low proportion of GNP (about 2%) being devotedto public education. There could be two plausibleexplanations for this. First, 2% of a growing GNP meanta substantial amount in absolute terms. Second, the bulkof educational expenditure (over 80% at its peak in theearly 1980s) was devoted to the primary education. Thus,although this period also saw a rise in secondary enrolment,from 10% to around 40%, Indonesia lagged far behindthe Philippines at around 70% and Malaysia at 60%. Thereis also some concern about the quality of education inIndonesia.

Indonesia's investment in basic education was to setthe stage for the industrial diversification that began fromthe second half of the 1980s. However, the relative neglectof the higher education sector meant the prolongation ofthe low-technology phase despite the growing signs ofits limitations.

Health care

Improvements in education were accompanied bybetter standards of health. The clearest indication is thereduction in infant mortality which had fallen from 132 inthe late 1960s to 90 by 1980 and to 47 by 1999. Over thesame period there was also a steady rise in average lifeexpectancy, from 42 years to 65 (Figure 3.5). While thisimprovement was welcome, it was no more than whatmight have been expected from the general rise in incomeand here too Indonesia fell behind other Asian countries:

31

in 1999 the infant mortality rate was 35 in the Philippines,33 in Thailand and 11 in Malaysia.

During this period, Indonesia had established a networkof health centres, the puskesmas, and sub-centres. Butalthough these were numerous they were not of aparticularly high quality, and poorer families were oftendeterred by user charges or the need to pay prescriptioncharges and meet other out-of-pocket expenses. Higherup the system, too, hospital beds were in short supply.The World Bank noted in 1990 that the availability ofhospital beds, at 0.6 per thousand population, rankedIndonesia among the lowest of all developing countriesregardless of their income level – it was also distributedvery unevenly: 1.24 in Jakarta, for example, but only 0.18in Lampung50.The growth of health services did increasethe possibility of modern treatment for the poor, but theygot only a small share of this. At the end of the 1980sonly 5% of the bottom decile of the population benefitedfrom hospital treatment, compared with around 40% ofthe top decile51. One of the most disturbing aspects of thepoor standard of health care is the lack of attention forpregnant mothers. As indicated in Figure 3.6, Indonesiahas one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the region– 450 deaths per 100,000 live births.

Food policy

An important contributory factor to the achievementof growth with equity was the official food policy. Thegovernment gave a high priority to agriculture and in thelate 1960s, aimed for national rice self-sufficiency. Forthis purpose by the 1970s it had created an entire industryto support the rice sector. This policy had two mainstrands. The first was to boost the production of ricethrough the intensive use of fertilizers and irrigation. For

this it supplied farm inputs through the ‘Bimas’ and‘Inmas’ programmes – the latter operating through anetwork of village cooperatives that drew on credit fromthe specialized state-owned agricultural bank. The secondstrand, complementing these efforts, was to stabilize pricesthrough a food price support agency, Bulog, to buy andsell rice.

The emphasis on agriculture was reflected in the firstnational plan, Repelita I (1969-74), in which agricultureand irrigation consumed over one-third of the entiredevelopment budget. The drive for self-sufficiency wasstepped up after 1972, following a series of indifferentharvests and increases in the price of rice.

These policies really began to pay dividends in the latterpart of the 1970s. Rice production increased from 23million tons in 1977 to 28 million tons in 1980 and to 38million tons in by 1984. As a result rice imports felldramatically. In the late 1970s Indonesia was importingup to one-third of the world's traded rice, but between1985 and 1990 it imported no rice at all. Since then thedream of food self-sufficiency has faded and around 10%of rice has had to be imported.

Food policy had a lasting impact on poverty reduction– on the one hand establishing a floor price to supportfarmers, on the other hand stabilizing prices at a reasonablelevel for urban consumers.



Protection of the development budget

Another important contribution towards povertyreduction was the way that the government managed toprotect development expenditures – even when its incomefluctuated along with the price of oil. During the 1970sthe government had benefited from windfall profits as aresult of the oil-price boom and decided to plough theseinto infrastructure particularly for agriculture, educationand transport via a series of flexible ‘Inpres’ grants. Thesewere designed to integrate national markets while reducingregional disparities. These grants also offered considerableemployment for unskilled labour: in 1970 Inpres grantsgenerated around a quarter of a million labour days, risingby 1982 to 1.5 million – around 2.7% of the total labourforce. Even in the difficult period 1981-86 when oil pricesfell, the government protected expenditure – not just asan isolated reaction in a situation of overall fiscal stringency,but rather as part of a deliberate strategy to ensure thateconomic growth did not worsen income distribution.Even when investment was falling the governmentmanaged to ensure that consumption was maintained.

As a result the income inequality that the New Ordergovernment had inherited remained largely intact. And asphysical capital accumulated, people steadily moved fromagriculture to industry. While this meant some migrationto urban centres of Java and Sumatra, the Inpres grantshelped maintain wages on some of the smaller islands andprevent any worsening in regional disparities.

Income poverty

As noted in chapter 1, an inevitable consequence ofthe combination of rapid economic growth and equitabledistribution of income was a steep reduction in incomepoverty (Figure 1.3). It also noted that by the late 1980sand early1990s, the reduction in poverty was taperingoff. However this did not lead to a steep rise in incomefor formal sector workers. Since the state controlled thetrade union movement workers had few opportunities tobargain up wages. As Figure 3.7 indicates, over the period1986-96 when GDP was rising by around 7% per yearreal wages virtually stood still.

By the beginning of the 1990s Indonesia had alreadyenjoyed a quarter of a century of economic growth. Ithad transformed its economy from one reliant onagriculture and minerals to one where the cutting edge ofeconomic prosperity was provided by non-oilmanufacturing. The government had also managed tocontain regional disparities by investing in infrastructureand services. This all helped to dampen down regionaldiscontent – a stability bolstered where necessary withmilitary force.

Indonesia's stable and inexpensive workforce madethe country a very attractive destination for foreigninvestment, and allowed aggregate investment to rise toaround 30% of GDP, over twice the proportion of mostcountries in the developing world.

The disappearing miracle

By the second half of the 1990s, however, there werealready signs that the golden age of Indonesian economicgrowth was coming to a close. Agricultural productivitywas stagnant, export growth was slowing, and there wasincreasing pressure on wages. Moreover the competitionfor labour-intensive manufacture was growing as othercountries – this time from South Asia – joined Asia's ‘flyinggeese’ formation. It was time for Indonesia to graduatefrom the easier first stages of industrialization to a higherproductivity stage based not just on assembly skills buton technological innovation.

From the mid-1960s Indonesia had enjoyed a happyinteraction of official policy and good luck that hadproduced fairly equitable growth. But by the mid-1990sthis model was slowly being eroded. There are two mainsets of issues: the first is the changing productionenvironment; the second the changing macroeconomicenvironment.

A changing production environment

Indonesia's former structure of production could nolonger be relied upon to produce steady growth. Neitheragriculture nor industry could continue in the samefashion.

33

• Stagnating agriculture – One of the features of theearlier period was a steady increase in agriculturalproductivity. This ensured that agricultural incomes didnot fall too far behind those in industry. But there areclear limits to this process. One problem is that there isless land available as more and more is given over tohousing and industry. Another is that it is difficult to driveyields up much further. By 1989 average rice yields hadpeaked at 3.97 tons per hectare and since then totalproduction has fluctuated. Rice yields in Java are alreadyvery high by world standards so technological advance isunlikely to lead to a further doubling of output. In anycase the government does not have the funds to invest inagriculture to the same extent as before52. Other foodcrops. such as corn, cassava, sweet potato, peanuts andsoybeans have also been stagnating. And smallholderproduction too has made little progress: their yields ofcoffee and cloves now appear to be lower than in the late1960s53.• More capital-intensive production – In the 1990s anumber of manufacturing industries became steadily morecapital-intensive. In textiles, for example, the largehandloom sector disappeared as production switched toartificial fibres and yarns. Meanwhile the wood and timberproducts sector shifted in favour of plywood and pulpwhose output is more mechanized. There werecorresponding changes in the food and tobacco industries,particularly with the mechanization of the large kretekcigarette industry54.• Slower export growth – By the end of the 1990s exportsof labour-intensive products had slowed markedly. Thiswas partly because the one-off boost from the devaluationsin the 1980s had eventually worn off as relative pricesand market shares settled down and adjusted to the newexchange rates. Another factor was that by the end of the1980s Indonesia was reaching the limits of its export quotaunder the Multifibre Arrangement55. Meanwhile there wasalso greater competition from lower-wage economies suchas China and Viet Nam. Finally, towards the end of the1980s recession in some developed market economiesdepressed the demand for Indonesian products. As a result,by the end of the 1980s industries such as textiles,garments and even plywood were declining or stagnating.In the case of textiles, for example, an industry thatbetween 1986 and 1991 had shot up from $0.3 billion to$2.7 billion then merely hovered for the next five yearsbetween $2.3 billion and $2.9 billion. This deceleration inexport growth would not have mattered so much if theslack could have been taken up by local consumers. Butthis does not appear to have happened, so as exports offootwear, woven cloth, yarn and thread decelerated sodid overall output.• Growth of the formal labour market – The majorityof the Indonesian workforce, have always worked inagriculture or the informal sector. Nevertheless the

expansion of manufacturing meant that by the early 1990saround 30% of the workforce was in the formal sector.This shift reflects first a decline in the rate of employmentgrowth in agriculture – from 4% annually in the period1980-85, to below 1% in 1985-90 and to minus 2% in the1990s. Meanwhile employment growth in the industrialsector accelerated from 5% to 7% from the early to late1980s, only falling to 6% in the first half of the 1990s.Employment growth in the service sector fluctuatedbetween 3% and 4% in the 1980s, rising to around 5% inthe 1990s. While the increase in formal employment helpsto boost income it also raises problems when workersneed to transfer from declining industries to growing ones.Many formal-sector workers have to endure long periodsof unemployment – averaging 10 months according tosome estimates. This is likely to involve considerablehardship. On the one hand they can get no unemploymentinsurance and on the other hand the cosmopolitan urbanenvironment is fast eroding many of the traditional copingsystems. They were also losing the option of returning tothe rural areas at times of economic hardship: many peoplewho had migrated to Java from the outer islands had rentedout their land or ceded their rights to other members ofthe family. Changing jobs in the formal sector andtransferring to more productive employment also meansdeveloping new skills. But most people were working suchlong hours – around 60 per week – that they had littleopportunity to gain additional qualifications or upgradetheir skills, especially if they also had to spend much ofthe day commuting.

A new macroeconomic environment

While the production environment was changing,Indonesia was also having to cope with a new financialenvironment that exposed it more to demands and moodsof the international money markets.• Savings and investment – In the 1990s Indonesia'ssavings-to-GDP ratio reached an upper ceiling of around29%56. This is high by the standards of most developingcountries but substantially lower than that achieved inseveral other East Asian economies. If the country is tostep up investment it will therefore have to rely more onsavings from overseas through foreign portfolioinvestment – with the attendant risks of volatilitydemonstrated only too vividly in the 1997 crisis57.• Exchange rate management – If the government wantsto have a stable exchange rate while also depending onexternal flows of capital it has correspondingly lessfreedom to adjust interest rates so as to stimulate domesticsavings and investment58. Dependence on external capitalhas a number of other consequences. It is, for example,much more difficult to defend the country against currencyspeculators. The Central Bank has at times attempted to‘sterilize’ sudden flows of foreign capital by intervening



in the foreign exchange markets. When it has tried toreduce the exchange-rate impact of an inflow of dollarsby selling rupiah, however, this has led to soaring foreignexchange reserves. But holding such reserves for longreduces the capital available for investment59. Ultimatelyit has to be accepted that the more Indonesia depends onforeign capital the more its exchange rate and its growthrates will fluctuate. As the experience of neighbouringcountries demonstrates, even having sound economicfundamentals does not guarantee that capital flows willbe stable. Given the sheer volume of mobile internationalcapital, no country can accumulate sufficient reserves toprotect the exchange rate against a determined speculativeattack.• Monetary and fiscal policy – Since it can no longersterilize large capital inflows in any convincing fashion,the government is going to have to reassess its mix offiscal and monetary policies60. Most governmentsnowadays want to keep inflation under control but thefloods of foreign capital make it difficult for Indonesia toexert much control over the money supply. The area whereit has most control, however, is fiscal policy and it hasattempted to use this to control inflation by reining inpublic expenditure so as to keep a balanced budget. This

has meant cutting back spending on health and educationas well as on investment in infrastructure – with seriousimplications for human development in general andpoverty reduction in particular. In these circumstancesthere is perhaps a case for Indonesia accepting a higherlevel of inflation. This too hurts the poor, but arguablyless so than cuts in public expenditure. Conceding a higherinflation rate would also permit lower real interest rates,which would help boost investment and growth.

In the first half of the 1990s therefore, Indonesia wasfaced with a new and more complex environment thatwas bound to affect income distribution and make it moredifficult to pursue equitable human development.Agriculture was stagnating, manufacturing was becomingmore capital intensive, and the macro-economicenvironment was becoming inherently riskier61. When thecrisis came it demonstrated the extent of thesedevelopments and constraints. At the same time the crisisitself further reshaped the economic and socialenvironment. Evaluating the prospects for social justiceand equity will therefore mean first taking stock of theeconomic and social consequences of the events of thepast four years.

35

Refashioning Indonesia's economy in thedemocratic era – rekindling the miracle – will

mean steering a new and more productive course,and an even stronger commitment to humandevelopment.

In the first half of the 1990s Indonesia's economywas already starting to struggle, But when the presentcrisis hit in late 1997, it was unexpected, swift, anddevastating. The government's first priorities were to tryto halt the slide in the currency and to rein in runawayinflation. This meant borrowing huge sums to supportthe balance of payments – efforts mediated and monitoredby the IMF – and also making draconian cuts in publicexpenditure.

Then it had to deal with the generic bankruptcy facingboth the banks and the industrial conglomerates. In theyears preceding the crisis, many corporations hadunwisely borrowed short in dollars and lent long in rupiah.With the sudden collapse of the rupiah in 1997 they couldno longer service their debts – a situation compoundedby the rapid contraction of the domestic market. As aresult, debtors and the banks that had unwisely lent tothem were nominally bankrupt. The government could ofcourse have let them suffer the fate they deserved. Butwithout a viable banking sector Indonesia had no prospectof recovery, so in the second half of 1998, it embarkedon its efforts to recapitalize the banks and to restructurethe failing conglomerates.

The government's third main task was to reform itself.Successive New Order administrations had steadily blurredthe distinctions between politics, economics, and business,instead weaving a complex mesh of inter-related interests.Within the government a small and privileged political elitehad overseen a three-way collusion between businesses,banks and state functionaries. This environment allowedmonopolies to flourish, froze out potential competitorsand treated standard rules of disclosure and due diligenceas mere formalities.

Meanwhile the authoritarian regime also cut off mostroutes of protest. It had banned independent trade unionsand confined political opposition to two parties which it

had created by fiat and which it monitored closely – leavingmost effective political activity the monopoly of thegovernment party, Golkar, which had grown into a‘banyan tree’ of inter-dependent interest groups. Just asbad, the New Order regime had suborned the legal systemto its own ends and the courts and the judiciary weredeeply corrupt.

Just as business had penetrated government so manypublic institutions had penetrated the business world andturned themselves into enterprises. The military and police,for example, had developed a wide range of businessinterests which they used to finance around 70% of theirbudgets. Corruption extended through most aspects ofpublic life – civil servants, judges, doctors, teachers, thepolice and district heads, all spent much of their officialtime on private business, effectively ‘hollowing out’government. In this corrupt and debilitating environmentaround 30% of government expenditure ‘leaked away’.

Taking this into account, Indonesia's true ratio of publicspending to GDP was around 13% – one-third of theaverage for OECD countries. By mid-1999 as the publicand the media found out more about the New Order erathe enormity of the problems was becoming clear. Fromthen on the new imperatives were to reform institutionsin general and governance in particular.

A collapsing economy

Meanwhile the economy had nose-dived. Theeconomic and financial turmoil that swept through EastAsia in the late 1990s took its toll on many countries butIndonesia was by far the worst-affected. The economycontracted by more than 13% in 1998 – twice the dropexperienced in Malaysia or Thailand, and per capita GPDfell by around 15%. This was a shocking reversal: priorto that the economy had been growing by about 7%annually, and per capita income by around 4.5% annually.Effectively therefore the crisis cost around three years'growth. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.1 whichshows the projected trajectories of real GDP per capitaassuming that the economy would otherwise havecontinued to grow at 7% annually.

CHAPTER 4

Rebuilding the Indonesian miracle

REBUILDING THE INDONESIAN MIRACLE


On this assumption, by 2010 total GDP will be morethan 20% below what it might otherwise have achieved.

Worst affected were the financial and constructionsectors which contracted by around 39%. The country'sfuture growth potential was also weakened by a sharpslowdown in investment: between 1997 and 1998 grosscapital formation fell by 41%. Meanwhile the stock ofgoods was piling up: over the same period unsold inventorymore than doubled.

Shrinking employment and incomes

Despite the severe drop in output this was notaccompanied by a steep rise in unemployment. In August1997, just before the crisis, the unemployment rate was4.7%. Then, following the crisis it rose to 5.5% in 1998and in 1999 it rose to 6.4%62. However, openunemployment in Indonesia is always a poor indicator ofthe real situation. In the absence of any social security orunemployment benefit few people can afford to be out ofwork for long and if they lose a formal-sector job theywill generally return to the informal sector or to agriculture.This is clearly what happened as a result of the crisis

Box 4.1Indonesia's financial crisis in historical perspective

The magnitude of the post-1997 economic crisis bears comparison with the impact of the great depressionfollowing the 1929 stock market crashes in the USA and Europe. This is illustrated in the next figure which mapsthe value of the Jakarta Stock Exchange between January 1997 and October 2000 over a corresponding timeperiod in the early 1930s. For the Jakarta Stock Exchange the base date is December 1996, for the UK the base is1924=100. For the United States, the base is 1926=100. In the United Kingdom, for instance, share prices movedfrom an index of 116 in January 1926, to a peak of 149 in January, 1929, to a low of 73 in June 1932 beforerecovering to 101 by June 1933.

For Indonesian economy as a whole the crisis-induced contraction was greater than in any years of the greatdepression in the United Kingdom.

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when about one million people are thought to have returnedto the countryside.

The main damage to household incomes was done byinflation, which between 1997 and 1998 surged from 6%to 78%. Meanwhile nominal wages failed to keep pace.In the rural areas the return of many people to agriculturefurther depressed agricultural wages as well as theearnings of petty traders and others in the informal sector.And in the urban areas wages in the formal sector grewonly slowly. This combination of high inflation and slowgrowth in nominal wages resulted in a steep drop in realwages. On average these fell by around one-third between1997 and 1998 but in some places the drop was far steeper– 45% for industrial workers in Jakarta, for example.

Income distribution maintained

Data from Susenas suggest that the crisis did notincrease inequality, indeed if anything inequality declined.Thus the Gini coefficient for household expenditure, whichwas 0.36 in 1996 fell to 0.32 in 1998 and only rose to0.33 in 1999. One plausible explanation is that the sharpdecline in the urban industrial economy hit the higherwage earners harder, thus compressing the upper end ofthe income distribution.

It also seems that the crisis did not greatly increaseinequality between the regions. This is illustrated by the‘L-index’, an index that permits the calculation of separatemeasures of inequality within and between provinces, andadds these to give a total measure (Table 4.1). Again thisshows total inequality to have fallen over the period 1996-98, but to be rising again in 1998-99. It also highlights thefact that inequality within the provinces is much moresignificant than inequality between them, typicallyaccounting for around 80% of the total.

per capita GDP then this would produce a straight diagonalline. The extent to which the actual line is bowed indicatesthe extent of maldistribution between the regions. Thebigger the bow, the bigger the distortion. On thisrepresentation, the Gini coefficient is the area betweenthe bowed line and the straight line divided by the totalarea under the straight line.

As elaborated in chapter 1, the incidence of povertyrose due to the crisis. There are two other ways of lookingat what was happening to the poorest. One is to dividethe population up into the poor and non-poor, within urbanand rural areas, and to calculate separate Gini coefficientsfor each of these four groups. The result is shown inFigure 4.3. This shows first of course that inequality ismuch greater within the non-poor since this group alsoincludes the very rich, though the contrasts are greater inthe urban areas. The crisis appears to have an equalizingeffect among the non-poor in both rural and urban areas.This once again shows that the crisis hit the higher wageearners harder.

The situation is different for the poor. First, their Ginisare far lower, and there is not much difference betweenurban and rural areas – a graphic demonstration that there


A similar conclusion is evident from the district-levelinformation illustrated in the ‘Lorenz curve’ shown inFigure 4.2. This is produced by ordering the districtsaccording to per capita GDP from lowest to highest andthen accumulating their GDPs and population from left toright so that they ultimately add up to the total nationalGDP and total population. If every district had the same


is greater equality in poverty than in wealth. However, inthe case of the poor, the effect of the crisis was actuallyto increase the disparities. The Gini coefficients for thepoor rose in both rural and urban areas.

The impact of the crisis on those living below thepoverty line is also evident from trends in the ‘povertyseverity index’. This measures the distance that the averageincome of the poor – as a group – lies below the povertyline, as well as the extent of disparities among the poor.Table 4.2 shows the change in the poverty severity indexduring the crisis. This indicates first the severity of povertyis greater in rural areas, and also that there was a sharpincrease during the worst of the crisis.

Keeping Children at School

So far the crisis has been more evident in publicexpenditure than in outcomes. The government's overhangof debt has reduced the amount available for publicservices. Between 1996/97 and 1997/98 public spendingon education fell from 1.4% of GDP to 0.7%63. This willalmost certainly lead to a further deterioration in quality.One possible consequence is the reduction in the numberof primary school teachers evident in Table 4.3 . Theaverage number of teachers per primary school has nowfallen from 8 to 7.

Nevertheless the available data do not show anyimmediate impact on attendance. Analysis by UNICEF ofthe results of a regular sample survey of 100 villages foundthat primary school attendance was maintained at around80% during the crisis. Indeed by May 1999, both atprimary and lower and upper secondary levels attendancewas marginally higher than before the crisis. Table 4.4

A dip in human development

The most direct and immediate effect of the crisiswas on incomes, whether because of the loss of jobs orthe sudden burst of inflation. But what about other aspectsof human development, such as educational attainmentor health, or nutrition? Figure 1.1 in chapter one shows asharp dip in the human development index (HDI) from0.69 to 0.64. The HDI is a composite measure that reflectsincome, educational attainment, and health. In fact, thedrop in the HDI was entirely due to a drop in the incomecomponents. The life expectancy index stayed more orless the same while the education index actually showeda marginal improvement. This is not surprising since adeterioration in standards of health and education wouldbe unlikely to show through for some time.

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shows that overall enrolment ratios also held up – as didlevels of literacy.

One reason why attendance did not fall is that thegovernment's social safety net programme includedspecific support for education – to offset overall cuts andto protect the poor by introducing additional subsidies.These took the form of block grants to schools in thepoorest areas, along with a system of scholarshippayments directly to the poorest pupils. The scholarshipsprogramme appears to have been quite well targeted, andprobably helped parents keep their children at school,particularly at the lower secondary level where they areespecially vulnerable to being withdrawn in order towork64.

However the main factor keeping children at schoolwas probably parental determination. There is evidencethat many parents made considerable sacrifices to protecttheir children's education. Not only did they sell some oftheir assets, but in some cases they also went short offood. For such parents, who would have been unable tosustain such efforts indefinitely, the scholarshipsprogramme will have been particularly valuable.

Cuts in the health budget

Cuts in public spending on health were even moredramatic. Total realized public expenditure on health fell8% in real terms in fiscal year 1996/97 and by a further12% in fiscal year 1998/99. And there is evidence that theresulting decline in quality caused people to make evenless use of government health facilities. Between 1997and 1998 the Indonesian Family Life Survey found thatthe proportion of adults that had used public healthservices, including the puskesmas, the public clinics, inthe previous month fell from 7.4% to 5.6%65. While insome cases this may have been because people did nothave the money for any kind of health care; in others theywere simply going to private clinics.

Worse still was the effect on children. This is indicatedin Table 4.5 which shows that between 1997 and 1998

the proportion of children using health facilities droppedfrom 26% to 20%. The most serious fall was in visits tothe posyandu. These local clinics are the main source ofpreventive care for children – offering immunization,vitamin A distribution and growth monitoring. The declinein usage of the posyandu, is partly because of a reductionin public support for the PKK, the Family WelfareMovement, but also because the posyandu rely on volunteerhelpers who as a result of the crisis will have had lesstime to volunteer.

Another area of great concern is child nutrition. Herethe overall national data have not yet shown a clearworsening in standards – though the pre-existing extentof malnutrition was bad enough. In 1999 the nationalproportion of children under five who were moderatelyunderweight was around 30%. For some districts, thisfigure was over 50%. Nevertheless there is also evidencethat the crisis increased malnutrition. For example,UNICEF-assisted research shows that the prevalence ofmicro-nutrient deficiencies and of child wasting (lowweight-for-height) increased markedly in rural Central Javabetween 1995-96 and early 1999. The prevalence ofwasting among children was found to be very high inearly 1999 in the urban slums of Jakarta, Surabaya andMakassar. The prevalence of anaemia and night-blindnessamong children and mothers in both rural Central Javaand in the city slums also increased during the crisis andin the first half of 199966.

Stagnating human poverty

A good way of getting a broad view of the impact ofthe crisis is through UNDP's human poverty index (HPI).As mentioned in chapter 1, the HPI remain stable at 25.4in 1999 following the crisis. Despite the stable HPI, a dipinto its components reveals a disturbing picture. The mainissue seems to be access to health services – between1995 and 1999 the proportion of the population ‘withoutaccess to health services’ rose from 10.6% to 21.6%.The criterion for ‘access’ is to live within five kilometresof a health facility – which could be a doctor, or a trainedmidwife or a paramedic, so there is room for differentinterpretations, nevertheless the trend and the long term-implications are worrying.

Reworking the miracle

The revival of economic growth in most of the crisis– affected Asian economies – including Indonesia – mightsuggest that these are temporary setbacks, that Indonesiacan expect to resume on an upward trend. Hopefully,Indonesia will be able to rekindle both economic andhuman development, but if it is to do so it will have tobuild a different structure on new foundations.



As outlined in the previous chapter, Indonesia by theearly 1990s was already markedly different from theIndonesia of 1970s and 1980s. A largely agriculturaleconomy had now become more reliant on industry andservices. And many more people were living in urban areas:between 1971 and 1990 the proportion of people living inurban areas nearly doubled: from 17% to 31%. Theexternal environment had also been changing. Internationalcompetition in labour-intensive goods was increasing,requiring Indonesia to move to more capital-intensiveproduction that was likely to lead to greater inequality. Atthe same time the integration of global capital marketsthrust Indonesia into a much more volatile financialenvironment that narrowed the opportunities forautonomous action by governments. The internationalpolitical environment had also changed. The cold war wasover and there was much less tolerance, and still lesssupport, for autocratic or military governments. In onesense therefore the economic crisis was just an interlude– albeit a very traumatic one – in an ongoing historicaltransition.

Nevertheless the crisis itself has clearly intensified andaccelerated this process of change, not just in the economybut also in the social and political spheres. Indonesia nowhas a democratic government that operates in a verydifferent environment from the old autocracy. Expectationsare high. People do not consider military-enforcedautocracy to be a legitimate system of government. Theyare demanding freedom and democracy and want to beable to influence policy through public debate, throughthe legislature, through the media and through the manynew institutions and non-governmental organizations ofcivil society. And with decentralization they will haveopportunities to do so at many different levels ofadministration. Even if constitutional theory is not beingchanged, activities on the ground are revolutionizingconstitutional practice.

This will have a profound impact on social policy.While the New Order administration could take largelyautonomous decisions behind closed doors the newdemocratic government has to balance many competinginterests and demands and make its decisions in the fullglare of the media spotlight. Awkwardly, just as publicexpectations and public scrutiny are at their highest, thegovernment has less resources to meet public demand.The days of the oil windfall, substantial Inpres grants,and generous food and fuel subsidies are over. Worsestill, the government is now deep in debt.

At the height of the crisis the government tookdecisions on bailing out public companies and banks thatwill reverberate for years to come. Indonesians are slowlybeginning to realize that they have thereby assumed amassive burden that they did not create – one that will

require them to pay higher taxes and will also putenormous pressure on public services. Most of the peoplewho caused the problems remain very well off and thefact that they are not paying for their greed or their mistakesamounts to a massive transfer of resources from poor torich. Hardly surprising therefore that the public at largeare reluctant to pay more for fuel, say, or electricity orpublic transport67.

A further direct consequence of the crisis is thatIndonesia now finds it has to respond more directly tothe advice of the international financial institutions and ofdonors. Now that private capital flows have to a largeextent been replaced by external development assistancethe government is more exposed not just to domesticquestioning but also to regular external scrutiny, notablyfrom the IMF.

Coping with globalization

Given that Indonesia finds itself in a very differentglobal economic environment, how should it respond?One temptation would be to try to close off the economy,to protect local producers from international competition,and to insulate the financial sector from currencyspeculation and sudden mood swings in the financialmarkets. Thus far Indonesia has rejected this option andshown a resolute determination to maintain open regimes.On the trade front it has been working to lower both tariffand non-tariff barriers, and on the financial front, despitethe onslaught of capital flight and currency speculation, ithas remained firmly committed to open capital accounts.

Such openness is the only feasible option. If Indonesiais to progress economically it will have to engage in athird round of industrial diversification, stepping up thetechnology ladder to produce goods that embody higherlevels of productivity. This will require investment thatcannot come from either the government or the Indonesiancorporate sector. For the foreseeable future the onlyrealistic source of industrial innovation will be throughexternal stimulus – international technology agreementsand the transfer of technology through foreign directinvestment. The economies of the 21st century willincreasingly be driven less by manufacturing and heavyindustry than by services and information technology.Some of these will be ‘weightless’ goods that can betransmitted by fibre optic cable rather than container ship.Even so, in many other cases, the information is likely tobe embedded in the kind of physical goods – from electricovens, to motor cars and even garments that Indonesiawill be producing in the years ahead.

The combination of this openness, and the emphasison stepping up to higher levels of technology, will alsoaccelerate the trend towards increasing inequality that wasevident even before the crisis. The proportion of national

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GDP that comes from industry will almost certainlyincrease inequality between income groups – particularlyif those working in agriculture get left further behind.And if the current pattern of distribution of industrialactivity remains the same – with most concentrated inJava – then there are likely to be greater disparities betweendifferent provinces and districts.

Investing in human development

Rekindling Indonesia's economic miracle will meanoperating on two fronts simultaneously. On the one handseeking to raise the country to higher levels of productivity.On the other hand achieving the political and socialstability in which productive enterprises can develop andgrow.

Fortunately both objectives can be achieved throughthe same basic policy – substantial and sustained investmentin human development. This is the same conclusion thatall the other fast-growing economies in the region havearrived at. They know that only with an alert and highly-skilled workforce will they be able to compete in a globaleconomy. It could be argued that Indonesia is unlikely tobecome a world leader in chip design, say, or softwareengineering, so there is little point in making investmentsin education to achieve industrial advantage. But theproblem is that without a more highly qualified workforce,Indonesia will be unable to benefit even from the lower-level spin-off effects of higher technology production.

This was evident in the previous phase of industrialdevelopments when the large-scale export-orientedenterprises had relatively few links with local small andmedium-sized enterprises that might have fed them withcomponents or intermediate goods. For electronics andpharmaceuticals, for example, imports were accountingfor 90% of export value. But the same was true even ofsimpler products which also had a high import component:footwear, 53%; garments, 49%; and textiles, 34%. As aresult, Indonesia has consistently imported moremanufactured goods than it has exported68. The dangerwith the next stage of industrial development is that thisprocess will intensify – leaving small and medium – sizedenterprises even further behind.

Steeping up to higher levels of technology will requiremuch greater investment in education. At the very least,Indonesia should aim to increase investment in publiceducation services to something like the internationalaverage. The extent of the current gap is indicated in Table4.6. Indonesia is investing only around 1.4% of GNP oneducation, compared with a global average of 4.8%.Greater public investment in education will not in itselfachieve the kind of transformation required, but it is anessential first step. Beyond this, Indonesia will also needto increase the efficiency of its education services andcreate much closer links between higher educationinstitutes and the kinds of enterprise that will benefit fromhigher levels of technology.

Health should also be a priority. This is not just a questionof providing better health services. Even some of the morebasic needs are not being met. Figure 4.4, for example,illustrates how far Indonesia lags behind other East Asian



countries in providing even the most basic sanitationfacilities. Sanitation is also closely linked to nutrition. Manyof Indonesia's children are being disadvantaged from theirearliest years. In insanitary conditions the youngest childrenare subjected to bouts of diarrhoea that sap their strengthand reduce their capacity to absorb nutrients. Currentlyaround 30% of Indonesian children under five aremoderately or severely malnourished. This is not so muchbecause their families do not have enough food to satisfytheir children's small appetites, but because they are notreceiving adequate care and appropriate feeding. Only ifthe growth of children is being carefully monitored in theposyandu or at home, can parents and health workersspot that there is a problem and make the necessaryadjustments. Without this kind of attention, the physicaland intellectual development of Indonesia's children is beingcompromised from the outset.

The essential point here is that human developmentcannot be considered independently of economicdevelopment – the two have to go hand in hand. Humandevelopment is not just an objective in itself it also boostseconomic growth, which in turn, can be invested in greaterhuman development. Human development is also key topreventing inequality to rise as this economy movestowards more skill intensive phase. There are manychoices to be made all along the route – about the extentand quality of education and health care, and about thedistribution of public resources, to ensure a healthy,sustainable and secure environment.

One new issue that Indonesia will have to address if itis to pursue more productive forms of industry is that of

social protection – which has a bearing not just on humanwelfare but also economic efficiency. Like many otherpoor countries, Indonesia offers very little socialprotection to the majority of people. Few can expect apension, unless they work for the government or in thehigher ranks of the private sector, and there is no publicsystem of unemployment benefit. As a result, whenworkers in the formal sector get laid off – an inevitablepart of the permanent process of restructuring that takesplace in an advanced economy – they often have littleoption but to resort immediately to work in the informalsector from which they may never return. This is a seriousloss to the economy since their skills are then going towaste. It is normally assumed that any system ofunemployment benefit would be impossibly expensive fora country like Indonesia. But this may no longer be true.One estimate suggests that an average contribution of just0.4% of the payroll between 1991 and 2000 would havebeen sufficient to provide all insured job losers with benefitsfor 12 months69.

Can Indonesia seriously pursue human development,while deep in debt, restructuring its economy, and copingwith more competitive and unstable economic environment– and all this at a time of political uncertainty that includesradical plans for decentralization? There is no choice. Thecountry has to find a way of pursuing all these objectivesin tandem. The key, however, is to recognize how all theseissues connect, the social, the economic and political andbring this recognition to the forefront of publicconsciousness.

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Faced with economic crisis, social unrest, and thedaunting prospect of decentralization, Indonesia

urgently needs to build a new social consensus. Animportant contribution to this – establishing commonrights and standards for all Indonesians – could be anational compact on human development.

Indonesia's transition has multiple dimensions, social,political and economic. But underlying all these is afundamental shift in values and perceptions. A morearticulate and more assertive population is no longer willingto tolerate domination by a small political elite. A moreurbanized society, informed by an ever more diverse rangeof national and international media, is far less willing totake political pronouncements on trust. Above all therehas been an explosion of expectations as people sense thepossibility for a different kind of future both forthemselves and their families – and for Indonesia in theworld.

Many people would see such developments asprofoundly destabilizing – and in many respects they are.All the evidence points in that direction. Indonesia will bea more fluid and less predictable country for some yearsto come. Yet a shift in values can also be an enormousstrength and open up fresh possibilities. People who aremore conscious of their own rights can also discovercommon needs and interests – and aspire to ideals thattranscend issues of class, or religion, or ethnicity.

In the past, consideration of ‘human rights’ inIndonesia has typically been confined to demands forpolitical freedom or protection from oppression. Theseare vitally important. Many Indonesians have themselvesbeen victims of arbitrary arrest and torture. But peoplecan also assert other, ‘economic’ rights – to food, say, orto health, or to work, or more broadly they might claim a‘right to development’.

While governments are willing to guarantee politicalrights, they have been more reluctant to take responsibilityfor economic rights. Political rights, have been seen as‘negative rights’ that demand that the state merely desistfrom infringing on human liberty. Thus they can be fulfilledfairly inexpensively. The economic and social rights, onthe other hand, are more ‘positive’ in that they require the

state to do something – to provide health care, say, orhousing, or employment – a more expensive proposition.

How could the government of Indonesia possibly makesuch generous provision for all its citizens? Clearly itcannot. A rich state, with a per capita income of $20,000or more might be able to offer extensive welfareguarantees. But Indonesia with a per capita income interms of purchasing power parity of $2,300, and withone-quarter of its population below the poverty line, isstruggling to provide even the most basic services.

Similar doubts have arisen in poor countries all overthe world, where the promotion of economic rights hasfoundered on the hard question of who has a duty to fulfilthem. Who is supposed to provide the food, or the work,or the health care? But as UNDP's global HumanDevelopment Report for 2000 points out, people shouldnot be disqualified from asserting their rights simplybecause these rights cannot easily be fulfilled. All rightsdo not have to be paired with corresponding duties. Suchan attitude is doubly destructive since it denies not onlythe rights themselves but also all hope of ever achievingthem.

A better approach is to see the assertion of rights asthe first step towards fulfilment. Simply identifying suchrights brings them to the forefront of public consciousnessand starts to build acceptance and support. A strikingexample of the rhetorical value of asserting rights is the1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child. Indonesia,along with almost every other government, has ratifiedthis Convention, which commits the government toachieving targets on malnutrition, for example, on watersupply, and maternal mortality. These are ambitious goals,and it is clear that many of the targets set in 1990 to beachieved by 2000 have not been fulfilled. But others were,and the promises as yet unfulfilled remain as clearintentions.

In many ways Indonesia's multi-faceted transition hasalready been driven by an assertion of rights. When peopleemphasize their regional or ethnic identity they are notjust demanding greater autonomy or political freedom,they are also saying that some of their most basic socialand economic rights have yet to be fulfilled.

CHAPTER 5

Putting people first:A compact for regional decentralization

PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: A COMPACT FOR REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION


All these demands are related to the two critical issuesthat have been raised in this report – the fate of Indonesia'sdemocracy and the prospects for Indonesia's economy.As the previous chapters have emphasized, these are notseparate issues. Without an open and transparentdemocracy, Indonesia is unlikely to be able to attract thekind of investment needed to lift the economy to the nextlevel of production. And without a functioning economythat can offer adequate employment and incomes, thecountry is likely to suffer from social and political unrestfor some years to come.

Democratic freedoms and economic progress arelinked in many ways but they converge most clearly whenit comes to human development. Only with higherstandards of human development will Indonesia be ableto weave that intricate web of institutions, attitudes andunderstandings upon which complex modern democraciesdepend. Only with higher standards of humandevelopment will Indonesia be able to create a broadly-based, productive economy.

Responsibility passes to districts

The Indonesian Government is already party to manyinternational conventions that commit the state as a wholeto certain overall development goals. So the fulfilment ofrights is generally assumed to be a national issue. But thepicture has been dramatically altered by Indonesia'sambitious plans for decentralization. Because even if thecentral government takes overall responsibility for thewelfare of its citizens, in future the responsibility fororganizing and delivering the services will fall on over340 districts.

Decentralization on this scale is a mammoth logisticalundertaking. It will probably take some years before theadministrative and fiscal relationships between the centralgovernment and the regions are clearly established. Andwill take a similar period to gather at the district levelsufficient people with the training and capacity to take onmany new responsibilities and duties. Decentralization alsoposes risks. One concerns equity. Given greater fiscal

Box 5.1Decentralization

Governments can have many different reasons for decentralizing — to increase the efficiency of public services,for example, or to allow for greater local participation. But in most countries in recent years the principalmotivations seem to have been political—to try to quell regional discontent from provinces wanting greaterautonomy.

In Latin America and Africa, for example, decentralization has been a part of the democratization process asmilitary or autocratic regimes have been replaced by democracies. Similarly in the transition economies of formersocialist states, the disappearance of the central government has given a much stronger say to regionaladministrations. In East Asia some governments have also chosen this route as a better way of delivering services tolarge populations.

Conventionally there are three types of decentralization:Deconcentration – This is the weakest form and often just shifts responsibilities to field administrations or to localadministrators who are closely supervised by central governments.Delegation – This involves transferring decision-making and administration to semi-autonomous organizations. Thesecan be regional bodies but they can also be public corporations.Devolution - This is the strongest form and entails transferring some authority for decision-making, finance, andmanagement. In this case local governments can elect their own leaders, raise their own revenues, and make theirown investment decisions.

Indonesia's decentralization amounts to devolution. Two laws passed in 1999 — 22 and 25 — give much moreautonomy and spending power to the regions. These provide for legislative assemblies at both provincial anddistrict level. The district assemblies, the kabupaten and the kota, will then elect the district heads, respectivelythe bupati or the wali kota.

In future the regions will receive a much larger General Allocation Grant, which will be a minimum of 25% ofdomestic revenue. The government will give 10% of this to the provinces and 90% to the districts. There will alsobe some specific grants. In addition, the regions that are well endowed with natural resources, particularly oil andgas, will be entitled to keep a share of these revenues. The World Bank estimates that the regions will ultimatelybe responsible for 40% of government spending.

Some of the most difficult issues on decentralization concern the abilities of districts to raise their own taxesand to borrow. Already districts anxious about their budgets have been introducing new taxes on local businesses.And there are concerns that if districts start to borrow funds this will further hamper the central government'sability to control the money supply and inflation. There are also worries that the bupati and the wali kota may bereluctant to invest in social services, seeing these as simply adding to their costs while not producing net revenue.

On top of this there are questions of capacity — whether the districts will be able to manage their newresponsibilities. There are also concerns for equity, since those regions with more natural resources can nowtake greater advantage of these to move further ahead of poorer regions.

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autonomy the districts better endowed with physical andhuman resources could use these to pull further ahead ofthe rest of the country.

The international experience on decentralization offerssalutary warnings and valuable lessons. One study of 12countries, for example, found little evidence for thecontention that decentralization empowers more people,reduces poverty, enhances human development ormitigates spatial equality. The results are summarized inBox 5.2. This and other studies confirmed one of thedangers of decentralization in developing countries – thatfar from strengthening local democracy, the process canend up reinforcing the power and influence of local elites.

Paradoxically the key to successful decentralization is

the attitude and behaviour of the central government. Isthe centre ideologically committed to human developmentfor all regional communities? Does it actively support localpolitical initiatives to challenge the power of elites? Is itprepared to work out a detailed strategy for decentralizationand to conscientiously amend this according to local needsand circumstances?

Indonesia's past success in narrowing regionalinequalities are a strong basis on which to build. But thisachievement may also engender complacency – anassumption that the proclamation of decentralization willon its own be sufficient to move the process in the rightdirection. As the international experience has shown, thisis unlikely.

Box 5.2Outcomes of decentralization around the world

Participation by, and Responsiveness to, the Poor Impact on Social and Economic Poverty

West Bengal, India Good: improved participation and Good: positive on growth, equity, HD;representation, improved responsiveness. evidence lacking on spatial equality.

Karnataka, India Fairly good: improved representation, but Neutral: did little to directly help pro-poor growth,participation of poor less effective and or equality; HD and spatial equality indirectlyresponsiveness low benefited from funding allocation and development

programs

Colombia Fairly good: evidence on participation/ Fairly good: little evidence on growth or equity,representation ambiguous, but responsiveness but good results on HD, spatial equity.improved.

Philippines Mixed: representation and participation improved No evidence presented.through people's organizations and NGOs, butevidence on responsiveness contested, local elitesstill dominant.

Brazil Little evidence, but thought to be poor as spoils/ Good on equity, HD in exceptional areas wherepatronage system run by powerful Mayors and state or federal programmes combined withGovernors still dominant. decentralization; poor generally on spatial equity.

Chile No evidence presented. Mixed: growth. Equity good as result of targeting,but evidence on HD, spatial equity contested,tends to show negative effects.

Cote d'Ivoire Poor: participation and representation low, No evidence presented, but spatial equity probablyresponsiveness very low. improved through government allocation to ruralareas.

Bangladesh Poor: some improvement in participation, but Very poor on all criteria, undermined byvery negative on representation of poor, corruption and political patronage.responsiveness low.

Ghana Fairly poor: participation by poor and community Limited evidence shows that resources involvedgroups improves, limited improvement in too insignificant to have made much impact.representation, but responsiveness low. Spatial equity may have improved through

government allocation.

Kenya Very poor: politically-run deconcentration scheme. Some impact on spatial equity through politicallymotivated redistribution.

Nigeria Very poor: low participation and representation, Poor: very bad record on equity, HD; spatial equityvery bad record of responsiveness and lack of subject to political manipulation and urban bias.accountability.

Mexico No evidence presented, but assumed that Poor in spite of significant central fundingparty-dominated patronage system allocations: equity, spatial equity and HDremains little changed. undermined by political patronage considerations

and 'basketball court' syndrome.


Sources: Crook and Suerrisson (1999)


A compact on human development

How can Indonesia ensure that decentralization doesindeed cement national cohesion and deepen nationalcommitment to human development? How can Indonesiacreate the momentum for public action?

One way to ensure that decentralization works in theinterest of all Indonesians would be to establish a newsocial compact: an agreement that all Indonesians – asIndonesians – are entitled to nationally mandated standardsof human development. They are entitled to be literate,for example, to be healthy, to be able to earn a decent

income, to have adequate shelter, and to live as one nationin peace and security.

These rights must apply equally across the country.This does not imply uniformity. Indonesia will remain arichly heterogeneous nation. But at the same time it shouldalso have a nationally agreed framework of rights andstandards. With these in place, regional cultural and ethnicdiversity are not divisive elements but rather the buildingblocks of a strong and coherent nation. Such a compactcould include the following key elements:

Box 5.3

Applying the Human Development Index in Indonesia

Now that the Government has passed responsibility for most development activities to the districts, many localofficials are faced for the first time with the task of promoting human development in their own areas. What shouldthey do?

First, they will need to appreciate the relationship between the human development concept and the humandevelopment index. The human development concept is very broad - encompassing almost every aspect of humanlife - from freedom of expression, to gender equality, to employment, to child nutrition, to adult literacy. Thehuman development index (HDI), on the other hand, has a much narrower scope. Although it does indeed try tomeasure the state of human development, it can do so only partially. This is mainly because many things, such ascommunity participation, for example, or mental health, are almost impossible to measure or to collect data on,and even then it is difficult to merge data on many different issues into one overall index.

The priority for the regions therefore should be to focus less on the index and instead on the wider concept andcentral principles of human development. This means that in every aspect of their work local officials should beputting people first - considering them not as the means of development but as the ends. Rather than trying toeducate people and keep them healthy simply to provide a better workforce, for example, or to boost economicprosperity, they should instead be helping men, women and children in their region to lead richer and morefulfilling lives. So every activity, be it investing in roads, or granting licenses for mining, or building new healthfacilities, should aim to enlarge the choices available to the whole population, and to do so in a way that isequitable and sustainable.

The human development index offers some guidance. This Human Development Report has calculated the HDI foreach of 294 districts or municipalities across Indonesia. In each case the index is a score from 0 to 100, so the gapbetween the current index and 100 represents the human development ‘shortfall’. This makes it possible to rankthe districts from 1 to 294. As can be seen from table 1, this places South Jakarta in first position, with an index of75 - and thus a shortfall of 25 - while Panaia in Irian Jaya occupies 294th position with an index of 44 and a shortfallof 56. What does this mean? Obviously when it comes to considerations of income, life expectancy and educationalachievement - the components embodied in the HDI - the needs of Panaia are far greater than those in SouthJakarta. But does it also imply that they are precisely twice as big - that the development budget per capita forPanaia should therefore be around twice that for South Jakarta?

Clearly not. In fact delivering services comparable to those in South Jakarta to remote areas of Irian Jaya wouldrequire far more than double the per capita development expenditure. The HDI offers a useful indication. Actualbudgeting, resource allocations and development planning will require closer examination of data on transportinfrastructure, say, health facilities, or levels of employment and unemployment to establish immediate prioritiesand opportunities. The HDI represents a huge advance from the previous concentration on income alone, but evenso it only offers a general signpost.

It should also be emphasized that the HDI is only as good as the data that is fed into it. The current data set hasbeen much improved by BPS, but even so more work needs to be done to refine and refresh the data. This meansthat one should not exaggerate minor differences in HDI. Better perhaps to consider districts or municipalities ingroups or bands. The global Human Development Report presents countries in three groups - low human development(0 to 49); medium (50 to 79); and high (80 and above). On this classification, all but eight districts in Indonesia wouldbe considered 'medium'.

To distinguish better between regions in Indonesia, one could have three different bands: ‘higher’ (65 and above);‘medium’ (60 to 64); and ‘lower’ (below 60). On this basis, 125 districts or cities fall into the ‘higher’ band, 128 in the‘medium’ and 44 into the ‘lower’. The districts classified as ‘lower’ here are all rural but they are scattered acrossmost of Indonesia's provinces. This indicates the need to target resources more carefully at the poorest districts.Even so, actual budget allocations, will need to take many other factors into account.

47

But these can only be worked out through a spirit ofpartnership that will enable central and local governmentsto reach their full potential Once this partnership has beenaffirmed, and the key ideas are in place, then both thefinancial arrangements and the necessary action willfollow.

Human development standards

There are two ways of setting standards and the variousintermediate targets towards achieving them. The first –a more minimalist approach – tries to establish what seemsto be feasible in Indonesia at present and merely tries toensure that this national standard is achieved across thecountry. The second – the internationalist approach – isbased on a more universal vision, taking inspiration frominternational goals and standards, setting these as the targetsto which Indonesia should aspire.

The minimalist approach

The aim here would be to ‘pull up’ weaker provincesand districts to the national average. So the national averagebecomes a de facto national standard. To illustrate howthis might work, one could take literacy, which is one ofthe key components of the human development index.Figure 5.1 shows how literacy varied across the provincesin 1999 and how this distribution relates to the nationalrate – 88%.

This shows that 10 out of the 27 provinces fell belowthe national average. If these were raised to the 1999national average of course the average would go up, sothe target subsequently might be higher. This isconceptually similar to a relative poverty line, which isthe type normally applied in richer countries where theproportion living in poverty are considered to be thoseliving on less than half the median income. If they becomeless poor this tends to raise the poverty line. In the caseof the ‘literacy line’ this too would slowly rise.

To see what kind of progress could be expected, it issimpler to fix the lines for literacy and for other socialindicators at the 1999 averages. Then extrapolation frompast trends will suggest how long it might take for allregions to attain these. For the purposes of demonstrationthis exercise has been carried out using provincial-leveldata, though the same principle can be applied to districts.

As Table 5.1 indicates, the number of provinces thatfall below the national average vary from 9 to 17 dependingon the indicator. But if previous performance is a guide,some will take a long time to catch up. West NusaTenggara, for example, would take 17 years to reach the1999 literacy average.

• A mission statement – emphasizing the primacy of hu-man development and articulating the basis for a creativepartnership between central and local governments.• Human development standards – establishing the lev-els to be achieved across all regions.• Public deliberations – reinforcing democratic normsand values and exchanging ideas and information acrossthe country.

As well as making a contribution towards nationalcohesion and consolidating democracy, such a compactcould also serve to galvanize policy makers andadministrators at all levels, enabling them to renew theircommitment to human development.

A mission statement

The mission statement would need to establish theprimacy of human development as both a means and asan end in itself. And it should also include a commitmenton absolute poverty – not merely on its alleviation, but onits eradication.

Indonesia's future will of course depend on the strengthof its economy and of its social and political institutions.But in Indonesia as elsewhere, these are contributions toa larger process – widening the range of choices, economicand social that are available to all citizens, ensuring thatthey are able to participate fully in the decisions that affecttheir lives.

The mission statement will also need to highlight theimportance of a productive partnership between centraland regional governments. There are still many detailedand practical issues to be settled on decentralization – onhow resources, human and financial are to be sharedbetween central, provincial and district administrations.



The universalist approach

The minimalist approach does highlight the plight ofcertain provinces, but in a sense it is arbitrary. In the caseof literacy, for example, it is more reasonable to set thetarget as 100% rather than 88%. The minimalist approachalso erodes the right to literacy since it suggests thatindividuals in each province only have a right to an 88%chance of being literate.

A better way is to start from universal norms and rights.Of course for each district, or province, or the nation asa whole there will be incremental progress as more peoplebecome literate, but an individual is either literate or illiterate,so the goal itself can be absolute.

In fact, many such goals have already been set. Asequence of United Nations conferences during the 1990sproduced a corresponding series of goals that encompassmost aspects of human development. These included:

• Poverty – By 2015 the proportion of people living inextreme poverty should be reduced from its 1990 levelby at least 50%• Basic education – By 2015 enrolment in primary edu-cation should have reached 100%.• Gender disparities in education – By 2005 gender dis-parities should have been eliminated in both primary andsecondary education.• Infant mortality – By 2015 the infant mortality rateshould be brought down below two-thirds of its 1990level.• Maternal mortality – By 2015 to be reduced to belowthree-quarters of its 1990 level.• Primary health care – By 2015 there should be univer-sal access to primary health care, including access to safeand reliable methods of family planning.

49

These goals were formulated as international targets,and assumed to be the responsibility of nationalgovernments. There was no consideration of how theymight be applied at a sub-national level. Such goals havealso been accepted at the national level in Indonesia wherethe government has incorporated them into national plandocuments, though again without disaggregating them foruse at provincial or district levels70.

While this approach is appropriate in small, compactcountries, it is less tenable in a country as extensive anddiverse as Indonesia. A better approach therefore wouldbe to ‘regionalize’ the international development goals,and assess the extent to which provinces and districtswill be able to reach these goals by 2015. What does thisimply? Table 5.2 shows the prospects for attaininga selection of these goals at the provincial level assumingthat the rate of progress is similar to that ofprevious years.

But it would also be possible to add other, universalgoals – to achieve 100% literacy, for example, 100% accessto safe water, and to have no households living in dwellingswith dirt floors.

Another possibility is to include Indonesia's statedintention to have all children complete nine years of school.The time that might be taken to achieve these goals isshown in Table 5.3.

These tables show that if one considered trends forthe country as a whole, many of these goals would beachieved within the targeted international timeframe. Indeedas Table 5.2 suggests, Indonesia would achieve all thegoals except those for universal net primary enrolment.The picture is similar for the universal goals, except thatin this case extrapolation suggest that it would takeIndonesia 40 years to achieve universal safe water supplies.



Can the regions catch up?

These tables also highlight the importance ofconsidering these targets by region. In the case of poverty,on current trends 18 provinces will not meet the 2015target date, and some will miss it by a long way. Thepicture is better for infant mortality and the elimination ofgender disparities in education: just two provinces fallshort.

But the implications emerges even more clearly whenit comes to the universal targets in Table 5.3. Simplyextrapolating national trends would suggest, for example,that nine years of compulsory education could be attainedwithin 13 years. But clearly this cannot be achievednationally until it has also been achieved in every province.

The slowest province is East Nusa Tenggara, soIndonesia cannot achieve the target before this provincedoes so. In that case it is going to take 30 years. The

same reasoning would suggest that universal access tosafe water will take not 40 years but rather thediscouragingly long 148 years required by Bengkulu.

These figure are intended only to be illustrative, andextrapolating from past trends is a crude way of makingsuch estimates. But this exercise does at least dramatizethe importance of drawing up a human developmentcompact with standards that will help the poorestprovinces to catch up. If these are basic rights then theymust be achieved by all Indonesians.

This raises serious distributional considerations. Atpresent the resource-rich regions are reluctant to cross-subsidize their less well-endowed counterparts. But thusfar the discussions have focused only financial transfers.The compact approach helps to shift the debate to theterrain of human rights – to the kind of standards thatshould be acceptable to all Indonesians wherever theylive.

51

Public deliberation

Democratic values and norms can only emerge fromdeep and extensive consultation. A clear Constitution, andthe holding of free and fair elections are of course thebedrock of a functioning democracy. Indonesia isfortunate to have both. But these are only the startingpoints. Citizens need many other opportunities for nationaldebate – to establish not just the basic ground rules, butalso the values that shape and colour everyday decisions.This is even more vital when the people who take suchdecisions are scattered across more than three hundreddistricts of a vast archipelago.

One way to trigger such deliberations would be tohold a National Social Summit – along the lines of theglobal Social Summit held in Copenhagen in 1995. Thepreparations for such meeting, and the event itself, couldhelp carve out a vision for a democratic, decentralizedIndonesia.

The starting point for such deliberations might be a‘state of the regions’ survey. The central government inpartnership with the provinces and kabupatens could

outline the issues and challenges facing the implementationof decentralized governance. This ‘information blueprint’could serve as the basis for a National Summit, to be heldsometime in 2002. From this could emerge a statementof agreed national standards and an assessment of whatthe entitlements were for each region. The next part ofthe Summit would consider the financial implications, thecritical policy interventions, and the strategic frameworkfor implementation.

A new consensus

The critical challenges facing Indonesia are complexand diverse – consolidating democracy, addressing regionalconflicts, regenerating the economy. But this report hasargued that a common thread runs through all these.Achieving a secure and prosperous Indonesia, with athriving economy, in which each part of the countrybelieves it has a vital stake, will demand considerable skilland commitment from leaders and communities at alllevels. It can only succeed if it is based on a newconsensus – a shared commitment to human development.


1 For a survey of global political change in the 20th Century seeFreedom House (1999), “Democracy's Century”.

2 Amartya Sen when asked to evaluate the most significantachievement of the 20th argued as follows:“the pre-eminent development of the period is the rise ofdemocracy. Indeed, in the distant future when people look backat what happened in this century they would find it difficult, Ibelieve, not to accept the pre-eminence of democracy as themost striking development of this period. It is in the 20th centurythat the idea of democracy got established as the “normal” formof government to which any nation is entitled – whether inEurope, or America, or Asia, or Africa. We do not have toestablish afresh, each time, whether such and such country is‘ready’ for democracy (the type of question that was prominentin the discourses in the 19th century); we now take for granted.”For a detailed treatment of the subject see Sen (1999),“Development as Freedom”.

3 A phrase popularised by Huntington (1991) in his book‘Democratization in the late 20th Century’. The third wave refersto the spread of democratic systems of government in around 35countries in Asia and Latin America from the 1970s onwards.The first two waves spanned 1828-1926, and 1943-1962.

4 Sen, 1999, p. 1

5 For a detailed treatment of different aspects of citizen's rights;civil, political and social see Marshall (1965), “Class, Citizenshipand Social Development”. Marshall distinguished the threecomponent of citizen's rights as follows: civil rights protectingindividual freedom, political rights guaranteeing participation inthe exercise of political power, and social rights, those providingaccess to material and cultural satisfactions. A similarclassification is used to rank democratic states in the FreedomHouse global survey of freedom.For a classic treatment of notions of individual freedom, seeBerlin (1969), “Four essays on liberty”. Berlin's classificationof liberty as positive and negative freedoms has now become astandard notion in the literature.

6 For an interesting view about the origins of different types ofrights, see Tilly (1998), “Where do rights come from?” Tillyargues that in the context of European politics, the recognitionof social rights was obtained by the exercise of political rightsand the consequent struggle between different social groups.The situation in fledging democracies in developing countrieswith regard to the acceptance of all three types of rights describedby Marshall might therefore be more favourable in so far asthere is now widespread acceptance of the validity of socialrights. These have a direct link with and bearing upon the policyapproach to the provision of social welfare services in line withHDI.

7 HDR 2000, p. 2

8 This is both by helping to rebuild lost human capital as well ascreating conditions of ‘trust’ between different social groups.The concept of social capital, attributed to James Coleman,

refers to the view now widely accepted that capital today isembodied less in land, factories, tools and machines andincreasingly in the knowledge and skills of human beings. Theconcept of social capital goes further and claims that in additionto skills and knowledge, a distinct portion of human capital hasto with people's ability to associate with each other, that iscritical not only to economic life but to virtually every aspect ofsocial existence. As Francis Fukuyama shows, “the ability toassociate depends on the degree to which communities sharenorms and values and are able to subordinate individual intereststo those of larger groups. Out of such shared values comes trust,and trust has a large and demonstrable economic value.”(Fukuyama, 1995, p.10)

9 The social compact approach has also the merit of helping todampen social conflict by an explicit recognition of human rightsand basic capabilities. According to Fukuyama, lack of suchrecognition leads social instability. As he writes: “The desire forrecognition (as distinct from the aim to maximise utility) is anextraordinary powerful part of the human psyche; the emotionsof anger, pride and shame are the basis for most political passionsand motivate much that goes on in political life” (See Fukuyama,1995 for a detailed elaboration of this thesis.

10 The role of equity in increasing social cohesion and reducingpolitical conflict is accepted by the IMF's recent analysis of thelink between economic policy and equity. As the Fund pointsout: “To be effective most policies require broad politicalsupport, which is more likely to be forthcoming when thedistribution of income is seen as fair.” (IMF, 1999,p.20). Insituations of systemic transitions triggered by sharp economicdeclines however, public dialogue and open debates facilitatedby democracy, as Sen argues, have an instrumental role. Theseprocesses help decide what is fair and not fair in a given socialand political context. See Sen (1999), chapter 2 on the Ends andMeans of Development.

11 There is of course considerable literature on different conceptsof democracy (e.g. procedural or deliberative), as well as on therole that public discourse and deliberation might play in defininga national or common interest distinct from specific groupinterest. See for instance Habermas, (1996), “Three normativemodels of democracy”, and Benhabib's, (1996) “Toward adeliberative model of democratic legitimacy”. For an analysis ofrelative merits of different democratic institutions see Dahl(1989), “Democracy and its Critics”For a set of essays on transitions to democracy see Haggard andKaufman (1995), “The Political Economy of DemocraticTransitions.”For a more detailed treatment of deliberative democracy see:Elster (1999), “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties ofPolitical Theory”, and Rawls (1999), “The Idea of PublicReason”. For a provocative essay on the need for equality ofpolitical opportunity see Knight and Johnson (1999), “WhatSort of Political Equality does Deliberative Democracy Require?”Rawls illustrates the link between human development, as anenabling condition for public participation in complex ethicaldecisions, when he notes that public reason “in democraticsociety is the reason of equal citizens who as a collective body,

End Notes

53

exercise final political and coercive power over one another inenacting laws and in amending their constitution. This meansthat political values alone are to settle such fundamental questionsas: who had the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated,or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to holdproperty.” (Ibid. p. 94)

12 Booth, A (2000). p. 75.

13 World Bank (2000), Poverty Reduction in Indonesia -constructing a new strategy, First Theme, pp 3-4.

14 The World Bank (1993) dubbed this phenomenon of growth andreduction in poverty and inequality as “shared growth”.

15 See Islam and Chowdhury (2000) for a discussion of trends ininequality in East and Southeast Asia.

16 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999,Table 1.3

17 BAPPENAS/UNICEF (2000, Table 6.2, p. 96)

18 BAPPENAS/UNICEF (2000).

19 BAPPENAS/UNICEF (2000, p. 41).

20 The Gender-related development index includes male-femaledifferentials in life expectancy, adult literacy rate, mean years ofschooling and earned income share.

21 Enclave districts have higher levels of resource and industrialbase, and can be treated as outliers.

22 See Dhanani and Islam (2000, pp. 11-12) for details.

23 See Papanek (2000).

24 See Dhanani and Islam (2000).

25 Skoufias et al (1999)

26 The World Bank estimates that between 30% and 60% ofhouseholds are vulnerable to poverty over a three year horizon(World Bank, 2000c, p. 11)

27 Nevertheless hubris is not confined to autocratic governments.What goes up need not necessarily stay up. Sen (2000) makesthis point cogently. 'Perhaps the most obvious problem relatesto the recognition that the heady days of unmitigated success –with things going up and up and nothing ever falling down – areover. Even though much of Asia is already well on the way torecovery from the crisis that hit it in 1997, the sense ofinvulnerability has not survived. It could not have. Indeed, it isclear that severe economic crises can occur and disrupt the rushingstream of unobstructed economic progress that many Asiancountries took for granted. This is not a kind of "Murphy'sLaw", a grand claim that if things can go wrong, they will. Rather,it is a very modest claim that dangers of interruption areomnipresent, and no matter how robust things may look, theycan - and sometimes will - go wrong. Belief in invulnerability is,in fact, a childish thought: like the way teenage car drivers oftenassume that accidents cannot happen to them in particular.

28 Zainu'ddin (1968) p. 251.

29 Ricklefs (1981). p 251.

30 On October 28, 1956 Soekarno made a famous speech in whichhe asked the Indonesian people to “bury the parties”. Twodays later, on October 30, responding to accusations that hewanted absolute power for himself, in an address to the

Indonesian Teacher's Association he said: “I am not a managingdirector of the Indonesian republic and I don't want to become adictator because it is contrary to my conscience. I am a democrat.But I don't desire democratic liberalism. On the contrary I wanta guided democracy”. Quoted from Harian Rakjat in Legge (1972),p.279.

31 Dahl (1996) p. 337.

32 Freedom House (1999)

33 Political observers characterise Malaysia and Singapore as semi-democracies. Although both countries have regular parliamentaryelections, political and civil rights are restricted, and one partyhas been dominant from their inception. Democratic transitionsoccurred in the Philippines and Thailand in 1986 and 1991,respectively. Democratic transitions in Taiwan (China) and theRepublic of Korea occurred in the mid-1980s

34 Macintyre (1994a)

35 Rajan and Zingales (1998)

36 This of course does not deny the importance of a policy-mixthat is conducive to economic growth. As mentioned earlier, theNew Order regime of President Soeharto was developmentalistand its first priority was to stabilize the economy.

37 The democracy index combines indices of political rights andcivil liberties.

38 Lee (1994).

39 Barro (1991).

40 Bhalla (1994).

41 World Bank (1993b), ADB (1997)

42 Krugman (1994b).

43 Hill (1996), p. 158, quoting BPS data. Also see Hill (1990) fora more detailed discussion of Indonesia's changing industrialstructure in the 1970s and the mid 1980s. As the author notes,(p. 90-91) the labour intensive classification included a widerange of industries with textiles, garments, furniture, non metallicmineral industries such as bricks, tiles, ceramics and miscellaneousmanufacturing industries such as sporting equipment etc. werethe most labour intensive industries, with labour productivityless than half that of the average of non-oil manufactures. Themost important anomaly in the labour intensive classificationseems to be in the case of “resource intensive” industries whichin fact contain a wide range of factor intensities, from the morelabour using wood and rubber to rather capital intensive basicmetals and cement. United Nations Indonesia (1991) CommonCountry Assessment.

44 By the mid 1970s, five SUSENAS surveys had been carried out:1963/64, 1964/65, 1967, 1969/70, and 1976. The same year,1976, saw the publication of a labour force survey: theSAKERNAS. Cost of living surveys of major cities wereconducted in 1968/69 and 1970/71. Finally, the AgriculturalCensus was published in 1973 and provided data on rurallandholdings. For an analysis of the results of these varioussources see Booth ( 1981)

45 Tabor (1992).

46 Jain (1975).

47 Booth and Sundrum (1981). p. 205.

48 Prijono, O. 1999. p. 161.

END NOTES


49 World Bank, 1990, p. 93

50 World Bank (1993a).

51 Moreover, as Hill (1996) , p. 147, writes: “The large subsidiessince the 1970s, in pesticides, fertiliser, irrigation, credit andresearch and extension services, are also being reduced. Inaddition, fiscal austerity since the mid 1980s and a reluctance toconsider partial or complete divestment have starved many stateowned agricultural enterprises of much needed capital injections.”

52 For a comprehensive if somewhat selective review of agriculturalmodernisation in Indonesia see Hill (1996), Chapter 7. For adiscussion of regional growth in agriculture see Tabor (1992).Hill summarises the different in economic performance of smalland large estates as follows: “...there are various commercialrelationships between larger and smaller units, particularly atthe processing stages. Some of these linkages have been promotedby the government, especially in the case of state enterpriseswhich are expected to be in their proximity. Physical yields onestates are often significantly higher, especially in the case ofrubber, palm oil and tea.... The estates which are state owned,have also received a range of government subsidies”. Hill (1996),p. 140.

53 Hill (1996). P.158.

54 For much of the last decade, Indonesia had under-utilised thisquota. Since the quota was set in physical terms, irrespective ofquality improvements, Indonesia benefited from a guaranteedmarket for its textile and garment exports relative to itscompetitors.

55 Savings ratios have been revised downwards in IMF (1997)compared to IMF (1996). The latter estimated national savings,as distinct from foreign savings, to be 35.4% in 1995/96. Theformer estimates this to be 29.4% in 1995/96, falling marginallyto 29.3% in 1996/97.

56 Reliance on FDI as distinct from portfolio capital is arguablyone way out of this volatility problem. But this too is notwithout difficulties. While it is true that direct foreign investmentis generally more stable than short-term portfolio capital, asneither is easy to predict over any given length of time. Theformer is undertaken for many different reasons, including thedesire to take advantage of tax and grant incentives, to gain firstentry into a growing market, and to benefit from entry into aregional trading bloc. Many countries including those in theOECD area have discontinued the policy of offering specialincentives to foreign investors, on the grounds that this merelyleads to a loss of revenue without guaranteeing higher volumesof FDI. Moreover, longer-term investment decisions are alsoaffected by volatility in the short-term capital market if thisleads to exchange rate instability or a rise in inflation, both ofwhich are likely to make the returns from longer-term investmentmore uncertain.

57 In Indonesia as elsewhere there is an ongoing debate over thepolicy towards interest rates. Typically the Central Bank hasargued in favour of a tight monetary policy and high interestrates to keep inflation in check while the Ministry of Financeargues for a lowering of interest rates. See the EconomistIntelligence Unit Report, Indonesia, (1997) 2nd Quarter.

58 Despite this, the problem of rising capital inflows and theinflationary threat that these pose has led the Indonesian CentralBank to widen its intervention bands used to support the rupiah.However, wider bands also carry a cost in terms of greaterexchange-rate volatility, and the impact on exportcompetitiveness

59 For a good overview of the tools available to handle the capitalinflows problem see Lee (1996), IMF. As Lee, p. 34, concludes:“The recent experiences of many developing countries revealthat the monetary authorities often lack suitable instrumentsthat can sterilise fully or for long, persistently large capitalinflows. In the context of a liberalising environment, theirtraditional tools of monetary control typically lose effectiveness;at the same time, they cannot fully rely on more advancedinstruments of market-based monetary control because variouselements of the supporting institutional infrastructure have yetfully to be developed.”

60 Mishra (1997) summarised the picture as follows: “The late1990s Indonesia is therefore confronted with a quite differentset of initial conditions with respect to an equitable developmentprogramme. The foundations of economic growth are less certainraising questions about sustainability. Economic policy is besetwith new problems which it only vaguely knows how to solve.The changing structure of production threatens Indonesia'shistorically relatively favourable distribution of income andconsumption. This in turn reduces the poverty elasticity ofeconomic growth. As a result, similar magnitudes of economicgrowth as in the past will contribute less to the decline in poverty.At the same time, public expenditure levels are under due to thedecline of oil and gas revenues and because of the need to maintainoutside investor confidence”.

61 Irawan, P., Ahmed, I., Islam, I., (2000).

62 World Bank (2000f).

63 Stalker (2000). p. 10.

64 Frankenberg, E. Thomas, D. and Beegle, K. (1999). p. 21, Table2.1

65 Helen Keller International (1999), cited in UNSFIR (2000a), p.14)

66 McLeod (200) p.13.

67 UNIDO (2000).

68 Islam, I. (2000).

69 In fact the Indonesian government has used the Copenhageninitiative to revisit national commitments to poverty eradicationand human development and has reflected them in national plandocuments. However, the province-level dimensions have notbeen explored. See Department of Foreign Affairs, Governmentof Indonesia (2000). See also UNICEF (2000, Appendix B)which explores the attainment of the 'World Summit on Children'sGoals and Progress in Indonesia' at a national level

55

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63HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND INDICES

Human Development Indicatorsand Indices

The concept and measurement of human development 64The concept of human development 64Translating the human development concept into policy 65Refinements in the statistical measurement of human development 68Estimating the Sub-National Human Development Indices in Indonesia 69

What do the human development indices reveal? 71The Human Development Index 71Human poverty and deprivation 73Disparities between men and women 76

Tables1. Human development Index (HDI) by Province, 1996 and 1999 782. Gender-related Development Index (GDI) by Province, 1996 793. Gender-related Development Index (GDI) by Province, 1999 804. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) by Province, 1996 and 1999 815. Human Poverty Index (HPI) by Province, 1995 and 1998 826. Human development Index (HDI) by District, 1996 and 1999 837. Gender-related Development Index (GDI) by District, 1999 908. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) by District, 1999 979. Human Poverty Index (HPI) by District, 1998 10410. Health Condition by District, 1999 11111. School Attendance by District, 1999 11812. Housing Condition by District, 1996 and 1999 12513. Economic Performance by District, 1995 – 1998 13214. Labour Force and Poverty Condition by District, 1999 139

Technical notes 147Calculating the Human Development Indices 147Computing the indices 148

The Human Development Index (HDI) 148Reduction Shortfall 150The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) 150The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 151The Human Poverty Index (HPI) 152Procedures for estimating time required to reach particular targets 153

Definitions of statistical terms 154


Those opening lines of the first HumanDevelopment Report (HDR), published by the United

Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990,clearly stressed the primary message of every HDR atglobal, national and sub-national levels – the human-centred approached to development – that places humanwell being as the ultimate end of development, not themeans of development. Unlike previous concepts ofdevelopment which have often given exclusive attentionto economic growth, on the assumption that growth willultimately benefit people, human development introducesa broader and more comprehensive concept, covering allhuman choices at all societies at all stages of development.It broadens the development dialogue from a discussionof mere means (GNP growth) to a discussion of theultimate ends. It draws its inspiration from the long-termgoals of a society and weaves development around people,not people around development.

As defined in the first HDR of 1990, humandevelopment is a process of enlarging people’s choices.The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are tolive a long and healthy life, to be educated and to haveaccess to resources needed for a decent standard of living.Other important choices include political freedom,guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect. Thus,human development concerns more than the formationof human capabilities, such as improved health andknowledge. It also concerns the use people make oftheir acquired capabilities – for leisure, productivepurposes, or being active in cultural, social and politicalaffairs. Human development has to balance theseconcerns.

Human development requires freedom. The objectiveof increasing people’s choices cannot be achieved withoutpeople actually being free to choose what they want to beand how they want to live. People must be free to exercisetheir choices in properly functioning markets, and theymust have decisive voices in shaping their politicalframeworks. People who are politically free can ensuretheir participation in planning and decision-making throughdemocratic rule that leads towards consensus andconsolidation rather than being dictated to by an autocraticelite. Here, human development and human rights share acommon vision and a common purpose – to secure thefreedom, well-being and dignity of all people everywhere(Box 1).

The concept and measurementof human development

To avoid any confusion, it is necessary to clearlydelineate the difference between this way of looking atdevelopment and the conventional approaches to economicgrowth, human capital formation, human resourcedevelopment, human welfare or basic needs. The conceptof human development is much broader than theconventional theories of economic development.

"People are the real wealth of a nation. Thebasic objective of development is to create anenabling environment for people to enjoy long,healthy, and creative lives. This may appear to bea simple truth. But it is often forgotten in theimmediate concern with the accumulation ofcommodities and financial wealth."

Box 1Human Development and Human Rights

Human development and human rights share acommon vision and common purpose to secure:

• Freedom from discrimination - by gender, race,ethnicity, national origin or religion.

• Freedom from want - to enjoy a decentstandard of living.

• Freedom to develop and realize one's humanpotential.

• Freedom from fear - of threats to personalsecurity, from torture, arbitrary arrest and otherviolent acts.

• Freedom from injustice and violations of therule of law.

• Freedom of thought and speech and toparticipate in decision-making and formassociation.

• Freedom for decent work - without exploitation

(HDR 2000, page 1)

The concept of human development


‘Economic growth’ models deal with expanding the GNPrather than with enhancing the quality of human lives.‘Human resource development’ treats human beingsprimarily as inputs in the production process – as meansrather than as ends. The ‘welfare’ approach looks athuman beings as beneficiaries and not as agents of changein the development process. Finally, the ‘basic needs’approach focuses on providing material goods and servicesto deprived population groups rather than on enlarginghuman choices in all fields.

The human development approach brings together theproduction and distribution of commodities and theexpansion as well as the use of human capabilities. Itanalyses all issues in society – whether economic growth,trade, employment, political freedom or cultural values –from the perspective of people. It also encompasses thecritical issue of gender. Human development is thus notmerely the concern of the social sector. It is acomprehensive approach to all sectors.

Human development has four major elements –productivity, equity, sustainability and empowerment (Box2). Through enhanced capabilities, the creativity andproductivity of people must be increased so that theybecome effective agents of growth. Economic growthmust be combined with equitable distribution of itsbenefits. Equitable opportunities must be available bothto present and to future generations. And all people,woman and men, must be empowered to participate inthe design and implementation of key decisions that shapetheir lives.

Human development goes beyond economic growth,but it is not anti-growth. From a human developmentperspective, economic growth is not an end in itself.Rather is a means to an end – enlarging people’s choices.There is, however, no automatic link between incomegrowth and human progress. In the short run, even inthe absence of satisfactory economic growth, countriescan achieve significant improvements in humandevelopment through well-structured public expenditure.However, it is wrong to suggest that economic growth isunnecessary for human development. In the long run, nosustained improvement is possible without growth.i

Human development concerns are not merely focusedon the rate of growth but also on its distribution. Thus,the issue is not only how much economic growth, butalso what kind of growth. More attention should bedirected to the structure and quality of that growth – toensure that it is directed to supporting the improvementof human well being for both present and futuregenerations. The main preoccupation of developmentpolicies then should be how such a link can be createdand reinforced.

Translating the human developmentconcept into policy

The incorporation of the human development conceptinto development policies does not necessarily lead to acomplete departure from earlier development strategiesthat aimed at, among others, accelerating economicgrowth, reducing absolute poverty and preventing adeterioration in the physical environment. The difference,from the human development standpoint, lies in theclustering of all the previous objectives around the centralgoal of enlarging human choices.

From time to time, the HDRs have made strong policyrecommendations for both international and nationalagendas (Box 3). The primary aim of the global proposalsis to contribute to a new paradigm of sustainable humandevelopment that is based on a new concept of humansecurity, a new partnership of developed and developingcountries, new forms of international cooperation and anew global compact. Meanwhile, the national proposalshave focused on the centrality of people in the developmentprocess, on the need for a new partnership between thestate and the market and on new forms of alliance betweengovernments, institutions of civil society, communitiesand people.

The human development approach also has tremendouspotential for analysing situations and policies at the nationallevel. By 1999 – ten years after the publication of thefirst HDR – more than 260 national and sub-national humandevelopment reports had been produced in 120 countries.

Box 2Four essential components of the humandevelopment paradigm

The human development paradigm contains four maincomponents:

• Productivity. People must be enabled to increasetheir productivity and participate fully in theprocess of income generation and remunerativeemployment. Economic growth is, therefore, asubset of human development models.

• Equity. People must have access to equalopportunities. All barriers to economic andpolitical opportunities must be eliminated so thatpeople can participate in, and benefit from, theseopportunities.

• Sustainability. Access to opportunities must beensured not only for the present generations butfor future generation as well. All forms of capital- physical, human, environmental - should bereplenished.

• Empowerment. Development must be by thepeople, not only for them. People must participatefully in the decisions and processes that shapetheir lives.

(HDR 1995, page 12)


In each country these served to bring together the facts,influence national policy, and mobilize action. The 1998South Africa human development report, for example,provided information on how the fast-spreading HIVepidemics will affect human development. In India, dueto its high level of regional disparities, UNDP India has

supported the preparation of human development reportsby state governments.

The human development concept has also caught theattention of Indonesia’s policy makers. Compared to thetraditional economic approach that primarily focuses onincreasing production and productivity, the human

GLOBAL PROPOSALS:

The 20:20 initiative (1992):With the aim of turning both domestic and externalpriorities to basic human concerns, the initiativeproposed that every developing country allocate 20%of its domestic budget, and every donor 20% of itsofficial development assistance (ODA), to ensuring basichealth care, basic education, access to safe waterand basic sanitation, and basic family planning packagesfor all couples.

Global human security fund (1994):This fund would tackle drug trafficking, internationalterrorism, communicable diseases, nuclear proliferation,natural disasters, ethnic conflicts, excessiveinternational migration and global environment pollutionand degradation. The fund of $250 billion a year wouldbe financed with $14 billion from a proportion of thepeace dividend (20% of the amount saved by industrialcountries and 10% of that saved by developing countriesthrough a 3% reduction in global military spending);$150 billion from a 0.05% of tax on speculativeinternational capital movements; $66 billion from a globalenergy tax ($1 per barrel of oil or its equivalent in coalconsumption) and $20 billion from a one-third share ofODA.

A new global architecture (1994):A globalizing world needs new institutions to deal withproblems that nations alone cannot solve:

• An economic security council to review the threatsto human security.

• A world central bank to take on global macroeconomic management and supervision ofinternational banking.

• An international investment trust to recycleinternational surpluses to developing countries.

• A world antimonopoly authority - to monitor theactivities of international cooperations and ensurethat markets are competitive.

A timetable to eliminate legal gender discrimination(1995):

As of December 1998, 163 countries had ratified the1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination Against Woman (CEDAW), but others -including the United States - had not. Women's rightsare human rights. There should be a timetable forrecognizing legal equality between women and meneverywhere, say by 2005, using CEDAW as the framework.

NATIONAL PROPOSALS:

Restructuring Social Expenditure (1991):Resources should be reallocated to basic humanpriority concerns through an analysis of a country'stotal expenditure, social expenditure and humanpriority spending ratios. The key is to move away frommilitary spending towards social spending - and to shiftthe focus to primary human concerns: bettereducation, health services and safe water accessibleto poor people.

A critical threshold of 30% for women representation(1993):Women must have a critical 30% representation in alldecision-making processes - economic, political andsocial - nationally and locally. Reaching this thresholdis essential to enable women to influence decisionsthat affect their lives. And to achieve gender equality,social norms and practices must be changed, andwomen's access to social services, productiveresources and all other opportunities made equal tomen's.

Pro-poor growth (1996):The quality of economic growth is as important as itsquantity. For human development, growth should bejob-creating rather than jobless, poverty-reducing,rather than ruthless, participatory rather thanvoiceless and environment-friendly rather thanfutureless. A growth strategy that aims for a moreequitable distribution of assets, that is job-creatingand labour-intensive, and that is decentralized canachieve such growth.

Agenda for poverty eradication (1997):People's empowerment is the key to poverty eliminationand at the centre of a six-point agenda:• Empower individuals, households and communities

to gain greater control over their lives and resources.• Strengthen gender equality to empower women.• Accelerate pro-poor growth in low-income

countries.• Improve the management of globalization.• Ensure an active state committed to eradicating

poverty.• Take special actions for special situations to support

progress in the poorest and weakest countries.

Box 3

(HDR 1999, page 18-19)


development approach has a closer association to theprimary objective of developing every aspect of humanityor “pembangunan manusia seutuhnya” as stated in the1993 state guidelines (GBHN). The human developmentindex also offers a more reliable and comprehensivemeasure of development progress than the single measureof growth in per capita GDP.

Several attempts have been made to introduce thehuman development concept and to apply this approachto Indonesia’s development process. The first step wasto make the data set available. In 1996, the IndonesianCentral Bureau of Statistics (BPS) published the 1990 and1993 human development indices for the provincial levels,followed in 1997 by a release of the 1996 index. Thisinter-provincial comparison attracted a lot of attention,particularly from the high-growth provinces that happenedto rank low in human development. This controversy,however, successfully triggered greater regional awarenessof the weaknesses of the traditional economic approachto development and has focused regional attention onpeople-centred development.

In 1997, to promote the adoption of the humandevelopment approach into the regional planning process,the Indonesian Government – i.e. the Directorate Generalof Regional Planning, the Ministry of Home Affairs andBPS – with the support of UNDP Indonesia initiated apilot programme that covered 9 provinces and 18 districts(Table 1). This 18-month pilot program was integratedinto the ‘Eastern Indonesia Decentralized DevelopmentProgramme’ with the primary aim of orienting regionaldevelopment planning toward human development, andenhancing the capacity of regional planning agencies(BAPPEDA) to coordinate regional development planning.For this purpose, the project provided training, manuals

and planning consultants to assist the regional governmentin adopting a human development approach in theirplanning process. Through this effort the humandevelopment approach has been integrated into the existingdevelopment planning mechanism – the P5D (Guidelinesfor Planning and Managing Development Process atRegional Level) – and the human development index hasbeen incorporated into the regional planning document –the ‘Pola Dasar Pembangunan Daerah’ -.

BPS produced the data set for all provinces and lateron, as part of the pilot project, for all districts. This hasfocused the attention not only of the governments of thepilot regions, but also of the non-pilot regions. However,the internalisation of the human development concept hasbeen hindered by the fact that the central government stilltends to use the traditional economic approach whichmerely focuses on per capita GRDP (Gross RegionalDomestic Product). When the pilot project ended, nofurther systematic attempt was made to disseminate thisconcept.

The most recent decentralisation efforts, however, haveraised concerns that the regional governments may neglect

Table 1Pilot regions for the development and applicationof HDI in regional planning

Province Regency

1. Irian Jaya Sorong and Jayapura

2. East Timor Aileu and Baucau

3. Maluku Central Maluku andCentral Halmahera

4. South Sulawesi Gowa and Polmas

5. East Nusa Tenggara Southern Part ofCentral Timor and Alor

6. West Nusa Tenggara Central Lombok andSumbawa

7. East Java Sidoarjo and Lamongan

8. Central Java Banyumas and Grobogan

9. West Java Bandung and Tangerang

Box 4

HDI in West Java Vision 2010

The province of West Java was one of the pilot regionsfor “Development and Application of HDI in RegionalPlanning” and its provincial government consistentlyused the HDI as the main indicator for its regionalplanning. In its 2010 vision, the province aimed to bethe most developed province in Indonesia, and toachieve that goal the HDI of the province wastargeted to be more than 80 by the year 2010.

This seems an ambitious target given the fact that its1999 HDI was 64.6 and the province was ranked 15among the 26 provinces in Indonesia. This was slightlylower than the pre-crisis HDI of 68.2 in 1996 when itwas ranked 14. If this province maintains its past trend,it will be able to attain a 100% literacy rate in 10years, achieve the 9 years compulsory educationtarget in 13 years, reduce infant mortality by one-third in 12 years, and close the gender gap in primaryeducation in 7 years. The hardest challenge is in theprovision of safe water. If it followed its previous trendthis province would need 37 years to be able toprovide all households with access to safe water.

To discuss the adoption of the human developmentindex in its regional development planning, theprovincial planning agency organised a 2-day workshopin May 2001. All the sectoral offices at the provincialand district levels of government attended theworkshop. There was an extensive discussion of thebudgetary implications. While the workshop wasfruitful, there was a call for further efforts towardssocialization at the district level with the fullparticipation of local legislatures.


long-term social development, since they have a tendencyto focus on short-term economic (revenue raising)activities. It is important therefore to ensure that the humandevelopment concept is used as an advocacy tool forsustainable regional development.

Refinements in the statisticalmeasurement of human development

If the human development concept is to be translatedinto policymaking, it must be easily measured andmonitored. Over the years the global HDRs havedeveloped and refined the statistical measurement ofhuman development. Nevertheless there remain manydifficulties in reducing the holistic concept of humandevelopment to one number. Consequently, it is importantto be aware that the concept of human development ismuch deeper and richer than its measurement. It isimpossible to come up with a comprehensive measure –or even a comprehensive set of indicators – because manyvital dimensions of human development are non-quantifiable. A simple composite measure of humandevelopment, can certainly draw attention to the issue

quite effectively, but it needs to be supplemented byanalyses to capture other important dimensions that cannotbe easily quantified.

In the first HDR (1990) the index combined nationalincome (as a proxy of standard of living) with two socialindicators – life expectancy (representing longevity) andthe adult literacy rate (representing knowledge). The indexwas thus an approximation that tried to capture the manydimensions of human choice. But it still had some of thesame shortcomings as the income measures, notably thatits national averages concealed regional and localdisparities.

From time to time, efforts have been made to refinethe HDI, although the three basic components – longevity,knowledge and a decent living standard – have beenmaintained to retain the basic simplicity of the originalHDI concept. The second HDR (1991) added a newindicator – mean years of schooling – to the knowledgecomponent. This variable was given a weight of one-third, while adult literacy was given a weight of two-thirds. This acknowledged the importance of having ahigh level of skill formation and also greatly helped indifferentiating countries clustered in the higher ranks. Inthe 1995 HDR, however, this variable was replaced bythe combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolmentratios because the latter were more readily available anddid not need a complex formula for calculation.

With regard to the indicator that represented decentliving standards, the first HDR used purchasing power,adjusted for real GDP per capita. This was the most widelyavailable data that could provide an approximation of therelative power to buy commodities and to gain commandover resources for a decent living standard. In 1991, theidea of diminishing returns to income was incorporatedby giving a progressively lower weight to income beyondthe poverty cut-off point, rather than the zero weightpreviously given. Until 1993, this poverty cut-off pointwas derived from the poverty-level income in industrialcountries, with values updated and translated intopurchasing power parity dollars (PPP$). From the 1994HDI onwards, the threshold value has been taken to bethe current average global value of real GDP per capita inPPP$.

Besides the refinements in HDI computation methods,the HDRs have also tried to take into account thedistribution aspect by measuring income-distribution-adjusted HDIs and gender-disparity-adjusted HDIs. Thishad the effect of significantly shifting the rankings of somecountries depending on their levels of disparity. Meanwhileother indices have also been developed. The 1995 HDR,for example, introduced the Gender related DevelopmentIndex (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measures

Indonesia is engaged in a complex series of transitionsthat will demand new forms of governance. To helpthe country explore the possibilities and build someof the necessary capacity for these changes, UNDPtogether with BAPPENAS, the World Bank and the AsianDevelopment Bank in February 2000 established thePartnership for Governance Reforms in Indonesia. ThisPartnership is neither government-controlled nordonor-driven, instead it is managed by an independentand diverse group of Indonesians. The Partnership’sactivities include:

Governance Assessment — Gathering local opinion ongovernance issues and disseminating the results.

Decentralization — Helping increase capacity at alllevels of government for the process of decentralizationand autonomy.

Civil Society — Contributing to an enabling environmentfor the organizations of civil society.

Legal and Judicial Reform – Supporting the reformplans of the National Law Commission for a sector-wide policy and plan. Helping promote dialogue amongkey actors in the justice sector. Supporting nationaldebate on constitutional reforms.

Police and Security Reform — Helping to clarify andstrengthen the role of the police.

Anti-Corruption — Contributing to a phased strategyand programme to combat ‘KKN’ – corruption, collusionand nepotism.

Electoral Reform — Supporting debate on alternativeelectoral systems and strengthening institutionalcapacity for electoral management.

Box 5A new partnership for governance reforms


HDI Life expectancy at birth 1. Adult literacy rate Adjusted per capita income in PPP$ *)

2. Combined enrolment ratio *)

GDI Female and male life 1. Female and male adult Female and male earned incomeexpectancy at birth literacy rate share

2. Female and male combinedenrolment ratio *)

HPI-1 Percentage of people not Illiteracy rate Deprivation in economic provisioning,expected to survive to measured by:age 40 1. Percentage of people without

access to water.2. Percentage of people without access

to health services3. Percentage of underweight

children under the age of five.

Table 2HDI, GDI and HP-1 — Same component, different measurements (global HDR norms)

Longevity Knowledge Decent standard of living

*) Minor adjustments in measurements made in the calculation of this indicator as presented in this publication(see the following sub-section for detail explanation).

(GEM) to better capture the extend of gender equality. In1997, the HDR presented another human deprivationmeasure – the Human Poverty Index (HPI) – to reflectthe extent of progress and highlight the backlog ofdeprivation (Box 5). In principle, the HDI, GDI and HPIall have the same components – longevity, knowledge anda decent standard of living – but use differentmeasurements (Table 2).

Estimating the sub-nationalhuman development indices in Indonesia

In 1996, BPS and UNDP Indonesia published, for thefirst time, the Indonesian inter-provincial comparison ofhuman development indices for 1990 and 1993.ii Sincethe main data source, the socio-economic survey(Susenas), was not available before 1990, the index wasnot compiled for earlier periods. Due to the limitation ondata availability, this first publication focused only on thehuman development index and was not yet able to presentother indices. In principle, the method used in this firstattempt followed the one applied by UNDP in constructingthe 1994 HDI. Some modifications, however, wereunavoidable, particularly with regard to the constructionof provincial standards of living. While UNDP usedadjusted real per capita GDP as a proxy for income, thispublication used adjusted per capita real expenditure(provincial average), obtained from Susenas and measuredin 1988/89 constant prices. This ensured comparability,both inter-regional and across time. A targeted level to beachieved by the end of the second long term developmentperiod (2018) was set as the maximum value, and the

selection of the income threshold values was adjusted soas to be suitable for the situation in Indonesia.

A revised version and more complete figures werepublished in 1997. The Summary of the Indonesian HumanDevelopment Report 1996 contained the revised figurefor 1990 and the figures for 1996. Besides the HDI figures,this publication also presents provincial GDIs, and GEMsfor 1990 and 1996 as well as the HPIs for 1990 and 1995.The HDI figure in this publication, however, is notcomparable with the HDI figure in the previous publicationbecause of methodological changes, notably in the baseyear used in the computation of the adjusted per capitareal expenditure. The previous publication used 1988/89as the base year, while the 1997 publication and thispublication have 1993 as the basis. As part of the pilotproject for the development of the human developmentindex and its application to regional development planning,in June 1999, BPS and the Directorate General of RegionalDevelopment and the Ministry of Home Affairs publisheddistrict level figures for 1990 and 1996.iii

The 1996 HDI figure presented in the 1997 publicationwas slightly different from the figure in the 1999publication and in this publication. This difference is dueto the calculation of life expectancy at birth which basicallyextrapolated the figures on infant mortality obtained froma series of surveys and censuses (see technical note for adetailed explanation). In the 1997 publication, the lifeexpectancy figure is less accurate because it was basedon the 1971, 1980 and 1990 Population Censuses, whilethe 1999 publication, as presented in this report, includesthe data from the 1995 Population Survey between


Censuses and the 1996 Social Economic Survey. It isalso of particular importance to note that the 1999 lifeexpectancy figure in this publication is based on theprojection of the 1971, 1980 and 1990 PopulationCensuses, the 1995 Population Survey between Censuses,and the 1996 Social Economic Survey, in addition to thecensus data mentioned above. It is also of particularimportance to note that the 1999 life expectancy figure inthis publication is an estimate based on past trends anddoes not take into account the possible impacts of thelatest economic crisis. A more reliable figure will bepublished in the next Human Development Report in whichthe data from the 2000 Population Census will beincorporated.

The methods used in this publication follow the UNDPmethods as much as possible, to ensure comparabilitywith the international figure. However, due to dataavailability and for other substantive reasons, somemodifications from the global method are necessary.

Among the differences is the measurement ofeducational attainment component in the HDI. Asmentioned earlier, after 1995 the global report replacedmean years of schooling with the combined primary,secondary and tertiary gross enrolment rates. This report,however, still uses mean years of schooling. This is forseveral reasons. First, for time-series comparisons, asreliable data on the combined gross enrolment rate in the

previous year are not readily available. Second, meanyears of schooling (MYS) is a better impact indicator thanthe gross enrolment rate which is usually considered as aprocess indicator. So the MYS will be more stable thanthe enrolment rate which tends to fluctuate more. However,the MYS is not sufficiently sensitive to capture the short-term impact of the crisis on school attendance. This wouldonly be captured if the crisis caused permanent dropoutsfrom school. To fill this gap, this report also presents theage groups school participation rate and school drop outrate.

The other departure from global methods is thedatabase used as a proxy of income. The global reportuses per capita GDP while this report uses per capitaexpenditure. This is primarily due to the fact that the percapita GRDP, an equivalent measure of per capita GDP atsub-national level, does not represent the real purchasingpower of the community. Inter-regional economicintegration is so high that even though the GRDP capturesthe regional output, it does not guarantee that this outputis distributed mainly among local people. In this regard,the per capita expenditure data obtained from the socialeconomic survey is a better proxy of the purchasing powerof local people. To ensure that it is comparable acrossregions and over time, this data is refined using a standardprocedure as presented in great detail in the technical note.

Human Development Index (HDI)The HDI measures the overall achievements in a countryin three basic dimensions of human development -longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living.It is measured by life expectancy, education attainmentand adjusted income.

Human Poverty Index (HPI-1)The HPI-1 measures poverty in developing countries.The variables used are the percentage of peopleexpected to die before age 40, the percentage of adultswho are illiterate and deprivation in overall economicprovisioning - public and private - reflected by thepercentage of people without access to health servicesand safe water and the percentage of underweightchildren under the age of five.

Gender-related Development Index (GDI)The GDI measures achievements in the same dimensionsand variables as the HDI, but captures inequalities inachievement between women and men. It is simplythe HDI adjusted downward for gender inequality. Thegreater the gender disparity in basic humandevelopment, the lower a country's GDI compared withits HDI

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)The GEM reveals whether women can take active partin economic and political life. It focuses onparticipation, measuring gender inequality in key areasof economic and political participation and decision-making. It tracks the percentages of women inparliament, among administrators and managers andamong professional and technical workers - andwomen's earned income share as a percentage of men's.Differing from the GDI, it exposes inequality inopportunities in selected areas.(HDR, 1998, page 15)

Box 6HDI, HPI-1, GDI and GEM


The global Human Development Reports haveintroduced the HDI, the GDI, the GEM and the HPI.

These provide summary information about humandevelopment in each country. Taking the spirit of theglobal report, this country report presents all those indicesdisaggregated at sub-national levels – provincial and districtlevels. The effort to construct the indices down to thedistrict level is of particular importance given that theongoing decentralization reform process in Indonesia willpotentially transfer the major part of the developmentprocess to local government and local society. This willrequire better understanding on local conditions supportedby reliable data for all districts.

There are two important points in using the indices.First, by going beyond income or regional output, theseindices provide more comprehensive measures of humanwell-being than income measures alone. Second, eventhese composite indices do not provide a complete pictureby themselves. They must be supplemented by otherindicators of human development.

The Human Development IndexThe HDI value ranges from 0 to 100 (see technical

note for a detailed explanation on the method for calculatingthe HDI). The HDI value of a region shows the distance

What do the human developmentindices reveal?


that it has to go – the shortfall - to attain the maximumpossible value of 100 and also allows inter-regionalcomparisons. The challenge for every region is to findways to reduce its shortfall.

The HDI reveals the following state of humandevelopment:• Of the 26 provinces for which the HDI is calculated,none of them is in the global category of high humandevelopment (with a HDI value of more than 80). If wedivide the global ‘medium’ category into ‘upper’ and‘lower’, 8 provinces are in the upper-medium humandevelopment category (HDI equal 66.00 – 79.99), 18 arein the lower-medium human development category (HDIequal 50.00 – 65.99) and none is in the low humandevelopment category (HDI less than 50.00).• The economic crisis that has hit Indonesia since late1997 has resulted in the reversal of human developmentachievements in all provinces. The negative value of thereduction in shortfall in all provinces indicates that,compared to what was achieved in 1996, the HDIsachieved in 1999 are moving farther from the maximumpossible value of 100. The province of North Sulawesirecords the sharpest drop, followed by Jakarta and CentralKalimantan, while East Nusatenggara experiences thesmallest drop. These sharp drops are explained largely byfalls in purchasing power parity.• Of the 294 districts for which the 1999 HDI isconstructed, none are in the high human developmentcategory, 93 are in the upper-medium human development

category, 195 in the lower-medium human developmentcategory and 6 are in the low human developmentcategory. Apart from nine districts, almost all of themalso experienced a decline in human development overthe period 1996-1999. Eight of the nine are located in theouter islands while only 1 is in Java.• The disparity between the western and the eastern partsof Indonesia still persists. Most districts in easternIndonesia are in the low and lower-medium humandevelopment categories, while the districts in Java-Baliand Sumatra dominate the upper-medium humandevelopment category. This inequality is largely explained

ReductionRegency/City Province shortfall

1996-99

Jaya Wijaya Papua 2.1

Central Halmahera Maluku 1.9

Central Maluku Maluku 1.7

Fak Fak Papua 1.7

Manggarai East Nusatenggara 1.5

Bantaeng South Sulawesi 0.9

Merauke Papua 0.7

Salatiga Central Java 0.7

Yapen Waropen Papua 0.5

Table 3Who still make progress during the crisis


by the disparity in educational attainment, particularly withregard to the adult literacy rate, and to people’s standardof living represented by per capita expenditure.• The disparity between provinces is relatively low andtends to decrease over time. The standard deviation ininter-provincial variation in HDI is less than 10%.However, the inter-provincial disparity in mean years ofschooling is relatively high, reflecting the persistence ofdisparities in the advancement in educational attainment.• The disparity within provinces can be substantial. IrianJaya records the widest disparity with the HDI valuesranging from 43.6 in Paniai to 69.7 in Jaya Pura. Thisdisparity is probably the result of natural conditions andthe poor infrastructure in the inner island that has createdisolated enclaves. The province with the second-largestintra-provincial disparity, however, is East Java – arelatively industrialized province with highly developedinfrastructure. The district of Sampang in the poor islandof Madura has a HDI value as low as 47.3, while the HDIvalue for Surabaya City, which is only 90 kilometres awayfrom Sampang, is 69.3. While the inequality in naturalconditions (soil fertility and climate) might explain someof this inequality, it also reflects the impact ofindustrialization which has increased the disparity betweenthe industrial area and the surrounding areas. Specialpolicies will be needed to reduce this gap if the fruits ofdevelopment are to be more evenly translated into betterhuman well-being for the population at large.• Just like the international phenomenon, the relationshipbetween economic prosperity and human development atthe sub-national level does not show any automatic link.The district-level data reveal that it is only in the big citiesthat the regions’ economic prosperity is beingsuccessfully translated into better living conditions for

their people. In these regions, the rank in per capita GRDPcorresponds to the rank in HDI. For the most remoteareas, the rank in HDI is substantially lower than the rankin per capita GRDP, indicating an output leakage.• The progress in human development differs amongregions. Of the 284 districts for which HDI trendsbetween 1990 and 1999 are available, 79 have experienceda reversal in human development and five of them (Kupang,Pekan Baru, Minahasa, Bukit Tinggi and Sabang) haverecorded sharp drops of more than an average of 1% peryear. This fall is basically due to the slow progress duringthe early 90s, so that the progress in 1990-96 could notcompensate for the sharp drop following the 1997 crisis.The other 205 districts have recorded an improvement inhuman development and four of them (Lebak, SangiheTalaud, Sukoharjo and Banyumas) have achievedsignificant improvements, averaging more than 3%annually, despite the HDI fall during the crisis.• In every human development category, there are casesof fast progress and slow. The fact that the regions thatstarted from the lower human development class in 1990have experienced relatively faster growth than ones thatstarted from higher human development classes indicatesa tendency towards convergence.

Human poverty and deprivationThe Human Poverty Index uses indicators of the most

basic dimensions of deprivation: a short life, lack of basiceducation and a lack of access to public and privateresources. This index uses the deprivation concept ofpoverty in which poverty is seen as the manifestation ofthe denial of opportunities and choices. For policy-makers,poverty of choices and opportunities is often more relevant


than poverty of income, for it focuses on the causes ofpoverty and leads directly to strategies of empowermentand other actions to enhance opportunities for everyone.

The HPI for provincial and District levels indicatesthe following:• Of the 26 provinces for which HPI trends between1990 and 1998 are available, all but five provinces (Aceh,Jambi, Bengkulu, Lampung and Central Sulawesi) managedto reduce their HPI during this period. The deteriorationin access to health services and the reduction in people’slongevity seems to explain the increasing HPI trend inthese five provinces. On the other hand, the success inreducing HPI is largely explained by the improvement inthe provision of basic education, access to safe waterand the nutritional status of the children under five.• For the provincial average, the HPI for 1998 rangesfrom 15.5% in Jakarta to 38.7% in West Kalimantan. Thisis much lower than the 1990 HPI which ranges from20.4% in Jakarta to 43.5% in Central Kalimantan. Jakartarecords the lowest HPI since 1990, while West Kalimantanalso records the highest HPI since 1990 despite minorchanges in the ranks of other provinces. This indicatesthat the relative position between provinces in terms ofhuman poverty did not change very much over the lastdecade.

• At the district level the variation is wider. The 1998HPI ranges from 8.3% in North Jakarta to 47.7% in JayaWijaya. Of the 294 districts for which the HPI iscalculated, 3 regions (Padang Panjang, Central Jakartaand North Jakarta) record HPIs of less than 10%. 126districts are in the lower-medium category of HPI (between10% to 25%), 154 districtrs are in the higher-mediumcategory of HPI (between 25% to 40%), and 11 districtsare in the higher rank (more than 40%) although none ofthem is higher than 50%.


• Income poverty and the HPI do not always go hand inhand as each measures different aspects of poverty.Income poverty, presented as the proportion of populationbelow the poverty line (the poverty rate), measures relativedeprivation in achieved standard of living, while the HPImeasures the deprivations that might hinder people’sopportunity to achieve a better standard of living.Combining these two measures, however, reveals aninteresting poverty picture. The district-level data showthat the regions with low HPIs also have low povertyrates, while the regions with high HPIs vary in theirpoverty rate. Of the 11 regions with HPIs of more than40%, nine of them have relatively low poverty rates. Theother two districts – Jaya Wijaya and Paniai – have seriouspoverty problems on both the HPI and income povertymeasures.• A comparison between HDI and HPI values showsthe distribution of achievements in human developmentprogress. For a given HDI, human development can bedistributed more equitably in a region with a relativelylow HPI and for a given HPI, human development progress

can be distributed less equitably in a region with a relativelylow HDI. The provincial figures of HPI and HDI revealthis distributional problem in 6 provinces. The provincesof Aceh, Riau and Central Kalimantan, are ranked high inHDI achievement but they are ranked low in HPI. Thisindicates the importance of directing human developmentefforts towards the most deprived people. On the otherhand, the provinces of East Java, South Kalimantan andSouth-East Sulawesi are ranked high in HPI (havingrelatively low levels of HPI) but ranked low in HDIachievement. Policies will certainly play a big part indetermining how achievements in human developmentprogress are distributed.


Disparities between men and womenThe HDI is a measure of average achievements and

thus hides differences in human development betweenmen and women. The gender-related development index(GDI) captures achievement in the same set of basiccapabilities as the HDI – life expectancy, educationalattainment and income – but adjusts the results for gender

inequality. The GDI for the provincial level has beencalculated for 16 provinces for 1996 and 1999, while thedisaggregated data for 294 districts has been calculatedfor 1999.• For every region where data is available, the GDI valueis lower than the HDI value. This reflects the presenceof gender inequality in every society. If there were nogender disparity, the HDI and GDI values would be thesame. During the period 1996-1999, the gap betweenHDI and GDI narrowed, reflecting an improvement ingender equality. Among the 26 provinces, the provinceof East Kalimantan recorded the largest gap with 15percentage points in 1996 which decreased to 14percentage points in 1999. Yogyakarta had the smallestgap of 3.5 percentage points in 1996 and also has narrowedthe gap to 2.2 percentage points in 1999.• Of the 26 provinces, none had a GDI value of less 50in 1996 but one province – West Nusatenggara - had aGDI value of less than 50 in 1999. Overall, the crisis hadan adverse impact on gender inequality as almost allprovinces have experienced reversal in GDI. Only Malukurecords progress in GDI during the 1996-1999 period.The sustainability of this progress, however, is questionablegiven the severe impact of the conflict in this region.• Of the 294 districts, 54 (18%) have a GDI value ofless than 50. 171 districts have a GDI value between 50and 60, while the rest (69 districts) are just above 60.

The gender empowerment measure (GEM) capturesgender inequality in key areas of economic and politicalparticipation as well as decision-making. It focuses onwomen’s opportunities rather than their capabilities. The


GEM has been calculated at the provincial level for 1996and 1999 and at the district level for 1999.• Among the 26 provinces, Yogyakarta is at the top ofthe ladder in 1999, followed by Bengkulu and SouthKalimantan. The relative position of each province with

regard to its GEM value changes significantly between1996 and 1999, which is partly the result of changes inwomen’s representation in local parliaments. In fiveprovinces (Aceh, East Java, South Kalimantan, EastKalimantan and Maluku), the proportion of the parliament’sseats occupied by women increased a little, but in theother 21 provinces the proportion fell. South-East Sulawesimarked the largest drop, almost 13%, followed by CentralKalimantan at about 10%.• Comparing the GEM values in 1996 and 1999 showsa reversal in all provinces. This reversal is primarilyexplained by the drop in women’s representation inparliament. The proportion of women elected to localparliaments in the 1999 election dropped significantlycompared to the proportion for the 1992 election ascaptured in the 1996 data. This shows that a moredemocratic election does not guarantee an increase inwomen’s representation, reflecting the fact that duringIndonesia’s transition political parties have yet to establishclear stands on gender mainstreaming.• Of the 26 provinces, 15 are in the low GEM categorywith GEM values of less than 50. The rest are in themedium category of just above 50 and none has a GEMvalue of more than 60. Among the 288 districts for whichthe GEM is calculated, 76% are in the low GEM categoryand the rest, 24%, are in the medium GEM category withthe city of Semarang having the highest value of 61.1.

i The correlation between economic growth and human development was intensively explored in the series of HDRs since its firstpublication in 1990. The 1996 HDR, in particular, is primarily focused on the discussion of this issue.

ii See “Human Development Index (HDI) of Indonesia: Provincial Comparison 1990 – 1993”. BPS and UNDP. 1996.

iii This publication is in Bahasa Indonesia and the title is “Indeks Pembangunan manusia Kabupaten dan Kota di Seluruh Indonesia”.

HumanDevelopment Index (HDI)by Province, 1996 and 1999

Province

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatra

13. West Sumatra

14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatra

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta

32. West Java

33. Central Java

34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan



64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi

74. South East Sulawesi

81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

Indonesia c)

Lifeexpectancy a)

1999

(years)

1996 1999

(%)

Adultliteracy rate

1996 1999

(years)

Mean yearsof schooling

1996 1999

(thousandRupiah)


expenditure

1996 1999

HDI

1996

HDI Rank

19991996

HDIReductionshortfall

1996 - 1999

66.4

65.7

63.8

66.9

65.5

64.1

63.8

64.5

70.2

62.9

64.8

69.9

63.8

68.1

54.9

62.2

62.9

68.3

60.3

68.1

66.6

60.6

65.0

63.6

63.1

62.7

64.4

67.6

67.1

65.5

67.8

66.6

65.5

65.2

65.9

71.1

64.3

68.3

70.9

65.5

69.5

57.8

63.6

64.1

69.2

61.0

69.0

68.1

62.7

68.3

65.0

67.4

64.5

66.2

90.1

94.6

91.8

93.4

91.8

90.4

91.5

89.8

96.8

89.7

81.3

79.8

77.7

79.4

68.0

78.9

80.4

93.7

90.3

90.3

96.8

90.4

79.6

86.3

93.2

67.4

85.5

93.1

95.8

94.7

95.5

93.7

93.4

92.7

91.8

97.8

92.1

84.8

85.5

81.3

82.7

72.8

81.2

83.2

94.8

92.8

93.5

97.2

92.6

83.2

87.1

95.8

71.2

88.4

7.0

7.5

6.9

6.9

6.5

6.1

6.6

5.9

9.5

6.4

5.5

6.9

5.5

6.3

4.6

5.2

5.2

6.6

6.1

7.2

7.3

6.6

6.1

6.6

7.1

5.0

6.3

7.2

8.0

7.4

7.3

6.8

6.6

7.0

6.4

9.7

6.8

6.0

7.9

5.9

6.8

5.2

5.7

5.6

7.1

6.6

7.8

7.6

7.0

6.5

6.8

7.6

5.6

6.7

576.3

576.9

587.3

578.6

580.4

581.4

580.8

576.5

591.7

591.6

594.5

612.3

594.3

609.0

579.7

544.3

570.7

578.9

586.7

586.1

582.4

581.4

580.6

568.8

573.6

566.9

587.4

562.8

568.7

577.3

579.6

574.3

564.5

576.6

567.0

593.4

584.2

583.8

597.8

579.0

587.9

565.9

576.9

571.2

565.4

576.7

578.1

578.3

569.0

571.0

571.8

576.9

579.9

578.8

69.4

70.5

69.2

70.6

69.3

68.0

68.4

67.6

76.1

68.2

67.0

71.8

65.5

70.1

56.7

60.9

63.6

71.3

66.3

71.4

71.8

66.4

66.0

66.2

68.2

60.2

67.7

65.3

66.6

65.8

67.3

65.4

63.9

64.8

63.0

72.5

64.6

64.6

68.7

61.8

65.7

54.2

60.4

60.6

66.7

62.2

67.8

67.1

62.8

63.6

62.9

67.2

58.8

64.3

9

7

11

6

10

15

12

16

1

14

17

2

22

8

26

24

23

5

19

4

3

18

21

20

13

25

12

8

9

4

11

16

13

18

1

15

14

2

22

10

26

24

23

7

21

3

6

20

17

19

5

25

-2.4

-2.4

-2.2

-2.2

-2.3

-2.3

-2.3

-2.4

-2.5

-2.2

-1.9

-2.2

-2.2

-2.4

-1.8

-1.1

-2.0

-2.5

-2.3

-2.3

-2.6

-2.2

-1.9

-2.1

-1.5

-1.5

Note:Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey.This is the annual reduction in shortfall of the HDI, calculated based on the assumption of decreasing rate of growth. For detailexplanation see the technical note.Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figure weighted by population.

- The number before each province is the official area code.

a)

b)

c)

Source: BPS special tabulation

1


Province

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatra

13. West Sumatra

14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatra

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta

32. West Java

33. Central Java

34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan



64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi


81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

Indonesia b)

Lifeexpectancy a)

Male(years)

Female Male(%) (%)

Adultliteracy rate

Female Male(years)


Female Male

Proportionof labour force

Female GDI GDI Rank

68.3

67.6

65.7

68.8

67.4

65.9

65.7

66.4

72.2

64.7

66.7

72.0

65.7

70.0

56.5

64.0

64.7

70.3

62.1

70.0

68.6

62.3

66.9

65.5

65.0

64.5

66.2

64.4

63.8

61.9

64.9

63.5

62.1

61.9

62.6

68.3

61.0

62.8

68.0

61.9

66.1

53.3

60.3

61.0

66.3

58.4

66.1

64.7

58.7

63.1

61.7

61.2

60.7

62.4

86.2

92.0

88.5

91.0

87.8

86.1

87.5

85.6

95.1

85.6

74.6

71.5

70.0

71.8

60.2

75.4

72.3

91.0

85.7

85.9

96.4

87.1

76.0

81.5

90.6

60.9

80.5

94.2

97.2

95.4

95.8

95.8

94.6

95.4

93.7

98.6

93.8

88.3

88.5

86.0

87.3

76.9

82.6

88.3

96.2

95.2

94.5

97.2

93.6

83.6

91.3

95.7

73.6

90.9

6.5

6.9

6.5

6.4

5.8

5.6

6.0

5.4

8.9

5.8

4.9

6.0

4.8

5.4

3.9

4.8

4.5

6.0

5.5

6.4

7.3

6.2

5.6

6.0

6.6

4.3

5.6

7.5

8.0

7.3

7.4

7.1

6.7

7.2

6.4

10.2

6.9

6.2

7.9

6.2

7.2

5.4

5.6

5.9

7.2

6.8

7.9

7.4

7.0

6.6

7.3

7.5

5.8

6.9

37.5

39.4

40.9

27.6

31.7

36.0

41.2

35.0

30.7

30.4

40.8

45.0

39.3

44.6

43.3

43.8

38.7

34.9

40.3

31.7

26.1

32.3

29.0

35.9

33.1

40.2

36.2

62.5

60.6

59.1

72.4

68.3

64.0

58.8

65.0

69.3

69.6

59.2

55.0

60.7

55.4

56.7

56.2

61.3

65.1

59.7

68.3

73.9

67.7

71.0

64.1

66.9

59.8

63.8

63.6

65.0

63.3

56.4

58.8

58.5

64.4

59.6

63.3

56.4

59.2

68.3

57.9

65.6

51.5

56.8

58.6

65.2

61.5

55.8

58.1

59.8

54.8

57.4

59.8

56.1

58.9

6

4

7

21

14

16

5

12

8

22

13

1

18

2

26

20

15

3

9

24

17

10

25

19

11

23

Note:Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey.Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figure weighted by population.


a)

b)


Gender-relatedDevelopment Index (GDI)by Province, 1996

2

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND INDICES 79

Province

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatra

13. West Sumatra

14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatra

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta

32. West Java

33. Central Java

34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan



64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi


81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

Indonesia c)

Lifeexpectancy a)

Male

(years)

Female Male

(%) (%)

Adultliteracy rate

Female Male

(years)


Female Male

Proportionof labour force

FemaleGDI GDI Rank

69.6

69.1

67.4

69.8

68.6

67.4

67.1

67.9

73.2

66.2

70.3

72.9

67.4

71.6

59.4

65.5

65.9

71.2

62.8

71.0

70.0

64.5

70.3

66.9

69.3

66.4

68.1

65.6

65.1

63.5

65.8

64.7

63.5

63.3

64.0

69.3

62.4

66.3

69.0

63.5

67.5

55.9

61.7

62.1

67.3

59.1

67.0

66.1

60.7

66.3

63.1

65.4

62.6

64.2

90.1

93.6

92.6

93.7

90.5

90.3

89.4

88.3

96.8

89.2

78.4

78.3

74.5

75.4

65.4

77.4

76.1

92.8

89.4

90.0

97.3

90.3

79.6

82.6

94.2

64.8

84.1

96.2

98.0

97.0

97.4

96.9

96.5

95.9

95.1

98.9

95.2

91.4

93.0

88.6

90.2

81.2

83.5

90.2

96.9

96.3

96.8

97.2

94.9

87.1

91.8

97.4

77.3

92.9

6.8

7.5

7.2

6.9

6.1

6.2

6.5

5.9

9.0

6.2

5.4

7.1

5.3

5.9

4.5

5.2

5.0

6.6

5.9

7.1

7.5

6.6

6.0

6.2

7.3

4.8

6.1

7.7

8.5

7.7

7.8

7.4

7.1

7.5

6.8

10.4

7.3

6.7

8.8

6.7

7.7

6.0

5.9

6.2

7.5

7.2

8.5

7.6

7.4

7.0

7.4

8.0

6.4

7.3

38.4

41.1

40.3

30.0

31.6

36.7

39.5

37.1

34.5

32.3

40.8

45.6

39.1

45.2

43.1

43.0

39.6

34.7

41.0

31.0

28.5

33.6

31.5

36.4

35.0

41.1

37.2

61.6

58.9

59.7

70.0

68.4

63.3

60.5

62.9

65.5

67.7

59.2

54.4

60.9

54.8

56.9

57.0

60.4

65.3

59.0

69.0

71.5

66.4

68.5

63.6

65.0

58.9

62.9

59.0

61.2

60.7

53.1

54.6

52.4

59.4

57.0

61.2

54.6

57.4

66.4

53.2

60.4

45.9

56.8

55.7

57.9

56.9

53.5

53.9

54.1

53.3

57.4

61.0

55.7

55.9

8

3

5

24

18

25

7

12

2

17

10

1

23

6

26

14

15

9

13

21

20

19

22

11

4

16

Gender-relatedDevelopment Index (GDI)by Province, 1999

3

Reductionshortfall b)

1996 - 1999

-2.3

-2.2

-1.9

-2

-2.2

-2.4

-2.4

-1.9

-1.8

-1.6

-1.6

-1.8

-2.2

-2.5

-2.3

-0.4

-1.9

-2.8

-2.3

-1.7

-2.2

-2.4

-1.5

-0.4

1.5

-1.0

Note:Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey.This is the annual reduction in shortfall of the HDI, calculated based on the assumption of decreasing rate of growth. For detailexplanation see the technical note.Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figure weighted by population.


a)

b)

c)



Province

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatra

13. West Sumatra

14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatra

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta

32. West Java

33. Central Java

34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan



64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi


81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

Indonesia a)

Women in theparliament

1999 1999 1999 1999 1999

(% of total)

1996 1996 1996 1996 1996

(% of total) GEM GEM Rank

Females in seniorofficial, managerial,and technical staff

positions(% of total)

Females in thelabour force

6.1

10.9

10.3

10.5

16.4

9.2

12.3

11.9

14.6

10.8

10.7

8.4

9.8

10.8

10.1

9.8

7.3

12.6

6.8

11.4

13.6

12.2

11.9

15.4

6.5

9.7

45.3

46.1

54.3

34.2

38.4

46.7

45.6

40.4

34.7

38.2

40.6

40.2

38.4

33.9

34.1

32.4

38.1

37.6

40.7

33.9

43.4

38.8

41.5

38.2

38.7

27.8

34.1

33.8

33.9

23.7

31.2

29.0

36.8

29.9

23.2

25.5

31.5

37.9

32.0

37.1

35.7

37.1

33.4

33.9

36.1

21.9

26.6

33.8

29.9

30.4

33.5

33.1

57.3

62.5

61.9

52.2

64.7

58.2

66.4

61.4

56.1

55.8

60.5

63.1

58.9

62.9

58.7

56.4

57.5

63.7

58.9

52.7

60.8

63.9

59.4

62.5

56.5

55.8

58.8

19

7

9

26

2

17

1

10

22

23

12

5

14

6

16

21

18

4

15

25

11

3

13

8

20

24

8.3

2.8

6.1

2.0

8.0

3.2

10.0

4.5

7.9

7.8

6.7

7.8

11.1

6.1

6.1

2.1

6.3

2.5

8.7

12.5

7.5

7.5

3.8

2.5

7.5

2.7

54.4

53.8

58.8

43.2

37.5

52.4

45.5

46.1

34.9

36.0

44.7

46.7

45.9

35.5

37.2

35.7

43.2

46.3

47.1

39.2

54.9

47.4

47.7

40.2

55.3

34.2

38.4

41.1

40.3

30.0

31.6

36.7

39.5

37.1

34.5

32.3

40.8

45.6

39.1

45.2

43.1

43.0

39.6

34.7

41.0

31.0

28.5

33.6

31.5

36.4

35.0

41.1

52.4

47.3

51.5

38.1

46.8

41.7

56.5

48.2

46.4

47.7

51.2

58.8

54.4

50.5

46.2

46.4

52.2

43.5

55.1

49.3

45.1

50.0

43.9

46.0

52.7

47.7

49.5

6

16

8

26

17

25

2

13

18

14

9

1

4

10

20

18

7

24

3

12

22

11

23

21

5

14

Gender EmpowerementMeasure (GEM) by Province,1996 and 1999

4

Note:Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figure weighted by population.

- The number before each province is the official area code.a)



Province

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatra

13. West Sumatra

14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatra

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta

32. West Java

33. Central Java

34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan



64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi


81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

Indonesia d)

People notexpectedto surviveage 40c)

(%) (%) (%) (%)

Adultiliteracy rate

(%)

Populationwithout

access tosafe water

Populationwithout

access tohealth

facilities

14.6

15.8

19.1

13.8

16.2

18.6

19.1

17.8

9.1

20.8

17.4

9.4

19.1

12.0

35.4

22.1

20.8

11.7

25.9

12.0

14.2

25.4

17.0

19.5

20.4

21.2

18.3

12.7

13.5

16.2

12.4

14.2

16.2

16.6

15.4

7.9

18.2

11.7

8.2

16.2

11.7

31.5

19.5

18.6

10.4

24.5

10.7

12.0

21.2

11.7

17.0

13.1

17.8

15.2

10.7

6.4

8.1

6.4

8.9

8.7

10.3

11.3

2.7

9.4

18.1

18.1

23.1

21.0

30.5

21.2

19.1

6.4

10.1

9.5

3.1

9.5

20.4

15.5

6.7

31.2

14.4

6.9

4.2

5.3

4.4

6.3

6.6

7.4

8.2

2.2

7.8

15.2

14.5

18.7

17.3

27.2

19.6

16.8

5.2

7.2

6.5

2.8

7.4

16.8

12.9

4.2

28.8

11.6

61.2

48.4

54.0

73.4

65.9

58.3

65.0

62.0

45.0

62.4

47.6

53.9

40.8

36.0

64.7

50.8

83.8

74.8

50.2

42.3

44.7

57.7

55.9

38.2

47.4

56.1

53.1

61.5

47.9

46.4

71.8

57.3

59.7

59.2

54.4

40.2

62.1

47.8

48.9

43.0

34.2

62.5

41.9

78.4

68.2

46.7

35.8

44.5

51.7

49.1

43.6

52.1

54.5

51.9

12.2

11.9

5.7

12.0

10.2

16.0

0.5

9.2

2.2

10.6

11.0

1.1

5.8

4.2

5.1

17.1

35.3

26.2

12.7

7.9

9.4

10.5

18.1

24.9

23.2

25.7

10.6

37.6

20.9

21.7

39.2

21.5

28.9

24.8

34.5

2.0

22.4

17.1

8.6

17.1

14.9

17.5

38.2

43.3

26.2

16.2

19.6

26.1

30.2

26.0

21.3

23.8

36.0

21.6

48.9

37.5

39.3

47.8

35.6

37.2

25.9

30.2

29.1

33.6

34.7

21.9

35.3

22.7

44.0

49.6

30.3

41.6

37.4

32.5

33.7

40.0

39.8

32.8

40.7

39.2

35.4

35.6

35.3

34.0

27.9

32.9

26.4

30.0

29.1

23.7

27.2

30.5

17.3

30.7

21.0

39.7

38.7

42.0

30.5

29.0

31.9

25.8

34.9

33.9

27.1

29.3

28.3

30.0

HPI HPI Rank

28.9

23.5

24.4

31.1

26.6

26.9

23.0

24.8

17.9

26.3

24.0

19.9

23.6

18.9

34.9

29.9

36.0

33.1

26.5

19.9

21.0

27.8

28.3

24.4

27.1

32.8

25.2

20

7

10

22

15

16

6

12

1

13

9

4

8

2

25

21

26

24

14

3

5

18

19

11

17

23

31.4

24.5

24.4

32.3

26.3

27.3

27.1

27.9

15.5

26.9

23.2

18.5

23.4

18.7

33.7

29.5

38.7

29.0

24.4

20.6

22.7

28.4

26.3

22.9

24.7

31.3

25.2

23

11

9

24

14

17

16

18

1

15

7

2

8

3

25

21

26

20

10

4

5

19

13

6

12

22

Note:Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and

1996 Socio-economic survey. Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figures, weighted by population.1996 figure; 1999 figure;


a) b) c)

d)


HumanPoverty Index (HPI)by Province, 1995 and 1998

5

Undernourishedchildrenunder

age five

1998b) 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 19981995a) 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995


ProvinceDistrict

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatera

13. West Sumatera

01. South Aceh02. South-east Aceh03. East Aceh04. Central Aceh05. Weast Aceh06. Aceh Besar07. Pidie08. North Aceh71. Banda Aceh72. Sabang

01. Nias02. South Tapanuli03. Central Tapanuli04. North Tapanuli05. Labuhan Batu06. Asahan07. Simalungun08. Dairi09. Karo10. Deli Serdang11. Langkat71. Sibolga72. Tanjung Balai73. Pematang Siantar74. Tebing Tinggi75. Medan76. Binjai

01. South Pesisir02. Solok03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjun04. Tanah Datar05. Padang Pariaman06. Agam07. Limapuluh Koto08. Pasaman71. Padang72. Solok73. Sawah Lunto74. Padang Panjang75. Bukit Tinggi76. Payakumbuh

Lifeexpectancy a)

1999

(years)

1996 1999

(%)

Adultliteracy rate

1996 1999

(years)


1996 1999

(thousandRupiah)


expenditure

1996 1999

HDI

1996

HDI Rank

19991996


1996-1999

66.4

65.7

63.8

62.866.766.165.566.968.066.467.367.167.9

65.063.164.163.864.165.565.864.070.364.665.467.065.568.768.167.867.7

62.658.658.765.662.865.663.159.467.264.769.767.669.765.7

67.6

67.1

65.5

64.067.867.366.768.169.267.668.468.268.6

66.464.565.565.265.566.967.265.470.666.068.868.466.970.169.569.269.1

64.360.260.467.264.467.264.761.168.866.370.169.269.866.8

90.1

94.6

91.8

83.587.494.592.787.686.884.791.696.894.0

73.397.692.094.296.193.992.494.695.894.795.198.396.098.997.598.797.3

88.389.387.692.189.591.893.390.096.294.795.497.098.696.3

93.1

95.8

94.7

91.390.793.997.291.294.487.694.597.794.8

85.799.393.896.296.593.793.696.895.594.097.298.597.098.497.898.897.3

93.494.791.793.293.594.294.893.997.297.697.497.498.797.1

7.0

7.5

6.9

5.96.76.97.16.17.26.37.010.28.0

4.67.06.57.86.46.66.57.57.57.56.78.77.59.18.69.68.5

6.25.85.96.75.86.76.55.89.28.27.59.29.48.0

7.2

8.0

7.4

6.37.07.07.86.28.06.77.310.38.4

5.77.76.98.27.36.97.17.67.97.77.78.87.89.58.99.98.9

6.96.27.07.16.56.96.86.69.68.77.89.59.78.4

576.3

576.9

587.3

563.7561.7566.6559.9558.0557.4577.2564.8582.4552.7

476.8565.7519.2555.9562.6567.7561.7560.3574.6584.2557.6564.7601.0568.7588.1579.5585.5

571.9574.9584.5575.5585.5575.5577.0570.7591.0574.9578.6579.2590.2579.4

562.8

568.7

577.3

560.6552.8565.5559.8561.5559.6567.6524.2583.0518.2

413.7561.6537.6566.9550.9567.4563.1509.8576.2577.9561.3573.1570.3579.9573.0579.8565.1

576.0572.9576.8576.2580.0578.1574.2570.0585.4579.8571.8586.9578.9578.6

69.4

70.5

69.2

64.267.769.568.367.168.467.869.574.270.1

55.568.563.867.968.068.968.268.373.270.568.372.072.573.774.274.373.6

66.164.064.569.267.269.168.064.274.170.373.173.676.171.4

65.3

66.6

65.8

62.163.965.466.064.366.864.163.170.563.7

50.465.262.165.764.065.165.161.169.166.167.168.966.870.969.570.868.5

64.461.661.966.164.466.364.662.070.468.068.870.870.967.9

9

7

11

21412780

106144104125811866

28399

22412111991

1141122962

105473623191625

17021920885

14288

118213206430267

51

12

8

9

21015410794

14576

14917923

162

288114207103150117119232369070377717311947

14322821691

13987

135214245941181662

-2.4

-2.4

-2.2

-1.8-2.3-2.4-2.0-2.0-1.7-2.3-2.7-2.4-2.8

-2.3-2.2-1.7-1.9-2.3-2.3-2.1-2.8-2.5-2.5-1.6-2.2-2.8-2.2-2.6-2.4-2.7

-1.7-1.9-1.9-2.2-2.0-2.1-2.2-1.8-2.4-2.0-2.5-2.2-2.8-2.3

HumanDevelopment Index (HDI)by District,1996 and 1999

6


14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatera

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta

01. Indragiri Hulu02. Indragiri Ilir03. Kepulauan Riau04. Kampar05. Bengkalis71. Pekan Baru72. Batam

01. Kerinci02. Bungo Tebo03. Sarolangun Bangko04. Batanghari05. Tanjung Jabung71. Jambi

01. Ogan Komering Ulu02. Ogan Komering Hilir03. Muara Enim (Liot)04. Lahat05. Musi Rawas06. Musi Banyuasin07. Bangka08. Balitung71. Palembang72. Pangkal Pinang

01. South Bengkulu02. Rejang Lebong03. North Bengkulu71. Bengkulu

01. South Lampung02. Central Lampung03. North Lampung04. West Lampung71. Bandar Lampung

71. South Jakarta72. East Jakarta73. Central Jakarta74. West Jakarta75. North Jakarta

Lifeexpectancy a)

1999

(years)

1996 1999

(%)

Adultliteracy rate

1996 1999

(years)


1996 1999

(thousandRupiah)


expenditure

1996 1999

HDI

1996

HDI Rank

19991996


1996-1999

66.9

65.5

64.1

63.8

64.5

70.2

63.867.167.464.867.770.068.4

67.162.465.064.666.667.2

66.461.162.461.959.965.365.065.566.467.9

62.560.864.267.9

63.765.463.763.766.3

70.170.669.370.570.3

67.8

66.6

65.5

65.2

65.9

71.1

64.868.068.365.768.770.269.3

68.263.666.265.767.868.4

67.862.563.863.361.366.766.466.967.868.3

63.962.265.669.3

65.166.865.165.167.7

71.171.570.271.471.2

93.4

91.8

90.4

91.5

89.8

96.8

91.894.489.393.093.098.493.5

93.389.991.093.287.895.4

90.187.491.691.790.087.487.190.494.694.4

87.493.288.798.0

88.986.890.792.995.4

97.796.896.697.395.1

95.5

93.7

93.4

92.7

91.8

97.8

92.896.890.995.795.599.596.3

94.992.492.895.292.195.3

91.593.495.496.291.293.387.793.595.993.4

90.492.590.498.3

91.789.292.292.496.3

97.798.497.797.897.1

6.9

6.5

6.1

6.6

5.9

9.5

6.35.86.36.26.79.57.9

7.05.76.15.75.68.6

5.95.36.05.65.55.15.56.18.37.5

5.76.55.59.5

5.65.65.45.88.3

9.99.79.79.38.7

7.3

6.8

6.6

7.0

6.4

9.7

6.76.26.66.37.010.09.1

7.76.46.36.05.98.5

6.25.56.56.86.25.56.06.78.77.9

6.26.55.810.1

6.16.25.66.08.7

10.010.19.79.49.2

578.6

580.4

581.4

580.8

576.5

591.7

570.8553.7564.7573.9567.4585.2563.9

567.1568.2579.1574.8531.0582.5

574.9566.6575.7557.9564.1512.4579.9577.9586.4584.6

559.5574.7561.4588.2

572.2567.1517.4573.3579.8

599.7590.4594.8589.1582.8

579.6

574.3

564.5

576.6

567.0

593.4

574.2571.5585.2577.7570.9581.2596.3

576.8568.0578.2573.6554.4585.1

567.3543.3561.4560.4559.2435.7575.2579.2577.4585.1

564.7576.4570.8592.5

570.7571.4538.5561.7580.2

623.8588.5585.0589.7586.3

70.6

69.3

68.0

68.4

67.6

76.1

67.568.268.568.469.975.971.1

69.965.668.468.164.672.8

68.664.066.864.963.861.967.268.572.272.3

64.466.665.774.9

66.466.462.467.571.8

77.276.476.076.174.6

67.3

65.4

63.9

64.8

63.0

72.5

64.266.366.565.366.971.770.9

67.562.765.064.663.668.9

64.759.863.163.160.453.863.565.968.368.0

62.062.763.271.8

63.463.960.762.868.5

75.172.871.372.271.5

6

10

15

12

16

1

136113101102719

57

7217710311620534

96220151195227249139984440

21016017611

16216124413248

1386

13

4

11

16

13

18

1

1478884

110741015

6419312413616838

134254185181249279171985158

213196178

9

17415524619048

14

147

12

-2.2

-2.3

-2.3

-2.3

-2.4

-2.5

-2.1-1.8-1.8-2.2-2.1-2.6-0.8

-2.0-2.0-2.2-2.2-1.4-2.4

-2.3-2.3-2.2-1.7-2.1-2.8-2.3-2.0-2.4-2.5

-1.9-2.3-1.9-2.3

-2.1-2.0-1.7-2.4-2.3

-2.1-2.5-2.7-2.5-2.3

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict


6


ProvinceDistrict

32. West Java

33. Central Java

01. Pandeglang02. Lebak03. Bogor04. Sukabumi05. Cianjur06. Bandung07. Garut08. Tasikmalaya09. Ciamis10. Kuningan11. Cirebon12. Majalengka13. Sumedang14. Indramayu15. Subang16. Purwakarta17. Karawang18. Bekasi19. Tangerang20. Serang71. Bogor72. Sukabumi73. Bandung74. Cirebon75. Tangerang76. Bekasi

01. Cilacap02. Banyumas03. Purbalingga04. Banjarnegara05. Kebumen06. Purworejo07. Wonosobo08. Magelang09. Boyolali10. Klaten11. Sukoharjo12. Wonogiri13. Karanganyar14. Sragen15. Grobogan16. Blora17. Rembang18. Pati19. Kudus20. Jepara21. Demak22. Semarang23. Temanggung

Lifeexpectancy a)

1999

(years)

1996 1999

(%)

Adultliteracy rate

1996 1999

(years)


1996 1999

(thousandRupiah)


expenditure

1996 1999

HDI

1996

HDI Rank

19991996


1996-1999

62.9

64.8

60.260.663.861.062.265.258.064.162.563.561.661.665.161.963.662.161.065.262.458.266.364.366.865.765.7-

63.764.663.963.963.764.164.164.567.365.668.870.669.567.364.366.464.568.164.866.165.267.667.2

64.3

68.3

61.662.065.262.463.666.659.465.563.964.963.063.066.563.365.063.562.466.663.859.667.765.768.267.167.166.6

67.268.167.467.467.267.767.768.069.469.169.171.170.170.867.869.968.071.667.869.668.770.670.7

89.7

81.3

91.586.489.893.594.492.692.995.192.488.186.287.993.167.082.490.780.890.188.488.397.799.097.695.186.4-

80.789.881.478.481.386.283.581.678.679.180.371.678.468.681.972.083.277.982.982.484.987.388.9

92.1

84.8

93.290.893.796.095.694.796.896.293.991.786.688.995.666.786.294.584.887.688.792.297.497.698.394.694.397.1

84.291.286.285.987.286.386.586.281.481.184.076.478.371.685.674.184.880.088.883.189.289.491.0

6.4

5.5

5.25.06.85.46.06.65.76.06.25.85.45.76.43.84.95.74.98.06.45.68.89.19.68.47.7-

4.95.85.15.15.26.14.95.95.76.26.54.85.74.85.14.55.65.16.05.45.66.35.3

6.8

6.0

5.35.58.05.75.77.06.26.36.46.15.76.06.83.95.46.25.46.86.65.99.38.69.68.48.89.4

5.46.45.35.65.96.35.46.36.26.77.45.66.15.35.64.85.95.66.96.06.16.65.6

591.6

594.5

562.4546.3585.5583.9580.5585.9568.2578.8592.2589.5574.5587.6590.1588.6590.0583.2582.5589.8578.5571.3575.3596.6589.8608.3570.2-

582.4585.8586.8580.5581.3590.9583.0584.4586.3595.0590.2588.2584.7577.9584.3577.7581.4591.8587.7586.8589.1588.4586.8

584.2

583.8

570.2570.3587.5579.2576.5584.5574.4577.7588.9592.6581.1587.0584.6588.1591.0585.5584.7582.4584.7577.7586.6590.1589.7586.4585.7-

579.9581.0572.2577.9590.1590.5580.4585.9582.0589.0591.8584.2587.6581.3585.0576.4588.6584.8586.7589.5583.6591.0584.6

68.2

67.0

63.961.668.566.667.669.863.968.768.567.564.666.270.160.465.766.863.470.666.663.172.373.474.373.768.3-

64.868.365.564.465.167.865.766.467.267.569.467.068.363.765.763.766.367.567.167.367.669.969.2

64.6

64.6

61.261.066.663.263.666.661.765.364.865.061.662.866.656.563.164.360.964.763.560.869.768.470.768.168.368.7

63.166.063.063.664.965.363.965.164.465.166.564.064.562.364.261.664.765.266.065.365.967.967.1

14

17

22125197

15512874

22393

10013120016767

26317314823161

15623839271421

111

19610918021119012417416314013584

1461082301752281661341431381297087

15

14

23123382

17616781

22310912712322719279

269182144237131169240294920555243

18695

18716612611215611814012183

15213820514622612811693

1081006169

-2.2

-1.9

-2.0-1.2-1.8-2.2-2.3-2.2-1.8-2.2-2.3-2.0-2.0-2.2-2.3-2.1-2.0-2.0-1.9-2.7-2.1-1.8-2.1-2.7-2.4-2.8-0.4

-1.7-1.9-1.9-1.3-0.8-2.0-1.7-1.5-2.0-1.9-2.1-2.1-2.3-1.6-1.6-1.8-1.7-1.9-1.5-1.8-1.7-1.9-1.9


6 (continued)


ProvinceDistrict

24. Kendal25. Batang26. Pekalongan27. Pemalang28. Tegal29. Brebes71. Magelang72. Surakarta73. Salatiga74. Semarang75. Pekalongan76. Tegal

01. Kulon Progo02. Bantul03. Gunung Kidul04. Sleman71. Yogyakarta

01. Pacitan02. Ponorogo03. Trenggalek04. Tulungagung05. Blitar06. Kediri07. Malang08. Lumajang09. Jember10. Banyuwangi11. Bondowoso12. Situbondo13. Probolinggo14. Pasuruan15. Sidoarjo16. Mojokerto17. Jombang18. Nganjuk19. Madiun20. Magetan21. Ngawi22. Bojonegoro23. Tuban24. Lamongan25. Gresik26. Bangkalan27. Sampang28. Pamekasan29. Sumenep71. Kediri72. Blitar73. Malang

34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

Lifeexpectancy a)

1999

(years)

1996 1999

(%)

Adultliteracy rate

1996 1999

(years)


1996 1999

(thousandRupiah)


expenditure

1996 1999

HDI

1996

HDI Rank

19991996


1996-1999

62.364.663.061.061.659.866.870.366.069.964.663.1

70.468.569.970.771.2

68.266.068.970.066.966.264.663.258.862.657.259.656.859.666.365.965.065.365.269.365.363.964.264.865.759.255.059.460.566.768.764.5

69.9

63.8

64.768.166.564.565.263.369.170.969.570.268.166.6

71.369.570.171.672.1

69.866.669.470.168.567.866.364.959.764.258.861.358.561.367.967.566.666.966.869.667.065.565.866.467.360.956.761.160.968.469.666.2

70.9

65.5

78.283.983.077.679.472.892.592.695.290.388.686.2

79.279.266.782.693.6

77.773.682.586.682.579.380.972.668.981.456.163.265.876.193.384.785.480.676.379.274.574.765.876.286.156.144.065.061.292.289.390.8

79.8

77.7

84.385.884.282.383.583.093.492.995.793.689.886.5

82.882.683.085.795.1

80.875.787.285.082.485.684.277.272.581.963.864.468.383.095.487.588.585.179.781.579.478.673.880.391.363.054.972.766.892.992.394.4

85.5

81.3

4.74.74.94.65.04.38.38.78.78.16.66.4

6.26.44.57.89.7

5.05.05.15.85.25.55.14.64.45.23.74.33.94.78.35.66.25.75.25.54.64.74.24.96.33.22.14.23.58.07.48.4

6.9

5.5

5.45.15.35.25.64.89.08.89.28.77.16.6

6.86.87.18.510.3

5.35.35.76.15.76.35.55.24.45.64.34.44.15.38.86.27.06.15.66.05.35.44.85.77.63.72.54.63.78.58.28.6

7.9

5.9

580.0587.3583.5577.5586.1583.1589.9587.2572.3584.0576.1582.7

593.5598.2588.3602.9591.3

586.5581.7579.0593.0591.1588.1587.9591.8581.9592.9589.9595.4586.2584.4591.4591.0591.7588.6590.9585.9593.1578.0585.1583.3587.9575.0562.3579.6598.5588.7595.6595.0

612.3

594.3

584.9579.5568.9575.8583.1580.2597.5591.9602.7591.5577.2594.5

583.7590.0552.4601.5598.9

582.8575.7579.7586.5581.9577.2577.4575.0570.4583.2583.2582.3580.7571.6587.9580.1582.7576.9589.8585.4580.5560.5579.3577.4580.1563.6564.3565.4583.8588.8588.0590.0

597.8

579.0

63.166.365.062.063.760.572.374.371.472.967.866.8

70.069.565.372.976.1

67.164.568.071.167.966.865.963.259.165.455.459.257.261.572.368.168.366.865.668.365.063.161.564.568.655.048.258.258.971.872.471.1

71.8

65.5

62.163.661.860.762.260.270.270.571.570.265.965.3

66.465.863.669.873.4

63.960.465.265.963.864.262.459.754.961.353.454.853.858.969.164.665.163.462.864.761.959.459.561.866.452.447.355.554.768.668.968.0

68.7

61.8

23616519224722926242155231

123149

6879

187335

14520612056

12215317223427118528427027925241

11511015217910719323725320995

285290275273493858

2

22

2081632192452062512522112699

113

85102165272

15324811596

15914820325627623028227728026135

13712217319113021725825722186

283292274278453960

2

22

-1.4-2.0-2.1-1.5-1.6-0.9-1.9-2.50.7

-2.2-1.8-1.7

-2.3-2.3-1.7-2.2-2.3

-2.1-2.3-2.1-2.6-2.3-2.0-2.2-2.1-2.2-2.3-1.7-2.2-2.0-1.9-2.3-2.2-2.2-2.2-2.0-2.2-2.1-2.2-1.7-2.0-1.9-1.8-1.2-1.9-2.2-2.2-2.3-2.2

-2.2

-2.2


6 (continued)


ProvinceDistrict

74. Probolinggo75. Pasuruan76. Mojokerto77. Madiun78. Surabaya

01. Jembrana02. Tabanan03. Badung04. Gianyar05. Klungkung06. Bangli07. Karangasem08. Buleleng71. Denpasar

01. West Lombok02. Central Lombok03. East Lombok04. Sumbawa05. Dompu06. Bima71. Mataram

01. West Sumba02. East Sumba03. Kupang04. Southern Central-Timor05. Northern Central-Timor06. Belu07. Alor08. Flores Timur09. Sikka10. Ende11. Ngada12. Manggarai71. Kupang

01. Sambas02. Pontianak03. Sanggau04. Ketapang05. Sintang06. Kapuas Hulu71. Pontianak

51. Bali

52. West Nusa Tenggara

53. East Nusa Tenggara

61. West Kalimantan

Lifeexpectancy a)

1999

(years)

1996 1999

(%)

Adultliteracy rate

1996 1999

(years)


1996 1999

(thousandRupiah)


expenditure

1996 1999

HDI

1996

HDI Rank

19991996


1996-1999

65.862.569.768.466.6

68.471.269.069.365.769.065.064.670.2

53.753.253.253.755.155.760.0

60.357.662.063.864.862.161.564.664.361.363.362.6-

55.763.565.363.864.863.464.6

68.1

54.9

62.2

62.9

67.564.170.069.168.3

69.872.670.570.767.170.566.466.071.6

56.556.056.056.557.958.562.8

61.759.063.465.265.163.562.966.065.762.864.764.163.4

56.864.666.564.966.064.565.1

69.5

57.8

63.6

64.1

84.185.892.191.093.2

81.983.185.575.575.079.263.375.491.8

58.452.566.581.780.180.583.0

68.073.783.567.077.572.190.478.980.682.486.484.6-

79.079.577.482.479.280.187.0

79.4

68.0

78.9

80.4

86.287.793.591.793.8

84.785.487.577.678.678.566.183.293.8

63.864.468.684.782.081.887.8

69.077.275.567.679.573.489.582.484.688.892.383.094.6

82.083.481.884.079.682.888.9

82.7

72.8

81.2

83.2

6.76.58.28.38.7

5.76.67.56.15.65.53.85.39.1

3.43.44.35.36.06.17.2

4.64.76.44.24.94.76.25.25.05.35.75.0-

4.55.44.44.84.75.67.5

6.3

4.6

5.2

5.2

7.17.18.48.79.0

6.17.18.16.36.15.54.16.29.7

4.04.34.86.06.06.47.8

5.05.44.94.35.35.06.25.45.35.66.35.29.6

5.15.65.15.14.95.87.9

6.8

5.2

5.7

5.6

600.5596.2605.1599.8583.1

601.7610.5591.7576.8596.6585.0586.6591.1589.8

562.1577.5570.4574.7560.7559.9578.2

547.1561.1563.5512.0515.6551.0521.6553.0500.7562.6552.3509.7-

552.9552.8539.9564.8522.8530.7583.0

609.0

579.7

544.3

570.7

581.7583.0575.7585.3589.4

583.67595.01588.14582.39587.18588.86578.01583.98595.65

559.23567.61568.91568.57558.51565.31578.10

437.64562.96557.71472.90487.56494.65485.96528.82440.01501.27566.54579.38-

569.45570.12567.57569.60569.39570.09578.57

587.9

565.9

576.9

571.2

69.567.574.973.672.1

69.872.971.567.266.368.161.265.174.6

51.651.254.459.259.059.464.6

57.258.164.255.959.659.562.062.958.962.664.259.5-

57.462.561.363.860.361.168.7

70.1

56.7

60.9

63.6

65.163.668.668.769.3

65.568.768.264.462.964.457.563.172.1

49.950.752.156.856.257.363.1

45.455.757.049.253.751.855.358.151.555.863.260.966.6

55.860.961.060.860.360.864.7

65.7

54.2

60.4

60.6

82130102445

753250

14116411725518912

287288286269272268201

280276215282265266248239274241215266

27824225422526425794

8

26

24

23

120164464433

1064253

141189142263183

8

289287284268270264184

29327326629028128527526228627217723580

271239234243250242133

10

26

24

23

-2.4-2.3-2.9-2.7-2.2

-2.4-2.5-2.3-2.0-2.2-2.3-2.1-1.8-2.2

-1.5-1.0-1.7-1.8-1.9-1.7-1.6

-3.0-1.8-2.7-2.5-2.4-2.7-2.6-2.4-2.6-2.6-1.41.5

-1.6-1.6-0.9-2.0-0.5-0.9-2.3

-2.4

-1.8

-1.1

-2.0


6 (continued)


ProvinceDistrict



64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi

01. West Kotawaringin02. East Kotawaringin03. Kapuas04. South Barito05. North Barito71. Palangka Raya

01. Tanah Laut02. Kota Baru03. Banjar04. Barito Kuala05. Tapin06. South Hulu Sungai07. Central Hulu Sungai08. North Hulu Sungai09. Tabalong71. Banjarmasin

01. Pasir02. Kutai03. Berau04. Bulongan71. Balikpapan72. Samarinda

01. Gorontalo02. Bolaang Mongondow03. Minahasa04. Sangihe Talaud71. Gorontalo72. Manado73. Bitung

01. Luwuk Banggai02. Poso03. Donggala04. Bual Toli-Toli71. Kodya Palu

01. Selayar02. Bulukumba03. Bantaeng04. Jeneponto05. Takalar

Lifeexpectancy a)

1999

(years)

1996 1999

(%)

Adultliteracy rate

1996 1999

(years)


1996 1999

(thousandRupiah)


expenditure

1996 1999

HDI

1996

HDI Rank

19991996


1996-1999

68.3

60.3

68.1

66.6

60.6

65.0

68.467.068.665.269.471.2

64.560.060.756.163.059.360.257.159.462.9

69.665.166.670.269.167.6

63.668.469.069.663.070.566.2

61.460.458.159.964.3

62.965.067.560.463.2

69.2

61.0

69.0

68.1

62.7

68.3

69.467.969.666.170.372.1

66.261.662.357.864.760.961.958.861.064.5

70.566.067.671.270.168.6

65.069.870.471.064.470.767.6

63.561.360.262.066.4

66.268.470.863.966.7

93.7

90.3

90.3

96.8

90.4

79.6

90.792.893.295.994.198.7

85.486.194.089.287.389.291.290.088.293.9

85.789.785.288.591.893.7

94.595.199.194.497.499.097.0

86.994.787.490.696.8

78.074.663.462.973.2

94.8

92.8

93.5

97.2

92.6

83.2

93.193.495.096.795.498.1

85.891.395.590.993.192.091.093.291.796.2

86.993.690.391.795.596.1

94.396.299.095.498.999.797.8

91.496.289.492.098.2

84.379.670.568.876.8

6.6

6.1

7.2

7.3

6.6

6.1

6.56.16.26.76.29.8

5.35.56.54.95.35.85.85.55.98.0

5.46.76.06.78.18.4

6.06.37.66.68.29.87.9

5.87.05.86.29.4

5.35.74.14.74.9

7.1

6.6

7.8

7.6

7.0

6.5

6.76.86.67.16.79.8

5.46.17.05.36.05.95.96.06.48.5

5.57.46.77.08.99.0

6.06.77.77.28.710.28.0

6.47.46.26.49.9

5.66.24.64.95.4

578.9

586.7

586.1

582.4

581.4

580.6

571.5575.5555.8570.4561.1585.8

574.3575.9583.7560.5572.7580.4571.4577.1574.0586.9

576.6584.4576.6578.0574.2578.5

556.1571.0580.3568.4580.8581.2588.4

572.1580.7566.8568.9589.2

572.4574.7558.2572.3576.8

565.4

576.7

578.1

578.3

569.0

571.0

577.60563.69571.51571.93569.20582.24

574.78576.15575.41576.11574.28583.29575.29576.22576.70587.32

568.61578.23571.41580.90590.90579.04

573.82573.99583.92576.66583.63587.29580.59

566.72561.96567.55566.16577.29

572.22574.26572.56572.95574.23

71.3

66.3

71.4

71.8

66.4

66.0

70.069.769.269.470.376.9

66.063.967.460.865.564.765.063.264.269.9

69.169.167.871.272.072.2

66.670.873.771.370.576.272.5

64.867.562.764.872.6

63.364.260.658.162.4

66.7

62.2

67.8

67.1

62.8

63.6

67.165.367.165.967.472.3

62.561.863.759.063.961.961.760.661.867.1

64.765.865.068.270.669.1

63.366.969.368.066.772.567.6

62.462.660.061.668.9

62.162.960.956.960.7

5

19

4

3

18

21

69778683652

17122213725918119919123521573

8989

126554643

157602253634

37

19713324019735

232215261276245

7

21

3

6

20

17

711117397656

20122016126015821522424721872

129101125542134

175753257785

63

20419825322540

211188238267244

-2.5

-2.3

-2.3

-2.6

-2.2

-1.9

-2.1-2.4-1.9-2.3-2.1-2.7

-2.2-1.8-2.2-1.7-1.7-2.0-2.1-1.9-1.9-2.1

-2.4-2.2-2.1-2.2-1.7-2.2

-2.1-2.4-2.5-2.3-2.3-2.5-2.6

-1.9-2.5-1.9-2.1-2.4

-1.5-1.50.9

-1.4-1.6


6 (continued)


06. Gowa07. Sinjai08. Maros09. Pangkep10. Barru11. Bone12. Soppeng13. Wajo14. Sidenreng Rappang15. Pinrang16. Enrekang17. Luwu18. Tana Toraja19. Polewali Mamasa20. Majene21. Mamuju71. Ujung Pandang72. Pare Pare

01. Buton02. Muna03. Kendari04. Kolaka71. Kendari

01. South-east Maluku02. Central Maluku03. North Maluku04. Central Halmahera71. Ambon

01. Merauke02. Jaya Wijaya03. Jaya Pura04. Paniai05. Fak Fak06. Sorong07. Manokwari08. Yapen Waropen09. Biak Numfor71. Jaya Pura

74. South-east Sulawesi

81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

Lifeexpectancy a)

1999

(years)

1996 1999

(%)

Adultliteracy rate

1996 1999

(years)


1996 1999

(thousandRupiah)


expenditure

1996 1999

HDI

1996

HDI Rank

19991996


1996-1999

66.766.265.163.963.263.767.366.566.265.368.768.169.562.558.963.667.968.5

64.762.663.863.3-

67.160.862.762.668.3

56.262.565.464.266.162.265.260.963.264.8

63.6

63.1

62.7

69.969.568.667.166.767.270.667.269.568.572.071.472.862.962.367.071.471.8

66.164.065.264.765.2

63.865.865.671.471.4

58.064.465.666.068.064.166.162.864.166.7

65.0

67.4

64.5

72.673.372.476.782.176.775.881.878.279.677.287.372.077.482.782.893.088.1

82.578.589.690.6-

98.289.492.888.698.1

73.729.383.949.888.384.075.677.895.895.0

86.3

93.2

67.4

76.978.576.882.683.881.078.276.182.882.789.792.073.380.989.584.295.294.2

85.283.286.987.397.1

96.396.893.690.399.9

79.136.090.349.894.988.274.185.594.696.8

87.1

95.8

71.2

5.45.24.75.25.85.35.54.95.25.66.16.35.54.75.95.59.57.8

6.25.47.26.8-

7.26.16.96.09.5

5.02.06.73.56.56.55.55.26.98.5

6.6

7.1

5.0

5.95.45.35.86.25.85.65.05.96.06.47.15.75.26.75.69.98.4

6.66.06.36.79.9

6.77.17.36.110.6

5.22.67.83.67.56.95.35.47.69.8

6.8

7.6

5.6

574.6533.9567.8569.3582.7578.1581.2581.8584.4575.7550.8569.5564.5555.8571.2567.6582.8583.1

564.9551.5559.0561.8-

549.6564.3563.5558.1577.3

551.6495.9568.3475.1537.7564.6574.2556.0584.8579.1

568.8

573.6

566.9

571.22571.76571.52576.33577.30568.18581.93578.74571.20574.22572.78574.61572.98574.53573.82574.30582.28575.47

565.37556.85570.32563.52

578.03578.10577.10579.54582.83

583.32579.50583.43451.70578.03587.19579.79578.50588.93590.27

571.8

576.9

579.9

64.561.062.463.365.563.866.166.666.165.565.368.865.261.262.564.673.371.3

65.461.766.866.6-

69.864.667.064.974.3

56.843.966.748.965.664.664.460.869.671.0

66.2

68.2

60.2

62.762.561.562.763.161.864.060.963.863.567.268.063.559.462.162.771.469.7

62.559.862.562.168.3

64.766.265.567.373.0

57.048.765.643.667.363.960.160.866.069.7

62.9

67.2

58.8

20725824523218122516815716818118692

1882552422012853

184250150157

7520114719417

2812911542891782012122597859

20

13

25

1951992291971802221512361601706856

1722592121941328

20225520020950

13289

105673

26529110429466

1572522419230

19

5

25

-1.71.6

-1.3-1.2-1.9-1.8-1.8-2.6-1.9-1.81.7

-1.4-1.7-1.7-1.0-1.7-1.9-1.8

-2.0-1.7-2.3-2.4

-2.61.7

-1.61.9

-1.7

0.72.1

-1.5-2.21.7

-1.3-2.30.4

-2.3-1.7

-2.1

-1.5

-1.5

(continued)

Note:Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey.

The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both Regency and Citya)


ProvinceDistrict


6


ProvinceDistrict

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatera

13. West Sumatera




Lifeexpectancy a)

Proportion ofpopulation

(years)(% of totals) (%) (%)

Adultliteracy rate

(years)


Share ofearned income

GDI GDI Rank

69.6

69.1

67.4

65.869.869.368.670.171.269.570.470.270.5

68.466.367.467.167.468.969.267.372.767.968.770.468.972.271.571.271.1

66.262.062.169.166.369.166.662.870.868.272.171.271.868.7

49.9

49.9

51.4

48.550.648.450.149.149.952.950.450.149.7

49.150.150.548.749.849.750.750.251.049.049.749.949.749.650.551.049.7

49.851.148.852.752.452.353.650.351.250.353.453.150.851.5

65.6

65.1

63.5

62.065.865.364.766.167.265.666.566.366.6

64.562.563.563.263.664.965.263.568.764.064.866.464.968.267.567.267.1

62.358.358.565.262.565.262.859.266.864.368.267.367.964.8

50.1

50.1

48.6

51.549.451.649.950.950.147.149.649.950.3

50.949.949.551.350.250.349.349.949.051.150.450.150.450.449.549.050.3

50.348.951.247.347.647.746.449.748.849.746.646.949.248.5

90.1

93.6

92.6

87.385.792.395.486.891.283.791.796.892.6

81.698.789.893.794.490.889.994.692.890.595.697.595.297.496.898.195.7

89.893.088.490.990.992.193.691.096.296.695.796.597.896.0

96.2

98.0

97.0

95.296.095.599.095.797.592.297.698.797.0

89.899.997.998.898.596.797.599.198.597.798.799.598.999.398.899.599.0

97.396.494.995.896.696.896.196.998.298.599.398.699.798.3

6.8

7.5

7.2

5.76.26.67.45.67.46.07.110.08.0

5.07.46.47.66.76.36.66.97.37.17.38.57.49.08.69.58.5

6.66.06.66.96.16.76.76.29.58.77.79.49.58.3

7.7

8.5

7.7

6.97.87.38.36.88.57.57.510.58.7

6.48.17.58.97.87.57.78.48.68.38.19.18.29.99.310.39.3

7.36.37.37.27.07.26.97.09.78.78.09.79.98.5

30.7

32.1

34.2

24.543.026.328.627.534.132.733.723.227.9

42.144.241.547.318.128.539.450.146.928.224.527.718.524.325.727.028.8

29.938.036.734.333.237.837.840.929.030.129.638.829.133.1

69.3

67.9

65.8

75.557.073.771.472.565.967.366.376.872.1

57.955.858.552.781.971.560.649.953.171.875.572.381.575.774.373.071.2

70.162.063.365.766.862.262.259.171.069.970.461.270.966.9

59.0

61.2

60.7

51.763.056.758.056.262.657.258.857.556.0

49.864.860.965.946.857.463.161.369.058.455.160.449.559.458.860.761.0

57.558.659.360.358.262.860.560.561.860.859.467.362.762.1

8

3

5

22624

13810814628

12686

118152

24212508

26612422474

9717863

24475875449

120918064

1032658574053766

2732

Gender-relatedDevelopment Index (GDI)by District, 1999

7

MaleMale Male Male MaleFemaleFemale Female Female Female


14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatera

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta







Lifeexpectancy a)

(years) (%) (%)

Adultliteracy rate

(years)



GDI GDI Rank

69.8

68.6

67.4

67.1

67.9

73.2

66.670.070.367.670.772.271.4

70.265.468.167.769.770.4

69.764.365.765.263.168.668.368.969.770.3

65.764.067.571.4

67.068.767.067.069.7

73.173.672.273.573.3

49.2

49.6

49.6

49.1

48.6

50.2

48.649.449.648.849.050.348.5

49.950.249.650.147.050.7

49.247.950.149.050.249.349.349.651.350.6

49.449.248.449.6

48.848.348.947.848.8

50.749.350.650.650.3

65.8

64.7

63.5

63.3

64.0

69.3

62.866.066.463.766.768.367.4

66.261.664.263.865.866.4

65.860.561.961.459.464.764.465.065.866.4

61.960.263.667.4

63.164.863.163.165.7

69.269.768.369.669.4

50.8

50.4

50.4

50.9

51.4

49.8

51.450.650.451.251.049.751.5

50.149.850.449.953.049.3

50.852.149.951.049.850.750.850.448.749.4

50.650.851.650.4

51.351.751.252.251.2

49.350.749.449.449.7

93.7

90.5

90.3

89.4

88.3

96.8

89.895.987.693.593.898.994.5

93.488.688.692.187.993.0

87.890.092.593.487.990.782.190.094.089.7

85.389.086.897.3

88.384.489.690.493.7

96.697.896.296.895.6

97.4

96.9

96.5

95.9

95.1

98.9

95.897.994.497.897.2100.098.3

96.496.397.198.295.897.7

95.196.898.398.894.695.993.097.198.097.4

95.595.993.799.3

95.093.994.794.298.8

98.999.099.298.898.7

6.9

6.1

6.2

6.5

5.9

9.0

6.15.96.25.86.69.78.6

7.25.65.45.25.38.0

5.75.06.06.45.75.15.46.28.17.3

5.56.05.39.7

5.55.75.35.48.2

9.49.59.08.78.5

7.8

7.4

7.1

7.5

6.8

10.4

7.36.56.96.87.410.49.5

8.17.27.16.76.49.0

6.76.07.07.36.75.96.57.19.38.5

6.87.06.310.6

6.66.66.06.59.1

10.710.710.410.210.0

21.1

24.9

24.0

31.6

29.0

25.2

29.117.416.524.314.119.522.2

24.330.430.024.715.323.3

31.524.120.227.427.626.619.516.224.621.8

37.134.134.027.4

27.630.231.527.827.2

27.123.127.525.323.9

78.9

75.1

76.0

68.4

71.0

74.8

70.982.683.575.785.980.577.8

75.769.670.075.384.776.7

68.575.979.872.672.473.480.583.875.478.2

62.965.966.072.6

72.469.868.572.272.8

72.976.972.574.776.1

53.1

54.6

52.4

59.4

57.0

61.2

57.447.946.554.444.854.957.9

55.955.858.053.344.855.6

59.249.947.655.051.646.747.445.755.953.2

59.458.759.563.0

55.458.055.755.660.0

64.760.361.960.959.1

24

18

25

7

12

2

123253270187280181113

156157109204279167

83241256179228267258276153205

78897325

17010716116569

1365375284

Male Male Male MaleFemale Female Female Female

Proportion ofpopulation(% of totals)

MaleFemale

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict


7


32. West Java

33. Central Java



Lifeexpectancy a)

(years) (%) (%)

Adultliteracy rate

(years)



GDI GDI Rank

66.2

70.3

63.463.867.164.365.568.561.267.465.866.864.864.868.465.166.965.364.368.565.661.469.767.670.269.169.068.5

69.170.169.469.469.169.669.669.971.471.171.173.273.272.869.872.069.973.769.871.770.772.772.7

49.6

50.4

48.047.150.349.349.648.750.050.749.850.849.551.450.549.150.248.350.647.649.849.349.351.650.350.150.448.6

49.949.849.350.450.049.248.651.350.851.651.250.751.551.250.250.350.351.650.849.948.151.150.5

62.4

66.3

59.760.163.260.561.764.657.663.662.062.961.161.164.561.363.161.560.564.661.957.865.763.766.265.165.164.6

65.266.165.465.465.265.765.766.067.467.267.269.269.368.965.868.066.069.865.867.766.868.768.8

50.4

49.6

52.152.949.750.750.451.350.049.450.249.250.548.649.550.949.851.749.452.550.350.750.748.449.749.949.651.4

50.150.250.749.650.150.951.448.749.248.448.849.348.548.849.849.749.848.449.250.151.948.949.5

89.2

78.4

90.987.991.894.993.293.195.895.091.787.681.585.193.655.280.691.980.182.483.988.596.497.197.292.191.795.7

77.286.681.281.582.081.380.880.674.372.377.668.370.762.578.066.978.672.183.776.083.183.987.5

95.2

91.4

95.693.695.897.298.196.498.297.597.196.191.993.097.778.691.997.189.392.693.696.398.498.299.597.696.998.8

91.195.891.190.392.591.592.192.388.990.891.085.087.081.493.481.591.588.994.290.595.195.294.6

6.2

5.4

4.84.97.55.35.26.65.76.06.05.65.05.56.43.14.75.74.76.26.05.28.78.19.07.78.18.7

4.75.84.95.25.25.75.05.75.45.86.64.85.44.54.94.25.45.06.35.35.35.95.3

7.3

6.7

5.86.28.56.06.27.46.76.66.86.76.46.47.24.76.06.76.07.47.36.59.89.1

10.39.29.5

10.1

6.17.05.86.16.56.95.87.07.07.78.26.46.96.26.35.36.56.37.56.66.97.36.0

26.1

30.4

26.622.225.619.826.324.529.125.836.824.923.522.929.219.929.928.521.913.822.924.026.825.528.723.825.221.7

23.328.019.234.926.929.430.335.238.837.335.033.231.931.231.731.528.129.832.724.330.931.640.5

73.9

69.6

73.477.874.480.273.775.570.974.263.275.176.577.170.880.170.171.578.186.277.176.073.274.571.376.274.878.3

76.772.080.865.173.170.669.764.861.262.765.066.868.168.868.368.571.970.267.375.769.168.459.5

54.6

57.4

52.949.555.747.453.955.954.154.562.053.049.348.558.540.255.757.146.142.650.449.360.656.462.455.756.955.4

50.357.446.759.455.258.257.960.561.961.461.858.558.355.258.155.355.956.860.353.460.461.165.5

17

10

20724516425919515419118634

20624825192

28816213027428423724755

14429

163133169

23912126877

1741041145638454195

10117510517115513566

203614810



MaleFemale

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict


7





34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

Lifeexpectancy a)

(years) (%) (%)

Adultliteracy rate

(years)



GDI GDI Rank

66.670.168.466.467.165.171.173.071.572.270.168.5

73.471.572.173.774.2

71.868.571.472.170.569.868.266.861.566.160.563.160.263.169.969.568.668.868.871.668.967.467.768.469.362.658.362.962.670.471.768.1

72.9

67.4

50.251.550.250.350.050.752.150.852.051.550.449.8

49.549.649.849.851.2

50.851.650.451.950.749.949.851.252.051.051.351.350.150.251.451.150.851.351.450.450.848.250.250.748.752.152.350.952.751.350.051.0

49.9

50.8

62.766.164.562.663.261.467.169.167.668.366.164.6

69.567.568.269.870.4

67.964.667.568.266.565.864.362.957.962.357.059.456.659.465.965.564.764.964.967.765.063.563.964.565.359.054.959.259.066.467.764.2

69.0

63.5

49.848.549.849.750.049.347.949.248.048.549.650.2

50.550.450.250.248.8

49.248.449.648.149.350.150.348.848.049.048.748.749.949.848.648.949.248.748.649.649.251.849.849.351.347.947.749.147.348.750.049.0

50.1

49.2

77.279.876.674.178.075.989.089.392.890.384.880.4

75.574.274.678.491.7

72.567.482.479.376.379.177.371.463.273.953.955.157.976.993.283.382.978.771.672.070.970.464.473.287.055.946.864.557.588.787.691.6

78.3

74.5

91.691.992.490.989.390.398.196.898.997.295.092.8

90.491.292.393.098.6

89.784.792.291.288.792.391.483.683.190.774.675.079.489.497.892.294.492.188.492.088.186.583.288.295.671.564.482.177.797.697.097.4

93.0

88.6

4.84.64.74.65.14.28.28.18.58.06.55.9

6.15.86.67.59.6

4.74.75.35.75.35.64.94.73.94.73.63.73.34.78.25.66.35.44.85.14.54.64.25.07.03.12.03.82.97.87.58.0

7.1

5.3

6.05.56.05.96.15.59.89.710.09.47.67.3

7.67.87.79.511.1

6.06.06.16.66.27.16.15.75.16.65.25.14.96.09.46.87.86.86.37.16.16.25.56.38.24.53.05.54.69.28.89.2

8.8

6.7

34.025.827.030.424.226.433.735.541.833.628.525.4

39.035.446.138.336.0

39.234.040.229.531.329.228.425.021.632.921.730.020.429.324.829.129.728.932.735.127.122.222.429.623.935.037.626.931.232.228.032.6

38.7

28.7

66.074.273.069.675.873.666.364.558.266.471.574.6

61.064.653.961.764.0

60.866.059.870.568.770.871.675.078.467.178.370.079.670.775.270.970.371.167.364.972.977.877.670.476.165.062.473.168.867.872.067.4

61.3

71.3

57.352.152.353.750.249.764.266.569.864.657.454.3

64.662.163.567.469.4

61.555.063.557.257.256.554.347.839.155.437.646.637.751.156.756.157.254.656.460.451.747.045.553.955.147.343.545.446.462.260.262.0

66.4

53.2

1252212171992402431772

15122188

14332153

4318020

12912814218925429116829426929323113715012718414560

227263277193176260282278271316736

1

23



MaleFemale

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict


7







51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan

Lifeexpectancy a)

(years) (%) (%)

Adultliteracy rate

(years)



GDI GDI Rank

69.466.072.071.170.2

71.974.772.572.769.172.568.367.973.9

58.157.757.758.159.660.264.7

63.560.765.367.167.065.364.767.967.664.666.665.965.3

58.566.568.466.867.966.467.0

71.6

59.4

65.5

65.9

50.652.650.151.450.2

49.050.948.349.051.848.949.651.450.2

51.852.754.149.249.750.750.5

49.748.949.349.449.649.751.354.053.253.652.250.748.3

48.849.148.948.849.149.449.6

50.0

51.9

50.7

49.0

65.562.268.167.166.3

67.970.968.668.865.168.664.464.069.8

54.754.354.354.756.156.760.9

59.857.261.563.363.261.561.064.063.860.862.862.161.5

55.162.764.563.064.062.663.2

67.5

55.9

61.7

62.1

49.447.449.948.649.8

51.049.151.851.048.351.150.448.649.8

48.247.345.950.850.349.349.5

50.451.150.750.650.450.348.746.046.846.447.849.351.8

51.250.951.151.250.950.650.4

50.0

48.1

49.3

51.0

78.982.289.787.290.5

77.878.881.268.370.571.854.374.990.7

55.055.263.577.276.775.182.1

64.972.272.164.877.472.586.378.483.185.490.778.094.5

74.375.474.277.473.677.782.7

75.4

65.4

77.4

76.1

94.294.197.496.697.2

91.692.493.286.887.485.178.192.496.9

73.775.675.191.987.789.093.8

73.282.078.670.381.974.493.087.686.793.294.488.896.9

89.891.089.190.685.687.895.2

90.2

81.2

83.5

90.2

6.36.57.77.98.4

5.46.17.15.45.14.73.25.29.0

3.23.44.45.35.55.96.8

4.75.14.63.95.04.95.65.05.05.26.14.79.3

4.44.94.54.54.45.37.2

5.9

4.5

5.2

5.0

8.07.89.19.69.8

6.98.09.07.27.26.35.07.310.4

4.95.45.36.76.57.08.9

5.25.75.24.65.55.26.96.05.56.26.75.710.3

5.76.35.65.75.56.48.5

7.7

6.0

5.9

6.2

30.527.027.829.727.1

31.734.828.929.935.537.336.728.630.5

26.730.825.432.137.633.528.6

35.031.835.823.927.630.136.242.838.154.344.241.226.3

34.732.436.933.928.027.525.3

33.0

30.2

36.7

32.5

69.573.072.270.372.9

68.365.271.170.164.562.763.371.469.5

73.369.274.667.962.466.571.4

65.068.264.276.172.469.963.857.261.945.755.858.873.7

65.367.663.166.172.072.574.7

67.0

69.8

63.3

67.5

57.952.459.960.459.7

60.164.161.357.658.062.054.153.865.1

39.142.438.851.553.852.254.6

42.450.553.939.646.445.951.956.248.555.862.359.458.2

52.255.858.456.852.352.354.1

60.4

45.9

56.8

55.7

112213716272

681846

11710635

19019711

290286292229198218185

2852361942892722752241482501583079

102

22015998

134216215192

6

26

14

15



MaleFemale

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict


7




64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi







Lifeexpectancy a)

(years) (%) (%)

Adultliteracy rate

(years)



GDI GDI Rank

71.2

62.8

71.0

70.0

64.5

70.3

71.469.971.668.172.374.2

68.163.464.159.466.662.763.760.562.866.4

72.667.969.573.272.170.6

66.971.872.473.166.372.869.6

65.463.161.963.968.3

68.170.472.865.868.6

48.8

50.5

49.1

49.6

49.4

51.3

49.448.148.949.649.448.4

48.549.650.350.552.051.951.251.851.549.9

46.749.748.547.150.749.3

50.648.348.449.551.950.947.7

48.949.549.548.950.1

52.852.152.252.151.1

67.3

59.1

67.0

66.1

60.7

66.3

67.465.967.664.268.470.3

64.259.760.456.062.759.060.056.959.162.6

68.764.165.669.368.266.6

63.167.868.569.262.568.865.6

61.659.458.360.164.4

64.266.468.962.064.7

51.2

49.6

50.9

50.5

50.6

48.7

50.651.951.150.450.651.7

51.550.549.749.548.048.148.848.248.550.1

53.350.451.552.949.350.8

49.451.751.650.548.149.152.3

51.250.550.551.149.9

47.247.947.847.949.0

92.8

89.4

90.0

97.3

90.3

79.6

91.190.592.994.893.897.7

80.587.993.385.289.289.387.289.487.094.2

79.490.387.487.492.693.9

95.295.299.095.899.199.697.6

88.694.686.190.197.1

79.577.267.365.473.0

96.9

96.3

96.8

97.2

94.9

87.1

95.196.297.098.697.798.6

91.094.597.796.997.194.995.197.696.798.4

93.496.793.195.798.498.2

93.497.399.095.198.799.897.9

94.097.992.593.999.2

89.882.674.172.581.2

6.6

5.9

7.1

7.5

6.6

6.0

6.16.26.36.76.39.3

4.85.36.44.85.45.45.45.45.57.8

4.86.66.16.48.18.3

6.26.57.77.28.79.97.8

5.97.15.86.09.3

5.15.74.44.75.0

7.5

7.2

8.5

7.6

7.4

7.0

7.37.36.97.57.1

10.2

6.06.97.65.86.76.46.56.77.39.1

6.28.27.27.59.59.7

5.86.97.67.28.7

10.58.3

6.97.76.66.8

10.5

6.16.84.85.15.8

26.5

33.2

21.1

21.6

27.1

26.8

18.021.026.033.935.729.1

29.630.332.738.934.639.842.440.734.925.6

16.523.323.420.918.524.4

25.919.523.432.829.921.714.2

30.728.427.219.526.6

28.627.529.730.931.0

73.5

66.8

78.9

78.4

72.9

73.2

82.079.074.066.164.370.9

70.469.767.361.165.460.257.659.365.174.4

83.576.776.679.181.575.6

74.180.576.667.270.178.385.8

69.371.672.880.573.4

71.472.570.369.169.0

57.9

56.9

53.5

53.9

54.1

53.3

49.352.057.761.764.465.7

56.055.258.356.658.559.560.458.557.056.4

47.253.453.555.151.958.0

53.552.458.664.059.257.546.9

56.654.951.246.159.1

52.252.752.449.353.8

9

13

21

20

19

22

24922211642169

15117310014193745994

131143

261202201177223110

200212901981

119264

14018223027385

219208214246196



MaleFemale

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict


7







81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

ProvinceDistrict

Lifeexpectancy a)

(years) (%) (%)

Adultliteracy rate

(years)



GDI GDI Rank

72.071.570.669.168.669.272.769.271.570.574.173.574.964.864.169.073.573.9

68.165.967.166.667.1

72.265.767.767.573.5

59.766.267.568.070.066.068.164.666.068.6

66.9

69.3

66.4

49.352.151.751.952.652.555.053.252.051.550.749.648.052.551.648.351.251.4

51.050.149.249.650.8

50.550.249.548.850.8

48.448.949.047.547.548.647.048.949.348.6

50.1

50.0

48.4

68.067.566.665.264.765.268.765.267.566.670.269.671.161.060.465.069.670.0

64.262.163.262.863.2

68.361.963.863.769.6

56.262.463.664.166.062.264.260.962.264.7

63.1

65.4

62.6

50.747.948.348.147.447.545.046.848.048.549.350.452.047.648.451.748.848.6

49.049.950.850.449.2

49.549.850.551.249.2

51.651.151.052.552.551.453.051.150.751.4

50.0

50.0

51.7

72.376.773.078.982.977.476.072.378.677.684.689.067.577.086.578.492.991.7

81.176.681.883.695.5

95.495.690.885.9100.0

75.023.786.942.294.085.065.281.892.094.7

82.6

94.2

64.8

81.780.581.186.984.885.481.080.787.988.395.095.078.685.393.089.497.797.0

89.990.991.991.098.8

97.398.196.394.699.9

83.048.393.557.495.791.482.489.297.398.7

91.8

97.4

77.3

5.55.24.85.26.25.45.34.55.55.45.86.65.24.96.35.09.37.8

6.05.35.76.29.3

6.46.96.85.610.5

4.51.57.12.96.96.14.44.76.99.1

6.2

7.3

4.8

6.55.75.96.46.36.36.15.76.56.77.17.66.15.57.16.210.59.0

7.26.86.97.210.6

7.07.37.96.610.8

5.93.78.54.28.07.66.26.18.310.4

7.4

8.0

6.4

29.126.022.318.621.828.025.819.220.921.635.124.233.732.328.028.227.329.8

37.035.533.824.225.3

26.234.527.230.136.9

32.948.126.346.417.927.625.230.329.324.1

32.2

31.3

35.2

70.974.077.781.478.272.074.280.879.178.464.975.866.367.772.071.872.770.2

63.064.566.275.874.7

73.865.572.869.963.1

67.151.973.753.682.172.474.869.770.775.9

67.8

68.7

64.8

55.651.146.843.947.251.850.341.847.548.163.156.659.952.552.555.361.461.8

59.256.258.450.856.9

57.960.956.757.869.8

52.647.756.243.450.755.851.154.658.858.4

57.4

61.0

55.7

16623326528126222523828725725223139702102111724439

8214799234132

111511361151

2092551492832351602321838896

11

4

16


7



MaleFemale

(continued)


The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both Regency and Citya)



11. Aceh

12. North Sumatera

13. West Sumatera




8.3

2.8

6.1

0.03.32.20.02.60.00.08.90.05.0

0.02.23.32.50.02.26.73.30.04.44.45.04.0

10.00.02.20.0

2.52.58.60.02.20.05.72.22.30.00.05.0

15.012.5

54.4

53.8

58.8

47.841.857.954.537.359.347.562.653.358.5

45.163.251.753.952.561.159.563.460.442.354.065.671.749.056.254.260.9

55.455.152.867.845.471.874.362.056.253.956.256.361.558.4

38.4

41.0

40.3

32.245.230.641.138.736.645.241.631.735.7

46.148.745.149.932.037.244.550.749.738.735.035.429.334.929.535.835.1

34.341.741.040.342.543.943.042.534.835.735.942.739.940.6

49.9

49.9

51.4

48.550.648.450.149.149.952.950.450.149.7

49.150.150.548.749.849.750.750.251.049.049.749.949.749.650.551.049.7

49.851.148.852.752.452.353.650.351.250.353.453.150.851.5

271.9

261.9

299.6

295.4340.4258.7265.8219.6323.3224.2290.9260.9219.1

342.2311.6337.7329.7242.4219.1252.2350.5312.4214.0291.4289.2217.8205.4265.1282.6228.6

321.5278.2331.7284.1257.2317.3263.0291.0331.9313.9281.1308.8253.6247.2

383.4

385.6

389.5

433.2372.6319.2463.6364.6360.1380.1408.1401.9314.7

401.8373.2390.7366.4517.5325.8311.1359.1349.9344.9482.5412.7398.7343.2320.2427.2304.8

392.8325.0397.2366.7382.7408.2327.1310.3433.4404.5375.2363.3411.0340.9

52.4

47.3

51.5

38.550.642.540.642.243.442.450.337.443.3

36.649.050.152.530.742.754.046.948.647.543.444.331.150.938.642.940.0

45.949.858.140.746.440.945.549.144.643.040.153.157.257.9

6

16

8

24562

20622821218920863

253191

261896743

28420229

12495

11019017028359

243201233

139725

22713522414684

16419923237117

ProvinceDistrict

Women in theparliament(% of total) (% of total) GEM

GEMRank


positions(% of total) (% of total)

(Thousand Rp)

Female Male


Femalepopulation

Average non-agricultural wage

Gender EmpowerementMeasure (GEM),by District, 1999

8


14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatera

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta







(continued)

2.0

8.0

3.2

10.0

4.5

7.9

2.54.46.74.47.00.0

--

2.90.07.5

10.05.0

12.5

8.911.12.94.56.7

13.62.23.37.0

12.0

0.07.72.2

10.0

2.24.44.40.02.2

--------–

43.2

37.5

52.4

45.5

46.1

34.9

45.244.240.439.747.444.041.8

51.140.835.533.623.244.2

48.143.849.548.267.246.449.652.857.835.7

22.153.949.548.1

46.547.345.325.149.5

40.739.436.631.023.9

30.1

31.6

36.7

39.5

36.9

34.6

35.027.927.534.827.028.531.9

37.930.636.032.822.829.4

36.433.138.739.338.639.632.126.836.732.5

41.641.437.837.0

35.837.237.937.136.5

35.730.838.635.535.2

49.2

49.6

49.6

49.1

48.6

50.2

48.649.449.648.849.050.348.5

49.950.249.650.147.050.7

49.247.950.149.050.249.349.349.651.350.6

49.449.248.449.6

48.848.348.947.848.8

50.749.350.650.650.3

360.1

281.6

214.7

254.6

236.2

376.9

322.3216.4267.6263.0218.3400.0524.1

289.2365.8279.4241.6237.3283.3

255.2222.4246.3199.8190.1172.2228.6154.6212.3271.9

276.0254.1294.3243.1

216.8238.6210.8230.5250.8

385.0403.2331.2378.1353.6

579.4

393.3

393.7

360.1

337.6

593.2

423.2397.9511.9436.2492.4658.5861.7

549.0370.1367.3359.7387.6389.3

317.1346.6613.9343.2313.6311.3445.2292.5377.3470.6

333.5346.2347.4378.2

317.4326.3279.2353.2386.7

573.4596.7549.0613.7612.3

38.1

46.8

41.7

56.5

48.2

46.4

46.236.637.943.836.233.0

--

42.141.449.946.927.551.3

54.850.837.146.544.347.936.934.345.647.0

36.455.449.054.3

44.549.647.734.144.8

--------–

26

17

25

2

13

18

137262251176266279

21422169

12528855

2361

256132168103257276145122

265179028

16775

108277156

--------–

Women in theparliament(% of total) GEM

GEMRank(% of total)

Femalepopulation

ProvinceDistrict


8

(Thousand Rp)

Female Male


(% of total)





32. West Java

33. Central Java



(continued)

7.8

6.7

0.06.7

11.16.7

11.16.76.76.70.04.48.96.7

15.62.26.72.24.46.72.26.78.96.78.90.04.4

15.6

11.18.98.94.46.74.48.92.22.28.98.98.99.16.74.42.24.46.7

11.12.20.06.72.2

36.0

44.7

35.631.333.331.651.239.636.147.644.939.234.159.040.035.637.954.431.024.425.422.233.050.939.347.131.850.4

42.945.046.450.045.545.260.850.933.451.535.941.246.542.936.851.641.257.755.730.338.049.463.8

32.4

40.8

33.924.630.631.034.130.835.539.337.634.433.636.533.034.333.834.927.118.630.732.428.634.835.535.932.827.2

37.137.938.337.940.040.236.944.645.846.042.640.445.642.439.739.940.941.545.539.640.743.740.0

49.6

50.4

48.047.150.349.349.648.750.050.749.850.849.551.450.549.150.248.350.647.649.849.349.351.650.350.150.448.6

49.949.849.350.450.049.248.651.350.851.651.250.751.551.250.250.350.351.650.849.948.151.150.5

284.0

186.7

238.8287.6413.5163.9193.1254.9207.7157.7282.8176.7164.4176.0276.0136.9207.1252.8262.0265.3289.1223.4433.7226.7285.4216.0330.7310.2

155.9182.9101.7206.6152.9178.6180.8202.8197.0191.1214.0217.9150.7169.1214.6195.0199.8199.2158.9161.5182.8185.2216.5

384.4

294.7

338.5328.7529.7298.3280.3348.9278.0293.5292.3278.8270.9340.3330.0287.7247.5340.1348.2379.9431.6339.5473.5354.0389.3387.8478.9418.9

302.3287.3266.3235.5277.2288.2242.9300.6262.2273.4294.7297.1270.0274.0303.9281.9353.5332.3273.3329.3280.8311.3211.9

47.7

51.2

38.942.749.338.453.647.147.947.447.743.245.743.858.635.550.146.236.728.932.536.848.947.251.938.240.654.9

50.252.444.251.649.549.553.649.147.158.054.454.954.750.948.046.746.849.957.736.943.652.649.4

14

9

24120383

24634

119102111105193143177

427066

13826028528125992

11549

24722921

6446

1735179783286

1206

27222560

101128127719

2581824282


GEMRank(% of total)

Femalepopulation

ProvinceDistrict


8

(Thousand Rp)

Female Male


(% of total)








34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

(continued)

6.74.4

11.10.04.48.9

12.03.34.0

16.76.72.2

7.56.76.76.72.5

6.76.74.46.74.42.22.26.76.76.74.40.00.04.44.44.46.72.22.20.06.76.76.70.04.44.40.04.54.46.74.08.9

7.8

11.1

42.441.044.648.350.641.749.540.044.736.654.750.0

54.346.076.437.237.3

31.256.155.245.558.244.646.636.454.434.230.955.336.749.950.933.938.850.446.548.435.728.740.249.556.342.847.636.452.254.653.747.5

46.7

45.9

39.238.739.138.037.540.442.445.045.743.638.039.8

42.545.249.843.646.0

45.042.243.541.136.839.036.935.437.138.738.938.637.339.037.738.737.539.039.244.437.131.138.938.836.142.845.045.346.642.038.941.3

45.6

39.1

50.251.550.250.350.050.752.150.852.051.550.449.8

49.549.649.849.851.2

50.851.650.451.950.749.949.851.252.051.051.351.350.150.251.451.150.851.351.450.450.848.250.250.748.752.152.350.952.751.350.051.0

49.9

50.8

213.3119.4130.4171.7187.0156.4215.1245.4319.2225.2201.1170.6

230.6174.4283.9264.6219.5

207.0184.6191.1161.3198.1163.0147.5141.0157.6207.6135.6169.4118.4164.4209.5177.6199.1216.2193.3195.6153.8184.5151.7201.6194.3246.8227.3111.8163.9221.2188.9212.9

232.3

197.1

267.2216.3226.9240.5350.9296.2310.5365.6373.6344.6308.7331.1

266.5262.2328.8329.5332.1

262.3261.4218.4268.7253.0252.4217.6231.6337.4267.4312.2248.3274.1253.6384.0272.9283.3339.8256.5288.8243.8292.5334.6303.5349.3342.7308.0251.4314.7337.2309.1309.1

308.1

314.8

53.643.152.843.144.349.659.449.954.861.149.743.5

57.855.747.155.848.6

51.652.453.949.848.745.044.843.641.949.535.642.332.247.744.143.849.044.347.546.645.839.643.542.444.248.845.442.448.152.547.255.7

58.8

54.4

3319639

198169763

70241

74187

815

1211496

5245307394

15415818321980

26821028210717417888

17110912914123818520917293

14820710044

11616

1

4


GEMRank(% of total)

Femalepopulation

ProvinceDistrict


8

(Thousand Rp)

Female Male


(% of total)










51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan

(continued)

3.33.34.00.06.7

0.00.05.75.78.00.02.92.20.0

7.57.57.35.30.00.00.0

0.00.05.05.70.00.00.00.06.73.30.00.0

10.0

0.00.00.00.00.00.00.0

6.1

6.1

2.1

6.3

44.535.758.752.143.5

41.949.845.517.343.526.034.031.339.2

33.223.941.533.739.343.037.7

37.533.930.630.543.236.929.035.245.039.942.626.238.8

40.751.530.251.333.431.241.2

35.5

37.2

35.7

43.2

34.636.337.943.037.8

43.845.839.145.046.847.648.547.444.0

42.047.341.741.842.342.739.0

42.940.136.632.740.134.342.650.247.954.948.448.730.6

44.337.839.336.742.142.933.2

45.4

42.9

43.0

39.8

50.652.650.151.450.2

49.050.948.349.051.848.949.651.450.2

51.852.754.149.249.750.750.5

49.748.949.349.449.649.751.354.053.253.652.250.748.3

48.849.148.948.849.149.449.6

50.0

51.9

50.7

49.0

268.9179.3208.7222.8252.1

187.3221.8274.1178.9198.8213.0200.2148.2278.2

121.1126.3149.5281.3263.7232.9214.3

261.7193.4293.7189.2186.0190.9184.4176.7183.7330.1297.1222.1282.3

237.6301.5326.6295.2224.1219.4302.0

229.1

177.7

233.6

288.2

324.7276.3331.1397.6411.5

314.0350.5433.3342.8317.5323.9324.0334.1498.4

240.9254.9313.7425.8320.9345.2342.5

364.8278.2303.6292.0327.2231.5241.3237.7273.9338.5351.9301.2348.0

356.2382.3362.3333.7418.8434.7442.7

387.3

308.6

304.3

395.1

47.240.345.442.549.1

44.546.951.337.255.141.347.839.442.9

43.140.543.347.744.843.439.6

34.440.747.134.835.335.633.540.843.846.547.441.152.6

45.044.742.045.638.136.538.7

50.5

46.2

46.4

52.2

11723115020585

16612356

25519

222104239200

197230192106159188236

27522611827327126727822517513011222341

153162218144248263242

10

20

18

7


GEMRank(% of total)

Femalepopulation

ProvinceDistrict


8

(Thousand Rp)

Female Male


(% of total)







64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi






01. Selayar02. Bulukumba03. Bantaeng04. Jeneponto

(continued)

2.5

8.7

12.5

7.5

7.5

3.8

0.03.32.24.00.04.0

3.82.55.93.30.04.2

10.03.30.02.2

3.32.20.03.3

13.36.7

7.07.5

17.87.44.27.58.0

0.05.06.86.73.3

4.05.74.02.9

46.3

47.1

39.2

54.9

47.4

47.7

30.942.751.358.843.349.5

52.933.357.450.047.957.743.046.647.244.0

39.537.343.925.644.240.9

60.042.762.660.560.349.332.0

50.044.852.530.548.6

53.238.746.546.6

43.5

41.1

31.0

28.5

33.7

31.4

29.128.539.939.636.933.5

38.238.141.543.642.544.045.047.344.733.0

25.531.532.732.328.534.0

26.324.528.533.032.133.523.4

37.637.631.525.033.6

34.430.333.736.2

48.8

50.5

49.1

49.6

49.4

51.3

49.448.148.949.649.448.4

48.549.650.350.552.051.951.251.851.549.9

46.749.748.547.150.749.3

50.648.348.449.551.950.947.7

48.949.549.548.950.1

52.852.152.252.1

301.1

281.7

300.6

303.9

250.9

321.1

264.7302.6208.6299.2430.3383.3

246.3301.6259.9312.0251.8275.1344.1221.2257.7300.7

242.9382.8298.9214.0315.1265.8

309.8285.4276.1342.0278.8340.9200.3

214.9241.8257.1198.2284.6

241.1353.7299.9312.6

447.8

395.6

505.1

439.7

342.4

401.9

493.7453.4394.9382.7452.8471.6

361.7426.0379.2378.8351.0326.9382.6289.6387.9430.9

420.4578.6475.9387.4555.1424.1

316.1383.3359.9345.8308.6621.1369.8

292.0368.0316.4272.5398.2

315.6404.7360.7396.1

43.3

55.1

49.3

45.1

50.0

43.9

27.539.743.249.545.749.0

48.443.251.352.044.752.759.751.945.242.6

35.538.637.834.547.346.5

46.543.556.652.846.344.835.2

43.547.349.137.444.6

44.844.545.945.5

24

3

12

22

11

23

28723519581

14291

981945748

161402

50151204

269244252274113133

1311861238

136157272

18411487

254163

160165140147


GEMRank(% of total)

Femalepopulation

ProvinceDistrict


8

(Thousand Rp)

Female Male


(% of total)





05. Takalar06. Gowa07. Sinjai08. Maros09. Pangkep10. Barru11. Bone12. Soppeng13. Wajo14. Sidenreng Rappang15. Pinrang16. Enrekang17. Luwu18. Tana Toraja19. Polewali Mamasa20. Majene21. Mamuju71. Ujung Pandang72. Pare Pare





81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

(continued)

6.75.33.33.36.78.08.93.3

12.50.02.98.02.95.0

10.04.26.77.08.0

7.510.04.46.7

16.0

3.12.28.90.08.6

5.72.5

12.07.40.03.38.00.04.03.3

2.5

7.5

2.7

51.856.854.541.954.461.855.460.050.845.948.150.048.738.451.949.040.743.049.0

47.933.230.640.644.7

63.062.350.637.552.9

47.920.136.747.729.125.624.325.829.842.0

40.2

55.3

34.2

31.829.226.929.023.923.828.628.130.427.128.835.431.535.938.532.130.033.130.6

40.543.136.926.031.8

36.134.934.133.038.0

41.749.830.647.427.735.838.134.734.126.6

36.5

35.0

41.4

51.149.352.151.751.952.652.555.053.252.051.550.749.648.052.551.648.351.251.4

51.050.149.249.650.8

50.550.249.548.850.8

48.448.949.047.547.548.647.048.949.348.6

50.1

50.0

48.4

301.1263.6342.8229.4307.0288.4357.1304.6185.1215.5260.5373.5412.3309.9232.1338.5310.6348.4366.7

337.2262.8244.5347.2292.6

243.7311.3343.2304.8381.1

513.5478.2462.7581.1531.3471.0287.3447.3411.0539.1

300.9

333.0

490.1

312.0265.0358.1325.6421.4323.2367.7341.6339.7303.4382.7379.1593.1341.2303.9412.6339.3460.1380.1

390.5361.0279.9382.1401.9

388.6317.0475.3348.1400.1

748.4512.6572.1604.5932.6689.6523.8546.4513.2616.2

364.1

394.4

638.2

51.148.542.238.139.142.149.539.945.133.038.155.342.251.354.645.450.148.251.5

54.953.246.445.056.3

41.646.852.142.157.4

53.742.153.350.028.239.643.836.543.643.6

46.0

52.7

47.7

5897

21124924021777

23415228025018

2135426

149659953

2036

13415513

22012647

21510

312163568

286237179264181180

21

5

14


GEMRank(% of total)

Femalepopulation

Note:The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City


ProvinceDistrict


8

(Thousand Rp)

Female Male


(% of total)





ProvinceDistrict

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatera

13. West Sumatera




HumanPoverty Index (HPI)by District, 1998

9

People notexpectedto surviveage 40 a)

(%) (%) (%) (%)

Adultiliteracy rate

(%)

Populationwithout

access tosafe water

12.7

13.5

16.2

18.812.413.214.212.010.412.811.411.711.3

14.617.916.216.616.113.813.316.28.5

15.314.111.513.89.1

10.010.410.5

18.325.322.413.418.013.417.424.410.914.89.2

10.49.6

14.0

6.9

4.2

5.3

8.79.36.12.88.85.6

12.45.52.35.2

14.30.76.23.83.56.36.43.24.56.02.81.53.01.72.21.22.7

6.65.48.36.86.55.85.36.12.82.42.62.61.32.9

61.5

47.9

46.4

73.764.647.654.575.561.378.861.023.535.9

48.366.161.663.763.942.338.250.945.955.645.310.720.98.0

69.228.263.3

53.934.650.944.461.744.147.340.255.011.429.216.121.735.6

37.6

20.9

21.7

73.945.740.237.156.021.321.745.90.0

25.0

47.746.920.960.841.112.014.419.818.113.923.50.02.1

10.60.00.00.0

46.421.735.612.633.821.733.737.810.30.00.00.00.00.0

35.6

35.3

34.0

30.935.637.721.053.149.541.733.624.926.3

59.030.233.032.323.627.131.750.729.241.437.334.726.729.323.236.336.4

32.434.932.538.241.039.138.132.528.128.528.018.621.031.8

HPI HPI Rank

31.4

24.5

24.4

41.734.029.326.542.830.733.332.612.520.6

36.333.727.436.630.219.720.228.721.726.325.011.813.411.721.615.523.3

31.424.629.122.632.224.728.327.821.912.313.79.6

10.816.8

23

11

9

842

100141

6814757

281229

2244

1281987

240236109209144164284276285212267190

7117210219861

171114120206282275292288257

Populationwithout

access tohealth

facilities


age five


14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatera

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta







(%) (%) (%)

Adultiliteracy rate

(%)

Populationwithout

access tosafe water

12.4

14.2

16.2

16.6

15.4

7.9

17.412.011.615.811.19.010.2

11.719.614.915.712.411.5

12.421.619.120.024.014.214.613.812.411.6

19.022.216.010.2

16.814.016.816.812.6

7.77.49.07.57.9

4.4

6.3

6.6

7.4

8.2

2.2

7.23.29.14.44.50.53.7

5.17.67.24.87.94.7

8.56.64.63.88.86.7

12.36.54.16.6

9.67.59.61.7

8.310.87.87.63.7

2.91.62.32.32.3

71.8

57.3

59.7

59.2

54.4

40.2

47.797.559.267.782.276.044.5

37.060.865.154.394.428.3

54.165.660.883.569.779.561.568.022.857.5

80.756.147.761.4

58.748.952.768.056.6

5.756.516.426.672.7

39.2

21.5

28.9

24.8

34.5

2.0

58.159.311.849.048.96.2

25.0

21.230.836.515.822.22.0

47.015.746.936.141.723.146.723.26.30.0

16.824.950.05.2

26.924.561.359.62.4

1.34.10.32.20.8

27.9

32.9

26.4

30.0

29.1

23.7

42.932.322.829.221.032.925.0

22.839.239.434.533.521.8

23.429.323.233.328.626.425.020.433.128.6

34.028.128.131.4

28.626.532.933.927.2

25.024.817.221.426.2

HPI HPI Rank

32.3

26.3

27.3

27.1

27.9

15.5

34.943.822.234.135.326.722.1

19.331.233.024.934.913.2

29.127.231.136.033.830.231.426.315.420.4

31.327.129.722.9

27.223.934.437.720.5

8.319.99.0

11.923.1

24

14

17

16

18

1

343

2024127

137204

2447549

16734

277

1021307923438771

144270234

7313397

195

1301843814

233

294239293283191

Populationwithout

access tohealth

facilities


age fiveProvinceDistrict


9


(%)


32. West Java

33. Central Java



(continued)

(%) (%) (%)

Adultiliteracy rate

(%)

Populationwithout

access tosafe water

18.2

11.7

23.322.516.721.719.414.326.916.118.917.220.620.614.520.116.919.721.714.319.226.512.615.811.813.513.614.3

13.411.913.013.013.412.612.612.110.210.510.57.97.98.3

12.49.4

12.17.3

12.49.8

11.08.58.4

7.8

15.2

6.89.26.34.04.45.33.23.86.18.3

13.411.14.4

33.313.85.5

15.212.411.37.82.62.41.75.45.72.9

15.88.8

13.814.112.813.713.513.818.618.916.023.621.728.414.425.915.220.011.216.910.810.69.0

62.1

47.8

52.660.659.056.662.270.864.980.060.765.356.953.559.159.770.753.170.151.277.363.968.947.233.817.867.874.9

58.851.068.963.756.357.833.828.937.154.764.841.358.340.935.024.820.953.649.844.652.341.650.7

22.4

17.1

44.551.315.434.655.914.321.210.413.622.423.412.634.330.429.322.226.924.330.729.111.30.04.40.0

20.00.0

24.317.617.117.136.512.346.627.320.017.117.125.917.151.325.930.114.929.614.431.414.428.517.1

27.2

30.5

39.623.929.532.531.821.225.930.527.732.333.937.319.925.734.828.932.511.620.335.531.410.922.927.318.511.6

33.321.030.021.632.724.133.928.019.125.318.617.728.830.720.334.050.635.443.040.028.532.733.1

HPI HPI Rank

26.9

23.2

33.032.724.929.935.325.128.828.524.928.528.125.726.732.532.025.531.521.430.731.926.115.515.012.625.120.8

27.821.327.524.629.622.827.120.720.024.124.323.026.031.320.224.521.328.625.427.722.624.123.6

15

7

4955

1679427

1621071121671121171551375964

15670

2148166

147267272279162224

12021612717298

19713322823818218119314973

236176216111158124198182187

Populationwithout

access tohealth

facilities




9


(%)





34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

(continued)

(%) (%) (%)

Adultiliteracy rate

(%)

Populationwithout

access tosafe water

17.511.914.517.816.720.110.68.19.99.0

11.914.4

7.610.09.27.36.7

9.614.310.19.2

11.312.314.817.226.318.328.224.028.924.012.212.814.213.813.99.8

13.716.115.614.613.224.834.124.424.811.59.8

15.0

8.2

16.2

15.714.215.817.716.517.06.67.14.36.4

10.213.5

17.217.417.114.34.9

19.224.312.815.017.614.415.822.827.518.136.235.631.717.04.6

12.511.614.920.318.520.621.426.219.78.7

37.045.127.333.27.17.75.6

14.5

18.7

48.670.771.358.370.944.018.139.016.815.362.521.4

39.953.742.946.460.5

47.835.348.954.752.252.339.057.244.560.346.760.751.565.726.640.949.442.844.626.143.438.438.544.246.743.348.343.844.664.670.242.1

48.9

43.0

17.117.113.417.110.323.80.00.00.06.60.00.0

23.79.69.58.60.0

17.114.210.414.117.117.134.236.427.117.134.518.317.129.512.111.117.117.117.117.131.728.123.912.910.544.722.829.536.40.00.00.0

8.6

17.1

34.321.933.634.439.641.519.214.021.029.329.731.2

21.524.07.5

18.111.3

19.812.529.917.526.617.123.434.933.134.440.033.754.329.833.022.828.427.922.613.439.227.533.339.529.448.343.462.932.521.120.025.9

17.3

30.7

HPI HPI Rank

24.926.128.327.229.227.410.412.910.112.622.015.3

21.121.816.618.116.8

21.720.621.421.023.621.323.831.730.127.735.633.434.631.217.318.722.921.822.316.728.124.626.224.520.837.639.635.032.820.321.217.2

18.5

23.4

167147114130101128289278291279205271

221207261249257

2092292142221872161856890

12424463775

25324619520720125911717214617622415123254

235220254

2

8

Populationwithout

access tohealth

facilities




9


(%)







51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan

(continued)

(%) (%) (%)

Adultiliteracy rate

(%)

Populationwithout

access tosafe water

12.918.69.3

10.611.7

11.26.18.78.4

13.58.7

14.615.37.2

34.535.735.734.531.228.820.9

23.227.819.816.616.819.720.815.315.821.117.518.719.8

33.717.714.517.115.317.816.7

11.7

31.5

19.5

18.6

13.812.36.58.36.2

15.314.612.522.421.421.533.916.86.2

36.335.631.415.318.018.212.2

31.022.824.532.520.526.610.517.615.411.27.7

17.05.4

18.016.618.216.020.417.211.1

17.3

27.2

19.6

16.8

41.026.655.949.34.5

43.925.963.023.827.128.930.423.743.1

64.752.279.558.942.951.961.6

48.430.847.544.730.437.940.854.755.454.614.439.724.8

70.287.478.669.075.385.885.4

34.2

62.5

41.9

78.4

0.00.00.00.0

12.2

14.914.917.036.714.925.529.214.96.2

24.917.512.833.917.537.70.0

26.640.535.949.162.523.338.229.953.541.218.665.30.5

33.641.369.548.057.260.70.0

14.9

17.5

38.2

43.3

32.130.123.215.025.8

24.319.320.613.718.813.424.725.121.2

44.135.338.635.046.245.634.8

44.131.949.541.151.855.529.341.825.738.232.831.929.3

39.348.151.238.241.239.930.5

21.0

39.7

38.7

42.0

HPI HPI Rank

18.617.118.615.711.6

20.615.623.820.819.019.527.818.116.5

39.035.437.634.430.034.324.5

32.729.133.235.134.730.526.730.332.032.217.632.916.7

37.141.546.536.641.043.727.7

18.7

33.7

29.5

38.7

247255247265286

229266185224245241120249262

132615389240

176

5510248313683

137846461

25153

259

1892

19104

124

3

25

21

26

Populationwithout

access tohealth

facilities




9


(%)




64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi







(continued)

(%) (%) (%)

Adultiliteracy rate

(%)

Populationwithout

access tosafe water

10.4

24.5

10.7

12.0

21.2

11.7

10.212.29.9

15.18.96.7

15.023.322.031.517.624.722.828.324.417.8

8.615.312.77.89.2

11.3

16.99.68.88.0

18.08.4

12.7

19.724.025.422.514.7

15.011.58.3

19.014.1

5.2

7.2

6.5

2.8

7.4

16.8

6.96.65.03.34.71.9

14.28.84.59.26.98.09.06.88.33.8

13.26.49.78.34.53.9

5.73.81.04.61.10.32.2

8.63.8

10.68.01.9

15.820.429.531.223.2

68.2

46.7

35.8

44.5

51.7

49.1

40.680.571.455.573.171.3

53.034.658.990.448.864.557.749.643.74.8

55.743.452.062.28.0

18.9

65.039.133.945.846.138.435.5

36.045.857.754.370.1

73.148.542.366.658.8

26.2

16.2

19.6

26.1

30.2

26.0

26.222.531.642.760.80.5

29.016.223.559.216.216.216.228.15.30.0

24.731.421.518.90.5

12.0

39.316.720.742.615.323.90.0

25.043.634.835.05.7

20.542.733.922.133.9

30.5

29.0

31.9

25.8

34.9

33.9

22.230.926.851.723.634.2

28.219.327.330.129.029.029.029.029.038.6

23.334.832.328.131.734.6

32.527.420.022.730.121.529.9

30.932.738.933.530.9

37.533.947.148.245.2

HPI HPI Rank

29.0

24.4

20.6

22.7

28.4

26.3

20.931.230.135.036.524.6

26.520.627.143.523.027.826.028.322.214.3

24.526.025.025.410.315.8

32.219.517.525.822.519.516.1

23.130.032.429.925.2

31.230.231.735.333.5

20

10

4

5

19

13

22375903221

172

141229133

5193120149114202273

176149164158290264

61241252154200241263

191926094

161

7587682745

Populationwithout

access tohealth

facilities




9


(%)







81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict

(%) (%) (%)

Adultiliteracy rate

(%)

Populationwithout

access tosafe water

9.410.011.213.414.113.38.5

13.310.011.36.97.55.9

20.822.013.77.57.0

15.118.816.717.516.7

9.119.115.715.97.6

30.918.116.015.212.118.615.121.018.614.2

17.0

13.1

17.8

23.121.523.217.416.219.021.823.917.217.310.38.0

26.719.110.515.94.85.8

14.816.813.112.72.9

3.73.26.49.80.1

20.964.09.7

50.25.1

11.825.914.55.43.2

12.9

4.2

28.8

63.941.564.750.161.850.356.267.260.864.651.844.922.352.057.168.118.151.0

43.241.247.845.631.3

62.458.254.742.229.6

65.844.244.675.459.155.255.369.450.025.5

43.6

52.1

54.5

39.727.328.245.037.130.850.022.420.619.939.738.433.133.933.966.41.90.0

15.627.148.914.50.0

25.516.847.420.30.0

41.244.831.235.535.732.271.336.031.20.0

21.3

23.8

36.0

44.921.534.044.126.624.531.629.131.543.028.331.738.129.033.438.227.241.3

25.535.624.425.524.4

17.329.333.621.743.0

28.326.328.329.228.332.328.330.028.328.3

27.1

29.3

28.3

HPI HPI Rank

35.523.431.033.029.926.033.029.627.130.327.926.725.528.930.340.411.421.5

21.326.028.921.715.5

24.525.431.820.817.0

35.247.725.042.628.728.837.532.626.414.2

22.9

24.7

31.3

25189804994

1494998

13384

1191371561058411

287213

216149105209267

17615867

224256

301

1647

1091071757

143274

6

12

22

Populationwithout

access tohealth

facilities


age five


9


The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City.a)



(%)


ProvinceDistrict

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatera

13. West Sumatera




Health Conditionby District, 1999

10

Infantmortality

rate(%)

Population withhealth problem

(%)

Morbidityrate

39

41

48

54384043373739353635

4452484948424148264643364228313233

5370704152415167344428323042

22.0

15.8

32.0

21.819.619.417.515.818.021.428.526.131.4

23.314.319.617.918.012.811.320.25.5

21.015.616.111.711.610.812.613.0

20.548.531.932.335.332.434.523.324.748.449.844.838.943.1

11.9

9.1

19.4

13.913.412.913.57.28.09.9

13.115.620.2

10.67.7

12.811.011.88.68.57.04.2

11.08.7

11.07.76.66.77.28.4

15.129.323.219.222.517.823.514.112.329.633.420.121.922.9

6.8

5.9

6.9

8.45.78.17.17.47.16.45.65.86.7

3.66.57.75.84.66.98.55.27.54.85.48.56.17.75.87.16.0

6.56.67.37.77.67.57.07.86.15.16.35.75.25.8

38.4

48.4

34.5

39.750.042.434.438.826.430.240.038.439.4

44.149.651.246.062.241.849.356.620.243.758.143.427.953.159.348.440.3

29.641.539.525.735.030.235.634.532.829.528.344.935.036.8

(%)

Birth deliveryassisted by

medicalpersonnel

75.4

83.8

77.6

53.863.291.262.441.8

100.085.272.097.4

100.0

48.142.490.692.967.781.892.081.995.988.985.995.096.5

100.097.997.5

100.0

84.856.578.075.677.486.591.750.988.7

100.088.4

100.098.096.2

(days)

Average durationof illness

(%)

Populationself-medicating


14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatera

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta







Infantmortality

rate(%) (%)


(%)

Morbidityrate

38

43

48

49

46

24

51373647342832

365645473836

38615557664344423836

55624832

5042505039

2422282323

17.3

17.6

21.4

17.8

25.6

28.9

20.58.8

23.219.922.85.9

13.0

19.020.919.515.215.115.5

14.921.315.820.414.114.919.728.338.122.6

15.812.918.025.8

29.029.215.212.935.1

24.832.536.123.232.2

10.7

11.3

12.1

11.3

13.7

15.6

13.95.9

11.212.515.13.86.8

16.015.711.77.1

10.67.4

8.812.810.310.98.69.4

11.113.419.810.8

9.68.9

13.113.6

16.813.68.46.3

20.6

14.916.319.112.717.4

5.3

6.1

5.1

6.3

5.3

4.6

5.84.84.96.25.14.84.2

6.86.15.96.85.65.6

5.55.54.95.56.24.15.36.54.76.0

5.56.66.76.1

5.85.15.84.94.6

4.64.54.64.94.2

53.1

41.7

48.3

37.1

45.8

51.1

39.849.136.258.364.452.346.4

44.045.839.032.858.230.9

43.044.249.143.446.660.439.445.950.956.5

38.136.138.435.7

41.747.358.249.139.6

49.556.652.845.148.9

(%)


medicalpersonnel

68.3

60.2

73.8

71.0

57.4

93.6

71.740.474.432.878.790.897.0

83.949.439.434.944.893.0

85.843.873.455.980.168.664.678.296.888.8

56.671.463.791.4

57.846.430.697.059.0

95.193.9

100.093.887.9

(days)


(continued)

ProvinceDistrict


10

(%)



32. West Java

33. Central Java



(continued)

Infantmortality

rate(%) (%)


(%)

Morbidityrate

53

36

65634961564374485551595944575057614355733947364141

4137404041393937313233242425382937223830342626

22.2

28.6

15.821.820.927.028.116.826.526.625.422.129.022.825.711.921.538.028.820.517.419.115.926.225.129.022.211.4

29.330.734.920.331.622.827.826.421.731.125.217.638.025.329.325.724.232.723.330.923.932.130.6

12.8

16.0

10.412.613.713.818.410.216.214.910.016.615.414.915.57.8

10.920.016.713.09.5

10.310.013.813.612.69.58.1

17.214.020.311.716.612.614.816.09.7

16.412.29.3

14.914.318.215.115.818.315.221.614.615.715.2

6.1

5.6

6.65.36.15.55.86.16.38.06.86.56.77.47.77.15.95.15.23.95.46.15.55.66.94.95.65.5

5.95.15.35.66.26.35.75.94.95.86.36.54.95.94.84.85.35.04.26.25.55.15.9

50.1

46.1

43.852.844.453.657.753.453.345.448.531.954.450.939.454.357.767.462.051.649.137.549.549.447.947.236.157.1

52.555.344.840.151.337.246.743.137.641.838.231.645.236.947.849.428.341.244.538.640.845.056.7

(%)


medicalpersonnel

51.5

63.2

15.511.457.618.230.252.022.844.744.173.059.163.664.651.064.318.060.940.066.031.463.658.879.083.294.992.8

51.064.237.538.061.167.226.751.375.591.597.180.4

100.078.057.047.251.155.545.665.144.578.944.4

(days)


ProvinceDistrict


10

(%)






34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

(continued)

Infantmortality

rate(%) (%)


(%)

Morbidityrate

(%)


medicalpersonnel

(days)


513744524957332531283743

2332282220

2943312835384551735377667866383943424230424847444068866768363045

25

48

31.426.421.224.634.132.731.732.227.729.633.641.2

30.033.749.821.833.4

21.922.423.534.226.227.921.729.821.726.027.533.836.420.823.533.534.035.628.022.220.115.227.624.327.115.821.823.817.827.929.036.6

33.2

25.7

15.314.313.011.021.221.811.615.916.818.020.322.0

18.717.720.810.413.6

11.714.016.519.115.216.213.319.112.916.917.417.724.515.214.522.517.920.512.811.613.011.117.916.316.111.816.417.211.316.019.117.9

15.8

15.6

5.86.16.06.25.96.07.55.96.55.15.26.7

5.64.56.76.05.8

7.46.88.57.06.65.36.36.16.76.17.37.16.56.05.55.76.36.06.06.56.15.85.94.95.26.55.56.27.96.16.66.5

5.7

6.2

45.151.142.246.454.948.049.238.841.852.852.853.7

28.444.637.640.352.7

41.037.150.961.640.247.448.953.253.746.242.236.239.343.128.739.643.846.944.036.135.639.948.532.038.336.044.044.938.247.744.554.4

41.1

44.6

89.446.441.451.867.664.897.1

100.096.093.576.284.0

62.666.191.491.9

100.0

51.979.458.190.477.687.761.465.238.460.050.064.040.263.398.983.573.576.088.685.788.162.658.463.190.033.314.645.740.796.696.388.4

84.2

67.2

ProvinceDistrict


10

(%)








51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan

(continued)

Infantmortality

rate(%) (%)


(%)

Morbidityrate

3945293336

291827264127444622

86888886807859

647657495057594647605154

85524450465249

31

81

56

54

25.031.332.633.025.0

40.122.032.935.225.331.344.332.021.2

37.635.530.531.739.829.736.3

37.450.034.424.241.941.536.135.637.541.242.434.637.1

20.919.715.727.414.219.727.1

31.3

33.8

36.7

20.4

16.718.912.917.913.1

29.216.425.021.916.724.232.223.710.3

30.927.918.220.126.524.021.4

33.242.329.018.136.338.427.322.927.729.729.624.423.4

12.410.77.7

17.58.7

10.714.1

21.8

24.1

28.3

11.5

7.14.96.86.55.7

5.35.84.35.55.65.44.86.04.9

6.97.25.16.46.77.15.2

7.26.97.04.96.87.87.46.36.97.27.76.45.4

7.36.06.05.34.35.75.6

5.3

6.5

6.8

6.0

37.841.755.253.149.9

36.322.845.923.630.329.519.331.934.7

32.025.633.841.137.232.537.5

33.436.027.319.316.723.137.420.130.331.224.740.148.1

45.639.952.743.136.825.940.4

30.1

32.9

30.4

42.1

(%)


medicalpersonnel

68.589.3

100.096.394.8

71.1100.099.1

100.094.191.076.289.7

100.0

42.954.536.542.434.828.045.2

20.924.323.527.041.844.732.961.464.241.058.427.083.0

54.137.332.347.943.648.884.3

92.0

40.5

37.9

50.0

(days)


ProvinceDistrict


10

(%)





64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi







(continued)

Infantmortality

rate(%) (%)


(%)

Morbidityrate

32

67

33

37

60

36

313831452720

45656280516763776752

264639242835

50302724532639

5666716344

4536255543

16.8

31.1

25.6

23.5

20.7

24.2

21.312.315.521.210.728.7

30.834.926.828.835.037.132.731.131.029.5

24.524.431.420.423.531.0

29.721.426.113.525.314.932.6

19.823.317.625.521.1

22.111.027.529.426.5

9.6

17.3

12.0

15.0

13.9

14.1

11.49.09.2

11.16.3

11.8

17.422.811.716.721.225.820.716.614.714.4

10.511.717.913.111.212.7

15.514.918.310.918.48.6

22.1

14.814.213.216.810.7

16.37.6

16.715.415.1

5.7

5.4

5.5

5.9

6.9

6.7

4.95.55.67.26.85.8

5.94.85.95.35.06.45.05.05.95.2

6.45.46.75.84.65.3

5.55.05.69.07.35.56.3

6.66.18.66.14.9

6.87.66.37.07.5

53.6

52.3

42.3

41.1

45.3

44.1

50.540.862.559.643.556.8

54.848.440.558.058.248.451.652.057.660.8

41.637.440.437.343.049.4

42.848.534.231.330.755.244.1

45.447.236.747.359.5

50.254.642.540.340.4

(%)


medicalpersonnel

62.4

58.5

65.2

71.1

53.4

56.9

65.049.466.757.273.884.1

65.647.956.242.547.451.657.159.262.880.3

55.264.270.941.081.076.0

53.868.771.753.771.2

100.092.9

60.652.552.525.092.2

66.451.022.127.835.9

(days)


ProvinceDistrict


10

(%)








81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict

Infantmortality

rate(%) (%)


(%)

Morbidityrate

293135414341264131352023175962412321

45544951

2855474723

80534746375445595443

50

40

52

29.932.024.924.727.919.710.920.153.325.816.929.914.521.023.621.122.626.3

18.222.115.813.515.3

19.918.116.614.610.4

20.931.88.4

30.13.7

16.926.522.316.421.2

17.0

16.5

22.5

22.822.913.415.116.211.35.4

11.022.713.79.3

15.49.0

13.218.913.912.714.9

10.116.310.97.97.3

17.010.912.110.26.4

11.418.66.3

16.82.4

13.816.118.19.7

16.8

10.6

11.4

14.1

7.65.26.56.37.36.49.27.66.67.57.76.29.26.45.16.75.66.1

7.17.15.86.85.2

6.99.15.06.56.0

4.95.65.45.83.75.14.65.16.56.3

6.5

6.8

5.5

52.547.123.841.836.141.248.146.944.854.040.341.339.040.945.650.345.947.0

50.138.450.058.159.3

78.840.258.156.853.7

16.99.6

13.410.819.634.712.311.116.528.2

49.7

54.9

15.5

(%)


medicalpersonnel

60.648.862.361.952.561.973.151.659.976.750.859.533.730.238.826.488.381.5

51.624.339.312.865.3

44.145.653.127.573.5

52.435.277.932.753.967.861.574.080.274.8

35.6

48.5

57.0

(days)



10




(%)



ProvinceDistrict

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatera

13. West Sumatera




age 7 - 12 age 13 - 15 age 16 - 18 age 19 - 24 age 7 - 15 age 16 - 18 age 19 - 24

School participation rate

96.3

97.2

96.7

92.396.797.098.692.099.298.496.499.198.8

94.596.594.598.696.897.398.497.798.096.198.798.296.298.198.598.299.3

97.195.795.397.595.697.195.895.599.496.398.298.499.196.4

81.7

87.4

84.0

77.781.878.783.373.186.684.483.592.690.7

76.290.486.295.777.977.790.294.394.985.988.891.579.494.392.891.291.1

83.880.578.192.090.584.480.568.793.282.586.388.289.487.3

48.4

63.9

63.9

44.755.047.752.438.263.043.743.275.169.8

41.057.957.086.355.551.163.070.476.059.058.973.454.181.773.776.877.0

63.046.355.565.166.868.948.745.383.074.981.177.282.169.8

12.1

14.9

18.9

3.75.9

10.38.84.7

23.26.7

10.042.77.5

5.35.0

11.219.35.56.29.1

13.111.610.913.010.86.9

15.210.233.221.5

11.17.23.9

12.415.515.07.05.8

41.718.88.2

24.124.314.0

3.0

2.9

4.7

6.11.63.22.25.43.01.22.32.11.8

5.22.13.51.33.54.12.71.61.74.51.62.34.31.30.72.31.1

4.75.95.23.33.24.06.88.22.24.62.72.83.25.0

10.4

11.8

16.6

20.68.2

11.46.6

19.57.59.05.56.07.2

23.27.3

19.17.4

15.617.613.58.7

12.816.58.5

12.417.43.23.36.37.3

16.232.627.215.115.412.423.121.85.2

16.48.9

14.56.3

13.8

12.9

14.0

21.5

29.513.017.810.019.08.48.88.04.6

14.1

33.112.029.416.220.420.816.117.412.313.110.918.420.08.02.36.39.9

20.035.034.720.120.130.224.628.49.5

25.714.018.69.4

22.2

School drop out rate

School Attendanceby District, 1999

11


14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatera

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta







(continued)



96.3

96.2

95.2

95.4

95.1

98.4

97.194.896.496.295.798.196.2

97.296.195.894.696.697.6

97.192.594.895.792.995.992.397.097.095.9

96.795.392.898.6

94.596.793.096.397.3

98.098.697.799.098.0

85.2

81.1

77.0

82.2

81.0

92.4

81.079.985.385.183.795.793.2

86.677.980.877.280.486.7

84.057.674.278.472.274.072.980.888.788.5

86.580.973.295.3

84.180.074.776.390.3

93.295.691.789.990.6

53.4

49.8

47.1

55.6

49.6

73.4

52.438.057.442.552.376.464.5

58.548.638.237.439.675.2

52.825.639.949.435.627.051.154.470.472.6

57.654.132.086.5

48.847.038.649.271.1

72.479.973.568.172.8

9.4

8.1

9.3

17.3

9.2

23.6

12.65.56.54.53.8

26.85.2

8.15.95.74.94.4

18.4

5.63.08.06.34.81.15.26.0

24.89.9

11.68.54.2

42.2

10.35.93.67.5

20.9

25.522.626.123.321.8

2.6

3.5

5.0

3.7

2.9

1.6

3.42.63.03.02.41.71.2

3.04.52.13.25.52.2

3.27.86.24.57.94.06.43.93.44.2

2.75.34.41.5

3.21.94.12.62.1

1.50.62.32.02.0

11.2

11.7

18.0

16.8

12.3

5.9

14.313.415.115.68.54.0

11.6

5.514.114.713.618.13.6

14.730.519.417.422.925.915.513.07.5

15.3

20.321.519.35.7

13.410.316.98.29.0

5.53.07.88.16.2

13.9

16.1

20.8

17.0

15.2

5.5

13.315.020.527.110.46.46.8

11.616.515.422.523.18.4

16.027.528.522.318.628.726.520.211.323.1

20.321.218.69.4

18.99.8

19.717.212.3

4.03.45.77.18.3

School drop out rateProvinceDistrict


11


32. West Java

33. Central Java



(continued)



95.4

97.4

93.293.592.494.194.996.395.195.398.295.695.596.096.294.598.396.997.594.794.694.994.298.197.596.998.598.2

98.698.496.996.397.598.796.297.998.897.998.898.199.498.497.198.098.799.099.298.698.699.398.3

72.2

81.5

57.254.978.962.849.373.469.565.677.471.570.665.977.159.270.570.758.273.172.473.587.691.288.389.792.696.8

85.882.873.769.184.392.867.182.489.091.596.690.792.588.383.977.782.782.889.272.078.883.973.7

45.4

49.4

24.132.754.934.927.443.233.038.144.351.836.029.850.936.937.038.929.154.247.031.871.472.464.676.964.476.9

51.553.549.637.357.666.535.456.361.073.969.554.250.556.641.741.044.345.043.837.336.654.434.2

11.4

10.2

4.62.5

15.03.42.18.93.62.95.76.5

10.23.37.93.73.75.94.8

10.611.74.4

27.613.232.620.918.916.3

7.210.05.45.97.19.83.49.4

14.115.723.412.210.28.06.43.23.37.76.14.36.87.23.9

3.3

1.6

5.43.35.84.53.03.42.72.61.41.63.20.81.76.53.83.82.72.44.91.44.11.42.32.31.20.6

1.02.22.73.01.50.82.11.11.10.70.60.40.21.00.71.21.01.10.42.11.61.11.7

10.3

7.1

19.68.1

10.912.45.8

10.311.85.96.04.2

13.77.43.0

22.112.39.9

13.510.715.010.39.54.86.75.97.74.4

8.27.17.7

10.15.42.13.26.73.74.33.32.62.13.63.08.47.42.83.58.08.95.89.3

11.3

9.4

19.612.614.313.08.58.2

13.57.03.86.3

15.36.86.2

31.413.89.4

16.47.3

16.613.110.83.35.18.7

10.84.4

18.310.79.5

13.511.38.09.9

10.74.97.94.51.63.94.56.59.38.26.13.68.89.28.1

10.4



11





34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

(continued)



97.996.397.594.894.093.198.197.999.598.696.894.3

99.798.799.498.9

100.0

97.496.797.499.697.598.195.193.888.596.594.989.192.196.499.198.598.098.798.899.198.798.496.699.298.585.076.895.296.6

100.0100.097.5

99.2

95.4

79.374.772.672.477.767.896.292.897.290.680.980.7

97.092.797.394.796.0

85.194.579.992.682.885.079.272.257.580.565.070.250.775.595.589.791.387.394.396.288.781.473.992.391.954.642.757.071.795.597.785.1

95.4

80.4

44.634.830.429.747.732.084.176.483.671.452.247.7

86.570.184.782.782.8

42.563.338.263.352.160.336.538.531.341.832.536.423.833.679.548.264.460.561.273.454.139.135.057.864.728.211.533.935.478.676.568.0

80.6

50.3

9.64.04.04.78.75.5

23.934.939.930.411.38.2

19.319.534.055.062.9

3.710.94.78.15.68.89.44.44.95.04.84.11.66.8

17.65.6

12.812.56.06.03.14.84.67.6

14.26.42.61.21.7

19.114.841.9

44.0

11.3

2.43.22.61.92.14.10.31.30.90.62.34.3

0.31.30.30.00.0

1.10.60.50.92.11.31.42.77.93.04.88.45.64.20.41.21.00.70.00.30.60.72.01.12.24.78.84.14.40.30.31.8

0.5

2.5

9.913.08.6

16.28.5

16.22.41.73.52.89.9

15.4

2.15.50.45.82.2

3.82.07.64.18.83.6

11.37.2

18.210.924.322.621.014.94.06.36.93.21.51.55.33.0

11.17.34.6

10.636.617.216.92.85.95.8

3.5

9.2

10.112.216.211.911.719.24.56.53.82.9

13.013.0

2.87.71.82.84.1

8.816.44.8

10.010.57.5

11.713.526.513.421.324.923.619.45.39.88.15.49.36.7

10.24.8

11.810.24.9

19.232.419.325.63.1

10.58.7

3.9

12.0



11







51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan

(continued)



92.697.198.799.597.1

95.499.698.898.997.496.790.596.499.1

88.493.794.397.192.191.794.8

77.493.685.890.988.883.891.892.386.993.495.089.796.9

91.387.390.088.491.293.194.8

96.7

93.0

89.0

90.3

78.487.794.495.390.7

82.992.890.391.692.673.074.879.288.7

58.364.970.874.177.684.782.1

72.080.066.557.270.466.982.569.872.977.269.660.892.4

72.679.778.765.170.880.083.9

83.6

71.5

69.7

76.0

57.559.472.284.069.6

42.781.272.165.671.343.040.862.274.9

25.432.438.347.057.860.364.0

35.254.225.026.830.130.448.631.629.449.930.313.679.2

39.941.336.425.023.243.869.4

63.4

41.8

34.4

41.0

8.612.514.219.828.0

5.615.214.014.08.04.85.29.0

32.6

5.52.24.53.71.65.8

29.9

6.47.14.33.73.21.94.95.54.5

11.23.11.3

43.7

5.38.65.73.44.59.2

25.1

15.1

7.3

8.1

9.5

3.51.60.50.61.3

2.80.32.00.40.83.43.32.91.3

9.35.55.52.37.35.83.9

7.04.56.96.83.58.42.75.89.86.53.75.91.6

6.27.03.87.32.43.55.0

2.1

5.8

6.0

5.4

9.511.86.12.16.4

16.61.32.25.03.18.1

19.27.72.8

30.723.925.011.022.119.47.3

39.027.435.927.316.430.220.224.741.132.328.335.18.0

27.331.917.535.325.918.612.1

6.9

21.7

29.5

25.2

8.913.58.47.65.6

13.84.55.06.59.0

10.419.213.73.0

34.828.727.919.030.223.510.2

40.444.435.036.412.730.727.629.549.047.426.838.68.0

25.736.628.934.325.416.812.0

8.5

25.5

32.8

26.2



11




64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi







(continued)



97.5

94.7

97.0

93.6

94.6

91.1

96.197.597.597.798.098.0

91.891.394.794.997.193.995.097.595.696.5

92.797.495.495.499.198.7

86.794.197.994.796.297.396.7

96.497.891.294.496.5

94.091.274.576.991.2

80.6

72.2

84.6

76.7

69.4

69.6

80.577.980.481.778.690.8

70.267.265.463.675.566.773.762.075.391.6

71.084.771.676.093.891.1

59.971.489.285.480.788.674.0

66.772.266.364.985.1

62.868.541.360.663.4

49.5

43.0

58.3

46.5

38.9

45.0

46.240.950.451.742.575.3

30.333.551.722.138.625.736.533.245.966.1

42.650.448.151.276.866.9

34.428.353.349.755.368.236.9

32.237.532.428.771.1

35.634.524.033.230.4

10.6

10.0

13.8

10.1

7.4

13.3

4.64.15.07.59.0

39.9

2.42.9

17.94.46.63.73.43.03.7

21.4

6.29.86.38.9

14.522.2

5.52.36.35.6

12.227.29.1

3.75.75.50.9

25.1

1.52.01.94.35.9

3.2

5.0

3.1

6.8

5.8

6.7

4.52.53.54.42.32.2

7.26.26.85.64.75.34.53.43.42.6

7.32.44.94.61.12.3

10.68.72.95.16.14.58.6

5.34.18.15.13.8

6.06.1

15.513.35.4

17.0

16.4

10.8

23.2

23.1

18.9

23.223.712.616.014.58.3

30.318.614.029.111.223.710.615.814.58.8

25.610.412.813.25.06.3

24.933.521.220.326.510.446.2

22.324.128.731.35.7

16.714.636.330.822.8

20.7

20.5

14.2

29.9

25.0

19.5

38.418.019.826.315.18.9

35.924.718.332.421.120.916.420.825.79.9

24.716.021.823.06.4

10.0

37.139.735.827.424.78.6

36.4

24.324.627.839.97.3

21.821.735.231.927.4



11







81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict



90.992.592.193.495.291.194.891.194.094.396.193.391.684.390.685.395.595.0

95.090.494.692.897.8

93.691.196.893.798.3

78.570.891.874.191.194.089.691.194.896.9

93.9

94.4

82.8

66.863.068.764.170.960.773.954.667.363.881.380.380.253.568.266.586.082.1

79.674.472.673.992.7

85.883.682.878.797.3

69.058.682.880.082.590.465.977.587.690.8

77.0

84.8

75.5

40.637.438.043.951.434.144.931.037.233.857.848.665.223.843.325.372.863.7

53.151.242.441.373.0

66.962.950.232.592.4

34.730.664.443.057.355.646.531.069.385.6

49.9

61.9

50.5

8.71.09.48.06.91.82.66.05.53.26.18.610.31.34.32.340.15.6

8.87.47.35.635.8

2.214.815.44.835.8

6.19.023.47.310.36.03.33.625.633.2

11.0

17.8

12.9

6.87.97.86.04.06.95.57.69.67.04.95.05.39.66.910.83.24.0

5.27.85.76.91.8

3.12.92.96.21.3

8.86.83.81.82.71.75.81.44.02.4

5.8

3.0

4.5

20.022.019.319.012.715.114.119.420.429.919.721.416.525.712.330.78.412.0

18.727.524.823.86.5

14.816.114.835.10.0

27.228.114.324.112.418.721.723.622.17.1

21.4

14.4

20.0

25.124.524.615.319.413.819.225.429.820.722.720.924.732.514.735.85.815.4

23.934.528.218.47.4

23.915.918.729.16.1

46.434.923.626.912.435.323.642.824.511.4

23.3

16.3

28.5

School drop out rate


11





ProvinceDistrict

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatera

13. West Sumatera




41.8

48.9

49.6

30.725.438.339.529.838.142.648.175.567.1

38.625.130.233.543.956.955.940.954.545.555.480.174.490.030.164.636.8

49.054.948.658.236.847.648.240.347.286.281.987.079.761.9

38.5

52.1

53.6

26.335.452.445.524.538.721.239.076.564.1

51.733.938.436.336.157.761.849.154.144.454.789.379.192.030.871.836.7

46.165.449.155.638.355.952.759.845.088.670.883.978.364.4

14.1

7.5

2.5

8.411.422.215.912.04.1

17.716.61.52.6

11.15.54.62.19.99.1

13.66.53.09.0

21.20.70.31.32.31.24.1

6.91.18.11.61.30.42.12.81.52.61.10.70.42.4

11.1

4.0

1.9

8.18.0

16.611.49.32.1

13.014.50.52.0

9.20.70.71.39.15.28.03.22.33.99.70.70.20.61.80.22.3

4.60.86.90.21.20.42.13.00.71.61.20.80.01.0

34.6

20.2

34.9

48.035.717.019.050.451.261.526.66.7

34.1

37.941.461.250.38.35.7

34.153.533.914.46.96.6

11.66.53.51.62.0

69.836.447.626.034.58.1

19.575.623.616.814.91.00.22.6

30.4

16.8

32.7

45.131.010.18.8

58.437.252.621.35.4

31.4

37.129.659.643.98.06.0

33.849.421.48.34.6

11.53.42.83.02.02.6

63.456.137.824.037.316.94.4

53.218.917.222.93.80.21.4

Housing Conditionby District,1996 and 1999

12

1996 19961999 1999

Households with accessto safe water

Households withdirt floor

(%) (%)

1996 1999

Households withoutaccess to sanitation

(%)


14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatera

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta







(continued)

32.3

39.9

39.0

40.7

41.4

58.4

52.87.9

44.339.319.334.859.3

49.537.633.450.06.1

63.0

39.335.225.927.332.717.840.045.574.550.8

35.735.149.139.4

48.839.039.435.937.4

25.637.775.877.893.6

28.2

42.7

40.3

40.8

45.6

59.8

52.32.5

40.832.317.824.055.5

63.039.234.945.75.6

71.7

45.934.439.216.530.320.538.532.077.242.5

19.343.952.338.6

41.351.147.332.043.4

27.343.583.673.494.3

5.6

11.4

14.1

13.3

43.2

1.1

16.00.31.39.05.81.20.6

2.212.823.013.47.04.9

24.118.56.84.1

24.527.35.10.61.70.6

14.23.7

27.80.8

44.444.360.237.75.4

0.21.40.71.61.2

2.6

6.2

11.1

12.1

34.4

0.3

2.70.01.06.83.50.20.6

2.95.5

13.18.92.32.8

19.016.74.43.4

18.322.62.40.21.70.3

7.62.1

29.31.6

35.133.448.126.93.7

0.60.00.30.20.7

14.7

20.9

24.1

32.5

10.7

1.0

27.118.111.934.44.70.50.7

34.626.232.321.09.41.7

21.224.444.446.133.810.946.138.11.09.3

49.732.638.13.6

22.92.97.8

17.95.2

0.31.80.30.22.1

11.4

20.3

22.3

31.1

12.0

0.8

28.53.6

12.826.55.11.30.2

35.830.931.18.6

14.63.7

22.018.939.544.421.69.6

43.942.83.78.4

46.738.935.73.2

24.42.86.0

35.49.7

0.10.20.01.12.6

ProvinceDistrict


12

1996 19961999 1999



(%) (%)

1996 1999


(%)


32. West Java

33. Central Java



(continued)

41.8

52.6

56.738.839.034.539.635.030.235.548.841.045.440.747.248.939.140.039.345.829.841.463.054.964.652.940.2

-

40.147.240.838.846.738.360.749.860.550.662.454.037.660.053.978.167.465.353.857.163.562.562.5

37.9

52.2

47.439.441.043.437.829.235.120.039.334.743.146.540.940.329.346.929.948.822.736.131.152.866.282.232.225.1

41.249.031.136.343.742.266.271.162.945.335.258.741.759.165.075.279.146.450.255.447.758.449.3

10.4

47.7

18.07.15.03.80.50.20.62.08.25.9

23.77.80.6

34.024.93.3

41.612.920.016.50.50.70.7

17.24.2

-

47.242.349.748.652.842.144.552.860.029.126.050.934.167.179.081.465.269.926.958.466.652.448.2

7.1

37.8

11.49.32.02.70.30.60.51.16.63.0

12.56.00.0

24.213.52.9

30.028.413.611.20.20.70.53.01.40.7

34.731.140.238.537.638.734.540.949.721.120.434.625.461.173.475.453.156.916.344.355.238.540.4

22.8

30.5

57.255.715.124.428.69.4

15.010.521.318.739.826.615.248.735.917.936.15.6

17.361.53.90.50.6

37.73.5

-

21.939.757.826.730.016.416.026.526.140.832.68.0

31.532.318.719.239.623.423.126.537.319.328.6

20.8

30.9

60.650.610.830.525.76.3

12.215.08.4

15.036.725.115.939.431.317.539.612.021.256.345.52.40.23.36.70.3

27.632.959.432.828.627.614.523.519.836.225.47.1

35.024.720.414.346.722.527.423.343.423.429.3

ProvinceDistrict


12

1996 19961999 1999



(%) (%)

1996 1999


(%)





34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

(continued)

52.745.730.046.335.744.472.547.782.973.542.373.7

46.944.048.145.854.7

58.668.558.647.047.768.961.453.453.050.870.545.343.161.662.674.252.863.355.281.167.567.759.450.345.464.186.663.260.637.241.151.2

47.4

61.3

51.429.328.741.729.156.081.961.083.284.737.578.6

60.146.357.153.639.5

52.264.751.145.347.847.761.042.855.539.753.339.348.534.373.459.150.657.255.473.956.661.661.555.853.356.751.756.255.435.429.857.9

51.1

57.0

72.657.834.646.826.142.88.67.97.7

16.212.36.7

50.716.645.514.04.2

53.449.950.428.927.827.629.618.631.233.551.443.249.926.24.3

31.627.442.859.73.6

72.181.677.868.927.638.379.249.89.4

11.08.87.3

23.9

34.6

60.050.926.638.420.431.14.93.97.29.85.76.6

38.611.133.46.21.7

44.239.441.022.020.519.626.512.525.622.343.644.641.317.41.9

22.821.734.653.119.763.775.166.653.818.928.068.638.68.06.24.83.6

15.8

28.3

45.356.456.659.043.650.311.21.80.54.0

12.228.0

3.133.84.2

29.00.5

6.828.837.415.725.018.622.857.860.956.070.569.276.064.235.535.032.920.822.712.335.154.556.323.513.624.554.545.444.89.4

18.613.9

17.4

36.2

52.459.258.352.941.859.65.62.52.83.0

19.323.4

2.629.23.1

28.10.9

5.621.438.015.722.415.917.252.356.154.367.363.475.761.117.230.531.120.619.013.929.049.951.520.49.9

23.351.938.241.77.1

18.75.7

16.1

31.9

ProvinceDistrict


12

1996 19961999 1999



(%) (%)

1996 1999


(%)







51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan

(continued)

60.474.233.050.894.4

60.761.846.175.864.863.967.670.249.8

29.331.437.148.060.546.830.1

48.356.556.646.352.657.748.144.833.740.987.166.0

-

25.68.1

12.920.721.710.621.5

62.6

37.2

53.7

17.5

59.073.444.150.795.5

56.174.137.076.272.971.169.676.356.9

35.347.820.541.157.148.138.4

51.669.252.555.369.662.159.245.344.645.485.660.375.2

29.812.621.431.024.714.214.6

65.8

37.5

58.1

21.6

6.412.39.17.31.5

15.83.71.43.65.28.8

21.69.00.8

24.838.743.711.622.62.67.0

17.527.852.284.780.670.167.363.954.935.049.845.9

-

0.81.51.60.3

12.10.00.0

7.7

27.0

54.8

2.4

3.14.87.72.52.5

10.11.93.13.83.06.7

15.36.20.6

14.630.128.910.619.64.35.7

12.323.759.774.674.563.563.357.842.630.139.546.611.3

0.71.21.80.83.90.00.0

5.6

19.3

48.1

1.3

37.441.615.75.11.3

40.718.514.932.931.847.771.536.64.5

52.076.360.754.544.742.826.8

37.428.524.01.81.2

37.422.421.740.129.314.227.9

-

48.937.652.130.257.647.52.8

32.2

56.1

23.5

40.7

31.535.419.10.21.0

35.014.711.217.527.241.161.126.34.1

62.564.968.247.351.546.020.7

49.831.841.42.97.2

33.723.232.540.433.418.335.80.3

39.038.950.438.442.151.82.4

24.9

56.9

28.2

36.9

ProvinceDistrict


12

1996 19961999 1999



(%) (%)

1996 1999


(%)




64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi







(continued)

26.5

52.8

63.5

51.0

45.1

49.0

52.026.810.132.121.541.3

50.366.237.515.557.150.441.343.048.191.4

50.956.148.337.285.784.8

35.749.951.856.647.567.068.1

50.947.040.653.334.8

31.248.537.231.852.1

31.8

53.3

64.2

55.5

48.3

50.9

59.419.528.644.526.928.7

47.065.441.19.6

51.235.542.350.456.395.2

44.356.648.037.892.081.1

35.060.966.154.253.961.664.5

64.054.242.345.729.9

26.951.557.733.441.2

2.6

3.3

2.1

14.0

18.2

4.5

18.30.00.50.20.00.2

16.110.80.10.38.70.40.20.01.50.2

4.43.40.10.20.40.7

18.912.014.821.64.75.3

10.5

42.121.911.46.82.5

0.21.32.81.26.4

1.9

2.5

1.4

9.7

13.8

3.5

12.30.00.00.20.01.1

13.36.90.30.24.60.20.00.12.40.0

3.32.70.20.00.70.0

15.511.57.9

12.93.33.08.6

31.415.69.14.62.4

0.00.91.21.35.4

41.1

27.9

15.5

25.7

49.6

39.0

25.031.457.843.872.43.9

15.326.220.550.539.535.830.953.220.89.7

22.621.632.118.51.26.2

55.543.56.4

31.218.72.79.7

58.143.458.453.817.2

74.652.657.265.038.9

19.0

18.1

11.4

25.0

47.4

36.4

18.320.111.433.345.42.6

17.218.76.6

22.313.537.317.841.823.55.2

25.49.7

33.426.71.42.9

56.042.26.0

26.311.82.79.3

50.936.563.449.912.8

78.944.762.759.540.0

ProvinceDistrict


12

1996 19961999 1999



(%) (%)

1996 1999


(%)







81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict


12

1996 19961999 1999



46.360.941.654.841.147.443.936.224.242.038.538.864.541.749.139.583.450.4

61.949.971.635.5

-

56.351.849.054.273.4

43.342.841.620.937.558.249.952.341.582.6

58.5

55.4

46.2

36.158.535.349.938.249.743.832.839.235.448.255.177.748.042.931.981.949.0

56.858.852.254.468.7

37.641.845.357.870.4

34.255.855.424.640.944.844.730.650.074.5

56.4

47.9

45.5

5.81.82.80.51.01.00.62.32.40.53.6

17.13.36.12.3

17.12.22.6

5.08.3

31.913.0

-

27.735.532.138.15.0

14.615.016.58.6

30.324.221.410.115.96.2

17.0

28.7

15.8

4.51.31.80.60.20.80.31.71.50.92.5

12.84.24.00.8

12.91.83.4

3.16.6

32.511.97.6

35.025.324.731.91.7

20.712.76.82.2

16.820.318.913.77.31.9

14.2

23.4

12.6

39.932.964.062.251.650.715.526.534.937.954.342.312.657.976.947.22.9

18.1

37.0

59.146.218.533.2

-

56.655.643.241.511.5

51.479.340.042.854.138.041.355.641.412.4

44.2

48.8

36.231.958.458.748.047.220.125.727.831.251.037.39.6

55.762.156.34.2

13.6

35.0

46.342.025.237.914.5

48.661.543.927.99.1

46.254.540.438.040.218.738.956.322.714.5

43.7

38.9

(%) (%)

Note:The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City.


1996 1999


(%)


ProvinceDistrict

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatera

13. West Sumatera




Real per capitaGRDP in 1998a) Annual growth in real per capita GRDP

(Thousand Rupiah) (%)

6.2

9.4

6.9

6.66.17.04.46.57.66.46.71.67.8

8.89.87.66.66.89.27.57.8

11.324.311.816.95.85.98.55.07.5

5.15.34.66.76.99.86.33.86.25.1

22.46.87.56.4

5.7

6.9

6.1

5.96.36.54.66.77.56.16.1

-0.37.1

5.06.08.77.29.39.12.69.68.04.18.4

16.48.74.34.87.57.3

5.66.04.66.97.26.96.65.16.44.6

-2.57.37.46.6

3.4

5.4

3.5

4.43.93.52.44.14.44.84.1

-3.05.8

2.53.53.55.77.17.75.35.57.55.83.64.56.45.31.75.60.3

2.83.12.14.33.83.93.62.23.71.80.93.24.33.5

-7.4

-9.4

-6.9

-4.93.7

-9.5-1.4-4.2-2.3-5.7

-10.2-14.7-2.8

-7.2-10.3-6.2-7.2-1.5-0.8-3.61.6

-6.0-8.7-4.1-8.8-8.7-5.7

-14.1-21.8-14.9

-6.1-5.3-6.0-5.3-5.3-4.5-6.1-5.1-9.8-6.9

-10.0-5.7-7.9-5.6

-10.8

-9.4

-6.9

-4.93.7

-10.5-1.4-4.2-2.3-5.7

-13.6-14.7-2.8

-7.2-10.3-6.2-7.2-1.5-0.8-3.61.6

-6.0-8.7-4.3-8.8-8.7-5.7

-14.1-21.8-14.9

-6.1-5.3-6.0-5.3-5.3-4.5-6.1-5.1-9.8-6.9

-10.0-5.7-7.9-5.6

-1.9

4.2

3.5

4.43.9

-2.82.44.14.44.8

-3.9-3.05.8

2.53.53.55.77.17.75.35.57.55.8

-9.74.56.45.31.75.60.3

2.83.12.14.33.83.93.62.23.71.80.93.24.33.5

0.6

6.7

6.1

5.96.33.94.66.77.56.1

-1.8-0.37.1

5.06.08.77.29.39.12.69.68.04.15.9

16.48.74.34.87.57.3

5.66.04.66.97.26.96.65.16.44.6

-2.57.37.46.6

-0.9

9.2

6.9

6.66.14.24.46.57.66.4

-4.11.67.8

8.89.87.66.66.89.27.57.8

11.324.38.8

16.95.85.98.55.07.5

5.15.34.66.76.99.86.33.86.25.1

22.46.87.56.4

Economic Performanceby District, 1999

13

with oil and gas without oil and gaswith oiland gas

without oiland gas

1995 19951996 19961997 19971998 1998

1,509

1,964

1,678

1,2771,1501,4431,9161,2971,7821,2451,8711,1872,133

1,1641,5891,6411,4682,4602,8812,1261,4282,4411,4861,8662,6652,9342,762

2,.2172,3221,327

1,0281,1711,5721,3931,4381,5191,745

9712,9801,9513,8562,0542,0991,715

2,548

1,976

1.678

1,2771,1501,5161,9161,2971,7821,2456,0281,1872,133

1,1641,5891,6411,4682,4602,8812,1261,4282,4411,4862,0302,6652,9342,7622,2172,3221.327

1,0281,1711,5721,3931,4381,5191,745

9712,9801,9513,8562,0542,0991,715


14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatera

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta







(continued)



5.3

5.9

7.0

1.7

8.0

7.3

5.56.14.34.94.8

-3.2-1.5

6.74.73.85.99.24.9

6.67.09.07.75.05.96.25.66.9

13.3

6.76.3

-5.9-0.7

11.28.46.97.94.1

9.36.1

11.45.36.8

8.3

6.0

7.4

3.7

6.1

7.7

6.57.19.75.55.64.19.4

8.15.84.75.18.44.9

5.88.38.96.66.95.7

11.48.36.57.1

3.56.72.70.9

6.86.25.06.64.7

10.35.9

11.66.07.7

6.5

1.3

3.5

1.1

2.8

3.5

4.95.36.94.12.97.75.3

3.01.4

-0.31.52.41.2

1.43.43.01.78.01.16.04.54.16.7

2.73.40.1

-2.1

2.33.60.6

-3.83.6

4.00.26.55.04.5

-2.0

-9.0

-8.3

-4.4

-9.5

-19.5

-5.60.1

-1.3-3.8-0.3-7.2-4.3

-5.5-9.5

-10.7-8.3-8.2-9.7

-7.9-4.1-3.5-3.7-6.8-9.2-6.5-5.4

-14.8-3.3

-1.6-1.3-4.3

-10.4

-7.1-6.2-9.01.4

-18.0

-21.3-17.7-7.6

-25.9-23.7

-5.3

-5.7

-6.9

-4.4

-9.5

-19.5

-9.30.1

-14.0-36.0

4.8-7.2-4.3

-5.5-9.5-8.4-8.86.1

-10.3

-7.4-4.1-1.7-3.7-4.7-5.8-6.5-5.4

-13.7-3.3

-1.6-1.3-4.3

-10.4

-7.1-6.2-9.01.4

-18.0

-21.3-17.7-7.6

-25.9-23.7

0.8

1.8

2.4

1.1

2.8

3.5

4.35.32.5

-0.3-2.17.75.3

3.01.4

-0.31.54.61.3

1.33.41.21.75.6

-1.06.04.53.16.7

2.73.40.1

-2.1

2.33.60.6

-3.83.6

4.00.26.55.04.5

3.8

6.4

6.6

3.7

6.1

7.7

6.17.15.52.42.04.19.4

8.15.84.76.28.46.0

5.68.36.56.65.84.3

11.48.36.07.1

3.56.72.70.9

6.86.25.06.64.7

10.35.9

11.66.07.7

0.5

5.7

5.2

1.7

8.0

7.3

12.16.12.70.5

-0.5-3.2-1.5

6.74.73.85.09.24.9

6.47.04.77.7

-2.02.96.25.66.1

13.3

6.76.3

-5.9-0.7

11.28.46.97.94.1

9.36.1

11.45.36.8

2,096

1,168

1,431

1,158

952

5,943

1,3551,5962,2641,2371,5181,778

11,686

1,243837852984

1,6561,566

1,0141,1511,8831,1931,0701,2711,9411,9791,8241,445

1,1401,415

8661,321

812986744603

1,683

4,9304,359

15,8203,8717,236

4,773

1,254

1,692

1,158

952

5,943

1,3711,5965,1822,4699,2621,778

11,686

1,243837874

1,1041,9561,649

1,0811,1512,9381,1931,3591,8681,9411,9792,0111,445

1,1401,415

8661,321

812986744603

1,683

4,9304,359

15,8203,8717,236


without oiland gas

1995 19951996 19961997 19971998 1998

ProvinceDistrict


13


32. West Java

33. Central Java

01. Pandeglang02. Lebak03. Bogor04. Sukabumi05. Cianjur06. Bandung07. Garut08. Tasikmalaya09. Ciamis10. Kuningan11. Cirebon12. Majalengka13. Sumedang14. Indramayu15. Subang16. Purwakarta17. Karawang18. Bekasi19. Tangerang20. Serang71. Bogor72. Sukabumi73. Bandung74. Cirebon75. Tangerang


(continued)



8.2

7.9

5.27.05.25.95.79.36.16.86.95.96.75.06.36.46.46.27.28.73.55.3

63.243.88.41.3

12.0

4.37.8

11.36.45.96.6

19.75.26.47.2

18.37.16.26.93.04.04.44.27.16.66.6

25.95.5

13.1

7.1

5.45.88.37.66.19.66.17.36.16.76.2

10.87.16.37.16.58.1

60.65.36.88.96.46.78.0

12.1

11.83.86.26.25.66.99.85.95.96.48.07.06.66.82.31.72.7

-0.36.05.85.7

15.05.3

3.2

1.5

2.22.31.72.22.94.12.42.73.03.22.24.72.51.43.11.13.61.20.82.54.22.42.37.45.9

-10.12.9

-1.7-0.32.11.9

-1.40.61.52.01.41.92.61.8

-3.41.63.03.2

-1.82.83.12.97.0

-17.8

-9.5

-26.5-20.2-23.0-11.7-6.6

-19.6-12.3-9.0-9.9-5.8

-21.8-10.7-12.1-11.0-8.8

-12.6-19.6-25.0-13.6-15.4-28.0-31.1-21.8-6.8

-20.6

6.3-7.5-6.0-5.2

-14.1-7.0

-10.1-3.7

-10.0-12.0-12.5-5.4

-11.4-10.3-10.7

0.9-12.3-4.7

-13.0-1.4

-12.1-18.5-11.3

-17.2

-8.4

-26.5-20.2-23.0-11.7-6.6

-19.6-12.3-9.0-9.9-5.8

-21.8-10.7-12.1-5.9-8.8

-12.6-19.6-25.0-13.6-15.4-28.0-31.1-21.8-6.8

-20.6

10.7-7.5-6.0-5.2

-14.1-7.0

-10.1-3.7

-10.0-12.0-12.5-5.4

-11.4-10.3-10.7-6.2

-12.3-4.7

-13.0-1.4

-12.1-18.5-11.3

2.4

1.8

2.22.31.72.22.94.12.42.73.03.22.24.72.5

-7.13.11.13.61.20.82.54.22.42.37.45.9

-4.22.9

-1.7-0.32.11.9

-1.40.61.52.01.41.92.61.8

-3.42.13.03.2

-1.82.83.12.97.0

14.3

6.5

5.45.88.37.66.19.66.17.36.16.76.2

10.87.1

30.67.16.58.1

60.65.36.88.96.46.78.0

12.1

5.13.86.26.25.66.99.85.95.96.48.07.06.66.82.32.92.7

-0.36.05.85.7

15.05.3

7.5

7.3

5.27.05.25.95.79.36.16.86.95.96.75.06.3

-1.06.46.27.28.73.55.3

63.243.88.41.3

12.0

1.97.8

11.36.45.96.6

19.75.26.47.2

18.37.16.26.93.04.34.44.27.16.66.6

25.95.5

1,533

1,204

845816

1,105968

1,0791,8391,0891,0441,229

947789951

1,1351,0051,2601,4191,4582,5001,3842,8112,6982,8712,0813,0644,106

2,218697768

1,009741913737953

1,0041,0251,438

7471,482

771565851826834

4,3061,023

7541,1871,015

1,616

1,282

845816

1,105968

1,0791,8391,0891,0441,229

947789951

1,1353,2491,2601,4191,4582,5001,3842,8112,6982,8712,0813,0644,106

3,733697768

1,009741913737953

1,0041,0251,438

7471,482

771565851826834

4,3061,023

7541,1871,015


without oiland gas

1995 19951996 19961997 19971998 1998

ProvinceDistrict


13





34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

(continued)



5.56.26.55.84.95.06.8

18.06.39.87.52.4

-6.07.08.77.59.3

16.26.45.07.58.36.63.05.88.30.17.26.96.65.25.25.95.61.31.15.65.56.26.72.37.64.94.15.4

-8.812.310.06.8

6.6

7.2

5.26.15.95.55.54.68.58.25.9

10.81.52.6

4.15.36.86.37.4

5.26.35.1

11.36.06.25.96.68.25.56.46.36.75.65.96.05.1

11.05.15.86.66.27.16.19.45.73.95.14.4

12.110.56.7

6.4

7.9

3.22.12.93.34.43.62.63.32.57.8

-2.5-1.8

2.61.73.61.73.1

3.33.75.04.43.84.03.64.64.16.02.64.12.84.12.03.83.3

-1.13.24.13.64.37.44.05.53.91.82.83.6

10.72.53.0

2.6

5.0

-12.9-10.9-9.5-0.8-8.40.5

-7.8-14.7-2.6

-19.6-13.3-11.0

-15.2-13.8-7.4-9.6

-12.6

-6.6-7.8-8.8-7.0-0.4-0.7-7.6

-10.9-7.9-6.6

-15.3-5.7-9.9

-14.8-18.3-9.1

-13.5-1.2-6.7-8.2-6.5-6.0

-10.6-5.7

-12.8-0.8

-13.5-14.6-10.8-3.4-4.4

-11.3

-11.2

-10.7

-12.9-10.9-9.5-0.8-8.40.5

-7.8-14.7-2.6

-19.6-13.3-11.0

-15.2-13.8-7.4-9.6

-12.6

-6.6-7.8-8.8-7.0-0.4-0.7-7.6

-10.9-7.9-6.6

-15.3-5.7-9.9

-14.8-18.3-9.1

-13.5-1.2-6.7-8.2-6.5-6.0

-10.6-5.7

-12.8-0.8

-13.5-14.6-1.7-3.4-4.4

-11.3

-11.2

-10.6

3.22.12.93.34.43.62.63.32.57.8

-2.5-1.8

2.61.73.61.73.1

3.33.75.04.43.84.03.64.64.16.02.64.12.84.12.03.83.3

-1.13.24.13.64.37.44.05.53.91.82.8

13.110.72.53.0

2.6

5.1

5.26.15.95.55.54.68.58.25.9

10.81.52.6

4.15.36.86.37.4

5.26.35.1

11.36.06.25.96.68.25.56.46.36.75.65.96.05.1

11.05.15.86.66.27.16.19.45.73.95.1

-4.312.110.56.7

6.4

7.8

5.56.26.55.84.95.06.8

18.06.39.87.52.4

-6.07.08.77.59.3

16.26.45.07.58.36.63.05.88.30.17.26.96.65.25.25.95.61.31.15.65.56.26.72.37.64.94.15.4

-8.212.310.06.8

6.6

7.2

1,6801,1041,102

857651737

2,3612,3242,2783,3331,043

939

1,1991,0601,2851,6092,945

655756735

1,136996

1,0051,098

956983

1,087734

1,3821,3271,0392,4821,416

9461,127

848945818835

1,033893

3,287947680653867

21,3571,3092,851

1,554

1,625

1,6801,1041,102

857651737

2,3612,3242,2783,3331,043

939

1,1991,0601,2851,6092,945

655756735

1,136996

1,0051,098

956983

1,087734

1,3821,3271,0392,4821,416

9461,127

848945818835

1,033893

3,287947680653978

21,3571,3092,851

1,554

1,628


without oiland gas

1995 19951996 19961997 19971998 1998

ProvinceDistrict


13





01. West Sumba02. East Sumba03. Kupang04. Southern Central-Timor05. Northern Central-Timor06. Belu07. Alor08. Flores Timur09. Sikka10. Ende11. Ngada12. Manggarai


51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan

(continued)



6.15.88.07.39.6

6.36.96.77.87.36.76.57.16.7

5.76.67.07.23.44.68.8

0.24.410.54.21.07.89.312.16.65.38.63.0

0.07.07.19.67.87.58.46.6

7.2

6.4

6.8

7.3

5.65.75.67.48.6

6.56.56.27.36.66.36.36.66.4

4.76.56.76.43.95.88.3

2.75.98.12.05.05.85.18.17.96.43.34.3

0.08.49.0

11.58.08.97.27.8

6.8

6.2

6.0

8.6

1.03.32.26.15.0

3.84.13.85.24.53.44.04.73.8

2.82.24.14.91.52.95.1

0.51.51.78.25.37.12.52.88.45.45.33.1

0.03.34.28.55.54.24.54.9

4.4

3.6

3.8

4.8

-8.0-7.3-5.8-5.9

-17.4

-4.9-4.8-7.4-3.4-3.4-3.2-3.4-3.8-7.6

-7.6-2.9-4.1-2.4-2.6-4.4-4.8

0.9-7.0-8.3

-10.50.8

-7.2-15.6-7.4-4.1

-10.9-4.2-5.4

0.0-0.1-7.0-0.8-4.6-5.5-0.1-3.0

-5.2

-4.3

-6.9

-3.8

-8.0-7.3-5.8-5.9

-17.4

-4.9-4.8-7.4-3.4-3.4-3.2-3.4-3.8-7.6

-7.6-2.9-4.1-2.4-2.6-4.4-4.8

0.9-7.0-8.3

-10.50.8

-7.2-15.6-7.4-4.1

-10.9-4.2-5.4

0.0-0.1-7.0-0.8-4.6-5.5-0.1-3.0

-5.2

-4.3

-6.9

-3.8

1.03.32.26.15.0

3.84.13.85.24.53.44.04.73.8

2.82.24.14.91.52.95.1

0.51.51.78.25.37.12.52.88.45.45.33.1

0.03.34.28.55.54.24.54.9

4.4

3.6

3.8

4.8

5.65.75.67.48.6

6.56.56.27.36.66.36.36.66.4

4.76.56.76.43.95.88.3

2.75.98.12.05.05.85.18.17.96.43.34.3

0.08.49.0

11.58.08.97.27.8

6.8

6.2

6.0

8.6

6.15.88.07.39.6

6.36.96.77.87.36.76.57.16.7

5.76.67.07.23.44.68.8

0.24.4

10.54.21.07.89.3

12.16.65.38.63.0

0.07.07.19.67.87.58.46.6

7.2

6.4

6.8

7.3

2,1171,5551,9851,6354,645

2,1321,9565,2442,3622,2981,9211,4561,5743,021

794661699

1,212979960

1,145

501899

1,217497681639605575696743682519

1,2242,2081,4861,718

9751,5154,035

2,431

852

712

1,871

2,1171,5551,9851,6354,645

2,1321,9565,2442,3622,2981,9211,4561,5743,021

794661699

1,212979960

1,145

501899

1,217497681639605575696743682519

1,2242,2081,4861,718

9751,5154,035

2,431

852

712

1,871


without oiland gas

1995 19951996 19961997 19971998 1998

ProvinceDistrict


13




64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi







(continued)



6.9

7.5

9.7

8.8

5.5

6.8

4.96.65.66.8

15.91.7

3.65.58.75.86.46.36.1

12.215.77.4

7.812.429.91.5

19.51.4

10.35.19.09.09.96.7

13.8

5.36.95.25.15.2

7.58.36.1

14.06.0

8.7

8.8

9.1

10.0

5.6

7.1

6.09.48.79.0

16.4-0.6

5.410.07.33.27.36.37.5

19.413.87.8

6.212.611.66.9

10.83.5

8.36.1

14.69.97.96.8

13.4

6.57.75.45.80.7

11.18.76.8

10.95.2

5.0

2.0

3.1

3.2

1.3

3.0

3.24.34.76.67.45.8

-2.6-1.31.81.63.13.11.50.38.55.2

2.23.0

-1.95.36.11.8

3.21.75.83.53.6

-1.06.7

2.74.5

-1.62.00.6

5.2-3.70.35.24.8

-6.5

-6.2

-1.3

-1.5

-6.0

-5.7

-7.5-7.1-7.8-5.4-6.4-1.7

-16.53.3

-6.1-9.2-2.5-4.8

-18.1-7.814.4

-13.8

-2.9-2.215.0-1.5-3.8-0.4

-3.7-9.21.91.91.0

-3.22.9

-6.3-3.7-5.2-6.7-9.2

-1.8-1.30.4

-7.8-5.1

-6.5

-5.3

0.3

-1.5

-6.0

-5.2

-7.5-7.1-7.8-5.4-6.4-1.7

-16.53.3

-6.1-9.2-2.5-4.8

-18.1-6.927.5

-13.8

-2.90.9

15.0-1.8-3.3-0.4

-3.7-9.21.91.91.0

-3.22.9

-6.3-3.7-5.2-6.7-9.2

-1.8-1.30.4

-7.8-5.1

5.0

2.3

2.4

3.2

1.3

3.0

3.24.34.76.67.45.8

-2.6-1.31.81.63.13.11.50.8

13.25.2

2.23.1

-1.95.90.41.8

3.21.75.83.53.6

-1.06.7

2.74.5

-1.62.00.6

5.2-3.70.35.24.8

8.7

8.8

7.5

10.0

5.6

7.1

6.09.48.79.0

16.4-0.6

5.410.07.33.27.36.37.5

19.212.47.8

6.27.4

11.67.7

10.93.5

8.36.1

14.69.97.96.8

13.4

6.57.75.45.80.7

11.18.76.8

10.95.2

6.9

7.5

2.2

8.8

5.5

6.8

4.96.65.66.8

15.91.7

3.65.58.75.86.46.36.1

12.114.57.4

7.83.5

29.9-4.8-2.31.4

10.35.19.09.09.96.7

13.8

5.36.95.25.15.2

7.58.36.1

14.06.0

2,350

1,943

4,502

1,434

1,070

1,201

3,1712,4061,5612,3133,6502,298

1,4113,3851,5132,4991,4251,298

8741,6181,7102,222

2,8415,5537,2123,7673,6614,496

1,0681,0381,6341,0851,3521,9392,918

1,0031,160

933991

1,507

1,055930856678921

2,350

1,975

8,401

1,434

1,070

1,207

3,1712,4061,5612,3133,6502,298

1,4113,3851,5132,4991,4251,298

8741,6522,2302,222

2,84114,8127,2124,1878,0594,496

1,0681,0381,6341,0851,3521,9392,918

1,0031,160

933991

1,507

1,055930856678921


without oiland gas

1995 19951996 19961997 19971998 1998

ProvinceDistrict


13



01. Buton02. Muna03. Kendari04. Kolaka




81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict



5.87.13.44.74.46.18.87.08.57.25.35.88.46.71.83.37.09.1

1.16.60.99.5

10.90.72.21.47.2

5.34.12.06.0

34.74.13.94.65.03.3

4.0

4.1

18.5

5.15.84.55.25.25.99.09.56.56.05.36.18.27.19.96.07.76.9

4.35.15.6

-1.5

6.85.22.16.48.2

14.25.05.16.3

14.95.25.07.26.34.3

3.6

5.5

10.9

4.51.93.2

10.74.32.10.1

-7.03.01.73.2

-1.03.86.83.93.84.86.7

2.21.33.92.6

-9.23.42.54.94.1

2.41.70.9

23.31.1

30.23.14.82.30.7

3.0

2.0

5.0

-5.3-4.7-6.7-7.6-4.6-5.7-4.8-2.1-9.0-3.2-3.9-4.0-0.9-4.2-8.1-6.1-8.4-5.7

-10.5-6.2-8.2-6.3

-5.0-6.2-6.6-7.5-6.2

-13.2-4.7

-11.2-3.731.7-1.4

-13.1-12.9-3.5

-12.5

-7.8

-6.2

13.2

-5.3-4.7-6.7-7.6-4.6-5.7-4.86.8

-9.0-3.2-3.9-4.0-0.9-4.2-8.1-6.1-8.4-5.7

-10.5-6.2-8.2-6.3

-5.0-6.2-6.6-7.5-6.2

-13.2-4.7

-11.2-3.731.70.6

-13.1-12.9-3.5

-12.5

-7.8

-6.2

13.0

4.51.93.2

10.74.32.10.1

-7.03.01.73.2

-1.03.86.83.93.84.86.7

2.21.33.92.6

-9.23.12.54.94.1

2.41.70.9

23.31.1

21.03.14.82.30.7

3.0

1.9

4.8

5.15.84.55.25.25.99.09.56.56.05.36.18.27.19.96.07.76.9

4.35.15.6

-1.5

6.85.22.16.48.2

14.25.05.16.3

14.90.85.07.26.34.3

3.6

5.5

10.1

5.87.13.44.74.46.18.87.08.57.25.35.88.46.71.83.37.09.1

1.16.60.99.5

10.90.92.21.47.2

5.34.12.06.0

34.7-5.63.94.65.03.3

4.0

4.1

16.2

942914

1,1581,423

9871,2571,0321,2871,0971,245

7681,038

754846

1,192717

2,2461,327

769829884

1,193

9871,0421,1921,4672,499

1,148564

1,7621,470

44,6332,8991,9601,7472,1702,425

907

1,333

3,948

942914

1,1581,423

9871,2571,0321,4041,0971,245

7681,038

754846

1,192717

2,2461,327

769829884

1,193

9871,0621,1921,4672,499

1,148564

1,7621,470

44,6333,9361,9601,7472,1702,425

907

1,339

4,074


13


without oiland gas

1995 19951996 19961997 19971998 1998

Note:Based on 1993 prices




ProvinceDistrict

11. Aceh

12. North Sumatera

13. West Sumatera




Labour forceparticipation

rate

Employeeworking Per capita

expenditurePoverty

Openunemployment

Employmentin informal

sector(%) (%) (%)

<14hoursper

week

TotalNumber of

poor people

Povertyline<35

hoursper

week

FoodPoverty

rate(%) (%)

(% oftotal)

(%)

(thousandrupiah/month) (thousand)

(thousandrupiah/capita/month)

73.8

70.9

71.2

75.775.473.173.172.472.081.574.463.978.0

78.877.879.378.874.072.376.177.880.769.476.269.873.471.973.658.967.4

75.275.472.575.873.773.674.274.862.267.568.764.362.768.6

72.3

81.0

86.5

70.372.771.077.269.876.969.272.778.770.4

80.775.573.975.780.479.081.075.077.782.580.184.278.385.281.987.982.0

85.880.283.587.587.385.285.282.692.887.786.193.398.288.4

602.1

1972.7

601.5

47.156.8

125.529.674.563.612.2

180.27.55.1

393.6140.054.5

101.9150.0167.4180.948.414.4

201.6174.210.87.8

49.917.8

240.019.4

52.050.960.749.8

122.855.224.489.958.64.89.33.49.3

10.3

14.7

16.7

13.2

12.228.917.512.814.721.42.6

17.73.1

20.1

57.012.421.114.016.517.520.816.15.0

10.519.513.36.7

20.912.911.88.8

12.210.419.813.823.013.07.7

16.67.58.7

14.98.29.7

10.3

123.5

136.8

151.6

121.6104.2124.3121.9121.9117.0130.4109.7197.9130.3

85.7124.4108.6135.7123.9130.2107.2108.7146.5151.1122.6166.5137.3129.6129.3181.0139.4

125.4145.9145.7129.8143.9145.8142.1138.7197.2171.8143.1208.8202.6158.5

75.4

67.3

73.0

82.185.259.890.869.185.476.480.741.961.2

98.081.179.594.165.463.163.994.095.650.259.761.856.350.168.440.752.7

72.975.579.178.080.879.670.881.453.562.960.250.449.863.8

48.8

37.6

46.7

45.561.239.958.946.550.450.953.328.355.3

38.659.249.551.941.934.646.264.529.428.943.831.732.218.817.115.525.1

41.858.046.441.255.253.750.459.326.122.939.233.229.040.7

12.9

7.8

15.1

7.611.57.3

16.910.49.6

18.517.97.4

15.2

4.014.011.611.16.5

10.78.7

10.84.66.79.49.06.72.32.42.65.7

12.720.315.113.124.817.113.117.16.33.8

17.410.38.7

13.8

6.8

6.6

5.9

5.42.78.52.56.28.68.95.8

12.89.7

0.65.43.12.04.84.15.51.62.95.87.1

12.310.413.416.214.413.7

3.32.91.95.46.22.83.43.4

15.07.3

10.45.68.76.4

67.8

68.0

65.4

63.077.859.179.174.965.771.070.255.567.6

78.880.770.682.761.467.072.585.780.067.265.358.257.854.757.957.160.9

59.273.672.964.561.968.071.472.656.659.961.164.361.268.9

Labour Forceand Poverty Conditionby District, 1999

14


14. Riau

15. Jambi

16. South Sumatera

17. Bengkulu

18. Lampung

31. Jakarta







(continued)


rate


expenditurePoverty

Openunemployment


sector(%) (%) (%)

<14hoursper

week

TotalNumber of

poor people

Povertyline<35

hoursper

week

FoodPoverty

rate(%) (%)

(% oftotal)

(%)



69.9

73.2

72.9

68.3

72.1

42.8

73.681.666.972.574.862.356.2

74.075.177.274.678.063.6

74.575.575.577.672.481.471.976.764.465.2

74.864.677.161.1

73.171.877.477.861.2

30.949.449.550.052.8

93.3

84.0

81.6

80.5

73.4

109.3

87.086.792.589.292.6

100.8112.5

87.381.980.382.681.692.0

82.281.678.678.778.278.278.582.089.286.6

77.681.575.290.4

73.174.671.468.177.5

109.5110.3109.1108.9108.2

589.7

677.0

1813.7

302.3

2037.1

379.6

86.085.348.6

108.7195.856.78.8

51.8201.181.8

115.6151.775.0

354.0277.8152.5124.999.6

459.956.328.8

248.111.8

107.962.898.932.7

481.6595.0807.758.993.9

27.570.9

112.474.794.1

14.0

26.6

23.5

19.8

29.1

4.0

18.716.39.8

15.717.29.52.8

16.742.516.827.237.017.2

30.730.421.817.615.339.39.2

12.517.48.4

33.115.520.510.4

25.728.447.415.210.0

1.32.8

11.93.25.7

162.3

127.2

120.9

141.0

109.2

344.3

149.1140.2186.4144.7136.6177.8321.7

122.7114.3130.4131.5101.6160.2

109.6106.5114.7125.1108.689.5

152.8128.2153.7172.8

102.0142.8116.8205.9

106.2112.584.5

118.9166.7

595.3276.1287.3284.9241.7

70.9

73.9

68.3

78.7

71.7

38.6

72.478.069.387.363.255.643.0

78.273.379.974.989.237.7

78.882.088.588.181.779.752.170.939.545.3

85.982.880.464.2

69.981.376.593.651.8

34.235.839.037.948.0

39.9

42.6

42.8

34.9

39.1

12.4

60.656.332.449.140.513.013.7

47.056.452.042.134.419.3

49.248.444.551.252.739.144.135.725.826.5

40.939.332.524.3

44.335.541.752.725.4

13.410.115.813.111.5

7.7

8.0

8.3

7.1

10.0

3.5

14.29.37.09.96.92.53.0

8.58.77.29.88.75.1

6.79.65.19.18.98.8

15.18.46.19.4

9.09.43.58.2

14.410.45.2

12.18.0

4.12.64.84.41.7

6.8

4.2

5.5

3.8

3.7

13.2

3.24.67.03.66.2

14.211.7

7.12.93.24.94.83.0

4.44.43.84.53.32.22.76.2

14.17.0

2.13.62.39.0

3.82.32.32.69.9

10.815.014.012.214.7

62.1

62.4

66.2

70.8

69.8

58.8

69.660.060.365.861.654.966.5

67.261.968.665.960.551.4

67.961.769.272.171.974.864.957.557.257.2

71.673.375.759.7

68.972.272.370.662.2

60.057.358.958.759.9

ProvinceDistrict


14


32. West Java

33. Central Java



(continued)


rate


expenditurePoverty

Openunemployment


sector(%) (%) (%)

<14hoursper

week

TotalNumber of

poor people

Povertyline<35

hoursper

week

FoodPoverty

rate(%) (%)

(% oftotal)

(%)



62.9

66.1

77.874.055.671.970.060.970.268.870.368.271.671.267.673.370.965.162.362.357.067.059.559.151.260.759.752.9

67.664.472.469.572.764.971.064.866.468.464.367.464.267.470.569.271.969.363.364.569.764.767.7

82.7

76.6

75.577.287.477.979.385.679.079.878.080.676.177.679.180.479.878.282.979.683.780.388.586.289.884.588.498.4

76.277.073.177.074.779.478.778.177.376.976.776.277.875.974.078.373.177.478.274.876.876.474.9

8393.4

8755.4

180.7271.4735.2471.1478.2890.0642.9665.1277.9264.9630.5205.4158.8339.8160.776.5

118.5267.0412.0404.687.516.9

227.552.5

105.6252.2

469.3624.1255.6437.8323.6238.8249.7318.6322.2262.898.8

266.0113.0331.4460.6365.388.2

346.6102.569.6

208.5191.5184.5

19.8

28.5

18.726.915.222.926.225.333.834.517.428.133.918.717.921.712.612.17.2

15.714.923.213.17.28.9

19.77.6

16.2

29.744.033.352.427.833.735.430.236.923.613.426.914.838.737.245.415.731.414.67.6

22.223.128.3

142.2

109.5

109.1114.7184.6116.9108.0136.8103.6108.6126.2117.2100.8121.3133.6115.9115.1144.4156.8156.0179.3128.2139.5171.3229.2154.9184.8155.3

102.7129.184.281.4

115.8104.982.092.897.8

108.0128.7109.2119.2100.094.679.4

118.798.2

113.6138.0105.5116.582.8

58.9

64.6

84.969.546.861.666.240.571.458.365.884.052.068.572.161.266.963.367.261.855.270.843.049.039.153.043.159.8

73.357.173.376.677.577.868.969.178.161.266.180.062.574.679.479.572.660.541.850.360.072.780.3

36.0

41.1

41.545.428.550.156.825.344.644.746.048.535.346.846.850.138.740.837.821.629.344.413.219.421.122.217.39.7

50.634.544.739.644.151.640.946.653.138.033.649.029.046.553.764.258.439.124.834.136.835.447.2

9.3

11.0

13.111.08.29.611.24.19.112.210.117.311.913.314.818.47.711.79.91.49.511.72.74.76.68.46.02.3

17.58.412.37.210.412.710.213.112.413.611.212.16.714.816.913.518.39.78.810.310.46.811.1

9.0

5.6

5.410.012.45.9

10.69.97.06.03.16.29.96.67.64.56.27.7

11.68.99.27.3

11.920.313.412.68.7

13.5

8.67.24.04.75.64.13.62.74.55.47.02.83.82.74.02.13.84.96.33.77.76.32.8

61.2

70.0

65.858.259.264.668.959.360.668.766.562.063.067.661.862.665.266.060.154.259.863.052.158.356.760.256.455.9

67.766.170.269.869.467.972.773.476.467.869.372.675.271.972.574.669.671.874.871.171.375.476.3

ProvinceDistrict


14





34. Yogyakarta

35. East Java

(continued)


rate


expenditurePoverty

Openunemployment


sector(%) (%) (%)

<14hoursper

week

TotalNumber of

poor people

Povertyline<35

hoursper

week

FoodPoverty

rate(%) (%)

(% oftotal)

(%)



67.072.668.368.267.768.262.558.158.353.260.163.0

72.361.265.947.150.0

74.167.271.261.067.466.568.272.069.768.371.869.366.868.662.567.667.171.775.168.572.473.571.772.666.675.778.173.972.263.162.556.8

54.5

66.9

75.078.077.276.476.175.579.477.681.378.777.778.6

84.188.285.389.691.9

79.578.575.180.179.978.178.277.377.980.776.079.381.878.881.578.377.975.980.379.978.377.878.277.680.074.972.877.379.182.780.083.8

88.0

79.4

149.1205.5180.5421.0388.1620.516.191.38.0

238.586.421.5

125.7222.0226.9158.655.9

187.1419.4336.2249.9328.6494.4899.7327.6987.3351.2249.4135.5345.4355.8124.0195.0323.5205.2218.5202.4262.3439.3340.7206.9149.6276.2432.0326.1401.927.027.996.3

789.1

10286.4

17.332.724.633.929.336.012.817.27.6

16.722.26.3

35.230.036.018.512.8

36.748.450.827.231.135.137.434.646.123.636.522.534.926.78.3

22.629.120.933.832.032.437.532.417.215.634.955.346.740.910.122.311.8

26.1

29.5

101.094.494.394.7

108.2100.8153.1150.1185.1178.2128.6151.8

99.7132.8125.1242.6245.9

98.992.890.5

137.5112.0107.398.3

102.395.8

122.6110.9103.3102.896.4

165.4112.7116.7114.6104.2102.0106.886.6

108.5106.6147.3106.984.981.286.8

145.5140.1204.3

177.8

118.0

51.357.150.755.058.166.143.047.549.743.639.450.5

81.763.762.756.852.5

89.475.786.265.575.960.261.450.846.657.460.166.165.152.134.054.053.365.562.978.172.279.471.582.055.366.577.880.881.147.157.048.1

63.6

61.1

47.141.145.738.539.244.226.618.815.917.518.528.3

46.431.443.331.420.3

52.154.168.451.545.648.244.850.756.452.955.643.158.640.422.236.244.551.656.844.253.151.440.751.835.065.872.368.568.220.236.428.9

34.4

46.6

14.66.2

17.19.78.68.6

10.15.04.34.04.0

13.5

13.311.311.39.96.8

16.814.326.323.116.016.314.015.218.918.917.713.718.612.86.2

12.815.217.717.115.116.312.912.110.77.6

24.827.926.922.75.2

13.611.9

10.6

15.3

7.35.44.57.39.24.4

12.97.9

14.58.19.7

11.9

2.13.94.34.69.6

1.83.91.66.06.06.12.93.93.24.02.01.33.14.46.55.58.07.37.23.55.24.74.02.54.35.92.52.62.3

10.19.3

11.1

4.7

5.0

70.170.769.367.464.270.560.665.459.963.166.264.1

66.373.574.967.158.3

79.970.878.768.465.967.266.964.066.168.068.868.769.370.263.069.662.065.067.474.768.164.473.668.165.568.573.274.075.861.261.861.7

68.8

67.4

ProvinceDistrict


14







51. Bali



61. West Kalimantan

(continued)


rate


expenditurePoverty

Openunemployment


sector(%) (%) (%)

<14hoursper

week

TotalNumber of

poor people

Povertyline<35

hoursper

week

FoodPoverty

rate(%) (%)

(% oftotal)

(%)



63.366.663.764.057.3

71.464.961.665.164.962.368.066.954.0

73.975.575.873.474.073.161.7

72.472.977.677.877.973.976.873.468.170.070.068.263.8

72.372.679.678.379.382.261.5

62.8

73.0

72.1

73.0

81.779.383.481.887.1

85.485.093.885.588.987.485.987.093.7

77.776.876.377.076.179.880.8

66.264.468.068.264.665.666.469.969.269.869.563.771.0

85.886.682.280.782.282.696.4

88.3

77.6

67.2

85.7

20.927.720.328.4

266.9

17.215.911.025.220.125.470.167.75.2

253.2231.6355.3132.176.6

172.855.2

191.249.9

203.2222.0126.5126.089.1

146.3172.2105.250.1

279.417.8

198.2297.3164.4109.5181.233.939.6

257.8

1276.8

1779.0

1016.2

10.516.318.116.59.3

7.44.43.37.1

13.113.919.611.81.1

36.030.936.831.139.634.016.6

53.927.249.454.564.449.954.952.563.644.522.746.37.8

22.232.231.428.236.718.38.3

8.5

33.0

46.7

26.2

137.0131.8135.2152.5198.2

140.0176.3218.9155.1153.3154.6125.5130.9278.2

104.0104.9104.7120.397.3

111.3164.5

88.1102.769.777.361.186.279.684.676.985.3

105.970.5

148.7

125.5131.5117.3116.3109.8111.4196.7

173.0

111.7

84.2

131.0

52.952.144.454.835.0

67.172.046.366.571.084.484.467.444.8

63.673.161.077.681.480.447.8

88.589.591.693.892.388.585.481.589.093.892.491.747.8

90.166.781.878.176.282.639.5

68.7

69.0

88.9

75.5

30.424.925.329.815.9

43.434.826.536.743.245.343.444.117.9

53.058.458.854.462.450.030.3

60.753.365.870.052.553.253.553.156.168.067.361.327.1

46.438.950.356.743.552.327.4

36.3

54.1

59.4

44.3

11.39.58.57.85.5

12.66.27.26.8

13.15.8

11.39.75.7

19.529.120.223.924.815.09.8

16.614.317.918.913.916.416.816.011.416.717.312.210.3

14.89.05.3

15.37.45.29.5

8.4

21.2

15.3

10.0

8.18.0

12.111.09.7

5.02.96.31.46.21.11.73.44.9

5.92.43.63.73.77.09.5

1.93.62.41.40.51.92.81.12.01.50.93.5

16.9

6.22.91.56.01.73.9

12.7

3.5

4.7

2.8

4.7

58.559.961.060.162.4

81.373.368.979.675.286.383.576.570.5

69.475.266.477.676.874.560.8

78.576.174.267.572.169.269.075.872.383.280.187.755.6

74.972.175.274.179.778.659.5

76.3

70.9

75.0

72.9

ProvinceDistrict


14




64. East Kalimantan

71. North Sulawesi


73. South Sulawesi







(continued)

ProvinceRegency/City


rate


expenditurePoverty

Openunemployment


sector(%) (%) (%)

<14hoursper

week

TotalNumber of

poor people

Povertyline<35

hoursper

week

FoodPoverty

rate(%) (%)

(% oftotal)

(%)



75.4

72.6

64.3

68.1

70.1

70.2

72.976.679.778.976.266.3

76.174.373.280.276.978.777.876.474.062.0

73.869.368.562.059.158.7

78.568.866.476.770.059.770.2

72.569.672.573.961.9

77.371.575.177.376.1

93.5

77.7

93.9

82.5

79.1

76.1

97.392.589.690.098.6

101.8

77.877.977.673.176.072.975.673.675.885.7

87.989.189.493.8

100.599.5

77.279.283.081.583.293.189.3

79.476.976.377.391.7

73.773.774.671.471.1

261.7

440.2

509.2

504.6

599.4

1462.0

22.557.1

109.115.548.59.0

27.157.693.448.222.127.846.845.740.830.7

87.3163.9

6.176.173.0

102.8

268.266.153.887.38.6

17.33.5

133.1121.9227.977.738.8

29.355.145.791.833.2

15.1

14.4

20.2

18.2

28.7

18.3

9.411.920.89.3

30.45.3

10.913.318.117.715.814.220.115.523.65.5

29.019.78.1

28.016.517.1

40.115.17.5

32.06.24.03.2

31.929.131.628.215.1

29.315.126.927.414.0

147.4

139.7

164.2

138.4

115.9

123.2

176.1146.3114.9146.0134.5217.1

123.9148.5138.9119.6124.4141.4119.6108.4113.6195.0

138.5155.9174.7139.8196.4177.5

89.5123.5153.5114.6143.6210.7144.0

98.5120.9108.7101.9173.3

98.0112.294.289.1

104.5

76.2

78.1

66.4

67.6

78.1

78.3

67.380.482.184.887.948.9

84.669.680.085.187.884.191.885.883.246.3

80.777.078.681.845.550.1

79.276.061.981.554.747.848.3

84.176.978.981.455.6

81.690.288.588.083.8

34.9

43.9

31.2

39.0

45.3

53.5

27.632.236.051.434.727.6

48.731.846.852.258.250.448.750.061.721.3

48.932.337.548.417.321.4

44.843.239.051.430.323.218.2

49.743.748.745.927.4

60.369.062.157.458.1

5.3

11.4

7.6

9.8

12.8

17.5

6.13.65.0

11.91.55.5

16.08.9

11.016.814.211.610.39.8

14.57.4

13.76.16.2

11.74.86.7

14.28.6

10.411.14.84.07.2

14.211.013.214.210.5

17.621.521.617.722.5

4.0

3.9

7.7

9.3

4.0

6.4

5.14.42.92.32.58.7

2.14.44.51.42.13.72.52.51.18.5

3.05.23.97.3

11.011.9

8.54.65.37.1

18.019.514.2

3.23.63.06.17.0

4.15.73.42.03.1

68.1

71.9

64.1

61.8

67.3

58.2

62.661.576.476.072.957.7

72.775.667.481.775.775.979.176.979.758.5

65.067.869.463.059.062.6

59.862.865.164.656.859.855.9

74.970.566.963.854.5

64.156.663.864.659.2

Labour Forceand Poverty Conditionby Regency/City, 1999

14







81. Maluku

82. Irian Jaya

(continued)

ProvinceDistrict


rate


expenditurePoverty

Openunemployment


sector(%) (%) (%)

<14hoursper

week

TotalNumber of

poor people

Povertyline<35

hoursper

week

FoodPoverty

rate(%) (%)

(% oftotal)

(%)



73.677.574.271.973.172.566.679.469.972.775.974.670.977.579.777.255.967.5

71.775.177.870.462.1

72.274.464.476.563.4

60.861.965.772.064.364.469.264.861.564.4

72.1

68.8

64.2

74.869.676.476.171.080.778.076.376.279.471.877.376.066.669.570.283.277.2

79.579.777.576.279.3

98.998.199.6

100.3107.4

87.9101.792.888.190.092.687.093.392.193.5

77.7

100.2

92.8

58.481.649.758.624.0

137.640.997.345.849.834.0

175.8108.366.715.055.2

104.53.8

150.3103.6176.146.028.8

172.3454.5244.899.442.9

175.6369.662.0

224.167.3

107.869.215.234.922.8

504.9

1013.9

1148.6

11.737.918.121.915.322.317.726.418.115.521.620.127.915.312.919.28.83.2

33.238.635.914.116.7

55.264.536.256.513.0

58.079.143.080.156.741.940.529.633.911.3

29.5

46.1

54.7

106.271.8

126.4140.0132.0106.1125.5133.1116.9111.594.6

122.0107.9108.8102.6121.8185.1154.7

106.998.879.0

140.7138.9

101.391.9

105.596.1

174.7

144.262.5

115.170.8

105.3136.3109.4131.0162.0218.3

106.6

110.4

113.3

72.675.686.881.574.287.275.981.583.894.187.485.988.181.575.683.542.871.6

76.485.782.788.331.1

97.580.180.689.920.2

86.995.653.297.9

100.056.576.396.571.557.8

80.0

79.4

85.4

45.957.848.559.643.461.256.251.249.165.566.358.471.663.069.353.421.923.6

47.653.545.549.229.1

39.460.457.251.230.2

65.476.052.769.762.743.252.351.949.926.4

46.7

51.7

61.1

16.320.918.215.912.218.312.110.616.224.715.825.627.019.316.914.06.38.0

14.418.912.614.05.5

12.514.514.911.98.8

13.15.09.2

13.213.710.013.57.35.29.6

13.7

13.4

9.7

5.51.18.35.87.17.63.56.86.75.41.34.32.44.65.12.8

15.712.9

6.43.76.01.9

14.5

1.84.97.13.1

21.9

1.20.84.21.53.06.33.24.76.4

13.7

5.8

7.6

3.4

54.856.157.551.652.058.052.854.754.358.567.261.865.271.560.068.251.353.1

66.270.372.261.255.9

58.662.564.367.452.7

79.195.860.386.061.871.575.469.157.255.1

66.5

61.2

76.1


14

Note:The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City.



The diagram here offers an overview of how the four human development indices used in the IndonesiaHuman Development Report are constructed, highlighting both their similarities and their differences. Adetailed explanationof the computation is presented in the following pages.

DIMENSION

DIMENSION

DIMENSION

DIMENSION

HDI

HPI

GDI

GEI

A long and healthylife



Politicalparticipation

Economic participation anddecision making

Life expectancy atbirth

Probability at birthof not surviving to

age 40

Female lifeexpectancy

at birth

Female lifeexpectancy

index

Equally distributedlife expectancy index

Equally distributed education index Equally distributedincome index

Female educationindex

Femaleincomeindex

Maleincomeindex

Male educationindex

Femaleadult

literacyrate

Femaleestimated

earnedincome

Female and male shared of jobs assenior officials, managers,professional and technical

positions

Female and male estimatedearned income

Female and male sharesof parliamentary seats

EDEP forparliamentaryrepresentation

EDEP for participation anddecision making

EDEP for income

Maleestimated

earnedincome

Maleadult

literacyrate

FemaleMYS

MaleMYS

Male lifeexpectancy

at birth

Male lifeexpectancy

index

Adult literacyrate (Lit)

Adult illiteracyrate

Percentageof population

withoutaccess to

healthfacilities

Percentage ofundernourishedchildren under

age five

Percentageof population

withoutaccess to

safe water

Mean years ofschooling (MYS)

Adjusted real percapita expenditure

(PPP rupiah)

Knowledge

Knowledge

Knowledge

A decent standard ofliving



Power over economicresources

INDICATOR

INDICATOR

INDICATOR

INDICATOR

DIMENTIONINDEX

EQUALLYDISTRIBUTEDINDEX

EQUALLYDISTRIBUTEDEQUIVALENTPERCENTAGE

DIMENSIONINDEX

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI)

HUMAN POVERTY INDEX (HDI)for developing countries

GENDER RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDEX (GDI)

GENDER EMPOWEREMENT MEASURE (GEM)

Lit index MYS Index

Education index

Deprivation in a decent standard of living

Life expectancyindex

Income index

Calculating the Human Development Indices

Technical Notes



The Human Development Index (HDI)

The HDI is based on three components: longevity, asmeasured by life expectancy at birth; educationalattainment, as measured by the combination of adultliteracy rate (two-thirds weight) and mean years ofschooling (one-third weight); and standard of living, asmeasured by adjusted per capita expenditure (PPP Rupiah).

The index is defined as the simple average of the indicesof those three components:

The estimation of IMR at regency/city level is basedon the pooled data from SUPAS 1995 and SUSENAS 1996.This pooled data is considered to be a reliable data sourcebecause it covers around 416,000 households. Howeverthe indirect technique used in this estimation producesthe estimate of four years before the survey time. Tocalculate the estimate points for 1999, the estimate figurebased on the pooled SUPAS 1995 and SUSENAS 1996data is projected after taking into account the provincialtrend of the respected region and the inter regencies/citiesvariation within each respected province.

Educational attainment

The component of educational attainment in thispublication is measured by using two indicators – literacyrate and mean years of schooling. The literacy rate is

Index X(i,j) = (X(i,j) - X(i-min)) / (X(i-max) - X(i-min))

Where :X(i,j) : Indicator ith for region jX(i-min) : Minimum value of XiX(i-max) : Maximum value of Xi

Longevity

Longevity is measured by using the indicator of lifeexpectancy at birth (e0). The e0 presented in this reportis based on the extrapolation of the e0 figure based onend-1996 and end-1999 situation as the correspondenceof the infant mortality rate (IMR) for the same period.For this publication, the estimation of IMR at provinciallevel is calculated based on data series from 1971 census,1980 census, 1990 census, and the pooled data of 1995survey between census (SUPAS) and 1996 socio-economic survey (SUSENAS). The calculation methodfollows the indirect technique based on two basic data -i.e. the average number of live births and the averagenumber of children still living - reported from each five-year class of mother ages between 15 - 49 years old. Byapplying this technique, there will be seven estimationpoints for each time reference from each data source.As a result there are 28 IMR estimations for all timereferences from which the estimation of IMR is calculated.It is done after the omission of any unreliable figuresreported by the eldest and the youngest maternal groups.

Notes:

a) Projection of the highest purchasing power for Jakarta in 2018(the end of the second long term development period) after adjustedwith Atkinson formula. This projection is based on the assumptionof 6.5 percent growth in purchasing power during the period of1993-2018.

b) Equal to two times the poverty line of the province with thelowest per capita consumption in 1990 (rural area of South Sulawesi).For 1999, the minimum value was adjusted to Rp. 360,000. Thisadjustment is necessary, as the economic crisis has drasticallyreduced the purchasing power of the people. It is reflected by theincrease in poverty level and the decrease in the real wages. Theadditional Rp. 60,000 is based on the difference between the “oldpoverty line” and the “new poverty line” that is amounted toaround Rp. 5,000 per month (= Rp. 60,000 per year).

Life Expectancy 85 25 UNDPStandard

Literacy Rate 100 0 UNDPStandard

Mean Years of 15 0 UNDP usesSchooling combined

grossenrolmentratio

Purchasing Power 737,720 a) 300,000 UNDP uses(1996) adjusted real

360,000 per capita(1999) b) GNP

Table 1Maximum and minimum value of each HDI indicator

HDI Maximum Minimum NotesComponent Value Value

HDI = 1/3 (Index X1 + Index X2 + Index X3)

Where X1, X2 and X3 are longevity, educational attainment andstandard of living respectively.

For any component of the HDI, individual index canbe computed according to the general formula:

Computing the indices


defined as the proportion of population aged 15 years andover who are able to read and write in Latin script or inother script as a percentage of this age group. Thisindicator is given a weight of two-thirds. Another one-third weight is given to the indicator of mean years ofschooling that is defined as the average years of formalschooling attended among the population aged 15 yearsand over. This indicator is calculated based on the variablesof the current or achieved grade and the attainment ofeducation level in the SUSENAS core questionnaire. Table2 presents the conversion factor of the year of schoolingfor each level of education being completed. For someonewho has not completed a certain level of education ordrop out from school, the year of schooling (YS) iscalculated using the following formula:

YS = Conversion years + the current/achieved grade-1

For example, someone who drops out from the 2nd year

of Senior High School:

YS = 9 + 2 - 1 = 10 (years)

4. Calculating the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) foreach region as the relative price of a certain bundle ofcommodities, with the prices in South Jakarta as thestandard;

5. Dividing Y2 with PPP to obtained a standardized Ru-piah value [=Y3];

6. Discounting the Y3 using the Atkinson formula to getthe purchasing power estimate [=Y4]. This step isapplied to accommodate the rule of decreasing mar-ginal utility.

Consumer Price Index

In Indonesia, the CPI figure is available only for 54cities. The calculation of purchasing power at regency/city level is using the CPI of the respected regency/citywhere the figure is available. For other than the 54 citieswhere the CPI data is available, the provincial CPI - i.e.the average of CPIs figure available in each province - isused.

Purchasing Power Parity

The calculation of PPP basically applies the samemethod used by the International Comparison Project instandardizing GDP for international comparison. Thecalculation is based on prices and quantities of selectedcommodities basket (27 items) available in SUSENASconsumption module. The prices in South Jakarta areused as the basic price. The formula for PPP calculationis:

Standard of living

This report is using the adjusted real per capitaexpenditure as the proxy for standard of living. In orderto ensure inter-regional and time series comparability, thefollowing procedure is applied:1. Calculating the annual per capita expenditure from

SUSENAS module data [=Y];2. Mark up the Y with a factor of 20% [=Y1], as various

studies suggested that the SUSENAS figure underes-timates by about 20%;

3. Calculating the real Y1 by deflating Y1 with the con-sumer price index (CPI) [=Y2];

Level of education completed Conversion factor

1. Never attend school 0

2. Primary School 6

3. Junior High School 9

4. Senior High School 12

5. Diploma I 13

6. Diploma II 14

7. Academy/Diploma III 15

8. Diploma IV/Sarjana 16

9. Master (S2) 18

10. Ph D (S3) 21

Table 2The conversion years for the highest level ofeducation being completed

The housing unit is calculated based on the housingquality index that consists of seven housing qualitycomponents in SUSENAS module. The score of eachcomponent is:1) Floor: ceramic, marble, or granite =1, others = 02) Per capita floor width > 10 m2 = 1, others= 03) Wall: cemented=1, others= 04) Roof: wood/single, cemented =1, others = 05) Lighting facility: electric=1, others= 06) Drinking water facility: piping=1, others= 07) Sanitation: private ownership=1, others= 08) Initial score for every house=1

Where:E(i,j): expenditure for commodity j in the province iP(9,j): the price of commodity j in South JakartaQ(i,j): volume of commodity j (unit) consumed in the province i

PPP =∑∑∑∑∑ E(i,j)

j

P(9,j) Q(i,j)∑∑∑∑∑j


The housing quality index is the sum of all scores witha range of 1 to 8. The quality of house consumed by ahousehold is equal to the housing quality index divided by8. For example, if a house has a housing quality index of6, then the quality of house consumed by the householdis 6/8 or 0,75 unit.

Atkinson Formula

The Atkinson formula used to discounted the Y3 can bedefined as:

Reduction Shortfall

The differences on the rate of change of any HDIscore during a certain period can be measured by theannual rate of reduction in shortfall. This shortfall valuemeasures the achievement ratio in terms of the gapbetween the ‘achieved’ and ‘to be achieved’ distancetoward the optimum condition. The ideal condition to beachieved is defined as the HDI equal to 100. The higherthe reduction in shortfall, the faster the HDI increases.This measure is based on the assumption that the growthof HDI is not linear. It is assumed to be diminishing as theHDI level is approaching the ideal point. The calculationof reduction shortfall is as follow:

C(I)*= C(i) if C(i) < Z

= Z + 2(C(i) - Z)(1/2) if Z < C(i) < 2Z

= Z +2(Z)(1/2) + 3(C(i) - 2Z)(1/3) if 2Z< C(i) <3Z

= Z + 2(Z)(1/2) + 3(Z)(1/3) + 4(C(i) - 3Z)(1/4)

if 3Z < C(i) < 4Z

where:C(i) : The PPP adjusted per capita real expenditureZ : threshold level of expenditure that is arbitrarily defined

at Rp. 549,500 per capita per year or Rp. 1,500 per capitaper day.

The reduction shortfall could also be measured foreach HDI component.

The Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

In principle, the GDI uses the same variables as theHDI. The difference is that the GDI adjust the average

Calculating the HDI

This illustration of the calculation of HDI uses datafor Aceh Province in 1999

Life expectancy 67.6

Adult literacy rate (%) 93.1

Mean years of schooling 7.2

Adjusted real per capita expenditure(Thousand Rupiah) 562.8

Life expectancy index(67.6-25) / (85-25) = 0.71 = 71%

Adult literacy index(93.1-0) / (100-0) = 0.93 = 93%

Mean years of schooling index(7.2-0) / (15-0) = 0.48 = 48%

Educational attainment index(2/3 x 93) + (1/3 x48) = 0.78 = 78%

Income index(562.8-360) / (732.72-300) = 0.469 = 47%

Human development indexHDI = (71+78+47) / 3 = 65.3

where:HDI(t) is HDI for the tth yearHDI(ideal) is 100n = year

r = x 100HDI(ideal) - HDI(t)HDI(1+n) - HDI(t)√√√√√

n


achievement of each region in life expectancy, educationalattainment and income in accordance with the disparityin achievement between women and men. The parameter∈∈∈∈∈ is incorporated into the equation to take into accountthe inequality aversion that reflects the marginal elasticityof social valuation toward a certain achievement acrossgender. To express a moderate aversion to inequality, theparameter ∈∈∈∈∈ is set equal to 2.

To calculate GDI, one needs to first calculate the equallydistributed equivalent achievement [Xede] using thefollowing formula:

7) Calculating the index of income distribution[= I Inc-dis]

I Inc-dis = [(Xede(Inc) x PPP) - PPPmin] / [PPPmax - PPPmin]

The calculation of GDI follows the steps below:1) Each index of the GDI component is computed using

the formula described above with the maximum andminimum thresholds as stated in Table 4;

2) Calculating the Xede from each index;3) Calculating the GDI using the following formula:

The calculation of income distribution component isfairly complex. Based on wage data collected in theNational Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS) 1996 and1999, the calculation follows the steps below:1) Calculating the ratio between wage for female and

wage for male in non-agriculture sector [Wf];2) Calculating the average wage using the following

formula:

Where:Xf : female achievementXm : male achievementPf : proportion of female populationPm : proportion of male population∈ : inequality aversion parameter (=2)

Xede = (Pf Xf (1-∈∈∈∈∈ ) + Pm Xm(1-∈∈∈∈∈ )) 1/(1-∈∈∈∈∈ )

3) Calculating the ratio between each gender group fromthe average wage above [=R];

4) Calculating the income contributed by each gendergroup [=IncC], where:

IncC = Aec(f/m) x R(f/m)

5) Calculating the proportion of income contributed byeach gender group [% IncC] using the following for-mula:

%IncC = IncC(f/m) / P(f/m)

6) Calculating the proportion of Xede from the%IncC [=Xede (Inc)]

Where:Xede(1) : Xede for life expectancyXede(2) : Xede for education I Inc-dis : Index of income distribution

GDI= 1/3 [(Xede(1) +Xede(2) + I Inc-dis]

Most data for computing GDI are from the same sourceas the data for computing HDI. Only wage data forcomputing GDI and Gender Empowerment Measure(GEM) is from SAKERNAS (National Labour ForceSurvey) 1996 and 1999.

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

The GEM consists of three components: i.e.parliamentary representation, decision-making and incomedistribution. In calculating GEM one should first calculatethe EDEP (the index of each component based on ‘EquallyDistributed Equivalent Percentage’). The calculation ofincome share for GEM is the same as the calculation ofincome share for GDI calculation described above. Then,the index of each component is the EDEP of eachcomponent divided by 50. 50 is considered to be an idealshare of each gender group for all GEM components.

The decision making component consist of twoindicators: managerial and administration job, andprofessional and technical staff. For national figure, theindex of decision-making is the average of the indices ofthese two indicators. This combination is necessary toavoid any misperceptions of the respondents in choosingbetween these two occupational categories. Data for

W = (Aecf x Wf) + (Aecm x 1)

Where:Aecf : proportion of women in the labour force (who are

economically active)Aecm : proportion of male in the labour force (who are

economically active)Wf : ratio of female’s wage in agriculture sector


The Human Poverty Index (HPI)

The HPI combines several dimensions of humanpoverty that are considered as the most basic indicatorsof human deprivation. It consists of three indicators:people expected not having a long live, deprivation oneducational attainment and inadequacy in access to basic

The GEM is calculated as:

GEM = 1/3 [Ipar + IDM + IInc-dis]

Where:Ipar : Parliamentary representation indexIDM : Decision making indexIInc-dis : Income distribution index

Component Female Male

Proportion of population 0.499 0.501

Life expectancy 69.6 65.6

Literacy rate (%) 90.1 96.2

Mean years of schooling (MYS) 6.8 7.7

Percentage of the economicallyactive population(Proportion of Labor Force) 38.4 61.6

Non-agricultural wage 271.929 383.423

PPP (Rp 000) 562.8

Calculating life expectancy and educational indices

Life expectancy index:• Female : (69.6 - 27.5) / (87.5 - 27.5) = 0.70• Male : (65.6 - 22.5) / (82.5 - 22.5) = 0.72If ∈ = 2. then:Xede (1) = [((0.499) (0.70) -1) + ((0.501) (0.72) -1)] -1 = 0.71

Literacy rate index:• Female : (90.1 - 0) / (100-0) = 0.901• Male : (96.2 - 0) / (100-0) = 0.962

Mean years of schooling index:• Female : (6.8 - 0) / (15-0) = 0.453• Male : (7.7 - 0) / (15-0) = 0.513

Educational attainment index:• Female : 2/3 (0.901) + 1/3 (0.453) = 0.75• Male : 2/3 (0.962) + 1/3 (0.513) = 0.81If ∈ = 2. then:Xede (2) = [(0.499) (0.75) -1 + (0.501) (0.81) -1] -1 = 0.78

Calculating income distribution index Ratio to malenon-agricultural wage: • Female : 271.929/383.423 = 0.709 • Male : 1

Average wage: (0.384 x 0.709) + (0.616 x 1) = 0.888

Ratio to average wage: Female : 0.709 / 0.888 = 0.798 Male : 1 / 0.888 = 1.126

Share of earned income Female : 0.798 x 0.384 = 0.307 Male : 1.126 x 0.616 = 0.693

Proportional income shares Female : 0.307 / 0.499 = 0.614 Male : 0.694 / 0.501 = 1.384If ∈ = 2. then:Xede (Inc) = [(0.499) (0.614)-1 + (0.501)(1.384) -1]-1 = 0.85

The income distribution index (I Inc-dis) isI Inc-dis = [(0.85 x 562.8) - 360] / [737.72 - 300] = 0.276

Gender Development Index

GDI = (0.71 + 0.78 + 0.276) / 3 = 0.59 = 59%

Calculating the GDI

As an example, the calculation of GDI for theprovince of Aceh 1996 is as follow:

Calculating the parliamentary representation indexand decision-making index with ∈ = 2

Parliamentary representation index (Ipar)EDEP (par) = [0.499)(8.3) -1 + (0.501)(91.7) -1] -1 = 15.25Ipar = 15.25 / 50 = 0.3

Decision-making index (IDM)EDEP (DM) = [0.499)(54.4) -1 + (0.500)(45.6) -1] -1 = 49.61IDM = 49.61/50 = 0.99

Calculating income distribution index

Following the calculation of income distributionindex for GDI above, the IInc-dis = 0.27

Gender empowerment measure:

GEM = 1/3 (Ipar + IDM + IInc-dis)= (0.3 + 0.99 + 0.27) / 3 = 52.4

Calculating the GEM

Using the case of Aceh province in 1999, thecalculation of GEM is as follows:

Component Female Male

Proportion of population 0.499 0.501

Parliamentary Representation (%) 8.3 91.7

Proportion of manager,administration staff, professionaland technical staff (%) 54.4 45.6

Percentage of the economicallyactive population (Proportion ofLabor Force) 38.4 61.6

Percentage of the economicallyactive population(Proportion of Labor Force) 38.4 61.6Non-agricultural wage 271.929 383.423PPP (Rp 000) 562.8

decision-making component is from SUSENAS 1996 and1999. Data for parliamentary representation is from“Lembaga Pemilihan Umum” (General Election Institute)and the parliaments at provincial and regency/city level.


services. The first indicator is measured by the probabilityof the population not expected to survive to age 40 (P1).The calculation of this indicator follows the method ofcalculating life expectancy for HDI measurement. Thesecond indicator is measured by adult illiteracy rate (P2).This is calculated based on SUPAS 1995 and SUSENAS1996 data and covers population age 15 and above. Whilethe limitation on access to basic services (P3) consists ofthe following variables:• Percentage of population without access to clean wa-

ter (=P31). P31 is defined as the percentage of house-hold using water source other tap water, water pumpand wheel that is located 10 meters or more from sew-age disposal. This data is collected from SUPAS 1995and SUSENAS 1998.

• Percentage of population without access to health ser-vices (=P32). P32 is defined as the percentage of popu-lation lives in the location 5 km or more from healthfacilities. The data source is the same as above.

• Percentage of children under five years old with lownutritional status (=P33). P33 is defined as the percent-age of children less than five years old belong to thecategory of low and medium nutritional status.

Calculating the HPI

As an illustration, the following equation shows thecalculation of HDI for Aceh province in 1999:

The composite of deprivation variables

P3 = 1/3 (61.5+37.6+35.6) = 44.9

Human poverty indexHPI = [1/3 (12.73 + 6.93 + 44.93)]1/3 = 31.4

Probability of people not expectedto survive to age 40 - P1 (%) 12.7

Adult illiteracy rate -P2 (%) 6.9

Population without access tosafe water - P31 (%) 61.5

Population without access tohealth services -P32 (%) 37.6

Undernourished children under age 5 - P33 35.6

For this publication, the calculation of HPI followsthe HDR 1997 published by UNDP:

HPI = [1/3 (P13 + P2

3 + P33)]1/3

Where P3 = 1/3 (P31+ P32 + P33)

Procedures for estimating time required toreach particular targets

The time required to reach particular targets in severalhuman development indicators, as presented in this report,is estimated by assuming that the past speed ofimprovement in those indicators as being constant in thefuture. The speed of improvement here indicates theabsolute changes, as referred to a simple average of annualincrease (or decline), expressed in years. By comparingdata in 1990 (I90), 1993 (I93), 1996 (I96) and 1999 (I99),thus, the annual speed of improvement (s) is given as:

s = [(I93 - I90)/3 + (I96 - I93)/3 + (I99 - I96)/3]/3

Then, the estimated time (T) to reach particular target orgoal in human development indicators (G) can be simplycalculated as follows:

T = (G - I99)/s


Access to health facilities: the percentage of householdswhose place of residence is less than five kilometres from ahealth facility (hospital, clinic, community health centre,doctor, nurse, trained midwife, paramedic, etc.).

Access to sanitation: the percentage of households who haveeither their own private toilet or access to public toilet facilities.

Access to safe water: the percentage of households whoconsume mineral water, tap water, or water from water pumps,protected wheels, or protected springs.

Average duration of illness: the average number of days ofillness of those who are sick.

Births attended by modern health personnel : the percentageof children aged 0-4 whose birth was attended by modernmedical personnel (doctor, nurse, trained midwife, paramedic,etc.).

Consumer price index (CPI): an index that indicates a relativecomparison between price level in the month of survey andprice level in the previous month, weighted by values ofconsumption in both months. CPI is calculated using amodified Laspeyres formula.

Economic growth: the relative change in the real value ofgross domestic product over a certain time period.

Education index: one of the three components of the humandevelopment index. This is based on the enrolment ratio andthe adult literacy rate. The index value is between 0 and 100.For details on how the index is calculated, see the technicalnote.

Enrolment. The gross enrolment ratio is the number ofstudents enrolled at a given level of education, regardless ofage, as a percentage of the official school-age population forthat level. The net enrolment ratio is the number of childrenof official school-age enrolled in school as a percentage ofthe number of children of the official school-age population.The official school ages in Indonesia are 7-12 for primaryschool, 13-15 for junior high school, 16-18 for senior highschool, and 19-24 for tertiary education.

Expenditure on food: the proportion of total expenditure usedto buy food.

Gender empowerment measure (GEM): a composite indexusing variables constructed to measure the decision-makingpower of women in political and economic activities. TheGEM is based on three indicators: the percentage of thoseelected to parliament who are women, the percentage ofprofessionals, technicians, senior officials and managers whoare women, and women’s share of earned income. The indexvalue is between 0 and 100.

Gender-related development index (GDI): a composite indexusing variables constructed to measure human developmentachievement taking into account gender disparity. The GDIcomponents are the same as the HDI components but adjustedto capture the disparity in achievement between men andwomen. The index value is between 0 and 100.

Gross domestic product: the total amount of gross value-added (total output of goods and services) produced by alleconomic sectors in a country during a certain period of time.

Gross domestic product at constant prices: a calculation ofgross domestic product using on prices in a specific baseyear.

Gross domestic product at current prices: the gross domesticproduct presented in current prices for the relevant year.

Gross domestic product per capita: the value of gross domesticproduct divided by total mid-year population.

Households with earth/dirt-floor house : the percentage ofhouseholds whose houses have mainly earth or dirt floors.

Human development index (HDI) : a composite index basedon three indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancyat birth; educational attainment, as measured by a combinationof adult literacy and mean years of schooling; and standardof living, as measured by per capita expenditure (PPP Rupiah).The index value is between 0 and 100.

Human poverty index (HPI): a composite index that measuresdeprivations in three dimensions: longevity, knowledge andstandard of living.

Illiteracy rate (adult): the proportion of adults who cannotread or write in Latin script or other scripts.

Infant mortality rate (IMR) : the number of infants who diebefore reaching one year of age per 1,000 live births.

Definitions of Statistical Terms


Labour force: the working age population (15 and over) whoare employed or looking for employment.

Labour force participation rate: the proportion of the working-age population who are in the labour force.

Life expectancy at birth : the average number of years thatnewly-born infants would live if the mortality patterns at thetime of birth prevailed throughout the children’s lives.

Life expectancy index: one of the three components of thehuman development index. The value of this index is between0 and 100. A detailed explanation on how to calculate thisindex is presented in the technical note.

Literacy rate (adult): the percentage of people aged 15 yearsor over who can read and write in Latin script or other scripts.

Mean years of schooling: the estimated average (mean) yearsof completed schooling for the total population aged 15 orover who have any status of educational attainment. For adetailed explanation see the technical note.

Morbidity rate: the proportion of the population who sufferedfrom health problems that disturbed their daily activities overthe previous month.

Non-agricultural wages: the average remuneration receivedby workers (labourers or official employees) in the non-agricultural sector.

Open unemployment: the proportion of the labour force whoare seeking employment.

Poor people: the population with a monthly per capitaexpenditure less than a certain threshold referred to as the‘poverty line’.

Population not expected to survive to age 40: the estimatedproportion of population that will die before reaching the ageof 40.

Population with health problems: the proportion of thepopulation that has had one or more health problems duringthe previous month.

Poverty line: the Indonesian rupiah value of the monthly percapita expenditure required to fulfil a minimum standard offood and non-food basic consumption.

Professionals, technical workers, senior officials andmanagers: defined according to “Klasifikasi Baku JabatanIndonesia (KBJI)”.

Purchasing power parity (PPP): PPP rates allow a standardcomparison of real price levels between provinces anddistricts, otherwise normal exchange rates may over- or under-value purchasing power as measured by adjusted real percapita consumption. At the PPP rate in the Indonesian context,one rupiah has the same purchasing power in each province

as it has in Jakarta. The PPP is based on real per capitaexpenditure after adjusting for the consumer price index anddecreasing marginal utility using Atkinson’s formula.

Purchasing power index: one of three components of thehuman development index based on purchasing power parity(PPP) adjusted by Atkinson’s formula. The index value isbetween 0 and 100. For details on how the index is calculated,see the technical note.

Self-medication: household efforts at self treatment for healthproblems using modern or traditional medicines, massage, orother traditional treatments.

School drop-out rate: the proportion of the population aged7-15 who are not enrolled in education at any level and havenot completed primary or junior high school.

School participation rate: the proportion of the population ina certain age group (7-12, 13-15, 16-18, and 19-24) who areattending school.

Total consumption: consumption of goods and servicesregardless of origin. This includes gifts and the household’sown production. In this publication, total consumption refersto monthly consumption.

Underemployment: the proportion of the totallabour force working fewer than normal working hours.

Undernourished children under five: also referred to aschildren underweight (suffering from moderate and severemalnutrition). Moderate malnutrition refers to the percentageof children under five who are below minus two standarddeviations from the median weight for the age of the referencepopulation. Severe malnutrition refers to the percentage ofchildren under five who are below minus three standarddeviations from the median weight for the age of the referencepopulation.

Women’s share of the labour force: the number of workingwomen as a proportion of the total working age population(aged 15 and over).

Women’s income share: the income contributed by women asa proportion of the total income of the population. For adetailed explanation on how to calculate this, see the technicalnote.

Women’s representation in parliament: the proportion ofparliamentary seats that are held by women.

Workers in the informal sector: the percentage of the labourforce who are individual entrepreneurs, are working with theassistance of family members, or are paid or unpaid familyworkers.

hdr - indonesia 2001 - towards a new consensus

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