hazard analysis template

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Hazard Analysis Template Reference Advisory Circular 437.55-1, Hazard Analyses for the Launch or Reentry of a Reusable Suborbital Rocket under an Experimental Permit # System Hazard Description Risk before Mitigation Measures Risk After Mitigation Measures Verification Data to Submit to AST Severity Likelihood Severity Likelihood EXAMPLE 4 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Risk Elimination or Mitigation Measures Risk Hazard Index Risk Hazard Index Flight Safety System Failure of TTS to respond to manual trigger effort I Catastrophi c C Occasional 1. “Dead Man” switch activates TTS when released (open circuit) 2. Activation sound and light warnings prompt backup actions if absent 3. Backup ABORT input 4. Telemetry ABORT verification 5. Backup ABORT using transmitter power off I Catastrophic E Extremely Unlikely 1. Test 001 showing the switch activates when open circuit 2. Test 002 showing sound and lights warning activate 3. Test 003 showing automated ABORT issued in case of loss of manual trigger 4. Test 004 showing automated ABORT issued in case of loss of telemetry 5. Test 005 showing automated ABORT issued when loss of power

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Hazar analysis template

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Hazard Analysis Template

Hazard Analysis#SystemAST Team Member AssignmentHazard DescriptionAST Hazard Source, Mechanism, & OutcomeRisk before Mitigation MeasuresRisk Elimination or Mitigation MeasuresAST Concurrence with MMRisk After Mitigation MeasuresVerification Data to Submit to ASTVerification Method? (A, T, D, I)AST Concurrence with Verification Method?Verified? (Y/N)AST CommentsAST Safety Inspection Checklist? (Y/N)SeverityAST Severity (before MM)LikelihoodAST Likelihood (before MM)Risk Hazard IndexAST RHI (before MM)SeverityAST Severity (after MM)LikelihoodAST Likelihood(after MM)Risk Hazard IndexAST RHI (after MM)EXAMPLEFlight Safety SystemFailure of TTS to respond to manual trigger effortICatastrophicCOccasional41. Dead Man switch activates TTS when released (open circuit)2. Activation sound and light warnings prompt backup actions if absent3. Backup ABORT input4. Telemetry ABORT verification 5. Backup ABORT using transmitter power offICatastrophicEExtremely Unlikely121. Test 001 showing the switch activates when open circuit2. Test 002 showing sound and lights warning activate 3. Test 003 showing automated ABORT issued in case of loss of manual trigger4. Test 004 showing automated ABORT issued in case of loss of telemetry5. Test 005 showing automated ABORT issued when loss of power1234567891011121314151617181920212223
&C&"Arial,Bold"&12Hazard Analysis Template
&C&"Arial,Bold"&12Reference Advisory Circular 437.55-1, Hazard Analyses for the Launch or Reentry of a Reusable Suborbital Rocket under an Experimental Permit
Combination of severity and probability to determine qualitative risk to the public. Red indicates unacceptable risk. If red, elimination or mitigation actions must be taken to reduce the risk. See AC 437.55-1.
The probability of occurance of the hazard or failure mode without any mitigation measures. See AC 437.55-1.
The severity of the worst credible effect without any mitigation measures. See AC 437.55-1.
The severity of the worst credible effect or consequence assuming all mitigation measures are employed. See AC 437.55-1
The probability of occurrence of the hazard or failure mode, assuming all mitigation measures are employed. See AC 437.55-1
Combination of severity and probability to determine qualitative risk to the public. Red indicates unacceptable risk. If red, further elimination or mitigation actions must be taken to reduce the risk. See AC 437.55-1.
Measures taken to reduce the risk to the public. (Reducing either the severity or probability). Typically design changes, safety devices, warning devices, procedures and training. See AC 437.55-1
Hazard Description should include: 1. Source of potential harm 2. Mechanism by which the harm may be caused 3. Worst credible outcome assuming no mitigation measures employed. See AC 437.55-1.
Risk Acceptability MatrixDescriptionCategoryHazard SeverityCatastrophicIDeath or serious injury to the public.CriticalIIMajor property damage to the public, major safety-critical system damage or reduced capability, significant reduction in safety margins, or significant increase in crew workload.MarginalIIIMinor injury to the public or minor safety-critical damage.NegligibleIVNot serious enough to cause injury to the public or safety-critical system damage.DescriptionLevelIndividual ItemFrequentALikely to occur often in the life of an item, with a likelihood of occurrence greater than 10-2 in any one mission.ProbableBWill occur several times in the life of an item, with a likelihood of occurrence less than 10-2 but greater than 10-3 in any one mission.OccasionalCLikely to occur sometime in the life of an item, with a likelihood of occurrence less than 10-3 but greater than 10-5 in any one mission.RemoteDUnlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item, with a likelihood of occurrence less than 10-5 but greater than 10-6 in any one mission.Extremely RemoteESo unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced, with a likelihood of occurrence less than 10-6 in any one mission.Category 1 - High (1-6,8). Elimination or mitigation actions must be taken to reduce the risk.Category 2 - Low (7,9-20). Risk is acceptable.Risk hazard IndexIIIIIIIVA13713B25916C461118D8101419E12151720
&C&"Arial,Bold"&12Risk Acceptability Matrix