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Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) Task No. 5.4.2 (Deliverable No. 5.4.2.B) Prepared for: Prepared by: 777 South Figueroa Street Suite 1100 Los Angeles, California 90017 Review Copy Date Initials Originator 31-Aug-2011 RH Checker 09-Sep-2011 GAh Back checker 03-May-2012 LM Verified by 11-May-2012 GA May 11, 2012 WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT Contract No. PS-4350-2000

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Page 1: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

 

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) Task No. 5.4.2 (Deliverable No. 5.4.2.B)

Prepared for:

Prepared by:

777 South Figueroa Street Suite 1100 Los Angeles, California 90017

Review Copy

Date Initials

Originator 31-Aug-2011 RH

Checker 09-Sep-2011 GAh

Back checker 03-May-2012 LM

Verified by 11-May-2012 GA

May 11, 2012

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT Contract No. PS-4350-2000

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Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)

Table of Contents  

W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page i May 11, 2012

Table of Contents

1.0  PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 1 

1.1  Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 

1.2  Overview of Alignment ....................................................................................................... 1 

1.3  Purpose ............................................................................................................................... 3 

1.4  Objectives ........................................................................................................................... 3 

1.5  Scope ................................................................................................................................... 3 

1.6  Referenced Documents ...................................................................................................... 4 

1.7  Definitions ........................................................................................................................... 4 

1.8  Hazard Analysis Methodology ............................................................................................ 5 1.8.1  Hazard Identification ............................................................................................. 5 1.8.2  Hazard Analysis ...................................................................................................... 6 1.8.3  Hazard Resolution .................................................................................................. 8 1.8.4  Documentation of Findings.................................................................................. 10 1.8.5  Documentation of Hazard Resolutions ................................................................ 11 

1.9  Update process ................................................................................................................. 11  

List of Figures Figure 1 –Westside Subway Extension Alignment ........................................................................................ 2 

List of Tables Table 1 – Hazard Identification and Resolution Process ............................................................................... 6 

Table 2 – Hazard Severity .............................................................................................................................. 7 

Table 3 – Frequency of Occurrence .............................................................................................................. 7 

Table 4 – Risk Assessment Matrix ................................................................................................................. 8 

Table 5 – Risk Acceptance Criteria ................................................................................................................ 8 

 List of Appendices

APPENDIX A  PHA STATIONS .......................................................................................................... A‐1 

APPENDIX B  PHA GUIDEWAY ....................................................................................................... B‐1 

APPENDIX C  PHA COMMUNICATIONS .......................................................................................... C‐1 

APPENDIX D  PHA YARD AND SHOPS ............................................................................................. D‐1 

APPENDIX E  PHA TRACTION POWER ............................................................................................ E‐1 

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APPENDIX F  PHA TRAIN CONTROL ............................................................................................... F‐1 

APPENDIX G  PHA EMERGENCY VENTILATION ................................................................................ G‐1 

APPENDIX H  PHA SYSTEMWIDE .................................................................................................... H‐1 

  

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1.0 PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

1.1 Introduction This document represents the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for the Westside Subway Extension Project.  It is developed and prepared in accordance with FTA Hazard Analysis Guidelines. The analysis presents an assessment of the potential hazards and possible safety mitigation measures that may be associated with the implementation of the WSE Project. The submittal presents the initial hazards list formatted in PHA form.  The identified catastrophic and critical hazards and resolutions will need to be summarized into a Safety Critical & Catastrophic Items List (SCCIL) in the detail design phase of the project for tracking to resolution.  

1.2 Overview of Alignment The Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA) for Westside Subway Extension is an 8.9 mile heavy rail line that would extend from the existing Metro Purple Line Wilshire/Western Station to a new western terminus in West Los Angeles near the Veteran’s Administration (VA) Hospital in Westwood.  The extension would include the following seven stations: 

Wilshire/La Brea Station 

Wilshire/Fairfax Station 

Wilshire/La Cienega Station 

Wilshire/Rodeo Station 

Century City Station 

Westwood/UCLA Station 

Westwood/VA Hospital Station 

From the Wilshire/Western Station, the LPA would travel westerly beneath Wilshire Boulevard to the Wilshire/Rodeo Station, then southwesterly toward a Century City Station, and then northwesterly toward a Westwood/UCLA Station. The LPA then travels westerly, traversing under Veteran Avenue, and continues west under the I‐405 Freeway, terminating at a Westwood/VA Hospital Station. The extended Metro Purple Line would operate seven days a week, with service frequencies of approximately 4‐minutes during the morning and evening peak periods in each direction and at 10‐minute headways during the midday, off‐peak period. 

 

 

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Figure 1 –Westside Subway Extension Alignment

 

 

 

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1.3 Purpose The purpose of this Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is to identify potential hazards and systematically assess conditions which could potentially affect the safe operation of the transit system.  Identifying potential hazards during the design phase will enable their elimination or control, together with their associated causes and effects, before the system is opened for revenue service. 

1.4 Objectives The objectives of this Preliminary Hazard Analysis are based on FTA hazard analysis guidelines and are as follows:  

Identify hazardous conditions, which could exist; evaluate the effects of the hazards to patrons, personnel and equipment; and define designs and criteria to eliminate or mitigate the identified hazards. 

Document the safety concepts and mitigation measures to be incorporated during the system development.  

Provide a checklist for guiding the design to identify and track hazards 

Provide a basis for requiring more detailed safety analyses and testing for specific system elements and subsystems.  

The PHA is performed to ensure that the following safety principles are followed in the design and operations of the rail transit system:  

When the system is operating normally there shall be no unacceptable or undesirable hazard conditions.  

The system design shall require positive actions to be taken in a prescribed manner to either begin or continue system operation.  

The safety of the system in the normal automatic operating mode shall not depend on the correctness of actions or procedures used by operating personnel.  

There shall be no single‐point failures in the system that can result in an unacceptable or undesirable hazard condition.  

Unacceptable hazards shall be eliminated by design. 

Maintenance activities required to preserve or reduce risk levels shall be performed.  

1.5 Scope The PHA covers three basic types of hazards: 

Fire/Life Safety – Hazards resulting in accidents involving injuries, fatalities, or property damage due to fire, smoke, explosion, or toxic due to these causes.  

System Safety – Hazards resulting in accidents involving injuries, fatalities, or property damage due to system design, construction, equipment, operations and maintenance, or lack of quality assurance.  

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Security – Hazards from acts of intentional harm, including terrorism, resulting in injuries, fatalities, or property damage.  The PHA does address limited security hazards, but does not include a Threat and Vulnerability Assessment.  

The following system elements are analyzed in the PHA, and are included in the Appendices A to H. 

1. Stations 

2. Guideway (tunnels and tracks) 

3. Communications 

4. Yard and Shops (Extension to current Yard and Shop facilities) 

5. Traction Power 

6. Train control 

7. Emergency Ventilation 

8. Systemwide 

The identified hazards, and recommended corrective actions concern the equipment, environment, procedures, and people, which comprise the transit system.  A number of hazards identified are generic in nature and are applied to all similar situations.  Hazards that are specifically unique to WSE Project are also identified.  

Although PHA will provide a useful checklist for guiding design reviews, formal verification that the identified hazards are closed will occur in subsequent safety analyses and during the Safety and Security Certification process.  

1.6 Referenced Documents The following documents have been reviewed and utilized as applicable in the development of the analysis and documentation in this report: 

Hazard Analysis Guidelines for transit Projects, DOT‐FTA‐MA‐ 26‐5005‐00‐01, January 2000. 

Metro Rail Design Criteria, Baseline, October 29, 2010. 

Metro Fire/life Safety Criteria, Baseline, October 29, 2010. 

MIL‐STD‐882E, Standard Practice for System Safety, February, 2000 

1.7 Definitions The following are definitions of key terms used in the PHA.  They are consistent with Federal Transit Administration Guidelines. 

Accident – An unplanned event or series of events resulting in fatality, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment 

Hazard – Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, death, or damage to or loss of equipment or property or damage to the environment; a prerequisite to an accident; the potential to do harm. 

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Hazard Description – A description of the specific hazardous condition. 

Hazard Effects – The anticipated “worst case” results that are expected to occur if the hazard causes are left uncorrected and an accident occurs. 

Hazard Risk – An expression of the impact and/or possibility of an accident in terms of hazard severity and hazard probability. 

Possible Controlling Measures – Actions that can be taken to prevent the potential accident from occurring. 

Resolution – Changes that have been or could be made relative to system design or operation to eliminate or control the hazard. 

Triggering Event – The event of condition most likely to interact with the hazard to cause an accident.  

1.8 Hazard Analysis Methodology The PHA, performed in the preliminary engineering phase, provides an initial assessment of hazards, and identifies possible controls and follow‐on actions to eliminate or mitigate the hazards. In this analysis, the heavy rail transit system is identified by its systems, facilities, and the environment in which they operate.  The guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, entitled “Hazard Analysis Guidelines for Transit Projects” have been utilized to perform the PHA contained in this report. 

An inductive, or top‐down, approach is used to develop the PHA.  Significant or top‐level events (i.e. hazards) are initially identified, followed by what might have caused them, and then by a determination of their potential effect on the total system.  This methodology is shown in Table 1 and is discussed below. 

1.8.1 Hazard Identification

The methods used for identifying hazards contained in this PHA included review of the design and operational concepts defined in the Westside Subway Extension Environmental Impact Report and incorporation of historical information and data from similar transit systems. Only hazards likely to result in an accident involving personal injury, fatality or property damage are identified. 

 

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Table 1 – Hazard Identification and Resolution Process

1. DEFINE THE SYSTEM 

Define the physical and functional characteristics and understand and evaluate the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and environment. 

2. IDENTIFY HAZARDS 

Identify hazards and undesired events 

Determine the causes of hazards 

3. ASSESS HAZARDS 

Determine severity 

Determine probability 

Decide to accept risk or eliminate/control 

4. RESOLVE HAZARDS 

Assume risk or 

Implement corrective action 

– Eliminate 

– Control 

FOLLOW‐UP 

Monitor for effectiveness 

Monitor for unexpected hazards 

 

1.8.2 Hazard Analysis

The objective of hazard analysis is to assess identified hazards in terms of the severity or consequence of the hazard and the probability of occurrence. Each hazard was analyzed to determine likely causes and effects of a related accident.  Worst‐case consequences were identified and appropriate risk index was assigned. Assessment and evaluation of the effectiveness of the mitigation measures and how well the engineered safety systems or procedures serve to prevent and/or mitigate the effects of the hazard were conducted.  Subsequently, a final risk index was assessed based on the hazard mitigation measures identified under resolution. The analysis was performed in conformity to Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Hazard Analysis Guidelines for Transit Projects.  The following definitions are used to develop the PHA.  

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1.8.2.1 Hazard Severity

Hazard severity categories are defined to provide a qualitative measure of the worst credible mishap resulting from personnel error, environmental conditions, design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies, system, subsystem or component failure, or malfunction, and are defined in Table 2. 

Table 2 – Hazard Severity

Category Severity Consequence I Catastrophic Death or system loss or severe environmental damage. II Critical Severe injury, severe occupational illness, major system, or environmental

damage. III Marginal Minor injury, minor occupational illness, minor system, or environmental

damage. IV Negligible Less than minor injury, occupational illness, or less than system or

environmental damage.

 

1.8.2.2 Frequency of Occurrence

The probability that a hazard will occur during the planned life expectancy of the system can be described in potential occurrences per unit of time, events, population, items, or activity.  Assigning a quantitative probability to a hazard is generally not possible early in the design or planning process.  Due to the preliminary nature of the design, a qualitative hazard probability was derived from estimates and comparative evaluation of the subject hazard relative to known historical safety data from similar systems and applications.   

The frequency of occurrence levels for hazards is defined in Table 3. 

Table 3 – Frequency of Occurrence

Descriptive Word Level Specific Individual Item Fleet or Inventory Frequent A Likely to occur frequently. Continuously experienced. Reasonably Probable B Will occur several times in life of an

item. Will occur frequently.

Occasional C Likely to occur sometime in life of an item.

Will occur several times.

Remote D Unlikely, but possible to occur in life of an item

Unlikely, but can reasonably be expected to occur.

Improbable (Highly unlikely)

E So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced.

Unlikely to occur, but possible.

 

1.8.2.3 Risk Assessment

Hazard analysis established hazard severity category (I through IV) and hazard probability ranking (A through E) which are combined into a Hazard Risk Index, reflecting the combined severity and probability ranking for each identified hazard. Risk assessment criteria are applied to the identified hazards based on their severity and probability of occurrence, to determine acceptance of the risk or the need for corrective action to further reduce the risk. The hazard risk index and risk assessment and acceptance criteria are defined in Table 4 and Table 5. 

 

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Table 4 – Risk Assessment Matrix

Event Frequency of Occurrence

Event Severity I (Catastrophic)

II (Critical)

III (Marginal)

IV (Negligible)

(A) Frequent IA IIA IIIA IVA

(B) Probable IB IIB IIIB IVB

(C) Occasional IC IIC IIIC IVC

(D) Remote ID IID IIID IVD

(E) Improbable IE IIE IIIE IVE

 

Table 5 – Risk Acceptance Criteria

Hazard Risk Index Acceptance Criteria

IA, IB, IC, IIA, IIB, IIIA Unacceptable.

ID, IIC, IID, IIIB, IIIC Undesirable (Metro decision required).

IE, IIE, IIID, IIIE, IVA, IVB Acceptable with review by Metro.

IVC, IVD, IVE Acceptable without review.

1.8.3 Hazard Resolution

After the hazard assessment is completed, hazards can be resolved by deciding to either assume the risk associated with the hazard or to eliminate or control the hazard. Mitigation of the risk associated with each hazard to an acceptable level can be accomplished in a variety of ways. 

1.8.3.1 Unacceptable and Undesirable Hazards

Corrective action for the elimination or control of unacceptable and undesirable hazards includes the following order of precedence: 

Design to Eliminate Hazards. Design, redesign or retrofit to eliminate (i.e., design out) the hazards through design selection. This strategy generally applies to acquisition of new equipment or expansion of existing systems; however, it can also be applied to any change in equipment or individual subsystems.  In some cases, hazards are inherent and cannot be eliminated completely through design.   

Design for Minimum Risk.  If an identified hazard cannot be eliminated, reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level. This may be accomplished, for example, through the use of fail‐safe devices and principles in design, the incorporation of high‐reliability systems and components and use of redundancy in hardware and software design.  

Incorporate Safety Devices.  Hazards that cannot be eliminated or controlled through design selection will be controlled to an acceptable level through the use of fixed, automatic or other protective safety design features or devices. This could result in the hazards being reduced to an acceptable risk level. Safety devices may be part of the system, subsystem or equipment. Examples of safety devices include interlock switches, protective enclosures and safety pins. Care must be taken to ascertain that the operation of the safety device reduces the loss or risk and does not introduce an additional hazard. Safety devices will also permit the system to continue to operate in a limited manner. Provisions will be made for periodic functional checks of safety devices. 

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Provide Warning Devices.  When neither, design nor safety devices can effectively eliminate or control an identified hazard, devices will be used to detect the condition and to generate an adequate warning signal to correct the hazard or provide for personnel remedial action. Warning signals and their application will be designed to minimize the probability of incorrect personnel reaction to the signals and will be standardized within like types of systems. Warning signals and their application should also be designed to minimize the likelihood of false alarms that could lead to creation of secondary hazardous conditions. 

Implement Procedures and Training. Where it is not possible to eliminate or adequately control a hazard through design selection or use of safety and warning devices, procedures and training will be used to control the hazard. Special equipment operating procedures can be implemented to reduce the probability of a hazardous event and a training program can be conducted. The level of training, required will be based on the complexity of the task and minimum trainee qualifications contained in training requirements specified for the subject system element and element subsystem. Procedures may include the use of personal protective equipment. Precautionary notations in manuals will be standardized. Safety critical tasks, duties and activities related to the system element/subsystem will require certification of personnel proficiency. However, without specific written approval, no warning, caution or other form of written advisory will be used as the only risk reduction method for Category I and II hazards.  

Hazard Acceptance or System Disposal. Hazards identified as having an unacceptable and undesirable risk will be reduced to an acceptable level before design acceptance, or a decision must be made to accept the risk or dispose of the system. 

Listed below are the accepted safety control methods used for the determination of a resolution that cannot be eliminated or controlled by system design.  

Deterrence strategies / Access Control  

Security and Patrol   

Public Awareness  Employee adherence to Metro operating rules, procedures, test plans and cautionary notifications  

Employees, contractors, emergency response and rescue workers successful completion of:  

a) Training/Drills  

b) Required re‐certification  

c) Performance of regular inspections and maintenance programs  

d) Equipment Testing and Field Verification.  

1.8.3.2 Acceptable with Review Hazards

Hazards identified as “acceptable with review” may be accepted in an “as‐is” condition with no further corrective action. Alternatively, operating and maintenance procedures must be developed for periodic tests and inspections of the subject item to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of the system. 

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W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page 10 May 11, 2012

1.8.3.3 Acceptable without Review Hazards

Hazards with combination of severity and probability IVC, IVD, and IVE are acceptable as is without further review. 

1.8.4 Documentation of Findings

The PHA has been organized and compiled according to the system elements identified in Section 1.5. The format of the PHA worksheets is as follows: 

System/Subsystem: Identifies system element and the subsystem analyzed. 

Performed By: Person performing the analysis. 

Reviewed By: Person reviewing the analysis. 

Approved By: Metro person reviewing and approving the analysis. 

Column 1, Item Number:  A unique alphanumeric number that identifies the hazard, with the first capital letter corresponding to the System. 

Column 2, Hazard Description:  Describes each hazard postulated for the subsystem, considering the following categories of hazards: 

– Function Loss 

– Malfunction 

– Malfunction / Loss of Other System 

– Human Error / Misuse 

– External Circumstances 

Column 3, Potential Cause:  Describes the most likely primary and secondary causes such as design deficiency, component malfunction, human error, or environment that can propagate a hazard into an accident if adequate controls are not provided. 

Column 4, Effect on Subsystem/System:  Describes the probable effect and consequence the hazardous condition may have on the system element or its element subsystem in terms of safety (e.g. delay, inconvenience, injury, damage, fatality, etc.). 

Column 5, Hazard Risk Index:  This is a combination of the qualitative measures of the worst potential consequence (severity) resulting from the hazard, and its probability of occurrence (e.g., IA, IIB, etc.) before any safeguard or safety mitigation is provided. 

Column 6, Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks: Describes actions that can be taken or procedural changes that can be made to prevent the anticipated hazardous event from occurring such as design change, procedures, special training, etc. 

Column 7, Final Risk Index and Resolution: This assigned classification is an estimate of the hazard severity and frequency of occurrence after the mitigation measures are accepted for implementation.  Resolution describes planned changes, changes made or steps taken relative to design and/or procedures, training, etc to eliminate or control the hazard. 

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W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page 11 May 11, 2012

1.8.5 Documentation of Hazard Resolutions

All undesirable and unacceptable hazards (safety critical) should be tracked on a Catastrophic and Critical Items List (CCIL) to verify implementation of mitigation measures identified in PHA under Resolution.  The identified items may require additional analysis to be performed in the detail design/ construction stage, i.e. Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), etc.  Action taken to resolve each hazard identified in the PHA should be recorded in the Resolution section of the CCIL.  All open unresolved hazards should be tracked until the accepted mitigation measures are implemented and verified. 

1.9 Update process This PHA represents the initial safety analysis performed solely for the Westside Subway Extension Project.  This document is dynamic, designed to be updated throughout the Project’s evolution, and to be used as the basis for performing other safety‐related activities. 

The document is to be updated by the: 

Addition of other hazards ‐  other hazards identified throughout the WSE Project development process should be documented as part of this hazard analysis and subsequent hazard analyses. 

Addition of other system elements as necessary.  

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  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)

Appendix A- PHA Stations  

W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T May 11, 2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX A PHA STATIONS  

 

 

 

  

 

 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY:   G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:__________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐01 

Fire/Smoke in Station  Train fire 

Electrical fire 

Debris fire 

Ignition of flammable /combustible gases or liquids. 

 

Loss of life or injuries due to patron exposure 

to fire and smoke.

 

IC  1. Conform to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

2. Provide emergency ventilation system. 

3. Install Automatic fire detection/ fire prevention system 

4. Establish station evacuation procedures. 

5. Provide evacuation training to all 

participating parties 

(i.e., fire, police, etc.) 6. Establish procedure 

for safe train operations during hazard. 

IE 

1. Design Station in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria. 

2. Design an emergency ventilation system in accordance with the Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130. 

3. Provide automatic fire detection devices throughout station ancillary areas where automatic sprinkler protection is not required.

4. Develop or implement applicable evacuation procedures. 

5. Conduct evacuation 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY:   G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:__________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

  training with all 

participating emergency 

responders. 

STA‐02 

Intrusion of Toxic/Flammable Gases 

HAZMAT gas accident near station entrance 

Hydrogen gas or other hazardous gasses released from battery storage or similar ancillary rooms. 

Intrusion of methane or hydrogen 

Loss of life or severe injuries due to explosion, fire and smoke 

IC  1. Conform to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

2. Provide emergency ventilation system. 

3. Establish station evacuation procedures. 

4. Provide evacuation training to all 

participating parties 

(i.e., fire, police, etc.) 5. Establish procedure 

for safe train operations during hazard. 

IE 

1. Design the stations in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria. 

2. Design an emergency ventilation system for normal and emergency situations. 

3. Develop or implement applicable evacuation procedures. 

4. Develop evacuation training plans for all 

emergency responders. 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY:   G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:__________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

sulfide  6. Provide gas detection system 

STA‐03 

Intrusion of Flammable /Combustible liquids 

HAZMAT liquid spill or leakage from nearby service stations, storage tanks or pipes. 

Loss of life or severe injuries due to explosion, fire and smoke caused by spark from passing train. 

IC  1. Conform to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

2. Provide adequate drainage capacity. 

3. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of drainage system. 

4. Establish station evacuation procedures. 

5. Provide evacuation training to all 

participating parties 

(i.e., fire, police, etc.) 6. Establish procedure 

IE 

1. Design stations in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria. 

2. Design an adequate drainage system. 

3. Develop procedures for periodic inspection and maintenance of drainage system. 

4. Develop or implement existing applicable evacuation procedures. 

5. Provide evacuation training to all emergency responders. 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY:   G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:__________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

for safe train operations during hazard. 

6.  Develop procedures for safe train operation during emergencies. 

STA‐04 

Structural  deficiencies in station entrances, stairs, concourses and platforms. 

Design /engineering deficiency 

Poor construction quality control 

Use of low quality construction materials. 

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons crushed by collapsed structure caused by sizeable earthquake affecting deficient area during system l  operation hours or due to vibration caused by trains, surface traffic  and other  

related causes. 

IC  1. Conform to applicable seismic/ structural code. 

2. Provide Implementation of quality control procedures during construction. 

IE 

1. Design to applicable seismic/ structural code. 

2. Implement quality control procedures during construction. 

STA‐ Unauthorized entry  Absence of  Vandalized  IIC  1. Provide effective  IID 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY:   G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:__________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

05  into station during 

non‐operating hours 

effective gates /fences. 

Absence of proper security surveillance. 

equipment 

Injuries related to damaged/vandalized equipment 

barriers or gates preventing unauthorized station entry during non‐operating hours. 

2. Provide security surveillance during non‐operating hours (e.g., guards or CCTV). 

1. Provide gates preventing unauthorized station entry during non‐operating hours. 

2. Design adequate CCTV coverage for non‐operating hours. 

STA‐06 

Improperly  insulated, grounded, or covered electrical wiring. 

Design or installation oversight 

Negligence of workmen /failure  to replace protective coverings 

Severe shock to individuals, not authorized to enter into rooms containing electrical wiring, who accidentally touch exposed wiring. 

IC  1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

2. Provide for restricted access for authorized individuals to ancillary rooms and areas containing 

IE 

1. Design electrical system to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

2. Restrict Access of unauthorized  individuals into ancillary rooms and areas containing  station wiring and control 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY:   G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:__________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

  station wiring and control panels. 

  

3. Provide proper maintenance procedures relative to electrical systems. 

4. Comply with applicable wiring codes and standards. 

 

panels.  

 3. Develop proper 

maintenance procedures relative to electrical systems. 

4. Design to applicable wiring codes and standards. 

 

STA‐07 

Obstacles With Sharp Protruding Edges in or Adjacent to Station Walkways. 

Design oversight. 

Vandalism. 

 

Minor injuries to patrons who accidentally hit a sharp edge. 

IIIC  1. Eliminate all sharp protruding edges in or adjacent to pedestrian walkways in station. 

IIIE 

1. Eliminate all sharp protruding edges in or adjacent to pedestrian walkways in station. 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY:   G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:__________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

2. Repair all sharp edges due to vandalism. 

2. Prepare repair procedures for   all sharp edges . 

3. Provide periodic inspections for sharp edges. 

STA‐08 

Slippery Surface  Use of surface material with low friction coefficient. 

Oil,  food, or other slippery substances on surface. 

Injuries due to slipping and falling. 

IIIC  1. Use surface materials with high friction coefficients of friction per MRDC 

2. Conduct preventive maintenance  in stations. 

IIIE 

1. Install surface materials with high friction coefficients of friction. 

2. Perform preventive maintenance  in stations. 

STA‐09 

Persons standing  t oo close to edge of platform 

Excessive platform crowding. 

Blind or 

Loss of  life or severe injuries to individuals who get hit by 

IC  1. Provide non‐slip platform edge material, different in color and texture 

IE 

1. Design non‐slip platform edge material, different in color and texture 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY:   G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:__________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

visually impaired cannot distinguish edge from rest of platform 

Lack of device to warm patrons of approaching train. 

passing train or fall on the track. 

from the main platform area. 

2. Establish procedure to control access to platforms after special events. 

3. Monitor  (via CCTV) platform crowd levels and warn by announcement on PA system. 

from the main platform area. 

2. Develop procedure  to control access to platforms after special events. 

3. Establish procedure  to monitor  (via CCTV) platform crowd  levels and provide warning announcements on PA system. 

STA‐10 

Obstructions in patron flow paths 

 

Debris left by patrons. 

 

Possible fall or injury. 

 

IIC  1. Provide conveniently located litter containers out of flow path. 

2. Conduct preventive 

IIE 

1. Locate litter containers located out of flow paths. 

2. Provide preventive maintenance  in 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY:   G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:__________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

maintenance  in stations. 

stations. 

Page 25: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐11 

Obstructions in patron flow paths 

 

Temporary barriers for cleaning and/or maintenance. 

 

Patrons blocking stairs by sitting or with personal possessions 

Possible fall or injury 

 

Injuries by trampling during evacuation 

IIC  1. Provide adequate cleaning services. 

2. Limit major cleaning activities during  non‐service hours. 

3. Place signs prohibiting sitting or blocking stairs 

IID 

1. Provide and implement adequate cleaning procedures and training of cleaning staff. 

2. Perform major cleaning during non‐service hours. 

STA‐12 

Station evacuation slow and/or confusing during emergency in the station requiring evacuation. 

 

Insufficient egress capability 

 

 

Loss of life or serious injuries. 

 

ID  1. Provide safety refuge for patrons in event of  emergency conditions. 

2. Provide emergency stairs in accordance 

IE 

1. Design safety refuge for patrons in event of  emergency conditions. 

2. Design emergency stairs in accordance 

Page 26: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

with NFPA 130 to provide adequate exit capacity. 

with NFPA 130 to provide adequate exit capacity. 

 

STA‐13 

Station evacuation slow and/or confusing during emergency in the station requiring evacuation. 

 

Egress routes not separated, and thus contaminated 

Egress routes not direct 

Inadequate signage 

Inadequate lighting 

 

 

 

Loss of life or serious injuries. 

 

ID  1. Provide emergency stairs in accordance with NFPA 130 to provide adequate exit capacity. 

2. Provide signage to direct patrons to areas of safe  refuge and site exiting.  

3. Provide emergency ventilation system to maintain tenable environment in the path of egress. 

IE 

1. Design emergency stairs in accordance with NFPA 130 to provide adequate exit capacity.  

2. Design and install signage to direct patrons to areas of safe refuge and site exiting.  

3. Design emergency ventilation system to maintain tenable environment in the path of egress. 

Page 27: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

4. Provide enclosed emergency stairs.  

 5. Provide emergency 

evacuation procedures.   

6. Provide adequate lighting in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.   

 

4. Design enclosed emergency stairs at the ends of platforms. 

5. Establish emergency evacuation procedures, 

6. Design adequate lighting in accordance with Metro Design Criteria. 

STA‐14 

Station evacuation slow and/or confusing during emergency in the station requiring evacuation. 

 

Inadequate warning due to inadequate /improperly located detection and alarming devices. 

Loss of life or serious injuries. 

 

ID  1. Design and test the Communications in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.

2. Develop an Emergency Management Plan 

IE 

1. Design for incident detection and alarms in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.  

2. Provide a fire alarm system in accordance 

Page 28: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

 

Lack of communications Inadequate emergency response planning. Insufficient fire department training.  Insufficient training of Metro operations personnel assisting with evacuation.  Confusing or misleading 

and verify by testing procedures prior to revenue service. 

 3. Provide local fire 

jurisdictions with fire protection documentation to be used in emergency training sessions. 

4. Train Metro ROC controllers, CCTV personnel and RTOS’s in making announcement and directing passengers during an evacuation. 

 

with NFPA 72. 

3. Design P.A. and emergency telephones throughout the stations to provide adequate communication during an emergency. 

4. Develop an emergency management plan and conduct drills with emergency responders. 

5. Coordinate with local fire jurisdictions and provide necessary documentation to be used for training purposes. 

Page 29: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Station‐wide 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

announcements during evacuation.

STA‐15 

Thrown or dropped objects (multi‐level stations). 

 

Accidental dropping of objects to lower station level. 

 

Possible injury to persons on lower level(s). 

 

IIIC  1. Use balustrades with sloped surface so object cannot be placed on them. 

2. Provide monitored CCTV coverage. 

3. Establish procedures to provide random security patrols. 

 

IIIE 

1. Design Balustrades with sloped surfaces so objects cannot be placed on them. 

2. Design and monitor CCTV coverage. 

3. Develop procedures to provide random security patrols. 

Page 30: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Security 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐16 

Patron assault  Inadequate security systems in station. 

Inadequate security systems in elevator. 

 

Patron injury due to assault or robbery attempt 

 

IIC  1. Provide monitored CCTV coverage. 

2. Provide staggered, periodic patrol of station by Metro and/or police personnel. 

3. Provide monitored elevator communications. 

IID 

1. Design monitored CCTV coverage. 

2. Develop procedures for staggered security patrols. 

3. Monitored elevator communications. 

STA‐17 

Unauthorized personnel on site. 

 

Lack of security patrols. 

Lack of monitoring of station areas.  

Loss of life or severe injury to intruder in volatile areas resulting from contact with 

IC  1. Provide patrolled security  

2. Provide monitored CCTV coverage 

3. Install warning signs prohibiting 

ID 

1. Develop procedures for staggered security patrols. 

2. Provide monitored CCTV coverage. 

Page 31: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Security 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

Inadequate security design 

 

high voltage traction power equipment or collision by a moving train.. 

Could affect transit operation if intruder tampers  with control equipment. 

unauthorized entry. 4. Provide intrusion 

detection system for tunnels and TPSS 

3. Install warning signs prohibiting unauthorized entry. 

STA‐18 

Failure of critical tunnel safety systems 

 

Unauthorized entry resulting in vandalism in ancillary rooms ‐ electrical, signals, 

Damage to critical tunnel safety systems. 

 

IC  1. Provide intrusion detection system at ancillary rooms and portals. 

2. Provide monitored CCTV coverage. 

IE 

1. Design intrusion detection system at ancillary rooms and portals. 

2. Monitor CCTV coverage 

Page 32: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Security 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

communications, elevator and fan rooms.  

Poor maintenance 

Water intrusion 

3. Provide warning signs prohibiting unauthorized entry. 

4. Provide intrusion detection system at ancillary rooms and portals. 

5. Establish proper maintenance procedures. 

6. Provide waterproof membrane on the outside of ancillary rooms in contact with the earth 

3. Install warning signs prohibiting unauthorized entry. 

4. Design intrusion detection system to cover ancillary rooms and at the gates at end of the platform leading to the tunnels. 

Page 33: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Elevators 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐19 

Closing of elevator door on patron or clothing with excessive force. 

 

Failure of door safety circuits. 

 

 

Possible injury to person effected. 

 

IIIC  1. Provide elevators that are designed per the Elevator Safety Code, ANSI/ASME A17.1. 

2. Assure through design verification and testing that elevator safety devices perform according to specification. 

3. Provide obstruction detection on elevator door. 

4. Provide CCTV coverage of elevator areas. 

5. Provide periodic operation checks and 

IIIE 

1. Specify that elevators are designed per the Elevator Safety Code, ANSI/ASME A17.1. 

2. Verify design and testing that elevator safety devices perform according to specification. 

3. Establish obstruction detection on elevator door. 

4. Design adequate CCTV coverage of elevator areas.  

5. Perform periodic operation checks and maintenance. 

Page 34: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Elevators 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012   

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

maintenance.   

Page 35: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Stairs & Escalators 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________ DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐20 

Congested station stairs and escalators  

 

Inadequate or confusing signage to control patron overflow. 

Inadequate clear space at ends of stairs or escalators. 

Inadequate stair and/or escalator capacity for patron loads experienced. 

 

 

Possible fall or injury. 

 

IIC  1. Use clear and uniform signs and flow patterns. 

2. Ensure that advertising, art and other station features do not distract attention from flow control signs. 

3. CCTV coverage and PA system should allow announcements when stations are overcrowded. 

4. Provide stairs and escalators of adequate size, capacity, and quantities to meet 

IIE 

1. Provide clear and uniform signs and flow patterns. 

2. Design advertising, art and other station  features that does not distract attention from flow control signs. 

3. Provide CCTV coverage and PA system to make announcement when stations are overcrowded. 

4. Design stairs and escalators with adequate size, capacity, and quantities to meet demands under 

Page 36: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Stairs & Escalators 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________ DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

demands under peak, normal and emergency conditions. 

peak, normal and emergency conditions. 

 

STA‐21 

Continued escalator operation in the down direction during emergency evacuation 

 

Failure of local or remote escalator control circuits to stop that are operating counter to the path or egress 

 

 

Reduced capacities for evacuations. 

 Possible injury to persons moving on an escalator in a direction opposite to its movement. 

 

IIC  1. Provide ability to stop escalator by using emergency switch at escalator. 

2. Provide ability to monitor escalator activity during emergency to determine if redirection of flow from escalator is required. 

IIE 

 

1. Install an emergency stop switch. 

2. Monitor escalator activity during emergency to determine if redirection of flow from escalator is required. 

 

STA‐ Slippery station stairs and escalator, ramp, 

Inadequate drainage of 

Possible fall and  IIC  1. Assure design for proper drainage of 

IIE 

Page 37: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Stairs & Escalators 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________ DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

22  platform and/or other surfaces. 

 

rain or clearing water from walking surfaces. 

Inadequate non‐skid surfaces. 

Inadequate inspection, maintenance and cleaning practices. 

 

injury. 

 

surface water and cleaning water. 

2. Protect stairs and escalators from surface water. 

3. Provide slip resistant surfaces are provided in stairs, escalators and ramps per Design Criteria. 

4. Ensure facility surfaces meet contract  specifications which meet MRDC for floor surfaces. 

5. Assure maintenance personnel are trained to inspect and clean 

1. Design for proper drainage of surface water and cleaning water. 

2. Provide protection of stairs and escalators from surface water. 

3. Specify slip resistant surfaces on stairs, escalators and ramps per Design Criteria. 

4. Verify facility surfaces meet contract specifications. 

5. Train maintenance personnel to inspect and clean up spills to prevent slippery surfaces. 

Page 38: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Stairs & Escalators 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________ DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

up spills to prevent slippery surfaces. 

STA‐23 

Sudden stopping or reversing of escalators which are carrying people 

 

Remote action from OCC. 

Power failure to escalator 

Equipment failure 

 

Possible injury from falls to patrons on escalator. 

 

IIC  1. Surveillance should be required to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown. 

2. Follow Elevator Safety Orders (ANSI 17.1) requirements for remotely stopping escalators. 

3. Provide gradual speed reduction capability in escalator stop mode n accordance with 

IIE 

1. Require surveillance to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown. 

2. Design to Elevator Safety Orders (ANSI 17.1) requirements for remotely stopping of escalators. 

4. Provide gradual speed reduction capability in escalator stop mode n accordance with ANSI/ASME A17.1. 

5. Proper maintenance to 

Page 39: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Stairs & Escalators 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________ DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

ANSI/ASME A17.1. 4. Proper maintenance 

to minimize failures including monitoring of escalator performance. 

minimize failures including monitoring of escalator performance. 

 

 

STA‐24 

Sudden stopping or reversing of escalators which are carrying people 

 

Actuation of emergency stop switch. 

Actuation of any escalator safety switch. 

 

Sudden deceleration may cause occupants of escalator to fall with possible injury. The effects will likely increase in severity with increased speeds and deceleration rates. 

 

IIC  1. Provide gradual speed reduction capability in escalator stop mode in accordance with ANSI/ASME A17.1. 

2. Provide SOPs/EOPs which include procedures to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to 

IIE 

1. Specify gradual speed reduction capability in escalator stop mode in accordance with ANSI/ASME A17.1. 

2. Develop SOPs/EOPs to include procedures to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown. 

3. Provide adequate CCTV 

Page 40: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Stairs & Escalators 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________ DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

shutdown. 3. Insure adequate CCTV 

coverage of escalators. 

coverage of escalators. 

 

STA‐25 

Sudden stopping or reversing of escalators which are carrying people 

 

Stopping of escalator from remote location because of emergency, both manual and automatic. 

 

Sudden deceleration may cause occupants of escalator to fall with possible injury. 

 

The effects will likely increase in severity with increased speeds and deceleration rates. 

 

IIC  1. Surveillance should be required to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown. 

2. Follow Elevator Safety Orders (ANSI 17.1) requirements for remotely stopping escalators. 

3. Provide gradual speed reduction capability in escalator 

IIE 

1. Require surveillance to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown. 

2. Design to Elevator Safety Orders (ANSI 17.1) requirements for remotely stopping escalators. 

3. Follow ANSI/ASME A17.1 requirements for gradual speed reduction. 

 

Page 41: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Stairs & Escalators 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________ DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

stop mode in accordance with ANSI/ASME A17.1. 

Page 42: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Architectural 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  1  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012  

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐26 

Station fire barriers do not close during fire or smoke in station. 

 

Power failure 

Improper maintenance 

 

 

Loss of life or serious injuries to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel exposed to fire or smoke. 

 

IC  1. Provide back‐up power to doors. 

2. Provide activation control at local fire management panel. 

3. Provide manual release of fire doors. 

4. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of fire doors in accordance with Maintenance Plan. 

IE 

1. Supply back‐up power to elevator doors. 

2. Design activation control at local fire management panel. 

3. Install manual release of fire doors. 

4. Develop procedures for periodic inspection and maintenance of fire doors in accordance with Maintenance Plan. 

Page 43: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Ancillary Areas 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH        DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐27 

Equipment room fire 

 

Mechanical and electrical failures 

Oily rags and other debris. 

 

Damage to equipment and possible loss of service.

Possible injury to maintenance personnel. 

 

IIC  1. Provide central monitoring of critical electrical and mechanical parameters to indicate impending and actual failures so that appropriate maintenance and repair action can be taken.  

2. Provide adequate circuit protection.

3. Provide fire protection measures as dictated by specific situations. 

IIE 

1. Design central monitoring capability for critical electrical and mechanical parameters to indicate impending and actual failures so that appropriate maintenance and repair action can be taken.  

2. Design adequate circuit protection. 

3. Use fire protection measures as dictated by specific situations. 

4. Develop good housekeeping, inspection and maintenance practices. 

Page 44: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Ancillary Areas 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH        DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

4. Ensure good housekeeping, inspection and maintenance practices. 

 

Page 45: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Ancillary Areas 

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH        DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐28 

Equipment room fire 

 

Vandalism. 

 

Damage to equipment and possible loss of service.

Possible injury to maintenance personnel. 

 

IIC  1. Lock equipment rooms to prevent access by public. 

2. Provide CCTV coverage of entrance to ancillary areas. 

3. Provide random security patrol of station areas. 

 

IIE 

1. Develop Lock Schedule and keying plan for equipment rooms to prevent access by public. 

2. Design CCTV coverage of entrance to ancillary areas. 

3. Establish random security patrol of station areas. 

STA‐29 

Fire in janitor's equipment storage area or trash storing area. (Where provided). 

 

Improper storage of combustible materials. 

 

Possible spread of fire and/or smoke to other areas of the station. 

 

IIC  1. Conduct periodic inspection and enforcement of proper cleaning materials storage practices 

2. Provide fire protection system. 

 

IIE 

1. Develop periodic inspection and enforcement procedures to assure proper cleaning materials and storage practices 

2. Design adequate fire protection system. 

Page 46: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Fire Alarm System  

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2011 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐30 

Failure of fire alarm system during fire in the station 

 

Electromechanical failure 

 

 

Possible injuries and extensive damage to facility equipment, if fire breaks and remains undetected in its early stages. 

 

IIC 

 

1. Ensure proper installation testing and maintenance of fire alarm system. 

2. Provide supervised system to monitor fire system and annunciate failure at central control. 

IIE 

1. Provide proper installation testing and maintenance of fire alarm system. 

2. Design supervised system to monitor fire system and annunciate failure at central control. 

STA‐31 

Failure of fire alarm system. 

 

Improper monitoring, testing and maintenance. 

 

 

Possible injuries and extensive damage to facility equipment, if fire breaks and remains undetected in its' early stages. 

 

IIC 

 

1. Provide procedures to provide a fire watch in case of fire alarm system failure until equipment can be repaired. 

2. Provide temporary work‐around procedure such as 

IID 

1. Develop procedures to provide a fire watch in case of fire alarm system failure until equipment can be repaired. 

2. Develop temporary work‐around 

Page 47: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM:  Fire Alarm System  

PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2011 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

person in facility equipped with portable radio to notify central control, while fire alarm system is inoperative. 

procedures such as person in facility equipped with portable radio can notify central control, while fire alarm system is inoperative. 

Page 48: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Operations 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐32 

Serious injury or death from a fall on open station platform during normal operations 

 

Overcrowding of platform. 

Carelessness of station platform occupants. 

Passenger being pushed onto the trainway 

 

Possible falling of patron to trainway resulting in serious injury or death. 

 

IC  1. Provide distinct marking of platform edge area through coloring and/or floor texture or other suitable means. 

2. Provide a 24” tactile warning strip along the platform edge per Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria. 

3. Provide a refuge area under the platform. 

IE 

1. Design distinct marking of platform edge area through coloring and/or floor texture or other suitable means. 

2. Design a 24” tactile warning strip along the platform edge per Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria. 

3. Design for a refuge area under the platform. 

 

Page 49: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐33 

Fire propagates rapidly in station. 

 

Public and non‐public spaces not fire separated. 

Excessive fuel load in public, non‐public spaces. 

 

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke. 

 

ID  1. Provide station facilities with compartmental separation in accordance with NFPA and Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

2. Public spaces should be protected from fuel loads and ignition sources in ancillary areas. 

3. Ensure that combustible materials brought into the stations are limited. 

4. Provide fire protection and/or fire alarm system in accordance with 

IE 

1. Design station facilities with compartmental separation in accordance with NFPA and Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

2. Design public spaces that are protected from fuel loads and ignition sources in ancillary areas. 

3. Limit combustible materials that can be brought into the stations. 

4. Design fire protection and/or fire alarm systems in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.  

Page 50: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

Metro Design Criteria. 

STA‐34 

Fire propagates rapidly in station 

 

Inadequate fire detection and suppression capability. 

 

 

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke. 

 

ID  1. Provide fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.

2. Verify through testing that fire detection and suppression systems meet all requirements as specified. 

IE 

1. Design fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with Metro Design Criteria. 

2. Test fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with NFPA 72 and NFPA 13 requirements. 

STA‐35 

Fire propagates rapidly in station. 

 

Ancillary spaces not fire separated from one another.

 

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke. 

 

ID  1. Provide separation of ancillary spaces in accordance with NFPA and Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

2. Provide fire detection 

IE 

1. Design separation of ancillary spaces in accordance with NFPA and Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

2. Design fire detection and 

Page 51: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

and suppression systems in accordance with Metro Design Criteria. 

suppression systems in accordance with the Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria, NFPA 72 and NFPA 13 requirements. 

STA‐36 

Fire propagates rapidly in station. 

 

Fire sources not isolated. 

 

 

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke. 

 

IC  1. Ensure that fuel loads and ignition sources installed in or near station areas(s) are isolated and controlled. 

2. Confirm that station design conforms to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

3. Provide fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with 

IE 

1. Inspect areas in or near stations to ensure that fuel loads and ignition sources are isolated and controlled. 

2. Design fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with the Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria, NFPA 72 and NFPA 13 requirements. 

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SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

Metro Design Criteria. 

STA‐37 

Fire/smoke at underground station. 

 

Electrical fire. 

Accumulation of trash. 

 

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke. 

 

IC  1. Provide smoke/heat detection in electrical rooms, platform, and ancillary spaces. 

2. Provide emergency ventilation to exhaust heat and smoke. 

3. Construct station in accordance with NFPA 130 abd Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

4. Establish procedures for station evacuation. 

5. Provide emergency procedures training for Metro and outside 

IE 

1. Install smoke/heat detection in electrical rooms, platform, and ancillary spaces. 

2. Design emergency ventilation to adequately exhaust heat and smoke. 

3. Design and construct station in accordance with NFPA 130 and Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 

4. Develop procedures for station evacuation. 

5. Develop emergency training procedures for Metro and outside agency personnel. 

Page 53: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

agency personnel. 

 

STA‐38 

Struck by closing fire barrier in station 

 

Patrons unaware door is in closing mode 

 

Minor injuries. 

 

IIID  1. Provide visual and audible indication of door closing. 

2. Provide sensitive edge on fire door. 

 

IIIE 

1. Annunciate visual and audible indication of door closing at ROC. 

2. Provide panic hardware in accordance with CBC. 

Page 54: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐39 

Insufficient station stair and escalator lighting. 

 

Electrical power failure. 

Inadequate lighting design. 

Improper inspection and maintenance of lighting fixtures. 

 

Possible fall and injury. 

 

IIC  1. Provide back‐up power supply to emergency lighting. 

2. Provide proper transition lighting between different ambient light levels for all times of day, seasonal and weather conditions. 

3. Establish inspection, maintenance and training procedures. 

4. Provide emergency 

IIE 

1. Connect the emergency lighting system to the UPS. 

2. Design for proper transition between different ambient light levels for all times of day, seasonal and weather conditions. 

3. Develop inspection, maintenance and training procedures. 

 

Page 55: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

lighting in accordance with NFPA 130 

Page 56: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐40 

Intrusion of flammable gases.  

 

Hydrogen gas released from battery storage or similar ancillary rooms. 

 

Loss of life or severe injuries due to contaminated air, fire, or smoke. 

 

ID  1. Provide ventilation of ancillary and battery storage areas to prevent the accumulation of gases. 

2. Use valve regulated (sealed) batteries. 

 

IE 

1. Design ventilation of ancillary and battery storage areas to prevent the accumulation of gases. 

2. Specify valve regulated (sealed) batteries 

 

Page 57: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire Suppression 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐41 

Standpipe system inoperative during fire in the station. 

 

Inadequate water supply 

Corrosion of pipe due to stray currents.

Improper maintenance. 

 

 

Unable to suppress fire. 

 

ID  1. Provide separate feeds to the standpipe from sources at each end of the station with a crossconnection. 

2. Provide corrosion protection of standpipe. 

3. Follow code requirements to, repair, inspect and maintain. 

4. Provide alternate means to charge standpipe system such as from fire department 

IE 

1. Feed the standpipe from separate sources at each end of the station with a crossconnection 

2. Specify corrosion protection of standpipe. 

3. Test, repair, inspect and maintain standpipe in accordance with Fire/Life safety Criteria and NFPA 14. 

4. Design means to charge standpipe system from separate locations. 

Page 58: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Fire Suppression 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

connections. 

Page 59: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Lighting 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  01  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 2‐21‐2012 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE:  

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐42 

Insufficient station stair and escalator emergency lighting. 

 

Inadequate emergency lighting. 

 

  

Possible fall and injury. 

 

IIC  1. Ensure that emergency lighting conforms to Metro’s Design Criteria. 

2. Establish procedures to test, repair, inspect and maintain the emergency lighting system on regular basis. 

 

IIE 

1. Design that emergency lighting according to Metro’s Design Criteria. 

2. Develop procedures to test, repair, inspect and maintain the emergency lighting system on regular basis.  

 

Page 60: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Structural 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  1  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 8‐27‐2011 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

STA‐43 

Structural inadequacies 

 

Poor construction quality control/low quality materials 

 

Portions of the station collapse on train or persons due to earthquake causing death or serious injury. 

Passenger panic during evacuation resulting in serious injury. 

 

ID  1. Follow CBC Seismic requirements in the design of stations. 

2. Perform quality assurance audits and quality control audits during construction phase. 

 

IE 

1. Design stations in accordance to the CBC Seismic requirements. 

2. Implement quality assurance and quality control audits during construction phase. 

 

STA 44 

Emergency gates at platform ends swing 

Incorrect design  Passengers evacuating 

1D  Design emergency gates to swing inwards in 

IE 

Provide emergency gates that 

Page 61: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Structural 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  1  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 8‐27‐2011 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

wrong direction  from trackway to platform will get trapped resulting in death or injury from fire and smoke 

compliance with MRDC 9  swing inward toward the platform. 

STA 45 

Structural failure   Earthquake  Death or serious injury to passengers and employees 

Long‐term service interruption  

1D  Design stations in accordance Metro Rail Design Criteria and  2010 CBC 

IE 

Provide a design that complies with the structural requirements of the Metro Rail Design criteria and CBC, 2010 ed. 

Page 62: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Stations    

SUBSYSTEM: Structural 

 

 PHA NO.:   

REV NO.:  1  

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT 

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 

 

    

PERFORMED BY:  RLH     DATE: 8‐27‐2011 

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed   DATE: 9‐5‐2011 

APPROVED BY:_________DATE: 

GENERAL DESCRIPTION  HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT  HAZARD RISK INDEX 

CORRECTIVE ACTION 

Item No. 

Hazard Description  Potential Cause  Effect on Subsystem /System 

Severity‐Probability 

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks 

Final Risk Index & Resolution 

Complete loss of station 

STA 46 

Passenger falls in the between‐car area of waiting train 

Visually disabled or otherwise disoriented passenger 

Death or serious injury to the passenger 

Lengthy service disruption 

1B  Install platform‐mounted barrier between‐car barrier per Metro design 

IE 

Follow the Metro design for platform‐mounted car barriers. 

STA 47 

Door opened on wrong side of train 

Operator error  Death or serious injury to passenger falling out of train in 3rd rail area 

1D  Design train control systems to interlock passenger door control with proper berthing position, per MRDC 

Provide an interlock to prevent the operator from opening the doors on the wrong side when birthing at the platform. 

Page 63: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)

Appendix B - PHA Guideway  

W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page B-1 May 11, 2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX B PHA GUIDEWAY  

 

 

 

  

 

 

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

GWY-01

Fire/Smoke in Tunnel

Ignition of flammable/combustible liquids or gases

Train collision /fire

Electrical fire

Debris fire

Trig: Passenger-loaded train enters area filled with fire/smoke. Passenger evacuation required.

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons as they are exposed to fire and smoke. Long term interruption to service and possible loss of system

IC 1. Design Ventilation and Fire Protection Systems in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

2. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of ventilation system.

3. Provide procedures for safe and prompt evacuation and safe train operations during hazard.

4. Develop emergency drill program that tests emergency procedures.

5. Include regular debris removal as part of preventive maintenance program.

ID 1. Design Ventilation and Fire Protection

Systems in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

2. Tunnel design in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.

3. Provide procedures for emergency evacuation

4. Provide procedures for emergency operations

5. Provide cross passages at maximum 800 ft. intervals.

6. Provide safety walkway leading to a point-of-safety

7. Perform emergency evacuation drills. 8. Develop emergency Preparedness Plan. 9. Include regular debris removal as part of

preventive maintenance program.

Page 65: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

GWY-02

Fire/Smoke in Tunnel Coverboard or wayside equipment fire. Trig: Ignition from spark or fire on the vehicle.

Facility damage and potential patron/employee injury

IC 1. Use low flame spread and smoke material for wayside equipment and facilities.

2. Provide wet standpipe system for fire department use.

3. Provide ventilation system designed in accordance with MRDC Section 8 to control “smoke”.

ID 1. Design tunnel in accordance with Metro

Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 2. Provide wet standpipe system for fire

department use. 3. Design emergency ventilation system per

Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 4. Use low flame spread and smoke

material for wayside equipment and facilities.

1. 1. GWY-03

Fire/Smoke in Tunnel Undercar equipment fire Trig: Electrical short circuit

Facility damage and potential patron/employee injury

IC 1. Provide safety walkway leading to a point-of-safety

2. Provide emergency ventilation.

ID 1. Design tunnel in accordance with Metro

Fire/Life Safety criteria. 2. Provide safety walkway leading to a

point-of-safety 3. Provide emergency ventilation system 4. Develop inspection & maintenance

procedures 5. Develop procedures for emergency

evacuation.

Page 66: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

GWY-04

Intrusion of Toxic or Flammable Gases

HAZMAT gas accident near station entrance or air ducts. Hydrogen gas or other hazardous gases released from battery storage or similar ancillary rooms. Natural gas intrusion. (CH4 and H2S – Methane and Hydrogen Sulfide)

Loss of life or severe injuries due to explosion, contaminated air, fire or smoke

IC 1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria

2. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of ventilation system

3. Provide procedures for safe and prompt evacuation and safe train operations during hazard

4. Provide a gas-monitoring system in compliance with MRDC 9.15 and NFPA 130.

IE 1. Design tunnel in accordance with Metro

Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 2. Provide emergency ventilation system. 3. Develop inspection & maintenance

procedures. 4. Develop procedures for emergency

evacuation and shut down of the system if gas equal or greater to lower explosive limit is present

5. Develop SOPs for ventilating subway to prevent build up of toxic and flammable gases frron equaling or exceeding lower explosive limits. The applicable FLSS criteria are found in Section 3.5

6. Establish training program for Operations and Controllers.

7. Perform emergency evacuation drills. 8. Design for CO detection in gas detection

system 9. Provide for system to measure C02

concentration including alarms for excessive C02.

Page 67: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

Trig: Malfunction/ failure of emergency ventilation fans Short circuit/spark in tunnel

GWY-05

Intrusion of Flammable/ Combustible Liquids

HAZMAT liquid spill or leakage from service stations, storage tanks or pipes near system.

Trig: Spark from passing train Electrical short circuit in tunnel. Inadequate

Loss of life or severe injuries due to explosion, fire and smoke.

IC 1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

2. Build ventilation shafts and other air intakes street or sidewalk level in accordance with MRDC 8.17

3. Provide adequate drainage away from tunnel.

4. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of

IE 1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety

Criteria. 2. Provide adequate drainage away from

tunnel. 3. Conduct periodic inspection and

maintenance of drainage system. 4. Establish procedure for prompt and safe

evacuation and safe train operation during hazard.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

drainage. drainage system. 5. Establish procedure

for prompt and safe evacuation and safe train operation during hazard.

GWY-06

Unauthorized Intruder Absence of proper barriers, signage, and alarms prohibiting unauthorized tunnel intrusion. Trig:

Approaching train

Loss of life or severe injuries to intruder hit by train Electrocution by third rail.

IC 1. Install automatic closing gates at ends of platforms

2. Provide proper signage on gates prohibiting unauthorized access

3. Provide gate alarm, warning Operations Control Center of intrusion

4. Provide CCTV coverage of Platform end gates.

ID 1. Provide automatic closing gates at ends

of platforms 2. Provide proper signage on gates

prohibiting unauthorized access 3. Provide gate alarm, warning

Operations Control Center of intrusion 4. Provide CCTV coverage of Platform end

gates.

GWY-07

Structural Deficiencies Design/ engineering

Tunnel walls collapse on

1C 1. Conform to applicable

ID 1. Follow applicable structural codes

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

deficiency Poor construction Quality control /low quality materials Improper Maintenance and inspection procedures. Trig: Sizeable earthquake affecting tunnel area in question Vibration from trains

train and crush passengers to death Passengers panic during evacuation from train obstructed by collapsed tunnel and incur injuries when falling, tripping, and trampling one another.

structural codes and Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.

2. Conduct periodic safety/quality assurance inspections during construction.

3. Conduct periodic inspection of tunnel wall integrity after revenue start-up.

4. Perform emergency evacuation drills.

and Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria. 2. Perform periodic safety/quality

assurance inspections during construction.

3. Perform periodic inspection of tunnel wall integrity after revenue start-up.

4. Conduct emergency evacuation drills.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

GWY-08

Poor Tunnel Lighting Inadequate design of tunnel lighting arrangement. Bulbs burn out and not replaced fast enough Power failure.

Trig: ---- Workman in tunnel; emergency evacuation from a train in tunnel.

Injuries to individuals slipping, falling or tripping while working in tunnel or during evacuation from train through the tunnel.

IC 1. Install adequate tunnel lighting in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria & NFPA 130

2. Conduct periodic light and tunnel inspections

3. Provide tunnel lighting on redundant circuits connected to the emergency power supply.

IE 1. Provide adequate tunnel lighting in

accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.

2. Perform periodic light and tunnel inspections

3. Design tunnel lighting on redundant circuits connected to the emergency power supply.

GWY-09

Structural Track Deficiency or Excessive Deterioration

Track design or installation deficiency

Inadequate inspection and

Severe injuries or deaths due to train derailment.

IC

1. Ensure proper design, installation and inspection of tracks prior to revenue service

2. Conduct periodic inspection and

IE 1. Use proper design, installation and

perform inspection of tracks prior to revenue service

2. Perform periodic inspection and repair of track.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

maintenance.

Metal Fatigue.

Trig: Trains passing over deficient area.

repair of track.

GWY-10

Workmen on Tracks during operating hours

Repair / maintenance tasks.

Trig: On-coming trains.

Loss of life or severe injuries due to train hitting individual Loss of life or severe injuries due to third rail shock.

IC 1. Provide restrictive train operating rules when workmen are on tracks and work rules for workmen. (Roadway Worker Protection rules)

2. Use protective coverings for third rail conforming to applicable Fire/Life safety criteria.

3. Provide adequate

IE 1. Establish restrictive train operating

rules when workmen are on tracks and work rules for workmen.

2. Provide protective coverings for third rail conforming to applicable Fire/Life safety criteria.

3. Design adequate walkway for workmen 4. Establish procedures for de-energizing

third rail when workmen are in tunnel

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

walkway for workmen

4. Provide procedures for de-energizing third rail when workmen are in tunnel

GWY-11

Collision with structures at end of the line.

Train control failure/fail to follow rules Trig: Vehicle fails to stop before end of line

Potential derailment, revenue vehicle damage and major injury or fatality

IC 1. Verify the integrity/fail-safe design of train control system

2. Allow safe braking distance.

3. Provide bumping posts at end line.

IE 1. Provide the integrity/fail-safe design of

train control system 2. Design safe braking distance into the

signaling system. 3. Use bumping posts at end line.

GWY-12

Inadequate walkway clearances.

Equipment/structure intrusion into walkway envelope Trig: Train strikes object within the clearance

Potential serious injuries or fatality

IC 1. Provide clearances in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

2. Confirm clearance envelope by testing prior to operational service.

IE 1. Design clearances in accordance with

Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 2. Inspect clearance envelope prior to

operational service.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

envelop. GWY-13

Train derailed or hit by damaged tunnel structure.

Uncontrolled filling or excavation above running tunnels with structural damage to tunnel lining. Trig: Failure to obtain permit.

Potential major revenue vehicle damage. Potential major injuries or fatality

IC 1. Implement appropriate restrictions in subsurface easement agreements, monitored and controlled through city of jurisdiction planning process.

IE 1. Provide appropriate restrictions in

subsurface easement agreements, monitored and controlled through city of jurisdiction planning process.

GWY-14

Train derailed or hit by damaged tunnel structure.

Falling structural elements Trig: Earthquake

Potential major revenue vehicle damage. Potential major injuries or fatality. Serious structural damage.

IC 1. Design to CBC seismic requirements

2. Establish procedure to inspect tunnel structure after sizable earthquake before resuming revenue service.

ID 1. Design tunnels per Metro Design Criteria

Seismic requirements. 2. Establish procedure to inspect tunnel

structure after sizable earthquake before resuming revenue service.

GWY-15

Access/egress by employees or emergency forces

Flow paths obstructed.

Hazards relating to path itself could produce

IC 1. Provide emergency access points that are unobstructed,

IE 1. Ensure that emergency access is

unobstructed, adequately lighted and

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

hazardous, difficult and/or slow due to problems in flow path

Flow paths hazardous in themselves (e.g., rough, dark, steep, slippery). Flow paths too restricted for intended use. . Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

falls and minor injuries. Delay in access of emergency forces could escalate the effects of a prior accident or incident in an emergency response situation.

adequately lighted and meets Metro design criteria for entrances and walkways.

meets Metro design criteria for entrances and walkways.

GWY-16

Collision between HRV and foreign objects on the track

Maintenance tools/equipment left on trackway Trig: Tunnel maintenance

Multiple deaths or serious injuries to passengers. Major damage to trains or tracks. Major damage to HRV's, possibly

IC 1. Metro Maintenance Plan and training should reinforce importance of maintainers retrieving all support equipment used at the affected site.

2. Establish procedure

ID 1. Provide a Metro Maintenance Plan and

training to reinforce importance of maintainers retrieving all support equipment used at the affected site.

2. Establish procedure to inspect right-of-way before resuming revenue service.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

total loss. to inspect right-of-way before resuming revenue service.

GWY-17

Egress path to surface is beyond physical ability of most patrons

Inability of patrons to reach a point of safety. Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

Loss of life or injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke.

IC 1. Provide safety refuge for patrons (such as Crosspassages to opposite tunnel).

2. Establish and rehearse station evacuation procedure.

IE 1. Design safety refuge for patrons (such as

Crosspassages to opposite tunnel). 2. Design elevator shafts such that it may be

used as a means of egress. 3. Provide procedures and rehearse station

evacuation plans.

GWY-18

Employees, emergency responders, or passengers lost in tunnel during evacuation

Improper signage of crosspassages and in tunnel Lack of emergency information at Blue Light Station Trig:

Loss of life or serious injuries to Metro employees, passengers, or emergency responders.

IC 1. Provide exit path signs.

2. Follow evacuation information as indicated in the Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

3. Provide crosspassages signs consistent with blue

IE 1. Provide exit path signs in accordance

with the fire/Life Safety Criteria. 2. Post evacuation information per Fire/Life

Safety Criteria. 3. Post crosspassages signs consistent with

blue light station. 4. Provide assistance for passengers who

are not able to self evacuate.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

light station.

GWY-19

Employees, emergency responders, or passengers lost in tunnel during evacuation

No light due to tunnel light failure Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

Loss of life or serious injuries to Metro employees, passengers, or emergency responders.

IC 1. Place alternating tunnel lights on separate circuits.

2. Provide lighting circuits with emergency power supply

IE 1. Design tunnel lighting so that alternating

tunnel lights on separate circuits. 2. Connect the tunnel lights to the

emergency power supply.

GWY-20

Employees, emergency responders, or passengers lost in tunnel during evacuation

Excessive smoke obscuring vision due to emergency ventilation fan failure Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in

Loss of life or serious injuries to Metro employees, passengers, or emergency responders.

IC 1. Perform periodic inspection and maintenance of tunnel emergency ventilation system in accordance with established maintenance plans.

2. Design emergency ventilation system in compliance with

IE 1. Conduct periodic inspection and

maintenance of tunnel emergency ventilation system in accordance with established maintenance plans.

2. Design emergency ventilation system in compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130.

3. Design emergency ventilation system taking into consideration of a fan failure.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

tunnel) MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130

3. Design emergency ventilation system taking into consideration of a fan failure.

GWY-21

Emergency Ventilation System cannot control the flow of heat and smoke

Air intake/exhaust blockage Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

Inability to effectively disburse heat or smoke resulting in serious injuries to patrons, Metro personnel or emergency response personnel.

IC 1. Design emergency ventilation system in compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130

2. Ensure emergency operating procedures and fan ventilation regimen matrices address full range of emergency scenarios.

3. Emergency Operating Procedures should reflect alternate

IE 1. Design emergency ventilation system in

compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130.

2. Create emergency operating procedures and fan ventilation regimen matrices that address full range of emergency scenarios.

3. Develop a matrix configuration that reflects alternate means of treating emergencies effectively.

4. Train Metro staff to examine alternatives through table-top drills.

5. Provide maintenance procedures to remove debris from intake and exhaust

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

means of treating emergencies effectively.

4. Train Metro staff to examine alternatives through table-top drills.

openings.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

GWY-22

Emergency Ventilation System cannot control the flow of heat and smoke

Fire intensity of HRV Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

Inability to effectively disburse heat or smoke resulting in serious injuries to patrons, Metro personnel or emergency response personnel.

IC 1. Design emergency ventilation system in compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130

2. Ensure emergency operating procedures and fan ventilation regimen matrices address full range of emergency scenarios.

3. Matrix configuration should reflect alternate means of treating emergencies effectively

4. Train Metro staff to examine alternatives through table-top drills.

IE 1. Design emergency ventilation system in

compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130.

2. Develop emergency operating procedures and fan ventilation regimen matrices that address a full range of emergency scenarios.

3. Provide a matrix configuration that reflects alternate means for treating emergencies effectively

4. Provide training to Metro staff to examine alternatives through table-top drills.

5. "Develop maintenance procedures for inspection and removal of debris from ventilation exhaust and intake shafts and openings."

GW Excessive tunnel Improper design Serious injury to IC 1. Provide a IE

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

Y-23 ventilation system air velocity

of ventilation system. Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel.

ventilation system per Metro Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements so that excessive velocities are not produced.

1. Design ventilation system per Metro Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements so that excessive velocities are not produced.

GWY-24

Fire in tunnel

Arson Trig: Unauthorized entry into the tunnel

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons, Metro, and emergency response personnel, exposed to fire and smoke. Major facility equipment damage.

IC 1. Construct tunnel in accordance with Metro Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements.

2. Restrict access to tunnel from station platforms by providing alarmed gates at the end of platforms,

3. Provide CCTV

IE 1. Design and construct the tunnel in

accordance with Metro Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements.

2. Provide restricted access to tunnel from station platforms by providing alarmed gates at the end of platforms,

3. Design for CCTV coverage of entrance to tunnel from the station platform.

4. Establish procedures for tunnel evacuation between Metro and outside agencies.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

coverage of entrance to tunnel from the station platform.

4. Provide procedures for tunnel evacuation between Metro and outside agencies.

5. Provide emergency procedures training for Metro and outside agency personnel.

6. Provide emergency ventilation system in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 to exhaust heat and smoke.

7. Provide standpipes on the guideway

5. Develop emergency procedures training for Metro and outside agency personnel.

6. Design the emergency ventilation system in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 to exhaust heat and smoke.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

GWY-25

Incorrect sequencing of emergency ventilation fans resulting in improper ventilation of fire/smoke area

Control manually, attempting to select proper sequencing of emergency ventilation fans Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

Loss of life or severe injury to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel due to exposure to heat or smoke.

IC 1. Provide pre-defined emergency ventilation modes.

IE 1. Establish pre-defined emergency

ventilation modes. 2. Design controls of the Emergency

Ventilation System that is coded into the SCADA system. Emergency fan configurations consistent with fire location and evacuation direction which can be implement remotely at ROC or locally at the Emergency Management Panel of each station.

3. Expand Metro’s EVOP Manual to include Westside Extension

GWY-26

Inoperative emergency ventilation system

Power failure Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel.

IC 1. Provide redundant power supplies from two separate sources of primary power in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements.

IE 1. Design a redundant power supply from

two separate sources of primary power in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

GWY-27

Inoperative emergency ventilation system

Improper maintenance of ventilation system Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel.

IC

1. Perform periodic inspection and maintenance in accordance with Metro Maintenance Plan and Manufacturer’s recommendations.

ID 1. Conduct periodic inspections and

preventive maintenance in accordance with Metro Maintenance Plan and Manufacturer’s recommendations.

GWY-28

Patron/employee fall on walkway in tunnel and crosspassages

Obstruction on walkway or in crosspassages.

Poor walking surface.

Handrail not provided.

Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in

Minor to serious injury to patron or employee.

IIC

1. Perform periodic inspections in accordance with established maintenance procedures, to ensure walkways/crosspassages are unobstructed.

2. Provide slip-resistant surface on the walkway.

3. Provide handrail

IIE 1. Conduct periodic inspections in

accordance with established maintenance procedures, to ensure walkways/crosspassages are unobstructed.

2. Design slip-resistant surface on the walkway.

3. Provide a handrail along walkway.

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

tunnel) along walkway.

GWY-29

Standpipe system inoperative or not activated

Damaged during emergency in tunnel

Corrosion of pipe due to stray currents.

Inadequate water supply.

Improper maintenance

Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in tunnel)

Unable to suppress fire.

ID 1. Provide alternate means to supply water to affected area(s).

2. Provide corrosion protection.

3. Hydraulically design for adequate water supply.

4. Provide inspection, testing and repair of standpipe in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations and NFPA 14 requirements.

IE 1. Feed standpipe from adjoining stations. 2. Cross-connect standpipe through

crosspassages. 3. Fire hoses can be brought into the

effected tunnel from the opposite tunnel through crosspassages.

4. Specify corrosion protection for the standpipe system.

5. Provide hydrostatic calculations for the standpipe system.

6. Specify that inspection, testing and repair of the standpipe be in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations and NFPA 14 requirements.

GWY-30

Vandalism of critical tunnel safety systems

Unauthorized entry in ancillary

Damage to critical tunnel

IC 1. Install intrusion detection devices.

IE 1. Specify intrusion detection and “No

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SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

rooms - electrical, signals, communications, elevator and fan rooms Trig: Tresspassing

safety systems.

2. Provide signage prohibiting unauthorized access.

3. Provide CCTV coverage of portal areas and platform ends.

Trespassing/Authorized Personnel Only” signs at tunnel entry points.

2. Design CCTV coverage in the stations to cover the entry to the tunnels.

GWY-31

Water standing in tunnel

Inadequate drainage system design

Improper maintenance of drainage system.

Sump pump malfunction

Trig: Heavy rain or broken water main. Standpipe failure.

Damage to HRV undercar equipment. HRV stalled in tunnel.

IIC 1. Provide sump with failure alarm or gradient to prevent water accumulation.

2. Provide adequate drainage capacity.

3. Conduct periodic maintenance of drainage system.

4. Provide inspection and preventive maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

IIE 1. Specify sump pumps with high water

alarms 2. Design a second pump in case the first

pump is not able to control rising water. 3. Install sump pump at the low points of

the tunnels. 4. Develop periodic maintenance

procedures for the drainage system. 5. Perform inspection and preventive

maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

Page 86: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Guideway

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012

APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index

Damaged in Accident.

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  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)

Appendix C - PHA Communications  

W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page C-1 May 11, 2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX C PHA COMMUNICATIONS  

 

 

 

  

 

 

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SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: CCTV

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-01

Failure/Malfunction of Data Transmission Equipment to Transmit Emergency Alarms

Design deficiency Component failure. Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in station)

Loss of life or injuries to patrons subject to the emergency situation because of the inability of Metro personnel to respond.

IC 1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria

2. Conduct proper inspection and maintenance of datatransmission system

3. Provide alternate or back-up data transmission system.

IE 1. Specify and install

communications equipment according to Metro Rail Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

2. Perform inspection and preventive maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

3. Provide redundant equipment and transmission pathways.

COM-02

Breached network security

Hacking Trig: Unauthorized access to Data Transmission System

Compromise of communications and fire management equipment

IIC 1. Maintain access control containing station network devices and network ports

2. Implement password protection

IID 1. Specify access control

for the station network, devices and network points.

2. Use firewalls and controlled access

Page 89: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: CCTV

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

for all users access to network devices

3. Monitor network configurations and device traffic.

4. Set alarms for unauthorized changes to network configuration or abnormal traffic.

measures to ensure secure of network.

3. Monitor access to Network

4. Provide alarms for unauthorized changes to network configuration or abnormal traffic.

COM-03

Data Transmission system equipment degradation

Improper /inadequate maintenance resulting from maintainer carelessness, lack of proper training, poor working conditions,

Can vary from loss of performance to the generation of unsafe operating conditions. May also result in situations hazardous to maintainers.

IIIC 1. The Metro system maintenance program, provisioning and personnel should be adequate for the purpose intended.

2. Provide training and

certification for critical elements.

IIID 1. Develop the Metro

system maintenance program, provisioning and staffing plans adequate for the purpose intended.

2. Develop training and certification programs for critical elements.

3. Conduct regular performance reviews

Page 90: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: CCTV

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

inadequate tools and test equipment, lack of spare parts.

Maintenance not in accord with manufacturers’ recommendations.

Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

3. Provide regular performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.

4. Provide periodic

inspection.

and support documentation revisions as necessary.

4. Conduct periodic inspection

COM-04

CCTV Equipment degradation

Improper/inadequate maintenance resulting from maintainer

Can vary from loss of performance to the generation of unsafe operating conditions. May

IIIC 1. The Metro system maintenance program, provisioning and personnel should be adequate for the

IIID 1. Develop the Metro

system maintenance program, and staffing levels for the purpose intended.

Page 91: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: CCTV

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

carelessness, lack of proper training, poor working conditions, inadequate tools and test equipment, lack of spare parts.

Maintenance not in accord with manufacturers’ recommendations.

Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

also result in situations hazardous to maintainers.

purpose intended. 2. Provide training and

certification for critical elements.

3. Provide regular performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.

4. Provide periodic inspection.

2. Develop training and certification programs for critical elements.

3. Conduct regular

performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.

4. Conduct periodic inspection.

Page 92: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: CCTV

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

Page 93: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-05

Loss of public address capability for areas in the vicinity of escalators and stairs

Failure of public address equipment (microphone, amplifiers, loudspeakers, or interconnecting cables). Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

Unable to direct patrons during crowded conditions, possibility resulting in delays and/or injury.

Overcrowdin

g of escalator causes patrons to become confused, angry, or to panic,

IIC 1. Design should include equipment that has a high reliability performance record.

2. Provide alternate or redundant equipment and cable transmission channels.

3. Provide workarounds where necessary.

IIE 1. Specify highly

reliable equipment. 2. Specify redundant

equipment and pathways.

3. P.A. will serve as a back-up for VMS and VMS as a back-up for P.A.

Page 94: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

possibly resulting in injuries.

Unable to

advise patrons about planned stop of escalator, abrupt stop results in injuries due to falls.

COM-06

Inaudible/unintelligible announcements at station

Loss of PA system due to component failure Trig:

Patrons unable to be notified of safety warnings.

IIC 1. Monitor P.A. announcements quality.

2. Capability of sending out text messages

IIE 1. Install and test P.A.

according to Metro Design Criteria.

2. Include VMS

Page 95: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

Emergency situation(e.g., station fire, assaults)

via Destination Signs.

3. Repair/replace defective equipment.

messaging in addition to P.A. announcements.

3. Monitor P.A. announcements quality during normal operations.

4. Maintenance procedures to repair/replace defective equipment.

COM-07

Loss of PA system announcements at station

Loss of PA system due to component failure Trig: Emergency situation(e.g.,

Patrons unable to be notified of safety warnings

Inability to convey

IIC 1. Periodic testing of PA system

2. Maintenance Procedures for loss of PA system.

3. Provide redundancy design of PA system.

IIE 1. Monitor PA

announcements quality during normal operations.

2. Supervise equipment and communication

Page 96: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

station fire, assaults)

instructions to patrons during emergency situation at station

4. Provide mega phone for broadcasting

5. Maintenance procedures to repair/replace defective equipment.

network. 3. Specify redundant

equipment. 4. Implement procedures

implemented to use mega phone as a back-up.

5. Develop maintenance procedures to repair/replace defective equipment.

COM-08

P.A./VMS Equipment degradation

Improper/inadequate maintenance resulting from maintainer carelessness, lack of

Can vary from loss of performance to the generation of unsafe operating conditions. May also result in situations

IIIC 1. The Metro system maintenance program, provisioning and personnel should be adequate for the purpose intended.

IIID 1. Develop the Metro

system maintenance program, and staffing levels for the purpose intended.

2. Develop training and certification programs

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SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

proper training, poor working conditions, inadequate tools and test equipment, lack of spare parts.

Maintenance not in accord with manufacturers recommendations.

Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

hazardous to maintainers.

2. Provide training and certification for critical elements.

3. Provide regular

performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.

4. Conduct periodic

inspection.

for critical elements. 3. Implement regular

performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.

4. Implement periodic inspections.

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SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-09

Loss of public address capability for areas in the vicinity of escalators and stairs

Interruption of electric power. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

Overcrowding of escalator causes patrons to become confused, angry, or to panic, possibly resulting Unable to advise patrons about planned stop of escalator, abrupt stop results in injuries due to falls.

IIC 1. Provide emergency power with automatic changeover.

IIE 1. Connect PA/VMS

system to UPS.

COM-10

Loss of public address capability for areas in the vicinity of escalators and stairs

Equipment damage resulting from fire, water, corrosive liquids

Overcrowding of escalator causes patrons to

IID 1. Provide adequate equipment protection and alternate equipment

IIE 1. Specify adequate

protection from fire and water damage and

Page 99: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

or gases, etc. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

become confused, angry, or to panic, possibly resulting in injuries.

Unable to

advise patrons about planned stop of escalator, abrupt stop results in injuries due to falls.

when feasible. 2. Provide workaround

when necessary.

corrosive liquids or gases into the system.

2. Provide redundancy into the system.

3. Specify highly reliable equipment.

4. PA will serve as a back-up for VMS and VMS as a back-up for PA.

COM- Loss of public address Temporary or Overcrowdin IID 1. Provide noise IIE

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SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

11 capability for areas in the vicinity of escalators and stairs

permanent changes in environmental noise (e.g. street/station noise design) affects acoustics in audio attenuation, garbling, etc. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

g of escalator causes patrons to become confused, angry, or to panic, possibly resulting in injuries.

Unable to

advise patrons about planned stop of escalator, abrupt stop results in injuries due

operated level amplifiers.

2. Modify and/or adjust public address system as necessary to restore effectiveness.

1. Specify noise operated levels for amplifiers.

Page 101: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

to falls.

Page 102: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Radio

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-12

Train contacts radio cable hanging in dynamic envelope

RF Communication cable fell due to mounting bracket failure. Trig: Cable or cable bracket comes in contact with HRV or maintenance equipment.

Potential revenue vehicle damage and/or injury to operator in train cab.

IID 1. Cable mounting location to be out of area of equipment to prevent inadvertent contact/damage.

2. Provide supports at conservative spacing to limit effect of loss of single support and/or cable breakage.

3. Provide mounting supports that are of adequate strength to support inadvertent loads.

IIE 1. Provide a cable

mounting location that is remote from equipment to prevent inadvertent contact/damage.

2. Specify supports at conservative spacing to limit effect of loss of single support and/or cable breakage.

3. Specify mounting supports that are of adequate strength to support inadvertent loads.

COM-13

Loss of underground radio communications with Central Control

Failure of radio system components Trig:

Failure to communicate during an emergency

IIIC 1. Provide preventive maintenance with test procedures for underground radio

IIIE 1. Develop preventive

maintenance with test procedures for

Page 103: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Radio

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

equipment. 2. Provide redundancy

in system design. 3. Procedures to use

Emergency Telephones as a back-up.

4. Provide back-up channel.

underground radio equipment.

2. Specify redundancy in system design

3. Develop procedures that use Emergency Telephones as a back-up to the radio system.

4. Make available back-up channels

COM-14

Radio failure during emergency situation

Line amplifier(s) malfunction. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

Loss of communications in tunnel.

IIC

1. Provide dedicated amplifiers for each radio communication channel.

IIE 1. Specify dedicated

amplifiers for each radio communication channel.

COM-15

Radio communications equipment produces EMI

Electrical equipment such as motors, power supplies,

Loss of radio communications between OCC, field locations

IIC

1. Provide system equipment to preclude EMI interference.

IIE 1. Specify inspection and

preventive maintenance according

Page 104: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Radio

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

switching devices and controllers in equipment within the Metro system. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

and roving personnel, inhibits response to abnormal and emergency conditions, possibly aggravating the severity of the hazard by increasing the exposure time.

2. Develop specific maintenance procedures.

to Manufacturer’s recommendations to test for EMI.

2. Shield radio equipment from external interference.

COM-16

Radio Equipment degradation

Improper/inadequate maintenance resulting from maintainer carelessness, lack of proper training, poor working

Can vary from loss of performance to the generation of unsafe operating conditions. May also result in situations hazardous to

IIC

1. The METRO system maintenance program, provisioning and personnel should be adequate for the purpose intended.

2. Provide training and certification for

IID 1. Develop the Metro

system maintenance program, and staffing levels for the purpose intended.

2. Develop inspection and preventive maintenance

Page 105: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Radio

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

conditions, inadequate tools and test equipment, lack of spare parts. Maintenance not in accord with manufacturers recommendations. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

maintainers.

critical elements. 3. Provide regular

performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.

procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

3. Develop training and certification programs for critical elements.

4. Conduct regular performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.

COM-17

Loss of maintenance radio communications service

Failure of equipment part(s) in base station

Maintenance personnel unable to report in realtime the location of maintainers and/or

IIC 1. Provide redundant critical base station equipment.

2. Effective routine maintenance program with a combination of

IIE 1. Specify and install

redundant critical base station equipment.

2. Establish an effective routine maintenance program with a

Page 106: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Radio

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

equipment on guideway possibly resulting in injury or equipment damage.

telephone/radio dispatching for quick response of repair crews to unexpected failures could minimize risk.

3. Augment maintenance radio service with maintenance telephone system.

combination of telephone/radio dispatching for quick response of repair crews to unexpected failures to minimize the risk.

3. Augment maintenance radio service with maintenance telephone system.

COM-18

Loss of maintenance radio communications service

Interference from sources external to Metro (e.g., transmitters, induction heaters, etc.)

Interference from sources

Maintenance personnel unable to report in real-time the location of maintainers and/or equipment on guideway possibly resulting

IIC 1. Provide proper design of radio equipment and circuits, with suitable filters should minimize interference.

2. Utilize RFI suppressors on

IIE 1. Specify suitable filters to

eliminate possible interference into the system.

2. Utilize RFI suppressors on offending equipment.

Page 107: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Radio

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

within the Metro system (e.g., electric motors, power supplies, switching devices, circuit controllers, etc.)

in injury or equipment damage

offending equipment.

Page 108: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

1SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Telephone

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-19

Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations

Inoperative equipment resulting from part failure. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an emergency

Potential that patrons /personnel unable to report problems /emergencies /assault to Central Control.

IIC 1. May be minimized by proper routine maintenance including scheduled checks.

2. Use procedure for responding rapidly to unexpected failures.

IID 1. Develop inspection and

preventive maintenance procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

2. Establish procedure for responding rapidly to unexpected failures.

COM-20

Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations

Open circuit in cable resulting from mechanical damage, fire, corrosion, etc. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an emergency.

Potential that patrons/personnel unable to report problems/emergencies /assault to Central Control.

IIC 1. Provide proper system design and careful attention to cable installation could minimize risk of failure.

IIE 1. Install system per

manufacturer’s recommendations.

2. Supervise emergency telephone circuits.

Page 109: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

1SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Telephone

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-21

Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations

Short circuit in cable resulting from entrance of water or other conducting material. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an emergency.

Potential that patrons/personnel unable to report problems/emergencies /assault to Central Control.

IIC 1. Locate and installation of cable to prevent entrance of water or other foreign substances could minimize risk.

IIE 1. Specify sealed conduit

to prevent water or other substances from coming in contact with conductor.

2. Supervise emergency telephone circuits for short circuits and ground faults

COM-22

Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations

Damaged equipment resulting from vandalism. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an

Potential that patrons/personnel unable to report problems/emergencies /assault to Central Control.

IIC 1. Provide equipment to be tamper-proof and sturdy under general and rough use.

IIE 1. Design equipment

tamper proof equipment that is able to withstand rough use.

2. Supervise emergency telephone circuits.

Page 110: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

1SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Telephone

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

emergency

Page 111: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

1SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Telephone

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-23

Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations.

Loss of emergency telephone service due to power interruption, component failure, etc. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an emergency

Potential that patrons /personnel unable to report problems /emergencies /assault to ROC.

IIC 1. Provide periodic testing and self-monitoring of emergency telephones.

2. Provide maintenance procedures for loss of emergency telephone.

3. Provide procedures to use radio as back-up.

4. Provide separate circuits to isolate common mode failure.

5. Provide backup power for emergency telephone system.

IIE 1. Develop inspection and

preventive maintenance procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

2. Develop procedures to use radio as back-up.

3. Separate circuits to isolate common mode failure.

4. Specify backup power for emergency telephone system.

5. Supervise emergency telephone circuits.

Page 112: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: SCADA

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-24

Loss of SCADA system I/O communications

Loss of SCADA system I/O communications due to component failure, etc. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

Potential that system control /indications or alarm conditions are not reported.

IIC 1. Provide periodic testing of SCADA system.

2. Provide maintenance and operating procedures for loss of SCADA components.

3. Provide backups via modems.

4. Provide self testing/monitoring and alarm status.

5. Provide redundancy communication means.

IIE 1. Supervise the SCADA

system equipment and pathway in accordance with NFPA 72.

2. Develop inspection and preventive maintenance procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

3. Establish operating procedures to recover from loss of SCADA, such as a fire watch at the stations.

4. Specify redundancy in SCADA System.

COM-25

Loss of monitoring capability of the SCADA system at ROC

Open circuit in interconnecting cable due to mechanical breakage,

Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a

IC

1. Provide remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to

IE 1. Supervise the SCADA

system equipment and pathway in accordance with NFPA 72.

Page 113: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: SCADA

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

defective connection, etc. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

timely manner may result in severe equipment damage, serious injuries and fatalities.

report problems to ROC upon failure.

2. Provide protection from mechanical damage.

2. Specify SCADA equipment that is not susceptible mechanical damage.

3. Specify redundancy in SCADA System.

COM-26

Loss of monitoring capability of the SCADA system at OCC

Short circuit in interconnecting cable due to entrance of water or other conductive material. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a timely manner may result in severe equipment damage, serious injuries and fatalities.

ID

1. Remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to report problems to central control upon failure.

2. Provide protection from entrance of foreign conductive materials.

IE 1. Supervise the

SCADA system equipment and pathway in accordance with NFPA 72.

2. Shield SCADA equipment from foreign or conductive materials.

3. Provide redundancy in

Page 114: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: SCADA

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

SCADA System. COM-27

Loss of the control capability of the supervisory and control system (i.e. loss of ability to control equipment in the field)

Accidental damage to control components during the performance of maintenance activities. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)

Unable to remove power under abnormal and emergency conditions increases risk exposure resulting in possible fatality.

IC

1. Protective enclosures could minimize risk.

2. Provide hardware with exceptional reliability record and with built-in component redundancy.

3. Employ techniques of software checked redundancy, redundant data bits, cyclic data transmission detection and correction and self-diagnostic checks.

4. Provide for automatic switchover to

IE 1. Specify protective

enclosures in locations that are subject to mechanical damage.

2. Specify high reliability equipment.

3. Specify redundant equipment and pathways with automatic switchover.

4. Ensure design complies with Metro Design Criteria.

5. Develop maintenance training and certification programs for critical elements.

Page 115: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: SCADA

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

redundant function, where provided.

5. Verify proper design and develop alternate local controls providing safety features.

Page 116: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-28

Loss of monitoring capability of the supervisory and control system at OCC

Accidental damage to sensors by maintenance personnel performing normal maintenance activities.

Defective sensor (fire, smoke, temperature, voltage, intrusion)

Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in station)

Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a timely manner may result in severe equipment damage, serious injuries and fatalities.

IC 1. Remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to report problems to central control upon failure.

2. Provide protection against accidental damage during the performance of routine maintenance.

IE 1. Design such that the

local premises equipment will be in constant contact with the equipment at ROC generating an alarm on any loss of “handshake”.

2. Specify addressable remote sensors

3. Specify that equipment that is in locations with a potential for mechanical damage be protected from damage.

4. Develop maintenance training and certification programs for critical elements.

Page 117: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-29

Loss of monitoring capability of the supervisory and control system at ROC

Compromise of sensors by intruders or vandals. Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in station)

Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a timely manner may result in severe equipment damage, serious injuries and fatalities.

ID 1. Remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to report problems to ROC upon failure.

2. Provide intrusion sensors to prevent access by unauthorized persons.

IE 1. Specify addressable

remote sensors. 2. Specify intrusion

detection to detect unauthorized entry into the non-public areas.

3. Locate detectors in the public areas so that they are out of reach from vandals.

COM-30

Loss of monitoring capability of the supervisory and control system at ROC

Hardware or software fault condition in CTS, SCADA or ROC data processing equipment Trig:

Emergency

Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a timely manner may result in severe equipment

IC 1. Remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to report problems to ROC upon failure.

2. Provide reliable supervised equipment with

IE 1. Specify addressable

remote sensors. 2. Specify highly reliable

equipment. 3. Specify redundant

equipment and software.

4. Specify automatic

Page 118: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

situation (e.g., fire in station)

damage, serious injuries and fatalities.

built-in redundancy. 3. Employ techniques

of software checked redundancy, redundant data bits, cyclic data transmission error detection and correction and self-diagnostic checks.

4. Provide for automatic switchover to redundant functions.

switchover when failure occurs

COM-31

Erroneous indications on status display devices

Malfunction in status display.

Hardware

malfunction misroutes

Third rail power line section erroneously energized or de-energized resulting

IC 1. Built-in diagnostics and scheduled check of integrity of status display device could minimize risk.

2. Fail operational, fail-safe design should

IE 1. Specify built in

diagnostics scheduled to check integrity of the status display.

2. Specify fail-safe design. 3. Develop inspection and

Page 119: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

message. Trig:

Emergency situation

(e.g., fire in station)

from incorrect information provided.

Failure to report fire, smoke, over-temperature.

Failure to report fire, smoke, over-temperature.

minimize risk.

preventive maintenance procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

Page 120: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-32

Seismic switch fails to detect seismic event

Electrical or mechanical failure

Loss of seismic event mechanical switch Loss of alarm/event data

IVC 1. Provide redundant sensors

2. Provide adjacent detector installations.

3. Establish procedures for train operators to stop and precede at slow order until the damage can be accessed.

IVD 1. A significant event will

activate several sensors 2. A significant seismic

event will be self evident.

COM-33

Seismic switch provides a false indication or non-existing seismic event

Electrical or mechanical failure

ROC controllers receive false seismic indication and shut down the system.

IVC 1. Monitor frequency of false indications.

2. Repair faulty sensors.

IVD 1. Establish procedure for

controllers not to shut down the system without positive confirmation on a seismic event.

1. COM-34

Loss of 120 vac power to seismic detectors

Auxiliary power failure

Loss of alarm/event data

IVC 1. Connect seismic detectors and

IVE 1. Connect seismic

Page 121: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

and recorders recorders to the emergency power system

detectors and recorders to UPS.

2. Specify design features to detect loss of power.

COM-35

Loss of power Failed or dead battery

Failure to detect seismic event

IVC 1. Provide notification to OCC of battery power failure

IVD 1. Indicate loss of battery

power at ROC. COM-36

Seismic relay open or closed

Electrical or mechanical failure

False indication (relay fails closed) No warning signal (relay fails open)

IVC 1. Provide regular maintenance checks.

IVD 1. Perform regular

maintenance on seismic equipment.

COM-37

Seismic relay open or closed

Electrical or mechanical failure

Internal faults identified through the self check function

IVC 1. Monitor external display during routine maintenance checks

IVD 1. Perform regular

maintenance on seismic equipment.

Page 122: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-38

Seismic relay open or closed

Electrical or mechanical failure

Controllers notified of false loss of power (relay fails closed). Reduced battery charge (relay fails open).

IVC 1. Provide regular maintenance checks.

IVD 1. Perform regular

maintenance on seismic equipment.

COM-39

Cable malfunction Electrical wire failure

Specific functions lost. Errors and warning signals sent to ROC for significant function loss.

IVC 1. Check ribbon cable during periodic maintenance.

IVD 1. Perform regular

maintenance on seismic equipment.

Page 123: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Communications

SUBSYSTEM: Gas Monitoring System

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

COM-40

Failure of Gas Detection System

Equipment malfunction Trig: Gas intrusion into tunnel, Ignition source

Explosion/ Fire IC 1. Supervise gas detection system for failures.

2. Develop procedures for inspection and preventive maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

3. Provide routine inspection and maintenance.

IE 1. Supervise gas detection

system for failures. 2. Develop procedures for

inspection and preventive maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.

3. Provide routine inspection and maintenance.

Page 124: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)

Appendix D - PHA Yard and Shops  

W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page D-1 May 11, 2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX D PHA YARD AND SHOPS  

 

 

 

  

 

 

Page 125: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Yards & Shops

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

Y&S - 01

Fire/Smoke in Yard, Shops or Facilities.

Debris fire Train accident (yard only) Electrical fire Arson

Loss of life or severe injuries due to fire or smoke.

IC 1. Conform to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

2. Conduct proper safe train movement procedures in yard and shop.

3. Provide emergency evacuation procedure.

4. Prevent debris accumulation in yard, shops, and facilities.

5. Prevent unauthorized intrusion.

IE 1. Design the yard and

shops according to the Metro Rail Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

2. Up-date procedures for safe train movement throughout the yard and shop as necessary.

3. Update the Emergency Preparedness Plan.

4. Implement maintenance program to prevent the accumulation of debris.

5. Restrict access to yard and shop to authorized personnel only.

6. Establish procedure to provide security patrols during non-working hours.

Y&S Ineffective Operating Poor Loss of life or IC 1. Establish and ID

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SYSTEM: Yards & Shops

SUBSYSTEM:

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

- 02 Procedures for Yard/Shop Train Movements

documentation of operating procedures. Inadequate procedural training Lack of compliance and enforcement.

severe injuries due to train/train collisions, derailments, trains impacting people, etc

document proper operating procedures for yard train movements.

2. Provide initial and periodic training on these procedures.

1. Revise Standard Operating Procedures to establish additional guidelines for the proper operation of trains within the expanded yard,

2. Revise procedures for entering the yard to cover the expanded facilities.

3. Strictly enforce operating procedures within the yard.

4. Update the training manual for expanded Y&S facilities.

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  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)

Appendix E - PHA Traction Power  

W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page E-1 May 11, 2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX E PHA TRACTION POWER  

 

 

 

  

 

 

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SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Guideway

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

TPS - 01

Electric shock/electrocution from contact with energized components, collector shoes or third rail.

Personnel performing a rescue operation. Trig: Emergency requiring working on the guideway.

Major injury to personnel, including electrical shock, involuntary reaction, burns, or fatality.

IC 1. Personnel shall consider the collector shoes, third rail, or electrical apparatus of any type LIVE AT ALL TIMES unless proper safety measures have been taken and verified.

2. Establish procedures to deenergize contact rail and isolate current collector before performing any work.

3. Provide Blue Light Station with emergency trip device to de-

IE 1. Establish emergency

procedures specifying to consider the collector shoes, third rail, or electrical apparatus of any type LIVE AT ALL TIMES unless proper safety measures have been taken and verified.

2. Establish procedures to deenergize contact rail and isolate current collector before performing any work.

3. Provide Blue Light Station with emergency trip device to de-energize power.

4. Provide coverboards over the contact rail.

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SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Guideway

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

energize power.

4. Provide coverboards over the contact rail.

5. Locate contact rail opposite to the safety walkway.

6. Training and drills in emergency procedures.

5. Locate contact rail opposite to the safety walkway.

6. Training and drills in emergency procedures.

TPS - 02

While evacuating, patrons are exposed to the hazards of the traction power contact rail.

Smoke/Fire on train or other emergency conditions which require patrons to evacuate.

Fatality or major injuries may result from trips and falls over contact rail; electrical shock/burns may result from residual potential (voltage).

IC 1. Provide emergency exit paths that do not require patron evacuees to step over traction power.

2. Locate contact rails, opposite safety walk wherever possible.

3. Locate contact rails, opposite station platform.

IE 1. Provide emergency exit

paths that do not require patron evacuees to step over traction power.

2. Locate contact rails, opposite safety walk wherever possible.

3. Locate contact rails, opposite station

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SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Guideway

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

platform.

4. Establish procedures to deenergize contact rail when evacuating patrons.

TPS - 03

Electrical shock from contact with 3rd rail.

Failure of the ETS to de-energize the 3rd rail Trig: Smoke/Fire on train or other emergency conditions which require patrons to evacuate. Work in the vicinity of the 3rd rail.

Electrocution caused by contact with contact rail because personnel assumed that the ETS de-energized the third rail.

ID 1. Provide proper inspection and testing of the ETS.

2. Verify contact rail is de-energized after operating ETS.

3. Train personnel to consider the collector shoes, third rail, or electrical apparatus of any type LIVE AT ALL TIMES unless proper safety measures have been taken and

IE 1. Provide proper inspection

and testing of the ETS. 2. Verify contact rail is de-

energized after operating ETS.

3. Train personnel to consider the collector shoes, third rail, or electrical apparatus of any type LIVE AT ALL TIMES unless proper safety measures have been taken and verified.

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SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Guideway

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

verified.

Page 132: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Stations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

TPS - 04

Significant electrical potential between the return rail and anything grounded to earth.

Personnel touch negative return potential (skin of train, running rails) while also touching earth ground.

Shock (50-70 volts) could cause startle reflex prompting slip and fall or in some cases could cause persons to go into cardiac arrest.

IC Provide negative Grounding Device (NGD) in Traction Power Substation to limit potential to non-lethal levels.

IE 1. Provide a negative

Grounding Device (NGD) in Traction Power Substation to limit potential to non-lethal levels.

Page 133: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

TPS - 05

Electrical shock from exposed energized parts of electrical equipment, and dangers from arcs, smoke or fire.

Inadequate design of electrical system.

Inadequate protection of electrical equipment subject to adverse weather, vandalism and unauthorized operation.

Potential injuries or electrocution. Potential loss of equipment.

IC 1. Verify equipment meets industrial standards and applicable electrical codes.

2. Protection of cables and use of conduit.

IE 1. Specify equipment

meets industrial standards and applicable electrical codes.

2. Imbed cables or enclose in conduit.

TPS – 06

Electrical shock from contact with 3rd rail.

Failure to operate DC breakers.

Potential serious injury or fatality

IC 1. Provide instructions for personnel to manually open and lock out circuit

ID 1. Provide instructions for

personnel to manually open and lock out

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SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

breakers or wayside sectionalization DC disconnect switches before starting any function.

2. Procedures and training to remove power before any maintenance.

3. Procedures and training to manually open and lock out circuit breakers or wayside sectionalization DC disconnect switches before starting any function.

4. Procedures and

circuit breakers or wayside sectionalization DC disconnect switches before starting any function.

2. Procedures and training to remove power before any maintenance.

3. Procedures and training to manually open and lock out circuit breakers or wayside sectionalization DC disconnect switches before starting any function.

4. Procedures and training to verify that contact rail is de-energized

Page 135: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

training to verify that contact rail is de-energized before starting any function.

before starting any function.

TPS – 07

Leakage of battery fumes into underground station areas.

Inadequate ventilation in battery room.

Minor to severe injuries due to inhalation of toxic fumes.

IIC 1. Provide ventilation, consistent with design ventilation studies, to exhaust fumes from affected areas.

2. Use sealed batteries.

IIE 1. Provide ventilation

consistent with design ventilation studies, to exhaust fumes from affected areas.

2. Use sealed batteries.

TPS - 08

Fire in TPSS structure goes unnoticed.

Failure of smoke detector / loss of alarm indicator

Loss of

Potential for severe injury. Potential for equipment damage. Potential

IIC 1. Loss of smoke detector must be detected.

2. Periodic inspection, testing and maintenance of fire

IIE 1. Loss of smoke detector

must be detected. 2. Periodic inspection,

testing and maintenance of fire

Page 136: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

communication link.

environmental hazard

alarm system. 3. Establish procedures

for station evacuation.

alarm system. 3. Establish procedures for

station evacuation.

TPS - 09

Potential smoke, toxic fumes and/or fire incident at substation.

Overheating of power cable and wiring

Improper installation.

Potential injuries or electrocution. Potential loss of equipment.

IC 1. Design power cable and wiring in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.

2. Establish procedures to verify proper installation, testing and construction inspections.

3. Ensure proper tests and procedures are included in

IE 1. Design power cable and

wiring in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.

2. Establish procedures to verify proper installation, testing and construction inspections.

3. Ensure proper tests and procedures are included in maintenance program and manuals.

Page 137: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

maintenance program and manuals.

4. Select cables having insulation with low smoke, fume and burn-rate.

5. Place cable in non-flammable conduit.

4. Select cables having insulation with low smoke, fume and burn-rate.

5. Place cable in non-flammable conduit.

TPS – 10

Overheated electrical cable.

Corroded or high resistance connection at junction point.

Smoke, toxic fumes and/or fire. Possibility for illness and/or suffocation. Could range from

ID 1. Specify and install cables in accordance with Metro design criteria and applicable code.

2. Provide overheating sensors, alarm and trip devices.

3. Verify, through

IE 1. Specify and install

cables in accordance with Metro design criteria and applicable code.

2. Provide overheating sensors, alarm and trip devices.

Page 138: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

minor to catastrophic.

installation test, that cable and associated equipment meets design specification requirements.

3. Verify, through installation test, that cable and associated equipment meets design specification requirements.

TPS - 11

Power cable/equipment short circuit(s)

Worn or damaged insulation materials.

Damage from accident /incident.

Loose mountings which allow flexing and/or

Possible tripping of protective circuit breakers (on power section) with subsequent car stoppage.

IIID 1. Conduct preventive maintenance activities in accordance with manufacturers' guidelines.

2. Establish procedure that maintainers should thoroughly inspect/test the system prior to restoring operation

IIIE 1. Conduct preventive

maintenance activities in accordance with manufacturers' guidelines.

2. Establish procedure that maintainers should thoroughly inspect/test the system prior to restoring operation from associated

Page 139: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

vibration.

from associated incidents.

incidents.

TPS – 12

Electrical shock from exposed energized parts of electrical equipment, and dangers from arcs, smoke or fire

Improper procedures.

Control circuit failure.

Human error. Uncoordinate

d maintenance activities.

Inadequate protection of electrical equipment.

Unauthorized operation and

Potential serious injury or fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities

IC 1. Provide training to personnel who work around electrical equipment.

2. Provide periodic safety information and retraining /recertification.

3. Ensure proper tests and procedures are included in maintenance program and manuals.

4. Ensure appropriate warning signs are

IE 1. Provide training to

personnel who work around electrical equipment.

2. Provide periodic safety information and retraining /recertification.

3. Ensure proper tests and procedures are included in maintenance program and manuals.

4. Ensure appropriate warning signs are posted.

Page 140: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

vandalism.

Inadequate design of electrical system.

Close proximity to high voltage

posted. 5. All electrical related

work will be done using written procedures.

6. Provide enclosed equipment with enclosures rated for the environment.

7. Post warning sign "Authorized Personnel Access Only" with self locking doors.

8. Provide Intrusion protection.

9. Verify equipment meet industrial standards and

5. Establish procedures to perform all electrical related work using written procedures.

6. Provide enclosed equipment with enclosures rated for the environment.

7. Post warning sign "Authorized Personnel Access Only" with self locking doors.

8. Provide Intrusion protection.

9. Verify equipment meet industrial standards and applicable electrical codes and Metro design criteria.

Page 141: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

applicable electrical codes and Metro design criteria.

10. Comply with Metro’s Procedure TP-1001 Arc-Flash and Shock Protection Programs

TPS – 13

Contact with live equipment transformers, busbars, circuit breakers, etc.

Access to live equipment is not protected.

Insufficient training of maintenance employees.

Insufficient warning signs on the

Potential serious injury or fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities.

IC 1. Provide interlocks which removes power when cabinet is opened.

2. Establish procedures for maintenance of equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations in the O&M Manuals.

IE 1. Provide interlocks which

removes power when cabinet is opened.

2. Establish procedures for maintenance of equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations in the O&M Manuals.

Page 142: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

equipment.

3. Provide adequate

training for assigned maintenance employees.

4. Post warning signs on the equipment.

3. Provide adequate training for assigned maintenance employees.

4. Post warning signs on the equipment.

TPS – 14

Fire in Traction Power Substation Equipment Room.

Equipment Overload.

Circuit breaker rating incorrect for intended purpose. .

Unauthorized intrusion and vandalism

Potential serious injury or fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities.

IC 1. Provide overload protection.

2. Verify circuit breaker sizing selection and perform installation verification prior to operational tests.

3. Provide smoke/heat detection in TPSS room.

4. Provide fire rating of TPSS rooms in

IE 1. Provide overload

protection. 2. Verify circuit breaker

sizing selection and perform installation verification prior to operational tests.

3. Provide smoke/heat detection in TPSS room.

4. Provide fire rating of TPSS rooms in

Page 143: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

(arson).

accordance with NFPA 130 and Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.

5. Provide room ventilation to exhaust heat and smoke.

6. Provide CCTV coverage to cover access to the non-public areas of the station.

7. Provide controlled access to TPSS room.

8. Provide intrusion detection.

accordance with NFPA 130 and Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.

5. Provide room ventilation to exhaust heat and smoke.

6. Provide CCTV coverage to cover access to the non-public areas of the station.

7. Provide controlled access to TPSS room.

8. Provide intrusion detection.

Page 144: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

TPS - 15

Overheated Transformers

Improperly sized for use intended.

Lack of ventilation causing high ambient temperature in substation.

Damage to case, windings, and/or insulation. Fire or explosion enabling toxic smoke hazards to personnel and adjacent equipment and facilities. Loss of traction power to section of track.

IC 1. Verify transformer sizing selection and perform installation verification prior to operational tests.

2. Provide for adequate protection via automatic circuit breakers and/or fuses.

3. Monitor room temperature and for failure of ventilation equipment.

4. Monitor transformer temperature and provide alarm for high temperature condition.

IE 1. Verify transformer sizing

selection and perform installation verification prior to operational tests.

2. Provide for adequate protection via automatic circuit breakers and/or fuses.

3. Monitor room temperature and for failure of ventilation equipment.

4. Monitor transformer temperature and provide alarm for high temperature condition.

Page 145: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

TPS 16

High voltage Arc-flash Working with high voltage switchgear in TPSS

Severe injury or death to traction power employees Interruption in traction power and lengthy service interruptions while traction power is restored

IC 1. Provide Traction Power employees with appropriate PPE in accordance with NFPA 70.and Metro’s Arc-Flash and Shock Protection Program TP-1001

2. Design TPSS with remote switching and racking capabilities

3. Develop rules and procedures for dealing with high-voltage switchgears

ID 1. Provide Traction Power

employees with appropriate PPE in accordance with NFPA 70.and Metro’s Arc-Flash and Shock Protection Program TP-1001

2. Design TPSS with remote switching and racking capabilities

3. Develop rules and procedures for dealing with high-voltage switchgears

Page 146: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Traction Power

SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

TPS-17

Electrical shock from a 3rd rail that was assumed to be de-energized

train stopped between circuits allowing current to bridge the gap

Electrocution caused by contact with contact rail

1D Design the system so that there are no bridgeable gaps

IE Design the system so that there are no bridgeable gaps

Page 147: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)

Appendix F - PHA Train Control  

W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page F-1 May 11, 2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX F PHA TRAIN CONTROL  

 

 

 

  

 

 

Page 148: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Track

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

ATC -01

Switch points not closed

Switch-and-lock movement not fully normal.

Obstruction of switch points.

Improper maintenance.

Derailment. Damage to switch.

IC 1. Provide automatic train protection track circuit.

2. Provide regular inspection and maintenance in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations.

IE 1. Specify that the ATC

issues a zero speed command if switch is not locked in the proper position for the route.

2. Regular inspection and maintenance in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations.

ATC -02

Switches operating while a vehicle is on the approach section

Improper procedures at ROC.

Misrouted vehicles. Possibility of derailment if switch is operated in front of, or under, HRV.

IC 1. Interlocking circuits should be designed, and maintained, in order that switches cannot be operated under "unsafe" conditions.

2. Vital circuitry in wayside ATC should

IE 1. Ensure that interlocking

circuits are designed, and maintained, in order that switches cannot be operated under "unsafe" conditions.

2. Design vital circuitry in wayside ATC that will not

Page 149: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Track

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

not honor a command to move a switch in front or under a vehicle.

3. Establish and verify proper operating procedures.

honor a command to move a switch in front or under a vehicle.

3. Develop and verify proper operating procedures.

Page 150: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Wayside ATP

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

ATC -03

Loss of train detection

Inadequate shunt provided due to rusty rail or poor shunting.

Track circuit fails to indicate occupancy, leading to derailment, collision or sideswipe.

IC 1. Ensure that the specified shunting sensitivity of the track circuit exceeds the maximum shunt resistance provided by the first axle of every car.

2. Provide loss of shunt protection in interlockings.

3. Provide regular inspection and maintenance.

IE 1. Specify track circuit

sensitivity to exceed the maximum shunt resistance provided by the first axle of every car.

2. Provide loss of shunt protecti in interlocking logic design.

3. Develop inspection and maintenance procedures for eliminating rust.

ATC -04

Loss of train detection does not indicate occupancy.

Equipment failure

Track circuit fails to indicate occupancy, leading to derailment,

IC Design ATP Module to be vital in accordance with failsafe principles.

IE 1. Specify that the ATP

Module is to be designed as a vital system using failsafe

Page 151: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Wayside ATP

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

collision or sideswipe.

design techniques.

Page 152: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Automatic Train Control (ATC)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

ATC -05

ATC signal is disrupted

Electro-magnetic interference.

Severe injury IIC 1. Incorporate electro-magnetic compatibility in the design of all wayside train control equipment to minimize potential interference.

2. Confine all vital train control ATC subsystem functions to an operating frequency that is not within the spectrum of the traction power transformer/rectifier harmonic output.

3. Test for

IIE 1. Provide a design that

assures electro-magnetic compatibility of all wayside train control equipment to minimize potential interference.

2. Provide a design that all vital train control. ATC subsystem functions are confined to an operating frequency that is not affected by the spectrum of the traction power transformer/rectifier harmonic output.

3. Provide test plans to

Page 153: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Automatic Train Control (ATC)

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

electromagnetic interference (EMI) compatibility on installed system.

test for Electromagnetic interference (EMI).

Page 154: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Train Control and Communications Room

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

ATC -06

Fire and explosion in TC&C Room

When TC&C equipment shares same room with the battery, an off-gassing battery and spark from TC&C equipment cause an explosion.

Major injury to personnel, including burns, involuntary reaction, shock, or fatality.

IC 1. Evaluate design of battery and provide adequate separation between battery and TC&C equipment.

2. Provide adequate ventilation.

3. Use sealed batteries (valve regulated).

IE 1. Evaluate design of

battery and provide adequate separation between battery and TC&C equipment.

2. Provide adequate ventilation.

3. Use sealed batteries (valve regulated).

ATC -07

Hazards relating to battery handling, such as acid burns, personal injuries, fire/smoke, explosion and toxic fumes

Accidental rupture of battery cell or spillage of electrolyte.

Overcharging of batteries.

IIC 1. Use sealed battery. 2. Provide facilities for

quick drenching or flushing of the eyes and body if flooded wet-cell lead-acid type storage batteries are used.

3. Provide sealed water

IIE 1. Use sealed battery. 2. Provide facilities for

quick drenching or flushing of the eyes and body if flooded wet-cell lead-acid type storage batteries are used.

3. Provide sealed water

Page 155: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Train Control and Communications Room

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

rinse or neutralizing packs if storage batteries of the enclosed type equipped with explosion proof vents are used.

4. Procedures and training relating to battery handling.

5. Install caution signs relating to battery handling.

6. Provide periodic inspection and testing.

7. Ensure battery charging design precludes over-

rinse or neutralizing packs if storage batteries of the enclosed type equipped with explosion proof vents are used.

4. Procedures and training relating to battery handling.

5. Install caution signs relating to battery handling.

6. Provide periodic inspection and testing.

7. Ensure battery charging design precludes over-charging.

Page 156: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Train Control and Communications Room

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

charging.

ATC -08

Hazards relating to battery handling, such as acid burns, personal injuries, fire/smoke, explosion and toxic fumes.

Inadvertent short circuit of battery cells.

Potential for severe injury. Potential for equipment damage. Potential environmental hazard.

IIC Cover battery terminals and tools with insulating materials to prevent inadvertent short circuits.

IIE Cover battery terminals and tools with insulating materials to prevent inadvertent short circuits.

Page 157: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Train Control

SUBSYSTEM: Vehicle Birthing Interface

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-07-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

ATC -09

Door opened on wrong side of train

Operator error Death or serious injury to passenger falling out of train in 3rd rail area

1C Design train control systems to interlock passenger door control with proper berthing position, per MRDC

IE Provide an interlock to prevent the operator from opening the doors on the wrong side when birthing at the platform.

Page 158: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)

Appendix G - PHA Emergency Ventilation  

W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page G-1 May 11, 2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX G PHA EMERGENCY VENTILATION  

 

 

 

  

 

 

Page 159: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Dampers

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

VEN -01

Dampers do not operate in the proper manner, so fans are unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel

Incorrect/ inadequate maintenance.

Damper switch left in the local position which overrides all remote commands, so dampers cannot operate as determined by SES.

Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

IC 1. Develop training procedures for Maintainers to return selector switch to the remote position upon finishing maintenance.

2. Ensure that all Metro maintainers are properly trained and certified.

3. Ensure that O&M manuals contain the appropriate notes, cautions and warnings for damper maintenance.

4. Ensure manufacturer inspection, servicing, and maintenance

ID 1. Develop training

procedures for Maintainers to return selector switch to the remote position upon finishing maintenance.

2. Ensure that all Metro maintainers are properly trained and certified.

3. Ensure that O&M manuals contain the appropriate notes, cautions and warnings for damper maintenance.

4. Ensure manufacturer inspection, servicing, and maintenance procedures are followed and correctly

Page 160: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Dampers

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

procedures are followed and correctly incorporated in the O&M manuals.

incorporated in the O&M manuals.

VEN -02

Fan unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section

Dampers fail in a non fail-safe position, or closed, thereby preventing fans from directing airflow to control heat and smoke.

Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

ID 1. As part of the SES analysis, determine the appropriate fail-safe position for all dampers, and verify during testing that the dampers default to the correct fail-safe position.

2. Annunciate damper position at ROC.

3. Establish procedure for regular inspection and maintenance.

IE 1. Design the appropriate

fail-safe position for all dampers, and verify during testing that dampers default to the correct fail-safe position.

2. Design the system such that damper position is annunciated at ROC.

3. Establish procedure for regular inspection and maintenance.

VEN -03

Heat and smoke are not adequately

Transient pressures cause

Unable to control the direction of

ID 1. Design and specify dampers to

IE 1. Design and specify

Page 161: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Dampers

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

controlled or the flow is misdirected due to a damper condition.

damper damage, affecting their operation. Trig: Emergency situation (e.g., fire in the station or tunnel)

flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

withstand anticipated transient pressures.

dampers to withstand anticipated transient pressures.

VEN -04

Dampers do not operate in the proper manner, so fans are unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel

Improper damper position e.g. closed instead of open.

Metro personnel unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke.

ID 1. Verify during testing that the dampers are in correct pre-defined mode for each ventilation scenario as determined by SES.

IE 1. Verify during testing

that the dampers are in correct pre-defined mode for each ventilation scenario as determined by SES.

2. Ensure that the design is consistent with current MRL fan/damper configurations and

Page 162: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Dampers

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

Metro Rail Design Criteria"

Page 163: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

VEN -05

Employee in fan room and vent fans started remotely.

Maintenance employee did not properly lock-out system.

Death or serious injury to employee.

IC 1. Develop O&M procedures and manuals according to manufacturer’s recommendations.

2. Develop maintenance employees training procedures with instructions for correct lock-out procedures.

3. Provide training and certification of maintenance employees.

ID 1. Develop O&M

procedures and manuals according to manufacturer’s recommendations, including lock-out tag-out procedures.

2. Develop maintenance employees training procedures with instructions for correct lock-out procedures.

3. Provide training and certification of maintenance employees.

VEN -06

Employee in fan room and vent fans started remotely.

Operations Control unaware of maintenance personnel

Death or serious injury to employee.

IC 1. Develop procedures for maintainers to notify ROC prior to entry into the fan

IE 1. Develop procedures for

maintainers to notify ROC prior to entry into

Page 164: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

presence in fan room.

rooms. 2. Provide fan lock-out

capability. 3. Develop training

procedures for maintenance employees with instructions on correct lock-out procedures.

the fan rooms. 2. Provide fan lock-out

capability. 3. Develop training

procedures for maintenance employees with instructions on correct lock-out procedures.

4. Provide procedures and training to ‘Block-out” equipment during maintenance.

VEN -07

Failure to replace covers to moving parts of environmental control equipment such as fans.

Negligence by maintenance personnel.

Injury to Metro personnel.

IIID 1. Develop O&M Manuals according to manufacturer’s recommendations.

2. Provide caution notes in O&M manuals on safety related to

IIIE 1. Develop O&M Manuals

according to manufacturer’s recommendations.

2. Provide caution notes in O&M manuals on safety related to equipment

Page 165: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

equipment maintenance.

3. Perform supervisory follow-up to ensure procedures are followed.

4. Develop training procedures for maintenance personnel.

maintenance. 3. Perform supervisory

follow-up to ensure procedures are followed.

4. Develop training procedures for maintenance personnel.

VEN -08

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

Fans cease to operate due to component failure other than blades, such as bearings, hub, motor.

Fan blades

Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke.

ID 1. Ensure manufacturer has a QA program in place and all components are individually tested, then tested as an assembly.

2. Develop O&M manuals according to manufacturer’s

IE 1. Ensure manufacturer

has a QA program in place and all components are individually tested, then tested as an assembly.

2. Develop O&M Manuals according to manufacturer’s

Page 166: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

fail due to not being in balance or improperly fastened.

Fan blades fail due to imperfections in the material during manufacturing.

Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

recommendations. 3. Institute effective

preventive maintenance program.

4. Emergency operating procedures should have capability to modify modes when fan becomes inoperable.

recommendations. 3. Institute effective

preventive maintenance program.

4. Develop emergency operating procedures that address capability to modify modes when fan becomes inoperable.

5. Design the ventilation system according to Metro's new design criteria per 3/22/12 FLSSC meeting.

VEN -09

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the

Fans cease to operate due to a deliberate act of sabotage by a terrorist,

Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing

ID 1. Before hiring, screen applicants carefully to ensure highest caliber of support staff.

IE 1. Develop hiring

procedures to carefully screen applicants to ensure highest caliber of

Page 167: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

station or tunnel section.

criminal, and/or disgruntled employee.

evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

2. Review performance records frequently to identify dissatisfied employees.

3. Use work orders and schedules to control access to fans and other ancillary areas.

4. Use controlled access measures to deny unauthorized persons access to key operating areas.

support staff. 2. Review performance

records frequently to identify dissatisfied employees.

3. Ensure that work orders and schedules control access to fans and other ancillary areas.

4. Design controlled access measures to deny unauthorized persons access to key operating areas.

VEN -10

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel

Feeders not adequately protected against damage due to fire and/or

Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating

ID 1. Provide redundancy in the design of the power for the ventilation system.

2. Provide redundant power supplies from

IE 1. Provide redundancy in

the design of the power for the ventilation system.

2. Provide redundant

Page 168: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

section

seismic activity.

Loss of electrical power feed.

passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

two separate sources of primary power.

3. Provide diversity in the routing of emergency ventilation circuits so that a single event does not cause loss of power.

4. Install feeders that are embedded or are in conduit and are securely mounted in separate tunnels to avoid a single event from causing dual feeder failure.

power supplies from two separate sources of primary power.

3. Provide diversity in the routing of emergency ventilation circuits so that a single event does not cause loss of power.

4. Design feeders that are embedded or are in conduit and are securely mounted in separate tunnels to avoid a single event from causing dual feeder failure.

Page 169: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

VEN -11

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

Fans improperly sized for the heat release rates encountered in the station or tunnel fire.

Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

ID 1. Specify design to meet critical velocity requirements for designated situations.

2. Design per Metro Fire/Life Safety and NFPA 130 requirements.

IE 1. Specify design to meet

critical velocity requirements for designated situations.

2. Design per Metro Fire/Life Safety and NFPA 130 requirements.

VEN -12

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

Improper installation. Fans may fail due to vibration, not being isolated.

Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

ID 1. Specify that strict Q.C. procedures will be followed throughout the installation process.

2. Ensure proper installation is part of the installation verification process.

3. Develop O&M

IE 1. Specify that strict Q.C.

procedures will be followed throughout the installation process.

2. Ensure installation is in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations and is part of the installation

Page 170: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

manuals according to manufacturer’s recommendations.

4. Schedule regular inspections and maintenance following manufacturer recommended procedures.

verification process. 3. Develop O&M Manuals

according to manufacturer’s recommendations.

4. Schedule regular inspections and maintenance following manufacturer recommended procedures.

VEN -13

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

Software fault (logic error). (e.g., fire in the station or tunnel).

Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and

ID 1. Specify to perform validation/verification on software, as part of the design verification process.

2. Regularly schedule inspections and maintenance following

IE 1. Specify to perform

validation/verification on software, as part of the installation verification process.

2. Regularly schedule inspections and maintenance according

Page 171: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

multiple injuries.

manufacturer's recommended procedures.

to manufacturer's recommended procedures.

VEN -14

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

Excessive corrosion.

Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

ID 1. Regularly schedule inspections and maintenance following manufacturer's recommended procedures.

2. Protect fans from excessive corrosion.

IE 1. Regularly schedule

inspections and maintenance according to manufacturer's recommended procedures.

2. Design fans and shafts so that they are protected from excessive corrosion.

3. Manufacture fan blades, shafts, fan housings, duct work and other parts where corrosion might render the ventilation system

Page 172: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

inoperable out of corrosion resistant material.

VEN -15

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

During maintenance activity, the mode selection switch is left in "local" position, thereby removing control from the ROC.

Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

ID 1. At ROC, provide annunciation indication of position of mode selection switch.

2. Provide training and application cautionary notes in O&M manuals.

3. Implement proper check-in and check-out procedures for maintenance functions.

IE 1. At ROC, provide

annunciation indication of position of mode selection switch.

2. Develop adequate training procedures to provide maintenance personnel with cautions to return the selector switch to the “Remote” position after maintenance.

3. Include “Caution” notations in O&M manuals.

4. Develop training procedures for

Page 173: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

maintainers on the proper “check-in and check-out” procedures.

5. Establish procedure to operate fans remotely after completing the maintenance.

VEN -16

Incorrect sequencing of emergency ventilation fans resulting in improper ventilation of fire/smoke area.

Control manually, attempting to select proper sequencing of emergency ventilation fans.

Inadequate training of operations controllers

Loss of life or severe injury to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel due to exposure to heat or smoke.

IC 1. Establish pre-defined emergency ventilation modes.

2. Develop training procedures for ROC personnel on proper emergency ventilation procedures.

3. Provide training to ROC personnel in emergency ventilation procedures.

IE 1. Establish pre-defined

emergency ventilation modes.

2. Develop training procedures for ROC personnel on proper emergency ventilation procedures

3. Provide training to ROC personnel in emergency ventilation procedures.

Page 174: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

VEN -17

Fans fail prematurely (in less than one hour) when exposed to fire/elevated temperatures. Rest of emergency ventilation system unable to maintain control of the direction of flow of heat and smoke.

Fans not properly specified to operate in a hostile/fire environment .

Loss of life or severe injury to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel due to exposure to heat or smoke.

ID 1. Specify that the fans meet the NFPA 130 requirements.

2. Install fans in a fire rated room.

IE 1. Specify that the fans

meet the NFPA 130 requirements

2. Install fans in a fire rated room.

VEN -18

Loss of Motor Control Center (MCC) results in loss of fan operation.

MCC exposed to fire.

ROC unable to maintain control of the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and

ID 1. Ensure that the MCC is in a protected location separated from other areas by 2 hour fire-rated construction.

2. Provide automatic sprinkler protection so that the fire is

IE 1. Ensure that the MCC is

in a protected location separated from other areas by 2 hour fire-rated construction.

2. Provide automatic sprinkler protection so that the fire is

Page 175: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

contained. 3. Provide an alternate

means to control fans.

contained. 3. Design fan control from

the EMP or locally at the fan room.

VEN -19

Fans do not operate or fail during an emergency, unable to maintain pre-established control of the direction of heat and smoke flow.

Mode selection at EMP is left in "EMP" position, thereby removing control from the ROC.

Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.

ID 1. At ROC, provide annunciation indication of position of mode selection switch.

2. Provide training to the fire department and others controlling ventilation from the EMP to return the selector switch to the “ROC” position

IE 1. Specify that

annunciation will be provided at ROC indicating the position of the selector switch at EMP.

2. Develop training plans so that emergency responders will be provided with adequate training cautioning them to return the selector switch to the “ROC” position after drills.

Page 176: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

VEN -20

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

Fire growth rate is higher than planned

Potential severe injury/fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path unprotected.

ID 1. Compare the heat release rate provided by the vehicle manufacturer agrees with heat release rate used to design the emergency ventilation system.

IE 1. Specify that the heat

release rate used to design the ventilation system meets and/or exceeds that provided by the vehicle manufacturer.

VEN -21

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

Fan motor failure

Potential severe injury/fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path unprotected.

IC 1. Follow criteria that provide a design for sufficient ventilation when the most critical ventilation fan is out of service.

IE 1. Specify that the design

provides sufficient ventilation when the most critical ventilation fan is out of service.

VEN -22

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and

Fan failure due to thermal overload.

Potential severe injury/fatality.

IC 1. Follow NFPA 130 requirement that does not permit

IE 1. Specify that the design

of the fans follows the

Page 177: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Fans

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path unprotected.

thermal overload devices.

Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 regarding thermal overload devices. In the case of overload fans will run to destruction allowing additional evacuation time.

Page 178: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Ventilation Controls

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

VEN -23

Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.

Control System failure - Failure at the primary control facility.

Control System failure - Failure of the automatic portions of the system.

Potential severe injury/fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path unprotected.

IC 1. Provide redundant control circuits including Emergency Back Up Panel at ROC with separate communication to ventilation plants and local control panels at each plant to allow full control of all plants required.

2. Develop procedures to ensure the ventilation system is operable in the event automatic system is out of service.

3. Perform regularly scheduled inspections and maintenance according to

IE 1. Design redundant

circuits with an auxiliary control panel.

2. Design so that automatic functions can be duplicated manually.

3. Perform regularly scheduled inspections and maintenance according to manufacturer's recommended procedures.

Page 179: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Ventilation Controls

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

manufacturer's recommended procedures.

Page 180: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Ventilation Controls

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

VEN -24

Tunnel airflow direction established during a fire that exposes a second train within the ventilation zone to smoke and heat.

Multiple trains allowed to enter each ventilation zone. Airflow direction established to expose fewest passengers on stalled on-fire incident train to smoke and heat even at risk to second train in the path of exhausting airflow. Passengers on non-incident train can be exposed to smoke and heat

Potential severe injury/fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path and cabin environment unprotected.

IC 1. Provide power sectionalizing within each ventilation zone to facilitate removal of non-incident trains.

2. Provide implementation instructions for use in a fire emergency. Non-incident trains to be removed from ventilation block/zone as quickly as possible.

ID 1. Develop an operating

plan that limits one train per ventilation zone.

Page 181: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Ventilation

SUBSYSTEM: Ventilation Controls

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012

APPROVED BY:__________DATE:

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

whether inside train or in evacuated positions on walkway.

Page 182: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)

Appendix H - PHA Systemwide  

W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page H-1 May 11, 2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX H PHA SYSTEMWIDE  

 

 

 

  

 

 

Page 183: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Tunnels

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

SYS-01

Protruding surfaces or devices, sharp edges, on emergency walkways (where provided).

Improper walkway design. Trig: Emergency situation (e.g. evacuation from the train in the tunnel).

Possible injury to passengers and/or employees from protruding surfaces.

IIIC 1. Provide handrails and other devices to be free of sharp and protruding surfaces.

2. Install handrails and other devices along the walkway in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and CBC

3. Provide a clearance envelope above the walkway walking surface in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

IIIE 1. Provide handrails and

other devices to be free of sharp and protruding surfaces.

2. Install handrails and other devices along the walkway in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and CBC

3. Provide a clearance envelope above the walkway walking surface in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.

Page 184: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Tunnels

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

SYS-02

Damaged or broken rail

Horizontal/vertical dynamic load, rail fatigue, impact loading, extreme temperature change, defective weld, poor tie supports. Trig: HRV travels over a broken rail.

May cause derailment of the vehicle.

ID 1. Proper rail design parameters and proper installation.

2. Periodic Rail Inspection / Maintenance.

3. If the break has no continuity then it should be detected by the de-energization of the track circuit (ATC).

IE 1. Design rail in

accordance with Metro design criteria.

2. Implement QA procedure to inspect for defective welds during construction.

3. Establish procedure to perform periodic inspections during operation.

4. Provide broken rail detection by ATC track circuit design.

SYS-03

Unusual Protruding trackwork parts or switch layout devices,

Failure of devices such as handrails and supports.

Possible injury to employees from protruding

IIIC 1. Ensure installation and design is in accordance with

IIIE 1. Ensure installation and

design is in accordance

Page 185: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Tunnels

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

sharp edges

Trig: Maintenance workers on the guideway

surfaces.

Metro Design Criteria.

2. Implement QA procedure to review closely during construction to assure adherence to the design.

3. Develop procedure to inspect and maintain trackwork parts on regular intervals.

with Metro Design Criteria.

2. Implement QA procedure to review closely during construction to assure adherence to the design.

3. Develop procedure to inspect for unusual protruding or sharp edges, and maintain trackwork parts at regular intervals.

Page 186: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Lighting

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

SYS-04

Loss of both normal and emergency lighting

Earthquake destroys emergency power supply in the auxiliary power room at the station Trig: Emergency situation (e.g. evacuation from the station or train in the tunnel

Loss of life or serious injury due to person being struck by HRV. HRV strikes object on track causing derailment. Injuries to passengers tripping or falling during evacuation.

ID 1. Provide redundant power supply.

2. Connect tunnel lighting to adjoining stations with every other lamp fed from a different source.

IE 1. Provide redundant

power supply. 2. Connect tunnel lighting

to adjoining stations with every other lamp fed from a different source.

Page 187: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Access/Egress

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

SYS-05

Fire propagates rapidly in station due to delayed notification of emergency response teams

Delayed notification of emergency response teams. Trig: Emergency situation (e.g., fire in station)

Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke.

ID 1. Provide emergency telephones and Blue Light Stations on platforms.

2. Provide emergency procedure training for HRV and outside agency personnel.

3. Verify adequacy of procedures with pre-revenue drills and simulations.

4. Provide CCTV

IE 1. Provide emergency

telephones and Blue Light Stations on platforms.

2. Provide emergency procedure training for HRV and outside agency personnel.

3. Verify adequacy of procedures with pre-revenue drills and simulations.

4. Provide CCTV in the stations

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

SYS-06

Employee contact with moving parts of rotating equipment / motors/ fans.

Improper or lack of shielding /protection around rotating equipment. Trig: Routine maintenance

Injury or death

IC 1. Specify equipment

designed to limit exposure to rotating parts of equipment.

2. Establish operational procedures with warnings regarding rotating equipment.

3. Establish procedures to lock-out/tag-out; deactivate power before accessing moving parts or removing protective shields.

4. Provide training in safety procedures.

5. Procedures are in

IE 1. Specify equipment

designed to limit exposure to rotating parts of equipment.

2. Establish operational procedures with warnings regarding rotating equipment.

3. Establish procedures to lock-out/tag-out, deactivate power before accessing moving parts or removing protective shields.

4. Provide training in safety procedures.

5. Procedures are in place to verify that power is turned off before

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

place to verify that power is turned off before accessing equipment.

6. Provide appropriate clearance around moving parts.

7. Establish procedures that allow only qualified personnel to perform maintenance.

8. Establish procedures to block equipment in such a manner at to prevent rotating equipment from operating even if power is restored.

9. Provide appropriate

accessing equipment. 6. Provide appropriate

clearance around moving parts.

7. Provide procedures that allow only qualified personnel to perform maintenance.

8. Provide procedures to block equipment in such a manner at to prevent rotating equipment from operating even if power is restored.

9. Provide appropriate guards and housings around rotating equipment

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

guards and housings around rotating equipment

SYS-07

Insufficient electrical & mechanical clearances around high voltage equipment

Improper clearance around high voltage equipment Trig: Equipment maintenance

Equipment failure Severe Injury

IIC Install electrical equipment with adequate clearances for operation and maintenance per applicable Electrical Code.

IIE Install electrical equipment with adequate clearances for operation and maintenance per applicable Electrical Code.

SYS-08

Danger to wayside employees’ hands or fingers caused by remote switch operation

Human error, lack of knowledge Trig: Equipment maintenance

Personal Injury

IIC 1. Provide training in proper installation methods and procedures.

2. Hold toolbox meetings.

3. Wear protective equipment.

IID 1. Provide training in

proper installation methods and procedures.

2. Hold toolbox meetings. 3. Wear protective

equipment.

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

4. Schedule regular

training for maintenance workers.

5. Include tight spaces with moving parts in Metro’s Confined Spaces – Permit Entry program. Conduct job briefing before entering hazardous area.. Hazardous areas should be “Permit Entry Required

4. Schedule regular training for maintenance workers.

6. Conduct job briefing before entering hazardous area.. Hazardous areas should be “Permit Entry Required

SYS-09

Inability to communicate with maintenance or operations personnel."

Insufficient communications systems /equipment

Lack of control and/or monitoring

IIC

1. Plan for and procure adequate communications services for

IIE 1. Design equipment

necessary for communications.

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

Will also add: provided.

capability. Inability to be aware of or respond to various emergency situations.

operations activities. 2. Obtain quality

equipment and provide good maintenance support.

3. Have back-up and/or contingency plan for various types of outages.

2. Specified reliable quality equipment.

3. Specify equipment design that provides good maintenance support.

4. Develop back-up and/or contingency plans for various types of outages.

SYS-10

Confused / uninformed patrons (Normal Operations).

Lack of Metro operations information provided to general public.

Disruption of passenger flows through stations, Misuse of fare collection equipment. Holding of HRV

IIID 1. Use of adequate signs/graphics.

2. Passenger assistance telephones.

3. Distribute "how to use system" literature.

4. Provide scripted communications

IIIE 1. Design adequate

signs/graphics, and passenger assistance telephones into the System.

2. Distribute “How to use” literature as part of the community outreach

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

doors. Some potential for injury to such persons.

direction for specific emergencies" to the Possible controlling Measures.

program. 3. Provide scripted

communications direction for specific emergencies" to the Possible controlling Measures.

SYS-11

Fixed or portable emergency equipment unavailable, inoperative, or inadequate

Failure to provide equipment. Poor equipment maintenance. Improper equipment sizing.

Effects of a prior accident or incident could be escalated. Also, there may be hazards associated with the use of inadequate /improper emergency

IIC 1. During design of the Westside Extension, develop emergency needs and requirements list

2. Prior to Westside determine the adequacy of the emergency equipment list through dry-run tests and drills.

IIE 1. During design of the

Westside Extension, develop emergency needs and requirements list.

2. Prior to Westside operation, determine the adequacy of the emergency equipment list through dry-run tests and drills.

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

equipment.

3. Perform periodic preventive maintenance on emergency support equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations.

4. During design of the Westside extension, verify that equipment, such as ventilation fans, sprinklers, deluge systems, etc are correctly sized based upon degree of possible emergency, coverage of area required, etc.

3. Perform periodic preventive maintenance on emergency support equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations.

4. During design of the Westside extension, verify that equipment such as ventilation fans, sprinklers, deluge systems, etc are correctly sized based upon degree of possible emergency, coverage of area required, etc.

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

SYS-12

Emergency equipment unavailable, inoperative, or inadequate

Vandalism.

Effects of a prior accident or incident could be escalated. Also, there may be hazards associated with the use of inadequate/improper emergency equipment.

IID 1. During design of the Westside Extension, develop security measures to protect emergency support equipment

2. Secure all emergency support equipment in tamper-proof enclosures and monitor condition periodically.

IIE 1. Develop security

measures to protect emergency support equipment from being tampered with or stolen.

2. Specify that all emergency support equipment will be secured in tamper-proof enclosures and their condition will be monitored.

3. Develop procedures for re-stocking. Include any special instructions such as how often to inspect emergency equipment and replacement

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

schedules.

SYS-13

Emergency equipment unavailable, inoperative, or inadequate

Equipment not matched to any special needs (e.g., fighting chemical fires).

Effects of a prior accident or incident could be escalated. Also, there may be hazards associated with the use of inadequate/improper emergency equipment.

IID 1. During design of the Westside extension, verify that equipment meets the needs of emergency response groups.

2. Train emergency responders on proper use of equipment.

IIE 1. Hold meetings with the

emergency response groups to determine their needs. Provide sufficient equipment according to their needs.

2. Train emergency responders on proper use of equipment.

SYS-14

Injury to passengers during the recovery process.

Passengers evacuated in the tunnel may be on guideway and, therefore, could be endangered

Effects will vary greatly with both cause and associated conditions. The potential for

IIC 1. Evacuation of passengers should be closely supervised by Metro personnel.

IID 1. Establish procedures to

provide close supervision of passengers by Metro personnel and the fire service.

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SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

by other vehicles both by emergency responders coming in on the incident tunnel and vehicles in the non-incident tunnel if it is being used for evacuation.

injury/damage can range from minor to major.

2. Power to the third rail should be turned off as necessary to ensure safety.

3. Vehicle operations should be limited at times of evacuation.

2. Develop procedures to turn off power to the third rail as necessary to ensure safety.

3. Establish procedures to limit vehicle operations at times of evacuation.

SYS-15

Remote operation of equipment without coordination with maintenance activities

Improperly displayed data and/or vital information not displayed.

Possible injury to maintenance personnel from moving equipment (e.g., switches, vehicles), traction

IC 1. Provide means (e.g., lock-out switches) by which maintenance personnel can protect themselves from remote operation of

IE 1. Design means (e.g., lock-

out switches) by which maintenance personnel can protect themselves from remote operation of equipment.

2. Develop proper

Page 198: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

electrification equipment activation.

equipment. 2. Establish proper

procedures for operations-maintenance coordination and enforce them.

3. Establish procedures for proper coordination during non-routine maintenance activities when people are working in areas, or on equipment, normally not occupied or attended.

4. Require permit for

procedures for operations-maintenance coordination and enforce them.

3. Establish procedures for proper coordination during non-routine maintenance activities when people are working in areas, or on equipment, normally not occupied or attended.

4. Require permit for confined space entry

Page 199: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

confined space entry

SYS-18

Vandalism to safety critical equipment in the tunnel

Various acts/activities carried on by intruders in the tunnel

Damage to safety critical equipment in the tunnels Possibility of injury or death to intruders by vehicle.

IC 1. Utilize vandal resistant materials and fastenings.

2. Enclose and lock equipment.

3. Monitor, via CCTV or other means, areas most affected.

4. Patrol tunnels portals with security force.

IE 1. Use vandal resistant

materials and fastenings to the extent possible.

2. Enclose and lock equipment.

3. Provide the areas that may be most affected by vandalism with CCTV coverage.

4. Provide intrusion detection.

5. Develop plans for periodic security patrols.

6. Design adequate illumination of system facilities as a deterrent

Page 200: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index

to vandalism/theft.

SYS-19

Vandalism to safety critical equipment in the station and station ancillary areas

Various acts/activities carried on by intruders in the station

Damage to safety critical equipment in the station

IC 1. Utilize vandal resistant materials and fastenings.

2. Enclose and lock equipment.

3. Monitor, via CCTV or other means, areas most affected.

4. Patrol stations and station ancillary areas.

IE 1. Use vandal resistant

materials and fastenings to the extent possible.

2. Enclose and lock equipment.

3. Provide the areas that may be most affected by vandalism with CCTV coverage.

4. Provide intrusion detection.

5. Develop plans for periodic security patrols.

6. Design adequate illumination of system facilities as a deterrent to vandalism/theft

Page 201: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) · Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) 1.0 - Preliminary Hazard Analysis WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT May 11, 2012

SYSTEM: Systemwide

SUBSYSTEM: Operations

PHA NO.:

REV NO.: 01

WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012

REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012

APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________

GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Item No.

Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System

Severity-Probability

Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk

Index