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Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final) Task No. 5.4.2 (Deliverable No. 5.4.2.B)
Prepared for:
Prepared by:
777 South Figueroa Street Suite 1100 Los Angeles, California 90017
Review Copy
Date Initials
Originator 31-Aug-2011 RH
Checker 09-Sep-2011 GAh
Back checker 03-May-2012 LM
Verified by 11-May-2012 GA
May 11, 2012
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT Contract No. PS-4350-2000
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Table of Contents
W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page i May 11, 2012
Table of Contents
1.0 PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 1
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Overview of Alignment ....................................................................................................... 1
1.3 Purpose ............................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 Objectives ........................................................................................................................... 3
1.5 Scope ................................................................................................................................... 3
1.6 Referenced Documents ...................................................................................................... 4
1.7 Definitions ........................................................................................................................... 4
1.8 Hazard Analysis Methodology ............................................................................................ 5 1.8.1 Hazard Identification ............................................................................................. 5 1.8.2 Hazard Analysis ...................................................................................................... 6 1.8.3 Hazard Resolution .................................................................................................. 8 1.8.4 Documentation of Findings.................................................................................. 10 1.8.5 Documentation of Hazard Resolutions ................................................................ 11
1.9 Update process ................................................................................................................. 11
List of Figures Figure 1 –Westside Subway Extension Alignment ........................................................................................ 2
List of Tables Table 1 – Hazard Identification and Resolution Process ............................................................................... 6
Table 2 – Hazard Severity .............................................................................................................................. 7
Table 3 – Frequency of Occurrence .............................................................................................................. 7
Table 4 – Risk Assessment Matrix ................................................................................................................. 8
Table 5 – Risk Acceptance Criteria ................................................................................................................ 8
List of Appendices
APPENDIX A PHA STATIONS .......................................................................................................... A‐1
APPENDIX B PHA GUIDEWAY ....................................................................................................... B‐1
APPENDIX C PHA COMMUNICATIONS .......................................................................................... C‐1
APPENDIX D PHA YARD AND SHOPS ............................................................................................. D‐1
APPENDIX E PHA TRACTION POWER ............................................................................................ E‐1
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Table of Contents
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APPENDIX F PHA TRAIN CONTROL ............................................................................................... F‐1
APPENDIX G PHA EMERGENCY VENTILATION ................................................................................ G‐1
APPENDIX H PHA SYSTEMWIDE .................................................................................................... H‐1
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1.0 PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
1.1 Introduction This document represents the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for the Westside Subway Extension Project. It is developed and prepared in accordance with FTA Hazard Analysis Guidelines. The analysis presents an assessment of the potential hazards and possible safety mitigation measures that may be associated with the implementation of the WSE Project. The submittal presents the initial hazards list formatted in PHA form. The identified catastrophic and critical hazards and resolutions will need to be summarized into a Safety Critical & Catastrophic Items List (SCCIL) in the detail design phase of the project for tracking to resolution.
1.2 Overview of Alignment The Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA) for Westside Subway Extension is an 8.9 mile heavy rail line that would extend from the existing Metro Purple Line Wilshire/Western Station to a new western terminus in West Los Angeles near the Veteran’s Administration (VA) Hospital in Westwood. The extension would include the following seven stations:
Wilshire/La Brea Station
Wilshire/Fairfax Station
Wilshire/La Cienega Station
Wilshire/Rodeo Station
Century City Station
Westwood/UCLA Station
Westwood/VA Hospital Station
From the Wilshire/Western Station, the LPA would travel westerly beneath Wilshire Boulevard to the Wilshire/Rodeo Station, then southwesterly toward a Century City Station, and then northwesterly toward a Westwood/UCLA Station. The LPA then travels westerly, traversing under Veteran Avenue, and continues west under the I‐405 Freeway, terminating at a Westwood/VA Hospital Station. The extended Metro Purple Line would operate seven days a week, with service frequencies of approximately 4‐minutes during the morning and evening peak periods in each direction and at 10‐minute headways during the midday, off‐peak period.
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Figure 1 –Westside Subway Extension Alignment
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1.3 Purpose The purpose of this Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is to identify potential hazards and systematically assess conditions which could potentially affect the safe operation of the transit system. Identifying potential hazards during the design phase will enable their elimination or control, together with their associated causes and effects, before the system is opened for revenue service.
1.4 Objectives The objectives of this Preliminary Hazard Analysis are based on FTA hazard analysis guidelines and are as follows:
Identify hazardous conditions, which could exist; evaluate the effects of the hazards to patrons, personnel and equipment; and define designs and criteria to eliminate or mitigate the identified hazards.
Document the safety concepts and mitigation measures to be incorporated during the system development.
Provide a checklist for guiding the design to identify and track hazards
Provide a basis for requiring more detailed safety analyses and testing for specific system elements and subsystems.
The PHA is performed to ensure that the following safety principles are followed in the design and operations of the rail transit system:
When the system is operating normally there shall be no unacceptable or undesirable hazard conditions.
The system design shall require positive actions to be taken in a prescribed manner to either begin or continue system operation.
The safety of the system in the normal automatic operating mode shall not depend on the correctness of actions or procedures used by operating personnel.
There shall be no single‐point failures in the system that can result in an unacceptable or undesirable hazard condition.
Unacceptable hazards shall be eliminated by design.
Maintenance activities required to preserve or reduce risk levels shall be performed.
1.5 Scope The PHA covers three basic types of hazards:
Fire/Life Safety – Hazards resulting in accidents involving injuries, fatalities, or property damage due to fire, smoke, explosion, or toxic due to these causes.
System Safety – Hazards resulting in accidents involving injuries, fatalities, or property damage due to system design, construction, equipment, operations and maintenance, or lack of quality assurance.
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Security – Hazards from acts of intentional harm, including terrorism, resulting in injuries, fatalities, or property damage. The PHA does address limited security hazards, but does not include a Threat and Vulnerability Assessment.
The following system elements are analyzed in the PHA, and are included in the Appendices A to H.
1. Stations
2. Guideway (tunnels and tracks)
3. Communications
4. Yard and Shops (Extension to current Yard and Shop facilities)
5. Traction Power
6. Train control
7. Emergency Ventilation
8. Systemwide
The identified hazards, and recommended corrective actions concern the equipment, environment, procedures, and people, which comprise the transit system. A number of hazards identified are generic in nature and are applied to all similar situations. Hazards that are specifically unique to WSE Project are also identified.
Although PHA will provide a useful checklist for guiding design reviews, formal verification that the identified hazards are closed will occur in subsequent safety analyses and during the Safety and Security Certification process.
1.6 Referenced Documents The following documents have been reviewed and utilized as applicable in the development of the analysis and documentation in this report:
Hazard Analysis Guidelines for transit Projects, DOT‐FTA‐MA‐ 26‐5005‐00‐01, January 2000.
Metro Rail Design Criteria, Baseline, October 29, 2010.
Metro Fire/life Safety Criteria, Baseline, October 29, 2010.
MIL‐STD‐882E, Standard Practice for System Safety, February, 2000
1.7 Definitions The following are definitions of key terms used in the PHA. They are consistent with Federal Transit Administration Guidelines.
Accident – An unplanned event or series of events resulting in fatality, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment
Hazard – Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, death, or damage to or loss of equipment or property or damage to the environment; a prerequisite to an accident; the potential to do harm.
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Hazard Description – A description of the specific hazardous condition.
Hazard Effects – The anticipated “worst case” results that are expected to occur if the hazard causes are left uncorrected and an accident occurs.
Hazard Risk – An expression of the impact and/or possibility of an accident in terms of hazard severity and hazard probability.
Possible Controlling Measures – Actions that can be taken to prevent the potential accident from occurring.
Resolution – Changes that have been or could be made relative to system design or operation to eliminate or control the hazard.
Triggering Event – The event of condition most likely to interact with the hazard to cause an accident.
1.8 Hazard Analysis Methodology The PHA, performed in the preliminary engineering phase, provides an initial assessment of hazards, and identifies possible controls and follow‐on actions to eliminate or mitigate the hazards. In this analysis, the heavy rail transit system is identified by its systems, facilities, and the environment in which they operate. The guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, entitled “Hazard Analysis Guidelines for Transit Projects” have been utilized to perform the PHA contained in this report.
An inductive, or top‐down, approach is used to develop the PHA. Significant or top‐level events (i.e. hazards) are initially identified, followed by what might have caused them, and then by a determination of their potential effect on the total system. This methodology is shown in Table 1 and is discussed below.
1.8.1 Hazard Identification
The methods used for identifying hazards contained in this PHA included review of the design and operational concepts defined in the Westside Subway Extension Environmental Impact Report and incorporation of historical information and data from similar transit systems. Only hazards likely to result in an accident involving personal injury, fatality or property damage are identified.
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Table 1 – Hazard Identification and Resolution Process
1. DEFINE THE SYSTEM
Define the physical and functional characteristics and understand and evaluate the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and environment.
2. IDENTIFY HAZARDS
Identify hazards and undesired events
Determine the causes of hazards
3. ASSESS HAZARDS
Determine severity
Determine probability
Decide to accept risk or eliminate/control
4. RESOLVE HAZARDS
Assume risk or
Implement corrective action
– Eliminate
– Control
FOLLOW‐UP
Monitor for effectiveness
Monitor for unexpected hazards
1.8.2 Hazard Analysis
The objective of hazard analysis is to assess identified hazards in terms of the severity or consequence of the hazard and the probability of occurrence. Each hazard was analyzed to determine likely causes and effects of a related accident. Worst‐case consequences were identified and appropriate risk index was assigned. Assessment and evaluation of the effectiveness of the mitigation measures and how well the engineered safety systems or procedures serve to prevent and/or mitigate the effects of the hazard were conducted. Subsequently, a final risk index was assessed based on the hazard mitigation measures identified under resolution. The analysis was performed in conformity to Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Hazard Analysis Guidelines for Transit Projects. The following definitions are used to develop the PHA.
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1.8.2.1 Hazard Severity
Hazard severity categories are defined to provide a qualitative measure of the worst credible mishap resulting from personnel error, environmental conditions, design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies, system, subsystem or component failure, or malfunction, and are defined in Table 2.
Table 2 – Hazard Severity
Category Severity Consequence I Catastrophic Death or system loss or severe environmental damage. II Critical Severe injury, severe occupational illness, major system, or environmental
damage. III Marginal Minor injury, minor occupational illness, minor system, or environmental
damage. IV Negligible Less than minor injury, occupational illness, or less than system or
environmental damage.
1.8.2.2 Frequency of Occurrence
The probability that a hazard will occur during the planned life expectancy of the system can be described in potential occurrences per unit of time, events, population, items, or activity. Assigning a quantitative probability to a hazard is generally not possible early in the design or planning process. Due to the preliminary nature of the design, a qualitative hazard probability was derived from estimates and comparative evaluation of the subject hazard relative to known historical safety data from similar systems and applications.
The frequency of occurrence levels for hazards is defined in Table 3.
Table 3 – Frequency of Occurrence
Descriptive Word Level Specific Individual Item Fleet or Inventory Frequent A Likely to occur frequently. Continuously experienced. Reasonably Probable B Will occur several times in life of an
item. Will occur frequently.
Occasional C Likely to occur sometime in life of an item.
Will occur several times.
Remote D Unlikely, but possible to occur in life of an item
Unlikely, but can reasonably be expected to occur.
Improbable (Highly unlikely)
E So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced.
Unlikely to occur, but possible.
1.8.2.3 Risk Assessment
Hazard analysis established hazard severity category (I through IV) and hazard probability ranking (A through E) which are combined into a Hazard Risk Index, reflecting the combined severity and probability ranking for each identified hazard. Risk assessment criteria are applied to the identified hazards based on their severity and probability of occurrence, to determine acceptance of the risk or the need for corrective action to further reduce the risk. The hazard risk index and risk assessment and acceptance criteria are defined in Table 4 and Table 5.
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Table 4 – Risk Assessment Matrix
Event Frequency of Occurrence
Event Severity I (Catastrophic)
II (Critical)
III (Marginal)
IV (Negligible)
(A) Frequent IA IIA IIIA IVA
(B) Probable IB IIB IIIB IVB
(C) Occasional IC IIC IIIC IVC
(D) Remote ID IID IIID IVD
(E) Improbable IE IIE IIIE IVE
Table 5 – Risk Acceptance Criteria
Hazard Risk Index Acceptance Criteria
IA, IB, IC, IIA, IIB, IIIA Unacceptable.
ID, IIC, IID, IIIB, IIIC Undesirable (Metro decision required).
IE, IIE, IIID, IIIE, IVA, IVB Acceptable with review by Metro.
IVC, IVD, IVE Acceptable without review.
1.8.3 Hazard Resolution
After the hazard assessment is completed, hazards can be resolved by deciding to either assume the risk associated with the hazard or to eliminate or control the hazard. Mitigation of the risk associated with each hazard to an acceptable level can be accomplished in a variety of ways.
1.8.3.1 Unacceptable and Undesirable Hazards
Corrective action for the elimination or control of unacceptable and undesirable hazards includes the following order of precedence:
Design to Eliminate Hazards. Design, redesign or retrofit to eliminate (i.e., design out) the hazards through design selection. This strategy generally applies to acquisition of new equipment or expansion of existing systems; however, it can also be applied to any change in equipment or individual subsystems. In some cases, hazards are inherent and cannot be eliminated completely through design.
Design for Minimum Risk. If an identified hazard cannot be eliminated, reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level. This may be accomplished, for example, through the use of fail‐safe devices and principles in design, the incorporation of high‐reliability systems and components and use of redundancy in hardware and software design.
Incorporate Safety Devices. Hazards that cannot be eliminated or controlled through design selection will be controlled to an acceptable level through the use of fixed, automatic or other protective safety design features or devices. This could result in the hazards being reduced to an acceptable risk level. Safety devices may be part of the system, subsystem or equipment. Examples of safety devices include interlock switches, protective enclosures and safety pins. Care must be taken to ascertain that the operation of the safety device reduces the loss or risk and does not introduce an additional hazard. Safety devices will also permit the system to continue to operate in a limited manner. Provisions will be made for periodic functional checks of safety devices.
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Provide Warning Devices. When neither, design nor safety devices can effectively eliminate or control an identified hazard, devices will be used to detect the condition and to generate an adequate warning signal to correct the hazard or provide for personnel remedial action. Warning signals and their application will be designed to minimize the probability of incorrect personnel reaction to the signals and will be standardized within like types of systems. Warning signals and their application should also be designed to minimize the likelihood of false alarms that could lead to creation of secondary hazardous conditions.
Implement Procedures and Training. Where it is not possible to eliminate or adequately control a hazard through design selection or use of safety and warning devices, procedures and training will be used to control the hazard. Special equipment operating procedures can be implemented to reduce the probability of a hazardous event and a training program can be conducted. The level of training, required will be based on the complexity of the task and minimum trainee qualifications contained in training requirements specified for the subject system element and element subsystem. Procedures may include the use of personal protective equipment. Precautionary notations in manuals will be standardized. Safety critical tasks, duties and activities related to the system element/subsystem will require certification of personnel proficiency. However, without specific written approval, no warning, caution or other form of written advisory will be used as the only risk reduction method for Category I and II hazards.
Hazard Acceptance or System Disposal. Hazards identified as having an unacceptable and undesirable risk will be reduced to an acceptable level before design acceptance, or a decision must be made to accept the risk or dispose of the system.
Listed below are the accepted safety control methods used for the determination of a resolution that cannot be eliminated or controlled by system design.
Deterrence strategies / Access Control
Security and Patrol
Public Awareness Employee adherence to Metro operating rules, procedures, test plans and cautionary notifications
Employees, contractors, emergency response and rescue workers successful completion of:
a) Training/Drills
b) Required re‐certification
c) Performance of regular inspections and maintenance programs
d) Equipment Testing and Field Verification.
1.8.3.2 Acceptable with Review Hazards
Hazards identified as “acceptable with review” may be accepted in an “as‐is” condition with no further corrective action. Alternatively, operating and maintenance procedures must be developed for periodic tests and inspections of the subject item to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of the system.
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1.8.3.3 Acceptable without Review Hazards
Hazards with combination of severity and probability IVC, IVD, and IVE are acceptable as is without further review.
1.8.4 Documentation of Findings
The PHA has been organized and compiled according to the system elements identified in Section 1.5. The format of the PHA worksheets is as follows:
System/Subsystem: Identifies system element and the subsystem analyzed.
Performed By: Person performing the analysis.
Reviewed By: Person reviewing the analysis.
Approved By: Metro person reviewing and approving the analysis.
Column 1, Item Number: A unique alphanumeric number that identifies the hazard, with the first capital letter corresponding to the System.
Column 2, Hazard Description: Describes each hazard postulated for the subsystem, considering the following categories of hazards:
– Function Loss
– Malfunction
– Malfunction / Loss of Other System
– Human Error / Misuse
– External Circumstances
Column 3, Potential Cause: Describes the most likely primary and secondary causes such as design deficiency, component malfunction, human error, or environment that can propagate a hazard into an accident if adequate controls are not provided.
Column 4, Effect on Subsystem/System: Describes the probable effect and consequence the hazardous condition may have on the system element or its element subsystem in terms of safety (e.g. delay, inconvenience, injury, damage, fatality, etc.).
Column 5, Hazard Risk Index: This is a combination of the qualitative measures of the worst potential consequence (severity) resulting from the hazard, and its probability of occurrence (e.g., IA, IIB, etc.) before any safeguard or safety mitigation is provided.
Column 6, Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks: Describes actions that can be taken or procedural changes that can be made to prevent the anticipated hazardous event from occurring such as design change, procedures, special training, etc.
Column 7, Final Risk Index and Resolution: This assigned classification is an estimate of the hazard severity and frequency of occurrence after the mitigation measures are accepted for implementation. Resolution describes planned changes, changes made or steps taken relative to design and/or procedures, training, etc to eliminate or control the hazard.
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1.8.5 Documentation of Hazard Resolutions
All undesirable and unacceptable hazards (safety critical) should be tracked on a Catastrophic and Critical Items List (CCIL) to verify implementation of mitigation measures identified in PHA under Resolution. The identified items may require additional analysis to be performed in the detail design/ construction stage, i.e. Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), etc. Action taken to resolve each hazard identified in the PHA should be recorded in the Resolution section of the CCIL. All open unresolved hazards should be tracked until the accepted mitigation measures are implemented and verified.
1.9 Update process This PHA represents the initial safety analysis performed solely for the Westside Subway Extension Project. This document is dynamic, designed to be updated throughout the Project’s evolution, and to be used as the basis for performing other safety‐related activities.
The document is to be updated by the:
Addition of other hazards ‐ other hazards identified throughout the WSE Project development process should be documented as part of this hazard analysis and subsequent hazard analyses.
Addition of other system elements as necessary.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Appendix A- PHA Stations
W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T May 11, 2012
APPENDIX A PHA STATIONS
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐01
Fire/Smoke in Station Train fire
Electrical fire
Debris fire
Ignition of flammable /combustible gases or liquids.
Loss of life or injuries due to patron exposure
to fire and smoke.
IC 1. Conform to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Provide emergency ventilation system.
3. Install Automatic fire detection/ fire prevention system
4. Establish station evacuation procedures.
5. Provide evacuation training to all
participating parties
(i.e., fire, police, etc.) 6. Establish procedure
for safe train operations during hazard.
IE
1. Design Station in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
2. Design an emergency ventilation system in accordance with the Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130.
3. Provide automatic fire detection devices throughout station ancillary areas where automatic sprinkler protection is not required.
4. Develop or implement applicable evacuation procedures.
5. Conduct evacuation
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
training with all
participating emergency
responders.
STA‐02
Intrusion of Toxic/Flammable Gases
HAZMAT gas accident near station entrance
Hydrogen gas or other hazardous gasses released from battery storage or similar ancillary rooms.
Intrusion of methane or hydrogen
Loss of life or severe injuries due to explosion, fire and smoke
IC 1. Conform to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Provide emergency ventilation system.
3. Establish station evacuation procedures.
4. Provide evacuation training to all
participating parties
(i.e., fire, police, etc.) 5. Establish procedure
for safe train operations during hazard.
IE
1. Design the stations in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
2. Design an emergency ventilation system for normal and emergency situations.
3. Develop or implement applicable evacuation procedures.
4. Develop evacuation training plans for all
emergency responders.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
sulfide 6. Provide gas detection system
STA‐03
Intrusion of Flammable /Combustible liquids
HAZMAT liquid spill or leakage from nearby service stations, storage tanks or pipes.
Loss of life or severe injuries due to explosion, fire and smoke caused by spark from passing train.
IC 1. Conform to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Provide adequate drainage capacity.
3. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of drainage system.
4. Establish station evacuation procedures.
5. Provide evacuation training to all
participating parties
(i.e., fire, police, etc.) 6. Establish procedure
IE
1. Design stations in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
2. Design an adequate drainage system.
3. Develop procedures for periodic inspection and maintenance of drainage system.
4. Develop or implement existing applicable evacuation procedures.
5. Provide evacuation training to all emergency responders.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
for safe train operations during hazard.
6. Develop procedures for safe train operation during emergencies.
STA‐04
Structural deficiencies in station entrances, stairs, concourses and platforms.
Design /engineering deficiency
Poor construction quality control
Use of low quality construction materials.
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons crushed by collapsed structure caused by sizeable earthquake affecting deficient area during system l operation hours or due to vibration caused by trains, surface traffic and other
related causes.
IC 1. Conform to applicable seismic/ structural code.
2. Provide Implementation of quality control procedures during construction.
IE
1. Design to applicable seismic/ structural code.
2. Implement quality control procedures during construction.
STA‐ Unauthorized entry Absence of Vandalized IIC 1. Provide effective IID
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
05 into station during
non‐operating hours
effective gates /fences.
Absence of proper security surveillance.
equipment
Injuries related to damaged/vandalized equipment
barriers or gates preventing unauthorized station entry during non‐operating hours.
2. Provide security surveillance during non‐operating hours (e.g., guards or CCTV).
1. Provide gates preventing unauthorized station entry during non‐operating hours.
2. Design adequate CCTV coverage for non‐operating hours.
STA‐06
Improperly insulated, grounded, or covered electrical wiring.
Design or installation oversight
Negligence of workmen /failure to replace protective coverings
Severe shock to individuals, not authorized to enter into rooms containing electrical wiring, who accidentally touch exposed wiring.
IC 1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Provide for restricted access for authorized individuals to ancillary rooms and areas containing
IE
1. Design electrical system to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Restrict Access of unauthorized individuals into ancillary rooms and areas containing station wiring and control
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
station wiring and control panels.
3. Provide proper maintenance procedures relative to electrical systems.
4. Comply with applicable wiring codes and standards.
panels.
3. Develop proper
maintenance procedures relative to electrical systems.
4. Design to applicable wiring codes and standards.
STA‐07
Obstacles With Sharp Protruding Edges in or Adjacent to Station Walkways.
Design oversight.
Vandalism.
Minor injuries to patrons who accidentally hit a sharp edge.
IIIC 1. Eliminate all sharp protruding edges in or adjacent to pedestrian walkways in station.
IIIE
1. Eliminate all sharp protruding edges in or adjacent to pedestrian walkways in station.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
2. Repair all sharp edges due to vandalism.
2. Prepare repair procedures for all sharp edges .
3. Provide periodic inspections for sharp edges.
STA‐08
Slippery Surface Use of surface material with low friction coefficient.
Oil, food, or other slippery substances on surface.
Injuries due to slipping and falling.
IIIC 1. Use surface materials with high friction coefficients of friction per MRDC
2. Conduct preventive maintenance in stations.
IIIE
1. Install surface materials with high friction coefficients of friction.
2. Perform preventive maintenance in stations.
STA‐09
Persons standing t oo close to edge of platform
Excessive platform crowding.
Blind or
Loss of life or severe injuries to individuals who get hit by
IC 1. Provide non‐slip platform edge material, different in color and texture
IE
1. Design non‐slip platform edge material, different in color and texture
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
visually impaired cannot distinguish edge from rest of platform
Lack of device to warm patrons of approaching train.
passing train or fall on the track.
from the main platform area.
2. Establish procedure to control access to platforms after special events.
3. Monitor (via CCTV) platform crowd levels and warn by announcement on PA system.
from the main platform area.
2. Develop procedure to control access to platforms after special events.
3. Establish procedure to monitor (via CCTV) platform crowd levels and provide warning announcements on PA system.
STA‐10
Obstructions in patron flow paths
Debris left by patrons.
Possible fall or injury.
IIC 1. Provide conveniently located litter containers out of flow path.
2. Conduct preventive
IIE
1. Locate litter containers located out of flow paths.
2. Provide preventive maintenance in
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
maintenance in stations.
stations.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐11
Obstructions in patron flow paths
Temporary barriers for cleaning and/or maintenance.
Patrons blocking stairs by sitting or with personal possessions
Possible fall or injury
Injuries by trampling during evacuation
IIC 1. Provide adequate cleaning services.
2. Limit major cleaning activities during non‐service hours.
3. Place signs prohibiting sitting or blocking stairs
IID
1. Provide and implement adequate cleaning procedures and training of cleaning staff.
2. Perform major cleaning during non‐service hours.
STA‐12
Station evacuation slow and/or confusing during emergency in the station requiring evacuation.
Insufficient egress capability
Loss of life or serious injuries.
ID 1. Provide safety refuge for patrons in event of emergency conditions.
2. Provide emergency stairs in accordance
IE
1. Design safety refuge for patrons in event of emergency conditions.
2. Design emergency stairs in accordance
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
with NFPA 130 to provide adequate exit capacity.
with NFPA 130 to provide adequate exit capacity.
STA‐13
Station evacuation slow and/or confusing during emergency in the station requiring evacuation.
Egress routes not separated, and thus contaminated
Egress routes not direct
Inadequate signage
Inadequate lighting
Loss of life or serious injuries.
ID 1. Provide emergency stairs in accordance with NFPA 130 to provide adequate exit capacity.
2. Provide signage to direct patrons to areas of safe refuge and site exiting.
3. Provide emergency ventilation system to maintain tenable environment in the path of egress.
IE
1. Design emergency stairs in accordance with NFPA 130 to provide adequate exit capacity.
2. Design and install signage to direct patrons to areas of safe refuge and site exiting.
3. Design emergency ventilation system to maintain tenable environment in the path of egress.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
4. Provide enclosed emergency stairs.
5. Provide emergency
evacuation procedures.
6. Provide adequate lighting in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
4. Design enclosed emergency stairs at the ends of platforms.
5. Establish emergency evacuation procedures,
6. Design adequate lighting in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
STA‐14
Station evacuation slow and/or confusing during emergency in the station requiring evacuation.
Inadequate warning due to inadequate /improperly located detection and alarming devices.
Loss of life or serious injuries.
ID 1. Design and test the Communications in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
2. Develop an Emergency Management Plan
IE
1. Design for incident detection and alarms in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
2. Provide a fire alarm system in accordance
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
Lack of communications Inadequate emergency response planning. Insufficient fire department training. Insufficient training of Metro operations personnel assisting with evacuation. Confusing or misleading
and verify by testing procedures prior to revenue service.
3. Provide local fire
jurisdictions with fire protection documentation to be used in emergency training sessions.
4. Train Metro ROC controllers, CCTV personnel and RTOS’s in making announcement and directing passengers during an evacuation.
with NFPA 72.
3. Design P.A. and emergency telephones throughout the stations to provide adequate communication during an emergency.
4. Develop an emergency management plan and conduct drills with emergency responders.
5. Coordinate with local fire jurisdictions and provide necessary documentation to be used for training purposes.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Station‐wide
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
announcements during evacuation.
STA‐15
Thrown or dropped objects (multi‐level stations).
Accidental dropping of objects to lower station level.
Possible injury to persons on lower level(s).
IIIC 1. Use balustrades with sloped surface so object cannot be placed on them.
2. Provide monitored CCTV coverage.
3. Establish procedures to provide random security patrols.
IIIE
1. Design Balustrades with sloped surfaces so objects cannot be placed on them.
2. Design and monitor CCTV coverage.
3. Develop procedures to provide random security patrols.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Security
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐16
Patron assault Inadequate security systems in station.
Inadequate security systems in elevator.
Patron injury due to assault or robbery attempt
IIC 1. Provide monitored CCTV coverage.
2. Provide staggered, periodic patrol of station by Metro and/or police personnel.
3. Provide monitored elevator communications.
IID
1. Design monitored CCTV coverage.
2. Develop procedures for staggered security patrols.
3. Monitored elevator communications.
STA‐17
Unauthorized personnel on site.
Lack of security patrols.
Lack of monitoring of station areas.
Loss of life or severe injury to intruder in volatile areas resulting from contact with
IC 1. Provide patrolled security
2. Provide monitored CCTV coverage
3. Install warning signs prohibiting
ID
1. Develop procedures for staggered security patrols.
2. Provide monitored CCTV coverage.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Security
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
Inadequate security design
high voltage traction power equipment or collision by a moving train..
Could affect transit operation if intruder tampers with control equipment.
unauthorized entry. 4. Provide intrusion
detection system for tunnels and TPSS
3. Install warning signs prohibiting unauthorized entry.
STA‐18
Failure of critical tunnel safety systems
Unauthorized entry resulting in vandalism in ancillary rooms ‐ electrical, signals,
Damage to critical tunnel safety systems.
IC 1. Provide intrusion detection system at ancillary rooms and portals.
2. Provide monitored CCTV coverage.
IE
1. Design intrusion detection system at ancillary rooms and portals.
2. Monitor CCTV coverage
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Security
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
communications, elevator and fan rooms.
Poor maintenance
Water intrusion
3. Provide warning signs prohibiting unauthorized entry.
4. Provide intrusion detection system at ancillary rooms and portals.
5. Establish proper maintenance procedures.
6. Provide waterproof membrane on the outside of ancillary rooms in contact with the earth
3. Install warning signs prohibiting unauthorized entry.
4. Design intrusion detection system to cover ancillary rooms and at the gates at end of the platform leading to the tunnels.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Elevators
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐19
Closing of elevator door on patron or clothing with excessive force.
Failure of door safety circuits.
Possible injury to person effected.
IIIC 1. Provide elevators that are designed per the Elevator Safety Code, ANSI/ASME A17.1.
2. Assure through design verification and testing that elevator safety devices perform according to specification.
3. Provide obstruction detection on elevator door.
4. Provide CCTV coverage of elevator areas.
5. Provide periodic operation checks and
IIIE
1. Specify that elevators are designed per the Elevator Safety Code, ANSI/ASME A17.1.
2. Verify design and testing that elevator safety devices perform according to specification.
3. Establish obstruction detection on elevator door.
4. Design adequate CCTV coverage of elevator areas.
5. Perform periodic operation checks and maintenance.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Elevators
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
maintenance.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Stairs & Escalators
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________ DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐20
Congested station stairs and escalators
Inadequate or confusing signage to control patron overflow.
Inadequate clear space at ends of stairs or escalators.
Inadequate stair and/or escalator capacity for patron loads experienced.
Possible fall or injury.
IIC 1. Use clear and uniform signs and flow patterns.
2. Ensure that advertising, art and other station features do not distract attention from flow control signs.
3. CCTV coverage and PA system should allow announcements when stations are overcrowded.
4. Provide stairs and escalators of adequate size, capacity, and quantities to meet
IIE
1. Provide clear and uniform signs and flow patterns.
2. Design advertising, art and other station features that does not distract attention from flow control signs.
3. Provide CCTV coverage and PA system to make announcement when stations are overcrowded.
4. Design stairs and escalators with adequate size, capacity, and quantities to meet demands under
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Stairs & Escalators
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________ DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
demands under peak, normal and emergency conditions.
peak, normal and emergency conditions.
STA‐21
Continued escalator operation in the down direction during emergency evacuation
Failure of local or remote escalator control circuits to stop that are operating counter to the path or egress
Reduced capacities for evacuations.
Possible injury to persons moving on an escalator in a direction opposite to its movement.
IIC 1. Provide ability to stop escalator by using emergency switch at escalator.
2. Provide ability to monitor escalator activity during emergency to determine if redirection of flow from escalator is required.
IIE
1. Install an emergency stop switch.
2. Monitor escalator activity during emergency to determine if redirection of flow from escalator is required.
STA‐ Slippery station stairs and escalator, ramp,
Inadequate drainage of
Possible fall and IIC 1. Assure design for proper drainage of
IIE
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Stairs & Escalators
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________ DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
22 platform and/or other surfaces.
rain or clearing water from walking surfaces.
Inadequate non‐skid surfaces.
Inadequate inspection, maintenance and cleaning practices.
injury.
surface water and cleaning water.
2. Protect stairs and escalators from surface water.
3. Provide slip resistant surfaces are provided in stairs, escalators and ramps per Design Criteria.
4. Ensure facility surfaces meet contract specifications which meet MRDC for floor surfaces.
5. Assure maintenance personnel are trained to inspect and clean
1. Design for proper drainage of surface water and cleaning water.
2. Provide protection of stairs and escalators from surface water.
3. Specify slip resistant surfaces on stairs, escalators and ramps per Design Criteria.
4. Verify facility surfaces meet contract specifications.
5. Train maintenance personnel to inspect and clean up spills to prevent slippery surfaces.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Stairs & Escalators
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________ DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
up spills to prevent slippery surfaces.
STA‐23
Sudden stopping or reversing of escalators which are carrying people
Remote action from OCC.
Power failure to escalator
Equipment failure
Possible injury from falls to patrons on escalator.
IIC 1. Surveillance should be required to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown.
2. Follow Elevator Safety Orders (ANSI 17.1) requirements for remotely stopping escalators.
3. Provide gradual speed reduction capability in escalator stop mode n accordance with
IIE
1. Require surveillance to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown.
2. Design to Elevator Safety Orders (ANSI 17.1) requirements for remotely stopping of escalators.
4. Provide gradual speed reduction capability in escalator stop mode n accordance with ANSI/ASME A17.1.
5. Proper maintenance to
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Stairs & Escalators
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________ DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
ANSI/ASME A17.1. 4. Proper maintenance
to minimize failures including monitoring of escalator performance.
minimize failures including monitoring of escalator performance.
STA‐24
Sudden stopping or reversing of escalators which are carrying people
Actuation of emergency stop switch.
Actuation of any escalator safety switch.
Sudden deceleration may cause occupants of escalator to fall with possible injury. The effects will likely increase in severity with increased speeds and deceleration rates.
IIC 1. Provide gradual speed reduction capability in escalator stop mode in accordance with ANSI/ASME A17.1.
2. Provide SOPs/EOPs which include procedures to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to
IIE
1. Specify gradual speed reduction capability in escalator stop mode in accordance with ANSI/ASME A17.1.
2. Develop SOPs/EOPs to include procedures to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown.
3. Provide adequate CCTV
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Stairs & Escalators
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________ DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
shutdown. 3. Insure adequate CCTV
coverage of escalators.
coverage of escalators.
STA‐25
Sudden stopping or reversing of escalators which are carrying people
Stopping of escalator from remote location because of emergency, both manual and automatic.
Sudden deceleration may cause occupants of escalator to fall with possible injury.
The effects will likely increase in severity with increased speeds and deceleration rates.
IIC 1. Surveillance should be required to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown.
2. Follow Elevator Safety Orders (ANSI 17.1) requirements for remotely stopping escalators.
3. Provide gradual speed reduction capability in escalator
IIE
1. Require surveillance to determine that escalator is unoccupied prior to shutdown.
2. Design to Elevator Safety Orders (ANSI 17.1) requirements for remotely stopping escalators.
3. Follow ANSI/ASME A17.1 requirements for gradual speed reduction.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Stairs & Escalators
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________ DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
stop mode in accordance with ANSI/ASME A17.1.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Architectural
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 1
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐26
Station fire barriers do not close during fire or smoke in station.
Power failure
Improper maintenance
Loss of life or serious injuries to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel exposed to fire or smoke.
IC 1. Provide back‐up power to doors.
2. Provide activation control at local fire management panel.
3. Provide manual release of fire doors.
4. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of fire doors in accordance with Maintenance Plan.
IE
1. Supply back‐up power to elevator doors.
2. Design activation control at local fire management panel.
3. Install manual release of fire doors.
4. Develop procedures for periodic inspection and maintenance of fire doors in accordance with Maintenance Plan.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Ancillary Areas
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐27
Equipment room fire
Mechanical and electrical failures
Oily rags and other debris.
Damage to equipment and possible loss of service.
Possible injury to maintenance personnel.
IIC 1. Provide central monitoring of critical electrical and mechanical parameters to indicate impending and actual failures so that appropriate maintenance and repair action can be taken.
2. Provide adequate circuit protection.
3. Provide fire protection measures as dictated by specific situations.
IIE
1. Design central monitoring capability for critical electrical and mechanical parameters to indicate impending and actual failures so that appropriate maintenance and repair action can be taken.
2. Design adequate circuit protection.
3. Use fire protection measures as dictated by specific situations.
4. Develop good housekeeping, inspection and maintenance practices.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Ancillary Areas
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
4. Ensure good housekeeping, inspection and maintenance practices.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Ancillary Areas
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐28
Equipment room fire
Vandalism.
Damage to equipment and possible loss of service.
Possible injury to maintenance personnel.
IIC 1. Lock equipment rooms to prevent access by public.
2. Provide CCTV coverage of entrance to ancillary areas.
3. Provide random security patrol of station areas.
IIE
1. Develop Lock Schedule and keying plan for equipment rooms to prevent access by public.
2. Design CCTV coverage of entrance to ancillary areas.
3. Establish random security patrol of station areas.
STA‐29
Fire in janitor's equipment storage area or trash storing area. (Where provided).
Improper storage of combustible materials.
Possible spread of fire and/or smoke to other areas of the station.
IIC 1. Conduct periodic inspection and enforcement of proper cleaning materials storage practices
2. Provide fire protection system.
IIE
1. Develop periodic inspection and enforcement procedures to assure proper cleaning materials and storage practices
2. Design adequate fire protection system.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire Alarm System
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2011
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐30
Failure of fire alarm system during fire in the station
Electromechanical failure
Possible injuries and extensive damage to facility equipment, if fire breaks and remains undetected in its early stages.
IIC
1. Ensure proper installation testing and maintenance of fire alarm system.
2. Provide supervised system to monitor fire system and annunciate failure at central control.
IIE
1. Provide proper installation testing and maintenance of fire alarm system.
2. Design supervised system to monitor fire system and annunciate failure at central control.
STA‐31
Failure of fire alarm system.
Improper monitoring, testing and maintenance.
Possible injuries and extensive damage to facility equipment, if fire breaks and remains undetected in its' early stages.
IIC
1. Provide procedures to provide a fire watch in case of fire alarm system failure until equipment can be repaired.
2. Provide temporary work‐around procedure such as
IID
1. Develop procedures to provide a fire watch in case of fire alarm system failure until equipment can be repaired.
2. Develop temporary work‐around
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire Alarm System
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2011
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
person in facility equipped with portable radio to notify central control, while fire alarm system is inoperative.
procedures such as person in facility equipped with portable radio can notify central control, while fire alarm system is inoperative.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐32
Serious injury or death from a fall on open station platform during normal operations
Overcrowding of platform.
Carelessness of station platform occupants.
Passenger being pushed onto the trainway
Possible falling of patron to trainway resulting in serious injury or death.
IC 1. Provide distinct marking of platform edge area through coloring and/or floor texture or other suitable means.
2. Provide a 24” tactile warning strip along the platform edge per Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
3. Provide a refuge area under the platform.
IE
1. Design distinct marking of platform edge area through coloring and/or floor texture or other suitable means.
2. Design a 24” tactile warning strip along the platform edge per Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
3. Design for a refuge area under the platform.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐33
Fire propagates rapidly in station.
Public and non‐public spaces not fire separated.
Excessive fuel load in public, non‐public spaces.
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke.
ID 1. Provide station facilities with compartmental separation in accordance with NFPA and Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Public spaces should be protected from fuel loads and ignition sources in ancillary areas.
3. Ensure that combustible materials brought into the stations are limited.
4. Provide fire protection and/or fire alarm system in accordance with
IE
1. Design station facilities with compartmental separation in accordance with NFPA and Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Design public spaces that are protected from fuel loads and ignition sources in ancillary areas.
3. Limit combustible materials that can be brought into the stations.
4. Design fire protection and/or fire alarm systems in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
Metro Design Criteria.
STA‐34
Fire propagates rapidly in station
Inadequate fire detection and suppression capability.
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke.
ID 1. Provide fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
2. Verify through testing that fire detection and suppression systems meet all requirements as specified.
IE
1. Design fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
2. Test fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with NFPA 72 and NFPA 13 requirements.
STA‐35
Fire propagates rapidly in station.
Ancillary spaces not fire separated from one another.
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke.
ID 1. Provide separation of ancillary spaces in accordance with NFPA and Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Provide fire detection
IE
1. Design separation of ancillary spaces in accordance with NFPA and Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Design fire detection and
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
and suppression systems in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
suppression systems in accordance with the Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria, NFPA 72 and NFPA 13 requirements.
STA‐36
Fire propagates rapidly in station.
Fire sources not isolated.
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke.
IC 1. Ensure that fuel loads and ignition sources installed in or near station areas(s) are isolated and controlled.
2. Confirm that station design conforms to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
3. Provide fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with
IE
1. Inspect areas in or near stations to ensure that fuel loads and ignition sources are isolated and controlled.
2. Design fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with the Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria, NFPA 72 and NFPA 13 requirements.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
Metro Design Criteria.
STA‐37
Fire/smoke at underground station.
Electrical fire.
Accumulation of trash.
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke.
IC 1. Provide smoke/heat detection in electrical rooms, platform, and ancillary spaces.
2. Provide emergency ventilation to exhaust heat and smoke.
3. Construct station in accordance with NFPA 130 abd Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
4. Establish procedures for station evacuation.
5. Provide emergency procedures training for Metro and outside
IE
1. Install smoke/heat detection in electrical rooms, platform, and ancillary spaces.
2. Design emergency ventilation to adequately exhaust heat and smoke.
3. Design and construct station in accordance with NFPA 130 and Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
4. Develop procedures for station evacuation.
5. Develop emergency training procedures for Metro and outside agency personnel.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
agency personnel.
STA‐38
Struck by closing fire barrier in station
Patrons unaware door is in closing mode
Minor injuries.
IIID 1. Provide visual and audible indication of door closing.
2. Provide sensitive edge on fire door.
IIIE
1. Annunciate visual and audible indication of door closing at ROC.
2. Provide panic hardware in accordance with CBC.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐39
Insufficient station stair and escalator lighting.
Electrical power failure.
Inadequate lighting design.
Improper inspection and maintenance of lighting fixtures.
Possible fall and injury.
IIC 1. Provide back‐up power supply to emergency lighting.
2. Provide proper transition lighting between different ambient light levels for all times of day, seasonal and weather conditions.
3. Establish inspection, maintenance and training procedures.
4. Provide emergency
IIE
1. Connect the emergency lighting system to the UPS.
2. Design for proper transition between different ambient light levels for all times of day, seasonal and weather conditions.
3. Develop inspection, maintenance and training procedures.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
lighting in accordance with NFPA 130
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire/Life Safety
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐40
Intrusion of flammable gases.
Hydrogen gas released from battery storage or similar ancillary rooms.
Loss of life or severe injuries due to contaminated air, fire, or smoke.
ID 1. Provide ventilation of ancillary and battery storage areas to prevent the accumulation of gases.
2. Use valve regulated (sealed) batteries.
IE
1. Design ventilation of ancillary and battery storage areas to prevent the accumulation of gases.
2. Specify valve regulated (sealed) batteries
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire Suppression
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐41
Standpipe system inoperative during fire in the station.
Inadequate water supply
Corrosion of pipe due to stray currents.
Improper maintenance.
Unable to suppress fire.
ID 1. Provide separate feeds to the standpipe from sources at each end of the station with a crossconnection.
2. Provide corrosion protection of standpipe.
3. Follow code requirements to, repair, inspect and maintain.
4. Provide alternate means to charge standpipe system such as from fire department
IE
1. Feed the standpipe from separate sources at each end of the station with a crossconnection
2. Specify corrosion protection of standpipe.
3. Test, repair, inspect and maintain standpipe in accordance with Fire/Life safety Criteria and NFPA 14.
4. Design means to charge standpipe system from separate locations.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Fire Suppression
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
connections.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Lighting
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2‐21‐2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE:
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐42
Insufficient station stair and escalator emergency lighting.
Inadequate emergency lighting.
Possible fall and injury.
IIC 1. Ensure that emergency lighting conforms to Metro’s Design Criteria.
2. Establish procedures to test, repair, inspect and maintain the emergency lighting system on regular basis.
IIE
1. Design that emergency lighting according to Metro’s Design Criteria.
2. Develop procedures to test, repair, inspect and maintain the emergency lighting system on regular basis.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Structural
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 1
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 8‐27‐2011
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
STA‐43
Structural inadequacies
Poor construction quality control/low quality materials
Portions of the station collapse on train or persons due to earthquake causing death or serious injury.
Passenger panic during evacuation resulting in serious injury.
ID 1. Follow CBC Seismic requirements in the design of stations.
2. Perform quality assurance audits and quality control audits during construction phase.
IE
1. Design stations in accordance to the CBC Seismic requirements.
2. Implement quality assurance and quality control audits during construction phase.
STA 44
Emergency gates at platform ends swing
Incorrect design Passengers evacuating
1D Design emergency gates to swing inwards in
IE
Provide emergency gates that
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Structural
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 1
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 8‐27‐2011
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
wrong direction from trackway to platform will get trapped resulting in death or injury from fire and smoke
compliance with MRDC 9 swing inward toward the platform.
STA 45
Structural failure Earthquake Death or serious injury to passengers and employees
Long‐term service interruption
1D Design stations in accordance Metro Rail Design Criteria and 2010 CBC
IE
Provide a design that complies with the structural requirements of the Metro Rail Design criteria and CBC, 2010 ed.
SYSTEM: Stations
SUBSYSTEM: Structural
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 1
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 8‐27‐2011
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 9‐5‐2011
APPROVED BY:_________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity‐Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks
Final Risk Index & Resolution
Complete loss of station
STA 46
Passenger falls in the between‐car area of waiting train
Visually disabled or otherwise disoriented passenger
Death or serious injury to the passenger
Lengthy service disruption
1B Install platform‐mounted barrier between‐car barrier per Metro design
IE
Follow the Metro design for platform‐mounted car barriers.
STA 47
Door opened on wrong side of train
Operator error Death or serious injury to passenger falling out of train in 3rd rail area
1D Design train control systems to interlock passenger door control with proper berthing position, per MRDC
Provide an interlock to prevent the operator from opening the doors on the wrong side when birthing at the platform.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Appendix B - PHA Guideway
W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page B-1 May 11, 2012
APPENDIX B PHA GUIDEWAY
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
GWY-01
Fire/Smoke in Tunnel
Ignition of flammable/combustible liquids or gases
Train collision /fire
Electrical fire
Debris fire
Trig: Passenger-loaded train enters area filled with fire/smoke. Passenger evacuation required.
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons as they are exposed to fire and smoke. Long term interruption to service and possible loss of system
IC 1. Design Ventilation and Fire Protection Systems in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of ventilation system.
3. Provide procedures for safe and prompt evacuation and safe train operations during hazard.
4. Develop emergency drill program that tests emergency procedures.
5. Include regular debris removal as part of preventive maintenance program.
ID 1. Design Ventilation and Fire Protection
Systems in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Tunnel design in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
3. Provide procedures for emergency evacuation
4. Provide procedures for emergency operations
5. Provide cross passages at maximum 800 ft. intervals.
6. Provide safety walkway leading to a point-of-safety
7. Perform emergency evacuation drills. 8. Develop emergency Preparedness Plan. 9. Include regular debris removal as part of
preventive maintenance program.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
GWY-02
Fire/Smoke in Tunnel Coverboard or wayside equipment fire. Trig: Ignition from spark or fire on the vehicle.
Facility damage and potential patron/employee injury
IC 1. Use low flame spread and smoke material for wayside equipment and facilities.
2. Provide wet standpipe system for fire department use.
3. Provide ventilation system designed in accordance with MRDC Section 8 to control “smoke”.
ID 1. Design tunnel in accordance with Metro
Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 2. Provide wet standpipe system for fire
department use. 3. Design emergency ventilation system per
Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 4. Use low flame spread and smoke
material for wayside equipment and facilities.
1. 1. GWY-03
Fire/Smoke in Tunnel Undercar equipment fire Trig: Electrical short circuit
Facility damage and potential patron/employee injury
IC 1. Provide safety walkway leading to a point-of-safety
2. Provide emergency ventilation.
ID 1. Design tunnel in accordance with Metro
Fire/Life Safety criteria. 2. Provide safety walkway leading to a
point-of-safety 3. Provide emergency ventilation system 4. Develop inspection & maintenance
procedures 5. Develop procedures for emergency
evacuation.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
GWY-04
Intrusion of Toxic or Flammable Gases
HAZMAT gas accident near station entrance or air ducts. Hydrogen gas or other hazardous gases released from battery storage or similar ancillary rooms. Natural gas intrusion. (CH4 and H2S – Methane and Hydrogen Sulfide)
Loss of life or severe injuries due to explosion, contaminated air, fire or smoke
IC 1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria
2. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of ventilation system
3. Provide procedures for safe and prompt evacuation and safe train operations during hazard
4. Provide a gas-monitoring system in compliance with MRDC 9.15 and NFPA 130.
IE 1. Design tunnel in accordance with Metro
Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 2. Provide emergency ventilation system. 3. Develop inspection & maintenance
procedures. 4. Develop procedures for emergency
evacuation and shut down of the system if gas equal or greater to lower explosive limit is present
5. Develop SOPs for ventilating subway to prevent build up of toxic and flammable gases frron equaling or exceeding lower explosive limits. The applicable FLSS criteria are found in Section 3.5
6. Establish training program for Operations and Controllers.
7. Perform emergency evacuation drills. 8. Design for CO detection in gas detection
system 9. Provide for system to measure C02
concentration including alarms for excessive C02.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
Trig: Malfunction/ failure of emergency ventilation fans Short circuit/spark in tunnel
GWY-05
Intrusion of Flammable/ Combustible Liquids
HAZMAT liquid spill or leakage from service stations, storage tanks or pipes near system.
Trig: Spark from passing train Electrical short circuit in tunnel. Inadequate
Loss of life or severe injuries due to explosion, fire and smoke.
IC 1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Build ventilation shafts and other air intakes street or sidewalk level in accordance with MRDC 8.17
3. Provide adequate drainage away from tunnel.
4. Conduct periodic inspection and maintenance of
IE 1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety
Criteria. 2. Provide adequate drainage away from
tunnel. 3. Conduct periodic inspection and
maintenance of drainage system. 4. Establish procedure for prompt and safe
evacuation and safe train operation during hazard.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
drainage. drainage system. 5. Establish procedure
for prompt and safe evacuation and safe train operation during hazard.
GWY-06
Unauthorized Intruder Absence of proper barriers, signage, and alarms prohibiting unauthorized tunnel intrusion. Trig:
Approaching train
Loss of life or severe injuries to intruder hit by train Electrocution by third rail.
IC 1. Install automatic closing gates at ends of platforms
2. Provide proper signage on gates prohibiting unauthorized access
3. Provide gate alarm, warning Operations Control Center of intrusion
4. Provide CCTV coverage of Platform end gates.
ID 1. Provide automatic closing gates at ends
of platforms 2. Provide proper signage on gates
prohibiting unauthorized access 3. Provide gate alarm, warning
Operations Control Center of intrusion 4. Provide CCTV coverage of Platform end
gates.
GWY-07
Structural Deficiencies Design/ engineering
Tunnel walls collapse on
1C 1. Conform to applicable
ID 1. Follow applicable structural codes
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
deficiency Poor construction Quality control /low quality materials Improper Maintenance and inspection procedures. Trig: Sizeable earthquake affecting tunnel area in question Vibration from trains
train and crush passengers to death Passengers panic during evacuation from train obstructed by collapsed tunnel and incur injuries when falling, tripping, and trampling one another.
structural codes and Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
2. Conduct periodic safety/quality assurance inspections during construction.
3. Conduct periodic inspection of tunnel wall integrity after revenue start-up.
4. Perform emergency evacuation drills.
and Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria. 2. Perform periodic safety/quality
assurance inspections during construction.
3. Perform periodic inspection of tunnel wall integrity after revenue start-up.
4. Conduct emergency evacuation drills.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
GWY-08
Poor Tunnel Lighting Inadequate design of tunnel lighting arrangement. Bulbs burn out and not replaced fast enough Power failure.
Trig: ---- Workman in tunnel; emergency evacuation from a train in tunnel.
Injuries to individuals slipping, falling or tripping while working in tunnel or during evacuation from train through the tunnel.
IC 1. Install adequate tunnel lighting in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria & NFPA 130
2. Conduct periodic light and tunnel inspections
3. Provide tunnel lighting on redundant circuits connected to the emergency power supply.
IE 1. Provide adequate tunnel lighting in
accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
2. Perform periodic light and tunnel inspections
3. Design tunnel lighting on redundant circuits connected to the emergency power supply.
GWY-09
Structural Track Deficiency or Excessive Deterioration
Track design or installation deficiency
Inadequate inspection and
Severe injuries or deaths due to train derailment.
IC
1. Ensure proper design, installation and inspection of tracks prior to revenue service
2. Conduct periodic inspection and
IE 1. Use proper design, installation and
perform inspection of tracks prior to revenue service
2. Perform periodic inspection and repair of track.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
maintenance.
Metal Fatigue.
Trig: Trains passing over deficient area.
repair of track.
GWY-10
Workmen on Tracks during operating hours
Repair / maintenance tasks.
Trig: On-coming trains.
Loss of life or severe injuries due to train hitting individual Loss of life or severe injuries due to third rail shock.
IC 1. Provide restrictive train operating rules when workmen are on tracks and work rules for workmen. (Roadway Worker Protection rules)
2. Use protective coverings for third rail conforming to applicable Fire/Life safety criteria.
3. Provide adequate
IE 1. Establish restrictive train operating
rules when workmen are on tracks and work rules for workmen.
2. Provide protective coverings for third rail conforming to applicable Fire/Life safety criteria.
3. Design adequate walkway for workmen 4. Establish procedures for de-energizing
third rail when workmen are in tunnel
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
walkway for workmen
4. Provide procedures for de-energizing third rail when workmen are in tunnel
GWY-11
Collision with structures at end of the line.
Train control failure/fail to follow rules Trig: Vehicle fails to stop before end of line
Potential derailment, revenue vehicle damage and major injury or fatality
IC 1. Verify the integrity/fail-safe design of train control system
2. Allow safe braking distance.
3. Provide bumping posts at end line.
IE 1. Provide the integrity/fail-safe design of
train control system 2. Design safe braking distance into the
signaling system. 3. Use bumping posts at end line.
GWY-12
Inadequate walkway clearances.
Equipment/structure intrusion into walkway envelope Trig: Train strikes object within the clearance
Potential serious injuries or fatality
IC 1. Provide clearances in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Confirm clearance envelope by testing prior to operational service.
IE 1. Design clearances in accordance with
Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria. 2. Inspect clearance envelope prior to
operational service.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
envelop. GWY-13
Train derailed or hit by damaged tunnel structure.
Uncontrolled filling or excavation above running tunnels with structural damage to tunnel lining. Trig: Failure to obtain permit.
Potential major revenue vehicle damage. Potential major injuries or fatality
IC 1. Implement appropriate restrictions in subsurface easement agreements, monitored and controlled through city of jurisdiction planning process.
IE 1. Provide appropriate restrictions in
subsurface easement agreements, monitored and controlled through city of jurisdiction planning process.
GWY-14
Train derailed or hit by damaged tunnel structure.
Falling structural elements Trig: Earthquake
Potential major revenue vehicle damage. Potential major injuries or fatality. Serious structural damage.
IC 1. Design to CBC seismic requirements
2. Establish procedure to inspect tunnel structure after sizable earthquake before resuming revenue service.
ID 1. Design tunnels per Metro Design Criteria
Seismic requirements. 2. Establish procedure to inspect tunnel
structure after sizable earthquake before resuming revenue service.
GWY-15
Access/egress by employees or emergency forces
Flow paths obstructed.
Hazards relating to path itself could produce
IC 1. Provide emergency access points that are unobstructed,
IE 1. Ensure that emergency access is
unobstructed, adequately lighted and
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
hazardous, difficult and/or slow due to problems in flow path
Flow paths hazardous in themselves (e.g., rough, dark, steep, slippery). Flow paths too restricted for intended use. . Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
falls and minor injuries. Delay in access of emergency forces could escalate the effects of a prior accident or incident in an emergency response situation.
adequately lighted and meets Metro design criteria for entrances and walkways.
meets Metro design criteria for entrances and walkways.
GWY-16
Collision between HRV and foreign objects on the track
Maintenance tools/equipment left on trackway Trig: Tunnel maintenance
Multiple deaths or serious injuries to passengers. Major damage to trains or tracks. Major damage to HRV's, possibly
IC 1. Metro Maintenance Plan and training should reinforce importance of maintainers retrieving all support equipment used at the affected site.
2. Establish procedure
ID 1. Provide a Metro Maintenance Plan and
training to reinforce importance of maintainers retrieving all support equipment used at the affected site.
2. Establish procedure to inspect right-of-way before resuming revenue service.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
total loss. to inspect right-of-way before resuming revenue service.
GWY-17
Egress path to surface is beyond physical ability of most patrons
Inability of patrons to reach a point of safety. Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
Loss of life or injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke.
IC 1. Provide safety refuge for patrons (such as Crosspassages to opposite tunnel).
2. Establish and rehearse station evacuation procedure.
IE 1. Design safety refuge for patrons (such as
Crosspassages to opposite tunnel). 2. Design elevator shafts such that it may be
used as a means of egress. 3. Provide procedures and rehearse station
evacuation plans.
GWY-18
Employees, emergency responders, or passengers lost in tunnel during evacuation
Improper signage of crosspassages and in tunnel Lack of emergency information at Blue Light Station Trig:
Loss of life or serious injuries to Metro employees, passengers, or emergency responders.
IC 1. Provide exit path signs.
2. Follow evacuation information as indicated in the Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
3. Provide crosspassages signs consistent with blue
IE 1. Provide exit path signs in accordance
with the fire/Life Safety Criteria. 2. Post evacuation information per Fire/Life
Safety Criteria. 3. Post crosspassages signs consistent with
blue light station. 4. Provide assistance for passengers who
are not able to self evacuate.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
light station.
GWY-19
Employees, emergency responders, or passengers lost in tunnel during evacuation
No light due to tunnel light failure Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
Loss of life or serious injuries to Metro employees, passengers, or emergency responders.
IC 1. Place alternating tunnel lights on separate circuits.
2. Provide lighting circuits with emergency power supply
IE 1. Design tunnel lighting so that alternating
tunnel lights on separate circuits. 2. Connect the tunnel lights to the
emergency power supply.
GWY-20
Employees, emergency responders, or passengers lost in tunnel during evacuation
Excessive smoke obscuring vision due to emergency ventilation fan failure Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in
Loss of life or serious injuries to Metro employees, passengers, or emergency responders.
IC 1. Perform periodic inspection and maintenance of tunnel emergency ventilation system in accordance with established maintenance plans.
2. Design emergency ventilation system in compliance with
IE 1. Conduct periodic inspection and
maintenance of tunnel emergency ventilation system in accordance with established maintenance plans.
2. Design emergency ventilation system in compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130.
3. Design emergency ventilation system taking into consideration of a fan failure.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
tunnel) MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130
3. Design emergency ventilation system taking into consideration of a fan failure.
GWY-21
Emergency Ventilation System cannot control the flow of heat and smoke
Air intake/exhaust blockage Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
Inability to effectively disburse heat or smoke resulting in serious injuries to patrons, Metro personnel or emergency response personnel.
IC 1. Design emergency ventilation system in compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130
2. Ensure emergency operating procedures and fan ventilation regimen matrices address full range of emergency scenarios.
3. Emergency Operating Procedures should reflect alternate
IE 1. Design emergency ventilation system in
compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130.
2. Create emergency operating procedures and fan ventilation regimen matrices that address full range of emergency scenarios.
3. Develop a matrix configuration that reflects alternate means of treating emergencies effectively.
4. Train Metro staff to examine alternatives through table-top drills.
5. Provide maintenance procedures to remove debris from intake and exhaust
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
means of treating emergencies effectively.
4. Train Metro staff to examine alternatives through table-top drills.
openings.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
GWY-22
Emergency Ventilation System cannot control the flow of heat and smoke
Fire intensity of HRV Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
Inability to effectively disburse heat or smoke resulting in serious injuries to patrons, Metro personnel or emergency response personnel.
IC 1. Design emergency ventilation system in compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130
2. Ensure emergency operating procedures and fan ventilation regimen matrices address full range of emergency scenarios.
3. Matrix configuration should reflect alternate means of treating emergencies effectively
4. Train Metro staff to examine alternatives through table-top drills.
IE 1. Design emergency ventilation system in
compliance with MRDC, FLSSC, and NFPA 130.
2. Develop emergency operating procedures and fan ventilation regimen matrices that address a full range of emergency scenarios.
3. Provide a matrix configuration that reflects alternate means for treating emergencies effectively
4. Provide training to Metro staff to examine alternatives through table-top drills.
5. "Develop maintenance procedures for inspection and removal of debris from ventilation exhaust and intake shafts and openings."
GW Excessive tunnel Improper design Serious injury to IC 1. Provide a IE
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
Y-23 ventilation system air velocity
of ventilation system. Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel.
ventilation system per Metro Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements so that excessive velocities are not produced.
1. Design ventilation system per Metro Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements so that excessive velocities are not produced.
GWY-24
Fire in tunnel
Arson Trig: Unauthorized entry into the tunnel
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons, Metro, and emergency response personnel, exposed to fire and smoke. Major facility equipment damage.
IC 1. Construct tunnel in accordance with Metro Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements.
2. Restrict access to tunnel from station platforms by providing alarmed gates at the end of platforms,
3. Provide CCTV
IE 1. Design and construct the tunnel in
accordance with Metro Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements.
2. Provide restricted access to tunnel from station platforms by providing alarmed gates at the end of platforms,
3. Design for CCTV coverage of entrance to tunnel from the station platform.
4. Establish procedures for tunnel evacuation between Metro and outside agencies.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
coverage of entrance to tunnel from the station platform.
4. Provide procedures for tunnel evacuation between Metro and outside agencies.
5. Provide emergency procedures training for Metro and outside agency personnel.
6. Provide emergency ventilation system in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 to exhaust heat and smoke.
7. Provide standpipes on the guideway
5. Develop emergency procedures training for Metro and outside agency personnel.
6. Design the emergency ventilation system in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 to exhaust heat and smoke.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
GWY-25
Incorrect sequencing of emergency ventilation fans resulting in improper ventilation of fire/smoke area
Control manually, attempting to select proper sequencing of emergency ventilation fans Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
Loss of life or severe injury to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel due to exposure to heat or smoke.
IC 1. Provide pre-defined emergency ventilation modes.
IE 1. Establish pre-defined emergency
ventilation modes. 2. Design controls of the Emergency
Ventilation System that is coded into the SCADA system. Emergency fan configurations consistent with fire location and evacuation direction which can be implement remotely at ROC or locally at the Emergency Management Panel of each station.
3. Expand Metro’s EVOP Manual to include Westside Extension
GWY-26
Inoperative emergency ventilation system
Power failure Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel.
IC 1. Provide redundant power supplies from two separate sources of primary power in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements.
IE 1. Design a redundant power supply from
two separate sources of primary power in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 requirements.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
GWY-27
Inoperative emergency ventilation system
Improper maintenance of ventilation system Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel.
IC
1. Perform periodic inspection and maintenance in accordance with Metro Maintenance Plan and Manufacturer’s recommendations.
ID 1. Conduct periodic inspections and
preventive maintenance in accordance with Metro Maintenance Plan and Manufacturer’s recommendations.
GWY-28
Patron/employee fall on walkway in tunnel and crosspassages
Obstruction on walkway or in crosspassages.
Poor walking surface.
Handrail not provided.
Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in
Minor to serious injury to patron or employee.
IIC
1. Perform periodic inspections in accordance with established maintenance procedures, to ensure walkways/crosspassages are unobstructed.
2. Provide slip-resistant surface on the walkway.
3. Provide handrail
IIE 1. Conduct periodic inspections in
accordance with established maintenance procedures, to ensure walkways/crosspassages are unobstructed.
2. Design slip-resistant surface on the walkway.
3. Provide a handrail along walkway.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
tunnel) along walkway.
GWY-29
Standpipe system inoperative or not activated
Damaged during emergency in tunnel
Corrosion of pipe due to stray currents.
Inadequate water supply.
Improper maintenance
Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in tunnel)
Unable to suppress fire.
ID 1. Provide alternate means to supply water to affected area(s).
2. Provide corrosion protection.
3. Hydraulically design for adequate water supply.
4. Provide inspection, testing and repair of standpipe in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations and NFPA 14 requirements.
IE 1. Feed standpipe from adjoining stations. 2. Cross-connect standpipe through
crosspassages. 3. Fire hoses can be brought into the
effected tunnel from the opposite tunnel through crosspassages.
4. Specify corrosion protection for the standpipe system.
5. Provide hydrostatic calculations for the standpipe system.
6. Specify that inspection, testing and repair of the standpipe be in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations and NFPA 14 requirements.
GWY-30
Vandalism of critical tunnel safety systems
Unauthorized entry in ancillary
Damage to critical tunnel
IC 1. Install intrusion detection devices.
IE 1. Specify intrusion detection and “No
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
rooms - electrical, signals, communications, elevator and fan rooms Trig: Tresspassing
safety systems.
2. Provide signage prohibiting unauthorized access.
3. Provide CCTV coverage of portal areas and platform ends.
Trespassing/Authorized Personnel Only” signs at tunnel entry points.
2. Design CCTV coverage in the stations to cover the entry to the tunnels.
GWY-31
Water standing in tunnel
Inadequate drainage system design
Improper maintenance of drainage system.
Sump pump malfunction
Trig: Heavy rain or broken water main. Standpipe failure.
Damage to HRV undercar equipment. HRV stalled in tunnel.
IIC 1. Provide sump with failure alarm or gradient to prevent water accumulation.
2. Provide adequate drainage capacity.
3. Conduct periodic maintenance of drainage system.
4. Provide inspection and preventive maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
IIE 1. Specify sump pumps with high water
alarms 2. Design a second pump in case the first
pump is not able to control rising water. 3. Install sump pump at the low points of
the tunnels. 4. Develop periodic maintenance
procedures for the drainage system. 5. Perform inspection and preventive
maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
SYSTEM: Guideway
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 02-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: G. Ahmed DATE: 05-03-2012
APPROVED BY:________ DATE:___
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk Index
Damaged in Accident.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Appendix C - PHA Communications
W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page C-1 May 11, 2012
APPENDIX C PHA COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: CCTV
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-01
Failure/Malfunction of Data Transmission Equipment to Transmit Emergency Alarms
Design deficiency Component failure. Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in station)
Loss of life or injuries to patrons subject to the emergency situation because of the inability of Metro personnel to respond.
IC 1. Comply with applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria
2. Conduct proper inspection and maintenance of datatransmission system
3. Provide alternate or back-up data transmission system.
IE 1. Specify and install
communications equipment according to Metro Rail Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Perform inspection and preventive maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
3. Provide redundant equipment and transmission pathways.
COM-02
Breached network security
Hacking Trig: Unauthorized access to Data Transmission System
Compromise of communications and fire management equipment
IIC 1. Maintain access control containing station network devices and network ports
2. Implement password protection
IID 1. Specify access control
for the station network, devices and network points.
2. Use firewalls and controlled access
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: CCTV
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
for all users access to network devices
3. Monitor network configurations and device traffic.
4. Set alarms for unauthorized changes to network configuration or abnormal traffic.
measures to ensure secure of network.
3. Monitor access to Network
4. Provide alarms for unauthorized changes to network configuration or abnormal traffic.
COM-03
Data Transmission system equipment degradation
Improper /inadequate maintenance resulting from maintainer carelessness, lack of proper training, poor working conditions,
Can vary from loss of performance to the generation of unsafe operating conditions. May also result in situations hazardous to maintainers.
IIIC 1. The Metro system maintenance program, provisioning and personnel should be adequate for the purpose intended.
2. Provide training and
certification for critical elements.
IIID 1. Develop the Metro
system maintenance program, provisioning and staffing plans adequate for the purpose intended.
2. Develop training and certification programs for critical elements.
3. Conduct regular performance reviews
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: CCTV
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
inadequate tools and test equipment, lack of spare parts.
Maintenance not in accord with manufacturers’ recommendations.
Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
3. Provide regular performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.
4. Provide periodic
inspection.
and support documentation revisions as necessary.
4. Conduct periodic inspection
COM-04
CCTV Equipment degradation
Improper/inadequate maintenance resulting from maintainer
Can vary from loss of performance to the generation of unsafe operating conditions. May
IIIC 1. The Metro system maintenance program, provisioning and personnel should be adequate for the
IIID 1. Develop the Metro
system maintenance program, and staffing levels for the purpose intended.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: CCTV
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
carelessness, lack of proper training, poor working conditions, inadequate tools and test equipment, lack of spare parts.
Maintenance not in accord with manufacturers’ recommendations.
Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
also result in situations hazardous to maintainers.
purpose intended. 2. Provide training and
certification for critical elements.
3. Provide regular performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.
4. Provide periodic inspection.
2. Develop training and certification programs for critical elements.
3. Conduct regular
performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.
4. Conduct periodic inspection.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: CCTV
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-05
Loss of public address capability for areas in the vicinity of escalators and stairs
Failure of public address equipment (microphone, amplifiers, loudspeakers, or interconnecting cables). Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
Unable to direct patrons during crowded conditions, possibility resulting in delays and/or injury.
Overcrowdin
g of escalator causes patrons to become confused, angry, or to panic,
IIC 1. Design should include equipment that has a high reliability performance record.
2. Provide alternate or redundant equipment and cable transmission channels.
3. Provide workarounds where necessary.
IIE 1. Specify highly
reliable equipment. 2. Specify redundant
equipment and pathways.
3. P.A. will serve as a back-up for VMS and VMS as a back-up for P.A.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
possibly resulting in injuries.
Unable to
advise patrons about planned stop of escalator, abrupt stop results in injuries due to falls.
COM-06
Inaudible/unintelligible announcements at station
Loss of PA system due to component failure Trig:
Patrons unable to be notified of safety warnings.
IIC 1. Monitor P.A. announcements quality.
2. Capability of sending out text messages
IIE 1. Install and test P.A.
according to Metro Design Criteria.
2. Include VMS
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
Emergency situation(e.g., station fire, assaults)
via Destination Signs.
3. Repair/replace defective equipment.
messaging in addition to P.A. announcements.
3. Monitor P.A. announcements quality during normal operations.
4. Maintenance procedures to repair/replace defective equipment.
COM-07
Loss of PA system announcements at station
Loss of PA system due to component failure Trig: Emergency situation(e.g.,
Patrons unable to be notified of safety warnings
Inability to convey
IIC 1. Periodic testing of PA system
2. Maintenance Procedures for loss of PA system.
3. Provide redundancy design of PA system.
IIE 1. Monitor PA
announcements quality during normal operations.
2. Supervise equipment and communication
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
station fire, assaults)
instructions to patrons during emergency situation at station
4. Provide mega phone for broadcasting
5. Maintenance procedures to repair/replace defective equipment.
network. 3. Specify redundant
equipment. 4. Implement procedures
implemented to use mega phone as a back-up.
5. Develop maintenance procedures to repair/replace defective equipment.
COM-08
P.A./VMS Equipment degradation
Improper/inadequate maintenance resulting from maintainer carelessness, lack of
Can vary from loss of performance to the generation of unsafe operating conditions. May also result in situations
IIIC 1. The Metro system maintenance program, provisioning and personnel should be adequate for the purpose intended.
IIID 1. Develop the Metro
system maintenance program, and staffing levels for the purpose intended.
2. Develop training and certification programs
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
proper training, poor working conditions, inadequate tools and test equipment, lack of spare parts.
Maintenance not in accord with manufacturers recommendations.
Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
hazardous to maintainers.
2. Provide training and certification for critical elements.
3. Provide regular
performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.
4. Conduct periodic
inspection.
for critical elements. 3. Implement regular
performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.
4. Implement periodic inspections.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-09
Loss of public address capability for areas in the vicinity of escalators and stairs
Interruption of electric power. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
Overcrowding of escalator causes patrons to become confused, angry, or to panic, possibly resulting Unable to advise patrons about planned stop of escalator, abrupt stop results in injuries due to falls.
IIC 1. Provide emergency power with automatic changeover.
IIE 1. Connect PA/VMS
system to UPS.
COM-10
Loss of public address capability for areas in the vicinity of escalators and stairs
Equipment damage resulting from fire, water, corrosive liquids
Overcrowding of escalator causes patrons to
IID 1. Provide adequate equipment protection and alternate equipment
IIE 1. Specify adequate
protection from fire and water damage and
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
or gases, etc. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
become confused, angry, or to panic, possibly resulting in injuries.
Unable to
advise patrons about planned stop of escalator, abrupt stop results in injuries due to falls.
when feasible. 2. Provide workaround
when necessary.
corrosive liquids or gases into the system.
2. Provide redundancy into the system.
3. Specify highly reliable equipment.
4. PA will serve as a back-up for VMS and VMS as a back-up for PA.
COM- Loss of public address Temporary or Overcrowdin IID 1. Provide noise IIE
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
11 capability for areas in the vicinity of escalators and stairs
permanent changes in environmental noise (e.g. street/station noise design) affects acoustics in audio attenuation, garbling, etc. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
g of escalator causes patrons to become confused, angry, or to panic, possibly resulting in injuries.
Unable to
advise patrons about planned stop of escalator, abrupt stop results in injuries due
operated level amplifiers.
2. Modify and/or adjust public address system as necessary to restore effectiveness.
1. Specify noise operated levels for amplifiers.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Transit Passenger Information system (PA/VMS)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
to falls.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Radio
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-12
Train contacts radio cable hanging in dynamic envelope
RF Communication cable fell due to mounting bracket failure. Trig: Cable or cable bracket comes in contact with HRV or maintenance equipment.
Potential revenue vehicle damage and/or injury to operator in train cab.
IID 1. Cable mounting location to be out of area of equipment to prevent inadvertent contact/damage.
2. Provide supports at conservative spacing to limit effect of loss of single support and/or cable breakage.
3. Provide mounting supports that are of adequate strength to support inadvertent loads.
IIE 1. Provide a cable
mounting location that is remote from equipment to prevent inadvertent contact/damage.
2. Specify supports at conservative spacing to limit effect of loss of single support and/or cable breakage.
3. Specify mounting supports that are of adequate strength to support inadvertent loads.
COM-13
Loss of underground radio communications with Central Control
Failure of radio system components Trig:
Failure to communicate during an emergency
IIIC 1. Provide preventive maintenance with test procedures for underground radio
IIIE 1. Develop preventive
maintenance with test procedures for
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Radio
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
equipment. 2. Provide redundancy
in system design. 3. Procedures to use
Emergency Telephones as a back-up.
4. Provide back-up channel.
underground radio equipment.
2. Specify redundancy in system design
3. Develop procedures that use Emergency Telephones as a back-up to the radio system.
4. Make available back-up channels
COM-14
Radio failure during emergency situation
Line amplifier(s) malfunction. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
Loss of communications in tunnel.
IIC
1. Provide dedicated amplifiers for each radio communication channel.
IIE 1. Specify dedicated
amplifiers for each radio communication channel.
COM-15
Radio communications equipment produces EMI
Electrical equipment such as motors, power supplies,
Loss of radio communications between OCC, field locations
IIC
1. Provide system equipment to preclude EMI interference.
IIE 1. Specify inspection and
preventive maintenance according
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Radio
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
switching devices and controllers in equipment within the Metro system. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
and roving personnel, inhibits response to abnormal and emergency conditions, possibly aggravating the severity of the hazard by increasing the exposure time.
2. Develop specific maintenance procedures.
to Manufacturer’s recommendations to test for EMI.
2. Shield radio equipment from external interference.
COM-16
Radio Equipment degradation
Improper/inadequate maintenance resulting from maintainer carelessness, lack of proper training, poor working
Can vary from loss of performance to the generation of unsafe operating conditions. May also result in situations hazardous to
IIC
1. The METRO system maintenance program, provisioning and personnel should be adequate for the purpose intended.
2. Provide training and certification for
IID 1. Develop the Metro
system maintenance program, and staffing levels for the purpose intended.
2. Develop inspection and preventive maintenance
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Radio
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
conditions, inadequate tools and test equipment, lack of spare parts. Maintenance not in accord with manufacturers recommendations. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
maintainers.
critical elements. 3. Provide regular
performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.
procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
3. Develop training and certification programs for critical elements.
4. Conduct regular performance reviews and support documentation revisions as necessary.
COM-17
Loss of maintenance radio communications service
Failure of equipment part(s) in base station
Maintenance personnel unable to report in realtime the location of maintainers and/or
IIC 1. Provide redundant critical base station equipment.
2. Effective routine maintenance program with a combination of
IIE 1. Specify and install
redundant critical base station equipment.
2. Establish an effective routine maintenance program with a
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Radio
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
equipment on guideway possibly resulting in injury or equipment damage.
telephone/radio dispatching for quick response of repair crews to unexpected failures could minimize risk.
3. Augment maintenance radio service with maintenance telephone system.
combination of telephone/radio dispatching for quick response of repair crews to unexpected failures to minimize the risk.
3. Augment maintenance radio service with maintenance telephone system.
COM-18
Loss of maintenance radio communications service
Interference from sources external to Metro (e.g., transmitters, induction heaters, etc.)
Interference from sources
Maintenance personnel unable to report in real-time the location of maintainers and/or equipment on guideway possibly resulting
IIC 1. Provide proper design of radio equipment and circuits, with suitable filters should minimize interference.
2. Utilize RFI suppressors on
IIE 1. Specify suitable filters to
eliminate possible interference into the system.
2. Utilize RFI suppressors on offending equipment.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Radio
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
within the Metro system (e.g., electric motors, power supplies, switching devices, circuit controllers, etc.)
in injury or equipment damage
offending equipment.
1SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Telephone
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-19
Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations
Inoperative equipment resulting from part failure. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an emergency
Potential that patrons /personnel unable to report problems /emergencies /assault to Central Control.
IIC 1. May be minimized by proper routine maintenance including scheduled checks.
2. Use procedure for responding rapidly to unexpected failures.
IID 1. Develop inspection and
preventive maintenance procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
2. Establish procedure for responding rapidly to unexpected failures.
COM-20
Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations
Open circuit in cable resulting from mechanical damage, fire, corrosion, etc. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an emergency.
Potential that patrons/personnel unable to report problems/emergencies /assault to Central Control.
IIC 1. Provide proper system design and careful attention to cable installation could minimize risk of failure.
IIE 1. Install system per
manufacturer’s recommendations.
2. Supervise emergency telephone circuits.
1SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Telephone
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-21
Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations
Short circuit in cable resulting from entrance of water or other conducting material. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an emergency.
Potential that patrons/personnel unable to report problems/emergencies /assault to Central Control.
IIC 1. Locate and installation of cable to prevent entrance of water or other foreign substances could minimize risk.
IIE 1. Specify sealed conduit
to prevent water or other substances from coming in contact with conductor.
2. Supervise emergency telephone circuits for short circuits and ground faults
COM-22
Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations
Damaged equipment resulting from vandalism. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an
Potential that patrons/personnel unable to report problems/emergencies /assault to Central Control.
IIC 1. Provide equipment to be tamper-proof and sturdy under general and rough use.
IIE 1. Design equipment
tamper proof equipment that is able to withstand rough use.
2. Supervise emergency telephone circuits.
1SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Telephone
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
emergency
1SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Telephone
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-23
Loss of emergency telephone service in passenger stations.
Loss of emergency telephone service due to power interruption, component failure, etc. Trig: Patron needs to contact ROC in an emergency
Potential that patrons /personnel unable to report problems /emergencies /assault to ROC.
IIC 1. Provide periodic testing and self-monitoring of emergency telephones.
2. Provide maintenance procedures for loss of emergency telephone.
3. Provide procedures to use radio as back-up.
4. Provide separate circuits to isolate common mode failure.
5. Provide backup power for emergency telephone system.
IIE 1. Develop inspection and
preventive maintenance procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
2. Develop procedures to use radio as back-up.
3. Separate circuits to isolate common mode failure.
4. Specify backup power for emergency telephone system.
5. Supervise emergency telephone circuits.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: SCADA
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-24
Loss of SCADA system I/O communications
Loss of SCADA system I/O communications due to component failure, etc. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
Potential that system control /indications or alarm conditions are not reported.
IIC 1. Provide periodic testing of SCADA system.
2. Provide maintenance and operating procedures for loss of SCADA components.
3. Provide backups via modems.
4. Provide self testing/monitoring and alarm status.
5. Provide redundancy communication means.
IIE 1. Supervise the SCADA
system equipment and pathway in accordance with NFPA 72.
2. Develop inspection and preventive maintenance procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
3. Establish operating procedures to recover from loss of SCADA, such as a fire watch at the stations.
4. Specify redundancy in SCADA System.
COM-25
Loss of monitoring capability of the SCADA system at ROC
Open circuit in interconnecting cable due to mechanical breakage,
Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a
IC
1. Provide remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to
IE 1. Supervise the SCADA
system equipment and pathway in accordance with NFPA 72.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: SCADA
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
defective connection, etc. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
timely manner may result in severe equipment damage, serious injuries and fatalities.
report problems to ROC upon failure.
2. Provide protection from mechanical damage.
2. Specify SCADA equipment that is not susceptible mechanical damage.
3. Specify redundancy in SCADA System.
COM-26
Loss of monitoring capability of the SCADA system at OCC
Short circuit in interconnecting cable due to entrance of water or other conductive material. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a timely manner may result in severe equipment damage, serious injuries and fatalities.
ID
1. Remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to report problems to central control upon failure.
2. Provide protection from entrance of foreign conductive materials.
IE 1. Supervise the
SCADA system equipment and pathway in accordance with NFPA 72.
2. Shield SCADA equipment from foreign or conductive materials.
3. Provide redundancy in
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: SCADA
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
SCADA System. COM-27
Loss of the control capability of the supervisory and control system (i.e. loss of ability to control equipment in the field)
Accidental damage to control components during the performance of maintenance activities. Trig: Emergency situation(e.g., station fire)
Unable to remove power under abnormal and emergency conditions increases risk exposure resulting in possible fatality.
IC
1. Protective enclosures could minimize risk.
2. Provide hardware with exceptional reliability record and with built-in component redundancy.
3. Employ techniques of software checked redundancy, redundant data bits, cyclic data transmission detection and correction and self-diagnostic checks.
4. Provide for automatic switchover to
IE 1. Specify protective
enclosures in locations that are subject to mechanical damage.
2. Specify high reliability equipment.
3. Specify redundant equipment and pathways with automatic switchover.
4. Ensure design complies with Metro Design Criteria.
5. Develop maintenance training and certification programs for critical elements.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: SCADA
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
redundant function, where provided.
5. Verify proper design and develop alternate local controls providing safety features.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-28
Loss of monitoring capability of the supervisory and control system at OCC
Accidental damage to sensors by maintenance personnel performing normal maintenance activities.
Defective sensor (fire, smoke, temperature, voltage, intrusion)
Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in station)
Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a timely manner may result in severe equipment damage, serious injuries and fatalities.
IC 1. Remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to report problems to central control upon failure.
2. Provide protection against accidental damage during the performance of routine maintenance.
IE 1. Design such that the
local premises equipment will be in constant contact with the equipment at ROC generating an alarm on any loss of “handshake”.
2. Specify addressable remote sensors
3. Specify that equipment that is in locations with a potential for mechanical damage be protected from damage.
4. Develop maintenance training and certification programs for critical elements.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-29
Loss of monitoring capability of the supervisory and control system at ROC
Compromise of sensors by intruders or vandals. Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in station)
Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a timely manner may result in severe equipment damage, serious injuries and fatalities.
ID 1. Remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to report problems to ROC upon failure.
2. Provide intrusion sensors to prevent access by unauthorized persons.
IE 1. Specify addressable
remote sensors. 2. Specify intrusion
detection to detect unauthorized entry into the non-public areas.
3. Locate detectors in the public areas so that they are out of reach from vandals.
COM-30
Loss of monitoring capability of the supervisory and control system at ROC
Hardware or software fault condition in CTS, SCADA or ROC data processing equipment Trig:
Emergency
Failure to detect and annunciate potentially unsafe conditions in the field in a timely manner may result in severe equipment
IC 1. Remote sensor system should be supervised and have the capability to report problems to ROC upon failure.
2. Provide reliable supervised equipment with
IE 1. Specify addressable
remote sensors. 2. Specify highly reliable
equipment. 3. Specify redundant
equipment and software.
4. Specify automatic
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
situation (e.g., fire in station)
damage, serious injuries and fatalities.
built-in redundancy. 3. Employ techniques
of software checked redundancy, redundant data bits, cyclic data transmission error detection and correction and self-diagnostic checks.
4. Provide for automatic switchover to redundant functions.
switchover when failure occurs
COM-31
Erroneous indications on status display devices
Malfunction in status display.
Hardware
malfunction misroutes
Third rail power line section erroneously energized or de-energized resulting
IC 1. Built-in diagnostics and scheduled check of integrity of status display device could minimize risk.
2. Fail operational, fail-safe design should
IE 1. Specify built in
diagnostics scheduled to check integrity of the status display.
2. Specify fail-safe design. 3. Develop inspection and
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
message. Trig:
Emergency situation
(e.g., fire in station)
from incorrect information provided.
Failure to report fire, smoke, over-temperature.
Failure to report fire, smoke, over-temperature.
minimize risk.
preventive maintenance procedures according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-32
Seismic switch fails to detect seismic event
Electrical or mechanical failure
Loss of seismic event mechanical switch Loss of alarm/event data
IVC 1. Provide redundant sensors
2. Provide adjacent detector installations.
3. Establish procedures for train operators to stop and precede at slow order until the damage can be accessed.
IVD 1. A significant event will
activate several sensors 2. A significant seismic
event will be self evident.
COM-33
Seismic switch provides a false indication or non-existing seismic event
Electrical or mechanical failure
ROC controllers receive false seismic indication and shut down the system.
IVC 1. Monitor frequency of false indications.
2. Repair faulty sensors.
IVD 1. Establish procedure for
controllers not to shut down the system without positive confirmation on a seismic event.
1. COM-34
Loss of 120 vac power to seismic detectors
Auxiliary power failure
Loss of alarm/event data
IVC 1. Connect seismic detectors and
IVE 1. Connect seismic
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
and recorders recorders to the emergency power system
detectors and recorders to UPS.
2. Specify design features to detect loss of power.
COM-35
Loss of power Failed or dead battery
Failure to detect seismic event
IVC 1. Provide notification to OCC of battery power failure
IVD 1. Indicate loss of battery
power at ROC. COM-36
Seismic relay open or closed
Electrical or mechanical failure
False indication (relay fails closed) No warning signal (relay fails open)
IVC 1. Provide regular maintenance checks.
IVD 1. Perform regular
maintenance on seismic equipment.
COM-37
Seismic relay open or closed
Electrical or mechanical failure
Internal faults identified through the self check function
IVC 1. Monitor external display during routine maintenance checks
IVD 1. Perform regular
maintenance on seismic equipment.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Seismic Interface
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-38
Seismic relay open or closed
Electrical or mechanical failure
Controllers notified of false loss of power (relay fails closed). Reduced battery charge (relay fails open).
IVC 1. Provide regular maintenance checks.
IVD 1. Perform regular
maintenance on seismic equipment.
COM-39
Cable malfunction Electrical wire failure
Specific functions lost. Errors and warning signals sent to ROC for significant function loss.
IVC 1. Check ribbon cable during periodic maintenance.
IVD 1. Perform regular
maintenance on seismic equipment.
SYSTEM: Communications
SUBSYSTEM: Gas Monitoring System
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
COM-40
Failure of Gas Detection System
Equipment malfunction Trig: Gas intrusion into tunnel, Ignition source
Explosion/ Fire IC 1. Supervise gas detection system for failures.
2. Develop procedures for inspection and preventive maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
3. Provide routine inspection and maintenance.
IE 1. Supervise gas detection
system for failures. 2. Develop procedures for
inspection and preventive maintenance according to Manufacturer’s recommendations.
3. Provide routine inspection and maintenance.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Appendix D - PHA Yard and Shops
W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page D-1 May 11, 2012
APPENDIX D PHA YARD AND SHOPS
SYSTEM: Yards & Shops
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
Y&S - 01
Fire/Smoke in Yard, Shops or Facilities.
Debris fire Train accident (yard only) Electrical fire Arson
Loss of life or severe injuries due to fire or smoke.
IC 1. Conform to applicable Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Conduct proper safe train movement procedures in yard and shop.
3. Provide emergency evacuation procedure.
4. Prevent debris accumulation in yard, shops, and facilities.
5. Prevent unauthorized intrusion.
IE 1. Design the yard and
shops according to the Metro Rail Design and Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
2. Up-date procedures for safe train movement throughout the yard and shop as necessary.
3. Update the Emergency Preparedness Plan.
4. Implement maintenance program to prevent the accumulation of debris.
5. Restrict access to yard and shop to authorized personnel only.
6. Establish procedure to provide security patrols during non-working hours.
Y&S Ineffective Operating Poor Loss of life or IC 1. Establish and ID
SYSTEM: Yards & Shops
SUBSYSTEM:
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
- 02 Procedures for Yard/Shop Train Movements
documentation of operating procedures. Inadequate procedural training Lack of compliance and enforcement.
severe injuries due to train/train collisions, derailments, trains impacting people, etc
document proper operating procedures for yard train movements.
2. Provide initial and periodic training on these procedures.
1. Revise Standard Operating Procedures to establish additional guidelines for the proper operation of trains within the expanded yard,
2. Revise procedures for entering the yard to cover the expanded facilities.
3. Strictly enforce operating procedures within the yard.
4. Update the training manual for expanded Y&S facilities.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Appendix E - PHA Traction Power
W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page E-1 May 11, 2012
APPENDIX E PHA TRACTION POWER
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Guideway
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
TPS - 01
Electric shock/electrocution from contact with energized components, collector shoes or third rail.
Personnel performing a rescue operation. Trig: Emergency requiring working on the guideway.
Major injury to personnel, including electrical shock, involuntary reaction, burns, or fatality.
IC 1. Personnel shall consider the collector shoes, third rail, or electrical apparatus of any type LIVE AT ALL TIMES unless proper safety measures have been taken and verified.
2. Establish procedures to deenergize contact rail and isolate current collector before performing any work.
3. Provide Blue Light Station with emergency trip device to de-
IE 1. Establish emergency
procedures specifying to consider the collector shoes, third rail, or electrical apparatus of any type LIVE AT ALL TIMES unless proper safety measures have been taken and verified.
2. Establish procedures to deenergize contact rail and isolate current collector before performing any work.
3. Provide Blue Light Station with emergency trip device to de-energize power.
4. Provide coverboards over the contact rail.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Guideway
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
energize power.
4. Provide coverboards over the contact rail.
5. Locate contact rail opposite to the safety walkway.
6. Training and drills in emergency procedures.
5. Locate contact rail opposite to the safety walkway.
6. Training and drills in emergency procedures.
TPS - 02
While evacuating, patrons are exposed to the hazards of the traction power contact rail.
Smoke/Fire on train or other emergency conditions which require patrons to evacuate.
Fatality or major injuries may result from trips and falls over contact rail; electrical shock/burns may result from residual potential (voltage).
IC 1. Provide emergency exit paths that do not require patron evacuees to step over traction power.
2. Locate contact rails, opposite safety walk wherever possible.
3. Locate contact rails, opposite station platform.
IE 1. Provide emergency exit
paths that do not require patron evacuees to step over traction power.
2. Locate contact rails, opposite safety walk wherever possible.
3. Locate contact rails, opposite station
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Guideway
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
platform.
4. Establish procedures to deenergize contact rail when evacuating patrons.
TPS - 03
Electrical shock from contact with 3rd rail.
Failure of the ETS to de-energize the 3rd rail Trig: Smoke/Fire on train or other emergency conditions which require patrons to evacuate. Work in the vicinity of the 3rd rail.
Electrocution caused by contact with contact rail because personnel assumed that the ETS de-energized the third rail.
ID 1. Provide proper inspection and testing of the ETS.
2. Verify contact rail is de-energized after operating ETS.
3. Train personnel to consider the collector shoes, third rail, or electrical apparatus of any type LIVE AT ALL TIMES unless proper safety measures have been taken and
IE 1. Provide proper inspection
and testing of the ETS. 2. Verify contact rail is de-
energized after operating ETS.
3. Train personnel to consider the collector shoes, third rail, or electrical apparatus of any type LIVE AT ALL TIMES unless proper safety measures have been taken and verified.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Guideway
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
verified.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Stations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
TPS - 04
Significant electrical potential between the return rail and anything grounded to earth.
Personnel touch negative return potential (skin of train, running rails) while also touching earth ground.
Shock (50-70 volts) could cause startle reflex prompting slip and fall or in some cases could cause persons to go into cardiac arrest.
IC Provide negative Grounding Device (NGD) in Traction Power Substation to limit potential to non-lethal levels.
IE 1. Provide a negative
Grounding Device (NGD) in Traction Power Substation to limit potential to non-lethal levels.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
TPS - 05
Electrical shock from exposed energized parts of electrical equipment, and dangers from arcs, smoke or fire.
Inadequate design of electrical system.
Inadequate protection of electrical equipment subject to adverse weather, vandalism and unauthorized operation.
Potential injuries or electrocution. Potential loss of equipment.
IC 1. Verify equipment meets industrial standards and applicable electrical codes.
2. Protection of cables and use of conduit.
IE 1. Specify equipment
meets industrial standards and applicable electrical codes.
2. Imbed cables or enclose in conduit.
TPS – 06
Electrical shock from contact with 3rd rail.
Failure to operate DC breakers.
Potential serious injury or fatality
IC 1. Provide instructions for personnel to manually open and lock out circuit
ID 1. Provide instructions for
personnel to manually open and lock out
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
breakers or wayside sectionalization DC disconnect switches before starting any function.
2. Procedures and training to remove power before any maintenance.
3. Procedures and training to manually open and lock out circuit breakers or wayside sectionalization DC disconnect switches before starting any function.
4. Procedures and
circuit breakers or wayside sectionalization DC disconnect switches before starting any function.
2. Procedures and training to remove power before any maintenance.
3. Procedures and training to manually open and lock out circuit breakers or wayside sectionalization DC disconnect switches before starting any function.
4. Procedures and training to verify that contact rail is de-energized
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
training to verify that contact rail is de-energized before starting any function.
before starting any function.
TPS – 07
Leakage of battery fumes into underground station areas.
Inadequate ventilation in battery room.
Minor to severe injuries due to inhalation of toxic fumes.
IIC 1. Provide ventilation, consistent with design ventilation studies, to exhaust fumes from affected areas.
2. Use sealed batteries.
IIE 1. Provide ventilation
consistent with design ventilation studies, to exhaust fumes from affected areas.
2. Use sealed batteries.
TPS - 08
Fire in TPSS structure goes unnoticed.
Failure of smoke detector / loss of alarm indicator
Loss of
Potential for severe injury. Potential for equipment damage. Potential
IIC 1. Loss of smoke detector must be detected.
2. Periodic inspection, testing and maintenance of fire
IIE 1. Loss of smoke detector
must be detected. 2. Periodic inspection,
testing and maintenance of fire
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
communication link.
environmental hazard
alarm system. 3. Establish procedures
for station evacuation.
alarm system. 3. Establish procedures for
station evacuation.
TPS - 09
Potential smoke, toxic fumes and/or fire incident at substation.
Overheating of power cable and wiring
Improper installation.
Potential injuries or electrocution. Potential loss of equipment.
IC 1. Design power cable and wiring in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
2. Establish procedures to verify proper installation, testing and construction inspections.
3. Ensure proper tests and procedures are included in
IE 1. Design power cable and
wiring in accordance with Metro Design Criteria.
2. Establish procedures to verify proper installation, testing and construction inspections.
3. Ensure proper tests and procedures are included in maintenance program and manuals.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
maintenance program and manuals.
4. Select cables having insulation with low smoke, fume and burn-rate.
5. Place cable in non-flammable conduit.
4. Select cables having insulation with low smoke, fume and burn-rate.
5. Place cable in non-flammable conduit.
TPS – 10
Overheated electrical cable.
Corroded or high resistance connection at junction point.
Smoke, toxic fumes and/or fire. Possibility for illness and/or suffocation. Could range from
ID 1. Specify and install cables in accordance with Metro design criteria and applicable code.
2. Provide overheating sensors, alarm and trip devices.
3. Verify, through
IE 1. Specify and install
cables in accordance with Metro design criteria and applicable code.
2. Provide overheating sensors, alarm and trip devices.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
minor to catastrophic.
installation test, that cable and associated equipment meets design specification requirements.
3. Verify, through installation test, that cable and associated equipment meets design specification requirements.
TPS - 11
Power cable/equipment short circuit(s)
Worn or damaged insulation materials.
Damage from accident /incident.
Loose mountings which allow flexing and/or
Possible tripping of protective circuit breakers (on power section) with subsequent car stoppage.
IIID 1. Conduct preventive maintenance activities in accordance with manufacturers' guidelines.
2. Establish procedure that maintainers should thoroughly inspect/test the system prior to restoring operation
IIIE 1. Conduct preventive
maintenance activities in accordance with manufacturers' guidelines.
2. Establish procedure that maintainers should thoroughly inspect/test the system prior to restoring operation from associated
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
vibration.
from associated incidents.
incidents.
TPS – 12
Electrical shock from exposed energized parts of electrical equipment, and dangers from arcs, smoke or fire
Improper procedures.
Control circuit failure.
Human error. Uncoordinate
d maintenance activities.
Inadequate protection of electrical equipment.
Unauthorized operation and
Potential serious injury or fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities
IC 1. Provide training to personnel who work around electrical equipment.
2. Provide periodic safety information and retraining /recertification.
3. Ensure proper tests and procedures are included in maintenance program and manuals.
4. Ensure appropriate warning signs are
IE 1. Provide training to
personnel who work around electrical equipment.
2. Provide periodic safety information and retraining /recertification.
3. Ensure proper tests and procedures are included in maintenance program and manuals.
4. Ensure appropriate warning signs are posted.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
vandalism.
Inadequate design of electrical system.
Close proximity to high voltage
posted. 5. All electrical related
work will be done using written procedures.
6. Provide enclosed equipment with enclosures rated for the environment.
7. Post warning sign "Authorized Personnel Access Only" with self locking doors.
8. Provide Intrusion protection.
9. Verify equipment meet industrial standards and
5. Establish procedures to perform all electrical related work using written procedures.
6. Provide enclosed equipment with enclosures rated for the environment.
7. Post warning sign "Authorized Personnel Access Only" with self locking doors.
8. Provide Intrusion protection.
9. Verify equipment meet industrial standards and applicable electrical codes and Metro design criteria.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
applicable electrical codes and Metro design criteria.
10. Comply with Metro’s Procedure TP-1001 Arc-Flash and Shock Protection Programs
TPS – 13
Contact with live equipment transformers, busbars, circuit breakers, etc.
Access to live equipment is not protected.
Insufficient training of maintenance employees.
Insufficient warning signs on the
Potential serious injury or fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities.
IC 1. Provide interlocks which removes power when cabinet is opened.
2. Establish procedures for maintenance of equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations in the O&M Manuals.
IE 1. Provide interlocks which
removes power when cabinet is opened.
2. Establish procedures for maintenance of equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations in the O&M Manuals.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
equipment.
3. Provide adequate
training for assigned maintenance employees.
4. Post warning signs on the equipment.
3. Provide adequate training for assigned maintenance employees.
4. Post warning signs on the equipment.
TPS – 14
Fire in Traction Power Substation Equipment Room.
Equipment Overload.
Circuit breaker rating incorrect for intended purpose. .
Unauthorized intrusion and vandalism
Potential serious injury or fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities.
IC 1. Provide overload protection.
2. Verify circuit breaker sizing selection and perform installation verification prior to operational tests.
3. Provide smoke/heat detection in TPSS room.
4. Provide fire rating of TPSS rooms in
IE 1. Provide overload
protection. 2. Verify circuit breaker
sizing selection and perform installation verification prior to operational tests.
3. Provide smoke/heat detection in TPSS room.
4. Provide fire rating of TPSS rooms in
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
(arson).
accordance with NFPA 130 and Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
5. Provide room ventilation to exhaust heat and smoke.
6. Provide CCTV coverage to cover access to the non-public areas of the station.
7. Provide controlled access to TPSS room.
8. Provide intrusion detection.
accordance with NFPA 130 and Metro Fire/Life Safety criteria.
5. Provide room ventilation to exhaust heat and smoke.
6. Provide CCTV coverage to cover access to the non-public areas of the station.
7. Provide controlled access to TPSS room.
8. Provide intrusion detection.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
TPS - 15
Overheated Transformers
Improperly sized for use intended.
Lack of ventilation causing high ambient temperature in substation.
Damage to case, windings, and/or insulation. Fire or explosion enabling toxic smoke hazards to personnel and adjacent equipment and facilities. Loss of traction power to section of track.
IC 1. Verify transformer sizing selection and perform installation verification prior to operational tests.
2. Provide for adequate protection via automatic circuit breakers and/or fuses.
3. Monitor room temperature and for failure of ventilation equipment.
4. Monitor transformer temperature and provide alarm for high temperature condition.
IE 1. Verify transformer sizing
selection and perform installation verification prior to operational tests.
2. Provide for adequate protection via automatic circuit breakers and/or fuses.
3. Monitor room temperature and for failure of ventilation equipment.
4. Monitor transformer temperature and provide alarm for high temperature condition.
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
TPS 16
High voltage Arc-flash Working with high voltage switchgear in TPSS
Severe injury or death to traction power employees Interruption in traction power and lengthy service interruptions while traction power is restored
IC 1. Provide Traction Power employees with appropriate PPE in accordance with NFPA 70.and Metro’s Arc-Flash and Shock Protection Program TP-1001
2. Design TPSS with remote switching and racking capabilities
3. Develop rules and procedures for dealing with high-voltage switchgears
ID 1. Provide Traction Power
employees with appropriate PPE in accordance with NFPA 70.and Metro’s Arc-Flash and Shock Protection Program TP-1001
2. Design TPSS with remote switching and racking capabilities
3. Develop rules and procedures for dealing with high-voltage switchgears
SYSTEM: Traction Power
SUBSYSTEM: Traction Power Substation (TPSS) / Tie-break Station
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
TPS-17
Electrical shock from a 3rd rail that was assumed to be de-energized
train stopped between circuits allowing current to bridge the gap
Electrocution caused by contact with contact rail
1D Design the system so that there are no bridgeable gaps
IE Design the system so that there are no bridgeable gaps
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Appendix F - PHA Train Control
W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page F-1 May 11, 2012
APPENDIX F PHA TRAIN CONTROL
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Track
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
ATC -01
Switch points not closed
Switch-and-lock movement not fully normal.
Obstruction of switch points.
Improper maintenance.
Derailment. Damage to switch.
IC 1. Provide automatic train protection track circuit.
2. Provide regular inspection and maintenance in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations.
IE 1. Specify that the ATC
issues a zero speed command if switch is not locked in the proper position for the route.
2. Regular inspection and maintenance in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations.
ATC -02
Switches operating while a vehicle is on the approach section
Improper procedures at ROC.
Misrouted vehicles. Possibility of derailment if switch is operated in front of, or under, HRV.
IC 1. Interlocking circuits should be designed, and maintained, in order that switches cannot be operated under "unsafe" conditions.
2. Vital circuitry in wayside ATC should
IE 1. Ensure that interlocking
circuits are designed, and maintained, in order that switches cannot be operated under "unsafe" conditions.
2. Design vital circuitry in wayside ATC that will not
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Track
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
not honor a command to move a switch in front or under a vehicle.
3. Establish and verify proper operating procedures.
honor a command to move a switch in front or under a vehicle.
3. Develop and verify proper operating procedures.
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Wayside ATP
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
ATC -03
Loss of train detection
Inadequate shunt provided due to rusty rail or poor shunting.
Track circuit fails to indicate occupancy, leading to derailment, collision or sideswipe.
IC 1. Ensure that the specified shunting sensitivity of the track circuit exceeds the maximum shunt resistance provided by the first axle of every car.
2. Provide loss of shunt protection in interlockings.
3. Provide regular inspection and maintenance.
IE 1. Specify track circuit
sensitivity to exceed the maximum shunt resistance provided by the first axle of every car.
2. Provide loss of shunt protecti in interlocking logic design.
3. Develop inspection and maintenance procedures for eliminating rust.
ATC -04
Loss of train detection does not indicate occupancy.
Equipment failure
Track circuit fails to indicate occupancy, leading to derailment,
IC Design ATP Module to be vital in accordance with failsafe principles.
IE 1. Specify that the ATP
Module is to be designed as a vital system using failsafe
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Wayside ATP
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
collision or sideswipe.
design techniques.
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Automatic Train Control (ATC)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
ATC -05
ATC signal is disrupted
Electro-magnetic interference.
Severe injury IIC 1. Incorporate electro-magnetic compatibility in the design of all wayside train control equipment to minimize potential interference.
2. Confine all vital train control ATC subsystem functions to an operating frequency that is not within the spectrum of the traction power transformer/rectifier harmonic output.
3. Test for
IIE 1. Provide a design that
assures electro-magnetic compatibility of all wayside train control equipment to minimize potential interference.
2. Provide a design that all vital train control. ATC subsystem functions are confined to an operating frequency that is not affected by the spectrum of the traction power transformer/rectifier harmonic output.
3. Provide test plans to
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Automatic Train Control (ATC)
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
electromagnetic interference (EMI) compatibility on installed system.
test for Electromagnetic interference (EMI).
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Train Control and Communications Room
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
ATC -06
Fire and explosion in TC&C Room
When TC&C equipment shares same room with the battery, an off-gassing battery and spark from TC&C equipment cause an explosion.
Major injury to personnel, including burns, involuntary reaction, shock, or fatality.
IC 1. Evaluate design of battery and provide adequate separation between battery and TC&C equipment.
2. Provide adequate ventilation.
3. Use sealed batteries (valve regulated).
IE 1. Evaluate design of
battery and provide adequate separation between battery and TC&C equipment.
2. Provide adequate ventilation.
3. Use sealed batteries (valve regulated).
ATC -07
Hazards relating to battery handling, such as acid burns, personal injuries, fire/smoke, explosion and toxic fumes
Accidental rupture of battery cell or spillage of electrolyte.
Overcharging of batteries.
IIC 1. Use sealed battery. 2. Provide facilities for
quick drenching or flushing of the eyes and body if flooded wet-cell lead-acid type storage batteries are used.
3. Provide sealed water
IIE 1. Use sealed battery. 2. Provide facilities for
quick drenching or flushing of the eyes and body if flooded wet-cell lead-acid type storage batteries are used.
3. Provide sealed water
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Train Control and Communications Room
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
rinse or neutralizing packs if storage batteries of the enclosed type equipped with explosion proof vents are used.
4. Procedures and training relating to battery handling.
5. Install caution signs relating to battery handling.
6. Provide periodic inspection and testing.
7. Ensure battery charging design precludes over-
rinse or neutralizing packs if storage batteries of the enclosed type equipped with explosion proof vents are used.
4. Procedures and training relating to battery handling.
5. Install caution signs relating to battery handling.
6. Provide periodic inspection and testing.
7. Ensure battery charging design precludes over-charging.
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Train Control and Communications Room
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-05-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
charging.
ATC -08
Hazards relating to battery handling, such as acid burns, personal injuries, fire/smoke, explosion and toxic fumes.
Inadvertent short circuit of battery cells.
Potential for severe injury. Potential for equipment damage. Potential environmental hazard.
IIC Cover battery terminals and tools with insulating materials to prevent inadvertent short circuits.
IIE Cover battery terminals and tools with insulating materials to prevent inadvertent short circuits.
SYSTEM: Train Control
SUBSYSTEM: Vehicle Birthing Interface
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-07-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
ATC -09
Door opened on wrong side of train
Operator error Death or serious injury to passenger falling out of train in 3rd rail area
1C Design train control systems to interlock passenger door control with proper berthing position, per MRDC
IE Provide an interlock to prevent the operator from opening the doors on the wrong side when birthing at the platform.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Appendix G - PHA Emergency Ventilation
W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page G-1 May 11, 2012
APPENDIX G PHA EMERGENCY VENTILATION
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Dampers
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
VEN -01
Dampers do not operate in the proper manner, so fans are unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel
Incorrect/ inadequate maintenance.
Damper switch left in the local position which overrides all remote commands, so dampers cannot operate as determined by SES.
Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
IC 1. Develop training procedures for Maintainers to return selector switch to the remote position upon finishing maintenance.
2. Ensure that all Metro maintainers are properly trained and certified.
3. Ensure that O&M manuals contain the appropriate notes, cautions and warnings for damper maintenance.
4. Ensure manufacturer inspection, servicing, and maintenance
ID 1. Develop training
procedures for Maintainers to return selector switch to the remote position upon finishing maintenance.
2. Ensure that all Metro maintainers are properly trained and certified.
3. Ensure that O&M manuals contain the appropriate notes, cautions and warnings for damper maintenance.
4. Ensure manufacturer inspection, servicing, and maintenance procedures are followed and correctly
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Dampers
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
procedures are followed and correctly incorporated in the O&M manuals.
incorporated in the O&M manuals.
VEN -02
Fan unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section
Dampers fail in a non fail-safe position, or closed, thereby preventing fans from directing airflow to control heat and smoke.
Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
ID 1. As part of the SES analysis, determine the appropriate fail-safe position for all dampers, and verify during testing that the dampers default to the correct fail-safe position.
2. Annunciate damper position at ROC.
3. Establish procedure for regular inspection and maintenance.
IE 1. Design the appropriate
fail-safe position for all dampers, and verify during testing that dampers default to the correct fail-safe position.
2. Design the system such that damper position is annunciated at ROC.
3. Establish procedure for regular inspection and maintenance.
VEN -03
Heat and smoke are not adequately
Transient pressures cause
Unable to control the direction of
ID 1. Design and specify dampers to
IE 1. Design and specify
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Dampers
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
controlled or the flow is misdirected due to a damper condition.
damper damage, affecting their operation. Trig: Emergency situation (e.g., fire in the station or tunnel)
flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
withstand anticipated transient pressures.
dampers to withstand anticipated transient pressures.
VEN -04
Dampers do not operate in the proper manner, so fans are unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel
Improper damper position e.g. closed instead of open.
Metro personnel unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke.
ID 1. Verify during testing that the dampers are in correct pre-defined mode for each ventilation scenario as determined by SES.
IE 1. Verify during testing
that the dampers are in correct pre-defined mode for each ventilation scenario as determined by SES.
2. Ensure that the design is consistent with current MRL fan/damper configurations and
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Dampers
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
Metro Rail Design Criteria"
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
VEN -05
Employee in fan room and vent fans started remotely.
Maintenance employee did not properly lock-out system.
Death or serious injury to employee.
IC 1. Develop O&M procedures and manuals according to manufacturer’s recommendations.
2. Develop maintenance employees training procedures with instructions for correct lock-out procedures.
3. Provide training and certification of maintenance employees.
ID 1. Develop O&M
procedures and manuals according to manufacturer’s recommendations, including lock-out tag-out procedures.
2. Develop maintenance employees training procedures with instructions for correct lock-out procedures.
3. Provide training and certification of maintenance employees.
VEN -06
Employee in fan room and vent fans started remotely.
Operations Control unaware of maintenance personnel
Death or serious injury to employee.
IC 1. Develop procedures for maintainers to notify ROC prior to entry into the fan
IE 1. Develop procedures for
maintainers to notify ROC prior to entry into
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
presence in fan room.
rooms. 2. Provide fan lock-out
capability. 3. Develop training
procedures for maintenance employees with instructions on correct lock-out procedures.
the fan rooms. 2. Provide fan lock-out
capability. 3. Develop training
procedures for maintenance employees with instructions on correct lock-out procedures.
4. Provide procedures and training to ‘Block-out” equipment during maintenance.
VEN -07
Failure to replace covers to moving parts of environmental control equipment such as fans.
Negligence by maintenance personnel.
Injury to Metro personnel.
IIID 1. Develop O&M Manuals according to manufacturer’s recommendations.
2. Provide caution notes in O&M manuals on safety related to
IIIE 1. Develop O&M Manuals
according to manufacturer’s recommendations.
2. Provide caution notes in O&M manuals on safety related to equipment
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
equipment maintenance.
3. Perform supervisory follow-up to ensure procedures are followed.
4. Develop training procedures for maintenance personnel.
maintenance. 3. Perform supervisory
follow-up to ensure procedures are followed.
4. Develop training procedures for maintenance personnel.
VEN -08
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
Fans cease to operate due to component failure other than blades, such as bearings, hub, motor.
Fan blades
Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke.
ID 1. Ensure manufacturer has a QA program in place and all components are individually tested, then tested as an assembly.
2. Develop O&M manuals according to manufacturer’s
IE 1. Ensure manufacturer
has a QA program in place and all components are individually tested, then tested as an assembly.
2. Develop O&M Manuals according to manufacturer’s
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
fail due to not being in balance or improperly fastened.
Fan blades fail due to imperfections in the material during manufacturing.
Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
recommendations. 3. Institute effective
preventive maintenance program.
4. Emergency operating procedures should have capability to modify modes when fan becomes inoperable.
recommendations. 3. Institute effective
preventive maintenance program.
4. Develop emergency operating procedures that address capability to modify modes when fan becomes inoperable.
5. Design the ventilation system according to Metro's new design criteria per 3/22/12 FLSSC meeting.
VEN -09
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the
Fans cease to operate due to a deliberate act of sabotage by a terrorist,
Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing
ID 1. Before hiring, screen applicants carefully to ensure highest caliber of support staff.
IE 1. Develop hiring
procedures to carefully screen applicants to ensure highest caliber of
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
station or tunnel section.
criminal, and/or disgruntled employee.
evacuating passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
2. Review performance records frequently to identify dissatisfied employees.
3. Use work orders and schedules to control access to fans and other ancillary areas.
4. Use controlled access measures to deny unauthorized persons access to key operating areas.
support staff. 2. Review performance
records frequently to identify dissatisfied employees.
3. Ensure that work orders and schedules control access to fans and other ancillary areas.
4. Design controlled access measures to deny unauthorized persons access to key operating areas.
VEN -10
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel
Feeders not adequately protected against damage due to fire and/or
Unable to control the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating
ID 1. Provide redundancy in the design of the power for the ventilation system.
2. Provide redundant power supplies from
IE 1. Provide redundancy in
the design of the power for the ventilation system.
2. Provide redundant
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
section
seismic activity.
Loss of electrical power feed.
passengers to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
two separate sources of primary power.
3. Provide diversity in the routing of emergency ventilation circuits so that a single event does not cause loss of power.
4. Install feeders that are embedded or are in conduit and are securely mounted in separate tunnels to avoid a single event from causing dual feeder failure.
power supplies from two separate sources of primary power.
3. Provide diversity in the routing of emergency ventilation circuits so that a single event does not cause loss of power.
4. Design feeders that are embedded or are in conduit and are securely mounted in separate tunnels to avoid a single event from causing dual feeder failure.
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
VEN -11
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
Fans improperly sized for the heat release rates encountered in the station or tunnel fire.
Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
ID 1. Specify design to meet critical velocity requirements for designated situations.
2. Design per Metro Fire/Life Safety and NFPA 130 requirements.
IE 1. Specify design to meet
critical velocity requirements for designated situations.
2. Design per Metro Fire/Life Safety and NFPA 130 requirements.
VEN -12
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
Improper installation. Fans may fail due to vibration, not being isolated.
Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
ID 1. Specify that strict Q.C. procedures will be followed throughout the installation process.
2. Ensure proper installation is part of the installation verification process.
3. Develop O&M
IE 1. Specify that strict Q.C.
procedures will be followed throughout the installation process.
2. Ensure installation is in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations and is part of the installation
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
manuals according to manufacturer’s recommendations.
4. Schedule regular inspections and maintenance following manufacturer recommended procedures.
verification process. 3. Develop O&M Manuals
according to manufacturer’s recommendations.
4. Schedule regular inspections and maintenance following manufacturer recommended procedures.
VEN -13
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
Software fault (logic error). (e.g., fire in the station or tunnel).
Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and
ID 1. Specify to perform validation/verification on software, as part of the design verification process.
2. Regularly schedule inspections and maintenance following
IE 1. Specify to perform
validation/verification on software, as part of the installation verification process.
2. Regularly schedule inspections and maintenance according
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
multiple injuries.
manufacturer's recommended procedures.
to manufacturer's recommended procedures.
VEN -14
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
Excessive corrosion.
Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
ID 1. Regularly schedule inspections and maintenance following manufacturer's recommended procedures.
2. Protect fans from excessive corrosion.
IE 1. Regularly schedule
inspections and maintenance according to manufacturer's recommended procedures.
2. Design fans and shafts so that they are protected from excessive corrosion.
3. Manufacture fan blades, shafts, fan housings, duct work and other parts where corrosion might render the ventilation system
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
inoperable out of corrosion resistant material.
VEN -15
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
During maintenance activity, the mode selection switch is left in "local" position, thereby removing control from the ROC.
Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
ID 1. At ROC, provide annunciation indication of position of mode selection switch.
2. Provide training and application cautionary notes in O&M manuals.
3. Implement proper check-in and check-out procedures for maintenance functions.
IE 1. At ROC, provide
annunciation indication of position of mode selection switch.
2. Develop adequate training procedures to provide maintenance personnel with cautions to return the selector switch to the “Remote” position after maintenance.
3. Include “Caution” notations in O&M manuals.
4. Develop training procedures for
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
maintainers on the proper “check-in and check-out” procedures.
5. Establish procedure to operate fans remotely after completing the maintenance.
VEN -16
Incorrect sequencing of emergency ventilation fans resulting in improper ventilation of fire/smoke area.
Control manually, attempting to select proper sequencing of emergency ventilation fans.
Inadequate training of operations controllers
Loss of life or severe injury to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel due to exposure to heat or smoke.
IC 1. Establish pre-defined emergency ventilation modes.
2. Develop training procedures for ROC personnel on proper emergency ventilation procedures.
3. Provide training to ROC personnel in emergency ventilation procedures.
IE 1. Establish pre-defined
emergency ventilation modes.
2. Develop training procedures for ROC personnel on proper emergency ventilation procedures
3. Provide training to ROC personnel in emergency ventilation procedures.
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
VEN -17
Fans fail prematurely (in less than one hour) when exposed to fire/elevated temperatures. Rest of emergency ventilation system unable to maintain control of the direction of flow of heat and smoke.
Fans not properly specified to operate in a hostile/fire environment .
Loss of life or severe injury to patrons, Metro personnel, or emergency response personnel due to exposure to heat or smoke.
ID 1. Specify that the fans meet the NFPA 130 requirements.
2. Install fans in a fire rated room.
IE 1. Specify that the fans
meet the NFPA 130 requirements
2. Install fans in a fire rated room.
VEN -18
Loss of Motor Control Center (MCC) results in loss of fan operation.
MCC exposed to fire.
ROC unable to maintain control of the direction of flow of heat and smoke, possibly exposing evacuating passengers to intense heat and
ID 1. Ensure that the MCC is in a protected location separated from other areas by 2 hour fire-rated construction.
2. Provide automatic sprinkler protection so that the fire is
IE 1. Ensure that the MCC is
in a protected location separated from other areas by 2 hour fire-rated construction.
2. Provide automatic sprinkler protection so that the fire is
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
contained. 3. Provide an alternate
means to control fans.
contained. 3. Design fan control from
the EMP or locally at the fan room.
VEN -19
Fans do not operate or fail during an emergency, unable to maintain pre-established control of the direction of heat and smoke flow.
Mode selection at EMP is left in "EMP" position, thereby removing control from the ROC.
Passengers evacuating from HRV possibly exposed to intense heat and smoke. Could cause fatalities and multiple injuries.
ID 1. At ROC, provide annunciation indication of position of mode selection switch.
2. Provide training to the fire department and others controlling ventilation from the EMP to return the selector switch to the “ROC” position
IE 1. Specify that
annunciation will be provided at ROC indicating the position of the selector switch at EMP.
2. Develop training plans so that emergency responders will be provided with adequate training cautioning them to return the selector switch to the “ROC” position after drills.
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
VEN -20
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
Fire growth rate is higher than planned
Potential severe injury/fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path unprotected.
ID 1. Compare the heat release rate provided by the vehicle manufacturer agrees with heat release rate used to design the emergency ventilation system.
IE 1. Specify that the heat
release rate used to design the ventilation system meets and/or exceeds that provided by the vehicle manufacturer.
VEN -21
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
Fan motor failure
Potential severe injury/fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path unprotected.
IC 1. Follow criteria that provide a design for sufficient ventilation when the most critical ventilation fan is out of service.
IE 1. Specify that the design
provides sufficient ventilation when the most critical ventilation fan is out of service.
VEN -22
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and
Fan failure due to thermal overload.
Potential severe injury/fatality.
IC 1. Follow NFPA 130 requirement that does not permit
IE 1. Specify that the design
of the fans follows the
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Fans
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path unprotected.
thermal overload devices.
Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and NFPA 130 regarding thermal overload devices. In the case of overload fans will run to destruction allowing additional evacuation time.
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Ventilation Controls
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
VEN -23
Ventilation system unable to maintain control of heat and smoke during a fire emergency in the station or tunnel section.
Control System failure - Failure at the primary control facility.
Control System failure - Failure of the automatic portions of the system.
Potential severe injury/fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path unprotected.
IC 1. Provide redundant control circuits including Emergency Back Up Panel at ROC with separate communication to ventilation plants and local control panels at each plant to allow full control of all plants required.
2. Develop procedures to ensure the ventilation system is operable in the event automatic system is out of service.
3. Perform regularly scheduled inspections and maintenance according to
IE 1. Design redundant
circuits with an auxiliary control panel.
2. Design so that automatic functions can be duplicated manually.
3. Perform regularly scheduled inspections and maintenance according to manufacturer's recommended procedures.
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Ventilation Controls
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
manufacturer's recommended procedures.
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Ventilation Controls
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
VEN -24
Tunnel airflow direction established during a fire that exposes a second train within the ventilation zone to smoke and heat.
Multiple trains allowed to enter each ventilation zone. Airflow direction established to expose fewest passengers on stalled on-fire incident train to smoke and heat even at risk to second train in the path of exhausting airflow. Passengers on non-incident train can be exposed to smoke and heat
Potential severe injury/fatality. Potential damage to equipment and facilities. Egress path and cabin environment unprotected.
IC 1. Provide power sectionalizing within each ventilation zone to facilitate removal of non-incident trains.
2. Provide implementation instructions for use in a fire emergency. Non-incident trains to be removed from ventilation block/zone as quickly as possible.
ID 1. Develop an operating
plan that limits one train per ventilation zone.
SYSTEM: Ventilation
SUBSYSTEM: Ventilation Controls
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 3-27-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 3-28-2012
APPROVED BY:__________DATE:
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
whether inside train or in evacuated positions on walkway.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Report (Final)
Appendix H - PHA Systemwide
W E S T S I D E S U B W A Y E X T E N S I O N P R O J E C T Page H-1 May 11, 2012
APPENDIX H PHA SYSTEMWIDE
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Tunnels
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
SYS-01
Protruding surfaces or devices, sharp edges, on emergency walkways (where provided).
Improper walkway design. Trig: Emergency situation (e.g. evacuation from the train in the tunnel).
Possible injury to passengers and/or employees from protruding surfaces.
IIIC 1. Provide handrails and other devices to be free of sharp and protruding surfaces.
2. Install handrails and other devices along the walkway in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and CBC
3. Provide a clearance envelope above the walkway walking surface in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
IIIE 1. Provide handrails and
other devices to be free of sharp and protruding surfaces.
2. Install handrails and other devices along the walkway in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria and CBC
3. Provide a clearance envelope above the walkway walking surface in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Criteria.
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Tunnels
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
SYS-02
Damaged or broken rail
Horizontal/vertical dynamic load, rail fatigue, impact loading, extreme temperature change, defective weld, poor tie supports. Trig: HRV travels over a broken rail.
May cause derailment of the vehicle.
ID 1. Proper rail design parameters and proper installation.
2. Periodic Rail Inspection / Maintenance.
3. If the break has no continuity then it should be detected by the de-energization of the track circuit (ATC).
IE 1. Design rail in
accordance with Metro design criteria.
2. Implement QA procedure to inspect for defective welds during construction.
3. Establish procedure to perform periodic inspections during operation.
4. Provide broken rail detection by ATC track circuit design.
SYS-03
Unusual Protruding trackwork parts or switch layout devices,
Failure of devices such as handrails and supports.
Possible injury to employees from protruding
IIIC 1. Ensure installation and design is in accordance with
IIIE 1. Ensure installation and
design is in accordance
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Tunnels
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARD RISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
sharp edges
Trig: Maintenance workers on the guideway
surfaces.
Metro Design Criteria.
2. Implement QA procedure to review closely during construction to assure adherence to the design.
3. Develop procedure to inspect and maintain trackwork parts on regular intervals.
with Metro Design Criteria.
2. Implement QA procedure to review closely during construction to assure adherence to the design.
3. Develop procedure to inspect for unusual protruding or sharp edges, and maintain trackwork parts at regular intervals.
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Lighting
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
SYS-04
Loss of both normal and emergency lighting
Earthquake destroys emergency power supply in the auxiliary power room at the station Trig: Emergency situation (e.g. evacuation from the station or train in the tunnel
Loss of life or serious injury due to person being struck by HRV. HRV strikes object on track causing derailment. Injuries to passengers tripping or falling during evacuation.
ID 1. Provide redundant power supply.
2. Connect tunnel lighting to adjoining stations with every other lamp fed from a different source.
IE 1. Provide redundant
power supply. 2. Connect tunnel lighting
to adjoining stations with every other lamp fed from a different source.
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Emergency Access/Egress
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: LM DATE: 4-10-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
SYS-05
Fire propagates rapidly in station due to delayed notification of emergency response teams
Delayed notification of emergency response teams. Trig: Emergency situation (e.g., fire in station)
Loss of life or severe injuries to patrons exposed to fire or smoke.
ID 1. Provide emergency telephones and Blue Light Stations on platforms.
2. Provide emergency procedure training for HRV and outside agency personnel.
3. Verify adequacy of procedures with pre-revenue drills and simulations.
4. Provide CCTV
IE 1. Provide emergency
telephones and Blue Light Stations on platforms.
2. Provide emergency procedure training for HRV and outside agency personnel.
3. Verify adequacy of procedures with pre-revenue drills and simulations.
4. Provide CCTV in the stations
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
SYS-06
Employee contact with moving parts of rotating equipment / motors/ fans.
Improper or lack of shielding /protection around rotating equipment. Trig: Routine maintenance
Injury or death
IC 1. Specify equipment
designed to limit exposure to rotating parts of equipment.
2. Establish operational procedures with warnings regarding rotating equipment.
3. Establish procedures to lock-out/tag-out; deactivate power before accessing moving parts or removing protective shields.
4. Provide training in safety procedures.
5. Procedures are in
IE 1. Specify equipment
designed to limit exposure to rotating parts of equipment.
2. Establish operational procedures with warnings regarding rotating equipment.
3. Establish procedures to lock-out/tag-out, deactivate power before accessing moving parts or removing protective shields.
4. Provide training in safety procedures.
5. Procedures are in place to verify that power is turned off before
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
place to verify that power is turned off before accessing equipment.
6. Provide appropriate clearance around moving parts.
7. Establish procedures that allow only qualified personnel to perform maintenance.
8. Establish procedures to block equipment in such a manner at to prevent rotating equipment from operating even if power is restored.
9. Provide appropriate
accessing equipment. 6. Provide appropriate
clearance around moving parts.
7. Provide procedures that allow only qualified personnel to perform maintenance.
8. Provide procedures to block equipment in such a manner at to prevent rotating equipment from operating even if power is restored.
9. Provide appropriate guards and housings around rotating equipment
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
guards and housings around rotating equipment
SYS-07
Insufficient electrical & mechanical clearances around high voltage equipment
Improper clearance around high voltage equipment Trig: Equipment maintenance
Equipment failure Severe Injury
IIC Install electrical equipment with adequate clearances for operation and maintenance per applicable Electrical Code.
IIE Install electrical equipment with adequate clearances for operation and maintenance per applicable Electrical Code.
SYS-08
Danger to wayside employees’ hands or fingers caused by remote switch operation
Human error, lack of knowledge Trig: Equipment maintenance
Personal Injury
IIC 1. Provide training in proper installation methods and procedures.
2. Hold toolbox meetings.
3. Wear protective equipment.
IID 1. Provide training in
proper installation methods and procedures.
2. Hold toolbox meetings. 3. Wear protective
equipment.
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
4. Schedule regular
training for maintenance workers.
5. Include tight spaces with moving parts in Metro’s Confined Spaces – Permit Entry program. Conduct job briefing before entering hazardous area.. Hazardous areas should be “Permit Entry Required
4. Schedule regular training for maintenance workers.
6. Conduct job briefing before entering hazardous area.. Hazardous areas should be “Permit Entry Required
SYS-09
Inability to communicate with maintenance or operations personnel."
Insufficient communications systems /equipment
Lack of control and/or monitoring
IIC
1. Plan for and procure adequate communications services for
IIE 1. Design equipment
necessary for communications.
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
Will also add: provided.
capability. Inability to be aware of or respond to various emergency situations.
operations activities. 2. Obtain quality
equipment and provide good maintenance support.
3. Have back-up and/or contingency plan for various types of outages.
2. Specified reliable quality equipment.
3. Specify equipment design that provides good maintenance support.
4. Develop back-up and/or contingency plans for various types of outages.
SYS-10
Confused / uninformed patrons (Normal Operations).
Lack of Metro operations information provided to general public.
Disruption of passenger flows through stations, Misuse of fare collection equipment. Holding of HRV
IIID 1. Use of adequate signs/graphics.
2. Passenger assistance telephones.
3. Distribute "how to use system" literature.
4. Provide scripted communications
IIIE 1. Design adequate
signs/graphics, and passenger assistance telephones into the System.
2. Distribute “How to use” literature as part of the community outreach
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
doors. Some potential for injury to such persons.
direction for specific emergencies" to the Possible controlling Measures.
program. 3. Provide scripted
communications direction for specific emergencies" to the Possible controlling Measures.
SYS-11
Fixed or portable emergency equipment unavailable, inoperative, or inadequate
Failure to provide equipment. Poor equipment maintenance. Improper equipment sizing.
Effects of a prior accident or incident could be escalated. Also, there may be hazards associated with the use of inadequate /improper emergency
IIC 1. During design of the Westside Extension, develop emergency needs and requirements list
2. Prior to Westside determine the adequacy of the emergency equipment list through dry-run tests and drills.
IIE 1. During design of the
Westside Extension, develop emergency needs and requirements list.
2. Prior to Westside operation, determine the adequacy of the emergency equipment list through dry-run tests and drills.
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
equipment.
3. Perform periodic preventive maintenance on emergency support equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations.
4. During design of the Westside extension, verify that equipment, such as ventilation fans, sprinklers, deluge systems, etc are correctly sized based upon degree of possible emergency, coverage of area required, etc.
3. Perform periodic preventive maintenance on emergency support equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s recommendations.
4. During design of the Westside extension, verify that equipment such as ventilation fans, sprinklers, deluge systems, etc are correctly sized based upon degree of possible emergency, coverage of area required, etc.
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
SYS-12
Emergency equipment unavailable, inoperative, or inadequate
Vandalism.
Effects of a prior accident or incident could be escalated. Also, there may be hazards associated with the use of inadequate/improper emergency equipment.
IID 1. During design of the Westside Extension, develop security measures to protect emergency support equipment
2. Secure all emergency support equipment in tamper-proof enclosures and monitor condition periodically.
IIE 1. Develop security
measures to protect emergency support equipment from being tampered with or stolen.
2. Specify that all emergency support equipment will be secured in tamper-proof enclosures and their condition will be monitored.
3. Develop procedures for re-stocking. Include any special instructions such as how often to inspect emergency equipment and replacement
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
schedules.
SYS-13
Emergency equipment unavailable, inoperative, or inadequate
Equipment not matched to any special needs (e.g., fighting chemical fires).
Effects of a prior accident or incident could be escalated. Also, there may be hazards associated with the use of inadequate/improper emergency equipment.
IID 1. During design of the Westside extension, verify that equipment meets the needs of emergency response groups.
2. Train emergency responders on proper use of equipment.
IIE 1. Hold meetings with the
emergency response groups to determine their needs. Provide sufficient equipment according to their needs.
2. Train emergency responders on proper use of equipment.
SYS-14
Injury to passengers during the recovery process.
Passengers evacuated in the tunnel may be on guideway and, therefore, could be endangered
Effects will vary greatly with both cause and associated conditions. The potential for
IIC 1. Evacuation of passengers should be closely supervised by Metro personnel.
IID 1. Establish procedures to
provide close supervision of passengers by Metro personnel and the fire service.
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
by other vehicles both by emergency responders coming in on the incident tunnel and vehicles in the non-incident tunnel if it is being used for evacuation.
injury/damage can range from minor to major.
2. Power to the third rail should be turned off as necessary to ensure safety.
3. Vehicle operations should be limited at times of evacuation.
2. Develop procedures to turn off power to the third rail as necessary to ensure safety.
3. Establish procedures to limit vehicle operations at times of evacuation.
SYS-15
Remote operation of equipment without coordination with maintenance activities
Improperly displayed data and/or vital information not displayed.
Possible injury to maintenance personnel from moving equipment (e.g., switches, vehicles), traction
IC 1. Provide means (e.g., lock-out switches) by which maintenance personnel can protect themselves from remote operation of
IE 1. Design means (e.g., lock-
out switches) by which maintenance personnel can protect themselves from remote operation of equipment.
2. Develop proper
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
electrification equipment activation.
equipment. 2. Establish proper
procedures for operations-maintenance coordination and enforce them.
3. Establish procedures for proper coordination during non-routine maintenance activities when people are working in areas, or on equipment, normally not occupied or attended.
4. Require permit for
procedures for operations-maintenance coordination and enforce them.
3. Establish procedures for proper coordination during non-routine maintenance activities when people are working in areas, or on equipment, normally not occupied or attended.
4. Require permit for confined space entry
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
confined space entry
SYS-18
Vandalism to safety critical equipment in the tunnel
Various acts/activities carried on by intruders in the tunnel
Damage to safety critical equipment in the tunnels Possibility of injury or death to intruders by vehicle.
IC 1. Utilize vandal resistant materials and fastenings.
2. Enclose and lock equipment.
3. Monitor, via CCTV or other means, areas most affected.
4. Patrol tunnels portals with security force.
IE 1. Use vandal resistant
materials and fastenings to the extent possible.
2. Enclose and lock equipment.
3. Provide the areas that may be most affected by vandalism with CCTV coverage.
4. Provide intrusion detection.
5. Develop plans for periodic security patrols.
6. Design adequate illumination of system facilities as a deterrent
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index
to vandalism/theft.
SYS-19
Vandalism to safety critical equipment in the station and station ancillary areas
Various acts/activities carried on by intruders in the station
Damage to safety critical equipment in the station
IC 1. Utilize vandal resistant materials and fastenings.
2. Enclose and lock equipment.
3. Monitor, via CCTV or other means, areas most affected.
4. Patrol stations and station ancillary areas.
IE 1. Use vandal resistant
materials and fastenings to the extent possible.
2. Enclose and lock equipment.
3. Provide the areas that may be most affected by vandalism with CCTV coverage.
4. Provide intrusion detection.
5. Develop plans for periodic security patrols.
6. Design adequate illumination of system facilities as a deterrent to vandalism/theft
SYSTEM: Systemwide
SUBSYSTEM: Operations
PHA NO.:
REV NO.: 01
WESTSIDE SUBWAY EXTENSION PROJECT
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
PERFORMED BY: RLH DATE: 2-21-2012
REVIEWED BY: GAh DATE: 5-04-2012
APPROVED BY:_______DATE: ________
GENERAL DESCRIPTION HAZARD CAUSE/EFFECT HAZARDRISK INDEX
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Item No.
Hazard Description Potential Cause Effect on Subsystem /System
Severity-Probability
Possible Controlling Measures and Remarks Resolution & Final Risk
Index