harvesting peace: food security, conflict, and cooperation

7/29/2019 Harvesting Peace: Food Security, Conflict, and Cooperation

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EnvironmEntal ChangE and SECurity Program RepoRt 2013

Vol

14issue

03

byE Ss

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suggested citation

Ss, E. (2013). Harvesting Peace: Food Security, Conflict, and Cooperation (Ee Ce &

Sec P rep v. 14, isse 3). Ws dC: Ww Ws ie Cee Scs.

The contents of this report are the responsibility of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

and do not necessarily ref lect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the

United States Government. Views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Centers staff,

fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or programs that provide assistance to the Center.

ecsp RepoRt

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gz as 29, 2006. rEutErS/me Se (gaZa)

EnvironmEntal ChangE and SECurity Program RepoRt 2013

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contents

abbes 2

Exece S 3

i. ic 6

ii. hw des Cc aec F Sec? 11

iii. hw des F isec Cbe Cc? 18

iv. iee rece Cc F isec 23

v. ipcs deepe P 34

annex: ie F Sec vbes i 43

tees Cc

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HaRvesting peace: F Sec, Cfc, Cpe 1


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abbes

caF Conict Assessment Framework (U.S. Agency or International Development)

des Demographic and Environmental Stress

Fao Food and Agriculture Organization o the United Nations

gdp Gross Domestic Product

idp Internally Displaced Person

ngo Nongovernmental Organization

QddR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (U.S. Department o State)

undp United Nations Development Program

unHcR Oce o the United Nations High Commissioner or Reugees

usaid U.S. Agency or International Development

WdR World Development Report 2011 (World Bank)

WFp World Food Program

ackwees

Tis report was the product o an experts workshop, Assessing the Links: Food, Agriculture, Conict, and

Fragility, convened at the Woodrow Wilson International Center or Scholars in March 2012. We are very grateul

to the many individuals who contributed to that workshop rom the policy, academic, and practitioner communi-

ties. Te discussion at the workshop helped to rame the main issues that this report addresses. We are especially

grateul to Marc Cohen (Oxam America ), Kelley Cormier (USAID, Bureau or Food Security), Geo Dabelko

(Ohio University), Gary Eilerts (USAID, FEWS NE), and Jim Jarvie (independent consultant) who provided

very thoughtul comments on previous versions o this report. Finally, we would especially like to acknowledge

Lauren Herzer Risi (Wilson Center), whose tireless eorts to coordinate the many details o this undertaking were

critical to making the collaboration a successul one.

Joe Hewitt (USAID/CMM)), Cynthia Brady (USAID/CMM), and Emmy Simmons (author and independent consultant)

2 EnvironmEntal ChangE and SECurity Program RepoRt 2013


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We se ze Cp, Zb. P ces fck se Sw S (iCriSat).

Exece S

since 2008a yeaR in WHicH rapid increasesin the global prices or major grains helped to trigger

outbreaks o civil unrest in more than 40 countries

scholars and policymakers have paid increased attention

to the potential inuence o global ood prices on social

and political instability. Since that time, spiking prices

have periodically sparked public protests and govern-

ments have struggled to respond. In September 2010,

citizens in Maputo, Mozambique, rioted over a govern-

ment decision to raise the price o bread. Eorts to con-

trol the crowds resulted in deaths and injuries. In 2011,

governments in the Middle East reduced subsidies orbread, a critical staple or the majority o the popula-

tion. Tis decision was blamed, at least in part, or the

popular uprisings o the Arab Spring.

But the compelling headlines associating rising oodprices, hunger, political instability, and conict are likely

to be only part o the story. People reacting to unex-

pected ood price increases may use these opportunities

to give voice to other grievancesunemployment, inad-

equate incomes, or government policies more broadly.

When national governance ails, as in Somalia, recur-

rent ood scarcity and amine become part o a vicious

cycle o instability. Food insecurity both results rom

and contributes to repeated rounds o armed conict in

that country. In other countries, such as Sudan, ood

shortages and hunger have been intended outcomes oconrontation and armed conict.

Tis report explores the complex linkages between

conict and ood security, drawing insights rom



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scholarly work to help inorm more eective program-

ming or practitioners. Tere is no doubt that conict

exacerbates ood insecurity. Conict can reduce the

amount o ood available, disrupt peoples access to

ood, limits amilies access to ood preparation acilities

and health care, and increase uncertainty about satisy-

ing uture needs or ood and nutrition.

Deaths directly attributable to war appear to be

declining, but war and other kinds o conict continue

to take a toll on human health, oten through oodinsecurity. Conict induces the aected populations to

adopt coping strategies that invariably reduce their ood

consumption and nutrition. Poor nutritional status in

individuals o any age makes them more susceptible to

illness and death.

But the acute ood insecurity caused by conict has

especially potent and long-lasting eects on children.

Children whose nutrition is compromised by ood inse-

curity beore they are two years old suer irreversible

harm to their cognitive and physical capacities.

Analysis o the causes o conict and war has beenan area o growing academic interest. Both theo-

retical work and empirical analyses substantiate the

many ways in which ood insecurity can trigger, uel,

or sustain conict. Unanticipated ood price rises re-

quently provide a spark or unrest. Conict among

groups competing to control the natural resources

needed or ood production can catalyze conict.

Social, political, or economic inequities that aect

peoples ood security can exacerbate grievances and

build momentum toward conict. Incentives to join

or support conicts and rebellions stem rom a num-ber o causes, o which the protection o ood security

is just one. Food insecurity may also help to sustain

conict. I post-conict recovery proves dicult and

ood insecurity remains high, incentives or reignit-

ing conict may be strengthened.

Given the complexity o actors underlying ood secu-

rity, however, we do not yet understand what levels or

aspects o ood insecurity are most likely, in what circum-

stances, to directly contribute to or cause conict. More

explicit integration o ood security variables into theories

o conict could help inorm external interventions aimed

at mitigating ood insecurity and preventing conict.

Te high human and economic costs o conict and

ood insecurity already provide substantial incentives or

international humanitarian and development organiza-tions to intervene in order to alleviate ood insecurity in

ragile states and conict-aected societies. Experience

suggests, however, that eective eorts to address ood

insecurity in these situations may require external actors

to reconsider the ways in which they intervene.

Modiying operational approaches to ensure greater

complementarity and continuity between humanitar-

ian and development interventions, or example, could

help to improve eectiveness and impact. External sup-

port could help to strengthen institutions critical to

ood security and conict prevention in ragile states.Engaging more closely with households caught in

conict-created poverty traps could alleviate persistent

ood insecurity and potentially sustain conict recovery.

And mobilizing civil society and private businesses as

partners could enable both humanitarian and develop-

ment organizations to broaden the capacities or conict

recovery and ood security.

But experience also shows that actions taken without

an adequate understanding o the complex and con-

ounding events associated with conict and ood inse-

curity may ail to achieve those goals and could makethings worse. Tere is, thereore, broad agreement that

rapid assessments conducted on the ground in specic

situations are essential to guide short-term interventions

that address acute needs. o break a cycle o recurring

violence and ood insecurity, rapid assessments must be

We ece s, s S, ece

scc e bece p cs cce sb.



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complemented with cross-country and multi-location

analyses that take a broader and longer view o the causes

and consequences o conict, especially violent conict.

Approximately 1.5 billion people live in conict-

aected, post-conict, or ragile countries. In recogni-tion o the act that violent conict can impede or even

reverse the processes o economic, social, and politi-

cal change, organizations such as the U.S. Agency or

International Development (USAID) have developed

comprehensive approaches to conict prevention, man-

agement, mitigation, and recovery.

USAID programs nearly 60 percent o its total

resources as humanitarian aid or development assis-

tance in ragile and conict-aected countries. USAID,

thereore, has a huge stake in better understanding the

dynamics o conict. o the extent that ood insecurityis a causal or contributing actor or conict, USAIDs

eorts in ragile countries to improve access to ood and

increase the availability and stability o ood supplies

could also help to reduce the risks o conict.

Since 2009, the United States and the other Group

o Eight (G-8) members have made signicant com-

mitments to improving global ood security. Tey have

committed more than $22 billion over a three-year peri-

od to expand investments in agricultural development.

Te United States launched its agship initiative, Feed

the Future, in 2010 and USAID has taken the lead inthe programs implementation.

O the 19 priority countries initially targeted or

Feed the Future assistance, 11 have experienced violent

conict within the last 10 years. At least 5 experienced

ood riots or demonstrations in 2008.

Te immediate challenge or USAID is to integrate

analytical eorts on conict and ood security, with a

view to shaping more eective interventions. Tis report

provides a rst step toward meeting this challenge.

Drawing on some o the ndings that emerge rom a

review o both experience and analysis, this report lays

out the ollowing broad observations and recommenda-

tions to guide USAIDs uture engagement:

USAID has immediate opportunities to apply and

rene its guidance on program implementation

related to conict and ood security in Feed the

Futureocus countries. USAID is already program-

ming both humanitarian and development assis-

tance in 16 o the 19 countries. Nine o them are

currently identied as ragile or conict-aected.

USAID will, however, need to pay close atten-

tion to setting its priorities or work in ragile and

conict-aected countries. O the 10 countriesranked at the top o the Failed States Index, only

1 (Haiti) is a Feed the Future country. All, how-

ever, are recipients o other USAID assistance.

Expanding commitments in these ragile or ailing

states will pose serious trade-os in terms o policy,

stang, and unding.

USAID could build on its long experience with

community-based ood security programs, using

a mix o emergency and development program-

ming to expand grassroots eorts in other conict-vulnerable contexts.

USAID should clariy its learning goals on

conict and ood security, deliberately support-

ing additional research, improving ood security

monitoring and evaluation eorts in conict-

aected areas, and partnering with others to

deepen knowledge on violence, ragility, ood

security, and development.



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i. ic

tee sb b uSaid pe Se e Ce Bs e Bes.

P ces fck se Se e Ce.



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global coRn and soybean pRices rose in

mid-2012 as drought in the American Midwest devas-

tated crop yields. Te possibility that increasing prices

would translate into a new round o increased world-

wide ood insecurity in 2013 was worrying news. Tenegative political and human security eects o the ood

riots that began in 2008 were resh in leaders minds.

Te eruption o violent conicts in rural areas o Mali,

Sudan, and South Sudan continued to link the issues o

ood and conict in the media headlines.1

Even in ogo, protests seemingly grounded in politi-

cal issues included ood among the issues. A 2012

New York imesarticle highlighted the concerns o the

opposition-led campaign, Save ogo, when violent

protests were taking place during the summer o 2012.

Were asking or a radical change in our country, saidJil-Benot Aangbedji, a lawyer who was helping to run

Save ogo at the time o the article. Te reason cited by

Aangbedji? Te ogolese are not eating three times a

day. Te authorities are dea to our demands. But we are

not going to shut up (Nossiter, 2012).

Since 2008, both the levels and volatility o global

ood prices have come to the ore as important causes

o social and political instability. In early 2008, rapid

increases in the global prices or major grainsrice,

wheat, and corntriggered outbreaks o civil unrest in

48 countries around the world (Brinkman & Hendrix,2011). In April o that year, the government o Haiti ell

ater a week o ood riots, as people protested against the

rising costs o basic ood staples. In spite o a proposal to

slash the price o rice, Haitis prime minister was voted

out o oce (Delva & Loney, 2008).

Further, both the Food and Agriculture Organization

o the United Nations (FAO) and the World Bank esti-

mated that, as hard-pressed low-income consumers had

to pay more or staple grains, an additional 75 million

to 160 million people were likely to be experiencing

hunger and poverty.2 Te then-president o the WorldBank, Robert Zoellick, predicted that the skyrocketing

prices would lead not only to immediate hardships but

to seven lost years in the ght against world poverty

(Riots, Instability Spread, 2008). Governments scram-

bled to moderate the higher prices, especially or poor

urban consumers, by blocking grain exports, reducing

taris on imports, and releasing security stocks to calm

markets (Benson et al., 2008).3

Te United Nations Secretary-General convened a

High-Level ask Force on Food Security in an eort toenable the many UN agencies involved in ood, health,

and agriculture to respond in a coordinated way to a

threat o global instability (Ki-moon, 2011).

World grain prices declined again by the end o 2008

and were relatively low in 2009 (Figure 1; FAO, 2013).

But levels in 2010 and 2011 were higher than the peak

o 2008, repeatedly rising to levels associated with grow-

ing ood insecurity, again sparking public protests; again,

governments struggled to respond. In September 2010,

citizens in Maputo, Mozambique, rioted over a govern-

ment decision to raise the price o bread. Governmenteorts to control the crowds resulted in deaths and inju-

ries (Reuters, 2010). In 2011, the inability o govern-

ments in the Middle East to sustain subsidies or bread,

a critical staple or the majority o the population, was

blamed, at least in part, or the popular uprisings o the

Arab Spring (Zuryak, 2011; Rosenberg, 2011).

However, compelling headlines that suggest a direct

link between hunger and political instability or conict

capture only part o the story. Analysts suggest that a

more complex picture needs to be painted i we are to

understand the relationship between conict and oodinsecurity. Spiking ood prices may provide an incen-

tive or people to give voice to underlying grievances

on other conditions that aect their ood securityor

example, jobs, incomes, or government policies (Bush,

2010). Where there has been a ailure o governance,

such as in Somalia, recurrent ood scarcity and am-

ine become part o a vicious cycle o instability, with

ood insecurity both resulting rom and contributing to

repeated rounds o armed conict. In other countries,

such as Sudan, ood shortages and hunger are intended

outcomes o conrontation and conict, although a hosto economic, political, and ethnic actors combined to

drive that country toward civil war.

Tis report explores more deeply the complex link-

ages between ood insecurity and a range o orms o

conict: rom the short-lived but sometimes violent



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public protests and demonstrations that constitute ood

riots; to violent clashes between communities over access

to the natural resources that are undamental to ood

production and rural livelihoods; to the sustained armed

conict that occurs both within and between nations,

devastating lives and livelihoods as ood becomes scarce.Deaths directly attributable to war appear to be declin-

ing (Goldstein, 2011), but war and other kinds o con-

ict continue to take a toll on human health and mor-

tality, oten through ood insecurity. Conict induces

aected populations to adopt coping strategies that

invariably reduce their ood consumption and nutrition

(Maxwell & Caldwell, 2008). Tese indirect eects will

have negative economic and social eects or decades to

come (UNICEF, 2009).

Te World Banks 2011 World Development Report

(WDR), which ocuses on conict, security, and develop-

ment, states that a lack o collective security has become

a primary development challenge o our time (p. 1):

One-and-a-hal billion people live in areas aect-

ed by ragility, conict, or large-scale, organized

criminal violence, and no low-income ragile

or conict-aected country has yet to achieve a

single United Nations Millennium Development

Goal. New threatsorganized crime and track-

ing, civil unrest due to global economic shocks,

terrorismhave supplemented continued preoc-cupations with conventional war between and

within countries. While much o the world has

made rapid progress in reducing poverty in the

past 60 years, areas characterized by repeated

cycles o political and criminal violence are being

let ar behind, with their economic growth com-

promised and their human indicators stagnant.

Tere are ew more sensitive and important indica-

tors o human welare than those relating to hunger

and ood security. Lie cannot continue without ood.

Hunger indicates a lack o ood. It is measured by the

degree to which a persons intake o calories alls below

the levels needed to sustain good health.

Te concept o ood security is more complex. It

encompasses not only individuals intakes o nutrients

FiguRe 1: gb F Pce tes

Sce: Fao, 2013

250

230

190

160

130

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Food

Price

Index

(20022004

=

100)



11/56

but also the production, processing, and marketing

systems that determines its cost and shape peoples

ood choices and concerns about acquiring ood in the

uture as well as today. As dened at the 1996 World

Food Summit, Food security exists when all people,at all times, have physical and economic access to su-

cient, saeand nutritious ood that meets their dietary

needs and ood preerences or an active and healthy

lie (FAO, 2006a).

Food security is generally characterized as having

our dimensions:

Availability: the suciency o supply through

production and/or trade;

Access: the ability to purchase ood in markets orproduce ood or onesel;

Utilization: being able to meet all physiological

needs or a healthy and productive lie through the

diet, without (or in spite o) losses due to lack o

clean water, sanitation, and health care; and,

Stability: the ability to access ood at all times, in

all seasons, in spite o price changes or other ac-

tors aecting availability.

Many actorsbad weather, expensive transporta-

tion, income loss, illnessescan reduce ood security.

Food insecurity occurs when peoples access to the ood

that they produce themselves or to ood in markets is

disrupted, reducing the volume and quality o oods

available to them; the resulting diets provide them insu-

cient nutrients or an active and healthy lie. Food inse-

curity can be experienced either as a normal condition

o lie (chronic ood insecurity) or as something moreextreme (acuteood insecurity) (FEWS NE, 2011).

Conict adds another dimension to this mix o ac-

tors driving ood insecurity. As is discussed in Section II

o this report, conict clearly contributes to both chronic

and acute ood insecurity in many ways. An FAO report

nds that the mortality caused by conict through ood

insecurity and amine can exceed the deaths caused

directly rom violence (FAO, 2000). Poor nutritional

status in individuals o any age makes them more sus-

ceptible to illness and death.4 But acute ood insecurity

and associated malnutrition that derive rom conictwill have an especially potent and long-lasting eect

on children. Children whose nutrition is compromised

beore they are two years old suer irreversible harm to

their cognitive and physical capacities.5

Also o concern is whether ood insecurity itsel is

a actor in the outbreak o conict; sustains or ampli-

es it; or acilitates its recurrence. Section III draws

largely on material rom case studies to suggest ways

in which actors related to ood insecurity gure into

conict. Conict among groups competing or con-

trol o resources or power (horizontal conict), orexample, can stem rom a scarcity o the resources

needed or ood production (e.g., o land, water, or

other environmental services). In some cases, govern-

ments seek to exert dominance over their citizens and

ace sec ssce ee

cfc w e espec pe -seec ce. Ce wse s cpse

bee e e w es se eesbe e

ce psc cpces.



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use the levers o ood insecurity to bring those citi-

zens to heel (verticalconict). In other cases, vertical

conict results as citizens organize rebellions, some-

times violent, against a central government when they

believe their interests, including their ood security,are compromised.

Section IV draws on both empirical case studies and

theories to suggest ways that external interventions

could better respond to the challenge o reducing ood

insecurity and conict, especially in ragile or weak

states. Each situation requires an in-depth assessment

to understand the dynamics o conict and the role

that actors underlying ood insecurity in that specic

context may play in that conict. Without such assess-

ments, interventions run the risk o making things

worse rather than better.Section V considers the implications o the conict

ood security discussion or development programming.

Approximately 1.5 billion people live in conict-aect-

ed, post-conict, or ragile countries. In recognition

o the act that conict, especially violent conict, can

impede or even reverse the process o economic, social,

and political change underpinning development, orga-

nizations such as USAID have developed a compre-

hensive approach to conict prevention, management,

and mitigation over the last decade (USAID, 2012b).

USAID implements nearly 60 percent o its resourcesor humanitarian aid or development assistance in these

countries (U.S. Department o State & USAID, 2010).

USAID has a huge stake in better understanding the

dynamics o conict, both to prevent it and to iden-

tiy potential interventions that could be eective in

addressing the ood insecurity that it causes. Further, to

the extent that ood insecurity is a causal or contribut-

ing actor or conict, eorts to improve the availability,

access, and stability o ood supplies should also help to

reduce the threat o conict and instability.

Since 2009, the United States and other G-8 mem-

bers have made signicant commitments to improving

global ood security, committing more than $20 bil-lion over a three-year period to expanded investments

in agricultural development (LAquila Food Security

Initiative, 2009). Te United States launched its ag-

ship ood initiative, Feed the Future, in 2010 and

USAID has taken the lead in implementing the pro-

gram. O the 19 priority countries initially targeted or

Feed the Future assistance, 11 have experienced violent

conict within the last 10 years. At least 5 experienced

ood riots or demonstrations in 2008 (see Figure 2)

(Schneider, 2008).

Te immediate challenge or the U.S. government ingeneraland USAID specicallyis to integrate ana-

lytical eorts on conict and ood security with a view

to shaping more eective interventions. Tis report pro-

vides a rst step toward meeting this challenge.

nes

1. WFP (2012) highlights conicts in Mali, South

Sudan, the Democratic Republic o Congo, and

Yemenall o which are experiencing rises in ood

insecurity. See also Kristo (2012).2. Headey (2011) questions the validity o these

estimates.

3. For snapshots o and government responses to ood

riots by country, see Schneider (2008).

4. Maternal and Child Undernutrition (2008)

provides a recent review o these data.

5. See Maternal and Child Undernutrition (2008)

and UNICEF & World Bank (2011).



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ii. hw des Cc aec

F Sec?

lesck e w ke e mekee, t, Ep. P ces fck se Kee lc.



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tHeRe is substantial empiRical evidence

that conict has a negative impact on ood security. Te

impact may be minor, as when spontaneous protest

demonstrations over rising ood prices take place in or

around ood markets and disrupt or close down vendorsoperations. At the other extreme, there are ood warsa

concept which includes the use o hunger as a weapon in

active conict and the ood insecurity that accompanies

and ollows as a consequence, according to Ellen Messer

et al. (2000, p. 1). Tey reported that such wars aected

nearly 24 million people in 28 countries in 2000.

Western Sudans Darur conict, which broke out

in 2004, presents an enduring case o a ood war.

UNICEF (2004) estimates that 4.7 million people are

currently experiencing direct eects o the conict.

Sudan political analyst Alex de Waal (2004) describesthe approach used by the government o Sudan in

responding to the demands o rebellious groups

as counter-insurgency on the cheapamine and

scorched earth their weapons o choice:

Each time, they sought out a local militia, provided it

with supplies and armaments, and declared the area

o operations an ethics-ree zoneTe atrocities

carried out by the Janjawiid [one such militia]are

systematic and sustained; the eect, i not the aim,

is grossly disproportionate to the military threat othe rebellionIn Darur, cutting down ruit trees or

destroying irrigation ditches is a way o eradicating

armers claims to the land and ruining livelihoods.

Such deliberate assaults on ood and agriculture are

not waged in all wars, but there are no conicts in which

additional hunger and ood insecurity are not an out-

come. Conict negatively aects all our dimensions o

ood security: availability, access, utilization, and stability.

Cfc reces eab F

Food availability, one o the our dimensions o ood

security, is aected by conict, even when the duration

o conict is relatively short.

Fr, r r. Hostilities,

especially armed hostilities, prevent normal arming,

shing, and herding operations rom being carried out.

For the millions o poor households whose principal

source o incomeand much o their ood supplyisderived rom agricultural production, conict can inict

signicant damage to livelihoods and ood security. For

example, a study o 14 countries ound that production

levels were, on average, 12.3 percent lower in conict

periods than in peacetime in 13 o those countries, with

Angolan armers experiencing reductions as high as 44

percent (Messer et al., 2000).

Tere is also evidence that households in conict-

aected areas deliberately make choices that reduce

their production and, thus, the risks o predation, loot-

ing, or loss o crops or livestock. In northern Uganda,or example, households shited their livestock holdings

rom cattle to small ruminants, reducing the value o their

herds by two-thirds (Rockmore, 2012). An FAO analysis

concluded that global agricultural losses due to conict

between 1970 and 1997 averaged $4.3 billion annually

(in 1995 constant U.S. dollars), exceeding the value o

ood aid to these countries. Tis implies a net reduction

o ood availability not just to producers but also to the

consuming population as a whole (FAO, 2000, able 7).

Recruitment o young males into conict reduces

the supply o labor or herding or arming. Women andchildren may be let to work the elds and tend the ani-

mals, but in many cases they do so under conditions

that threaten their saety and well-being.

Oten, members o rural households in conict zones

simply ee their armlands, leaving most o their assets

(including stored crops) and livelihoods behind. In

many cases, they end up as displaced persons in com-

munities where they have ew claims to land or in camps

managed by the international humanitarian communi-

ty. For example, the Oce o the United Nations High

Commissioner or Reugees (UNHCR) estimates thatmore than 400,000 Malians, many o them pastoralists

or armers, were displaced across borders with neigh-

boring countries or within Mali beginning in January

2012, when communal conict, insurgency, and mili-

tary actions broke out.



15/56

Te way that conicts are carried out can reduce ood

and agricultural production capacitiesand the availabili-

ty o oodeven when peace is achieved. When landmines

are placed on agricultural land or rural roads during con-

ict, or unexploded ordnance is widely scattered in rural

areas, the resumption o arming and herding operationscan take years ater the termination o hostilities. ree

crops abandoned when households ee rom conict are

attacked by pests and diseases, and productivity levels can-

not be recaptured immediately when peace is achieved.

Other actions can reduce productive capacity and

result in permanently reduced ood availability. For

example, armed conict in the Democratic Republic

o Congo permitted the growth o unregulated mining

o valuable columbite-tantalite (also known as coltan)

deposits underlying arable land in the North and South

Kivu regions. Te mining rendered signicant amountso land unusable or agriculture (UNDP, 2010). Civil

war in Liberia and Sudan caused environmental damage

through extensive deorestation, with resulting eects

on ecosystem services that compromise prospects or

ood security (UNDP, 2010, p. 66).

s, r w . Conict

reduces physical security, even or people not directly

engaged as combatants or victims o violence. Tis inse-

curity disrupts normal commerce, directly reducing

ows o ood through market channels, as marketingagents ace high risks o loss through thet and high costs

i they try to protect their stocks. Further, international

humanitarian organizations are only too aware that,

since ood is a valuable commodity in a resource-con-

strained environment, supplies o ood readily become

targets or competing parties, and ood assistance pipe-

lines are adjusted accordingly.

In Somalia in 2008 and 2009, or example, ood aid

was a source o competition, diversion, and manipu-

lation. o prevent losses, ood aid transporters were

required to pay a deposit equal to the value o the oodin order to ensure its arrival at the intended destination.

Fears about the loss or diversion o ood aid made

donors more wary and access by agencies more dicult

(IFRC, 2011, pp. 12728). Te lack o physical security

thus contributed to a downward spiral regarding ood

availability, even though needs increased as the num-

bers o internally displaced persons (IDPs) jumped rom

300,000 in 2007 to nearly 1.4 million two years later.

thr, h r -

r rk - r . Governments, either intentionally or

because conict is threatened, divert unds rom agricul-

tural development to conict-related expenditures (e.g.,

acquiring armaments and nancing military operations).

In other cases, governments must adjust their budget-

ary priorities to support the emergency relie and recon-

struction activities necessitated by communal conict.

International borrowing capacity to sustain investments

may also shrink as current account decits pile up (espe-

cially i earnings rom trade are dependent on agricultural

commodities), debt payments are missed, and sovereigndeaults seem likely (Chapman & Reinhardt, 2009).

Te risk o conict generally discourages private

investment in agriculture, although the possibility o

private investors aligning themselves with particular war-

ring actions in order to acquire both production assets

tee e cfcs wc e

sec e ce. Cfc ee ecs

ess sec: b, ccess,z, sb.



16/56

and protected rights to markets has been noted (Bennett,

2001). Domestic investors hesitate to invest in regions

with agricultural potential, especially when the conict

is horizontal, and competition over potentially produc-

tive land and water resources is at the root o the conict.Estimates o capital ight rom Arica, prompted in part

by potential instability, range around 35 to 40 percent o

all private wealth (Collier, 2007; Collier et al., 2001).

Foreign investors, too, generally perceive the risks o

loss to be unacceptably high. An FAO analysis o experi-

ences in conict-aected sub-Saharan countries during

the period o 1975 to 1997 ound that, while agricul-

tural losses were compensated by donor capital ows,

oreign direct investment levels were signicantly lower

than losses (FAO, 2000, able 9).

Tus, oreign assistance unds have helped to com-pensate or the lack o public and private investments

in conict-aected countries. But donors also oten seek

to promote agricultural investments aimed at reducing

the risk o conict in the uture with their nancing. In

Aghanistan, or example, donors have promoted agri-

cultural investments that encourage armers to move

away rom opium production that, although protable,

provides unding or insurgent war eorts. Investments

in developing licit and protable agricultural activities

whose principal benet would be the ood security o

the producers are, however, not always successul (Wardet al., 2008; USAID Oce o Inspector General, 2008).

Reduced agricultural production and slowed invest-

ments in processing and trading activities resulting

rom violent conict contribute in many agriculture-

dependent low-income countries to what the Global

Poverty Project describes as development in reverse

a shortcut to extreme poverty. Te World Bank esti-

mates that civil conict causes a 2.2 percent reduction

in gross domestic product (GDP) per year. O the 29

conict-aected countries included in a report rom the

United Nations Development Program, just 3 reportedany growth in GDP during the conict and 9 experi-

enced GDP declines o over 50 percent (UNDP, 2010).

Decreased ood production and availability is likely

to accompany such a decline in GDP. As less oreign

exchange is available to be allocated or the importing

o ood and ertilizers, ood production and processing

enterprises are less likely to grow and there will be less

investment in the market inrastructure necessary to

link ood producers and consumers.

F, r rh hrh

h r -r

. Production equipment, animals, seed supplies,

and ood stocks are oten casualties o conict, deliberately

destroyed by competing actions. Such destruction reduces

ood availability in the short term, but it also prevents a

resumption o productive activities and recovery o liveli-

hoods in post-conict periods. During the Mozambique

civil war, there was a two-thirds reduction in operational

dams and plant nurseries, with 40 percent o rural acilities

destroyed or eroded (Brown et al., 2011, p. 11; Brck,2001). Additionally, as Collier et al. (2003) point out, the

national cattle stock was reduced by almost 80 percent dur-

ing the course o the conict. Similarly, during the 1994

genocide in Rwanda, the national cattle stock declined 50

percent (Verpoorten, 2009).

Post-conict recovery o agricultural production is

oten urther impeded by the increased poverty o people

aected by the conict. Even when they are able to reoc-

cupy their lands or homes, they have lost their economic

ability to reinvest in lost assets (Ibez & Moya, 2010).

Cfc reces access F

Access to ood is the most dening aspect o an indi-

viduals ood security. Access implies that consumers

have both the physical and economic ability to acquire

the ood they need. Physical access is provided either

by production on ones own arm or by going to mar-

kets in which supplies are available. Economicaccess to

ood depends upon prices, incomes, and households

competing expenditure needs. Delivery o ood aid to

populations by national or international humanitarianorganizations can compensate, to some extent, or dis-

ruptions to either physical or economic access.

Populations orcibly displaced by violent conict suer

the greatest reductions in their access to ood. Teir eco-

nomic access is hit hard as they are separated rom their



17/56

sources o livelihood and income. Teir physical access

may be urther compromised i they move into areas where

markets are limited. In some cases, reugees liquidate their

assets to generate cash in hopes o being able to purchase

oods that will sustain them in exile. A crisis sale o live-stock or grain, however, oten drives prices down and gen-

erates returns that are less than anticipated. In some cases,

eeing households are able to take ood stocks with them,

but oten they leave with ew reserves and quickly become

dependent on international assistance.

Populations eeing violent conict or the relative

saety o reugee camps claim priority attention rom

international organizations, such as the UNHCR and

World Food Program (WFP). Te provision o emer-

gency ood assistance is oten rapidly organized using the

Central Emergency Response Fund until donors respondto specic appeals or nancing and commodities. Given

limitations on the volume o internationally donated or

nanced ood assistance, however, only a portion o the

directly aected people are likely to receive ood deliver-

ies or income support adequate to assure ood security.

Households relocated to camps established by the inter-

national community or the purpose o accommodating

reugees are likely to be rst in line or basic rations o the

ood aid packagegrain, oil, and a corn-soy blendbut

they will be hard-pressed to nd the vegetables or meat

that would enrich the nutritional value o their diets. Temost vulnerable households and individuals among the

displaced (the elderly, the chronically sick, orphans, and

the disabled) are likely to remain more ood-insecure than

others (Bukuluki et al., 2008).

When the displaced people move to established

towns or cities experiencing peaceul conditions, physi-

cal access to ood supplies in markets may be within

reach, but the migrants economic access is likely to

be seriously aected. Displaced households are likely

to have let many assets behind and to have limited

amounts o unds with them. Tey then conrontinated market prices as traders anticipate the growth in

demand and/or raise their prices to cover the costs asso-

ciated with increased risks, especially when conict is

ongoing. For households displaced to relatively peaceul

areas, humanitarian programs are increasingly likely to

use some orm o cash or voucher-based assistance as an

appropriate way to address ood security (Meyer, 2007).

Tis access-ocused approach allows markets to play a

major role in ood supply and gives recipients greater

ability to exercise their consumption preerences.Te provision o such economic assistance to dis-

placed populations, however, may reduce the ood secu-

rity o people in the receiving community. Te increased

demand created by the additional purchasing power o

migrants, or example, may boost prices or the origi-

nal residents as well. When receiving communities are

home to many ood-insecure people, the perception

that humanitarian eorts are providing unequal access

to reugees may itsel give rise to grievances. o prevent

conict at this community level, ood assistance may

need to be extended to all, at least until markets adjust(Reugees International, 2012).

Evidence rom several conicts demonstrates that

markets do adapt to conditions o instability or conict.

Private sector marketing agents respond to demand, per-

haps in recognition that ood is such a basic need that, in

spite o high costs or poor quality, people will be prepared

to spend moneyand even borrow moneyto get it.

In some cases, however, ood markets do not adjust

and do not provide access to ood supplies. Markets

are deliberately disrupted by actions in the conict

and pose unacceptable risks to marketing agents. Highprices or transportation and communications reect

these risky conditions; in other cases, the destruction

o inrastructure makes it physically impossible to move

supplies to markets. Markets become less competitive as

the credit small traders need to support their activities

is constrained by the prospect o violence.1 Further, due

to the general lack o physical security in conict zones,

people may simply not eel sae traveling to markets

(Perry & Borchard, 2010).

Both physical and economic access to ood in these

cases becomes problematic, sometimes orcing theaected populations to undertake urther migration or

to adopt coping behaviors that permit survival.

When governments are not active parties in a con-

ict, it may be possible or them to extend ood saety

nets to the aected populations, complementing or



18/56

supplementing international ood relie eorts.2 Tese

saety nets can improve either physical access, by ensur-

ing nonmarket distributions when markets no longer

unction, or economic access, by providing cash grants

or ood- or cash-or-work to vulnerable households.

Cfc ips e Eeceuz F

Te eective utilization o ood is a measure o how

well ood supplies accessible to consumers are used to

promote their health and productivity. According to the

FAO, [u]tilization reers to the proper use o ood and

includes the existence o appropriate ood processing

and storage practices, adequate knowledge and applica-

tion o nutrition and child care and adequate health andsanitation services (Cohen et al., n.d., p. 14).

In low-income developing countries, ood utilization

is more oten compromised than either ood availability

or access, even under peacetime conditions. Many con-

sumers routinely incur signicant health risks when they

eat unsae ood (e.g., inected with aatoxin or harmul

bacteria), and drink, wash, or cook ood in contaminat-

ed water. Insucient knowledge o appropriate nutri-

tional and child care practices or young children con-

tinues to exacerbate both high inant mortality rates and

high levels o stunting (low height or age) and wasting(low weight or height).

Limited access to health care also reduces individuals

eective utilization o ood. o increase the biological

benets o ood, it is essential to curb the incidence o

communicable diseases; the relationship between inec-

tions and malnutrition is increasingly well articulated

(Ambrus, Sr. & Ambrus, Jr., 2004). Tere is also a great-

er appreciation o the role that hookworm and other

neglected tropical diseases associated with poor water

and sanitation practices play in micronutrient malnutri-

tion (Smith & Brooker, 2010).Conict makes eective ood utilization much more

dicult. It not only reduces both the availability o and

access to sae and nutritious oodand especially perish-

able oods o high nutritional value (vegetables, ruits,

milk, meat)but it also makes proper preparation and

storage o the ood that is available more complicated.

Conict also makes it dangerous or women and children

to collect rewood and clean water or cooking in many

situations, even within supposedly secure camp areas

where women and children constitute the vast majorityo the population. Te possibility o urther displacement

or the threat o thet discourages people rom storing ood

to smooth their consumption patterns over time.

Te reduced access to health care associated with con-

ict, however, seems to have the greatest impact on ood

utilization. Health acilities are destroyed during violent

conict. Te killing or ight o trained health workers

and the lack o public nancing or medications and

vaccinations exacerbate the loss o public health acili-

ties. Very high mortality and morbidity rates are rou-

tinely reported among populations aected by conict.3Health services such as vaccinations are oten provided

in camps that receive international humanitarian support,

including ood, but crowding and poor shelter conditions

give rise to epidemics o communicable diseases, which

oten prove atal in populations with poor nutritional sta-

tus. ALancet review o health care in conict settings,

moreover, nds that people internally displaced by con-

ict oten do not go to camps. Paul B. Spiegel et al. (2010)

nd that high coverage o health interventions outside

o camp settings is especially challenging because o poor

security, intermittent accessibility, and the incapacity oragile states to eectively provide services to their own

populations or to those who are displaced.

Cfc iceses ucere F ab,

access, uz

Conict by denition involves social, economic, and

political instability. Te impact o such instability on

households varies, but there is evidence that the ourth

dimension o ood securitypredictability, stability, cer-taintyis strongly aected by conict. Conict-related

uncertainty aects the decisions made by arming and

rural populations about whether to invest resources in

uture agricultural production and risk its loss or to ee

with no assurance o uture supplies.



19/56

Oten, according to the 2012 Arica Human

Development Report, conict means that []arm house-

holds [themselves] become ood insecureunable

to buy or sell ood. Even when warring parties allow

exchanges, armers and traders might hesitate, ear-ing conscation, thet, or taxes (oten in the orm o

the orced supply o ood to the more powerul war-

ring side). During Mozambiques civil war, or instance,

small-holder armers retreated into subsistence arming

(UNDP, 2012, p. 43). Such choices by producers have

knock-on eects, aecting ood supply or towns and

cities and inuencing uture prices. Greater volatility in

markets may increase urban consumers perceptions o

risk and spark panic-buying or hoarding to improve the

security o their ood supplies (Nellemann et al., 2009).

External interventions intended to reduce conict-related uncertainties associated with ood supplies and

prices (e.g., increased imports o ood, ree distributions

o ood aid, or the provision o price subsidies or poor

consumers) may improve the situation or some, but

increase uncertainties or others in the ood and agricul-

tural system. For example, traders who normally manage

the ow o ood rom producers or importers through

markets may nd themselves competing with ree ood

distributors or having their stocks commandeered (i not

stolen) to meet the needs o those who cannot pay.

Households have developed and demonstrated arange o coping behaviors or dealing with impending

ood insecurity. Daniel Maxwell and Richard Caldwell

(2008) have ound that responses all into our categories:

dietary change, short-term measures to increase house-

hold ood availability, short-term measures to decrease

the number o people to eed, and rationing to manage

the shortall. Extended conict and the uncertainties

related to both availability and access to ood are likely

to lead to the most extreme o these behaviors: ration-

ing ood. Rationing could transorm chronic ood inse-

curity into acute ood insecurity or some households,with long-term eects on adequate diets or pregnant

and lactating mothers and young children and a poten-

tial loss o productivity in jobs requiring physical eort.

Households responses to conict-driven uncertainties

with regard to ood supply and accessibility will, thus,

plant the seeds or lasting uncertainty regarding uture

ood security.

It is now understood, or example, that an adequate

quality and quantity o ood and eeding in the rst1,000 days o a childs lie is critical to their uture devel-

opment (Maternal and Child Undernutrition, 2008).

Conictand the strategies that people adopt to cope

with uncertainties o ood supply and accessinicts

irreversible damage on the children o war and on their

chances or a more ood-secure uture.

Research by the Households in Conict Network at the

Institute o Development Studies, or example, ound that

war-exposed children in Eritrea and Ethiopia rom 1998

to 2000 were more stunted than children rom outside the

war zone and that children on the losing side (Eritrea) weremore severely aected (Akresh et al., 2010). As is requently

the case in conict, amilies were displaced and suered the

consequences: loss o assets, worsened access to water and

health care, and disruption o agricultural production. Tis

displacement and its impact on ood intakes and nutrition-

al status are, thereore, projected to have imposed perma-

nent negative eects on the childrens educational attain-

ments and their earnings as adults (Verwimp & Van Bavel,

2004; Justino, 2009; Justino, 2012).

nes

1. For a good discussion o the interacting actors

that reduce market access, see World Food

Program (2010a).

2. For example, Colombia provides active

coordination o both government and NGO

eorts to support the ood security o IDPs in

that country. While Matthew Finger (2011) notes

that Colombia, with the second-largest number o

IDPs in the world, arguably has one o the most

advanced systems or providing assistance, manyothers criticize the governments perormance in

implementing its policies.

3. For data on eects in Mozambique, East imor, and

Sierra Leone, see Waters et al. (2007).



20/56

iii. hw des F isecCbe Cc?

hs C Se qee . P ces fck se un P/Sp Ps.



21/56

WHile tHe evidence that conict causes ood

insecurity is clear and unassailable, the case that ood inse-

curity directly causes conict is more dicult to make, in

part because there are so many underlying causes o ood

insecurity. Tere is, however, an emerging consensus thatood insecurity joins with other actors to worsen insta-

bility in societies, economies, and polities (Bora et al.,

2010). A new body o research is under way to identiy

how this plays into the dynamics o conict (Brinkman &

Hendrix, 2011). Case studies and other analyses o ood

insecurity and conict suggest there are several ways in

which ood insecurity could spark conicts.

Se F Pce rsesC te Cfc

An unexpected or higher-than-normal rise in ood pric-

es, which has an immediate impact on purchasing power

and thus access to ood, has already been noted as a key

mechanism linking ood insecurity and conict. Food

prices can rise rapidly in response to shits in global mar-

kets, local shortalls in supply that cannot be or are not

compensated by trade, or deliberate changes in policies,

especially those that lead to the removal o subsidies or

price controls. Such price increases oten bring protest-

ing people into the streets. Food protestssometimes

peaceul, sometimes violentensue.Food riots have a long history. Prior to the French

Revolution in 1789, protests were directed at producers,

traders, and merchants with the goal o orcing them to

lower ood prices. Since the French Revolution, howev-

er, ood riots have become more political in nature and

are largely an urban phenomenon (Bellemare, 2011).

Protests against extraordinary increases in the price

o rice (and, to a lesser extent, the prices o wheat and

corn) led to a number o outbreaks o civil unrest in

2007 and 2008. Most involved nonviolent demon-

strations that lasted a ew days at most. Others turnedviolent and resulted in deaths. Demonstrations have

continued sporadically rom 2008 to the present as

price volatility continues to aect global commodity

markets and as national governments react to interna-

tional price changes in dierent ways.

Marc Bellemare (2011) has explored the causal

pathways between rising ood prices, the volatility o

ood prices, and political unrest. Using monthly inor-

mation on global ood and cereal prices and newspa-

per reports o ood riots rom January 1990 to January2011, he concludes that rising ood prices, and spe-

cically cereal prices, caused political unrest, but that

price volatility did not.

Marco Lagi et al. (2011) examined the coincidence o

high global ood prices in 2011 and the riots that led to

the revolutions o the Arab Spring. Tey conclude that

it was highly likely that, while there were many other

actors in play, high ood prices were a precipitating con-

dition or the unrest.

Te potential or protests to become violent likely

depends on contextual actors such as perceived govern-ment eectiveness and average income levels. For exam-

ple, in recent research Joachim von Braun noted that the

ratio o violent to nonviolent ood price-related protests in

2008 was higher in low-income countries and in countries

with lower government eectiveness (von Braun, 2008;

Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011). Tere were 19 ood pro-

tests in low-income countries, and 11 involved violence.

O the 15 protests in lower-middle-income countries, only

7 were violent; o the 6 protests in upper-middle-income

countries, 2 were violent; and o the 9 ood protests in

upper-income countries, none were violent (orero,2008). Rabah Arezki and Markus Brckner (2011) also

show statistically that increases in international ood prices

lead to greater incidence o anti-government demonstra-

tions, riots, and civil conict in low-income countries, but

not in higher-income countries.

Many have explained these dierential responses

by pointing to the higher relative share o household

income devoted to ood in lower-income countries

(FAO, 2011). Any price change that reduces their pur-

chasing power has a relatively greater impact on their

ood security.Brett L. Carter and Robert Bates (2012) introduce

another perspective on the relationship between rising

ood prices and ood riots. Tey look not only at the

initial impact o the price increases but also at the result

o governments eorts to mitigate them. Tey examine



22/56

how price risesdue not just to changes in global

ood prices but also to changes in government policies,

exchange rate variations, and so oncontribute to the

potential or creating unrest and civil war. Tey nd that

ood price shocks alone increase the likelihood o con-ict. However, when they expand the analysis to take

into account governments responses to the price shocks,

they nd that governments tend to implement policies

that avor urban consumers and the probability o insta-

bility disappears. Urban consumers, they conclude, are

both more sensitive to price changes or their staple

commodities and better able to inuence policy through

their protest actions.

Cpe F Pcresces C Czerece Cfcs

Water, land or cultivation, and grazing lands are contested

resources in many regions o the world. Communal con-

ict is oten associated with localized competition among

rural groups within a country, each seeking to ensure ade-

quate access to production resources and, through the use

o these resources, to their ood security. Cattle-rustling,

land grabs, and the diversion o water resources are signs

o such conict and communities inabilities to negotiate

acceptable compromises peaceully.1When weather conditions result in drought or

ooding or when population growth and in-migration

add new stresses, armers and herders who see their

ood security and livelihoods threatened may escalate

conict to the point o violent clashes. Colin H. Kahl

(2006) nds that there is much to suggest that rapid

population growth, environmental degradation, and

competition over natural resources play important

causal roles in civil strie, although he does not draw

a direct link to (or through) the ood security status o

those participating in the conict.Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix (2011,

p. 8) also note that communal conicts over scarce

resources, particularly land and water, have involved

groups with permanent or semi-permanent armed

militias and have been particularly important in recent

cases o violent clashes in Kenya, Nigeria, the Sudan,

and Uganda:

Repeated clashes between Fulani herders and

arok armers in Nigerias Plateau State killed 843people in 2004. Similar clashes between Rizeigat

Abbala and erjam herders in the Sudan killed

382 in 2007. Cattle raiding in the Karamoja

cluster, a cross-border region o Ethiopian,

Kenyan, and Ugandan territory, resulted in more

than 600 deaths and the loss o 40,000 heads o

livestock in 2004 alone.

And in August 2012, the arming Pokomo and cat-

tle-herding Orma groups in Kenya instigated a violent

conict over access to the water and riparian lands othe ana River. Newspaper reports indicate that the col-

lapse o irrigation schemes along the river had reduced

employment and incomes or the Pokomo and catalyzed

the resurgence o a long-running conict between the

groups (Kenya to Disarm ribes, 2012).

Water is a unique natural resource that can aect ood

security in many ways. Sandra L. Postel and Aaron .

Wol (2001, p. 2) warn that unlike oil and most other

strategic resources, resh water has no substitute in most

o its uses. It is essential or growing ood, manuactur-

ing goods, and saeguarding human health. Whetheror not water scarcity causes outright warare between

nations in the years ahead, it already causes enough vio-

lence and conict within nations to threaten social and

political stability.

ieqes aec F SecC Excebe geces B me tw Cfc

Perceived social, political, or economic inequities that

aect peoples access to ood can exacerbate grievanc-es that, in combination with other actors, appear to

build momentum toward conict. Messer and Cohen

(2006, p. 15) note that historically, most individuals,

households, communities, and peoples denied access to

resources adequate to eed themselves and to live their



23/56

lives with dignity have ailed to rebel because they are

(1) insuciently organized and (2) overly terrorized and

repressed. However, they continue, [t]hese conditions

o unchanneled rustration and hopelessness can lead toviolence and conict once there emerges political lead-

ership that can successully mobilize this discontent in

ways that serve a leader or groups particular political

ends, usually articulated as a struggle or social justice or

political identity.

Te grievance linkage between ood insecurity and

civil conict seems to be o particular importance in

resource-rich countries, where the wealth and benets o

an exported natural resource (e.g., oil) are subject to elite

capture or corruption and do not translate into greater

ood security or all.Brinkman and Hendrix (2011, pp. 56) concur in

this view, noting that [s]ome o the countries most

plagued by conict the past 20 years are characterized by

widespread hunger, such as Angola, DRC [Democratic

Republic o Congo], Papua New Guinea, and Sierra

Leone. Te mixture o hungerwhich creates griev-

ancesand the availability o valuable commodities

which can provide opportunities or rebel undingis a

volatile combination.

Droughts in northern Mali led to reductions in ood

supply in the 1970s and 1980s. Te greater ood inse-curity that resulted did not directly lead to conict. or

Benjaminsen (2008) argues, however, that the scarcity

o ood led to the migration o young men to Algeria

and Libya, where they became exposed to revolution-

ary discourses. Tey returned to Mali to support an

incipient rebellion launched by the nomads and uaregs

o northern Mali, who believed that they were being

unairly treated by the national government, includ-

ing being orced to settle in towns and villages ratherthan continuing their nomadic liestyle. Embezzlement

o drought relie unds by government ocials in

Bamako added urther to the anger elt by the young

men who took up arms against the Malian state, writes

Benjaminsen (2008, p. 819). Tus, reduced availability

o ood and perceived inequities in systems intended to

increase access to ood combined with a complex set o

cultural and political drivers to ignite violent conict in

northern Mali.

F isec m ge isicees J SppCfcs rebes

Poverty-based ood insecurity may give incentives to

individualslikely, in Paul Collier et al.s (2008) analy-

sis, to be unemployed or underemployed young men

to join conicts and rebellions. By participating in the

conict, they increase their chances o securing produc-

tion resources (land, nancial assets) through preda-

tion and/or acquisition o the spoils o conict, thereby

increasing their ood security.Anecdotal inormation suggests this to be the case

in countries where population growth has resulted in a

bulge o poorly educated rural youths who see little

prospect o gaining resources through other means.

Studies o demobilized combatants in Sierra Leone

Wee wek ps-cfc ees e be pe

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pese -sece pps, e ppcss s j es ee cfc e w

becse e s ee b s ws sec.



24/56


25/56

iv. iee rece Cc

F iseca Bes w cs p ee e s esck.

P ces fck se S. mje/dk/Cimmyt.



26/56

tHe Human and economic costs o ailing

to avert ood insecurity related to conict are very high.

Tese costs provide substantial incentives or humani-

tarian and development organizations to intervene by

providing ood and agricultural assistance and promot-ing the emergence o peace-building eorts, in which

greater ood security is a key outcome.

Experience, however, shows that eective interven-

tions are likely to require the external actors to change

their operational approaches; accept risks o working with

ragile states; engage more closely with households caught

in conict-created poverty traps; and mobilize civil soci-

ety and private businesses as partners. Experience shows,

urther, that actions taken without adequate understand-

ing o the complex and conounding events that contrib-

ute to conict and ood insecurity may ail to achievethose goals and could make things worse.

Tis section reviews lessons that emerge rom both

empirical and theoretical work.

Exe acs

er r r rz

h r rr

r . One o the key principles

articulated at the 2009 World Food Summit is that

ood insecurity, in all settings, requires (1) direct actionto immediately tackle hunger or the most vulnerable,

action that generally involves urgent ood or income

assistance; and (2) medium- and long-term sustain-

able agricultural, ood security, nutrition, and rural

development programs to eliminate the root causes

o hunger and poverty (World Food Summit on Food

Security, 2009).

Addressing immediate and medium- and long-

term ood security challenges simultaneously is easier

said than done. Julia Steets (2011, p. 3) has reviewed

the diculties that external actors ace in trying to sup-ply appropriate types o assistance across the range o

conict-related scenarios. She nds that the two broad

types o external supporthumanitarian assistance and

development cooperationpursue dierent aims and

ollow dierent principles.

International humanitarian organizations are likely

to be the principal external agents or the immediate

work o addressing the acute ood insecurity associated

with ongoing conict. Teir mission is to independently

supply both resources and expertise in response to need.Food emergencies, extensive nutritional stress, and

elevated mortality are universally seen as unacceptable

assaults on human security that warrant international

intervention even in harsh and insecure conditions.

In taking on these responsibilities, humanitarian orga-

nizations are expected to be neutral and, just as important,

be perceived as neutral by the combatants. Humanitarian

actors must not avor any side in an armed conict or

other dispute where they are carrying out programs o

support. Tis expectation limits the incentives and capac-

ities o any humanitarian organization to interact withnational or local governments in ways that could directly

address either conict recovery or prevention.

Organizations providing development assistance, on

the other hand, are expected to mount medium- and

long-term sustainable programs to eliminate the root

causes o hunger and poverty and to build the oun-

dations or sustainable ood security. Using a results-

based management approach to achieve more eective

outcomes and provide greater accountability or their

actions, development organizations have incentives to

partner with reasonably capable and accountable gov-ernments on an agreed agenda, operating in conditions

that are at least somewhat stable.

Not surprisingly, ew development assistance orga-

nizations are eager to make substantial commitments

o support to weak governments in ragile states where

there is a high risk o not achieving desired results.

Tese diverging sets o organizational interests and

incentives lead to a disconnect between the two orms

o assistance that results in an excessive short-term ori-

entation o humanitarian assistance, a discontinuity o

project implementation across the two orms o assis-tance and an insucient ocus on disaster risk reduc-

tion and preparedness among development actors

(Steets, 2011, p. 55).

Several initiatives to address the lack o coordina-

tion between humanitarian and development agencies



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ocusing on ood insecurity and conict have been

undertaken in recent years.

Te FAO and the WFP have attempted to bridge

the divide between humanitarian assistance and devel-

opment assistance by orming the Food SecurityCluster. Although its principal unction is to coordinate

humanitarian assistance, the Food Security Clusters

responsibilities also include early recovery activities and

collaboration with other programs providing longer-

term assistance or ood security. Te activities o Food

Security Clusters, co-led by the FAO and WFP, could

reach into the domain o development assistance.

he Organization or Economic Cooperation and

Development has helped to orm the International

Network on Conlict and Fragility. International

agencies have adopted guidelines on GoodHumanitarian Donorship (2003) and principles or

Good International Engagement in Fragile States

and Situations (OECD, 2007).

Te World Bank proposed a new approach to opera-

tionalize the ndings o the 2011 WDR on conict,

security, and development. Te proposal echoes the

Food Summits call or simultaneous immediate and

long-term support. [V]iolence and other challenges

plaguing [ragile and conict-aected situations] can-

not be resolved by short-term or partial solutions in the

absence o institutions that provide people with secu-rity, justice, and jobs, the World Bank writes. What is

required is much greater partnership and discipline by

external actors, as well as revised procedures to permit

greater speed, allow or longer engagements, and better

manage the inevitable risks inherent in assisting coun-

tries acing ragility, conict, or violent crime (World

Bank, 2011a, p. iii).

Repeated experience shows that conict recovery is

the work o a generation or more, requiring commit-

ments that will run well beyond the normal timerames

o humanitarian assistance and development projects.But with acute ood insecurity as a key element o con-

ict, long-term perspectives must accommodate short-

term solutions as well. Both humanitarian assistance

and development tools must be wielded with skill and

sensitivityand in tandem.

is deepe

i -r r-

h . Te

WDR argues that building capable and legitimate insti-

tutions to deliver citizen security, address injustice, and

create employment is key to breaking these cycles o

violence. Noting that decits in institutional capac-

ity, inclusion, accountability and legitimacy are the root

cause o vulnerability to dierent orms o violence and

conict, the report calls upon external actors to invest

in eorts to strengthen government institutions in ragile

states (World Bank, 2011a, p. 3).

Tere is substantial evidence that decits in institu-

tional capacity are also root causes o ood insecurity in

ragile states. Governments in ragile states are unlikely

to command adequate scal resources or investments

in inrastructure necessary or sae and ecient markets.

Tey are also unlikely to carry out public agricultural

research and extension programs, support trade robust

enough to compensate or production shortalls, or pro-

vide the ood saety nets and health care services that will

protect the poor. New governments, brought into oce

through military victory or brokered peace negotiations

rather than democratic processes, may be overwhelmed

with responsibilities and unable to deal with the ood

insecurity consequences that the conict has generated.Luca Alinovi et al. (2007) provide useul insights

into the complexity o dealing with government insti-

tutions in ragile states. Teir case study review ound

that institutional weaknesses at all levels o society in

the Democratic Republic o the Congo, Somalia, and

Sudanrom state to community to householdwere

both the cause and the result o the ood insecurity.

Formal and traditional/inormal institutional systems

broke down beore the emergence o violent conict.

Access to land and other issues related to land tenure,

key to household ood security, emerged as a criticalarea o institutional breakdown. Social norms also col-

lapsed, and societal regulatory unctions were unable

to mediate emerging communal conicts, such as cat-

tle-raiding or conicts between nomadic groups and

sedentary arming populations.



28/56

With neither state nor local institutions capable o

providing governance, both public services and tradi-

tional social saety nets eroded, with negative eects

on livelihoods and ood security. Food insecurity thus

contributed to the onset and duration o conict. Asconicts went on or years, households short-term

coping behaviors ailed them and people had to adapt

their livelihoods strategies as best they could (Alinovi

et al., 2007).

Te crisis nature o the situations in the Democratic

Republic o the Congo, Somalia, and Sudan led to

immediate humanitarian aid rom the international

community. Food aid and inputs or arming were pro-

vided quickly, but without sucient recognition that

the ailed government and community institutions had

to be somehow enabled to provide armers secure accessto land and water or production, and to govern the

operations o markets.

On the other hand, the NGOs providing the human-

itarian aid were perceived as having replaced some gov-

ernment unctions, which may have urther weakened

the credibility o the public institutions.

Te countries examined in the case studies were

characterized by institutional dysunctioning or col-

lapse and the disruption or collapse o livelihoods, with

an overall reduction in the societys resilience. Further

complicating matters is the act that in some cases, theinteraction o institutional breakdown and conict has

provoked the development o new, non-state centers o

authority that consolidate themselves around alterna-

tive patterns o social control, protection, and prot

(Alinovi et al., 2007, p. 19).

Alinovi et al. (2007, p. 19) suggest that it is essential

to recognize that prolonged ood insecurity is on the

whole a maniestation o the social and political con-

text rather than triggered basically by natural hazards

such as crop ailure, or at best as livelihoods crises at thehousehold level caused by external actors.

In light o this, they suggest that the longer-term per-

spective calls or comprehensive analyses that go beyond

immediate needs assessments (e.g., to include studies on

nutrition and ood economy, land tenure issues, and the

dynamic nature o ood systems). Such analyses should

not, they warn, avoid consideration o institutional and

policy contexts or ear o politicizing the responses.

Consistent with the WDRs emphasis on security, jus-

tice, and jobs as key goals or conict recovery, it is likely

that analyses in conict-aected settings will show thatsecurity needs include ood security as well as physical

security; the justice most important to the most ood-

insecure households will include air and secure access to

land and/or water; and the jobs are likely to be in the

ood and agricultural sector.

Tus, to promote ood security and reduce risks o

conict at the same time, eorts in ragile states should

strengthen those institutions that:

Govern access to, and the use o, natural resources

that are key to ood production and sustainableecosystem services, which are critical to long-term

productivity;

Provide options and opportunities or increasing

output and incomes in the agricultural sector;

W ce sec s ke eee cfc,

-e pespeces s cce s-e ss

s we. B sssce eepe ss be wee w sk ses e.



29/56

Manage the macroeconomy to contain ination

and price rises and curb corruption;

Foster the operations o ecient, competitive

markets, including nancial markets that can helpto recapitalize producers that have lost produc-

tive assets, as well as commodity markets that will

provide agricultural production inputs and ood;

Oer a ood saety net to ood-insecure house-

holds and individuals vulnerable to acute mal-

nutrition; and,

Build the condence o citizens and private

businesses in the ability and will o public

institutions to support recovery o the ood andagricultural sector.

Post-conict experiences in Nicaragua, Uganda, and

Pakistan urther illustrate the institutional challenges

posed in post-conict recovery and the centrality o

ood security-related policies and institutions to success.

A joint review o Nicaraguas post-conict history

ound that, 15 years ater the end o violent conict,

the country was still experiencing relatively high levels

o ood insecurity and depending on relatively high lev-

els o ood aid. According to the assessment team, theNicaraguan government had ailed to give ood security

adequate policy attention and to address the grassroots-

level problems that national institutions were expect-

ed to resolve. As a result, land tenure issues were not

resolved and the most politically marginalized people

were still vulnerable to persistent ood insecurity (Sahley

et al., 2005).

By contrast, Regina Birner et al. (2011) describe

a conict recovery process in northern Uganda that

directly addressed governance and government capac-

ity issues in the agriculture sector. Te national govern-ment launched programs (with World Bank unding)

to enable IDPs and ormer combatants to resume arm-

ing when armed conict ceased in 2006. Further, the

government recognized its limitations and welcomed a

number o NGOs to mount projects as well.

Te resulting diversity o approaches enabled multi-

ple implementing institutions to address agriculture and

ood security. However, each mechanism or interven-

tion came at a cost. Combating corruption among pub-

lic ocials using community-based procurement cameat the expense o elite capture in community groups,

or example. Using specialized organizations to deliver

post-conict programs worked well in the short run, but

aected the possibilities or creating well-unctioning

institutions in the long run. Some interventions worked

well on a small scale, but were dicult to scale up to

make sure that all the aected victims had the chance

to rebuild their agricultural livelihoods, escape poverty,

and live in peace.

Post-conict recovery in the Swat Valley in Pakistan

highlighted the need to strengthen institutions to resolveremaining conicts by improving governance and physi-

cal security. Initial interventions were quick xes pro-

vided by external organizations to support agricultural

recoveryseeds or planting, replacement animals, and

jobs in inrastructure rehabilitation or young men.

An assessment showed, however, that these actions

were not likely to strengthen ood security su-

ciently to avert uture conict (Nyborg et al., 2012).

Among the institutional challenges identied were

ensuring that the rights and interests o vulnerable

groups (poor women and men) were protected as theyattempted to re-engage in agriculture and resource

management activities; that conict and social change

did not lead to domestic violence; that women par-

ticipated in meetings organized or their support; that

widows would not only receive sheep as a means o

support but that they would have access to pasture;

that armers were able to market their crops without

being hindered by robbers, opposing power actions,

or established traders; and that daughters rom poor

households would not be sold in marriage to settle

amily debt. In particular, unequal access to andconicts over water and land resources lead to situa-

tions o extreme insecurity or the vulnerable, write

Ingrid Nyborg et al. (2012, p. 2).

As both the Uganda and Pakistan cases show, nation-

al institutions are not the only institutions that need



30/56

strengthening in conict-aected and ragile states.

Local governments and communities may assume some

o the states responsibilities or getting agricultural

development going again, especially in post-conict

recovery settings.Ami Carpenter (n.d.) summarizes our case stud-

ies o community actions that successully addressed

ood security and conict challenges without calling

upon external resources or help. When conronted

with state ragility (Haiti), an impending violent

takeover (Aghanistan), the potential o rising crime

as young, armed men returned rom war (anzania),

and ongoing civil war (Iraq), these communities sel-

organized themselves and adopted measures that

enabled them to survive and largely protect the social

and economic assetsincluding ood securitythatthe community possessed.

Patti Petesch (2011) documents a case o commu-

nity-led recovery in Indonesia: Local women who had

been displaced rom their arms and rural villages during

conict learned new skills and acquired a voice that

enabled them to ensure that they received their air share

o post-conict assistance when they returned.

Oten, however, violent conict leads to a loss o

social cohesion and trust at the community level,

severely limiting the capacities o local institutions to

undertake the kind o positive leadership in recoverythat Petesch describes. Where the social abric is torn,

as Naori Miyazawa (2011) ound in i

harvesting peace: food security, conflict, and cooperation

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