greiman city of boston presentation 2013

Managing Project Complexity

Northeast Public Sector Project Management ConferenceCity of Boston Department of Innovation and Technology and

Boston Public SchoolsMarch 20, 2013

Presented By: Professor Virginia A. GreimanV. A. Greiman Copyright © 2013

What Makes a Project Complex?Size and Duration: The Big Dig, Crossrail and The English Chunnel (FHWA: More than $1Billion)

Technology: Hoover Dam and Panama Canal Extension

Untried: BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Disaster

Integration of Processes: Many Diverse and Autonomous, but interrelated and interdependent components or parts linked through many dense interconnections and interfaces.

Virginia A. Greiman © 20132

Unique Characteristics of Complex Projects

Long Duration – 10 to 60 years

Extensive Public Scrutiny

Ambiguity and Uncertainty

Large Scale Policy Making

Complex Organizational and Governance Structures

Consistent Cost Underestimation

Systems Complexity


Linkage Between Complexity and Ambiguity

If requirements are Ambiguous, then resolving that Ambiguity will be more complex than if projects are well specified

If the deliverables are complex, then it follows that the outcomes will be less certain, especially if the plan is ambiguous about how success will be measured

Virginia A. Greiman © Copyright 2012 4

Challenges of Mega ProjectsKeeping the Focus on Quality and Safety instead of Schedule and Cost

Integration of all Project Disciplines throughout the Life of the Project

Educating and Involving the Public Citizens from the Inception of the Project

Establishing a strong public owner with independent oversight

Integration does not mean sacrificing Independence!

Dynamic governance structures

Virginia A. Greiman © 2010 5

Boston’s Big Dig

An Example of a Complex Project


Another Example

London’s Crossrail Project - 16 Billion Pounds– 42 kilometres of rail tunnels underneath London– Nine new Stations– 200 million passengers– 10% increase in rail capacity

UK’s High Speed Rail Service between London and Birmingham (HS2) - 17 Billion Pounds


CA/T Program

• 54 Design Packages• 132 Construction Packages• 9000 Processes & Procedures• 161 Lane Miles

• 5 Major Interchanges

• Landmark Cable-stay Bridge

• Jacked Tunnels

• Immersed Tubes

• Soil Freezing

• Deep Soil Mixing

• 8 miles of Slurry Wall

• Jet Grouting

• Excavation and Parks

CA/T Program

• 54 Design Packages• 132 Construction Packages• 9000 Processes & Procedures• 161 Lane Miles

• 5 Major Interchanges

• Landmark Cable-stay Bridge

• Jacked Tunnels

• Immersed Tubes

• Soil Freezing

• Deep Soil Mixing

• 8 miles of Slurry Wall

• Jet Grouting

• Excavation and Parks

Virginia A. Greiman © Copyright 2012

VV. A. Greiman © 2012

Major Complexity Challenges on the Big Dig:

Project Integration – (150 Major Employers – One Team) 5,000 workers, thousands of complex processes

Risk Management – World’s Largest Wrap-up Program

Ambiguity and Uncertainty – Subsurface conditions

Technology Integration – Monitoring the Critical Path

Claims and Changes - Partnering

Project Integration Management

Project Charter

1

CloseProject

7

Integrated Change Control

6

ProjectMgmtPlan

3

MonitorAnd Control

5

Direct and ManageExecution

4

Scope Statement

2

Project Management Institute, PMBOK, 4th ed.

What is Integration?

Requires each project and product process to be appropriately aligned and connected with the other processes to facilitate their coordination. These process interactions often require tradeoffs among project requirements and objectives.

Integration on Large and Complex Projects

Organizational Structure

– The People– The Processes

Community and Public Concerns

Internal and External Stakeholders

First of 12 tube sections each longer than a football field arrive in Boston for the Ted Williams Tunnel


EIS = Environmental ImpactStatementICE – Interstate Cost EstimateCSU – Cost and Schedule Update

Fig. 7.1

Why are Mega Projects Consistently Underestimated?

A review of large public works projects over the last century concluded that costs are consistently underestimated, a phenomenon attributed to the desire of the project advocates to have their projects approved.

(Flyvbjerg, Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition, 2002)

National Transportation Research Board

In 2006, the Transportation Research Board’s Final Report for Cost Estimation and Management for Highway Projects, identified eight strategies to address cost escalation, and linked these strategies to 18 different causes of cost escalation on highway projects in the United States. Notably, the research concluded that most efforts in cost estimation have focused on creating tools to improve cost estimates with less emphasis on tools for cost estimation management.

(Anderson et. al. 2006).

Complexity and Project Management Trade-offs

Design, Risk, Safety, and Quality Decisions!!

Big Dig’s Worst Disaster


2006 Ted Williams Tunnel Roof CollapseSource: NTSB Report

National Transportation Safety Board Findings

(1) Failure to identify potential creep by designers and contractors in the anchor adhesive as a critical long-term failure mode

(2) A general lack of understanding and knowledge in the construction community about creep in adhesive anchoring systems.

(3) Failure of the Contractor to provide the Central Artery/Tunnel project with sufficiently complete, accurate, and detailed information about the suitability of the company’s Fast Set epoxy for sustaining long‑term tensile loads.

(4) Failure of Powers Fasteners, Inc., to determine that the anchor displacement that was found in the high‑occupancy vehicle tunnel in 1999 was a result of anchor creep.

(5) Failure of Contractor, subsequent to the 1999 anchor displacement, to continue to monitor anchor performance in light of the uncertainty as to the cause of the failures.

(6) Failure of the owner to implement a timely tunnel inspection program that would likely have revealed the ongoing anchor creep.

20Virginia A. Greiman © Copyright 2012

Mississippi River I-35 Bridge Collapse in Minneapolis, August 1, 2007

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the collapse, was the inadequate load capacity, due to a design error, of the gusset plates at the U10 nodes.

Contributing to the accident was the generally accepted practice among Federal and State transportation officials of giving inadequate attention to gusset plates during inspections for conditions of distortion, such as bowing, and of excluding gusset plates in load rating analyses.


What Tradeoffs Have You Made on Your Project?

Resources?

Quality?

Design?

Risk?

Time?

Cost?


Questions???

Virginia A. GreimanProfessor

Boston University617-353-6860

[email protected]


greiman city of boston presentation 2013

Technology

gusset plates

highway projects

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