graham mcfee_ a nasty accident with one's flies (inaugural address)

7/31/2019 Graham McFee_ a Nasty Accident With One's Flies (Inaugural Address)

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ham McFee: A Nasty Accident With One's Flies (Inaugural Address)

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Graham McFee

Main page Curriculum Vitae

Baker and Hacker without Baker? Wittgenstein: Text and Context

"On first looking into ...": The

placing of the 'slips of paper' ...Wittgenstein, Systematicity and theUse of Philosophy

A Nasty Accident Wit hOne's Flies (I nauguralAddress)

Everything Goes with Beer

A Nasty Accident Wit h One's Flies

(Or, Life in Philosophy)

The following was my inaugural lecture as professor of philosophy at the University of Brighton,

delivered in May, 1996 -- coinciding with the Brighton Arts Festival. As is the tradition in theUniversity of Brighton (although not in all UK universities that have inaugurated professors), it wassupposed both to reflect my professional concerns and to be accessible to a general audience.(Although it has not [yet] been published, a version was distributed in pamphlet form by theUniversity of Brighton after the event: that version, unrevised, is presented here.)

Asked about the purpose of philosophy, the Austrian-born philosophical genius LudwigWittgenstein replied that its task was to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle (PI309[1]). Such a remark is likely to puzzle us, even if we know what a fly-bottle is (it'sa kind of fly-trap). What could Wittgenstein have meant by such a remark? And thatpuzzlement becomes important once someone (like me) urges that Wittgenstein'scomment, properly understood, offers a profoundas well as a correctaccount of the

nature of the philosophical enterprise.

In the rest of this talk, I shall first clarify some aspects of what Wittgenstein meant bythis gnomic remark (taking its truth and importance for granted), and then I willillustrate impacts of these ideas with examples from two (or three) specific areas ofphilosophy -- the philosophy of language, the philosophy of art, and the philosophicalstudy of sport. In this way, I will bring out both the potential of philosophy and theimpact of Wittgenstein.

That should explain the main title of this lecture ... Its other title ... well, in whatfollows there are fragments of a number of lives -- mine, Wittgenstein's -- but also (Ihope) something of the enduring vitality -- the life-- of the philosophical.

But first, an autobiographical anecdote, to make the philosophical life at issue clearlymy life: as an undergraduate, hitching to London (say, to a rock concert) and asked bythe lorry driver who was giving me a lift what I was studying, I replied ... well,whatever I said did not mention the conversation-stopping word "philosophy". Perhapsthere were many reasons why I could not discuss philosophy in that context; but mypoint is that philosophy -- like most disciplines, but perhaps with a greater urgency --needs a clear sense of itself and its purposes. Certainly, there is a general lack of aconsensus about the scope and limits of philosophy:

There is wide-spread disagreement about what activities it is legitimate for
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philosophy to pursue.[2]

I want to enter that debate tonight.

Strange as it may seem, recent philosophy in the English-speaking world is notintrospective enough[3] -- once, perhaps, it was too introspective, a kind of navel-gazing having as much general relevance as debates about landing angels on the headof a pin. Return to that sorry situation is not being advocated, but it has been replacedby a brisk confidence about the nature and purposes of philosophy; a confidence not, in

my view, justified.

1 A t herapeut ic concepti on of philosophy

Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy -- manifest in the 'fly-bottle' quote -- isappropriately called therapeutic, in the sense of being directed at the resolution ofproblems or perplexities besetting particular individuals[4]; the showing of particularflies the way out of specific fly-bottles. So it is work that needs to be done person-by-person: or, as Wittgenstein put it:

Work in philosophy is -- as work in architecture frequently is -- actually moreof a kind of work on oneself. (BT pp. 406-7; PO p. 161[5])

Nor should we think these tasks easily accomplished, for they can involve giving upideas that one had acquired in a completely 'taken-for-granted' way[6]. Again,Wittgenstein offers an evocative metaphor:

Teaching philosophy [he says] involves the same immense difficulty asinstruction in geography would have if a pupil brought with him a mass offalse and falsely simplified ideas about the course of rivers and mountainchains. (BT p. 423: PO p. 185[7])

In these ways, then, work in philosophy centrally involves the dissolution of problems

which beset that person, with no greater claim to generality.

But philosophical work will typicallybe more general: why? The point to see is thegenerality of the sourcesof these problems. Now, the 'flies' in the initial metaphor areall of us: the problems philosophy addresses are problems that could, in principle, besetany of us. Gilbert Ryle (then Professor of Philosophy at Oxford) used to raise an obviouscriticism by asking, what about the fly that never finds its way intothe fly-bottle?Hearing this question, John Wisdom (a pupil and friend of Wittgenstein's, and at thetime Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge) once offered the stage-whispered reply:"But you will have lured him in there, Gilbert". Wisdom's point, which I shall not becontesting tonight, is that misconceptions identified by, say, Ryle, should not be seen asresulting from what 'we' commonly say or think but, instead, from the interpretation of

'our' doings by specialists, and especially by philosophers, resulting from their tendencyor inclination to take what can (in principle) be misleading as having misled[8]. Soreading philosophy (or other 'expert' opinion) may be the problem, not the solution!

What arethe sources of philosophical perplexities? As Wittgenstein put it, in a presentlyunpublished manuscript:

Philosophy is a tool which is useful only against philosophies and against thephilosopher in us. (MS 219, 11[9])

So philosophical perplexities derive from (at least) two related sources:


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From the effect of the views of experts.From "the philosopher in us".

But[10] we might see the philosopher in usas someone who is almost bound to arise inthe course of a standard education. So few people will not needphilosophy: asWittgenstein[11] urges, only those

... who have no need for transparency in their argumentation are lost tophilosophy. (BT 421; PO p. 183)

But are there any such people? One major commentator[12] is even more forceful: inhis view,

... only a clod or a god could resist being drawn into the fly-bottle ofphilosophical puzzlement.

The 'fly-bottle' metaphor concerns the impact of philosophy -- that it responds topuzzlements or perplexities: we are not here addressing the contentedfly, since (in thefly-bottle) there can be no such thing.

2 The met hod of therapy

But how is the 'therapy' to be achieved? What does one do? The aim, as Wittgensteindescribes it, is to provide:

... an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with aparticular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not theorder. (PI132 [B&H 1 p. 484])

This Wittgenstein calls "a perspicuous representation" of whatever, a representationwhich makes the matter perspicuous (clear)[13]. Notice, first, that this is not an orderto our useof language, but to our knowledge, to what we recognise: second, that it

does not offer newknowledge, really -- rather, it puts in order what we already know;and third, that the order achieved is acknowledged as oneordering among many,selected for some "particular purpose" (PI 127[14]), to answer some puzzlement.

It is not as though there were a representation that could notmislead. The right ideahere, as Wittgenstein urges, is given by comparing a perspicuous representationwith alamp which, in illuminating the perplexing 'side' of the issue, necessarily throws itsother 'side' into shadow[15].

What we lack is not a (generalised or once-and-for-all) perspicuous representation of

our grammar/language; but, rather, a certain representation (for example, the colour-octahedron [PR p. 51ff; WWK p. 42; PR p. 278]) to make some part of our grammar, apart which puzzles us, perspicuous (=clear) for us. We are puzzled because what weknow, in knowing how to go on in language, is not clear to us; misleading analogies(and such like) suggest themselves -- or someone suggests them to us!

Lacking such clarity, we will remain puzzled: but, once we have achieved the clearview, it can seem obvious. As Wittgenstein remarks:

Philosophical problems can be compared with locks on safes, which can beopened by dialling a certain word or number, so that no force can open thedoor until just this word has been hit upon, and once it has been hit upon,


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no effort at all is necessary to open the door. (BT p. 417; PO p. 175 [seeB&H 1 p. 485 note 22][16])

A further moral from the 'fly-bottle' metaphor is that the task of philosophy cannot turnon matters in principle unavailable to us -- the perplexities typically arise from lookingin the wrong wayat what we know, rather than from not knowing enough. Here,Wittgenstein's characteristic advice was "Look and see", and that is only plausibleadvice if what one is looking for is in plain sight.

So the task of philosophy cannot be to uncover something unavailable, but (rather) toget us to re-assess what we already know: the point about the fly-bottle just is thatflies do not typically find their own way out, even though there is nothing stoppingthem!

Now, we have only just begun to explore this way of thinking about philosophy[17].Still, we do not need to go much further to see that such a conception will have animpact on what is done both in pursuing and in teaching philosophy.

At this point, I will take a brief detour to mention in the context of commenting on theteaching and learning of philosophy (where mention occurs naturally) the immensecontribution both to myunderstanding of issues raised here, and to understandingmore generally, of a collection of other thinkers [some of whom are here tonight]: first,my predecessor in the ancestor of this post, David Best, whose ideas about art, dance,and philosophy are profoundly intermingled with mine; but also a collection of my'philosophical forebears' -- in alphabetical order, Gordon Baker, whose reading ofWittgenstein founds much of what you have (and will) hear tonight; then, Terry Diffey,whose encouragement has continued unabated since he was on a panel that firstappointed me (more years ago than I care to recall), and who (among other assistance)laid out for me the institutional character of the concept "art"; and also RichardWollheim, who taught me a lot about aesthetics -- but also taught me a bit aboutphilosophy (and its teaching) by permitting me to show-up at PhD supervision sessionshaving done no work but with a good question about Freud for us to discuss -- I do notassume he failed to notice this strategy; finally, the late John Wisdom -- in the past,inviting him would have involved ascertaining that he was well enough for discussionand not scheduled for horse riding!

Others who have helped me with their ideas and/or their example include a variety ofcolleagues (and students) from the Chelsea School -- in particular, Alan Tomlinson andPaul McNaught-Davis; and colleagues from School of Historical and Critical Studies,especially Bob Brecher and Tom Hickey.

3 Why is giving an account of philosophy problematic?

To continue: I suggested earlier that it was difficult to give an account of the nature of

philosophy. Why is that?

The chief problems, it seems to me, come from two wide-spread characterisations ofphilosophy: that it is about words(sometimes thought-of positively, but chiefly anegative characterisation) and that it addresses profound, general abstractquestions.John Wisdom[18] recounts confronting both these reactions to the term "philosophy":

People sometimes ask me what I do. Philosophy I say and I watch their faces veryclosely. 'Ah -- they say -- that's a very deep subject isn't it?' I don't like this at all. Idon't like their tone. I don't like the change in their faces. Either they are frightfullysolemn. Or they have to manage not to smile. And I don't like either.


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Of course, these are the sorts of reaction I feared from the lorry-driver! But why arethese the typical reactions?

To bring out one reason, consider two main ways[19] in which philosophicalpuzzlement can arise:

first, through 'expert' opinion misleading us, through stirring up (what I shall call)Berkeleyan dust.second, through confusions about 'the logic of what we say'[20] (cf. PI 345; also

PI 119): so that, for example, we might look for substances, faced withsubstantives (That is, look for the "sake" involved in doing something forsomeone's sake, the "it" of "It is raining"); or, again, we might take as meresymptomswhat are really criteria (mistaking logical/grammatical points forempirical ones, since there can be fluctuation between criteria and symptoms: PI354[21]).

The first category (the Berkeleyan dust) highlights the sort of perplexity the expertmight thinkprofound; the second (focusing on "what we say") seems to imply a verbaldimension to philosophy.

4' Expert ' quest ions.

Let us take them in that order. So first, then, to the views of 'experts': I spoke of"Berkeleyan dust" since the Irish philosopher, George Berkeley[22], remarks:

... that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hithertoamused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirelyowing to ourselves. That we have first raised a dust, and then complain wecannot see.

While I do not disagree, I would add that philosophers are not the only ones shufflingtheir feet to create the dust: in particular, scientists are doing it too. So two chief waysthese perplexities are likely to arise are through the imperialism of other philosophers,or through the misleadingness of some scientific presentations. The illusion here, asWittgenstein recognised, is that philosophical investigation is always necessary toground other speculation. As he wrote:

Philosophy solves, or rather gets rid of, only philosophical problems; it doesnot set our thinking on a more solid basis. What I am attacking [he says] isabove all the idea that the question 'What is knowledge?' -- e.g. -- is acrucial one. (MS 219, 10)

As though, say, we had to establish the possibility of knowledge of the (external) worldin order to make the place safe for science[23]. As Wittgenstein continues:

... it seems as if we didn't yet know anything at all until we could answerthatquestion [about the nature of knowledge]. In our philosophicalinvestigations it is as if we were in a terrible hurry to complete a backlog ofunfinished business which has to be finished or everything else seems tohang in the air. (MS 219, 10[24])

His point: we should not see philosophy as seeking (much less achieving) somefundamental foundation for this or that form of knowledge; but rather working to dispelthose misunderstandings that doarise (as opposed to those that might!). To illustrate,I will offer a sport-based example (thereby acknowledging one of my professional


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concerns, in the Chelsea School).

This case is based on a comment genuinely made during a television programme, inwhich viewers were told (with a straight face) that a water-skier was making manythousand calculations as she kept her balance. Myreaction would be that elaboratemental arithmetic is quite a feat for someone simultaneously engaged in water-skiing;and my advice would be to keep her attention on what she is doing! The televisionprogramme, of course, meant something quite different: roughly, that if we chose tosimulatethe skier's behaviour using a computer -- or perhaps a computer-controlled

robot -- and if we understood computers in a fashionable way, then the computerwould be doing such calculations. Now, I am not sure that even this is true; but, eitherway, it has no obvious bearing on what that personwas doing. For that person is not acomputer, nor do we have any reason to model her behaviour as computation: if wethink we do, it is because we have been listening to too much 'popular science'.

It may be (completely hypothetically) that some wealthy research council might fund aproject which studied computer 'activity' as a way of illuminating human action (it mighteven acquire a name -- say, the study of artificial intelligence, or AI): if so, thenpenniless scientists (if any) would have a reason to investigate it. But, notice, the firsthurdle for such a project should be to determine that this is a suitable topic forinvestigation -- and that involves demonstrating that there is something revealing to be

learned about humansin this way! Against me, it might be insisted that an open mindis what is needed here: I would agree -- but an open minddoes not consist in assumingthat one has the right question, and then remaining 'open' about the answer. Rather, itinvolves open-ness about the question too[25]. (But that is a hard idea to include inresearch-grant applications.)

The point, then, is that one source of 'conceptual confusion' is so-called 'expertopinion': the creation of wholly spurious difficulties, which are then transmitted toothers -- for example, through one's philosophy classes. (I speak only for myself, ofcourse.)

This case can introduce another, related problem: on the rebound from the absurdity ofthinking that the skier is calculating furiously, we might say that she just does it-- thatno further explanation is required. As persons, we recognise one another as embodiedagents; that we can (if we are lucky) achievethings in the world. But howdoes theskier do it? Well, by having learned to do it, and by thinking about what she wants todo. So far, this is harmless.

But it canseem that what is going on is, first, a bit of thinking or intending(psychological activity) and then a bit of doing (bodily activity). And, enquiring howthese two are related, we may see a 'little water-skier' (doing the thinking) insidethereal skier: a 'dualist' conception, treating minds and bodies as inhabiting separaterealms. Even this may not be bad yet. For there is no misunderstanding at workyet:we have drawn no conclusions -- say, about training programmes -- from these ideas.Now, I see how dualistic conceptions of human beings and human action can bedetrimental to our understanding of action, of feeling and of one another -- but I donot find dualism in all the places some of my colleagues see it. For instance, mycommitment 'body and soul' to a research project does not, in and of itself, commit meto viewing persons as combinations of bodies-plus-souls, or bodies-plus-souls-plussomething-else!

One might think that it was only when we had been listening to philosophers -- whodistinguish a psychological realm from a bodily one (what I earlier called "dualists"[26])or who postulate attitudes to propositionsto explain our beliefs -- that we are likely tobe confused. Actually, that is not quite right -- we are as likely to be confused on thisissue by scientists -- especially (as we have seen) by psychologists with a fascination


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with computers.

5 Lit eralism and language

If that puts aside, and clarifies, the sorts of (false) profundity of which philosophy isaccused, what about the other accusation: that it isjust about words? It is easy to seewhere the ammunition for this charge comes from: from the propensity to say, "It alldepends what you mean by ....". And certainly part of any full reply I made wouldinclude disputing the force of the word "just", when it is said that philosophy isjustabout words.

But the crucial point is to show that, contrary to what is often asserted or assumed,philosophy is not about language[27]. Indeed, this point can be made sharp bycontrasting the view presented here with another; for the conception of philosophyproposed here should work against the literalism characteristic of much philosophicalwriting. And such literalism, with its insistence on reading at (what ittakes to be) 'thefoot of the letter', is destructive of progress both in the teaching and the understandingof philosophy.

To illustrate what is at issue, consider the following case. At one time, in gents' toiletsin bars across the land, a particular sign was regularly found, reading:

Do not throw cigarette ends into the urinals: it makes them damp anddifficult to light

Now, that sign saysthat the urinals will become difficult to light; but the joke (or quasi-joke) -- that the landlord might in this way be collecting cigarettes from the urinal --works by our reading the sign differently. My point is that native English-speakers willrecognise this sign as a badly-written sentence, as bad grammar if you like -- but theyare not misled by it. So in what sense is it misleading? The point is not whethermisleading inferences couldbe drawn, but whether they aredrawn[28]. The literalistwill insist boththat this ismisleading, and that facts such as this are philosophically

revealing.

But is the mere possibilityof such misunderstanding a genuine worry? To see that it isnot, imagine that I am talking about sunrise; say, in the context of having seen abeautiful sunrise, or of sunrise being a good time to view such-and-such a species ofbird. Should one take issue with this kind of talk? I see no reason to do so, eventhough I don't believe in sunrises (any more than the rest of you) since I take us to livein the solarsystem. So it would be misguided of some 'philosopher', hearing myremark, to conclude, "McFee operates with a pre-Copernican cosmology!". To repeat, itis important to reject the kind of literalism much beloved by some philosophers withanalytic training who, finding a way to 'read' a sentence asmisleading, take it to havemisled. (In my sunrise example, no-one was misled, no-one misunderstood.)

Rather, ascription of misunderstanding must be based on evidenceof misunderstanding-- that is, evidence ofgenuinemisunderstanding, not the mere possibilityofmisunderstanding. This would typically take the form of some inference drawn. In mysunrise case, someone might, for instance, argue that, since there are sunrises, itfollowsthat the sun is moving and hence that God could cause the sun to stand still.Further, this point might be used as part of a proof about the nature or existence of adeity, perhaps. Such a person is misunderstanding: none of that does follow from whatI'd said! So it is possibleto be misled by this form of words. But that possibility doesnot lead me to demand that talk of sunrises be banned!


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As Wittgenstein remarks in another place:

We never dispute the opinions of common sense but we question theexpression of common sense. (PO p. 247)

He is acknowledging that some implicationswhich might be drawn from certain ways ofputting a point must be rejected -- just as we reject any move from the possibility ofsunrise to the fact of the sun's movement. (This is of a piece with Wittgenstein'sinsistence that the search for essence and the programme of analysis[29] must be

abandoned: belief that there must besome underlying structure is unwarranted.)I am effectively making two related points, the first about the nature of philosophy, thesecond about the teaching (and learning) of philosophy. For we do philosophy noservice if we present it as requiring a wholly inappropriate 'rigour' (or literalism): first, itpresents pedantry as though it were philosophy (there may be a point, as a joke, inmaking certain literalist remarks -- but to do so is not to practice philosophy); second,it precludes beginners from expressing points which, they fear, will not meet thestandards of 'rigourous' (that is, pedantic) presentation. Yet this only hinders the entryof such beginners into the discussion; and such discussion is central to philosophy -- isa part of its life! As others have observed[30], the same word from Greek that foundsthe centre of philosophy -- logic -- also grounds "dialogue" and "dialectic": and thethought that philosophy should open, rather than close, options for discussion seemscrucial. How else can you make the perplexities under consideration yourperplexities?Indeed, if philosophy has its interest from such cases, how can it develop a history if --at every stage -- the effect of philosophical 'discussion' is to shut-down the possibilitiesof further discussion? There could be no such history.

The justification often given for literalist practice is that, in order to think clearly, onemust be able to express one's thought clearly. I take this point: but I would urge, first(and a debatable non-philosophical point), that a broadly supportive atmospherefacilitates one's learning to express one's thought clearly, but second(and in the centreof philosophy) that a realistic attitude to clarity of expression is needed -- in particular,one must not give in to the thought that remarks potentiallymisleading do actuallymislead. For, in the absence of a clear understanding of appropriate clarity here, onewill certainly be dismissing as misleading what are, in context, perfectly unambiguousremarks[31]. And, if they mislead none of their hearers, they can only be 'misleading' insome bizarre philosopher'ssense of the term!

If no-one is being misled, there is no view put forward that requires disputing: as withthe sunrise case, misleading inferences are blocked (by fiat?). Indeed, we mightrecognise "our strong cravings for generality and our inclination to extractgeneralisations" (B p. 128) as operative outside philosophy as within it: just asphilosophical arguments should be seen as "absolutely context-relative and purpose-specific" (B p. 129), so too should our commonsense utterances.

Associatedly, philosophers of a literalist tendency attack the clarity of certain verbalexpression. But any difficulties here are not somehow generated by language -- ifanything, they arise because we seek a uniform 'reading' of forms of words[32].Wittgenstein (PI 402) asks us to consider a case where:

... we disapprove of[33] the expressions of ordinary language (which areafter all performing their office), ... we are tempted to say that our way ofspeaking does not describe the facts as they really are. As if, for example,the proposition "he has pains" could be false in some other way than by theman's not having pains. As if the form of expression were saying somethingfalse even when the proposition, in want of better expression [faute demieux], asserted something true. (PI 402)


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Suppose the person really is in pain (what is asserted is true). Still, a 'philosopher'might urge that saying, "He has a pain" implies that one ownsor possessespains, assaying, "He has a gun" would imply possession of a gun: and that pains are notobjects, not possessible in this sense. So the form of expressionmight seemtointroduce something false. Taking such a line is not, as Wittgenstein notes, seeingsomething profound. Rather:

... we have got a picture in our heads which conflicts with the picture of ourordinary way of speaking. (PI 402)

And it is that new picturethat misleads us. We do not really infer, for example, that theutterance "It is raining" misrepresents the facts because we cannot answer thequestion, "what is the 'it'?"[34].

Almost without exception, literalist sorties are based either on a failure to understandthe remark at issue (typically, a pretended failure, as in the urinal notice) or on theassumption that (grammatical) substantives imply substances -- but that idea isobviously false: we understand actions done "for your sake" and the claim that "It israining" without postulation of an ontology ofsakesor of raining its.

The philosopher's request, "what did you mean by such-and-such?", seemsconclusive

proof that the topic is words(only): yet it proves no such thing, for it is easilytranslated into a request for the contrasts drawn, the comparisons invited, theexamples (pro and con) deployed -- that is, it turns into a request for clarification ofwhat one said, what one asserted, what one asked, rather than an invitation to discussword-use.

My suggestion has been that we focus on what isunderstood: by contrast, in the fly-bottle, the focus is on a disordered, philosophicalaccount of the understanding. [Butthis shift of focus is not easy: as Gordon Baker[35] points out, "Only a hair's breadthseparates platitude from absurdity."]

In summary, then, I suggest literalism is pernicious in three or four ways:

First, it gives a mistaken picture of precision; in particular, of precision inlanguage-use.Second, it separates (mis)understanding from context (as in the sunriseexample), leading to a philosophical thesis about what it is for a claim to bemisleading: namely that it should be potentially or possibly misleading.Third, it destroys the 'conversation' of philosophy by suppressing views for trivialreasons[36].[Finally, if taken for the doing of philosophy, it makes philosophy appear afootling game for the witty, a species of debating.]

The abandonment of literalism should mean that the philosophical concern becomes

clearlywith understanding and misunderstanding, rather than with words, even if wesometimes locatethe (mis)understanding in linguistic terms.

6 The questi on of t he pract icalit y of philosophy

If the account of philosophy offered here is correct, is it a worthwhile activity? Whyshould people study it; and why should its study be supported?

To reply, I will consider two key questions, about (respectively) the potential benefitofphilosophy and the idea ofprogressin philosophy. So, the first question is: is


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philosophy practical?

One could easily see a practicality to philosophy by pointing to philosopherspronouncingon:

... such subjects of immediate concern as abortion, euthanasia, the right todie, the apportionment of scarce medical resources, nuclear war, suicide, theenvironment ... (p. x)

or to philosophers teaching"... medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics ..."(p. ix) -- the list is Peter Kivy's[37]. But these have philosophers acting as sages,handing down 'wisdom'. And that is notthe view of philosophy urged here.

In contrast, Wittgenstein offered both a therapeutic conception of philosophy anda"yes" answer to the question of practicality: as he[38] wrote to a friend,

... what is the use of studying philosophy if all it does for you is to enableyou to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic,etc., & if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions ofeveryday life, if it does not make you more conscientious than any ...

journalist in the use of the dangerousphrases such people use for their ownends ...?

For Wittgenstein clearly thought philosophy could, and should, do these things. Anexample may make his point sharply for us.

If we consider two instances of graceful, elegant human action -- say, one from danceand one from gymnastics --it may seem that what is true of the one is true of theother: in particular, that the benefits to the participant in each are the same. Similarly,we might think that the benefits (say, of enjoyment of graceful human movement) arealso the same from the spectators' viewpoint. In that sense, the two actions are inter-changeable. And we might characterise the enjoyment and so on here as aestheticenjoyment: the aesthetic enjoyment of the participant, and the aesthetic appreciation ofthe spectator, say.

This picture may seem quite attractive; but not (I hope) to those -- like myself --committed to an educational role for dance. For, if things were as I have characterisedthem (if the explanation of the place of dance rested on its being graceful and elegant,say), there could be no reason to include dance in the curriculum (no educational

justification for dance) that was not alsoa reason to include gymnastics -- and withpressure on curriculum time, and gymnastics already in the curriculum, no reason toinclude dance at all.

To avoid that unpalatable conclusion (unpalatable to me at least) we must find a wayof distinguishing dance from gymnastics -- and, moreover, it must be an educationally-relevant distinction. Resolving questions of this sort is just one place to do philosophy

with a practical 'edge'.

As I have written a whole book[39] on just this question, I cannot deal with it fullyhere. But, to sketch the outlines of my answer, notice two points. First, we consider(some) dance artin the 'fine art' sense of the expression; second, we value art in waysdifferentfrom the ways we value other beautiful objects, such as natural beauty or thedecorative; or even designed objects [the Ferrari] -- indeed, it would be hard to see thedistinctiveness of art if we did not draw contrasts such as these.

So the move is to contrast the (varied) interest we take in art with the (equally diffuse)interest we take in otherthings in which we take an aesthetic interest. Now, we do


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But does it always succeed: is there always clarity? Of course, and sadly, the answer is"no" -- some flies stubbornly refuse to see their way out of the fly-bottle, even thoughsomeway out has been offered to them: perhaps it doesn't quite address theirparticular problems. For whatever reason, that leaves them in the fly-trap. Hence mycharacterisation offailurein philosophy: "a nasty accident with one's flies".

Notes

[1] Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations(trans G E M Anscombe)Oxford: Blackwell, 1953; cited as "PI". [Throughout, standard abbreviations toWittgenstein's published texts are used.] The text, in translation, is:

What is your aim in philosophy? -- To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.

Note that this is hisaim; but we should regard this as a normativecharacterisation of philosophy generally.

[2] Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning:Volume 1 of an Analytical Commentary on thePhilosophical I nvest igations Oxford:Blackwell, 1980 p. 457, cited as "B&H 1", followed by page number.

[3] It was Gordon Baker who remarked in conversation that philosophy todayis not especially introspective -- he and I agreed that this was not a virtue; thatthinking about the projectof philosophy was an integral part of maintaining a 'live'discipline of philosophy. The alternative was one of 'briskness', where the problems areknown by the philosopher and philosophy consists simply in straightening out themistakes of others. [cf. David Best's remark that, if a bible was inevitably to beadopted, he preferred that it be his book -- I have mixed feelings about this, as I knowDavid does too!] The problem as defined from Descartes: how are the problemsDescartes raises "for as all" (see note 10 below), to be handled individually? [NBBaker's suggestion that Bernard Williams influential book on Descartes goes wrong "on

the title page": it (mistakenly) presents the requirement for an "Pure Enquiry" -- whichis neither possible nor desirable!!! But I should not be repeating the 'slander' ...]

[4] As Gordon Baker ["Some remarks on 'Language' and 'Grammar'" GrazerPhilosophische StudienVol. 42 1992 pp. 107-131 (cited as "B")] urges, Wittgenstein:

... always sought to address specific philosophical problems of definiteindividuals and to bring to light conceptual confusions which theseindividuals would acknowledge as a form of entanglement in their own rules.He did not make direct assaults on various standard 'isms' ... (B p.129)

[5] Another version (Anthony Kenny The Legacy of WittgensteinOxford:

Blackwell, 1984, p. 50: cited as "Kenny"):

The job to be done is .... really a job on oneself.

Yet another (CV p. 16):

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- isreally more a working on oneself...

[6] To use a favourite analogy of Wittgenstein's (from Norman Malcolm LudwigWittgenstein: A memoir, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958 p. 55):


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... just as one's body has a natural tendency towards the surface and onehas to make an exertionto get to the bottom-- so it is with thinking.

[7] Another version (Kenny p. 50):

Learning philosophy has the kind of extraordinary difficulty that geography lessonswould have if pupils began with a lot of false and oversimplified ideas about the wayrivers and mountain ranges go.

[8] A tendency with a Cartesian heritage, based on the idea of needing toconsider all the things that, had they gone wrong, would have prevented myknowledge-claims amounting to genuine knowledge, whatever their likelihood of beingrealised [what Barry Stroud {The Significance of Philosophical ScepticismOxford:Oxford University Press, 1984 pp. 24-29; see also Stroud's Review of Unger Journal ofPhilosophyVol. LXXIV 1977 pp. 246-257 esp. p. 253, and his "Skepticism and thePossibility of Knowledge" Journal of PhilosophyVol. LXXXI 1984 pp. 545-551} calls "allcounter-possibilities"].

[9] Quoted Peter Hacker Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind: Volume 3 of anAnalytical Commentary on thePhilosophical I nvest igations Oxford: Blackwell, 1990p. 264; and in Kenny p. 48

[10] With Descartes [J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (eds) ThePhilosophical Writings of Descartes(Volume 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1985, cited as "CSM", followed by volume and page number], although this is widelyneglected: (see note 3 above). For instance, in order to make a sustained effort tobreak bad intellectual habits:

[t]he seeker after truth must, once in the course of his life, doubt everything, as far asis possible. (PrinciplesCSM vol. 1 p. 193 [section title])

The key thing here is the expression "once in the course of his life", for onlyon the therapeutic conception do we all need this. (A similar point is made inMeditations[CSM vol. II p. 12] but in the first person.) Compare Gordon Baker and

Katherine Morris Descartes' Dualism, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 87.

[11] B&H 1 p. 475 offer another translation

[12] Hacker Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mindp. 243

[13] Compare Gordon Baker "Philosophical Investigations122: NeglectedAspects", in R. L. Arrington and H-J. Glock (eds )Wittgenstein'sPhilosophicalI nvestigations: Text and Context, London: Routledge, 1991 pp. 35-68, esp. pp. 53-63.

[14] Compare BT p. 420; PO p. 181 [B&H 1 p. 557]

[15] Compare Descartes:

... a painter cannot represent all the different sides of a solid body equallywell on his flat canvas, and so he chooses one of the principal ones, sets itfacing the light, and shades the others so as to make them stand out onlywhen viewed from the perspective of the chosen side. (CSM vol. 1 p. 132)

[16] In BT this is followed by what is now part of PI 122:

The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us ....


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[17] This presentation deviates from a key principle of mine; namely, thatWittgenstein's utterances should not be wrenched from their argumentative context:that we must pay attention to Wittgenstein's argumentative strategy, rather thantreating his work as a collection ofaperus. This might be disputed: but, on the face ofit, treating a body of writing as a work in philosophyseems to presume that as astarting point. And mentioning that principle allows me to recognise the contribution tomy writing and thinking on these matters of Gordon Baker.

Now, this may not be an easy course to follow in practice. As

Gordon Baker urges:... we should proceed on the basis that the texts which Wittgenstein constructedhimself consist of carefully thought out arrangements of remarks whose precise wordingwas of paramount importance. (B p. 127)

But, as he goes on to lament:

... this principle does not apply .. to the texts compiled by editors in variousmore or less systematic ways from his manuscripts. (B p. 127)

If Wittgenstein's remarks are not a string of oracular utterances forinterpretation, neither are they transparent to casual scrutiny. Rather, they must beunderstood as part of an on-going argument, although sometimes with opponentswhose views must be reconstructed.

Further, it is sometimes difficult to take Wittgenstein at his word:to see him addressing only the specific issues he says he is addressing. As Baker putsit:

... we might consider respecting his reticence as an essential aspect of histhinking. (B p. 128)

Moreover, and relatedly, taking Wittgenstein at his word may meanrespecting (at least initially) his conception of the philosophical enterprise.

[18] John Wisdom Paradox and DiscoveryOxford: Blackwell, 1965 p. 1

[19] A more comprehensive list is provided by B&H 1 p. 481 (and examples ofeach are given pp. 487-488):

(i) Analogies in surface grammar

(ii) The phenomenology of the use of language

(iii) Pictures embedded in language (BT p. 423: PO p. 185)

(iv) The model of science

(v) Projecting grammar onto reality

(vi) Natural intellectual prejudice

(vii) Philosophical mythologies.

[20] Two points: first, Baker (B. p.118) takes this expression to be ambiguous,and hopes that recognition of its ambiguity will force consideration of how it is to betaken in any particular context (rather than the present reading); second, this emphasison an utterance-type of idea may conflict with Shankar's insistence on the


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coffee. In the second case, Pia had previously asked Hugo to clean the fridge -- nowshe finds him reading the paper, drinking coffee and stillthe fridge is not clean! So Piautters the sentence, saying (truly) that the fridge contains the puddle of milk. Notice,first, that the sentence amounts tosomething different on the two speakings justpresented -- we see this clearly once we recognise that, in the first, what Pia says isfalse while, in the second, it is true. And nothing else has changed. But, second, theword "milk" still means milk, the word "in" still refers to the inside of the fridge, and soon. Moreover, the indexicals, and such like, are not the issue. Pia is talking about thatvery fridge, and at thatvery time. (Not, for instance, looking at the television and

commenting on a fridge in California.) In these cases we see the word "milk" making:

... any of an indefinite variety of distinct contributions to what is said inspeaking it, and, specifically, to the truth condition for that. (Travis "Annalsof Analysis" Mind, Vol.100, April, 1991 p.242)

[32] As Gordon Baker ("Philosophy: Simulacrum and Form" [title in Greek] inStuart Shanker (ed) Philosophy in Britain Today, London: Croom Helm, 1986 pp. 1-57:quote p. 48.) articulates a central Wittgensteinian thesis, the important thing "... is todirect attention away from the form of expressions to their uses". For Wittgenstein (aswe have seen) formsof words might mislead -- this partly explains his preference fordiscussions of use. But this idea too has proved to be misleading: people have

misunderstood the use of the word "use" here, having taken it as some sort ofdefinition of "definition". Nothing could be further from the truth: indeed, the wholedemand for definitenessthis implies is misplaced. The use of the term "use" here isstraightforward, if negative: it is just to record that our interest in forms of words isessentiallycontextual -- that forms of words do not have a specific meaning (perhaps,are not the bearers of meaning).

[33] See Cora Diamond The Realistic Spiritp. 14-15, where it is translated: "...we are out of agreement with ...".

[34] Peter HackerAppearance and RealityOxford: Blackwell, 1987 p. 500

[35] Gordon Baker "Following Wittgenstein: Some Signposts for PhilosophicalInvestigations143-242", in S. Holtzman and C. Leich (eds) Wittgenstein: To Follow aRule, London: Routledge, 1981, pp. 31-71: quotation p. 43.

[36] See John Wisdom (Philosophy and PsychoAnalysisOxford: Blackwell, 1953p. 41: also Paradox and Discoverypp. 83-6) on, for instance, Moore's rejection ofMcTaggart's claims of the unreality of time:

... he is right, they are false -- only there isgood in them, poor things.

[37] Peter KivyAuthenticities: Philosophical Reflections on Musical PerformanceIthaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.

[38] Letter to Norman Malcolm, November 1944; quoted in Norman MalcolmLudwig Wittgenstein: a MemoirOxford: Oxford University Press, 1958 p. 39

[39] Graham McFee The Concept of Dance EducationLondon: Routledge, 1994

[40] Someone might, for instance, invoke Wittgenstein (PI 286) at this point:

... isn't it absurd to say of a bodythat it has a pain?

But this is only a question (and not a rhetorical question) asking when, forexample, it would seem OK to say this, when not. Certainly, Wittgenstein is not here


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identifying some general absurdity: as he continues, we need to enquire what sort ofissue this is. (Is a similar point made in Gordon Baker and Katherine Morris Descartes'Dualism p. 207 note?)

[41] Gordon Baker "Philosophy: Simulacrum and Form" p. 55.

[42] Cora Diamond (ed.)Wittgenstein's Lectures On the Foundations ofMathematics, Cambridge, 1939 Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976 p. 103.

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