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1 Good Governance of the Libyan Investments

and Funds Abroad

Good Governance of the Libyan Investments

And Funds Abroad

Introduction

The Libyan Investment Authority

(LIA) is the umbrella that covers all

the Libyan investments in Libya and

abroad. Its assets value was estimated

at $68 billion at the end of 2015. LIA

has nearly 550 subsidiary companies

and frozen cash accounts in the form of

long-term investments in a number of

Libyan institutions. 50% of these

investments come in the form of funds

and portfolio investments, while the

other half is managed by LIA itself and

it is basically cash balances and

deposits in foreign banks, investments

in bonds and in investment instruments

of steady revenues. LIA faces

difficulties in managing these accounts

due to the continued international

embargo imposed on it.

In this context, the total Libyan

investments abroad amounted to 255.8

billion Libyan dinars that is equivalent

to $196.7 billion during 2013. Like its

Arab counterparts, the Libyan

investment funds have a tendency

towards investments in the sectors of

real estate, services,

telecommunications, energy, and

mining. This type of investment

represents nearly 80% of the total

investment funds, while only 9% of the

investment is in the sector of industry

and the remaining is in the Agriculture,

besides the various investments in the

money market and the treasury bonds.

Among the most serious challenges

facing LIA is the possible acquisition

of the Libyan investments in some

countries in the world, after the Ivorian

government announced, last June, the

nationalization of three mobile phones

companies, among which the "LAP

Green" company that is owned by LIA.

LIA filed lawsuits against the

"Goldman Sachs" company and

"Societe General Bank" for

manipulating the Libyan funds and

investments.


and Funds Abroad

The Libyan economy is going through

a critical phase, represented in:

- Reconstructing and rebuilding the

economic and oil sectors in the light of

the unstable security situation, which is

one of the most important challenges

facing the economic development

process in Libya;

- The unclear path of the transitional

period;

- The widespread of financial and

administrative laxity;

- The misuse of the public funds in the

companies and institutions of the

public sector.

Amid all these circumstances, comes

the importance of the good governance

of the Libyan investments and funds

abroad, as they are the backbone of the

national economy during this current

period. Therefore, they should be

rationally exploited in order for the

present and next generations to benefit

from them.

To achieve this, there are two paths the

Libyan government should pursue. The

first path is to address the problems

within LIA and improve the conditions

of the foreign investment through

directing it towards the most profitable

countries and sectors. While the

second path is to restore those foreign

investments and exploit them locally in

order to reconstruct the Libyan

economy. There are requirements in

order to achieve both paths.

Based on what have preceded, the

report sheds the light on:

I: A Reading on the Size of the

Investments and the Libyan Funds

Abroad.

II: The Challenges Facing the Libyan

Investments Abroad

III: LIA's Reactions towards the

Manipulation of its Investments

Abroad

IV: The Requirements of the Good

Governance of These Investments.

I - A Reading on the Size of the

Libyan Investments and Funds

Abroad

A Historical Overview:

Libya's journey with foreign

investment has started when it

established the "Libyan Foreign Bank",

which was fully-owned by the Central


and Funds Abroad

Bank of Libya in 1972, to assume all

the financial and investment operations

outside the country. In 1973, the

accounts balances of the Central Bank

of Libya and the Libyan Commercial

banks abroad amounted to $2.4 billion

to rise in 1982 and reach $22.2 billion.

In 1977, the Italian car company "Fiat

Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino

"FIAT" went through financial

difficulties, which urged it to put part

of its shares for sale in the global

financial market. It was a good

opportunity presented for the former

Libyan government to buy 15% of the

"FIAT" company's shares. A few years

later, the value of the "FIAT"

company's shares rose; however, the

pressures exerted on the company later

on obliged the former Libyan

administration to sell its shares in

1986.

In 1983, The “Libyan Arab Foreign

Bank” collaborated with other banks to

provide a loan to the Italian company

"Tamoil" with an aim to buy the

properties of the Italian company

"AMACO" for oil refinery and

marketing.

In 1986, the “Libyan Foreign

Investment Company” (LAFICO) was

founded. It had several investments in

the Arab world, Africa, and Europe,

especially in the field of purchasing

commercial real estate. However, most

of its investment decisions in Arab

countries or in the African continent, -

and even in Europe- were politically

oriented and subject to political

directives, which is not economically

right.

In 1988, the "International Petroleum

Investment Company" (IPIC) was

founded under the name of

"International Oil Invest", which is a

holding company fully-owned by

Libya. The company is registered in

the Dutch Caribbean Islands and has

its headquarter in Monaco. Among the

duties of this company is overseeing

all the Libyan investments in the field

of oil, gas, petro-chemistry, and energy

abroad.

"The "International Oil Invest

Company" started working through a

number of subsidiary companies, in an

attempt to gain the majority of shares

in a group of refineries, fuel

distribution networks, and European

oil and petrochemical products. Over

the period of 13 years, the company

managed to form a considerable

investment portfolio, for instance:


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- "The International Oil Invest"

company increased its shares in the

Italian "Tamoil" company to reach

85% in 1989, then 100% in 1991.

- The company bought from the

American company "Coastal" in

Hamburg, Germany what was

estimated at 30% of the Holborn

refinery's shares for $45 million. After

two years, its shares in the refinery

increased to reach 67% and its name

was changed to "Holborn Investment

Company". The "Libyan International

Oil Invest" company was forced to

inject large sums of money for

maintenance and redeveloping of the

refinery, due to its poor condition.

- In 1991, the company owned

all the shares valued at 100% from the

oil distribution company in Germany

that was known by the name of

“Holborn European Marketing”.

- In the same year, the company

bought in Switzerland "GAT Oil"

company after it announced its

bankruptcy and changed its name to

“Tamoil - Switzerland”. Once again,

the "Libyan International Oil Invest"

was obliged to spend large sums of

money, first to pay the debts of the

newly bought company, second to

redevelop the company's rickety

stations.

- The investments of the "Libyan

Foreign Investment Company

(LAFICO) expanded to reach other

countries; including Malta, Spain,

France, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech

Republic, Serbia, and Greece.

- In 1992, the “Libyan Foreign

Investment Company” (LAFICO)

bought 80% of the “Tamoil-Egypt”.

In Africa, Tamoil's activities reached

several countries.

In September 2002, "Tamoil" signed a

99-year contract in the Central African

Republic to explore for oil, Uranium,

and other minerals. In the same year, it

signed an agreement with the

government of Ghana to provide the

latter with nearly 10 thousand barrels

of oil daily, besides that 24 thousand

barrels of oil per day are refined by the

Ghanaian refinery known by the name

"TEMA". In Zimbabwe, June 2003,

"Tamoil" bought oil pipeline and

concluded a deal with the American

company "Exxon Mobil" in Niger,

under which, the American company

sold the "Oil Distribution Network"

company that was its subsidiary in

Niger, as well as the network that

supplies both airports of Niger with the


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jets fuel. In Eritrea, it bought the fuel

distribution stations from "Royal

Dutch Shell" company which allows it

to control 50% of the fuel stations in

Eritrea. 1

In 2006, after the rise of the oil

revenues, and based on several

suggestions, there was an idea to found

a sovereign fund as the case in most

countries. It is a fund that shall ensure

revenue for the next generations when

the oil ends. Therefore, the "The

Libyan Investment Authority

(LIA)" was established to also include

the "Libyan Foreign Investment

Company" and the long-term portfolio

and other related companies. At

approximately the same time, the

portfolio "Libya-Africa" was founded

and it was based on the idea of finding

dense investment in Africa. Another

internal Fund was also created under

the name of "The Libyan Fund for

Domestic Development and

Investments". This Fund aimed at

accelerating the pace of economic

growth in the country through projects

to which the private and foreign

sectors contribute. This fund was not

supposed to substitute the role of the

government, but rather to contribute to

the strategic projects that revitalize the

national economy, and this is one of

the institution's most important

objectives.

The Libyan Investment Authority

(LIA)

The Libyan Investment Authority was

established pursuant to resolution

(205) of the year 2006 issued by the

former General People's Committee.

The Authority was reorganized

pursuant to resolution No. 125 of 2007,

and Resolution No. 184 of 2008, and

the law No. 13 of 2010, as an

investment institution for investing

part of the Libyan money abroad and

in the country in various financial and

economic fields to contribute to

developing and diversifying the

national economy's resources and to

achieving the best revenues to support

the national economy. The institution

started its actual investment activities

as per March 23, 2007. The Table (1)

shows the financial resources of the

institution:


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Table (1): The Financial Resources of the Libyan Investment Authority

Data The Value in Billion Dollars %

Net Cash resources 50,682.6 77

In-Kind resources 14,729.5 33

The Total 65,412.1 100

The in-kind resources of LIA are represented in some subsidiary companies which

LIA included their data in the following Table (2):

Table (2): The Sources of the in-kind Resources

Data The Value in Billion

Dollars

%

The Long-term Investment Portfolio 7,766.9 53

The Portfolio Libya-Africa 5,097.2 35

Oil Investment Company 0,836.3 6

The Libyan Foreign Investment

Company

0,881.4 6

The Libyan Investment Council Abroad 0.603 0

The Total 14,582.4 100

The source: The report of the Libyan Audit Bureau of year 2015.


and Funds Abroad

The Libya Investment Authority (LIA) is

the umbrella that covers all the Libyan

investments in Libya and abroad. Its assets

value is estimated at about $68 billion

dollars. LIA has nearly 550 subsidiary

companies and has frozen cash accounts in

the form of long-term investments in a

number of Libyan institutions. 50% of

these investments come in the form of

funds and portfolio investments affiliated

to:

- The Libyan Foreign Investment

Company (LAFICO) which is investing

in various fields and it is the oldest

investment companies outside Libya;

- Libya Africa Investment Portfolio

(LAP);

- Libya Long Term Investment Portfolio

(LTP);

- Oil Invest Company;

- Libyan Local Investment &

Development Fund (LLIDF).

As for the other half, it is managed by LIA

itself and it is represented in cash accounts

and basically cash balances and deposits in

foreign banks and investments in bonds

and investment instruments of steady

revenues. LIA faces difficulties in

managing these assets due to the continued

international embargo imposed on it.2

By the end of the fourth quarter of

2015, the total assets of LIA amounted

to $68.8 billion. In addition to the

amount of $2.5 billion that represents

the funding for the public finance for

the years 2007 and 2008, achieving by

that a growth rate of 9% during the

nine years since it has started

exercising its activities, which is

equivalent to 1% annually. This

percentage is considered low in

comparison to the size of the

investment. Besides, this figure does

not reflect the reality, where the

investment of the subsidiary

companies is shown through the

investment cost and not by the net

book value. The “Libya Africa

Portfolio” is still showing the cost of

the investment estimated at $5 billion,

while it suffered successive losses due

to its contribution to the "LAP Green"

for telecommunication that exceeded

$1 billion.

On another level, the profits during

that period amounted to around 417

million Libyan dinars, without

including the settlement restrictions

and locks which are usually completed

by the end of the fiscal period. They

did not also fit the revenue rate on the

invested assets, which is estimated at

5% along with the size of investment

and risks. It is possible to achieve this

revenue through investments that


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involve less risk and cost. Table (3)

shows the assets of LIA at the end of

the third quarter of year of 2015.

Table (3): LIA Assets by the End of the Third Quarter of Year 2015

The Assets The Balance in

Million Dollars %

Monetary assets and the like 20,931 30.43

Receivables or other debit balances 5,198.2 7.56

Financial assets available for sale 11,076.5 16.1

Financial investments at fair value through

income statement

1,869.8 2.72

Financial assets held to maturity 0,130.795 0.19

The portfolio of loans and credit facilities 3,105 4.51

Investments in subsidiary and ally companies 24,859.9 36.14

Third party Investments 1,069.6 1.56

Projects under implementation 0,195.096 0.28

Intangible assets 0,336.200 0.49

Net fixed assets 0,10.867 0.02

The total 68,8 100



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We note from the above table that the

largest size of money employment was

through investment in the subsidiary

and allied companies with a relative

size of 36%, then the monetary and the

like with 30%, and the investments in

the stocks with 20%. The latter is the

riskiest investment as it is supposed to

achieve rewarding revenues but instead

it caused large capital losses that

exceeded $3 billion. These losses are

due to the lack of sufficient investment

studies that covers all the aspects in

details. Moreover, LIA failed to follow

up, manage and address its negative

effects, due to its inability to make

strategic decisions through either

restructuring or liquidating the stocks.

The Size of the Libyan Investments

and Funds Abroad

The total of Libyan investments abroad

was estimated at 255.8 billion Libyan

dinars, that is equivalent to $196.7

billion during the year of 2013. These

investments are distributed between

the Central Bank of Libya with 149.04

billion Libyan dinars, the “Libyan

Sovereign Fund” and LIA with 85.012

billion Libyan dinars and 21.7 billion

Libyan dinars to the “Libyan Foreign

Bank”.

Similarly to its Arab counterparts, the

Libyan investments are oriented

towards the sectors of real estate,

services, telecommunication, energy,

and mining. The investments in these

sectors represent nearly 80% of the

Libyan investments and only 9% in the

industry sector and the remaining in

the agriculture, besides the various

investments in the money markets and

the Libyan treasury bonds.

It should be noted that these

investments in some African countries

are managed under several institutions

or portfolios. In South Africa, there are

hotels of high revenues, such the case

in Europe, notably the “Corinthia

Group” in Malta. The revenues of

some hotels in Africa, Tunis, Morocco

and Egypt have also increased.

In Egypt, the “Sheraton-Cairo”, is

among the fanciest hotels, but it needs

maintenance which was supposed to

occur a long time ago. However, the

maintenance has been ongoing since

2007, at a cost of $120 million. There

are also agricultural, real estate and

hotels investments and two pieces of

land from the government: one is 40

hectares in the heart of Cairo and the

other is 45 hectares in the October 6

area. The situation is the same for the


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“Abou Nawas - Tunis” Hotel, which

maintenance was scheduled to finish

by the end of the current year and it

will reopen. In Morocco, there are also

several projects, some of which are

working well and some stopped. 3

In this same context, LIA investments

include the banking sector. It owns

16.25% of the shares in the "First

Energy Bank" of Bahrain and owns

2.6% of shares in the "Unicredit

Bank", the biggest bank in Italy in

terms of assets. Apart from that, the

Central Bank of Libya owns 4.9% of

shares in the Italian Bank, which

increased the Libyan contribution to

the Italian Bank to 7.5%.

In the construction sector, LIA owns

10% of the shares of the Austrian

company "Wienerberger", which is the

largest brick producer in the world and

it is an important cement manufacturer

in Europe. In addition, it acquired 3%

of shares in the "Pearson" publishing

company that owns the British

Financial Times newspaper.

LIA also owns 2.6% of shares in the

"FIAT" and 7.5% of shares in the

Italian "Club Juventus". 4

Through following the money

employments operation during the

year 2015, we find the following:

- The Cash Balances:

They reach $21.206 billion. Among

which, $1.5386 billion are in the

banks, that is equivalent to 7% of the

total cash balance of LIA. $558.997

million are frozen assets pursuant the

decision of the Security Council, that is

equivalent to 4%. While the time

deposits amounted to $18,781 billion,

that is equivalent to 89%.

These accounts were affected by the

Security Council's resolution regarding

the freezing of the funds. In fact, the

bulk of the frozen cash reached 85%,

meaning that these are stalled funds,

which LIA cannot re-employ in other

investments.

- The Investments in Stocks,

Funds, and Portfolios:

There is a difference of $6.2

million between the balance that is

shown in the budget and the

analytical statements of the stocks,

due to the failure to make certain

adjustments.

A difference of $881 thousand

in the balance of the investment

funds and portfolios between the


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balance shown in the budget and the

analytical statements obtained from

the financial administration.

The total losses of all kinds in

the stock reached $4.1 billion that is

equivalent to 27% of the investment

cost.

The highest losses were in the

investments in option contracts

amounting to $1.8 billion, which is

equivalent to 82% of the investment

cost. This investment consists of

decisions to invest in high-risk

option contracts. These decisions

were taken and implemented for

political purposes during the

financial crisis in Europe at the end

of 2008 to save the two biggest

banks in Europe and the USA from

bankruptcy. Hence, these

investments were more of a political

nature than an economic one.

It was noted that the investment

cost of a number of funds and

portfolios amounted to nearly 400

million, while its market value is

zero, as a result of its bankruptcy.

The equivalent of 13% of the

investment in funds and portfolios

was allocated to it.

Several portfolios include

conditions that are not in favor of

LIA and it is difficult to withdraw

from them. Hence, LIA assumes the

expenses of the administration, even

when they do not make a profit.

From what have preceded, it is

obvious that investing in the stocks

was futile because it caused very

large capital losses to LIA. These

losses were the result of the

investment decisions that are made

without sufficient investment

research studies that would

incorporate the necessary elements

for the success of this type of

investments.

- The Loans:

The loans balance amounted to $3.1

billion, which represents the loans

granted to generally-oriented

companies. The loans repayment

deadline was due, but neither the

original loans amount nor the interest

of the loans was repaid. Below are the

financial data as shown in table (5):


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Table (5): The Size of the Granted Loans from LIA in million dollars

Grating Party Loan Value Paid

Installments

Outstanding

Installments

Paid

Interests

Outstanding

Interests

The Ministry

of Finance

1,100 - 1,100 - 159

The National

Oil

Corporation

1,143 95 189 387 1,410

The

Development

Fund

500 - 500 - 40

LAP Green

Company

25 - 7 - 4

Portfolio of

Africa

320 - 200 - 27

Probe

Company

16 - 16 1,39 11



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According to the above table we note

the following:

All the loans have payment

problems.

The balance of the loans in the

financial center does not reflect the

real balance. In fact, these loans

have dues, while the financial

administration did not set any merit

restrictions for them. The financial

administration determined the

merit restrictions and it enclosed

them in the provision for the

accrued interests.

The value of the oil

development projects decreased by

nearly $94.8 million, which

represents the value of the

premiums due for the year 2015.

Meanwhile, the value was

determined and added to a

provision for the accrued interest.

The LIA's administration did

not form a provision for the non-

performing loans.

Not taking all the legal

measures towards the laggards to

pay.

- The Investment in the Subsidiary

and Allied Companies:

As for the situation of the investments

in the subsidiary and allied companies

we can note that:

Despite that the contribution to

most of these investments exceeded

50%, they are considered subsidiary

companies. However, LIA continues

to show them as the cost of

investment in the financial

statements, which breaches the

generally accepted accounting

principles. The latter require

reflecting this figures in the

consolidated financial statements or

disclosing them in the net value book

and that is through reducing the

investment.

LIA did not achieve any profit

from these contributions which are

equivalent to investment size that

exceeded 36%.

- The Libyan African

Investment Company

(LAICO)

The Libyan African Investment

Company (LAICO) is in charge of all

the contractual measures and

supervising the implementation of the

investment projects. It has the


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prerogatives to pay the dues of the

implementing company and to carry

out the administrative, technical and

financial measures, as well as to

manage the investment of the project

after the completion of its

implementations. At the end of the

year 2015, LAICO's contribution

amounted to nearly 743 million Libyan

dinars.

Our remarks on this subject can be

summarized as follows:

The company failed to achieve

any financial revenues in 2015. In

fact, the annual revenue was shown

as zero.

The net equity of some of the

company's contributions in 2015 has

significantly decreased due to the

losses resulting from the activities of

these investments. The company's

administration did not examine the

conditions of these contributions in

order to regulate them through

conducting studies and evaluation.

Among these contributions are:

LAICO-Kenya, LAICO-Burkina,

LAICO-Central Africa, LAICO-

Niger, LAICO- Madagascar and

LAICO-Ghana.

Some of the contributions faced

risks, as a result of the

nationalization or liquidation

measures carried out by a number of

countries, where the investments are

taking place.

LAICO-Togo: This investment

is represented in a hotel that was

nationalized by the Togolese

government. The latter did not

finalize the nationalization process

decision, which is now the subject of

legal follow-up by the company.

Super Nile Company: A

judicial ruling was issued to liquidate

the company, through offering the

hotel for sale. The case is being

followed-up by the company.

- The Libyan African Investment

company:

The number of projects reached 26,

among which five were nationalized

by the host countries; some are

presented to the International Court of

Justice while the Libyan African

Investment Company (LAICO)

received compensation for some other

projects, while nine projects were

canceled.5


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II: The Main Challenges Facing the

Libyan Investments and Funds

Abroad:

1- The Particular Challenges

Facing the Libyan Foreign

Investment Company (LAFICO)

- The non-commitment of the

responsible managers of the LAFICO

to the administrative structure

according to the provisions of law

No. 13 of the year 2010 stipulating

the organization of its work in a way

that the Chairman of the Board of

Directors assumes the

responsibilities of the Executive

Director too. While the duties of the

Board of Trustees were designated to

one of its members, resulting in the

disruption of the control and

supervisory role in LAFICO. This

procedure neglected the right of

LAFICO’s team to develop its public

policies.

- The Board of Trustees does not

exercise any technical or supervisory

control over the work of the Board of

Directors. Most of the decisions

correspondences sent by the Board of

trustees to the Board of Directors do

neither carry indicative figures nor

the name of its source, especially

those dealing with financial benefits.

Besides that the Board made 14

changes in chairmanship and

members of the Board of Directors

during a short period of time, in a

way that makes it impossible to

develop any investment policies, not

to mention implementing them. 6

- Freezing the assets led to the

inability of the institution on more

than one occasion to halt its losses or

increase its gains or reinvest its

revenues, especially in light of the

inability of the State sovereign actors

to make the political and diplomatic

efforts that interpret the decisions

texts of the freezing in a way that

protects the funds of Libyans.

Besides, the former Chairman

claimed that he represents the

institution which was a major

obstacle for the institution to demand

its legal rights.

- The resort of the corporation in

most of its technical matters to the

consulting offices as a result of the

lack of illegible human resource

which made it vulnerable to fraud

and collusion. The corporation did

not make any precautionary

measures that are suitable to the

exceptional circumstances, such as to

identify the prerogatives of some


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stakeholders or restrict certain

financial expenses.

- The ineffective control of LIA

over its affiliates is clearly shown

through the disclosure of all the

LIA's data by its subsidiaries such

the case of LAFICO, which is not

cooperative with the Deloitte

consulting office that is in charge of

evaluating its assets. 7

- Some investment-hosting

countries tried to nationalize the

investments which urged LIA to sell

these assets such the case of the real

estate investment in Zambia.

- The international decision to

freeze all LIA's assets and the lack of

the good governance of the

investments led to several thorny

issues. All the subsidiary companies

took this situation as a pretext to

evade their legal obligations. Apart

from that, LIA is facing challenges

ending the investments management

contracts, which cannot be managed

at first place as they are frozen.

Despite LIA's efforts to identify its

assets and embark into restructuring

them, its success depends in big part

on the extent to which it could

effectively control all the affiliates,

especially that these measures will

definitely cancel or merge many of

the subsidiary companies, which

seems to be hard based on the current

conditions.

- The blurry investment map of

the Libyan Sovereign Fund, the

ambiguity that is characterizing

many of its subsidiary companies,

and the many investment projects for

political purposes require a firm

position from all the sides.

- Some companies are suffering

structure problems and difficulties on

several levels, thus it is mandatory to

pursue transparency and deal with

problems facing LIA with much

more of clarity through publishing

the data and disclosing the conditions

of the Libyan investments of the

authority.

- The absence of monitoring the

operations of the Libyan investment

funds and portfolios abroad. It is no

longer possible to manage the giant

investments with the same traditional

methods used to manage and follow-

up the smaller investments or those

owned by the private sector. 8

- Since 2014, LIA has been

going through a division that caused

a tremendous impact on its authority

of control and monitoring over the


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subsidiary companies it owns, which

has further exacerbated corruption

and the spread of the culture of

cronyism in the appointments

decisions in these companies. 9

- The lack of an investment

vision for LIA (The Libyan

Sovereign Fund).

- Having an organizational

structure that does not fit the needs

of LIA along with the absence of job

descriptions. It is noteworthy to

mention that a foreign company

"Oliver Wyman" was assigned to

carry out additional tasks. It received

millions of dollars, however its work

lacked results and outcome, besides

that there was no follow-up with its

commitment to the contracting

conditions.

- Incomplete and outdated regulations

which are not consistent with the

occurred changes and other

regulations that are missing such as

the financial ones. Moreover, some

regulations are neglected such as the

sanctions regulations and instead

there has been a reliance on the

erroneous personal interpretations in

favor of some over others.

- The absence of the concept of

monitoring and evaluation of LIA's

work either from the stakeholders

inside the company or outside it. 10

- The LIA's administration did

not form a provision for the non-

performing loans, and it did not take

all the legal measures towards those

who did not pay.

- The reporting and information

systems used by LIA in order to

follow-up with the investments

management of the subsidiary and

allied companies are inefficient. In

fact, there is no networked

monitoring system or manual

mechanism that depends on a set of

follow-up forms and models that are

legally developed in advance and are

obligating the subsidiary companies.

However, most of these companies

are fully owned by LIA and the

appointment decisions of their board

of directors are emanating from LIA,

as well as it represents the General

Assembly for these companies.

- There is no effective

communication system between the

administrations and sometimes with

the employees within the same

administration which affected the

flow of information and data inside

the institution.


and Funds Abroad

- There is a problem of

conflicting data and information

between the final information

received at the financial

administration and its details in the

administrations and divisions where

the information was first generated.

In fact, the information conformity

system used in the institution is very

weak and LIA is not working with a

fully linked system as it is not using

an automated conformity system.

2- The Challenges Facing the

Libyan African Investment

Company (LAICO)

- LAICO conducted financial

ratifications on debit and credit

balances only to very few companies.

- The company did not conduct

any study to all the debts that are

subjects to doubts in order to reach

their real value.

- The increase in interest rate on

the loans granted to the contributions

which amounted to 26.180 million

Libyan dinars at the end of the fiscal

year, that is equivalent to 44% of the

total amount of the loans amounted

to 118.429 thousand Libyan dinars. It

is noted that several loans are having

problems paying the due

installments.

- Several lawsuits are filed by

and against LAICO, many of which

are not resolved and date back to

previous years.

- The significant decline in

revenues during the fiscal year 2015

to 103.004 thousand Libyan dinars

compared to the amount of the actual

expenses of 5, 063.903 million

Libyan dinars. That is said, the

percentage of revenues to expenses is

2% as the company did not achieve

any revenues through additional

contributions. It is also noted that

there is a significant decline in the

loans interest rates revenues

amounted to 78.272 thousand Libyan

dinars compared to the size of

granted loans amounted to 118.462

million Libyan dinars.

a- The Challenges Facing the

Projects of the Libyan African

Investment Company (LAICO)

- The project management

division within the LAICO did not

follow up with most of the projects,

due to the lack of all the technical

and financial data, despite the


and Funds Abroad

availability of the communications

means, such as (the rehabilitation of

Abou-Nawas hotel in Tunis and

Libya hotel in Guinea Bissau).

- The exchange rate exceeded the

actual implementation by 31.51%, in

contradiction with the legislations in

force. For instance, (the maintenance

project of Hyatt Regency Hotel in

Kenya).

- The increase of the concluded

contracts. The additional work

reached 31.21% of the original

contract, such the case of the

completion of the Hotel Africa in

Mali, which is violating the

legislations.

- The poor choice of the

implementing companies led to

canceling some of the contracts and

concluding new others.

- The failure of the company in

the field of optimal investment of

projects. Several projects were

canceled such as the establishment of

a five -star hotel in the city of

Nouakchott in Mauritania.

- Some contracts with companies

were canceled without getting back

the surplus and the expenses values,

which violates the current legislation

in force. For instance: the

rehabilitation project of 2nd

of

February hotel in Lomé, Togo. The

contract value amounted to

20,500,000 euros and the value of the

total expenses paid to the contractor

amounted to 11,106,401 euros, while

the percentage of the technical

implementation did not exceed 10%.

- The implementing companies

were unable to execute the projects

within the approved legal time frame,

which led to not benefiting from

these projects. Furthermore, the

hosting countries took control over

these projects such the case in Mali,

Togo, and Rwanda.

b. Technical and Legislative

Challenges Facing the Libyan

Investment Authority:

- The lack of professional

competencies in the field of

investment in general, and the

management of risks in particular, as

well as the lack of Libyan lawyers

specialized in the corporate law. In

addition, the young employees are

quitting LIA due to the poor

management.


and Funds Abroad

- The inability to attract foreign

or Libyan investors who preferred to

run their businesses outside Libya, in

the light of the deteriorating public

services such as the electricity and

water and the difficulty of navigation

in between the cities due to the

exacerbating security conditions

- There are legislative

impediments on the level of legal

facilitations which the investors are

looking for, such as low taxes and

customs facilitations. In addition to

the complex bureaucratic

environment inside the State

institutions that either discourages

the investors or oblige them to knock

on corruption doors. 11

III: The Reactions of the Libyan

Investment Authority towards the

Manipulation of its Investments

Abroad:

Since their inception, all the

investment companies and institutions

were founded on incompetent

management and according to political

criteria at first place. These companies

were run and managed based on non-

scientific and non-commercial methods

and procedures which lack the

economic and investment planning.

The poor management of the Libyan

funds was more obvious in Africa,

where the former regime invested

around $1.5 billion in 12 African

countries. Most of the investments

were in telecommunication companies.

The purpose was mainly related to

political propaganda. These

investments have completed

disappeared except for few assets in

Uganda and Ivory Coast, which both

have nationalized these companies in

the recent years.

The Ivory Coast government

announced the nationalization of the

LAP Green company that is owned by

LIA which means that it seized the

majority of the shares of its capital.

This decision comes after the "LAP

Green " company had known a golden

period between 2007 and 2011 because

of the vitality of the field it is investing

in and the big transactions number that

reaches billion of dollars throughout

different countries in the continent.

LAP Green company is among tens of

the leading Libyan companies in the

field of telecommunication (fixed and

mobile phones) in the west, the coast,

central and southern Africa.

Other countries have preceded the

Ivory Coast such as Zambia, Tanzania,

Niger and Gabon and "seized" the


and Funds Abroad

Libyan company "LAP Green" for

fixed and mobile telecommunication

taking advantage of the State's

weakness and the absence of follow-

up. They gained all they could of

assets under the pretext of tax

renderings, the fees of the various

contributions and the unpaid

concessions to reach the extent of fully

nationalizing the company.

LIA, which is the main Libyan

sovereign fund through the Libya

Africa portfolio, invested a huge

amount of money in planting millions

of hectares of wheat and rice. These

projects were useful in 2008 and 2009

during what is known by the food

crisis and the skyrocketing prices of

grains and the basic agricultural

products. This kind of projects has also

become among the many stalled

projects which Libya has lost since the

February revolution.

Many of the Libyan projects were

looted and fully seized by the host

countries. In Africa, hundreds of

projects in the field of fuel marketing

were looted and seized, mainly the

projects of the Libyan Oil company in

particular and “ Tamoil” but on a

smaller scale. Other hotel and

residential projects of high cost, which

were implemented through the Libyan

African Investment Company

(LAICO) were all seized in most of the

west, central and east Africa, and even

in the Arab Maghreb countries such as

Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and

Mauritania. The looting of these

projects led to fully taking control over

them, and some other underwent

liquidation and bankruptcy. 12

In 2011, the Transitional Council

demanded from the European countries

and the United Nations to put a hold on

the Libyan money fearing that some

parties have the right to sign and

withdraw it. After a short period of

one year, the Central Bank of Libya's

funds were released, but LIA's assets

remained under sanctions. Hence, LIA

is facing much pressure due to the

lawsuits filed against it, among which

the recent one on 27th of July when the

supreme court in London issued a

ruling fining LIA 15 million dollars for

violating a contract with an Australian

company.

The ruling came based on a lawsuit

filed by the Dubai-based Australian

company "C MAS", which is

specialized in the administrative

services. The company asked for

compensations after the Libyan

African Investment portfolio canceled


and Funds Abroad

the contract signed in 2010 with the

company that stipulates the provision

of strategies to develop the portfolio's

business for five years starting in 2009.

On another aspect, LIA started taking

measures against Rwanda, Zambia,

Chad, and Niger for the nationalization

of the Libya assets.13

Meanwhile, some

international financial institutions are

being prosecuted. These institutions

invested $2.8 billion of the Libyan

money during the former regime.

These investments lost their value

years ago, during the global economic

crisis.

Moreover, LIA sued the "Goldman

Sachs" and the "Societe General

Bank". LIA accused "Goldman Sachs"

for deliberately taking advantage of the

limited experience of LIA's officials

and for squandering investments worth

$1 billion, while it made a profit of

$350 million. The case against

"Societe General" is different. It is

related to allegations of corruption in

the concluded deals with the Libyan

side, which amount to $1.5 billion.

From their side, the "Goldman Sachs"

and the "Societe General" rejected the

charges of the Libyan side. The

division at the head of LIA affected the

proceedings of both cases, which were

delayed in the court of London. There

are concerns that this division would

also reflect on the situation of LIA's

assets around the world, in the light of

the quest of some countries to

nationalize LIA's shares in shared

institutions. 14

The legal battle that lasted for two and

half years between the "Goldman

Sachs" and the Libyan sovereign

wealth fund ended up with the

Goldman Sachs winning the case

despite the reveal of the way some of

its bankers performed.

On Friday, October 14, 2016, the High

Court in London issued a ruling in

favor of the "Goldman Sachs". In fact,

the judge Vivienne Rose rejected the

arguments the Libyan Sovereign

Wealth Fund presented throughout the

trial that lasted seven weeks.

While it is likely that LIA will seek to

appeal the judgment, the Court stated

that the nine transactions that are the

subject of the dispute were considered

as not suitable for a wealth fund. In

this sense, they are not any different

from several other investments carried

out by LIA in that period of time.

LIA's management were assigned to

achieve higher revenues than they

hoped to achieve through routine


and Funds Abroad

transactions which probably explains

their choice of investments of a

speculative nature. "Goldman Sachs"

stated in documents submitted to the

Court, that LIA was under internal and

political pressures to engage in

substantial investments in order to

achieve quick returns.

The Bank said that "unexpected

financial distress" caused the losses

and not any wrongdoing on the part of

the Bank. The subject of disagreement

during the trial was whether the staff

has actually realized what they are

investing in.

LIA's lawyers said that "Goldman

Sachs" misused its position as a trusted

advisor, while the bank claims that it

was obvious that they were dealing

with each other as business parties and

that it maintained with its client a

relationship of two independent and

equal parties. 15

The FM Capital fund, which the

Libyan African Investment Portfolio

owns 67% of its shares, sued the

partner and its former director,

Frederic Marino, in British Courts. Mr.

Marino, who previously run the fund in

2009, was accused of squandering the

fund's money on his personal expenses

from the year 2011 to 2014 and for

receiving concessions and bonuses

which he was not entitled to receive as

it was not approved by the fund's board

of director. Additionally, LIA which

capital amounts to $800 million,

racked up losses amounted to $67

million during the administration of

Mr. Marino, from 2011 until 2014. 16

LIA's board of directors is seeking

ways to face the possible acquisition of

the Libyan investments in some

countries around the world, such the

case of the Ivory Coast government

which announced last June the

nationalization of the three mobile

phones companies among which the

LIA-owned " LAP Green ". 17

VI: The Requirements of the Good

Management of the Libyan

Investments and Funds Abroad:

The good governance is a new

economic concept that incorporates a

number of indeterminate definitions as

its overlaps with several

administrative, economic social and

legal aspects. The World Bank defines

the good governance as the manner in

which power is exercised in the

management of a country's economy

(financial resources) for development.

The Organization for Economic


and Funds Abroad

Cooperation and Development

(OECD) defines the good governance

as the rules that govern the work of

enterprises and the way they are

managed. It also determines the

distribution of rights and

responsibilities among the various

parties which are the board of

directors, the directors, and the

contributors.

The good governance is based on

several axes. At the forefront is the

transparency in what is related to the

information system. The good

governance advances the drafting of

laws that are in line with the

requirements of the work of the

companies and enterprises in both the

public and private sectors. The aim is

to reach the optimal performance that

would lead to achieving the desired

objectives. 18

Under the circumstances through

which the Libyan economy is going

through, that are represented in:

- Reconstructing and rebuilding the

economic oil and non-oil sectors in the

light of the security instability that is

considered among the most important

challenges facing the economic

development process in Libya.

- The transitional phase has not yet

taken shape.

- The widespread of the financial and

administrative laxity.

- The irrational exploitation of the

public money in the companies and

institutions of the public sector that led

the Libyan economy into a dark tunnel

of recession.

In the light of all these circumstances,

comes the important role of the good

governance of the Libyan Investments

and funds abroad as they represent the

backbone of the national economy

during this period. These resources

have to be efficiently exploited in

order to maximize them so that the

present and next generations can

benefit from them.

To achieve this, there are two paths

the Libyan government should

pursue. The first path is to address

the problems within LIA and

improve the conditions of the Libyan

foreign investments through

directing them towards the most

profitable countries and industries.

The second path is restoring these

foreign investments and exploiting

them locally to rebuild the Libyan

economy. Achieving both paths

requires the following:


and Funds Abroad

To achieve the first path:

Addressing the problems of LIA,

improving the conditions of the

foreign investments and directing

them towards the most profitable

countries and sectors:

o The need to develop an

advanced management model to run

such a giant institution such the LIA,

which is relied upon to contribute to

achieving the long-desired economic

stability in Libya during the

upcoming phase. This model has to

ensure a constant control of the

investments through implementing

firm governing rules and managing

the risks in situations of uncertainty.

Moreover, this model has to focus on

the rehabilitation and training of the

board of directors’ members through

developing their decision-making

capacities under various

circumstances. Furthermore, the

designations of the boards of

directors’ members should not be

considered as a tribute and an

opportunity to gain benefits, but

rather as a pivotal responsibility. In

fact, the selection of the members of

the boards of directors must be based

on specific criteria, standards, high

competencies, capabilities, and

knowledge of the LIA field of work.

19

o The owner should have the

technical tools to monitor the

investments. In this sense, the board

of directors is considered among the

most important monitoring tools and

that is through the presence of its

representatives, who have to meet on

regular basis to present the

performance reports and make the

strategic decisions that will facilitate

the executive administration of the

LIA.

o The owner has to use additional

tools to better monitor and follow-up

the operations through his authority

as a public association of the

company. In addition to the use of

control mechanisms through

applying the models of the good

governance, risk management and

performance evaluation.

o The need to provide the

minimum level of an organizational

environment as well as providing the

guarantees before granting local and

international loans to ensure its

retrieval.

o Changing of the ineffective

elements that are running the

investment abroad, and pursuing the


and Funds Abroad

correct, business and transactional

methods. 20

o LIA has to be governed in a

wise and professional way as do the

other funds through seeking to invest

with the best investment managers in

the world, and employ the best

investment consultants in the world

to be its advisors, and the best

auditors to scrutinize the numbers, so

that it has the capability of

assimilating, auditing, accounting,

and maintaining the investments

portfolio, while abandoning the

politicized and directed investments.

o LIA has to have an audit team

to present reports every three months

to:

- Confirm the revenues,

- Evaluate the performance, whether

or not the investment comply with

the market indicators;

- To withdraw the money from the

unsuccessful parties to employ it

elsewhere.

o Moving from an outdated

administration to a modern and

professional one to the same

standards of the international

sovereign funds. A good example of

this is Norway, which has a

sovereign fund that was established

25 years ago. Norway is an oil

country of 5 million people, while

Libya is an oil country too, of 6

million people.

o Scrutinizing the expenses and

sources of money through providing

financial statements to be presented

to the Presidential Council so that

any existing funds with the parallel

institution should be placed in LIA's

account.

o To firmly move forward with

the filed lawsuits in order to recover

the looted money. 21

o Attracting the financial and

monetary technology that helps raise

the economic capacity at country and

regional levels, and includes, in

particular, the developing countries

because it lacks the specialized

technology to develop energy,

services, and other sectors.

o The need to focus the

investments on real economic sectors

which generate high revenues for the

hosting government in the short and

long terms, instead of directing them

to the unproductive and non-actors

sectors in the development process.

o Achieving a real balance

between the domestic and foreign


and Funds Abroad

investments which would lead to

maintaining the external gains. At the

meantime, the balance would prevent

the State's economic growth from

declining, as well as preventing the

increase of unemployment rates, and

the stagnation of goods.

o A thorough revision of the

investment and economic policies, in

general as they are linked to each

other as well as reviewing the

international agreements and the

legal frameworks organizing the

economic activity in Libya and the

cooperation and partnership with the

European Union. 22

o Restructuring the institution in

line with the sovereign funds and the

wealth management funds and

forming an independent committee to

investigate the previous violations

and announce the investigations

results and bring the perpetrators of

crimes to justice.

o Benefiting from the intensive

consultations with the International

Monetary Fund on the optimal form

and size of the Libyan sovereign

investments. 23

o As for the issue of the official

representative of the authority, the

Presidential Council and the

government should put an end to the

duplicate sovereign institutions

through forming new board of

trustees and board of directors and

selecting a new executive director for

the institution.

o The Presidential Council and

the government should not manage

in any way the frozen funds as it

violates the act of establishing the

Libyan sovereign fund. However, the

council has to only seek the transfer

of the funds between the frozen

accounts and to allow re-investing

them and opening or closing some

accounts in order to maintain the

value of these assets, besides

maximizing its revenues.24

To achieve the second path

represented in restoring these

foreign investments and exploiting

them locally to rebuild the Libyan

economy. The following is required:

o Strengthening the Monetary

Policy

The monetary policy is among the

most important macroeconomic policy

tools, through which it is possible to

achieve the high priority economic

objectives. The monetary policy is

represented in the total of actions taken

by the monetary authorities (Central


and Funds Abroad

Bank) to manage the monetary bulk

necessary to achieve the economic

objectives. The Central Bank works to

influence the money supply to direct

the economic activity according to the

requirements of the economic

situation. Through extrapolating the

Libyan economic situation one notes

that the Central Bank needs to pursue

an expansionary monetary policy to

serve the next economic phase and

provide the liquidity to consolidate the

economic activity. This would be

possible through directing part of the

investments and financial assets to

enhance the monetary policy by

increasing the size of the Central Bank

of Libya's financial assets and increase

the volume of foreign exchange.

Therefore, the Central Bank of Libya

has to follow two kinds of mechanisms

to expand the monetary policy. These

mechanisms are illustrated as follows:

1- Lowering the Discount Rate

Under this type of quantitative

mechanism, the commercial banks

discount the commercial papers in their

possession at the Central Bank in

exchange for an identified percentage

of interest on these commercial papers.

In return, the Central Bank offers to

the commercial banks loans used to

support their credit policy (to increase

the loans granted to the customers). In

the case of the recession the Libyan

economy is facing, the economic

policy's objective is to achieve

economic growth and increase

employment opportunities and thus,

the Central Bank depends on an

expansionary policy that is based on

expanding the issuance of money and

hence, it lowers the rate of discount

earned in order to encourage the

commercial banks to discount the

commercial papers. Therefore, the

increase of loans the commercial banks

grant to their customers lead to an

increase in liquidity for the various

projects and hence, reviving the

investments and contribute to rising the

economic growth rates.

2- Lowering the Legal Reserve

The Central Bank requires from all the

banks operating under its umbrella to

place part of their deposits in the

Central Bank as a collateral for the

loans granted to customers. The

Central Bank of Libya has to lower the

reserve requirement for the banks

operating under its umbrella, taking

into consideration that a part of the


and Funds Abroad

assets will be directed to the official

reserve of the Central Bank of Libya.

3 - The Open Market Operations

Within this mechanism, the Central

Bank of Libya can buy assets such as

bonds and instead it provides an

amount of liquid assets to revive the

liquidity in the local market. The open

market operations are considered

among the main tools used to control

the money supply, because of their

quick impact (on increasing the

liquidity in the local market).

Moreover, these operations cannot

engender any inflation such the case

with other tools. The Central Bank can

use several ways to execute the open

market operations including

purchasing, selling through direct

negotiation or through fixed price

auctions as well as open auctions.

o Reconstructing Libya

The reconstruction plans are

exceptional plans imposed by the

reality of the crisis and developed by

the government to address this reality

with all the possible tools. However,

this initiative place the reconstruction

plan in the general context of the

national sectoral plans that are

supporting the comprehensive national

development which is prepared based

on dual feed from above to ensure

coherence (the national visions and

plans) and from bottom to ensure the

complementarity (institutions plans,

sectors structures, the plans for

developing the cities) to become a plan

of a determined time frame

exceptionally the plan to reconstruct

Libya.25

Finally, LIA has to be unified for the

interest of the Libyan people so that

the flows of investments are directed

toward:

- The infrastructure such as the oil

installation so that Libya achieve

higher revenues;

- The social services, airports, roads

- To increase the power generation to

prevent power outages

- To develop the telecommunication

and internet networks that are urgently

required developing the Libyan

economy.

- To contribute to finding solutions to

some of the problems facing the

Libyan citizen, besides helping the

local capitals to contribute to moving

the Libyan economy wheel.


and Funds Abroad

References

1 Mohamed Fathi Cherif, the Libyan Investments Abroad, a Series of Mistakes,

Stumbling and Chaos. $197 billion is the Size of the Investment in 2014, Most of it is

High Risk Investments,

http://sootelshab.com%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%

2 Suliman Alshahomy, How Much Are the Libyan funds abroad?

https://www.facebook.com/suliman.alshahomy/posts/10153343764487701

3 Soumaya Ahmed, Bawabat Al Wasat, an interview with the Libyan Foreign

Investments Company, http://www.minbarlibya.com/?p=2680

4 Hazem Ali, 80 billion dollars of Libyan Investments Abroad are Trapped by

Unknown Fate, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/22/138749.html

5 The report of the Libyan Audit Bureau of the year 2015,

http://lfb.ly/CMS_Files/Publications/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%

B1_%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85

%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%

D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A_2015%D9%85_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%87

%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A.pdf

6 Mahmoud Gharib, will the Caretaker Steering Committee Succeed in Saving LIA's

Assets, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/115227/#sthash.TgRmKyWJ.dpuf

7 Suliman Alshahomy, Revealing the Hidden in the Libyan Investment Authority,

http://www.libyaakhbar.com/libya-news/31448.html

8 Sabri Najah, "The Libyan for Investment", a model for Squandering Billions,

http://www.gulf-24.com/business-news/9731.html

http://sootelshab.com/الاست%D8%25

https://www.facebook.com/suliman.alshahomy/posts/10153343764487701

http://www.minbarlibya.com/?p=2680

http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/22/138749.html

http://lfb.ly/CMS_Files/Publications/تقرير_ديوان_المحاسبة_الليبي_2015م_النهائي.pdf





http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/115227/#sthash.TgRmKyWJ.dpuf

http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/115227/#sthash.TgRmKyWJ.dpuf


http://www.gulf-24.com/business-news/9731.html


and Funds Abroad

9 Omar Saeed Khataly, The Libyan Investment and the World of the Membership of

the Boards of Directors, https://goo.gl/pjOlqd

10 Ahmad Maghrawi, The Corruption System and the ISIS Members of the Public

Money, http://www.libya-al-

mostakbal.org/95/1583/%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8.html

11 The Libyan Economy after the Revolution: The Indicators for Collapse and the

Hopes for Recovery, https://goo.gl/kPprDq

12 Mohamed El Amine Mohamed, the International organized Looting for the

Libyan Investment Abroad. The money of Libyans, to where?

http://ewanlibya.ly/news/news.aspx?id=1389

13 Zeinab Gharian, Libya's Looted Funds the Bankruptcy Nightmare is Hunting

down the State, http://www.vetogate.com/1745549

14 Kamil El-Tawil, The LIA's Chairman Confirms to "Al Hayet" the Existence of

Frozen Projects Worth Billion Dollars, https://goo.gl/Ib1T95

15 Jane Croft, Libya Lost the Case Against "Goldman Sachs", https://goo.gl/txh1fg

16 Suliman Alshahomy, Revealing the Hidden in the Libyan Investment Authority,


17 Ahmad Al Khamisi, Libya Is Waiting for $3.3 Billion on the Doorsteps of London,

https://goo.gl/Ngl1ad

18 The Good Governance of Companies,

http://www.lsm.ly/Arabic/Control/Governance/Pages/GovernanceForm.aspx.

19 Lina Saigol and Cynthia O'Murchu, Managing the Libyan Investments Abroad is

a Big Challenge for the Rebels, http://www.aleqt.com/2011/09/17/article581255.html

https://goo.gl/pjOlqd

http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/95/1583/منظ.html

http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/95/1583/منظ.html

https://goo.gl/kPprDq

http://ewanlibya.ly/news/news.aspx?id=1389

http://www.vetogate.com/1745549

https://goo.gl/Ib1T95

https://goo.gl/txh1fg


https://goo.gl/Ngl1ad

ttp://www.lsm.ly/Arabic/Control/Governance/Pages/GovernanceForm.aspx.

http://www.aleqt.com/2011/09/17/article581255.html


and Funds Abroad

20 Abdelmonsef Bouri, The Libyan Investments,

http://libyaparty.blogspot.com.eg/2013/09/blog-post_13.html

21 Soumaya Ahmad, Bawabat Al Wasat interview with the Libyan Foreign

Investments Company, http://www.minbarlibya.com/?p=2680

22 Hamd Ben Mostafa, For Reviewing the Policy for Attracting the Foreign

Investments, https://goo.gl/3Qgo7j

23 Ahmed Ahmed, the Libyan Foreign Investments, to where?

http://libyaparty.blogspot.com.eg/2013/09/blog-post.html

24 Ahmed Maghrawi, The Corruption System and the ISIS Members of the Public

Money, http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/95/1583/%D9%.html

25 The Reconstructing Vision of Libya, http://www.libyavision2020.ly/lv/?lang=ar

http://libyaparty.blogspot.com.eg/2013/09/blog-post_13.html

http://www.minbarlibya.com/?p=2680

https://goo.gl/3Qgo7j

http://libyaparty.blogspot.com.eg/2013/09/blog-post.html

http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/95/1583/%D9%25.html

http://www.libyavision2020.ly/lv/?lang=ar


and Funds Abroad

Recent Publications

1. Priorities of National Reconciliation Government.

2. The Draft of Political Agreement: Review of the Content.

3. 2014 Audit Bureau Report and Rationalization of Public Spending.

4. A Framework for the Comprehensive Transitions (Translated to Arabic).

5. Social Impacts of the Political Division in Libya.

6. The Political and Security Scene in Libya an Analytical and Forward-Looking Vision.

7. The Economic Impacts of Political Division in Libya.

8. Is it Possible to Bring Peace to Libya?

9. Policies of Commodities Subsidy in Libya.

10. Libya 2015 Report: Year in Review.

11. Government Performance Evaluation in Libya for Year 2015.

12. War on ISIS in Libya through the Accord.

13. The Libyan Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA): Path, Outcomes and Reviews.

14. Consociational Democracies, Political Stability and External Intervention.

15. The Health Sector in Libya: Situation and Challenges.

16. Financial Corruption in the Libyan Economy.

17. The Situation of Higher Education in Libya.

18. Public Education in Libya: Problems, Challenges and Solutions.

19. The Impact of Geography and Demography on the Conflict and the Solution in Libya.

20. The Role of the Social Groups and Religion in the Conflict over Power in Libya.

21. Performance Evaluation of the Ministry of Interior in Libya.

22. War against ISIS. Till When? Assessment Report.

23. The Paths of War in Benghazi. Assessment Report.

24. The International Community and its Compliance with the Skhirat Agreement.

Assessment Report.


and Funds Abroad

25. Eight Months after Signing the Political Agreement. Assessment Report.

26. Tripoli and the Oil Crescent; Two Possible Pathways to War in Libya.

Assessment Report.

27. Consequences of Voting ‘No Confidence’ on Government of National Accord.

Assessment Report.

28. The Role of the State in the Economic Activity in Libya.

29. The Libya Case. Monthly report, August 2016.

30. The Libyan Political Dialogue (Skhirat). Obstacles or Closed Roads? Assessment

Report.

31. The Shifts of the Conflict in the Oil Crescent. Assessment Report.

32. The Libyan Oil Sector during Year 2016.

33. Repercussions of the Declarations of the State Council and the Mufti. Assessment

Report.

34. Challenges Facing the Spatial Development in Libya.

35. The Libya Case. Monthly report, September 2016.

36. The Russian Role in Libya. A Context of a New Cold War. Assessment Report.

37. Social Justice in Libya since 2011.

38. The State of War in Libya What is it? And How to Dismantle it?

39. The Possibility of an Armed Clash in Tripoli after the Return of the Salvation

Government. Assessment Report.

40. New Possible Scenarios for the War in the Oil Crescent. Assessment Report.

41. The Possibilities of the Libyan War: Monopoly - War - Division – Negotiation.

42. The Absence of the State Movement in Libya.

43. The Libya Case. Monthly report, October 2016.

44. A Vision for the Management of Antiquities and Heritage in Libya.


and Funds Abroad

About LOOPS

The Libyan Organization Of Policies & Strategies (LOOPS) is an independent,

nonprofit and nongovernmental institution founded in December 2014 in Tripoli,

Libya. A representative branch was founded in Istanbul in January 2015.

The organization carries out research and studies related to emerging policy and

strategy issues with the aim of generating effective and successful policies and

providing support to decision-makers. The organization devotes its efforts to improving

the performance of Libyan institutions and advancing the economic and social welfare

of the Libyan people. It seeks to spread the notions and concepts of quality, good

governance, strategic planning and a culture of excellence so as to improve the

performance of Libyan institutions.

LOOPS aspires to promote and spread knowledge about public policies and strategies

to the state through the dissemination of statistics, studies and periodic reports. It also

organizes conferences, workshops and forums as platforms for discussion, the exchange

of opinions and spreading knowledge.

Tripoli Office

Alnofliyin, Tripoli, Libya

Tel: 00218 21 340 01 43

Istanbul Office

Istanbul Vizyon Park

YenibosnaMerkez MAH.29

Bahçelievler- Postal Code 34197

Ofis Plaz.A3 BLK

K: 3/D28

Phone:0090 212 603 25 92

Fax: 0090 212 603 27 48

Istanbul, Turkey

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