god’s in his heaven, all’s right with the world: the need for the timely establishment of an...

8/3/2019 Gods in His Heaven, Alls Right with the World: The Need for the Timely Establishment of an International Legal Regime in Outer Space and the Privatization o

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Gods in His Heaven, Alls Right with the World: The Need for the Timely Establishment of

an International Legal Regime in Outer Space and the Privatization of Space War

A Thesis submitted in partial satisfaction

of the requirements for the major in

Global Studies

By

Einar Engvig

June 7, 2010

The thesis of Einar Engvig is approved.

___________________________________

John A. Agnew, Chair of Global Studies

___________________________________

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Russell A. Burgos, Faculty Advisor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project is the end product of two years of intense study at the University of

California, Los Angeles; an institution that has given me the freedom to engage in an incredibly

rewarding and mind expanding major while allowing me to create, design and facilitate my very

own political science class for spring quarter 2010. Specifically, I would like to thank my faculty

mentor Russell A. Burgos for inspiring me to be independent, creative and to push myself as hard

as it takes and librarian Joseph Yue for all the help in research. I would also like to thank all my

friends in the Global Studies major at UCLA for being supportive and friendly. Most of all,

however, I would like to thank Yvonne Pueblos of Los Angeles Harbor College, who helped me

every step of the way to pull myself up and dared me to challenge the world and get into UCLA,

making this all possible for me. Doors have been opened for me; I will not close any behind me.

Of note is also Dr. James Clay Moltz for indirectly revealing the field of space security to me and

for sending me resources and going out of his way to help out a UCLA undergrad.

I would also like to forward appreciation to all my friends at UCLA who have made this

the best year of my life. Of note are my roommates Brian Khang Le and Tim Rozelle, who have

always kept me in good company day in and day out and the fifth roommate, James Jeffery whokept me company no matter the distance. Special thanks go to my last roommate Stephen

Crisafulli who helped create the figures, graphs and Orson Scott Card references. I would also

like to thank all my friends who have waited patiently on the sidelines for my return to the social

world and have always been caring, loving and supportive. Of special note are Charles Ryu,

Omar Salim Patel, Roomana Patel and Mariam Ter-Stepanian who have always given me all the

companionship, love and beer I need, even when I forget to return the favor myself.

Most of all I would like to thank my family who has loved me unconditionally throughthick and thin. I would like to thank my funny and kindhearted father, Olaf, for loving life and

teaching me to do so as well and my brother Tormod for always being a steadfast and true role

model who always makes time for his silly brothers. I would like to thank my extremely

intelligent yet hopeless mother, Dr. Mona Engvig, for an endless source of unconditional love

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that has always encouraged me in whatever endeavor I set before me. Most of all, I would like to

thank my brother Hkon Hawk Engvig for being my entire lifes best friend and for inspiring

me to write this thesis, conquer the world and take on endless, nerdy challenges from new places,

new planets, new galaxies and occasionally even new dimensions. I love you all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Abbreviations and Acronyms4

2. Introduction (Relevant Characteristics of Space)..5

3. Literature Review....10

4. Thesis...14

4.1. Governance in Space is a Reality Today

4.2. Governance in Space will not be a Reality in the Future

5. Case.19

5.1. Space Security Will Be Privatized...19

5.1.1.KillSats as beneficial

5.1.2.Privatization of KillSats as beneficial

5.2. Space Security Must Not Be Privatized...31

5.2.1.Unnecessary

5.2.2.Not Beneficial for Nation-States

5.2.3.Empowers Destabilizing Actors

5.2.4.Weakens Centrality of Nation-States in Space

6. Recommendation....46

6.1. Existing pertinent legislation on space

6.2. Type, form and methods of legislation needed to halt the privatization of space security

6.3. A New Outer Space Treaty

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7. Summary and Conclusion...54

8. Tables 55

9. Figures....63

10. Works Cited...65

1. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASAT = Anti-Satellite

ABM Treaty = Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

CIS = Corpus Iuris Spatialis, or Five Treaties

ComSat = Communications Satellite

EU = European Union

KillSat = (Hunter) Killer Satellite

KKV = Kinetic Kill Vehicle

LEO = Low Earth Orbit

Liability Convention = Known officially as the Convention on International Liability for

Damage Done by Space Objects

MEO = Medium Earth Orbit

MHIV = Miniature Homing Intercept Vehicle

Moon Treaty = Known officially as theAgreement Governing the Activities of States on the

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OST = Outer Space Treaty, known officially as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities

of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial

Bodies

PMSC = Private Military Security Company

PRC = Peoples Republic of China

Partial Test Ban Treaty = Known officially as the Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In The

Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water

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Registration Treaty = Known officially as the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched

into Outer Space

Rescue and Return Agreement = Known officially as theAgreement on the Rescue of

Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space

SPT = Space Preservation Treaty

Terra = Planet Earth and its atmosphere

US = United States

2. INTRODUCTION1

While less than one century ago, outer space was void of any interaction with mankind, it

has today become characterized by (1) globalization, (2) the types and numbers of actors, (3)

strategic military value, (4) nation-state and private militarization and (5) weaponization.

Although there are many definitions of globalization, they revolve around (1) the de-emphasis of

the nation-state and the emphasis of global transnational political processes, (2) the emergence of

a global economic market centered on new systems of production, finance and consumption and

(3) the emergence of a social, world-spanning global culture.2 All three of these trends

complement and compete against one another in emerging global commons, a world

environment where thecircumstances and events of one region has consequences on all others.3

Specifically, authors on globalization decry the lack of institutions when analyzing the state of

the worlds natural environment and note the lack of capacity to conserve and lack of support for

5

1Partofthe/tleofthispaperistakenfromBrowning,Robert,PippaPasses(NewYork:Dodd,MeadandCo.,

1901).

2SeeSklair,Leslie,Compe/ngConcep/onsofGlobaliza/on.JournalofWorld-SystemsResearch2(Summer

1999):143-163.

3SeeWorldCommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopment:OurCommonFuture.UnitedNa/onsWorld

CommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopment.(OxfordUniversityPress,1987):1-9.


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conservation in national and international legislation.4 Authors also note that, due to global

integration, a serious issue in the global commons is ungoverned spaces. Ungoverned spaces are

areas of (1) contested, (2) incomplete or (3) abdicated governance.5 Outer space is a global

common characterized by a lack of institutions, lack of capacity to conserve and a system of

incomplete or abdicated governance.

Since the launch of the privately owned Telstar 1 Communications Satellite (ComSat) in

1962, interaction in space has been typified less by the Soviet/United States (US) Cold War

rivalry of nation-states, and more by privatized commercial interests. This trend has not

diminished in recent days with the coming retirement of the US Space Shuttle, President Barak

Obamas cancellation of the Constellation Program, the creation of space tourism as well as

increasing Russian and US privatization of the space sector.6 ComSats are no exception to this

development. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database, 40.69 percent

(or 378 of 929) of satellites in orbit are solely commercial as of April 2010. In terms of the

different categories of ownership for space assets (commercial, government, military, civil, etc.),

6

4SeeWorldConserva/onStrategy:LivingResourceConserva/onforSustainableDevelopment.Interna/onal

UnionforConserva/onofNatureandNaturalResources(1980).Availablefromh_p:data.iucn.orgdbtw-wpd

edocsWCS-004.pdf;Internet;Accessed21May2010.

5SeeRabasa,Angelandothers,UngovernedTerritories:UnderstandingandReducingTerrorismRisks.RAND

(2007).Availablefromh_p:www.rand.orgpubsmonographs2007RANDMG561.pdf;Internet;Accessed24

May2010.

6Forexamples,seeAmos,Jonathan,Atlan/sLaunchesonFinalVoyage.BBCNews.Bri/shBroadcas/ng

Corpora/on(14May2010).Availablefromh_p:news.bbc.co.uk2hisciencenature8681451.stm;Internet;

Accessed15May2010.andAmos,Jonathan,ObamacancelsMoonreturnproject.BBCNews.Bri/sh

Broadcas/ngCorpora/on(1Feb.2010).Availablefromh_p:news.bbc.co.uk2hisciencenature8489097.stm;

Internet:Accessed1Feb2010.andMoreEntrepreneursPushISSCommercialUse.Avia;onWeek&Space

Technology154,no.2(8January2001):26.andRussianOperatorofMirtoSellSharestoInvestors.WallStreet

Journal-EasternEdi/on232,no.18(July27,1998):B7A.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8489097.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8681451.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8681451.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8681451.stmhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdfhttp://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/WCS-004.pdfhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8489097.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8489097.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8681451.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8681451.stmhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdfhttp://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/WCS-004.pdfhttp://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/WCS-004.pdfhttp://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/WCS-004.pdfhttp://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/WCS-004.pdf


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this makes up the plurality of all assets in space by a margin of at least 102 satellites.7 See Figure

1. Add to this private firm SpaceXs successful launch of the Falcon 1 launch vehicle in

September 2008 and the Falcon 9 in June 2010 and one sees that private firms are fully capable

of ownership, placement and operation of space assets.8

While space has not yet been significantly weaponized, it has been militarized. US

military forces and many militaries like it today depend on satellites forcommunications, early

warning, intelligence gathering, arms control verification, navigation, mapping and weather

forecasting. Strategically, nation-states militarize space in order to create space support and force

enhancement.9 Specifically, space assets are essential in observation and planning in peacetime,

are essential as force multipliers in wartime and fill both of these roles in the advent of nuclear

operations, making them an indispensible tool for deterrence.10 Having nets of deployed satellites

is crucial for national defense as well as waging both modern wars and new wars. They were

central to the US offensive during the first modern war; Operation Desert Storm. 11 See Table 1

7

7SeeGrimwood,Terri,UCSSatelliteDatabase.UnionofConcernedScien/sts(March17,2006).(Lastupdated

April1,2010)Availablefromh_p:www.ucsusa.orgnuclearweaponsandglobalsecurityspaceweapons

technicalissuesucs-satellite-database.html;Internet;Accessed17May2010.

8SeeShanklin,Emily,SpaceXSuccessfullyLaunchesFalcon1intoOrbit.SpaceXpressrelease(28Sept.2008).

Availablefromh_p:www.spacex.compress.php?page=20080928;Internet:Accessed27May2010.andSpaceX

Falcon9RocketEnjoysSuccessfulMaidenFlight.BBCNews.Bri/shBroadcas/ngCorpora/on(4June2010).

Availablefromh_p:news.bbc.co.uk2hiscienceandenvironment10209704.stm;Internet;Accessed4June

2010.

9SeeChapter4ofJohnson-Freese,Joan,SpaceasaStrategicAsset(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2007).

10Seechapters2and3ofStares,PaulB.,SpaceandNa;onalSecurity(Washington,D.C.:TheBrookingsIns/tu/on,

1987).andRichelson,Jeffrey,AmericasSpaceSen;nels:DSPSatellitesandNa;onalSecurity(UniversityPressof

Kansas,1999).forin-depthanalysesofthevalueofsatellitestona/on-states.

11SeeSmith,MarciaS.,U.S.SpacePrograms:Civilian,MilitaryandCommercial.CRDC-ID:CRS-2002-RSI-0162.

U.S.CongressionalResearchService.Resources,ScienceandIndustryDivision(14Jan.2002).andSmith,MarciaS.,

MilitaryandCivilianSatellitesinSupportofAlliedForcesinthePersianGulfWar.CRDC-ID:CRS-1991-SPR-0025.

U.S.CongressionalResearchService.SciencePolicyResearchDivision(27Feb.1991).
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science_and_environment/10209704.stmhttp://www.spacex.com/press.php?page=20080928http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.htmlhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science_and_environment/10209704.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science_and_environment/10209704.stmhttp://www.spacex.com/press.php?page=20080928http://www.spacex.com/press.php?page=20080928http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.htmlhttp://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.htmlhttp://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.htmlhttp://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html


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by new types and numbers of actors, (3) of indispensible strategic military value, (4) militarized

by both nation-states and private firms and (5) weaponized to a limited degree, it has now

become an indispensible, invaluable, vulnerable and uncontrolled arena open to all and contested

between many violent, militarily capable actors. Despite this bleak outlook, however, the global

common of outer space can still be salvaged from self-destruction in the hands of mankind. The

answer is legislation and the time is now.

This paper argues that if nation-states do not cooperate now to establish an international

legal regime in space, they will not have another chance. Outer space is today (1) at a historical

crossroads that makes its international legislative governance more a reality than ever before and

at the same time, (2) is at its most vulnerable stage of development in history. This paper is

structured as follows. Chapter two is a literature review on global studies, security studies,

mercenarism and private military and security company (PMSC) studies and space security.

Chapter three is the thesis, or central argument of this paper, that the establishment of an

international governing legal regime in space must occur now. Chapter four is a case study of the

privatizing of space warfare, illustrating arguments for and against the privatization of space

warfare for nation-states. Chapter five is this papers recommendations, which outlines

contemporary space legislation while offering prescriptions to better it. Chapter six will

summarize the findings of this paper and conclude.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review will conduct a brief analysis of pertinent topics in the fields of (1)

global studies, (2) security studies, (3) mercenarism and PMSC studies and (4) space security.

The forces of globalization have altered international relations. Realist assumptions on

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international anarchy, rationality, national interest, power, security and the centrality of the

nation-state are being challenged by a new model.19 The study of complex interdependence

posits that (1) societies are connected not only by interstate, but transgovernmental and

transnational channels as well; (2) interstate issues are not arranged in a hierarchy with military

security at the top and (3) military force is not always central to conflict resolution.20 These new

assumptions move the nation-state away from the center of international relations, and while a

few will argue that the nation-state is vanquished, the fact is that we are living in a world

characterized by power and influence stemming from both nation-states and non-state actors. 21

The literature on security studies can be divided into traditional and non-traditional

perspectives on the (1) centrality of the nation-state and definitions of national interest, (2) role

of influence and legitimacy and (3) proliferation of modern and new wars. Traditionalists

argue that the nation-state is solely significant and its survival and maintenance paramount, that

influence and legitimacy are only significant in perpetuating the nation-state and that security is

the nation-states ability to wage modern wars against other nation-states.22

Non-traditionalists

argue that due to trends in globalization, nation-state power is still central, but has been spread to

11

19Forexamplesofrealistthinking,seeSmith,MichaelJoseph,RealistThoughtfromWebertoKissinger(Louisiana

StateUniversityPress,1987).

20SeeKeohane,RobertO.andJosephS.Nye,RealismandComplexInterdependence.Powerand

Interdependence,3rded.(Addison-Wesley,2000):3-7.

21SeeOhmae,Kenichi,TheEndoftheNa/onState.TheEndoftheNa;onState:TheRiseofRegionalEconomies(SimonandSchuster,1995).andStrange,Susan,TheDecliningAuthorityofStates.TheRetreatoftheState

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).

22SeeWaltz,KennethN,RealistThoughtandNeorealistTheory.JournalofInterna;onalAffairs44,Issue1

(SpringSummer1990).andWaltz,KennethN.,"Globaliza/onandGovernance."PSOnline(NewYork:Columbia

UniversityPress,Dec.1999).Availablefromh_p:www.mtholyoke.eduacadintrelwalglob.htm;Internet;

Accessed22May2010.andTilly,Charles,WarMakingandStateMakingasOrganizedCrime.foundinEvans,

Peterandothers,eds.,BringingtheStateBackIn(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985).
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/walglob.htmhttp://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/walglob.htmhttp://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/walglob.htm


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other actors like international, non-government and private organizations and people in general

and that national interests have shifted accordingly. In addition, non-traditionalist security studies

scholars argue that international normative regimes are significant and war is now more

characterized by the nation-states struggle against these new non-state actors.23 There has also

emerged a discussion of the significance of the security threat from diminishing resources,

pollution and unsustainability of mankinds natural environment.24

Modern wars can be defined as wars that are (1) fought between nation-states, (2)

dictated within a nations government, armed forces and people, (3) high-tech in being only

affordable by and useful against nation-states, (4) based on lines of communication and (5)

strategically two-dimensional with the end goal of cutting lines of communication and are

thought to have diminished with the Cold War, but still exist in outer space.25 New wars can be

defined as a transformation in wars as they are now (1) between nation-states and non-state

actors and (2) changed in both attitudes on war and military strategies utilized in war.26 Both are

characteristic of the proliferation of PMSCs.

12

23SeeCha,VictorD,Globaliza/onandtheStudyofInterna/onalSecurity.JournalofPeaceResearch37,No.3

(2000):391-403.andDavis,LynnE.,Globaliza/onsSecurityImplica/ons.RAND(2003).andLio_a,P.H.,

BoomerangEffect:TheConvergenceofNa/onalandHumanSecurity.SecurityDialogue33,No.4(2002):

473-488

24SeeKlare,MichaelT.,ResourceWars:TheNewLandscapeofGlobalConflict(NewYork:OwlPublishing,2001).

25SeeCreveld,Mar/nvan.,TheFutureofWar.foundinPatman,RobertG.,SecurityinaPost-ColdWarWorld

(NewYork:St.Mar/nsPress,1999).

26Seechapter6ofNeack,Laura,ElusiveSecurity:StatesFirst,PeopleLast(RowmanandLi_lefield,2007).


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The literature on the privatization of force and PMSCs can be divided into (1) functional,

(2) political and (3) social discussions.27 Functional opinions discuss the usefulness,

effectiveness, efficiency and conflict resolution abilities of PMSCs as well as the supply and

demand characteristics of the global market for private force.28 Political arguments are centered

on the effects PMSC proliferation has on political control of force, authority over the use of

force, sovereignty and the legitimacy of the nation-state.29 Social discussions on the privatization

of force revolve around whether concepts like specific definition, democracy, human rights,

international law and protection of civilians are or should be implicated in PMSCs.30

The influx of PMSC proliferation has been attributed to supply and demand dynamics. In

a world where diminishing military budgets funneled into advanced and specialized forces create

13

27Thisdis/nc/onismadeinchapter2ofEmployingPrivateMilitaryCompanies:AQues/onofResponsibility.

AdvisoryCouncilonInterna;onalAffiars(TheHague:AdvisoryCouncilonInterna/onalAffairs,Dec.2007).and,to

abroaderdegree,inchapter2ofAvant,DeborahD.,TheMarketforForce:TheConsequencesofPriva;zing

Security(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005).

28SeeSinger,P.W.,CorporateWarriors:TheRiseofthePriva/zedMilitaryIndustryandItsRamifica/onsforInterna/onalSecurity.Interna;onalSecurity26,no.3(2002):186-220.andMessner,J.J.EthicalSecurity:The

PrivateSectorinPeaceandStabilityOpera/ons.foundinGumedze,S.,Ed.,PrivateSecurityinAfrica:

Manifesta;on,ChallengesandRegula;on(Pretoria:Ins/tuteforSecurityStudies,November2007):57-70.and

Leander,Anna,TheMarketforForceandPublicSecurity:TheDestabilizingConsequencesofPrivateMilitary

Companies.JournalofPeaceResearch42,no.5(2005):605-622.

29SeeLeander,Anna,ErodingStateAuthority?PrivateMilitaryCompaniesandtheLegi/mateUseof

Force(Rome:CentroMilitarediStudiStrategici,2006).andSimelaneH.S.,TheState,SecurityDilemma,andthe

DevelopmentofthePrivateSecuritySectorinSwazilandfoundinGumedze,S.,Ed.,PrivateSecurityinAfrica:

Manifesta;on,ChallengesandRegula;on(Pretoria:Ins/tuteforSecurityStudies,November2007):151-167.

30

SeeGumedze,S.,PouringOldWineintoNewBo_les?TheDebatearoundMercenariesandPrivateMilitaryandSecurityCompanies.andJuma,Laurence,Mercenarism:LookingBeyondtheCurrentInterna/onalandRegional

Norma/veRegimes.bothfoundinGumedze,S.,Ed.,Elimina;onofMercenarisminAfrica:ANeedforaNew

Con;nentalApproach(Pretoria:Ins/tuteforSecurityStudies,July2008).andWilliamson,Jamie,PrivateSecurity

CompaniesandPrivateMilitaryCompaniesUnderInterna/onalHumanitarianLaw.foundinGumedze,S.,Ed.,

PrivateSecurityinAfrica:Manifesta;on,ChallengesandRegula;on(Pretoria:Ins/tuteforSecurityStudies,

November2007):89-96.andLumina,Cephas,Coun/ngtheCost:TheImpactofCorporateWarfareontheHuman

RightofWomenandChildreninAfrica.foundinGumedze,S.,Ed.,Elimina;onofMercenarisminAfrica:ANeed

foraNewCon;nentalApproach(Pretoria:Ins/tuteforSecurityStudies,July2008):101-120.


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a supply of effective military personnel and ungoverned spaces have created a demand for their

services, PMSCs have become a powerful force in the global market.31 Ungoverned spaces are

arenas of ungoverned force where PMSCs excel and add to the cycle by offering short term

solutions to long term problems. 32 Outer space is characterized by a lack of governance.

The existing literature on space security can be divided into discussions on the (1) value

and vulnerability, (2) legislation, (3) military control and (5) past history of outer space. The

perceptions and opinions in these five categories, now and in the future, can be divided into

camps of (1) space nationalism, (2) technological determinism, (3) social interactionism and (4)

global institutionalism. Simply put, the first camp seeks weaponized military control of space,

the second seeks the non-confrontational go slow approach to defense in space, the third seeks

a social framework of interdependence and mutually established rules of the road of

encouraged self-restraint while the fourth seeks a unified international response to the inherent

dilemma of the tragedy of the space commons through institutions and treaties.33

Space security scholars and policy makers have also noted how outer space has also

become characterized by the increasing number and influence of private actors. 34 However,

while there are discussions on both weaponization and privatization of space, there is no

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31Seechapter3ofMandel,Robert.,ArmiesWithoutStates:ThePriva;za;onofSecurity(Boulder:LynneRienner,

2002).andLeander,Anna,TheMarketforForceandPublicSecurity:TheDestabilizingConsequencesofPrivate

MilitaryCompanies.JournalofPeaceResearch42,no.5(2005):605-622.andAvant,DeborahD.,TheMarketfor

Force:TheConsequencesofPriva;zingSecurity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005).

32SeeLeander,Anna,GlobalUngovernance:Mercenaries,StatesandtheControloverViolence.Copenhagen

PeaceResearchIns/tute(June2001).

33SeeMoltz,JamesClay,ThePoli;csofSpaceSecurity:StrategicRestraintandthePursuitofNa;onalInterests

(StanfordUniversityPress:2008).

34Seechapter7ofMoltz,JamesClay,ThePoli;csofSpaceSecurity:StrategicRestraintandthePursuitofNa;onal

Interests(StanfordUniversityPress:2008).


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literature on the weaponization of space by and through private firms. Although the space

nationalist school accepts and even endorses international cooperation, it rejects the notion of

possible changes in space security decision making stemming from the influence of new non-

state actors, including those in the commercial sector. This prediction may be shortsighted.35

4. THESIS

The establishment of an international governing legal regime in space ameliorates threats

from the (1) weaponization of space, (2) chaos from the lack of a space traffic control authority

and (3) space debris.36 While there are limited forms of law and cooperation on the latter two

points, this chapter will argue that the establishment of this regime in space must occur now.

Simply put, if nation-states do not cooperate now, they will not have another chance. Outer space

is today (1) at a historical crossroads that makes its international legislative governance more a

reality than ever before and (2) at the same time, is at its most vulnerable stage of development

in history. The establishment of a safe and stable international legal regime for outer space is

more a reality than ever today from (1) linkages from complex interdependence, (2) a

comparative political calm, (3) the stable and laissez-faire nature of the contemporary political

unipolar regime, (4) the power of legislating nation-states and (5) the influence of a multilateral

US. Space is characterized by a lack of governance in that it lacks overarching international

legislation and institutions on a wealth of topics. Just as realists would claim the arena of

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35TakenfromMoltz,JamesClay,ThePoli;csofSpaceSecurity:StrategicRestraintandthePursuitofNa;onal

Interests(StanfordUniversityPress:2008):316.

36SeeMacDonald,BruceW.,StepstoStrategicSecurityandStabilityinSpace:AViewfromtheUnitedStates.

foundinVignard,Kers/n,ASaferSpaceEnvironment?.DisarmamentForum4.UnitedNa/onsIns/tutefor

DisarmamentResearch(Geneva:UnitedNa/ons,2009):17-26.


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international politics is, space is an anarchic realm where naked force exists and is not

centralized in a single international legislative or institutional power.

However, contrary to realist opinions rooted in the tensions of the Cold War, todays

integrated and globalized world connects nation-states and non-state actors through interstate,

transgovernmental and transnational mediums.37 Economic and social integration has spurred on

cooperative and interdependent governance structures inside, outside and through national

boundaries. Globalizing forces have empowered non-state actors to internationally integrate and

cooperate outside national borders as well. These trends are evident in outer space, where a

multiplicity of civil, public, private and military groups work in cooperation without

confrontation. As such, a complex, cooperative and invested framework already exists to

implement informal practices already in use to create an international legal regime in space.

Considering that the high strung tensions and political realism of the Soviet/US Cold War

rivalry did not end in the complete weaponization of space, one finds comparatively little

justification for committing to weaponizing space after the political Mexican standoff that was

the Cold War. Other than the PRC, Russia and the US, there are few nation-states with

questionable ambitions, in regards to weaponization, in outer space. While India, Iran and North

Korea could theoretically develop killer satellites (KillSats) and other ASAT weaponry, they

are very far from establishing a standardized space fleet and generations behind the rocket

science and rocket engineering of ASAT capable nation-states and thus far from posing any real

16


Interdependence,3rded.(Addison-Wesley:2000):3-7.


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relationship of actors. This is true in space as well. While private actors hold influence in space,

they are still subject to their respective nation-states laws and enforcement. Where nation-states

do not codify formal codes of conduct, private actors do, as they have done in space. However,

these informal orderings are not adequate as they are disorganized, not comprehensive and

accountable only to firms profits and shareholders, and not the interests of all. Although there is

no overarching and standardized international legal regime in space, single nation-states and

regional entities have fashioned their own respective legislation.42 As both non-state actors and

nation-states have begun legislation while nation-states are still primary in space, nation-states

need only to unify their resources to enforce a comprehensive legal regime for all.

On the third of February, 2009, Iran became the 11th nation-state to deploy a domestic

satellite into orbit.43 Although more nation-states are becoming independently space-capable, the

number is still small. In addition, the US holds a stabilizing economic and military hegemony on

both Earth and in outer space. This puts the US in the unique position of acting as either

benevolent patriarch or uncaring dictator. Considering that the US has the plurality of all assets

in space, the single nation-state holds tremendous sway in its own legislature and could lead the

way for the creation of an overarching legal regime in space. However, this is dependent on the

stance of the US in it policies regarding outer space. While the majority of nation-state

interaction in space following the moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons in space in 1963

can be characterized as social interactionism between the Soviet Union and the US, policies

18

42SeeRathgeber,Wolfgangandothers,SpaceSecurityandtheEuropeanCodeofConductforOuterSpace

Ac/vi/es.foundinVignard,Kers/n,ASaferSpaceEnvironment?.DisarmamentForum4.UnitedNa/ons

Ins/tuteforDisarmamentResearch(Geneva:UnitedNa/ons,2009):33-42.

43SeeTait,Robert,IranLaunchesFirstDomes/callyProducedSatellite.guardian.co.uk.GuardianMediaGroup(3

Feb.2009).Availablefromh_p:www.guardian.co.ukworld2009feb03iran-satellite-launch-omid;Internet;

Accessed30May2010.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/03/iran-satellite-launch-omidhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/03/iran-satellite-launch-omid


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adopted by various national executives have been more confrontational than others.44 Notably,

the space policies of the administration of former president George W. Bush can be characterized

as aggressive space nationalism.45 However, the multilateral policies of the current presidential

administration of Barak Obama free the US executive to bring the premier space power to the

head of negotiations to formulate a legal regime in space. All that is needed is a push.

Outer space is also at its most vulnerable stage of development in history. While there are

multiple circumstances that make today the best time to initiate the creation of a legal order in

space, this will not be the case in the near future. The safety and stability of outer space will

diminish in coming years from conflictions over (1) increasing weaponization, (2) inherent

scarcity of space lanes and frequencies, (3) increasing number of actors, and (4) the privatization

of space security. Although outer space has been militarized by multiple nation-states and

represents an investment that should be defended from encroaching legislation, an overarching

legal regime in space need not encroach upon the right of nation-states to use space assets to

assist people and forces on the ground, but will be perceived as threatening regardless. As nation-

states might contest this from fear of these assets being used against them, these fears will not be

resolved with the initiation of further weaponization of space. The weaponization of space would

represent a much greater investment for nation-states that would undermine multilateral trust and

19

44SeeTreatyBanningNuclearWeaponTestsintheAtmosphere,inOuterSpaceandunderWater,Signedbythe

OriginalPar/es,theUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics,theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland

andtheUnitedStatesofAmericaon5Aug.1963(Enteredintoforce:10Oct.1963).

45FordetailsontheBushadministra/onspoliciesonspacesecurity,seeRumsfeld,DonaldH.andothers,

CommissiontoAssessUnitedStatesNa/onalSecuritySpaceManagementandOrganiza/on.Wri_enin

AccordancewithSec/on1623oftheUnitedStatesNa/onalDefenseAuthoriza/onActforFiscalYear2000(11Jan.

2001).


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hinder the establishment of any meaningful legal regime in space. The anarchic regime in outer

space assures that the eventual weaponization by some power is inevitable in the future.

Satellites are invaluable for nation-state military forces in communications, early

warning, intelligence gathering, arms control verification, navigation, mapping and weather

forecasting.46 They are also of great value to the private and commercial sectors of the

international economy. The value of space assets for both national and international entities is

compounded by the fact that there are (1) limited orbital lanes in which to station space assets as

well as (2) a limited frequency spectrum of transmission without both of which satellites are

useless. Considering the influx of actors and interests in space in recent years, the limited nature

of space as a resource entails that a surplus of this resource will eventually dry up, leaving

nation-states to resort to lawless acts to acquire more. This is also compounded by the fact that

space will become economically and militarily more invaluable to more nation-states in the

future as more of them develop further. Cooperation will not exist in this dog-eat-dog future

environment.

The establishment of an international legal regime in space is also made uncertain by the

inevitable influx of actors. While there may only be 11 nation-states capable of independent

space launches, this number will continue to expand in the future. This entails the eventual

empowerment of nation-states that may wish to challenge US supremacy or international norms

in space. Private actors on the other hand, while already well established in outer space, represent

other unstable elements to cooperation in conflicting interests and misunderstandings. The two

20

46Seechapters2and3ofStares,PaulB.,SpaceandNa;onalSecurity(Washington,D.C.:TheBrookingsIns/tu/on,

1987).andRichelson,Jeffrey,AmericasSpaceSen;nels:DSPSatellitesandNa;onalSecurity(UniversityPressof

Kansas,1999).forin-depthanalysesofthevalueofsatellitestona/on-states.


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go hand in hand as private actors also work as a source of space technology proliferation that

stimulates the growth of new and ambitious space-capable nation-states.47

Most importantly, however, private actors represent a new source of space weaponization

that will destroy the possibility of creating a cooperative international legal regime in outer

space. Although the irreversible process of the privatization of space security has not yet been

initiated, it represents the gravest threat to safety, stability and trust in space. Where nation-states

leave space ungoverned, market forces fill security gaps for them.48 In addition, nation-states will

seek private firms as a solution to issues of space security, as will be elaborated upon below. I

will argue in the next two chapters (1) how and why space security will be privatized in the near

future, (2) why this is a threat to security in space and (3) what should be done about it now.

5.1. SPACE SECRUITY WILL BE PRIVATIZED

In this chapter, I shall elucidate (1) why policy makers in the US, as well as other

countries, would consider the creation of fleets of KillSats beneficial and (2) why policy makers

in the US, as well as other countries, would consider the privatization of KillSats beneficial

while in the next section I shall show (3) why the US, as well as other countries, must not

privatize weapons in space. In my debate on space weaponization, I will forgo a discussion of

Earth-to-space weapons and concentrate on space-to-space weapons as (1) commitments have

already been solidified in the national policies of several nation-states to Earth-to-space

weapons, (2) space is currently still free of space-to-space weapons deployment and thus at an

historical critical point and (3) space-to-space weapons constitute unique possibilities in the form

21

47Seechapter2ofMandel,Robert,DeadlyTransfersandtheGlobalPlayground:Transna;onalSecurityThreatsin

aDisorderlyWorld(Connec/cut:Praeger,1999).

48Seechapter3ofMandel,Robert,ArmiesWithoutStates:ThePriva;za;onofSecurity(Boulder:LynneRienner,

2002).


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of KillSats. Although there are many forms of space militarization that could be subject to

privatization, I have chosen to center my case on KillSats specifically for a number of reasons.

As will be elaborated in depth below, KillSats work as unique weapons in space as they are (1)

tested and effective, (2) hard to reach and far reaching, (3) deterring and first strike capable, and

(4) dual-use, disguisable and, most importantly, can be enhanced through privatization. In

describing why policy makers in the US, as well as other countries, will consider the creation of

KillSats beneficial, I will illustrate (1) traditional arguments supporting weaponization of space

and (2) why KillSats are desirable as the primary, long term medium of weaponization.

Traditional arguments supporting the weaponization of space, and thus the creation

KillSats, are (1) the inevitability of realist politics, (2) the establishment of space control, (3)

sustainment of established space hegemony, (4) lack of defensibility in space, and (5) the

desirability first and second strike capabilities. In an anarchic international ordering on Terra (the

Earth and its atmosphere), nation-states must secure and defend three core values; protection of

territory and citizenry, sovereignty and economic welfare.49

Within this insecure environment,

realism pervades as nation-states must prepare for the use of conventional and nonconventional

military force as (1) the political world is uncertain and thus they must take worst-case scenario

preparatory defensive stances, (2) defense deters other nation-states, (3) in the end, wars do not

have rules, (4) there are cultural and ideological differences between nation-states which are

sometimes inconsolable and (5) security is no longer a simple win or lose circumstance, meaning

22

49Seechapter2ofNeack,Laura,ElusiveSecurity:StatesFirst,PeopleLast(RowmanandLi_lefield,2007).


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nation-states need as much military force as can be afforded.50 As such, nation-states must

prepare for war in all places where it can grant them military advantages over other nation-states.

Considering the critical value satellites have for national militaries in communications,

early warning, intelligence gathering, arms control verification, navigation, mapping and weather

forecasting, many policy makers, politicians, military strategists and scholars in the space

nationalism school of space security are proponents of the concept of space control.51 While

there are many varying interpretations of space control, the US Department of Defense defines

space control as combat, combat support, and combat service support operations to ensure

freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an

adversary freedom of action in space.52 In short, the establishment of space control is critical for

a nation-states ability to target potential assets for offence on Terra, enemy ballistic missiles for

defense and space assets for sustainment of space control. Space control works to allow one

nation-state to enjoy unfettered access to the benefits of access to outer space while denying any

would be opponents these same benefits at the same time through early weaponization. Although

few nation-states have weaponized space, the insecurity of realist politics in anarchy ensures that

competing nation-states both space-capable and not, will invariably seek space control.

23

50SeeQuinlan,Michael,TheRoleofMilitaryForceinInterna/onalSecurity.foundinPatman,RobertG.,Security

inaPost-ColdWarWorld(NewYork:St.Mar/nsPress,1999).

51SeeauthorsDeanCheng(2007),Evere_CarlDolman(2002),ColinS.Gray(1986),StevenLambakis(2001)andJamesT.Westwood(1984)forexamplesofrealist,spacena/onalismperspec/vesonspacesecurity,takenfrom

Moltz,JamesClay.ThePoli;csofSpaceSecurity:StrategicRestraintandthePursuitofNa;onalInterests(Stanford

UniversityPress:2008).

52TakenfromU.S.DepartmentofDefense,JointChiefsofStaff,JointDoctrineforSpaceOpera/ons,

JointPublica/on3,no.14(9Aug.2002):GL-6.foundinFernandez,AdolfoJ.,MilitaryRoleinSpaceControl:A

Primer.ordercodeRL32602.USCongressionalResearchService.ForeignAffairs,DefenseandTradeDivision(23

Sept.2004).


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However, this realist security dilemma is compounded by the fact that outer space is a

unique combat environment void of defensibility. While security analysts will liken space to the

ultimate high ground for military operations, I posit that any actor with established assets in

space is an indefensible threat to a nation-state that has already consolidated a position in

space.53 After all, there is no higherground than outer space. In Orson Scott CardsEnders

Shadow, the science fiction novels protagonist, Bean, when reviewing 17th century French

military strategist Marquis de Vaubans traditional, two-dimensional conceptualizations on

defense, comes to the conclusion that defensibility is meaningless in space as any enemy is not

limited to a primary direction of approach [creating] the classic problem of defense, cubed.54

While Earth-to-space weapons are somewhat limited to a primary direction of approach, which is

Terra, space-to-space weapons are not hindered by this foundation of defensibility. Logically,

Bean concludes that the only fit strategy for the International Fleet is to destroy the home world

of the alien Formics, an excellent analogy that highlights that policy makers will presume that it

is solely an offense-only strategy of defense in space could deny any would be attackers. This

offensive strategy would require ASAT weapons use and thus the weaponization of space.

In light of this realization, there has developed a fear in US defense circles about the

possibility of a space Pearl Harbor, where US space assets would be compromised by a swift,

all out offensive by enemy forces.55 Realists would posit that this leaves the US, as the premier

24

53SeeLambeth,BenjaminS.,MasteringtheUl;mateHighGround:NextStepsintheMilitaryUsesofSpace.RAND:

ProjectAirForce(SantaMonica:RAND,2003).

54SeeCard,OrsonSco_,EndersShadow.(Tor,1999),153.

55ThetermspacePearlHarborwasusedmostpopularlyinRumsfeld,DonaldH.andothers,Commissionto

AssessUnitedStatesNa/onalSecuritySpaceManagementandOrganiza/on.Wri_eninAccordancewithSec/on

1623oftheUnitedStatesNa/onalDefenseAuthoriza/onActforFiscalYear2000(11Jan.2001).


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space power, with a forced hand and three options in order to sustain and assure future space

hegemony, which would be critical in assuring that the US could be the only power capable of

initiating a space Pearl Harbor. The US can (1) declare its own preemptive space war and

forcibly remove all competitors assets, (2) create first or second strike capabilities or (3) do

nothing. As initiating a world war over space control is unrealistic and costly in the extreme, the

establishment of an offensive network of a multiplicity of ASAT weapons complemented by a

fleet of KillSats to deter and ensure the ability to destroy the weaponized space forces of other

nation-states will be desired in order to enforce US space hegemony.

As mentioned at the beginning of the section, KillSats work as a unique choice in the

decision to weaponize space as they are (1) tested and effective, (2) hard to reach and far

reaching, (3) deterring and first strike capable, and (4) dual-use, disguisable and, most

importantly, can be enhanced through privatization. From 1967 to 1982, the Soviet Union

conducted tests of its own KillSat program. While only 45 percent of the 20 tests conducted were

considered completely successful by Soviet authorities, the point stands that KillSats have been

created and shown to work in the past.56See Table 2 for details. Considering that nearly 30 years

have elapsed since the last test, one must also note how the success rates will be increased over

time to a much greater rate today and into the future with investment. To elaborate, note that the

riskiest stage in establishing a fleet of KillSats is placing them into space on volatile rocket

launch vehicles. However, as of 1999, 91.1 percent (or 3,988 of 4,378) of space launches

conducted worldwide were successful. See Table 3 for details. Of all the US launch failures in

25

56TakenfromYusof,Nordin,SpaceWarfare:High-TechWaroftheFutureGenera/on.Universi/Teknologi

Malaysia(JohorBahru:FirstPrin/ng,1999):669.


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this same period, 68.6 percent (or 101 of 164) were from 1957 to 1967 alone. 57 See Figure 3 for

details.As such, KillSats represent a reliable deterring presence in space and will represent a

reliable ASAT weapon with future investment. KillSats can also extend general ASAT range.

Fleets of KillSats would be difficult to target by ASAT weapons and would diversify the

range of targets that could be destroyed in space beyond contemporary limitations. While there

are many different orbits in space that space assets can occupy, the majority of them are located

at either low, medium or geosynchronous orbits. These orbits are classified by their altitudes

above sea level. Low Earth orbit (LEO) ranges from 180 km to 2,000 km, and is populated by

the majority of satellites. Medium Earth orbit (MEO) ranges from 2,000 km to 42,164 km, and is

populated by navigation and specialty satellites. Geosynchronous Earth orbit ranges from 42,164

km and is populated by weather satellites and communications satellites.58 While the Soviets

developed KillSats during the Cold War, the US developed Miniature Homing Intercept Vehicles

(MHIVs) and kinetic kill vehicles (KKVs). Launched from a high flying F-15 jetfighter, MHIVs

are known as the poor mans ASAT weapon and are limited to interception in LEO only. Using

a traditional, Earth-based rocket launch vehicle, KKVs are also limited to LEO but with nearly

twice the range of MHIVs at 1,000 km. However, this is roughly only half of the distance to

MEO.59 A KillSat on the other hand, can be deployed in any satellite orbit to target any space

asset in any orbit while avoiding the current ASAT kill zone of 1,000 km above sea level.

26

57TakenfromSpaceLaunchVehicleReliability.Crosslink.AerospaceCorpora/on.Availablefromh_p:

www.aero.orgpublica/onscrosslinkwinter200103.html;Internet;Accessed1May2010.

58SeeRiebeek,Holli,CatalogofEarthSatelliteOrbits.EarthObservatory.Na/onalAeronau/csandSpace

Associa/on(4Sept.2009).Availableath_p:earthobservatory.nasa.govFeaturesOrbitsCatalogpage1.php;

Internet:AccessedMay20,2010.

59Seepart3ofchapter9sec/ononthedevelopmentofASATweaponsinYusof,Nordin,SpaceWarfare:High-

TechWaroftheFutureGenera;on.Universi/TeknologiMalaysia(JohorBahru:FirstPrin/ng,1999).
http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2001/03.htmlhttp://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2001/03.htmlhttp://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/OrbitsCatalog/page1.phphttp://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/OrbitsCatalog/page1.phphttp://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2001/03.htmlhttp://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2001/03.htmlhttp://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2001/03.htmlhttp://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2001/03.html


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The creation and deployment of a web of KillSats would also work as an invulnerable

and fast first-strike capability as well as a military deterrent for competing nation-states. As

noted in the paragraph above, current ASAT weaponry is limited in range, and KillSats could

exceed this range and thus remain impervious to forms of ASAT technology other than KillSats,

hopefully none of which are operating by any nation-state in space today. In the advent of war

between space-capable nation-states, the space-to-space KillSat employing nation-states could

also destroy enemy space assets in less time than traditional Earth-to-space ASAT forces would

be able to. This would accelerate and enhance the scare presented from a space Pearl Harbor

preemptive attack scenario to nation-states not utilizing this weaponry. The Rumsfeld

Commission notes that in order to extend its deterrence concepts and defense capabilities to

space, the U.S. will require development of new military capabilities for operation to, from, in

and through space.60 Also, these KillSat capabilities can work as an ever present deterrence for

any knowledgeable would be aggressors. These space forces would browbeat contending nation-

states under the threat of being denied the benefits of space.

Depending on how a KillSat is deployed, designed or advertized, they can afford their

user additional advantages in their dual-use and disguisable properties. Scholars and policy

makers have been quick to realize the militarized dual-use advantages of satellites in general.61

For a list, see Table 4. However, KillSats also have inherent, weaponized dual-use advantages.

Considering that space assets freefall in LEO at speeds ranging from 25,000 to 28,000 km/hr, a

27

60Rumsfeld,DonaldH.andothers,CommissiontoAssessUnitedStatesNa/onalSecuritySpaceManagementand

Organiza/on.Wri_eninAccordancewithSec/on1623oftheUnitedStatesNa/onalDefenseAuthoriza/onAct

forFiscalYear2000(11Jan.2001):12-13

61SeechaptertwoofJohnson-Freese,Joan,SpaceasaStrategicAsset(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,

2007).


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head on collision of two satellites can work as an ASAT weapon in its own right. With the right

trajectory, even typical, unarmed ComSats could become KillSats. By sacrificing sufficient

weight for space weapons while retaining enough equipment for basic telecommunications,

ComSats could also double as full-fledged KillSats, performing both tasks simultaneously. When

one considers that KillSats can double as ComSats, depending on how a nation-state decides to

release information regarding a KillSat, it could be disguised as a non-military space asset,

doubling its effectiveness as a first-strike space weapon. The disguisable nature of KillSats

specifically, but also many other aspects, are enhanced greatly by their privatization as well.

Policy makers in the US, as well as other countries, will consider the privatization of

KillSats beneficial because (1) of outsourcing pressures and privatized space assets have been

used and proven before, (2) there are traditional advantages to the privatization of military tasks

and (3) there are case specific advantages to the privatization of KillSats. With the advantages of

privatization enumerated below aside, an overriding determining factor in the US is persistent

government programs to outsource technical operation, support and assessment and combat

functions from traditional military forces to commercial providers. This trend began under the

Bill Clinton administration in the mid 1990s and accelerated under the strain of the George W.

Bush administrations foreign policy.62 Space is no sanctuary to this trend. As mentioned before,

privately owned and operated space assets were utilized during Operation Desert Storm to

28

62ThisargumentissupportedbyKrahmann,Elke,Transi/onalStatesinSearchofSupport:PrivateMilitary

CompaniesandSecuritySectorReform.foundinChesterman,SimonandChiaLehnardt,eds.,FromMercenaries

toMarket:TheRiseandRegula;onofPrivateMilitaryCompanies(OxfordUniversityPress,2007).94-112.


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support the US military offensive in communications, navigation, weather forecasting and land

remote sensing.63 See Table 1 for details.

There are traditional advantages to privatization of military tasks which has empowered

and proliferated PMSCs the world round since the end of the Cold War. The traditional PMSC

advantages pertinent to the proliferation of space-capable PMSC use of KillSats are (1)

efficiency and cost-effectiveness, (2) enhanced power and capacity for action, (3) advantages for

transitional nation-states, and (4) an existing market of supply and demand. The use of PMSCs

increases efficiency and benefits nation-states by freeing up core national military forces for

more important or more specific tasks that cannot be privatized. Standardized military forces,

while most effective and appropriate in a wide spectrum of tasks, are frequently overstretched

and placed into operations where a greater level of specialization would be optimally performed

by tailor-made professionals. Employment of PMSCs also benefits nation-states that have

diminished military budgets since the close of the Cold War and are facing a wider array of

security issues. For nation-states forced into a juggling act to try to maintain the existing scope

(or maybe at times even a greater scope) of operations with lower funding, outsourcing to cost-

effective private military providers can play a decisive role64 While the upkeep of other assets in

space is not cost-effective, ComSats are a reliable, established and profitable foothold for private

29

63SeeSmith,MarciaS.,MilitaryandCivilianSatellitesinSupportofAlliedForcesinthePersianGulfWar.CRDC-

ID:CRS-1991-SPR-0025.U.S.CongressionalResearchService.SciencePolicyResearchDivision(27Feb.1991).

64TakenfromMandel,Robert,ArmiesWithoutStates:ThePriva;za;onofSecurity(Boulder:LynneRienner,2002):

59.


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firms in outer space.65 Considering the dual-use nature of KillSats as ComSats, this makes space-

capable PMSCs cost-effective for governments and profitable for private firms.

Utilization of PMSCs can bring an administration enhanced power and capacity for

action as well. The conscription of ready-to-order private military assets work to enhance the

power of executive administrations by providing a reserve of raw military power with a short

deployment time required in high tension or emergency situations. In addition, just as access to

space works as a force multiplier to forces on the ground, PMSCs are seen as force multipliers

that complement existing national military forces in more direct ways by providing professional

expertise, which is usually complemented with high levels of experience. Because executive

administrations are empowered by the reduced transparency, reduced mobilization bureaucracy

and relative weakening of the power of obtrusive legislatures from the employment of PMSCs,

they are afforded the freedom to engage in more ambitious and adventurous foreign policies.66

In scholarship concerning mercenarism and PMSCs, the clientele of PMSCs can be

broadly categorized as either donor states or transitional nation-states. While donor states enjoy

the benefits of an efficient and cost-effective force with short deployment time, specific expertise

and high levels of experience mentioned above, transitional nation-states enjoy additional

advantages from PMSC use. For lesser developed transitional nation-states lacking in sufficient

security, PMSCs offer not only (1) force multipliers to existing national military institutions, but

also offer (2) first-rate assistance in the creation, development and training of national military

forces, (3) alternative sources for advanced, modern war military capabilities and hardware other

30

65SeeReichhardt,Tony,U.S.CommercialSpaceAc/vi/es.CRDC-ID:CRS-1992-SPR-0015.U.S.Congressional

ResearchService.SciencePolicyResearchDivision(1Feb.1992).

66SeeChapter7ofAvant,DeborahD.,TheMarketforForce:TheConsequencesofPriva;zingSecurity(Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress,2005).


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than nation-states with specific political agendas and (4) an alternative to slow, unresponsive and

obstructive international assistance.67 While the distinctions made between the multiple

advantages of PMSC use as well as donors and transitional nation-states have been made by

scholars with mercenaries and failed states in mind, all of these advantages can be provided to

these respective parties by private firms with the expertise, experience and resources to create,

deploy and operate KillSats in order to provide clients with the advantages of space control.

The accelerating proliferation of PMSCs since the close of the Cold War has been

attributed, on the systemic scale, to the creation of both an international supply and demand for

the services that they provide in the new world order. Where the world had, only a decade before

the fall of the Berlin Wall, seen a near limitless funding for national military services and

servicemen, the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall has shown dramatic cutbacks in

military spending throughout Europe, but most dramatically in post-apartheid South Africa and

the nation-states of the former Warsaw Pact. This left a surplus of young men trained in very

specialized military occupations without jobs and in excess supply. With the collapse of the

Soviet/US world rivalry, loss of their combined world security enforcement and control interests

and these same cutbacks in military spending there developed a security vacuum that has left

entire regions of the world without security or governance. This has created a demand in the

world market for security where none exists and only PMSCs can provide.68 The collapse of the

31

67Thedis/nc/onbetweendonorandtransi/onalstates,aswellassomeofthereasonsforPMSCuseismadeby

Krahmann,Elke,Transi/onalStatesinSearchofSupport:PrivateMilitaryCompaniesandSecuritySectorReform.

foundinChesterman,SimonandChiaLehnardt,eds.,FromMercenariestoMarket:TheRiseandRegula;onof

PrivateMilitaryCompanies(OxfordUniversityPress,2007).94-112.

68Seechapter3ofMandel,Robert,ArmiesWithoutStates:ThePriva/za/onofSecurity(Boulder:LynneRienner,

2002).andLeander,Anna,TheMarketforForceandPublicSecurity:TheDestabilizingConsequencesofPrivate

MilitaryCompanies.JournalofPeaceResearch42,no.5(2005):605-622.


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Soviet Union, the USs rival in space, has likewise created open sources of supply for the

weaponization of space. As outer space lacks both governance and security, and as one nation-

states pursuit of space security and space control only increases the insecurity of space to all

other actors, there exists a demand for PMSCs in space as well.

Case specific advantages to the privatization of KillSats include (1) their enhanced dual-

use disguisable nature, (2) clients freedom of plausible deniability and lack of accountability, (3)

the overt and secret exploitation of a lucrative and untapped market, and (4) the overt and

secretive and selective selling of KillSats in order to undermine rival nation-states or the

international regime. As mentioned above, KillSats afford their users additional advantage in

their dual-use and disguisable nature, working as hidden, first-strike capable space assassins.

However, the privatization of KillSats doubles this advantage. This advantage has both defensive

and offensive properties. Defensively speaking, while nation-states can observe a threatening

nation-states assets in space and target them in the advent of weaponized confrontation in space,

KillSats under the guise of privately owned and operated ComSats would be immune from

unwitting enemy forces. Offensively speaking, as KillSats in the guise of private ComSats would

be immune from a first strike, this affords them both first and second strike capabilities. This

ensures invincibility from and, depending on how information regarding this hidden fleet is

selectively disseminated, deterrence through other nation-states fears of a space Pearl Harbor.

A traditional advantage PMSCs have granted executive government administrations has

been the freedom of plausible deniability and a lack of accountability. By establishing loose and

liberal chains of command where operators in the field are left to their own judgments

disconnected from higher level oversight, PMSCs empower government executives by giving

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them the capability of diverting blame forpublicly unpopular actions by institutionalizing a lack

of required adherence to responsibility for an agent in the principle/agent relationship. This

cushions and protects governments from moral and normative restrictions while ensuring

freedom of action, as was accomplished by nation-states like France and Belgium when seeking

to manipulate newly independent African nation-states in the latter half of the 20th century.69

Utilization of PMSCs also affords clients with a flexible tool equipped with a non-obstructive

lack of accountability. The lack of accountability inherent in PMSCs and the sustainment of it

complements their condition as plausibly deniable and is in the interest of governments to utilize.

As elaborated upon above, there exists an overt market with both a supply and demand

for space assets, which includes weaponized space assets. For example, Glavcosmos, a Russian

space company looking to sell its services abroad, sold advanced, dual-use rocket technology to

both India and Iran for civilian space cooperation. These nation-states were seeking to

ameliorate their lack of presence in space. However, these moves were so unpopular

internationally, and especially in the US, that US legislators enforced sanctions against the

company.70 So while there is a high supply and high demand for space security, there exist a

plethora of restrictions to the proliferation of much of this technology within the US, and

consequences for nation-states openly trading this technology on the world market from the US.

Any space-capable PMSCs that could bypass these roadblocks with secrecy, especially with the

additional help from cooperative nation-states, could tap into an untapped market for major

profits from the highest bidder for both the PMSC and nation-state in question. However, if the

33

69SeeAvant,DeborahD.,Mercenaries.ForeignPolicy,no.143(Aug.2004):20-28.andFrench,Howard.,The

MercenaryPosi/on.Transi;on,no.73(1997):110-121.

70SeeShin,Jenny,AChronologyofIransSpaceAc/vi/es.CenterforDefenseInforma/on(2009).Availablefrom

h_p:www.cdi.orgpdfsIranSpaceTimeline09.pdf;Internet;Accessed11Dec.2009.
http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/IranSpaceTimeline09.pdfhttp://www.cdi.org/pdfs/IranSpaceTimeline09.pdfhttp://www.cdi.org/pdfs/IranSpaceTimeline09.pdf


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US was to privatize its KillSat technologies and capabilities, it would also open a lucrative, albeit

suicidal market for its goods which it would dominate. The US could also engage in these trades

with secrecy to save face internationally. Nation-states could also profit from a market of space-

capable PMSCs by flying flags of convenience.

Utilizing space-capable PMSCs as a front for the selective dissemination of KillSat

technologies and capabilities, nation-states can decide who is afforded the advantages of a fleet

of KillSats and who is not in order to further their own interest. While it would not be in the

interest of the US to disseminate this technology through PMSCs, this is because the US is outer

spaces hegemon and the worlds enforcer against undesired KillSat proliferation; this is not the

case for other nation-states. Other nation-states can utilize these PMSCs to proliferate KillSat

technologies and capabilities in order to undermine either rival space-capable nation-states, the

international world order or both. The freedom of plausible deniability and lack of accountability

garnered from PMSC use, mentioned above, allow nation-states the freedom to proliferate

KillSats to their advantage with no repercussions from the US or the international community.

5.2. SPACE SECURITY MUST NOT BE PRIVATIZED

In this section, I will reveal why the US, as well as other countries, must not privatize

weapons in space. The weaponization of outer space, the creation of fleets of KillSats, the

privatization of space security and the initiation of an arms race in space (1) is unnecessary, (2) is

not beneficial for nation-states, (3) empowers a diversified array of actors that will destabilize

space and (4) weakens the power, centrality and cooperation of nation-states in a realm

characterized by lack of governance. The weaponization of outer space, the creation of fleets of

KillSats, the privatization of space security and the initiation of an arms race in space is

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unnecessary because of (1) complex interdependence, (2) normative constraints, (3) a history of

peaceful space interaction, (4) the creation of a threat that does not exist and (5) Terra already

being weaponized. Contrary to realist assumptions of the inevitability of an arms race in space,

space, like many theaters of international interaction, is characterized by cooperation and

normative values. In a world characterized more by international cooperation and less by

confrontation and outright war, nation-states interact in ways characterized as complex

interdependence than simple realism. They are influenced not only through interstate channels,

but also transgovernmental and transnational ones. They do not have a static policy hierarchy

that always prioritizes military positioning above all others. Also, when states establish a

complex interdependence with one another, they do not militarily position themselves against

one another in new ways and places where it is unnecessary.71 Multilateral cooperation and

mutual trust would offer an alternative that would make weaponizing space unnecessary.

While realists conceptions on international politics are a self fulfilling prophesy that

spiral nation-states into arms races based on a simple model of prioritized militarization and

mutual mistrust, this is not the case for nation-states that represent a wide spectrum of identities

and interests. The interests of nation-states cannot be simplified as one answer to every dynamic

situation to which nation-states confront, but are defined by the identity or role of a nation-state

gives itself.72 The identity or role a nation-state assumes is based off normative beliefs and

interpretations that do not always put every aspect of national defense, no matter how

35


Interdependence,3rded.(Addison-Wesley:2000):3-7.

72SeeWendt,Alexander,AnarchyisWhatStatesMakeofIt.FoundinWendt,Alexander,AnarchyIsWhat

StatesMakeofIt:TheSocialConstruc/onofPowerPoli/cs.Interna;onalOrganiza;on46,No.2(Spring,1992):

391-425.


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unnecessary or overly specific, first. The power of normative values makes an assumption of

inevitable weaponization of space misplaced and works to inspire the normative values of other

nation-states toward multilateral resolutions to conflicts of interest.

History shows that an arms race in space is not inevitable and that these normative values

of coordinated restraint arepossible. This has been evidenced in the past on multiple occasions in

outer space. There are three years that illustrate how Soviet and US leadership consistently

sought to secularize outer space from the hostility of the superpower Cold War rivalry where it

would have been in the strategic interests of each party to do otherwise. The first is 1962, where

Soviet and US cooperation established the Partial Test Ban Treaty and with it a moratorium on

the environmentally catastrophic testing of nuclear weapons in space in order to ensure safe

access to space for all.73 The second is 1983, with the abandonment of the confrontational and

space weaponizing Strategic Defense Initative due to unrealistically high costs, a desire to

preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty and difficulties of creating a weapons system

to intercept over 2,000 Soviet multi-warhead missiles. The third is 2001, when the possibility of

an arms race in space began with the militant prescriptions of the Rumsfeld commission on space

management, heated up with the PRCs ASAT test of 2007 and the US withdrawal from the ABM

Treaty that ended with the PRC stating an end to its ASAT tests and the US stating that there was

to be no arms race in space.74

36

73SeeTreatyBanningNuclearWeaponTestsintheAtmosphere,inOuterSpaceandunderWater,Signedbythe

OriginalPar/es,theUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics,theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland

andtheUnitedStatesofAmericaon5Aug.1963(Enteredintoforce:10Oct.1963).

74SeeMoltz,JamesClay,Protec/ngsafeaccesstospace:Lessonsfromthefirst50yearsofspacesecurity,Space

Policy23,no.4(November2007):199-205.


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In view of the complex interdependence, the normative constraints, history of peaceful

space interaction and comparative political calm between nation-states that has restrained them

from fully weaponizing space, the weaponization of space at this point in time would create a

threat to all nation-states that does not exist yet. The full scale weaponization of space is

reciprocal and multiplies on itself. However, as no nation-state has taken this first leap, there is

still no dire need to arm space assets. The weaponization of space is unnecessary as it will create

a threat in space in itself, where none existed before, in an environment that would not need to be

weaponized for that reason. Also, the proliferation of disguised KillSats works to legitimize the

threat posed by a preemptive, first strike space Pearl Harbor attack in an arena where such a

threat does not exist to such a great degree.

Creating constellations of weaponized KillSats is unnecessary in that the utilization and

control of space assets is grounded on the surface of the Earth, which is already weaponized. By

destroying the command centers of space assets of a rival nation-state in time of war, a military

force could deny the rival the benefits of space access without the costs and consequences

inherent in the initiation of space warfare. Consider the case of the US, which has the force

projection of 11 aircraft carriers to ensure the safety of both grounded and orbiting space assets

through deterrence or naked force.75 Such overwhelming force would not need to be

complemented with fleets of KillSats to ensure supremacy over another nation-state.

The weaponization of outer space, the creation of fleets of KillSats, and the privatization

of space security will not be beneficial for nation-states in that it will (1) destroy the laissez-faire

unipolar regime of space, (2) create a security dilemma and initiate an arms race, (3) destabilize

37

75Foralistofallac/veUSaircracarriers,seeTheUSNavyAircraCarriers.Navy.mil.UnitedStatesNavy.

Availableath_p:www.navy.milnavydatashipscarrierscv-list.asp;Internet;Accessed17May2010.
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/cv-list.asphttp://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/cv-list.asphttp://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/cv-list.asp


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the nuclear standoff on Terra, (4) inadvertently threaten every actor and asset in space, (5) pollute

the environment of space and safe access to it impossible for all, (6) be extremely expensive with

cheaper alternatives and (7) be normatively deplorable and negatively affect influence. As it

already dominates space, it is not in the interest of the US specifically to weaponize space

anymore than it already has as it has the most to lose of all nation-states with complete

weaponization. However, other nation-states, while perhaps threatened by US dominance, still

benefit from the stable regime of US power restrained under its laissez-faire economic

cooperative approach of interaction.76 The proliferation of space weapons will create instability

in a realm that is currently secured and undermine this centrality to make space nonconductive to

the peaceful commercial and political interaction ofall actors.

The weaponization of space will also create a security dilemma which, in turn, will

generate an arms race that creates a space environment that is threatening to all nation-states

including the weaponizing nation-states themselves.77 Simply put, the security dilemma is

created when a nation-state seeks to increase its own security which inadvertently furthers the

insecurity of other nation-states. This dilemma is likened to Rousseaus Stag Hunt where

actors can either cooperate and trap the stag, or defect and hunt the easier but less desirable

rabbit alone. If there are any defections, the cooperation is insufficient and the prospective stag

hunters are left with nothing. In terms of international relations, this affords nation-states a

hierarchy of choices to either (1) cooperate and trap the stag (the international analogue being

cooperation and disarmament); (2) chase a rabbit while others remain at their posts (maintain a

38

76Foranoverviewonpolarityandstability,seechapter2ofSchweller,RandallL.DeadlyImbalances:Tripolarity

andHitlersStrategyofWorldConquest(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1998).

77SeeMaogoto,J.N.andStevenFreeland,FromStarWarstoSpaceWars-TheNextStrategicFron/er:Paradigms

toAnchorSpaceSecurity.AirandSpaceLaw33,no.1(February2008):10-37.


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high level of arms while others are disarmed); (3) all chase rabbits (arms competition and high

risk of war); and (4) stay at the original position while another chases a rabbit (being disarmed

while others are armed).78 Logically, in one instance with no development of trust, nation-states

will choose to all chase rabbits. However, with a continuation of instances, a development of

trust can arise and it logically follows that the best choice is for nation-states to cooperate and

trap the stag. Historically, nation-states have cooperated in establishing very limited

weaponization of space.79 Weaponization of space at this point would undo that trust and lead to

arms competition between nation-states and a high risk of war.

The stability of outer space is depended on for the political stability of Terra as well.

While nation-states will go to war if their space assets are actively targeted and destroyed by a

belligerent power, this threat is compounded by the fact that space assets are depended on for

early warning of nuclear strikes. Satellites also work to ease the instability of the nuclear standoff

in functioning in intelligence gathering, arms control monitoring, and crisis management tasks.80

Where the destruction of enemy space assets would prove beneficial in the advent of wars

between space-capable nation-states, the cost of initiating a nuclear exchange would eclipse this

benefit. The weaponization of space would not be beneficial for nation-states as it would create a

blindfolded Mexican standoff that would strain tensions and fears between nation-states by

destabilizing the nuclear standoff between the nation-states possessing nuclear arms.

39

78SeeJervis,Robert,Coopera/onUndertheSecurityDilemma.WorldPoli;cs30,no.2.(NewYork:Cambridge

UniversityPress,Jan.1978):167.

79SeeMoltz,JamesClay,ThePoli/csofSpaceSecurity:StrategicRestraintandthePursuitofNa/onalInterests

(StanfordUniversityPress:2008).andMoltz,JamesClay.ThePast,Present,andFutureofSpaceSecurity.Brown

JournalofWorldAffairs14,no.1(Fall2007):187-195.

80Seechapter3ofStares,PaulB.,SpaceandNa;onalSecurity(Washington,D.C.:TheBrookingsIns/tu/on,1987).

andRichelson,Jeffrey,AmericasSpaceSen;nels:DSPSatellitesandNa;onalSecurity(UniversityPressofKansas,

1999).foralistofpeace/meusesforsatellites.


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The weaponization of space acts as a threat to not only targeted actors and assets in space,

but indirectly all actors and assets in space. The buildup of debris in space from both natural and

manmade sources is a great concern for the high-velocity environment and can damage or

destroy assets placed into orbit from hypervelocity impacts. One of these manmade sources is

the intentional creation of debris in orbit by the testing or use of destructive ASAT weapons.

With their high speed in orbit, even relatively small pieces of debris can damage or destroy

satellites in a collision. Since debris at high altitudes can stay in orbit for decades or longer, it

accumulates as more is produced.81 This indiscriminate and environmentally destructive power

makes ASAT weapons a danger to

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