God Returns to Europe

The Demographic Revival of Religion in Europe?

Source: ‘The Moment of Truth’, Ha’aretz, 8 February 2007

Religious Fertility vs. Religious Decline

"One of the most central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or anything that interferes with high rates of reproduction. As a result of these two interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming more secular, but the world as a whole is becoming more religious." (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)

Hypothesis: a combination of higher religious fertility and immigration will lead to a growth in the religious population (defined in terms of belief) that exceeds the net loss of communicants through religious apostasy.

USA: Denominational Projections to 2050

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

2002 2012 2022 2032 2042 2052

Protestants Fund.

Protestants Mod.

Catholics

Hindus Buddhists

Jews

Muslims

Other Religions

None

Zero Immigration Scenario

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

2002 2012 2022 2032 2042 2052

Protestants Fund.

Protestants Mod.

Catholics

Hindus Buddhists

Jews

Muslims

Other Religions

None

Fertility Differences, Austria

ROMAN CATHOLIC

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

1,4

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49

1981

1991

2001

  

WITHOUT

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

1,4

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49

1981

1991

2001

MUSLIM

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

1,4

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49

1981

1991

2001

Results: Proportion Without Religion

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

PercentAssuming:

Low secularization trend

Constant secularization trend

High secularization trend

Austria, TFR 2001

Roman Catholics 1.32

Protestants 1.21

Muslims 2.34

Others 1.44

Without 0.86

Total 1.33

Methods

• Source: EVS / WVS & ESS + ethnic minority surveys

• Cohort Component Projection Parameters: Fertility & Switching (i.e. religious decline or revival) by age and sex, plus current Age/Sex Structure of Religious and Secular 'Populations'

• Mortality Rates assumed as standard

EVS Definition of Religiosity

• 'Are you a religious person'?

1. Yes2. Not religious3. Atheist

• A measure of belief, rather than affiliation or attendance

• Majority (50-60%) of W. Europeans believe, though few attend, i.e. Davie (1994) Believing Without Belonging

Weekly Attendance by Cohort, 1981-2004, Ten W. European Countries

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85

1981

1990

2000*

2004**

Weekly Attendance by Cohort, Early Secularising Societies

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85

1981

1990

2000*

2004**

Fig. 3 Religiosity by Cohort, 'Early Secularising' Societies

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85

1981

1990

2000*

2004**

Religious-Nonreligious Fertility Differences

• In multivariate analysis, TFR difference of 15-20% across 10 W European countries, 10-15% across 6 'early secularising' countries

• Female preponderance in childbearing age range

Projected Religious Population, 6 Early Secularising Societies, 2004-2104

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

2004

2009

2014

2019

2024

2029

2034

2039

2044

2049

2054

2059

2064

2069

2074

2079

2084

2089

2094

2099

2104

1816-E6

1816-E10

1818-E6

Religious Retention by Faith and Birthplace, UK, 2001-3 (Excludes nonidentifiers. 'Practice' is self-description)

00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9

1

2001Attend Worship*

2003Retain Religious Practice*

UK BP Muslims

Foreign BP Muslims

UK Afro Christians

Foreign Afro Christians

UK White Christians

Foreign White Christians

Age Structure of Major Religious Groups in UK, 2001 Census

34

25

18

3739

22

25

32

41

4 4

19

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Muslim No religion Christian

% in

Ag

e B

an

d

0 - 15

16 - 34

35 - 64

65 and over

'5 Minutes of Fame……'

Conclusion

• Northwest Europe (and probably all of western Europe) will likely be more religious in 2050 than in 2000 on current trends because:– Secularisation rates have slowed dramatically, to the

point of stalling– Religious women have 10-20% higher fertility, all else

equal– Immigrants are more religious than natives– Muslim immigrants in particular retain their religiosity

into the second generation

Attitudes to Shari'a and Fertility, Islamic Countries, by Urban and Rural, 2000 WVS (Muslims Only)

1.5

1.7

1.9

2.1

2.3

2.5

2.7

2.9

3.1

3.3

3.5

Str. Agree Agree Neither Disagree Str. Disagree

Ch

ildre

n E

ve

r B

orn

city > 100k

town < 10k

Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

coun

try

relig

tot fertility rate1.4048 7.1

.592294

.98574

Source: 2000 WVS and World Bank.

Religiosity and Fertility in Muslim Countries, 2000

Tanzania

Jordan

Egypt

Algeria

Bosnia

Iran

Azerbaijan

'95-97

Bangladesh

Albania 2000

Turkey

Indonesia

Pakistan

Morocco

Nigeria

Uganda

Albania '95-97