global swing states and the non-proliferation order

7/30/2019 Global Swing States and the Non-Proliferation Order

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Global SwinG StateS workinG PaPer 2012

Global SwinG StateS and

the non-Proliferation order

MeGan Garcia


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2012 Te German Marshall Fund o the United States. All rights reserved.

No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means without permission in writing

rom the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to:

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E [email protected]

Tis publication can be downloaded or ree at www.gmus.org/publications.

G Sg Ss Pj

Tis working paper is part o an ongoing project undertaken by the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF)

and the Center or a New American Security (CNAS). Te project, co-led by Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine,

examines how the United States and its European allies can partner more closely with Brazil, India, Indonesia, and urkey to

strengthen international order. Te views expressed here are those o the author and do not necessarily represent the views

o the project leaders or their respective institutions.

au GMf

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and

global challenges and opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institu-

tions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members o the policy and business communities,

by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed

commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democra-

cies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-prot organization through a gi rom Germany as a permanent memorial to

Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in

Washington, DC, GMF has seven oces in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF

also has smaller representations in Bratislava, urin, and Stockholm.

GMfs as Pgm

Te German Marshall Funds Asia Program addresses the economic, oreign policy, and security implications o Asias rise

or the United States and Europe through research, publications, commentary, conerences, ellowships, study tours, and

collaborations with other GMF programs. Te Programs initiatives include the Stockholm China Forum, India rilateralForum, the Global Swing States Project, the Young Strategists Forum, rilateral Forum okyo, ransatlantic Workshop on

Pakistan, and high-level conversations at GMFs major conerences. Te program also publishes independent analysis by

more than 15 in-house experts on Asia and externally commissioned papers looking at American and European approaches

to the Asia-Pacic and on deepening cooperation between democratic Asia and the West.

au c n am Suy

Te mission o the Center or a New American Security (CNAS) is to develop strong, pragmatic and principled national

security and deense policies. Building on the expertise and experience o its staf and advisors, CNAS engages policy-

makers, experts and the public with innovative, act-based research, ideas and analysis to shape and elevate the national

security debate. A key part o our mission is to inorm and prepare the national security leaders o today and tomorrow.

Cover photo: Fornaxus
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Global Swing States andthe Non-Proliferation Order

Global Swing States Working Paper

November 2012

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Global Swing States and the Non-Proliferation Order 1

Nuclear issues are

a source of intense

domestic debate.

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The German Marshall Fund of the United States2

he global nuclear order

is under increasing

pressure as the

perceptual gap grows

between nations with

nuclear weapons and

those without.

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Since the initial deb

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carved its own path

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Brazil has also been

a stalwart champion

of generating regional

solutions to nuclear

security problems.

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Balancing Regional and Global Relationships:

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http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=24321http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=24321http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=24321http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=24321


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The Iran Fuel Swap Deal

As a singular case of global swing states taking a high-profile role in addressing a non-proliferation challenge,

the fuel swap negotiations with Iran undertaken by Brazil and Turkey warrant close attention.

In 2009, Iran raised concerns by revealing that it had built a secret nuclear facility near Qom, and outside

experts said that the plant could produce enough nuclear material to fuel one bomb per year.1 The

permanent members of the UNSC responded by pushing the IAEA board of governors to adopt a resolution

demanding that Iran immediately stop building the facility and freeze uranium enrichment.2 Amid the

concern about developments in Irans nuclear program, the UNSC permament members and Germany began

discussions about whether to hold talks with Iran. With support from the Obama administration, Brazilian

President Lula and Turkish Prime Minister Erdoan began discussions about how they might be able to

negotiate a deal with Iran.

On May 17, 2010, Brazil, Iran, and Turkey agreed on a plan in which Iran would export 1,200 kilograms

of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in return for fuel for a medical research reactor. The terms of the

arrangement were nearly identical to a proposal that France, Russia, the United States, and the IAEA had

proposed to Iran the previous October.3 One day later, the five permanent members of the UNSC forwarded

a draft sanctions resolution on Iran to the councils ten rotating members, which included Brazil and Turkey,

putting the future of the fuel swap in question. In addition, the permanent members reacted coldly to the

deal negotiated by Brazil and Turkey. Western leaders indicated that Irans stockpile of low-enriched uranium

had grown since the previous October, and removing the 1,200 kilograms would thus account for a smaller

percentage of Irans total stockpile, reducing the deals value as a confidence-building measure and leaving

an unacceptably high amount of low-enriched uranium in Iran.

The Turkish and Brazilian governments were caught off guard, having expected their role as mediators to

be heralded. Heavily criticized by the domestic press, Lula was lambasted as a pawn of the major powers.

Turkish leaders were also viewed negatively at home. Particularly in light of Obamas earlier encouragementof Turkey and Brazil playing a role in discussions with Iran, Lula and other Brazilian policymakers publicly and

privately fumed when the permament members of the UNSC disavowed the deal, arguing that the traditional

centers of power will not share gladly their privileged status.4 In the end, the UNSC adopted new sanctions

against Iran, effectively taking the agreement negotiated by Brazil and Turkey off the table. The deal and

the subsequent Brazilian and Turkish decision to vote against UNSC sanctions sent ripples through the

established powers by providing an example of how emerging powers could negotiate on a highly charged

issue like nuclear policy.

1 David Albright and Paul Brannan, Critique of Recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Article on the Fordow Enrichment

Plant (Institute for Science and International Security, November 30, 2009).

2 George Jahn, Nuclear Agency Comes Down on Iran, Associated Press, November 28, 2009.

3 Peter Crail, Brazil, Turkey Broker Fuel Swap with Iran,Arms Control Today, 40 no. 5 (June 2010).

4 Celso Amorim, Lets Hear From the New Kids on the Block, International Herald Tribune, June 14, 2010.


11/14


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Moving Forward

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The most dramatic

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in which Indonesia

forged a role as a non-

roliferation leader was

its ratification of the

CTBT.


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