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of 36VII ICCEES World Congress in Berlin, July 25-30th 2005

Miller & Duckett: The Open Economy and its Enemies Public Attitudes towards Economic and Cultural Openness

in East Europe and East Asia

The Open Economy and its Enemies Public Attitudes towards Economic and Cultural Openness

in East Europe and East Asia William Miller & Jane Duckett

University of Glasgow

There have been few more contentious subjects than globalization. It has generated intense debates about whether it brings benefits or problems to people around the world. These debates, whether conducted in the books of economists from Stiglitz to Bhagwati or transformed into street protests around the meetings of international organisations such as the IMF or G8, have predominantly reflected the concerns of people in the West. Though many of those debates include voices that claim to defend the interests of people in the developing world, the voices of those people themselves have rarely been directly heard. Neither the media, nor Western protestors and academics have yet thoroughly investigated and reported their views.

Our study focuses on public attitudes towards globalization or openness, not in mature western democracies with highly developed economies but rather in developing, or what are

Full details of this study will be published as: Jane Duckett and William L. Miller. (2006) The Open Economy and its Enemies Public Attitudes towards Economic and Cultural Openness in East Europe and East Asia. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This research was funded by the ESRC under grant R000239581 to Duckett & Miller.

PageWhy public attitudes matter 3The debate about valid reasons for public discontent 5Key empirical questions: the extent, nature, causes, and

consequences of public discontent8

Modelling the causes and consequences of public discontent

10

Four countries: two global regions, two levels of development

21

Methodology: surveys and focus-groups, public and officials

23

Findings 25Conclusions 33




termed ‘transitional’, countries. Our aim is to complement the well-publicised views of western academics, activists, international organisations and pressure-groups about globalization – valuable though these are – by listening to the views of the public in selected developing/transitional countries in east Asia and east Europe. We accept that the public’s perceptions and attitudes may be right or wrong, coherent or incoherent. But either way, they matter. They deserve respect and they demand attention.

This is not a study of globalization or openness, nor of the case for or against it. We will briefly review the arguments of some distinguished critics and proponents of globalization but only by way of introduction to public opinion. Our focus is on public perceptions and public attitudes towards openness in developing or ‘transitional’ countries: in particular, on the extent, nature, causes – and consequences – of public discontent with a more open economy.

Nor is it a study of active resistance to globalization or openness; instead we focus on public support for active protest and resistance to the abuses and injustices associated with opening-up the economy.

Globalization – in Stiglitz’s (2002, p.9) working-definition: ‘fundamentally globalization is the closer integration of countries and peoples of the world’ – is a process usually viewed ‘from above’. Our own perspective is less Olympian. We are interested in globalization not as a world-wide process but from the perspective of the public, as an external challenge to their country. For them, and for us, the key questions are about greater economic and cultural ‘openness’ to an external, rapidly integrating world though these public attitudes towards openness, if and where they are influential, may affect whether globalization continues or is reined in. By ‘openness’ we mean participation in multi-national or supra-national organisations, and an inward flow of foreign ideas, customs, symbols, capital, and personnel as well as foreign technology, economic goods and services.

Our aim is therefore to:

Present an integrated account of both the causes and the consequences of public discontent with (or enthusiasm for) a domestic market-economy and an internationally open-economy.

Pay equal attention to public attitudes towards cultural openness and economic openness – and look closely at the relation between the two.

Outline and test – comparatively – a large number of models that purport to explain the causes and consequences of discontent. Many would pass a less comparative test, but few survive our comparative test.

We shall also:

Contrast public attitudes in the most successful (east Asia) and the least successful (east Europe) regions of the world – as judged either by their economic development or their (UNDP calculated) ‘human development’ since the 1980s.

Investigate whether (and more especially, where) the attitudes of government officials represent or misrepresent the attitudes of their public.

But listening to the public requires us to go beyond standard interview surveys with pre-formulated questions and answers and give people the opportunity to express themselves in




their own way: to reformulate the questions in the mould of their minds rather than ours, to dispute the preconceptions built into our questions, to re-focus from what we think important to what they think important, to perversely but insistently misinterpret our questions (as they sometimes rather revealingly do), to speak at length when they feel engaged and to give cursory answers when they do not. Statistical analysis is essential but insufficient. So we have based our study on:

Large scale surveys , with a multiplicity of questions and at least 2000 respondents (1500 of the public and 500 officials) in each of the four countries in our study, enough therefore to provide definitive statistical results: in all a total of 10,338 interviews.

Full transcripts of 16 lengthy focus-group discussions, which guided the content of the subsequent survey questionnaires and provide deeper meaning, understanding and interpretation of the survey findings.

Why public attitudes matterFrom a democratic perspective, grass-roots public opinion in developing/transition countries is important in itself. But even in countries that are only partially democratic, grass-roots opinion can be important. It can always influence, even if it cannot determine policy. Even in only partially democratic societies the climate of public opinion affects elites and policy. It constitutes the background against which national and international elites and activists must operate. And it not only sets the frame for elite choice, it also influences elite opinion itself.

In particular, development economists have argued that public opinion is important for the sustainability of economic openness and market-oriented policies. Public discontent and support for resistance to outside influences can affect political stability, encourage protectionism, and discourage inward investment. The UNDP has argued that opening-up economies has spurred economic growth in the short run, but in a form that threatens longer-term development: ‘increasing the concentration of income, resources and wealth among people, corporations and countries’, ‘dismantling institutions of social protection’, letting ‘criminals reap the benefits of globalization’, and thus stimulating ‘social tensions that threaten political stability and community cohesion’.(UNDP 1999)

In turn, the instability caused by the injustices of an open economy may ultimately restrict future development since stability-seeking investors avoid areas of conflict.(Alesina and Perotti; Garrett; Klak and Myers; see also Muller). Alesina and Perotti argue that governments should therefore encourage inward investment (and thus development) by increasing political stability through ‘maintaining public support for market openness.’ In a series of influential papers Rodrik (1996,1997,1998) also advocated greater emphasis on ‘social safety nets’ and measures to ‘root out corruption’ in order to offset the naturally perverse distributional and social consequences of globalization that provoke public discontent and thereby threaten longer-term stability and development.

Threats to the environment (Kelly) or to local culture (Appadurai, 1990) may also provoke public reactions that damage prospects for long-term development. A strong sense of national/cultural identity may reinforce social cohesion and thus assist development in the




short-term. But the cultural openness that goes with economic development may provoke fears (justified or not) that national/cultural identity is threatened, stimulate public reactions against an open economy as a by-product of cultural fright, and thus perhaps threaten economic development in the longer-term.

However, it is public support for (or reaction against) openness that is itself the key socio-political precondition for maintaining an open economy rather than the specific factors – economic, cultural or environmental – that may influence that support. Perceptions of increasing inequality, for example, are likely to lead to political instability if inequality is attributed to the policy decisions or corrupt behaviour of local political actors. They are likely to fuel demands for autarky or protection if inequality is attributed to globalization. But they are likely to have relatively little effect on the political conditions for development if inequality is attributed to chance, to misfortune, or to circumstances beyond anyone’s control. In a similar way perceptions of corruption, environmental damage or cultural threat may have different consequences depending upon the way they are viewed by the public. How ordinary citizens feel about the downside of an open economy – quite apart from their perceptions of the downside itself – may have a significant impact on its sustainability.

Quite apart from the intrinsic importance of the ordinary public in a democratic perspective, elites and activists operate against the background of the wider public. Relatively few of the ordinary public get regularly involved in political action of any kind, least of all in active protest or resistance. Nonetheless their discontent – or contentment – matters. Across the mass public, the consequences of individual discontent may be regarded as trivial – nothing more than demotivation, lack of commitment, slow or bad workmanship, even purely ‘psychological’ or attitudinal reactions, mere grumbling to friends and family. Individually, such reactions have little or no impact. But when multiplied by millions, grumbling or enthusiasm can create a climate that may significantly promote or inhibit openness and development. Moreover, as the literature on protest indicates, a general climate of public support or disapproval has a very significant impact upon whether the relatively few potential activists are encouraged into actual activity or discouraged from it: the general climate of public opinion acts as a trigger for the behaviour of potential activists.

There is a profoundly undemocratic view that the public does not have sufficiently well-formed views on such abstract issues as globalization or openness to make them worthy of serious study. There is an element of truth in that. But ordinary people do have views, often strongly held, about the ownership and use of land or other natural resources, about the availability of foreign goods, about the ubiquity of advertisements for foreign goods (and the language used in them), about foreign films and TV, and about the influx of foreign companies, foreign employers, foreign managers, foreign immigrants or ‘guest’ workers, or foreign ideas and customs into their own country. Indeed ordinary people have strong views – sometimes benign but often xenophobic – about foreigners and ‘foreignness’ in general. Whatever the factual or moral status of their views, they are significant for public policy, for public order, and ultimately for development. They should be heard, and heard directly rather than inferred from inspired speculation, fascinating anecdotes or press reports of ‘newsworthy’ incidents.




The debate about valid reasons for public discontentCritics: For a time, Joseph Stiglitz’s Globalization and its Discontents (Stiglitz, 2002) succeeded in almost equating economic openness and ‘globalization’ with ‘discontent’. There is indeed no shortage of well-informed and well-argued criticism of opening-up the economies of developing or transitional states. The ILO report (Feb 2004) A fair Globalization – Creating Opportunities for All argues that the potential of globalization is ‘immense’ though ‘not realized… …the unfairness of the key rules of trade and finance reflect a serious democratic deficit at the heart of the system…financial and economic considerations have consistently predominated over social ones’; and ‘seen through the eyes of the vast majority of men and women around the world, globalization has not met their simple aspiration for decent jobs, livelihoods and a better future for their children’.

Successive UNDP reports (1999, 2002) have pointed to increasing inequality exacerbated by ‘dismantling institutions of social protection’ (UNDP 1999 Report), brought about by the privatisation of public services (Pollock & Price 2000) as well as by a decline in transfer payments. Within countries, marketisation has increased inequality between ethnic groups and bred ‘ethnic hatred’ by allowing ethnic minorities in places like Indonesia to dominate impoverished indigenous majorities (Chua, 2003). And in developed countries, neo-liberalism and globalisation have cut the demand for unskilled workers and so increased inequality in them also (Goodman, Johnson and Webb, 1997: pp.281-2). Globalization has led to a world divided between ‘tourists and vagabonds’ (Bauman 1997, p.93).

The 2002 UNDP report reviewed progress over the decade of the 1990s and highlighted a widening gap between rich and poor, between countries and regions as well as amongst individuals. Over that decade East Asia showed the greatest rise in both GDP per capita and HDI (Human Development Index). East Europe and the CIS showed the greatest drop in GDP per capita, and was indeed the only region to show a drop in HDI (a particularly sharp drop in 1990-95 followed by only a slight recovery in 1995-2000).

These inequalities are not just the result of some impartial ‘invisible hand’ however. Power remained in the hands of the elite in highly developed countries (Hirst and Thompson, p.2) who defined globalisation in terms of their ‘Washington consensus’ of US-style free-markets and democracy (Gray 1998 p.215).

Elliot asserts that ‘the west talks about free trade but its approach can be summed up in four words: you liberalise, we subsidise’ whereas history, he claims, shows the USA, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea ‘all built up industrial strength in well-protected domestic markets’ (Larry Elliot ‘Sweet Nothings’ Guardian 16nov02 p.20). Monbiot criticises US drug firms as ‘companies now demanding intellectual property rights (who) were built up without them’ (G 12mar02 ‘Patent Nonsense’ p.15)

Even the central claim that opening the economy stimulates economic growth is disputed. A CEPR (2001) analysis of UNDP data, comparing the period before and after 1980 claims that economic growth actually slowed during the ‘era of globalization’. And after subtracting the identifiable economic costs of development, Saldivar (2001, p.10) claims that while US GDP steadily increased, ‘genuine progress’ even in the USA peaked in the 1970s and has declined steadily since then: ‘growth does not equal progress’. Rodrik (2002, p.9) also attacks studies




that ‘purport to show that globalizers grow faster’ as ‘misleading…the countries used as exemplars of globalizers in these studies, China, India, and Vietnam…remain among the most protectionist in the world’.

At the same time, specific IMF and World Bank prescriptions for various East European, East Asian, Latin American and African countries have been labelled incompetent and perverse by critics such as Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs – notably the Soviet transition from communism and the 1997-9 East Asian crisis where these prescriptions contributed to decline, not to growth: ‘The contrast between Russia’s transition as engineered by the international economic institutions and that of China, designed by itself, could not be greater…The transition from communism to a market economy has been so badly managed that, with the exception of China, Vietnam and a few Eastern European countries, poverty has soared as incomes have plummeted’ (Stiglitz, 2002, pp.6 and 214. During the East Asian Crisis of 1997 and the subsequent crises in Argentina and Brazil international advice was ‘like the 18th century medical practice of treating feverish patients by drawing blood from them… hastening their deaths’ (Sachs G 8may02). Indeed, Stiglitz (2002, p.97) claims that ‘the perception throughout much of the developing world is that the IMF itself had (in 1997-9) become a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution’ noting that in several countries ‘history is dated by before and after the IMF…the way one would say the plague or the Great Depression’. Korea, says Stiglitz, only recovered as well as it did by rejecting international advice. (Stiglitz, 2002, pp.117, 127).

Finally critics argue that international organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO and regional organisations such as the EU or ASEAN constrain the independence of the state: ‘The nation-state, economic integration, and democracy are mutually incompatible.’ (Rodrik, 2002, pp.13-14); ‘as your country puts on the Golden Straitjacket (of international integration) your economy grows and your politics shrinks’ (Friedman,1999, p.87).

Proponents: On the other side, the case for market economies, open economies and globalization is argued with equal vigour however. The collapse of communism in Europe and its market-reorientation in Asia changed the terms of debate about managed and protected economies versus free and open markets: even long-term critics of market economies now agreed ‘there is no plausible alternative.’ (Galbraith, 2000, ix; see also Haass and Liton; Rodan). But support for the open economy goes beyond reluctant acceptance, or mere defence. Philippe Legrain lists – and rejects – four charges against the WTO made by its critics: that the WTO ‘does the bidding’ of the multinationals; that it undermines workers rights and environmental protection by encouraging a ‘race to the bottom’ between governments eager for investment; that it harms the poor; and that it is ‘destroying democracy’ by its combination of power without responsibility.

Instead, Legrain argues, opening the economy exposes national monopolies to competition and the WTO keeps the international market-place more competitive; that the alleged ‘race for the bottom’ has not prevented Britain’s government from raising taxes and imposing a minimum wage – while OECD government generally have increased taxes over the last two decades; that the poor in developing countries get better jobs with multinationals than in ‘local sweatshops’; and that the WTO – where ‘every country has a veto’ is more democratic than the UN where ‘only the big powers do’ (G12july01: “The left must learn to love the WTO”) . He argues that companies get power through ‘the absence of competition’ not through size – which means globalization weakens them; that globalization does not inhibit




the maintenance of a welfare state – ‘Sweden’s economy is far more open than Britain’s yet its welfare state is second to none; and that progressives should ‘embrace the liberating potential of globalization’ (G 9oct02 p.17 Philippe Legrain: “Business doesn’t rule”).

The Fraser Institute’s 2004 Report, Economic Freedom of the World, suggests that an open economy is good for civil liberty, reducing corruption and indeed for human development in the widest sense. Its Economic Freedom ranking (one measure of an open economy) not only correlates modestly with World Bank economic growth rates, it also correlates more consistently with UNDP Human Development Indicators, with Transparency International indices of low corruption, and less surprisingly with Freedom House scales of civil liberties (Fraser Institute, 2004, pp.22-26).

Even globalization-sceptic Larry Elliot has argued that ‘history suggests trade can help boost the economic growth of poor countries’; and very significantly he asserts that ‘the developing world does not have much in common with the anti-globalization movement in the west…it sees trade as a key ingredient in boosting growth and per capita incomes’ (G 12nov01). Contrary to the impression given by the UNDP that globalization has not helped the poor, some hotly contested analyses by Dollar and Kraay (2000, 2002) at the World Bank suggest that globalization and development have helped the poor.

In contrast to the ILO (2004) claim that for ‘the vast majority of men and women around the world, globalization has not met their aspirations’ the Pew Centre’s multinational survey report, Globalization with Few Discontents? (Pew Center, 2003) concludes that there are ‘few discontents…generally, people of the world agree, albeit to different degrees that they favour an interconnected world…economic globalization is particularly popular’. On Pew’s remarkably positive figures, the people of the four countries in our study are exceedingly enthusiastic about ‘growing trade and business ties’ – 98 percent in Vietnam feel that such economic globalization is ‘good for their country’, 93 percent in Ukraine, 90 percent in (South) Korea, and 84 percent in the Czech Republic – all significantly higher numbers than in the USA where only 78 percent of Americans feel it is ‘good for America’. Similarly the World Economic Forum Poll (WEF, 2002) of the public in 25 countries finds that a majority in 19 of the 25 countries feel more economic globalization would be good for themselves and their families. Such optimism, it found, was overwhelming in developing east Asian countries like Korea and China but noticeably absent in Russia.

This WEF Poll also highlighted a significant contrast between public opinion in rich and poor countries: in poor countries a majority feel globalization helps poor countries as much as rich countries; in rich countries a majority feel globalization does not help poor countries as much as rich countries. So it is the public in the rich countries – not in the poor countries themselves – that agonise over the impact of globalization on poor counties.

At the same time however, the WEF Poll also shows that the public in most countries feel globalization has its downsides, in particular that it increases poverty and pollution. And it reveals remarkably widespread support (almost one in two) for ‘people who take part in peaceful demonstrations against globalization’. So on WEF figures the public value globalization but across the world they sympathise in large numbers with anti-globalization protestors – a finding somewhat inconsistent with Elliot’s view that ‘the developing world does not have much in common with the anti-globalization movement in the west’.




Key empirical questions: the extent, nature, causes, and consequences of public discontentWhat can we conclude – indeed, what should we conclude – from these powerful arguments and counter arguments about globalization? Our task is not to weigh the arguments on one side against those on the other. It is sufficient to note that there is no consensus about valid reasons for discontent about globalization. There are good reasons to expect public discontent but also good reasons to expect public support for the open economy.

We are left with a number of key questions about public discontent with the open economy:

First, since there are valid reasons for public discontent with globalization, and also valid reasons for enthusiasm, how much discontent? (And conversely, how much enthusiasm?)

Second, what is the nature of this discontent? Discontent with too much openness or with too little? With unfairness rather than openness as such? With one kind of openness (eg cultural), or with all kinds of openness (including cultural, social, political, technical and economic)?

Third, what are the causes of this discontent? What factors make some of the public more discontent than others?

Fourth, what are the consequences of discontent? How do the public feel this discontent should be expressed? Against the state? Outside (ie bypassing) the state? Or through the state?

How much discontent? The ILO claims that globalization has not met the aspirations ‘of the vast majority of men and women around the world’ have to be set against the Pew surveys whose headline figures suggest quite the opposite. But the public have quite complex opinions on this subject and much depends upon question-wording. We need to frame questions about contentment in a variety of different ways and if possible give the public the space to reply in their own terms. Above all, we cannot infer the level of discontent from our own external evaluation of the circumstances. Discontent is a choice, not an echo of some objective reality.

The nature of discontent. It is impossible to reach a definitive conclusion on the extent of discontent without taking into account the nature of that discontent. Discontent with the open economy needs to be unpacked. It comes in different varieties with correspondingly different implications. Again we can approach an answer by listening carefully to the content of spontaneous contributions in focus-groups and by asking the right questions in surveys, especially questions about perceptions of economic, environmental, social, cultural and other trends, and explicit questions about the advantages and disadvantages of the open economy, perceptions of responsibility for the good and the bad. And we can assess the impact of adverse perceptions – in some cases these may be influential, in others recognised but discounted as ‘a price worth paying’ – by their role in multivariate models.

More or less globalization? First, do those in developing countries who are discontented want less globalization or more? Micklethwait and Woodridge (2000), Legrain (2004), Bhagwati




(2002, 2004) and others suggest the public in developing countries should be discontented with the slow pace and incompleteness of globalization: ‘globalisation is a liberating force that brings wealth and opportunity to people in the remotest parts of the globe… (Micklethwait and Woodridge, 2000 p.338); ‘globalization is part of the solution, not the problem (though) there is legitimate impatience with the speed at which globalization will deliver on the social agendas’ (Bhagwati, 2002, p.4).

Principle or implementation? Second, are the discontented in developing countries opposed to the principle of the open economy or to the way it has been implemented – are the discontented opposed to globalization or merely seeking ‘global justice’? Stiglitz (2002, p.xv) railed at the ‘hypocrisy of pretending to help developing countries by forcing them to open up their markets to the goods of the advanced industrial countries while keeping their own markets protected…rules must be – and must be seen to be – fair and just’. Even the anti-globalization campaigners of the 1990s have been trying to re-brand themselves as campaigners for ‘global justice’ or ‘global solidarity’ in order to distinguish between support for the principle and opposition to the practice of economic globalization. In the words George Monbiot, a prominent supporter of the 1990s anti-globalization protests, ‘I was wrong about trade…our aim should not be to abolish the WTO but to transform it’ (Monbiot, 24 June 2003). Similarly, global justice, not anti-globalization resistance, is the aim of the emerging ‘G20’ group of developing countries led by Brazil, India and China within the WTO itself, and also the aim of many participants in more outsider groups like the European Social Forum and World Social Forum (inspired by Lula da Silva, later President of Brazil) who want to articulate a positive rather than purely negative message.

In fact both sides in the 1990s conflict, both pro- and anti-globalization, have converged towards the global justice agenda. Stephen Byers who led the official UK delegation at the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle has more recently echoed Monbiot’s words: ‘I was wrong: free market trade policies hurt the poor…IMF and World Bank orthodoxy is increasing global poverty’ (Stephen Byers G 19 May 2003). UK Chancellor Gordon Brown and the World Bank President Jim Wolfensohn have together advocated a reduction in agricultural protectionism (Brown and Wolfensohn, 2004) which discriminates against less developed countries while open markets on manufactured goods and insistence on intellectual property rights discriminate in favour of advanced countries. For years, Wolfensohn has been arguing (unsuccessfully for most of the time) in the same terms as Stiglitz that it was ‘hypocritical to give debt relief (to developing countries) and then deny the ability to export’ (G 17 July 2001, p.21). Even Brzezinski’s (2004) patronising Global Domination or Global Leadership goes some way towards a more equitable concept of globalization.

So there is no longer much dispute about the goal of global justice. And if the old protestors of the ‘anti-globalization movement’ do successfully encourage ‘a new deal on the management of the world economy, the protestors may yet prove to be the true defenders of globalization’ (Green and Griffith, 2002, p.68).

On the other hand, more, more real, and more equitable, globalization would transfer globalization’s discontent from the public of developing countries to the public in the advanced west, especially the USA. There have always been some workers and businesses in economically advanced countries that were, or thought they were, potential casualties of globalization. But they were protected by the ‘hypocrisy’ to which Stiglitz referred. As the American grip on international organisations has loosened however, the USA has




increasingly switched, under growing domestic political pressure, towards exercising purely national power through unilateral action or bilateral agreements (G 21 May 03) – openly and unilaterally opting-out of globalization whenever it finds globalization too painful.

Economic openness itself or its by-products? Third, are the discontented in developing countries discontented with the open economy itself, or with some of the things that contingently come with it but are not an essential part of it – notably the erosion of national culture? Indeed, is the open economy for them perhaps the ‘good side of globalization’ not the bad? Is the economic attraction of the open economy itself so attractive that collateral damage such as the erosion of national culture, increasing crime and corruption, or increasing pollution of the environment are recognised as reasons for discontent but nonetheless considered a price perhaps worth paying for the benefits of economic development? Discontent with globalization may not be tied to specifically-economic openness.

The blame game: Fourth, who or what are the targets of public discontent? – anyone who has done well out of the open economy; local power-holders (cited by Hossain and Moore, 2002) and criminals (cited by the UNDP 1999 Report) who have stolen the benefits; the country’s government for failing to seize the opportunities offered by globalizing markets; foreign or international businessmen who are skilled at exploiting the underdeveloped; the incompetence of International Organisations like the IMF, World Bank or WTO – or self-interest of the great powers that control them?

Modelling the causes and consequences of discontentWe use multivariate modelling (multiple regression) to test alternative explanations of discontent and its consequences comparatively. More than that, multivariate modelling allows us to decide which elements of discontent are critical and which, though real enough in themselves, are discounted by the public as perhaps a ‘price worth paying’ for a greater good, and thus have little or no impact on support for development or openness.

A framework for analysis: Our framework for a comparative analysis of alternative models of the causes and consequences of discontent can be summarised in a six-stage block-recursive model (shown in Table 1) which assumes a flow of influence from:

(1) personal background and experience

and then through:

(2) perceptions of recent development (whether positive or negative, and including the ‘downsides of development’ – rising inequality, crime, corruption, pollution and the erosion of national culture)

(3) attitudes towards development (and the pace of development)

(4) attitudes towards cultural openness

(5) attitudes towards economic openness

(6) attitudes towards protest and resistance; the government and its policies; and the role of the state under globalization




At each stage all elements from previous stages, but only from previous stages, are regarded as potential influences – though many will prove to be redundant once account is taken of the most important key influences.

We take people’s background (gender, income, education, age, employment etc) and their personal experiences (especially whether their family income has been rising or declining) as given. They do not depend upon attitudes. But they may shape and condition attitudes towards development, cultural and economic openness, the legitimacy of protests and the role of government.

Amongst attitudes we place attitudes to development at the start of the sequence because we believe that perceptions of, and attitudes towards, economic development and its social consequences may shape attitudes towards development-oriented strategies – including the strategies of moving towards a more market-orientated economy internally and opening up the national economy more to world business and markets. Those who advocate internal market-economies and externally open-economies argue that these will foster development. That is their principal justification for these strategies. But it is usually based on the untested assumption that people actually want development. Yet development is not universally desired. Within Britain for example, those who live in the south-east of England frequently speak out against development. Over-development can be as uncomfortable as under-development. And if people do not want development, if they regard the social and cultural costs as outweighing any possible economic gains for them (if not gains for others), then their antipathy to development should reasonably turn them against strategies that aim (whether successfully or not) at further or more rapid development.

We place attitudes toward cultural openness next. Our surveys show that the public regard the erosion of their national culture as an inevitable consequence of opening up the economy. They feel there is a sequence of cause and effect that runs from an open economy to cultural decline. So why place cultural openness prior to economic openness in our sequence of potential influences on attitudes, a placing which assumes that cultural attitudes influence economic attitudes?

The answer is that this is good example of teleological causation, where the means is determined by the end, a form of causation that is indeed very common in human affairs though less familiar in the natural sciences because it is based on awareness, forecasting, reasoning and intention rather than on inanimate action-and-reaction. The golf-ball does not anticipate (nor care about) being struck; so it does not remove itself from the tee. But our surveys show that the public regard the good side of globalization as primarily economic, and the bad side as primarily cultural. In order to preserve their culture therefore they may be less willing to accept economic openness. Hence the paradox, that while the sequence of perceived impact runs from an open economy to an open culture, the sequence of attitudinal influence, if any, must run in the opposite direction: that is, from distaste for cultural homogenation towards rejection of economic openness.

Our statistical analysis reinforces this expectation that cultural attitudes do indeed influence public support for an open economy (chapter 4), and not the reverse. It might be argued that cultural and economic protection are merely two manifestations of a general distaste for openness, or that attitudes towards cultural and economic protection may influence each other. That would imply an element of non-recursivity. Statistical analysis of such two-way




causation is notoriously difficult in practice because it requires ‘instrumental variables’ that plausibly have a direct influence on one, but only one, of the two that are locked in a reciprocal causal relationship. Luckily, the ‘instrumental variables’ required for such an analysis of reciprocal influences are unusually easy to find in this case and we can be sure that attitudes towards cultural protection are more, if not exclusively, a cause than a consequence of attitudes towards economic protection.

Our framework then assumes that attitudes towards anti-globalization protests, government policies, and the role of the state may be influenced to some degree by that personal background and experience, and attitudes towards development, culture and economic openness. Those who oppose a market economy are likely to be statists, more favourable than others towards ‘big government’ and greater state intervention – though, as we shall see attitudes towards the role of the state involve other dimensions than merely bib-versus-small government. Similarly, those who are opposed to opening-up the economy towards world markets and world capital may reasonably be expected to take a tougher line on protests against unfair treatment by multinational companies or international organisations.

We assess the merits of numerous competing models of attitudes toward globalization within the larger integrated context of this overall framework of cause and consequence.

Table 1: A framework for analysispersonal background & experience

perceptions of development (including the ‘downsides’)

attitudes towards development (discontent or support)

attitudes towards cultural openness

attitudes towards economic openness

attitudes towards protest and resistance attitudes towards the government & its policies attitudes towards the role of the state under globalization

Modelling the causes of discontent. One explanation for discontent with openness is what we might call the ‘medievalism model’ – a simple fear of living in a dangerous world without the security of a city-wall – or its modern equivalent, a tightly guarded state frontier. It is not an entirely unreasonable fear. Open borders allow the easy, unchecked, and unmonitored movement of the bad as well as the good, the unwelcome as well as the welcome – including unwelcome immigrants, criminals, terrorists and diseases. With special measures the movement of undesirables can be controlled even in an open economy – witness the UK’s refusal to accede to the Schengen agreement within the open-economy of the EU, or the ‘frontier controls’ between eastern and western states of the USA which are used to prevent the movement of certain agricultural products that might carry disease – but all of these things that the public may wish to control are certainly more difficult to control in an open economy. Other things being equal, human diseases spread faster when people move in larger




numbers with fewer checks. Medievalism in this sense of living within the ‘city-wall’ is just a blanket fear of the unknown ‘outside world’. (Table 2)A more common explanation of discontent with globalization (and conversely of support for it), perhaps the most common explanation of all, is some variant on a ‘winners and losers model’: that those who have done well out of the open-economy will be enthusiastic, and those who have done badly will be discontent. That is the core (but untested) assumption behind the UNDP critique of globalization – and it is the core assumption behind of Philippe Legrain’s advocacy. Usually this ‘winners and losers’ model is formulated in purely economic terms, though it could be applied in terms of power and prestige, or in terms of culture, as well as in terms of income or wealth. And even in purely economic terms, the level of public services and social welfare may be as significant as take-home pay in defining winners and losers. So it is a class of models rather than a single model, depending on the criteria to which the public are most sensitive and responsive. Related to the ‘winners and losers’ model, but fundamentally distinct from it, are variants of a legitimacy or ‘justice and injustice model’ that focuses on the justice or injustice of the gains and losses that result from opening-up the economy rather than on mere gains and losses themselves. The public generally resent a politician making millions out of office, but happily accept a footballer doing the same. Winners who win by effort and skill are more acceptable than those who win through insider deals or contacts with powerholders. This is also a core part of the UNDP argument, expressed in its allegation that ‘criminals reap the benefits of globalization’. A third common explanation of discontent or enthusiasm is ideology – especially nationalism, socialism, and environmentalism. A ‘nationalist v cosmopolitan model’ is the most obvious: nationalists value the nation-state. They are peculiarly sensitive to anything that might threaten their national culture, national identity, or national autonomy. And they join with ideological democrats in their suspicion that international organisations are less accountable than national governments. Against the nationalists, cosmopolitans put less value on the nation-state, national culture, and national identity – or at least relatively less value. In fact the identities of cosmopolitans are usually not so much different from those of nationalists as more complex, richer, more multi-dimensional, a mix of national, supra-national and simply non-national elements. They positively welcome foreign influences of all kinds, and that may be reflected in their attitude towards an open-economy.At the same time, a ‘world ideologies model’ suggests that globalization is just a new battle-ground for left and right, that socialists have extended or even replaced their anger with private domestic capitalism with a focus on ‘international capitalism’ – that they are perhaps more interested in attacking capitalist enterprise in developing countries than they are in the welfare of the people in those countries; that the western socialist left resents the big brand multinationals manufacturing in developing countries not because it pays local workers less than in the West, but because it pays them anything at all, and because the real victims are high-wage westerners who have lost jobs to developing countries. Finally, environmentalists accuse multinationals of switching environmentally damaging activities to developing countries that are under more pressure to mortgage their future well-being – and the future-well-being of the planet – in return for small but immediate economic gains. Since our focus is on the attitudes of the public in developing or transitional areas of the world, the socialist explanation is not relevant to our study, but environmentalist and more especially the nationalist explanations are so.




Table 2: Explanations of public discontent with (or enthusiasm for) the open economy

medievalism modelfear of openness, exposure to immigration, disease, terrorism etc

winners v losers modelsegocentric/selfish or altruistic

family, regional/ethnic, national, international

justice v injustice modelsdomestic or international

nationalist v cosmopolitan ideology model: perceived threats to…national culture and identity

national autonomy & international accountability

world ideology modelsleft v right; statism v marketism

environmentalism

background modelssocio-economic: age, gender, income, occupation, education, rurality

cosmopolitan: contact with foreigners at home or abroad, language skills, internetidentity: religion, religiosity, ‘home’ region, residence region, ethnicity, national v supra-national identity

We might also attempt to explain attitudes towards economic openness in terms of various ‘background models’ – not just ‘socio-economic background’, but also ‘cosmopolitan background’ and ‘identity background’. We might expect younger generations, higher earners, urban dwellers and the better educated to be more confident, more open to change, and more willing to engage with the wider world (though the evidence may contradict rather than quantify these plausible expectations). Similarly, we might expect those with more cosmopolitan backgrounds – those who have had more contact with foreigners at home or abroad, those who can speak languages other than the state-language, even perhaps those with home computers (and thus perhaps with internet potential) – to be more open to the world. Conversely, limiting identities – whether national, regional or religious – might make people more concerned about these groups and perhaps more defensive in their attitudes towards the wider world. While these background factors may be regarded as the ultimate primary influences they may not have a direct impact on attitudes towards openness. Instead they may operate through the more proximate influences of the ‘winners-and-losers’, ‘justice-and-injustice’, ‘nationalist-v-cosmopolitan ideology’ or ‘world ideology’ models. For example, those with larger incomes may take a more optimistic view about economic trends and that in turn may affect their attitude towards an open economy. Similarly, ethnic identification may affect the importance that people put on national culture and that in turn may affect attitudes towards cultural an economic openness.

Some models, especially the ‘winners-and-losers’ model can be formulated in ‘egocentric’ and ‘selfish’ form or, on the other hand, in an ‘altruistic’ form, based on sympathy and concern for the plight of others in some wider community. And both selfish and altruistic versions may operate at the level of individuals and their families, regions and sub-national ethnic groups, or nation states. For example: a ‘winners and losers’ model can be based on reactions to perceptions of personally being a loser (egocentric-family) or on concern for those amongst their fellow citizens who have lost out (altruistic-family). But it can also be




based on perceptions that the individual’s own region or sub-national ethnic group has won or lost (egocentric-regional/ethnic) or a concern for all loser-regions or loser-ethnicities within the state (altruistic-regional/ethnic). More often, it can be based on perceptions that the individual’s own country has been a loser – not against other countries in a zero-sum game, but in the positive-sum game of development (egocentric-national), that is to say on whether the national economy has been performing well or badly. And it can also be based on perceptions that the individual’s own country has lost out in some zero-sum international competition against powerful countries or international organisations like the IMF (egocentric-international). There are at least these eight variants to consider. They are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Eight variants of the ‘winners and losers’ model Discontent with globalization reflects concern for…

Family model …individual or family being a loser … all fellow citizens who are losers

Regional/ethnic model …own region or ethnic group being a loser …any regions / ethnic groups that are losers

National model …own country being a loser …all countries that are losers

International model …own country being a loser in zero-sum game …all countries that are losers in zero-sum gameEgocentric/selfish model Altruistic model

The altruistic-international model might provide the most obvious explanation of Western anti-globalization protests. But in developing or transitional countries we might expect egocentric/selfish models to apply more strongly: the egocentric-family model is certainly an obvious explanation for discontent on a collective farm in Ukraine. But we have no reason to assume without proper investigation that the public in developing/transitional countries are not also influenced by perceptions of wider misfortunes and injustices in addition to their own.

In addition, all ‘winners-and-losers’ models, but especially the ‘national-winners-and-losers’ model can be formulated in backward-looking ‘retrospective’ form, or forward-looking ‘prospective’ form, depending upon whether it is based on the public’s sensitivity to the recent economic record, or their expectations of future economic performance.

Since we asked many questions about economic trends, it is possible to use multivariate analysis to decide between rival winners-and-losers models..

‘Regional/ethnic’ models are of course only applicable where region and/or sub-national ethnicity are important cleavages. The Bohemian v Moravian cleavage in the Czech Republic was only significant for a brief period after the fall of communism. But Ukraine remains divided regionally, culturally (by religion and religiosity for example), linguistically and by ethnic identification, between Ukrainians and Russians – though these different cleavages only partially coincide. (There are far more in Ukraine who identify as ethnic Ukrainians than speak the language at home.) Throughout history Vietnam has been repeatedly divided between north and south, most recently in the decades after 1945 when a market economy was vigorously encouraged in the south and vigorously discouraged in the north. After reunification, regional tensions remained and arguably increased (Evans, 2004: Marr and White, 1988). Southerners might be expected to have more expertise in operating a market-economy and more resentment against the communist alternative. (In addition there is some




altruistic concern within Vietnam, even guilt, about the plight of ethnic minorities in the western highlands who have not shared fully in the 1990s boom.) In Korea too there is a keen sense of region – not merely region-as-residence but region as a ‘home-region-identity’ that persists throughout life wherever the person resides – and a perception that the benefits of development have been purposefully steered towards some politically-favoured regions and away from others. Two key regions are the Jeolla / Cholla region in the south west, centred on the city of Gwangju / Kwangju (and associated with the anti-authoritarian opposition to the previous regime) and the Gyeongsang / Kyongsang region in the south-east centred on the cities of Taegu and Pusan (which was associated with the old authoritarian regime). (Min, 2004)

Although regional identities in Korea and Vietnam are strong they are primarily based on perceptions of economic advantage, and defined largely in terms of some ‘other’. They do not reflect the deep cultural differences that make regional identity in Ukraine as much about ‘self’ as about ‘other’. In particular, uniform policies and equal treatment of regions might be widely supported in Vietnam and Korea but are themselves the basis for regional resentment in Ukraine where ethnic Russians object to being Ukrainianized – as earlier generations of Ukrainians objected to being Russified.

Models to explain the attitudes of officials: The position of state officials in developing and transitional countries is particularly interesting. The question of whether government officials (appointed or elected) are representative of the public in terms of their attitudes to an open-economy is important – as much so in emerging democracies as in established democracies. How much, and in what way, they differ from the public has implications for the quality of democracy as well as the implementation of policy.

First, officials may constitute a ‘development vanguard’. Even at a junior level, officials tend to be better educated than the general public, which typically makes people more open, more cosmopolitan. Through their work and their official contacts they may also be better placed to see the advantages of an open-economy through their official work. They may have better information about the development successes of the open-economy – which may foster commitment to a process that may benefit the country as-a-whole. A ‘development vanguard model’ suggests that officials should be (i) more favourable than the public towards economic globalization; and (ii) more opposed than the public towards any expressions of discontent that could disrupt economic development; despite perhaps also being (iii) more willing than the public to resist cultural globalization. (Table 4)

Alternatively, officials as government employees may be more committed to current government policy, and therefore back an open-economy in part simply because it is current government policy – especially in developing or transitional countries where government administration may be more politicised than in long-established democracies. Since they embody the state and insofar as they identify themselves with state and nation we might expect them to be more jealous of state autonomy and more proud of their national culture. So while they might be more committed than the public towards economic globalization they might be more willing than the public to resist cultural globalization. Moreover, officials as government also have a special interest in public order – and an ‘interest’ in both senses of that word. They may be targets of public wrath, which gives them a material interest in order. But because their role forces them to think harder, more often and more deeply about public




order than do the general public they also have an intellectual interest in public order. And these material and intellectual interests often have opposing impacts on the attitudes of officials towards public order. In established democracies, officials tend to be more liberal, more willing to accept the public’s right to protest than are the public themselves – up to the point where they perceive that the state itself is in danger, when they switch to being more authoritarian than the public. This slightly complex pattern has been described as a ‘governing perspective’ (McClosky, 1983; Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff, 1996). But under the pressures of development or transition their commitment to order may be greater, and their commitment to citizens’ rights rather less. So when we move on from the causes of discontent to considering the consequences of discontent – and especially whether discontent should be expressed outwith or even against the state through public protest or, alternatively, expressed through the state as guardian and protector of the public interest – we might expect government officials in developing and transitional countries to have a peculiarly ‘governing perspective’ about the limits of legitimate methods for articulating public discontent. So an ‘officials as government model’ suggests that, compared to the public, officials should (i) give stronger support to the government; (ii) be more jealous of state autonomy in the international arena; (iii) be more committed to the protection of national culture; (iv) be more committed than the public itself to citizens rights to protest – in mild, orderly, and especially through-the-state ways; yet (v) be more critical than the public about any disorderly or disruptive forms of protest. This model is rather more detailed and complex than the simpler ‘vanguard model’.

There remains a more perverse model of the differences, if any, between officials and the public: a ‘conspiracy model’. Officials may be willing and able to take greater personal advantage of new opportunities, including ‘informal payments’ from business entrepreneurs large and small – which may also foster a commitment to the open economy, but for less worthy reasons. Hossain and Moore (2002) suggest that ‘national elites in developing countries are not as pro-poor as we would wish’ (p.1); though they say ‘bureaucratic elites are relatively pro-poor’ compared to ‘agrarian elites’ their ‘motivations for action against poverty are often negative, driven by fear’ (pp.17-19). Worse, their actions may be driven by personal greed: the benefits of an open-economy may go disproportionately to existing power-holders, including quite junior officials, or to their families and friends. True or false, our evidence shows that the public believe officials, existing power-holders and those with ‘contacts’ have been the chief domestic beneficiaries of globalization and development.

Table 4: Explanations of the gap between officials’ and public’s attitudes towards the open economy

official-versus-mass models officials as a development vanguard: better education, broader vision, able to see national opportunities

officials as government: committed to government policy, public orderofficials as conspiracy: in a position to take personal opportunities

A simple ‘conspiracy model’ – in which officials support an open economy while the public opposes it, because officials grab all the benefits and the public bears all the costs, is perhaps too extreme to occur in reality. But as public allegations against officials increase, and as




officials become demonstrably less representative, the ‘conspiracy model’ becomes a more plausible explanation and the ‘development vanguard model’ correspondingly less plausible.

Models to explain national or (global-) regional differences: Finally, there are a variety of the national or (global-) regional models, sometimes termed ‘legacy models’ (Ekiert and Hanson, 2003). Some very broad-brush explanations of attitudes to development have invoked the concept of a long-term culture of socially cohesive and industrious ‘Asian values’. At the other extreme, problems in eastern Europe have been attributed to the medium-to-long-term culture of statism and dependency left behind as the legacy of communism and, in the former Soviet Union, by the longer-term legacy of Czarism that preceded communism. Both these Asian and east European models are examples of a relatively ‘long-term cultural legacy model’. Inglehart and his associates have produced a variety of ‘cultural zone maps’ of the world (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003, p.155). The maps vary but typically include an ‘ex-communist’ zone and an east Asian zone (labelled ‘Confucian’). And those who talk of ‘Western values’ implicitly or explicitly adopt the perspective of value zones, as does Jacques (G Mat 15th 2004, p.23) when he argues that ‘the claims of Western values are mocked by the rise of Asia…the West no longer has a monopoly of modernity…the next quarter-century will not be simply about American hyper-power but the rise of Asian power and values’. (Table 5)

But the concept of peculiarly ‘Asian’ or (European) post-communist values is hotly contested. ‘Asian values’ are essentially equated by advocates such as Lee Kuan Yew with mid-to-northern east Asian, specifically including both Korea and Vietnam (Zakaria, 1994, p2) and with the concept of a family-oriented orderly society in contrast to both American moral decay and socialist state-paternalism – though the subtext may be simple fear of the erosion of national identity (Zakaria, 1994, p.8). Critics of the concept focus on its implicit justification of authoritarian government and disrespect for human rights (Jung, 1994; Sen 1997) arguing that ‘there are no ideas more fundamental to democracy than the teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Tonghak’ (Jung, 1994, p.2). Given the way that Western Christianity has been used over the centuries to justify everything from the most extreme autocracy to the most extreme democracy the very notion that religions have a consistent relationship to democracy is absurd: they are far too old for that.

Nonetheless, it is striking that east Asia and east Europe/CIS are the two regions of the world that have had the most extreme development experiences (in both GNP and HDI terms) over the decade or so since the fall of communism (UNDP, 2003). And the contrast owes as much to East Europe as to East Asia. In thinking about that contrast we therefore need to give as much weight to the East European legacy as to the East Asian legacy. In particular the standard terminology of ‘developing’ versus ‘transition’ countries has been all too accurate. In addition, the second – and largely neglected – strand of Lee’s argument was that Asians relied on their extended family and civil society more than in the West and relied on the state less. That argument might not be sustainable in a contrast between Singapore and America, but perhaps it would be more applicable to the contrast between east Asian traditions and east European, especially Soviet, traditions. World Values Survey data provides ‘clear evidence of the continuing centrality of the family in Vietnam’ (Dalton et al., 2002, p.386).

Table 5: Explanations of national or (global-) regional discontent with the open




economy

national and (global-) regional legacy modelslong-term regional cultural-values models: Asian v European values / cultural zones

short-term regional economic-experience models: east Asian v east European economic experiencesself-images / standards models: richer v poorer countries; specific countries

Although it can be argued that the ‘wreckage of history’ – as a source of building materials for discretionary construction by current entrepreneurs – is a better metaphor for historical legacies than the more deterministic image evoked by the ‘weight of history’ (Ekiert and Hanson, 2003), the long experience of communist rule has perhaps given east Europeans, especially those in the former Soviet Union, different expectations of state and family (Baxandall, 2003, 279-80) than in east Asia, even communist east Asia. Communist North Vietnam borrowed inspiration from the Soviet Union but South Vietnam did not and there was scarcely more than a decade between reunification and Doi Moi – nothing like Ukraine’s seven decades of Soviet ideology.

But a very different possibility is that global regional differences may be better explained by yet other legacy models, based on only a couple of decades: ‘short-term economic legacy models’. East Asia can be distinctive here and now without being distinctively Confucian. Rather than ‘Asian values’, Stiglitz (2002, pp.10-11) refers to the ‘Asian model’ of development, promoted by the Asian Development Bank, ‘in which governments, while relying on markets have taken an active role in creating, shaping and guiding markets…(which is) distinctly different from the American model pushed by the Washington-based institutions’ and accepted more readily in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Gierus (2001), like Stiglitz distinguishes three models of development: the ‘Asian model’, the ‘Eastern and Central European’ model, and the ‘African states’ model. Leaving aside the Africa states which were ‘the biggest losers in globalization’, Gierus distinguishes between the successful ‘Asian model’ of globalization directed by a strong, self-confident and nationalist state, and the ‘Eastern and Central European model characterised’ by ‘huge polarization between western-oriented elites and the rest of society’ coupled with a weak and inactive state that had ‘lost legitimacy’, incurred ‘enormous debts’, presided over a bureaucracy that was ill-disciplined, badly paid and ill-trained, and distracted from economic affairs by unresolved regional, territorial, cultural and ethnic problems.

Statistically contrasts between East Asia and East Europe cannot, by themselves, discriminate between a long-term cultural-values and a short-term economic-experience legacy model. But our data are not just numbers: they are numbers with meanings (and, in the case of focus-group transcripts, almost purely meanings rather than numbers). So we can (and should) base conclusions on the meaning and content of the observable contrasts. Some Asian/European contrasts may be consistent with the Asian Values variant but others (as we shall see) are decidedly not. It is essential to consider, not just the existence of differences between perceptions and attitudes in east Asia and East Europe, but to consider what differs, and how it differs – not least by taking account of the sign or direction of the difference.

Although a winners-and-losers model would predict greater discontent in less successful economies, at any given level of economic performance, cross-national variations in discontent may also reflect national self-images of the country’s rightful place in the world. The public may not have absolute but relative standards – judging their own experience of an




open-economy against a routine comparator (Ukrainians for example routinely compare Ukraine with Bulgaria, Poland, or Russia – but not with Germany, Sweden or the USA); or judging their experience of an open-economy against their judgement of their own past – for example, against the increasingly nostalgic and favourable image that many Ukrainians now have of their own national achievements and personal life-style under communism (Ekiert, 2003, p.98), or against Korean memories of year-on-year growth until the 1997-9 IMF crisis so rudely interrupted it, or against Vietnamese memories of the pre-‘Doi Moi’ (‘national renewal’) era.

Modelling the consequences of discontent. How should discontent be expressed? In particular should it be expressed through the state, against the state, or in ways that simply bypass the state? (Table 6) Stiglitz (2002, p3) claims that ‘for decades people in the developing world have rioted when the austerity programs imposed on their countries proved to be too harsh, but their protests were largely unheard in the West’. But it takes relatively few to riot. Do such expressions of discontent even gain broad approval within the developing world itself? That depends upon the nature as well as the intensity of the discontent. It depends also on what are regarded as legitimate modes of protest. And it depends upon the public’s regard for their government and officials.

If the discontented want more globalization rather than less, they are unlikely to take to their own streets in protest – though they may protest abroad against unfair trade barriers, or press their government to argue their case more strongly in international forums. If they accept the principle of an open economy but not its implementation they may protest in discriminating ways against specific injustices or abuses. If they welcome economic openness and development but not the things that go with it – the erosion of national culture, increasing crime and corruption, or pollution of the environment – then they have to consider whether these are a price worth paying, or whether they can take specific action against these unwelcome concomitants. If they are to take any action, it should logically be against the specific targets of their discontent – whether that be the ‘winners’, criminals, local or international businessmen and their companies, international organisations, local officials or their national government.

At the same time, the consequences of discontent depend on what the public regard as a legitimate repertoire of action. Many would regard a letter of protest as legitimate; few would regard violence as legitimate. But general attitudes towards the legitimacy of different actions are only the starting-point for the public’s assessment of appropriate action in particular circumstances. People make exceptions, they take account of circumstances, they excuse actions they would generally condemn when circumstances make them appropriate, and they shrink from actions they would normally support in principle when they feel they are inappropriate or unnecessary or disproportionate.

Table 6: Explanations of the consequences of internal markets and open economies

‘state-is-irrelevant’ model (bypass-the-state-model) public support for direct action (protest and/or sabotage) against




international companies and organisations.

‘state-is-the-problem’ model (against-the-state model) public opposition to the government and its policies; public demands for a smaller role for the state within the national

economy; public support for supra-nationalist solutions

‘state-is-the-solution’ model (through-the-state model) public support for the government and its policies; public complaints to the state about foreign companies; public demands for a larger role for the state within the national

economy; public suspicion of international organisationspublic support for state action – as a state – within an international

arena (but not its replacement by supra-national arrangements)

If the public feel government is merely ineffective or irrelevant they may bypass it and express their discontent in support for direct action against the perceived culprit. If the public feel that government is the problem they may support protests against it: at the very least they may tell us that they do not support their government and its policies. Several Latin American elections have been lost by governments were judged to have followed bad advice from international financial organisations. The electoral defeat of Indian government was widely attributed to public reactions against its policies on globalization and development. And the severe criticisms of government in Ukraine that are so clear in our survey were soon followed by mass demonstrations and electoral defeat. But if the public feel the government is the solution rather than the problem, they may try to enlist its help – appealing to local officials against bad working conditions or pollution caused locally by a multinational company, for example; calling for an expanded role for the state within their country; or viewing their state as their principal advocate and protector in a tough, competitive, globalizing world of potentially predatory big powers and potentially unfair international organisations.

Four countries: two global regions, two levels of developmentOur study is based on 8,202 hour-long interviews and 16 two-hour focus-group discussions in 2003 (supplemented by another 2136 interviews in Ukraine in 2005 to measure the impact of the ‘orange revolution’). But instead of covering 16 countries with 500 interviews and one focus-group in each we have opted for a ‘small-N’ comparison of just four countries. That permits in-depth analysis. We have not had to spread our resources too thinly. But we have had to choose our countries carefully.

Choosing countries: As global regions, the UNDP 2002 Report shows east Asia was the most outstanding ‘winner’ and the east Europe/CIS region the most outstanding ‘loser’ over the decade of the 1990s. East Asia had the greatest rise in both GDP per capita and HDI (Human Development Index); and East Europe/CIS had the greatest drop in GDP per capita and HDI – indeed East Europe/CIS was the only region where HDI declined across that decade. Since ‘winners-and-losers’ models of various kinds are often used as explanations of support for an open economy, we have chosen countries from each of these regions.

Within each region we have hosen one relatively rich (and rated ‘high’ on UNDP HDI rankings, 2004) and one relatively poor (and rated ‘medium on UNDP HDI rankings):




Vietnam and (South) Korea from the rapidly developing east Asian region; Ukraine and the Czech Republic from the transitional (and not developing) east Europe/CIS region.

It is the two poorer countries that best typify the 1990s pattern of regional growth however – Ukraine collapsing in chaos and corruption, Vietnam growing rapidly from a low economic base. Decline was less severe in the Czech Republic and, conversely, a long period of rapid growth in Korea was halted by the 1997-99 Asian crisis.

An analysis of only four countries does not permit statistically definitive cross-national conclusions, but it does permit statistically compelling analysis of patterns within each of the countries. And this set of four is sufficiently diverse that if we find a pattern replicated across them all – between for example ‘winners and losers’ or between ‘public and officials’ for example – it is likely to apply quite widely.

But our study does provide some insight into cross-national differences. If there are sharp systematic differences between regional cultures they should be evident in the contrast between our developing (Asian) and transitional (east European) countries. If there are sharp systematic differences between richer and poorer countries they should be evident in the contrasts within each region. Moreover, our data is not merely statistical: it has intrinsic meaning. That is most obvious in the focus-group transcripts which we shall quote frequently. But it also emerges from the depth of our survey interviews which used multiple questions to elicit the instability, nuanced and multi-faceted nature of public opinion. Together they tell us a lot about the ‘why’, and the ‘in what sense’, as well as about the ‘what’. Nothing could be further removed than this approach from the infamous (though possibly apocryphal) statistically significant correlation between mining disasters in Italy and wheat yields in Ohio – a ‘what’ without a ‘why’.

The four countries have much in common however. All have had relatively recent experiences of opening up their economies. None have large economies capable – as are the American and Chinese – of any significant degree of self-sufficiency – which makes protectionism at once especially attractive and especially deadly for them.

None of them are powerful. All have vivid memories of being occupied. Though homogeneity is less in Ukraine than in the others, all four share a strong sense of ethnic/nationalist identity threatened by larger neighbours or more distant superpowers. Within all four, there is the potential for territorial insecurity and cultural fright, albeit to varying degrees. (On our data, Koreans feel particularly insecure: they remain resentful of Japanese occupation, fearful of North Korean or Chinese intervention, and increasingly resentful of blundering American diplomacy and of American troops on their soil.) Conversely all except Vietnam have contributed troops to UN peacekeeping forces in recent years, with the Ukraine contributing particularly large numbers (United Nations website, 2004).

All have recent or continuing experience of a communist or authoritarian regime. Inglehart and Norris (2003, pp165-7) categorise Vietnam as a ‘non-democracy’, Ukraine as a ‘semi-democracy’, Korea and the Czech Republic as rather tentative ‘newer democracies’ – in contrast to the more mature ‘older democracies’ of the west; and they categorise none of the four as ‘post-industrial’ – again in contrast to almost all the ‘older democracies’ of the west. After the Asian crash of 1997-99 (what Koreans in our focus-groups – echoing Stiglitz – call




simply ‘the IMF’: for Koreans an event not an organisation) even the most economically developed of our four does not feel, to its own citizens, like a fully advanced country.

Methodology To investigate public opinion towards the open economy in these four countries we began by holding four focus-group discussions within each country towards the end of 2002:

one in each of the capital cities: Prague, Seoul, Kyiv and Hanoi

one in another major urban area: Cseske Budejovice (CzR), Taejon (K), Kharkov in the ethnically Russian area of Ukraine, and Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam

two in more rural areas (though nowhere in the Czech Republic or Korea is very rural): Brno and Prostejov (Cz), Yechon and Yoju (K), small villages in Zhytomyr Oblast and Kirovograd Oblast (U), and with rural groups in Hoa Binh Province (north Vietnam) and Tay Ninh Province (south Vietnam).

At least one member of the Glasgow University team was present to observe every focus group (with the help of simultaneous translation). Focus groups were video-recorded, transcripted in the vernacular, and the transcripts translated into English. They were guided by local professional moderators using a 52-question schedule covering six topics: (i) recent economic, social and cultural change, (ii) the market-economy or ‘market mechanisms’, (iii) the pros and cons of development, (iv) national identity, culture and foreign influences, (v) the advantages and disadvantages of opening-up the economy to world markets, and (vi) attitudes towards so-called ‘anti-globalization’ protests.

That was followed at the end of 2003 by representative surveys with at least 1500 members of the public and 500 elected or appointed officials in each country – making a total of 8202 interviews in all. The interview schedule was designed to cover not only the questions we had put to the focus group participants but also the range of answers and the additional topics they had spontaneously raised in those discussions. The survey questionnaire included 117 substantive questions about the same topics as in the focus groups plus another 27 ‘background’ questions including questions about religious, ethnic and territorial identities, linguistic capabilities as well as the usual socio-economic background questions.

In Vietnam previous surveys had often been restricted to the towns, sometimes towns plus their rural fringe. While urban populations might have the same perceptions and attitudes as their rural compatriots, they might not – especially on issues such as opening-up the economy, if that produced much greater benefits for urban rather than rural populations (or vice versa).

Our public opinion surveys were therefore designed to be representative of the whole country, rural as well as urban – covering villages in ‘remote’ rural areas (defined in countries with poor communications as more than 20 km more from the nearest town) as well as villages closer to a town than that. In our samples, 10 percent of Koreans lived in villages, 20 percent of Czechs, 31 percent of Ukrainians and 62 percent of Vietnamese (and altogether 80 percent of our Vietnamese sample lived in small towns or villages). But few Czechs (one




percent) or Koreans (four percent) lived in remote villages, compared to 15 percent of Ukrainians and 20 percent of Vietnamese.

Within Ukraine, 78 percent of the public declared themselves ethnically Ukrainian – exactly the same figure as in the census.

Half the officials we interviewed in the Czech Republic, Korea and Ukraine were elected deputies at regional or local government level, the rest appointed officials in economic affairs, education, social services, environmental affairs, or general administrators. In Vietnam, just over 20 percent were elected officials, the rest divided equally between these five categories of appointed officials. They were asked exactly the same questions as the public. In every country, our samples of officials were spread right across the country roughly in line with the general population. The fit between the regional distributions of public and officials was particularly close in Vietnam and the Czech Republic, though Ukrainian officials were proportionately more numerous in Kyiv and Korean officials proportionately less numerous in Seoul. In Vietnam, 40 percent of the officials we interviewed lived in villages (18 percent in ‘remote’ villages) and 70 percent in small towns or villages.

To test the models of cause and consequence against the survey data, one basic method of statistical analysis we use is to run a sequence of multiple regressions to show how the variables associated with each of the stages in the ‘analytical framework’ (outlined above, in table 1) are influenced by those at prior stages. But we calculate these regressions separately for the public within each country, as well as for a pooled data-set of the public in all four countries (with ‘dummies’ to account for crude differences between countries or regions), and lastly for a pooled data set that includes both public and officials from all four countries (with ‘dummies’ to account for crude differences between public and officials as well as between countries or regions.) The pooled data set of the public is slightly weighted to have (after weighting) equal numbers from each of the four countries. The pooled data set of the public-and-officials is heavily weighted to have (after weighting) equal numbers of officials and public, as well as equal numbers from each country. That allows differences between countries, or between officials and public to emerge (if they exist) and not be suppressed by variations in sample size. We use a version of regression designed to highlight the key influences rather than clutter up our conclusions with minutiae.

It is particularly important to double-check findings from the pooled data-sets against the findings within individual countries, however. Where there is severe spatial auto-correlation (a coincidence of high values for two variables within a single country), regressions on pooled data-sets may highlight relationships that do not exist within any country, but only between countries and further consideration is necessary. The dummy variables used in the pooled data-sets only take account of different levels of opinion within different countries (or between officials and publics) on the dependent variable but they are not a sufficient substitute for a full within-country analysis. Often however, the pooled-data analysis provides a concise summary of a pattern that does in fact exist within most or all countries.

Because the survey questionnaires were designed to cover the same ground as the preceding focus group discussions we can integrate our analysis of the two. The large scale representative surveys supply us with the best estimate of the numbers with an opinion or the correlation between different variables, while the transcripts of the focus groups often provide us with the deepest insight into the meaning of those answers or correlations.




Because both discussions and interviews cover the same ground, and the more rigid survey questionnaire was designed after a preliminary analysis of the focus-group discussions, what we have is a single integrated methodology, not two separate methodologies.

Finally, following the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine we repeated our Ukraine survey in the spring of 2005 to measure any significant changes – for example in attitudes towards east and west. This time we interviewed another 2136 using a sample-design that ‘boosted’ the number of interviews with Russian-speakers and Russian ethnic-identifiers by over-sampling eastern parts of Ukraine. By weighting, it provides a fully representative sample for 2003-2005 over-time comparisons. But it also provides the most reliable estimates of divergent views between Russian and Ukrainian speakers, identifiers or areas within Ukraine.

Findings1. Public perceptions of the current trends in their countries – their perceptions, hopes and fears with regard to economic prosperity, inequality, pollution, crime, corruption and cultural change; how they assign responsibility for these changes – in particular whether they assign prime responsibility to their fellow citizens, or to their government, or to foreign influences:

Like UNDP analysts the public in our four countries perceive the injustice of sharply increasing inequalities and would prefer less; they feel the beneficiaries of recent changes have been rich countries, foreigners, and local officials or businessmen rather than ordinary people; they perceive the danger of growing crime, the injustice of growing corruption, and the damage caused by growing pollution; and while they claim their national culture is increasingly respected abroad they nonetheless feel their traditional way of life is threatened at home.

But while they attribute economic trends more to government than people, they attribute cultural change, and increasing pollution more to their fellow citizens than to their government. And they attribute growing crime and corruption to both government officials and their fellow citizens. Significantly, they blame none of these trends primarily on foreign influences.

Internationally they feel their country should accept international standards and learn from foreigners. They are divided in their perception of the fairness of big and powerful countries – though slightly negative. They are also divided about international organisations – though rather more negative. Nonetheless they feel their country must participate in these international organisations, though they have reservations about committing their troops to a peace-keeping role abroad. They are also divided also about whether foreign companies help their country or exploit it – though this time they are slightly more positive than negative.

But the public’s satisfaction with changes in their own personal circumstances is much greater than their satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with changes in their country. And overall, despite recognising the many disadvantages of development and suspecting that they are not the principal beneficiaries, the majority feel that development is more good than bad.




Moreover, a majority would even prefer more rapid development rather than development at a more measured pace.

Satisfaction with changing family circumstances, the ‘way things are going for your family today’, is best explained by an egocentric winners-and-losers model focused on recent trends in family income coupled with a distinctive east Asian (or conversely east European) perspective. East Europeans react more strongly to their sense of being a winner or loser. But irrespective of whether they are personally winners or losers, East Europeans are far more gloomy about their family’s circumstances than even their family’s changing economic circumstances might in fact warrant.

Satisfaction with the ‘way things are going for our country today’ is also best explained by cross-national and winners-and-losers models. But by a different cross-national model – focused on Vietnam alone; and by a different winners-and-losers model – focused more on recent trends in the national economy rather than family circumstances. Though both have an independent impact on satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the country’s progress, what matters most is not a personal winners-and-losers model but differences of opinion about whether the national economy is winning or losing.

It is important to note that both satisfaction with family circumstances and with ‘the way things are going in our country’ seem to depend primarily on economic factors rather than perceptions of inequality, injustice, or growing crime, corruption and pollution (though these have a minor role).

Altruistic versions of winners-and-losers models are admirable but ineffective. The public do recognise and lament the social and national injustices, the pollution and corruption associated with development. But although they express these concerns it has little impact on their satisfaction with ‘the way things are going’ for their family or country, or on their support for development. What matters most at any level – family, national, or international – is always being a winner rather than being motivated by a concern for the losers. Their focus may switch from ‘my family’, to ‘my country in itself’, or to ‘my country in relation to other countries’, but whatever the level it is always the egocentric/selfish model rather than the altruistic model that works best. Altruistic models must find their place in studies of the public in more advanced societies.

Support for the principle of rapid development is best explained by a combination of a cross-national (legacy) model and a specific variant of the winners and losers model (focused on expectations of future national economic performance). Support for rapid development runs much higher in the poorer countries; and within countries it runs higher amongst those who are more optimistic about the prospect of a growing national economy.

Social background and perceptions of injustice (domestic or international) have smaller additional impacts. But it is worth recording that within countries, especially within east European countries, those with higher incomes are more favourable to rapid development – which is in sharp contrast to the cross-national pattern: so richer people and poorer countries are united in their tendency to support rapid development.

To an even greater degree, support for increasing the current pace of development is also explained by a cross-national (legacy) model – but by a very different one. Support for increasing the pace of development runs much higher in stagnating east Europe than in east Asia where there has been a recent history of rapid development. So while support for the




principle of rapid development is greatest in poorer countries, the demand for accelerating the pace of development is greater in countries with a recent history of stagnation or decline.

Apart from the impact of national growth or stagnation the only general influence on demands for accelerating the pace of development is education – and even education has only a weak impact. Primarily attitudes towards increasing or reducing the pace of development reflect the pace of development itself. Stagnation increases the demand for greater growth but that demand does not increase without limit: the faster the pace of achieved development the less public support there is for increasing the pace still further. Thus the Vietnamese combine the highest level of public support for rapid development with the greatest opposition to increasing the pace of development still further.

A short-term (decades rather than centuries), and economy-based (not culturally based) legacy model dominates. It would be difficult if not impossible to explain East Asian opposition to faster development in terms of Lee Kuan Yew’s doctrine of ‘Asian values’; but far more plausible to explain it in terms of recent ‘Asian experience’ of development – or conversely (and equivalently) to explain east European demands for accelerating the pace of development in terms of ‘East European experience’ of recent stagnation and decline. The critical legacy here is post-communist stagnation and decline, not centuries of Asian values.

2. Public attitudes towards cultural openness: We distinguish sharply between ‘two cultures’ – ‘consumer-culture’ and ‘identity-culture’ (arguably with the addition of an intermediate ‘values-culture’). The public feel that the most important elements of their national culture are language (identity culture) and family or social behaviour ( a mix of values and identity culture) – but not films, TV, food, clothes etc despite the high visibility of such life-style or consumer-culture and the consequent stress put on it outside commentators.

The public say that the elements of culture which are most threatened by opening up their economies are their national language and their traditional patterns of social behaviour (about both of which they say they care) and their national TV and films (about which they say they do not care so much). In fact, a majority say they like foreign TV or films and that they like foreign brands – again despite frequent criticism by outside commentators. Nonetheless, like outside critics they attribute cultural threats – like territorial threats – more to the USA than to any other country or bloc.

We find evidence of a high, but variable, level of what might be called ‘cultural fright’: public fears that their traditional way of life is getting lost, and that this is an inevitable consequence of opening up the economy to foreign companies and world markets. But in fact the terms ‘fright’ and ‘fears’ are totally misleading. These are merely perceptions, and it would be quite wrong to assume that they indicate distress. Some do not regret the passing of traditional society, others are indifferent, others regard it as a price worth paying for economic development, and some of those that would be distressed by the decline of their traditional culture assert that it is not in fact in decline. So while there is broad public support for cultural protection, it hardly correlates with perceptions that the national culture is less respected in the world, that traditional ways of life are getting lost or that this loss is an inevitable consequence of opening up the economy. Indeed, in Vietnam, it is those who assert that their national culture ‘remains strong’ that are rather more committed than others to cultural protection.




Instead of reflecting cultural perceptions of cultural homogenization, support for cultural protection correlates with pride in national culture, with national culture being important to the individual personally, and with a desire to emphasise national culture and traditions rather than accept becoming ‘more like other countries’. Support for cultural protection is therefore based primarily on positive rather than negative feelings, on personal respect for the national culture rather than on fears that it is in decline.

But since the a majority of the public feel – perhaps wrongly, as many students of national identity such as Smith (1995) would argue – that economic openness automatically entails the erosion of their national culture and identity, the publics’ commitment to their national cultures and their support for cultural protection may affect their attitudes towards economic openness. That is a question we address, amongst others, in the next chapter.

3. Public attitudes towards an internal, domestic market economy and an internationally open economy: The public have complex views about a (domestic) market economy. They themselves would prefer to work for the state or in a family business, not for a private company. Their favoured employment would provide security if not high wages and, in the case of family businesses, it also provides greater scope for personal development. For the public, the attraction of themselves working for foreign firms is high wages and not much else. More generally however, a majority feel that the market economy is unfair but nonetheless that it increases national prosperity.

A (national) winners-and-losers model best explains why people feel the market economy makes their country more prosperous: those who think their national economy has prospered over the last decade and/or that it will prosper over the next decade are the most likely to conclude that the market economy produces prosperity – and conversely, those who think their national economy has done badly, or will do badly in the next few years, conclude that the market economy does not produce prosperity. The public extrapolate from perceptions of national economic success or failure to economic principle, even though a significant number of people in the worst-performing economies deny that they have a ‘real market economy’.

Commitments to rapid economic development and perceptions of (international) injustice have only a smaller impact on perceptions that a market economy generates prosperity. However it is these factors – and not a winners-and-losers model – that provide the best explanation of why some regard the market economy as fair and others do not.

The public have similarly complex views about an (internationally) open economy. The principal advantage of an open economy that they most frequently cite is that it is ‘good for shopping’; and the principal disadvantage that they most frequently cite is that it is ‘bad for culture’. For the public, unlike economists, the impact of the open economy on work, business, and trade is neither the most frequently cited advantage or nor the most frequently cited disadvantage – though when questioned explicitly, a majority do say it is good for jobs and working conditions. At the same time, opinion is divided about its impact on old age provision, and negative about its impact on inequality or the spread of disease. Yet overall, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages, public evaluations of the open economy are strongly positive.

An (international) justice model and a (national) winners-and-losers model rival each other as explanations of support for an open economy but the justice model predominates and it is




reinforced by some simple xenophobia – dislike of foreigners in general and international businessmen in particular makes an open economy unpalatable. The bases of support for an internal market economy and an external open economy are therefore rather different.

While cultural commitment (though not cultural fright) proved to be a major influence on support for cultural protection it has relatively little influence on support for the principle of an open economy.

Attitudes towards protecting specific industries do not correlate strongly with attitudes towards the principle of an open economy either. Despite commitment to an open economy, there is widespread support for agricultural protection and for ‘small businesses’ though less public support for giving even temporary protection to obsolete businesses or the media. The most predictable is support for media protection, and that is better explained by cultural attitudes rather than by general commitment to an open economy but even here the impact of cultural attitudes on industrial protect is still relatively weak.

4. Public attitudes towards the articulation of discontent – towards different methods of resisting the downsides of economic openness and development – low wages, unsafe working conditions, pollution, or unfair international regulations:

Even though a majority are more contented than discontented with an open economy in principle, most hold attitudes that mix contentment with discontent in practice. So there is widespread support for resistance to the downsides of globalisation – even while supporting globalisation itself. The real issue is about modalities of resistance.

We focus not on participation but on justification however – not on the few who engage in acts of resistance but on the many who support and legitimise (or oppose and de-legitimise) such acts of resistance.

There is almost universal support for protest of some kind against international companies that cause serious local problems, or against international organisations (such as the WTO, IMF or World Bank) whose policies damage poorer countries. For most of the public, such circumstances justify protest. Indeed focus group participants in Ukraine and Vietnam criticized the lack of anti-globalization protest in their countries. For them protest was ‘normal’ in a developed democracy and lack of actual protest in their country was for them a mark of democratic immaturity. (Ukrainians may now feel that the subsequent protests at the end of 2004 were a mark of their increasing democratic maturity.) The issue for most people is therefore not protest itself, but the method of protest.

Disorderly, disruptive and violent methods of protest are rejected by a majority. Even in principle, more of the public oppose disorderly protest than support it in every country except Ukraine. And half of those who do support disorderly protest in principle feel it should only be used as a last resort after peaceful protest has failed. When asked about specific methods of protest, public support for anything other than peaceful protest is very low. Two-thirds would support a peaceful demonstration but only one-sixth would support a workers’ ‘go-slow’ and only one in nine ever explicitly support sabotage despite being asked about it four times (though more than one in five fail to consistently condemn it).




Support for more robust anti-globalization protests reflects something more than commitment to the classic liberal democratic concept of a general right to protest however. It clearly varies with attitudes towards globalization: those who feel that opening up their economy has benefited other countries more than their own, or has more disadvantages than advantages, those who feel it is better to preserve their country’s independence than to join international organizations, and those who feel that foreigners are generally bad for their country are all more willing to back robust methods of protest.

Beyond the general tendencies, visible in all our countries, the national setting remains important. Even when attitudes towards globalization have been taken into account the Ukrainian public remain notably unwilling to condemn disruptive protest. And while the Vietnamese support the principle of anti-globalization protests as much as people from other countries, they are very much less willing than others to back specific forms of protest in practice.

5. Public perceptions of the state and the role that the state can and should play in the life of the nation:

Support for the government and its policies is best explained by (i) a cross-national (legacy) model, (ii) a winners-and-losers model focused more on recent national economic performance than on future expectations or personal circumstances, and more surprisingly perhaps, (iii) a nationalist culture model. Support for government policies runs much higher in Asia; it runs higher amongst those who feel the national economy has been improving; and it runs higher amongst those who feel their national culture is increasingly respected. Cultural and economic performance are about equally important factors in affecting government support in Korea and Ukraine, while perceptions of economic performance matters more than cultural perceptions in the Czech Republic, and perceptions of cultural performance matter more than economic performance in explaining variations in support for the government of Vietnam.

An international justice model also exerts some additional influence on government support: those who feel that international organisations treat their country (and others like it) unfairly are more likely to oppose their own government’s policies. National governments are mediators between the public and international organisations and it is perhaps natural that both public and international organisations will feel that national governments, as mediators, have divided loyalties. Attitudes towards the (internal) market economy have a more variable impact. Support for the government is eroded in Ukraine by the feeling that the market economy does not deliver prosperity, while in Korea and Vietnam it is eroded by perceptions that the domestic market economy is unfair.

Governments and policies come and go; the state remains. But with an internal market economy and an externally open economy in a globalized world, what role is left for the state? In particular, what roles – old or new – do the public expect the state to play?

Our findings point to public expectations of a ‘mentor state’, guiding rather than commanding, but able to play the roles of entrepreneur, physician, and advocate within a global context. As national entrepreneur, a large majority hold the state responsible for the pace of economic development. Though they accept the need to open up to world markets, a large majority also expect the state to act as physician – remedying the ills of globalization by




intervening in the economy, by providing help for losers, and by protecting (though not primarily by tariffs) farmers, small businesses, even obsolete businesses, as well as – for cultural reasons – their national media and ‘way of life’. And an overwhelming majority expect the state to act as advocate of the national interest within international organisations and within the global arena more generally.

Significantly, in Vietnam where only a small minority admit that their country’s policies are largely determined by outside forces, or accept the idea of allowing their citizens to appeal against the state to a supra-national court, or accept even the slightest sense of a supra-national regional identity, there is more overwhelming support than anywhere else for the state to join international and regional organisations. For the public therefore, the global arena is an arena for states. And that global arena – at least for the public in our Asian countries – makes the state more necessary than ever before. In Europe there is an element of genuine supra-nationalism but in our east Asian countries, and arguably more widely throughout east Asia, there is a great appetite for state-based internationalism coupled with very little appetite for people-based supra-nationalism.

Although public expectations point universally to a strong role for the state as entrepreneur, physician and advocate, public perceptions of state performance are more variable and far less positive. The public hold the state primarily responsible for adverse economic trends in the Czech Republic, Korea and Ukraine – as well as for positive economic trends in Vietnam. Conversely, public perceptions of state autonomy are greater in east Asia.

Similarly, although the public clearly want the state, as physician and advocate, to protect them against the downsides of globalization, an overwhelming majority in the Czech Republic and Ukraine, and a large majority in Korea feel that their country’s policy is determined more by world markets and international organisations than by the country’s people. But public perceptions of state autonomy are greater in east Asia where larger numbers do not feel their country’s policies are at the mercy of outside forces – one third in Korea and two-thirds in Vietnam.

Worst of all however, the public, especially in east Europe, fear that the state has a fourth, unwanted and darker role, as a conspiracy against the public. The majority feel the benefits of opening the economy have gone to those who ‘already had more power’. Even when we widen the question by explicitly suggesting that the benefits might have gone to ‘foreigners’ or to ‘business people’, the public put ‘government officials’ at the top of their list of perceived beneficiaries and ‘ordinary people’ at the bottom. Vietnam is the only country where more than a few cite ‘ordinary people’ as the chief beneficiaries of the development brought about by opening the economy.

These perceptions of the state as a conspiracy against the public erode satisfaction with ‘the way things are going in our country’, erode judgements that the market economy is ‘fair’, and even erode support for ‘rapid economic development’. Most significant for governance, perceptions of the state as a conspiracy erode public support for ‘the government and its policies’ and increase support for methods of protest that by-pass the state – including direct action through ‘disorderly or violent’ protests, and the use of disorderly or violent protest as a first resort rather than a last resort. In short, perceptions of the state as a conspiracy measurably erode its legitimacy.




The public tend to agree with those who argue that the state in a global world is neither irrelevant nor entirely ineffective; and that it is getting stronger (in terms of meeting public demands) in east Asia while getting weaker and less relevant in eastern Europe.

There is an important distinction between public perceptions of the Czech and Ukrainian states as weak, however. Partly as a consequence of EU accession, together with their small numbers, the Czech public have an exceptionally weak perception of their state’s autonomy. By contrast, the Ukrainian public’s perception of a weak state owes more to perceptions of domestic incompetence or worse and they are in consequence far more dissatisfied. Moreover, although our survey interviews suggest both publics are prone to view their states as a conspiracy against the public, our focus group discussions reveal far more detail and bitterness about this in Ukraine than in the Czech Republic. In short the weakness of the Czech state is attributed more to external forces while the weakness of the Ukrainian state is attributed more to internal failings.

Strong states are not seen by the public as incompatible with globalization. Paradoxically, enthusiasm for joining regional and global organisations is greater in our east Asian countries than in our east European countries. Such as it is, east European supra-nationalism is based in part on public perceptions of weak, ineffective or self-serving states and the need for a stronger advocate in the global arena, while east Asian inter-nationalism is based on public perceptions of strong states with the ability to play an effective role in the global arena. The public in our east Asian countries, more than in our east European countries, look to secure global justice through the state rather than through the withering of the state.

6. Officialdom – vanguard or conspiracy? Viewed across the whole range of perceptions and attitudes towards development, cultural openness and economic openness how representative are officials of their publics? How great are the differences? What is the nature of these differences? And is the gap between public and officials greater in some countries than in others? The 2100 relatively junior officials we interviewed do not set state policy, but they are important because they reflect the perceptions, attitudes and opinions of the ‘apparatus’, the governing machine, those who implement policy at street level even if not those who make the speeches.

None of our four countries is a long-established democracy. And officials differ sharply from their publics in terms of socio-economic background – on education, foreign contacts, income, being an economic winner over the last few years and an economic optimist about the next few years for example. But despite that, the overall evidence suggests that officials are not completely out of touch with public opinion. They are generally more favourable to development, to an internal market economy, and to an externally open economy than their publics, but at the same time more committed to their national culture. Yet when the public in a country have distinctive opinions, so do the officials from that country: they mirror the perceptions and attitudes of their publics, but with a pro-globalization bias. They constitute a vanguard, more pro-global in everything except national culture – which, of course, they may see as a marketable tourist asset in a globalized world.

What is more surprising is the cross-national variation in their representativeness: Vietnamese officials are closest to their public (or, equivalently, the Vietnamese public are closest to their officials in attitudes towards development, markets and open economies).




Korean officials are not much further away from their publics. It is officials in east Europe who are least representative of their publics – especially in Ukraine but also in the Czech Republic. Officials differ sharply from their publics on over half the questions in our Ukrainian survey and over a third in our Czech survey but on few in our Vietnam survey.

And there is a recurrent pattern of Czech and Ukrainian officials taking a sharply unrepresentative position on a question while neither Korean nor Vietnamese officials do so. It is a pattern that applies not just to general support for an internal market economy and an internationally open economy, but also to a failure to recognise the injustices and unfairness of the market economy, a lack of sympathy and an unwillingness to back state help for the casualties of opening up the economy, opposition to popular protests against companies that treat workers badly or damage the environment, a specially favourable view of foreign companies, international businessmen, powerful foreign countries and international organisations, plus an unusual willingness to commit national troops to international organisations – even, at a personal level, an unusual willingness to embrace supra-national identities.

So although officials overall are not greatly out of touch with their publics, our east Asian officials are fairly close to their publics, while it is our east European officials who are dangerously out of touch. Taking into account the strength of allegations that the chief beneficiaries of the open economy have been officials, power-holders or those ‘with contacts’, as well as the extent to which officials are unrepresentative of their publics, the ‘vanguard model’ fits Vietnam well while the ‘conspiracy model’ fits Ukraine well. Korea and the Czech Republic are intermediate cases, but Korea is closer to fitting the ‘vanguard mode’ and the Czech Republic is closer to the ‘conspiracy model’ – though with some indications that the conspiracy in the Czech Republic is somewhat more confined to high-level officials and is rather less pervasive at all levels than in Ukraine. With those minor qualifications, the ‘vanguard model’ fits east Asia and the ‘conspiracy model’ fits east Europe.

ConclusionsThe extent of public discontent is limited. With respect to attitudes towards development, the internal market-economy, or the internationally open-economy the public are ‘critical supporters’, even ‘highly-critical supporters’, but supporters nonetheless. Despite recognising all the downsides of development (though in Ukraine they have had the downsides without development) and feeling that greater benefits have gone to others, the majority remain in favour of rapid development. And greater or lesser recognition of the downsides of development does not much affect support for development. Similarly, despite feeling that a market economy is unfair a majority think it increases national prosperity. And despite recognising the disadvantages and injustices opening up the economy to global trade and business, a large majority think the open economy has more advantages than disadvantages.

Our multivariate modelling shows that winners-and-losers models perform particularly well as explanations of public satisfaction with development and the market-economy, though it is very much bespoke rather than off-the-peg versions that matter. No single version of the winners-and-losers model fits all. In particular the personal or family version of a winners-and-losers model applies only to personal or family satisfaction.




Satisfaction with the way things are going for the family does depend primarily on a family version of the egocentric winners-and-losers model. But satisfaction with the way things are going for the country, support for rapid development, and perceptions of the market-economy as an engine of prosperity are all best explained by a national version of the egocentric winners-and-losers model, not a more personal version. A national version of the egocentric winners-and-losers model is also one important explanation of support for an open-economy – though not quite the most important. And support for protests against foreign companies depends on an international version of the egocentric winners-and-losers model. Altuistic versions are never important however: concern for the casualties of development and markets, though often expressed, never has much impact.

Winners-and-losers models perform much less well as explanations of cultural and economic openness than as explanations of attitudes to development however. A national version of the winners-and losers model is clearly the best explanation of perceptions that the market economy is an engine of growth. But it is not quite the most powerful explanation of attitudes towards an open-economy. And it is not at all an important explanation of cultural openness – nor of perceptions that the market-economy is fair.

Attitudes towards cultural protection do not depend upon any kind of winners-and-losers model, not even on cultural fright. Instead they are based on positive respect for national culture. Indeed in Vietnam it is the optimists about national culture who are actually the most inclined to back cultural protection. Conversely, attitudes towards culture do not have much impact on attitudes towards markets or the open economy.

The international justice model also has considerable explanatory power; in particular it is important for explaining attitudes towards both the market-economy and the open-economy. Public perceptions of international injustice have an important impact on public attitudes towards whether the market-economy is fair (though not whether it is an engine of prosperity). And the international justice model is more important than even winners-and-losers models for explaining public attitudes towards an open-economy – though both models are important. Yet the power of the international justice model is not evidence of altruism so much as evidence of public reactions to feelings of unfair and unjust treatment of their country by more powerful countries or international organisations. Justice, like winners-and-losers, can be egocentric. So even though the justice model echoes the arguments of western critics of globalization it lacks the altruistic character of much western criticism.

Support for the government and its policies is best explained by a combination of cultural attitudes and a national winners-and-losers model. Overall both are equally important, and while the economic model is rather more important in some countries, a cultural model based on respect for the national culture is more important in others. Governments can therefore win favour by protecting and reinforcing the national culture, irrespective of their economic policies. The cultural dimension is a potential resource for globalizing governments, rather than a problem.

There is overwhelming public support for some form of protest against international firms that ill-treat workers or pollute the enivironment. But public discontent with an open economy combines with an international version of the winners-and-losers model to explain support for the use of more robust methods of protest.




Regional or country legacy models also have an important independent impact on public satisfaction with development: satisfaction with the way things are going for the family is exceptionally high in east Asia (or exceptionally low in east Europe); public support for rapid development is exceptionally low in more prosperous countries; and public support for increasing the pace of development is exceptionally high in stagnating or declining east Europe (or exceptionally low in faster developing east Asia). That is simply inconsistent with a long-term Asian values model as proposed by Lee (the ‘sign’ is wrong), but it is consistent with an east European short-term legacy of stagnation, decline and gloom. Although statistically there is no difference between highlighting public opinion in east Europe rather than east Asia as the exception, it is easier to focus on the dismal economic record in east Europe than to not merely deny, but actually invert, Lee’s Asian values model.

We have uncovered another clear difference between the east European countries and the east Asian however: a close agreement between the attitudes of public and officials in east Asia, but a much wider difference in east Europe and especially in Ukraine. Together with our other findings that suggests the vanguard model fits best in east Asia, and the conspiracy model in east Europe, as explanations of the gap between the attitudes of public and officials.

We have found almost universal support for protest of some kind against international companies or organisations when they cause serious local problems. For most of the public, such circumstances justify protest. Lack of protest is regarded as a mark of democratic immaturity. But disorderly, disruptive or violent methods of protest are rejected by a majority. Yet a significant minority, rising to a majority within Ukraine, do support more robust anti-globalization. And that support varies with attitudes towards globalization itself. It is best explained by the international justice model reinforced with a dose of nationalism and even simple xenophobia. Those who feel that opening up their economy has benefited other countries more than their own, and especially those that feel foreign companies exploit their country, or that foreigners are generally bad for their country are all more willing to back relatively robust methods of protest – ‘whatever is necessary and effective’ in protest against the misbehaviour of multinationals. Once again legacy or country effects are important: Ukrainians are uniquely favourable to robust protest (though often too fearful to engage in even mild protests). And while the Vietnamese support robust protest in principle they are very reluctant to back specific forms or examples of robust protest. And there is some evidence of another general Asian/European divide here.

Everywhere we find evidence that the public want a strong and effective state that will encourage though not command or itself undertake, development; that will minimise and offset the downsides of development, markets and an open economy; and that will be a powerful advocate of the national interest in the international arena. Globalization has changed the role of the state but made it no less important in the minds of the public. Unfortunately, especially in east Europe, the public judged the state has failed to meet these demands. For Czechs, that is because Europe has been developing a range of supra-national institutions and the Czech Republic is too small and weak to stay out; for Ukrainians the problems of the state are home-grown. But in east Asia, the public look towards greater internationalism, not supra-nationalism, and they have much more confidence in the competence of their state. If there is a crisis of discontent with markets and the open-economy it is in Europe not Asia.




Overall, a clutch of egocentric winners-and-losers models (not, primarily based on personal gains and loses however), an egocentric international justice model, a positive rather than negative cultural model, a short-term economic legacy model and the conspiracy model explain most of what can be explained about the causes and consequences of attitudes towards the market-economy, the open-economy, and the role and performance of the state in an era of globalization.

But explaining variations in public attitudes, or relationships between them is not everything. We are also struck by the evidence of coherent dissonance: the way the public (and individuals within the public) combine harsh criticism of development, markets, and an open economy with simultaneous support; the way they combine economic openness with the assertion of national identity and culture; the way they combine near universal support for protest against the injustices of globalization with the way they insist on non-destructive protest; and the way they combine support for participating in globalization with a strong emphasis on the role of the state. In each case, these are not alternatives, still less contradictions, but things that have to be addressed simultaneously or taken forward together, not traded-off against each other.

Thus it seems unlikely that globalization will be derailed by itself triggering instability in developing countries – especially if governments provide safety nets to protect losers from the downsides and encourage respect for national culture. The public in developing or transitional countries, such as those in our study, want globalization despite their discontent with its downsides. The anti-globalization protesters in the West have no option but to re-focus on international justice if they do not wish to be rejected as much by the developing world as the developed. And steps by the G8 towards providing greater international justice, should be taken for positive rather than negative reasons, more as a means to reinforce and consolidate support for globalization in developing countries than to ward off the imminent danger of an anti-globalization reaction in these countries. If there is another round of truly anti-globalization protest it is more likely to be in the West than in the developing countries, and more likely to be overtly egocentric than altruistic.

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