Draft:11-15-20

GaslightingCitizensEricBeerbohmandRyanDavis

Gaslighting,asaninterpersonalwrong,bringsitsvictimstodoubtthesourcesoftheirevidence.Thispaperholdsthatpoliticalgaslighting,byleadingcitizenstoholdbeliefsdisconnectedfromtheavailableevidence,posesadistinctivethreattodemocraticpolitics.Butholding“audaciousbeliefs”—beliefsthatareaheadoftheevidence—canserveasacoreingredientfordemocraticmovements.Thiscreatesadilemmaforcitizens,whomustchoosebetweentwokindsofevidentialpolicies.Howcantheyprotectthemselvesfromthegaslightingwithoutrenderingthemselvesinsusceptibletothemobilizingeffortscentraltodemocraticpolitics?Citizens,then,faceastandingchallenge:toremainopentothebullypulpitwhilevigilantagainstthegaslighter’sepistemicbullying.

Membersofpoliticalmovementsfacedauntingodds.Evenminorchangestopolicyarehard

won.Mostattemptsfail.Ifthemovementsucceeds,it’shardtoconnectthesuccessofthegroupto

anyindividualmember’scontribution.Ifyouwanttochangetheworld,theobjectivechancethat

you’llprevailisprobablybleak.Soit’sunsurprisingthatcitizenscollectivelyengagedineffortsto

putadentintheworldhavetoadoptandmaintainbeliefsthat–insomeways–extendbeyondthe

evidenceavailabletothem.We’lldescribethesebeliefsasaudacious.Theempiricalliterature

suggeststhattheyplayanimportantroleinsuccessfuldemocraticefforts.Butthisdistance

betweenbeliefsandevidenceisalsosymptomaticofvictimsofgaslighting,whoseperceptionsand

attitudesareatoddswithreality.Thechargeofgaslighting—bringingpeopletodoubttheirown

attitudesorcapacities—hasquicklygainedpopularityasanexplicitlypoliticalcharge(Hoberman

2019).

Thisessayexploresgaslightingasapoliticalphenomenon.Wearguethatgaslighting

operatesasahigher-orderattack,threateningitsvictims’identities.Thissetsitapartfromordinary

deceptioninpolitics,andexplainsthedistinctivethreatthatitposestodemocraticcitizenship.Our

argumentproceedsinsixparts.First,wewillsketchtheconceptasithasbeendevelopedinthe

philosophicalliterature.Thesecondsectionappliestheconcepttocasesofmanipulationby

politicalelites.It’stemptingtothinkthattheproblemsassociatedwithgaslightingmightbe

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alleviatedeitherbyapolicyofbelievingonlyontheevidence,orelsebyavoidingrelationsof

epistemicdependenceonothers.Buteffectivepoliticalagencycandependonsharedbeliefs—

aboutourselves,ouropponentsandourinstitutions—thatgobeyondtheevidence.Weexplainthe

rolethataudaciousbeliefsplayinperseveringinourindividualandcollectiveprojects.Thefinal

sectionsrespondtoadilemmaforcitizenshipasanidealthatgovernsourevidentialpolicies.How

cancitizensprotectthemselvesfromthegaslighterwithoutrenderingthemselvesinsusceptibleto

themobilizingeffortscentraltodemocraticpolitics?

1.Gaslighting:ThePersonalIntheplayandsubsequentmovie,Gaslight,GregoryintentionallyattemptstocausePaulato

doubthersensoryinputs.Inthetitularactofmanipulation,Gregorychangesthebrightnessofthe

gaslightsintheirhomebutinsistentlydeniesthatthereisanydifferencewhenPaularepeatedly

noticesthatthelightshavedimmed.ThismomentservesasaparadigmforKateAbramson’s

account.Forher,gaslighting“induce[s]insomeonethesensethatherreactions,perceptions,

memoriesand/orbeliefsarenotjustmistaken,bututterlywithoutgrounds”(Abramson2014,2).

Thegaslighter’sfinalgoalisnottoleadthevictimtodoubttheirownperceptionsandbeliefs,butto

protectthegaslighter’sownconceptionoftheworldbyeliminatingeventhepossibilityofchallenge

ordisagreement(2014,9-10).What’scrucialaboutthisrelationshipisthatthevictimcomesto

endorsethegaslighter’sownbeliefs(Abramson2014;Spear2018,230).Tosecurethiskindof

epistemiccapture,gaslightinginvolvesadiachronicprocessinwhichtheperpetratorseeksto

undermineandultimatelydestroythe“independent,separate,deliberativeperspectivefromwhich

thedisagreementarises”(Abramson2014,10).Onlywhenthevictim’sownperspectivehasbeen

thoroughlyunderminedcanthegaslighterbeconfidentthattheirworldviewhasbeensecured

againstthepossibilityofchallenge.

Thelossofthegaslitagent’spointofviewhaspracticalaswellasepistemicconsequences.

Thegaslighteraimstodisplacethevictim’sself-trustwithtrustin—oratleast,relianceon—their

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beliefs,sointhefirstinstancetheyseekcontroloverthevictim’sbelief-formingprocesses(Cf.

Spear2018,2321).Insodoing,theyunderminethevictim’sabilitytomakeassertionsaboutthe

world,ortheirownexperiences,apartfromthegaslighter’ssignalsaboutwhatmaybesaidor

believed.Asepistemologistshaverecentlypointedout,thepracticeofassertioncarriesintowa

claimtoakindofauthority(Wanderer2012;Goldberg2015).Inassertingapropositionastrue,an

agentimplicitlyclaimstobeinpositiontoprovidereasonsinsupportoftheassertion,ortobeheld

accountablebyotheragentswhoacceptandactonit(Tanesini2016).Toplaytheserolesisto

claimauthoritywithinacommunityofspeakers(Goldberg2015,187-188).Thisauthorityis

ethicallysignificant,sinceholdingandbeingheldaccountableinturnaremorallyserious.Sothe

statusasanasserterpartlyconstitutestheagent’smoralstatus.Bycompromisinganagent’s

epistemicauthority,gaslightingreducesonetotheroleofobjectratherthansubjectinthepractice

ofsharingknowledge(cf.Fricker2007,pp.132-133).Inthisway,gaslightingalsothreatensthe

agent’smoralstatus(Abramson2014,16).

Wecandrawtogetherthesharedpropertiesfromthisconceptualwork.Atitscoreisthe

ideathatitsvictims’rationalfacultieshavebeencapturedinadistinctiveway:

Gaslighting:Agent[A]wronglyinducesanotheragent[B]todoubtB’sabilitytorespondrationallytoevidence,inordertomakeBepistemicallyreliantonA.

Thisaccountmarksoutanendandthecharacteristicmeans.Gaslighterscreatearelationshipof

objectionabledependencebyplayingwiththeirvictim’sgripontheevidencebeforethem.A

frequentattackvectoristhevictim’shigher-orderevidence(Feldman2005;Kelly2010).Our

evidenceaboutourevidencetendstohavespecialvulnerabilities.Gaslightingcanworkbysupplying

higher-orderdefeaters,exposingthevictim’sbeliefsastheupshotofafaultyprocessandleading

victimstoconcludethattheirattitudeswereneverjustifiedinthefirstplace.

Thisexplainshowgaslightingtargetsthevictim’sownpointofview(Abramson2014;Spear

2018;Stark2019,224).Whetheryouenjoyauthoritywithinapracticeofassertiondependson

yourjudgementsaboutyourowncapacities.Althoughyoumightdoubtyourbeliefs,youwillnotbe

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driventoquestionyourauthoritativestandpointaslongasyourconfidenceinyourbeliefforming

capacitiesremainsintact.Ifthewrongnessofgaslightingisgroundedincompromisingthis

standing,thenitmakessensetounderstanditasundermininganagent’sconfidenceinthese

capacities(Cf.SliwaandHorowitz2015).

Everydaydeceptionandmanipulation,whensuccessful,undermineourfirst-order

evidence.Gaslighting,incontrast,functionsasahigher-orderattack,threateningitsvictim’s

particularidentity.Inordinarycases,“theimportofaparticularbitofevidencemaydependonthe

thinker’sbackgroundbeliefs,butitdoesnotdependonwhothethinkeris”(Christensen2010,

190).However,ifyoulearnthatyourparticularbelief-formingprocesswasdefective,thenyouhave

areasontotreattheevidencedifferentlythanyouotherwisewouldinvirtueoffactsaboutyou,

ratherthanfactsaboutthefirst-orderevidencealone.Thegaslighter“claimsthatthetarget’s

judgmentslackcredibility”asaresultof“adefectinher”(Stark2019,224).

Contrastthiswithordinarychallengestoourfirst-orderevidence.Supposeyoubecome

convincedthatyourbeliefsinsomedomainaresystematicallyincorrect,duetosomeclearly

identifiableerror.Perhapsyouhaveaclusteroffalsebeliefsaboutthecityyou’revisitingbecause

you’vebeenreadingthemapupsidedown,oryouhaveaseriesoffalsemoralbeliefsbecauseyou

havebeenpersuadedofanextensionallyincorrecttheory.Incaseslikethese,discoveringthatone’s

beliefsaresystematicallymistaken—orevenutterlywithoutgrounds—wouldn’tinduceany

skepticismaboutyourauthoritativestandingwithinacommunityofmoralagents.Yourfalse

beliefsmightonlysaysomethingaboutthetoolsyouwereusingortheevidenceyouhad.They

don’tsayanythingaboutyou.Youmaytakecomfortinthethoughtthatthiserrorcouldhave

happenedtoanyone.

Thewrongofgaslightingisalwaysrelativetoaparticularagentorgroup.Putdifferently,

whetheragaslightingspeechactwouldchallengemyepistemicagencydependsonindexicalfacts

—whoIamaffectshowtheutteranceaffectsme.Partofwhatmakesgaslightinginsidiousisthatit

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exploitsthevulnerabilityofsomeagentswhileleavingothers(characteristicallyoutsidethetarget

group)perplexedabouthowanythingseriouslywrongcouldhavebeenperpetratedatall.

Thesignificanceoftheidentityofmembersofthetargetgroupfindssupportinsociological

workongaslighting.Sweet(2019)explainsthat“gaslightingiseffectivewhenitisrootedinsocial

inequalities,especiallygenderandsexuality,andexecutedinpower-ladenintimaterelationships”

(852).Intersectinginequalitiesmayamplifytheseeffects,suggestingthat“womenofcolor,poor

women,immigrantwomen”andothersmaybeespeciallyvulnerabletogaslighting(Sweet2019,

856).Whilenotstrictlynecessaryfortheconcepttoapply,wewillsuggestinthenextsectionsthat

thissociologicalfindingcanhelpinformunderstandingofgaslightinginpoliticalcontextsaswell.

2.PoliticalGaslighting

Ifdeepenough,politicaldisagreementcansignalnotonlythatouropponentsareincorrect,

butthattheyarefailingtorespondtotheevidenceinaremedialway.Sobeginsamuchsharper

allegation:thatouropponentisnotjustmistaken,but“crazy.”Inapartisanworld,therhetorical

forceofthisaccusationiseasilyweaponized.Ifouropponentslackbasicepistemiccapacities,wedo

themnowrongbyignoringthem,andencouragingotherstoignorethemaswell.Apolarized

politicscanseemlikeatargetrichenvironmentalforprospectivegaslighters.

Butourparadigmcaseshavetakenplaceinintimatesettings,involvingclosepersonal

relationships,oratleasttheirperversefacsimiles.Itisnotobviousthatalloftheseingredients

couldbeinplaceinpolitics.Andyet,politicsisnowthebellwetheroftheconcept’sprominencein

populardiscourse.Doesthechargeofgaslightingtravelfromthepersonaltothepolitical?Consider

threeexamples:

(a) DuringtheRepublicanPrimaryprocess,Trumprepeatedlyinsinuated(andthendenied

hewassuggesting)thatGeorgeW.Bushwasresponsibleinsomewayfor9/11,and

floatedconspiracistnarrativesconjecturingthatthepublicdidnotunderstandthe

attacks(cf.Glueck2016;Bort2019).

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(b) Afterhisinauguration,Trumpandhissurrogatesfamouslymaintainedthatthe

inauguralcrowds“wentallthewaybacktotheWashingtonmonument”and“wasthe

largestaudiencetoeverwitnessaninauguration,”publiclydisputingmediaandDC

Metroaccountsandphotographsdisconfirmingtheseclaims.(RobertsonandFarley

2017).

(c) InJuly,2019,Trumptweetedthatfourprogressivecongresswomenshould‘goback’to

wheretheycamefrom,falselyimplyingthattheywerenotUScitizens.Hethenclaimed,

contrarytovideoevidence,thathedidnotoriginatethephrase,andthathetriedto

preventacrowdatarallyfromchantingit.(Rupar2019;Crowley2019).

Theseepisodeshavebeenthebasisforaccusationsofgaslightinginpopularmedia(Rupar2019;

Carpenter2018).We’llnowconsiderhowouraccountcanexplainthepoliticalwrongsatstakein

thesecases.

First,eachofthesecasesinvolvesdenyingfactswhichwereeithereasilyconfirmedthrough

secondarysources,orelsecouldbeperceiveddirectlybyonlookers.Inorderfortheclaimstobe

believed,citizenswouldhavetodiscountthedeliverancesoftheirowncapacitiesforobservation

andevidencegathering,orelserefusetoexercisethosecapacitiesentirely.Second,Trumpandhis

surrogatesinsistedthatopposingevidencecouldnotbetrusted,includingevidencefrom

supporters’ownobservations.“Justremember,whatyou’reseeingandwhatyou’rereadingisnot

what’shappening,”Trumpadvisedonerallycrowd(Rupar2019).Third,theclaimscouldbe

interpretedaspartofacampaigntoruleoutcounterargumentandmakemembersofthetarget

audienceepistemicallyreliantonthespeaker(cf.Hahl,Kim,andSivan2018).Fourth,theclaims

invokedpowerasymmetries,includingthosecreatedbyintersectionalinequality,inordertorule

outcertaindeliberativeviewpoints.Inthecaseofthe“sendthemback”tweet,thetargetgroupwas

comprisedofminoritywomen,includingoneimmigrant–echoingtheidentitycategories

prominentinfirst-personalcasesofgaslighting(Sweet2019,856).

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Thereisevidencethatthesetacticsdohelpfacilitatethegaslighter’scentralobjective:

insulatingthespeaker’sassertionsagainstthepossibilityofchallengebyoccludingeventhe

possibilityofdisagreement.Remarkably,whenshownpicturesrevealingthecrowdtobevisibly

smalleratthe2017inaugurationthanin2009,15percentofTrumpvotersdeniedtheapparently

obviousevidenceandincorrectlyidentifiedthesmallercrowdaslarger.Politically-engaged

supportersweremorethantwiceaslikelytochooseincorrectlyastheirunengagedcounterparts

(SchaffnerandLuks2018).Theseresultscoherewithbroaderfindingsinpoliticalpsychologythat

partisanidentitystronglyinfluencesattitudes,andthatpartisanswillsimplyfollowelitesignals

whenreportingtheirpoliticalviews–includingaboutseeminglyfactualmatters(Bartels2002;

Flynn,Nyhan,andReifler2017;BisgaardandSlothuus2018).Partisanloyaltiesmakepoliticsan

especiallycongenialdomainforthegaslighter’stactics.

Wethinkthattherearen’ttwoconceptshere,butacommonone.Toextendtheconcept

fromthepersonaltothepoliticaldomain,weproposethisanalogue:

PoliticalGaslighting:Apoliticalactorwronglyinducesagroupofcitizenstolimittheexerciseoftheirbelief-formingandrevisingcapacitiesinwaysthatservethepoliticalendsofthegaslighter,inordertobringaboutthatthegroupbecomesepistemicallyreliantonthegaslighter.

Theexploitliesinthegapbetweenthevictim’sbeliefsandtheiravailableevidenceaboutthe

politicalworld.Whensuccessful,gaslightingchangeshowtheyholdandhandlethosebeliefs.On

thisaccount,victimsneedn’tcometodoubttheirownepistemiccapacities.Farfromquestioning

theircapacities,theaudiencesofthetacticsdescribedin(a)-(c)reproducedthespeaker’sattitudes

withahighlevelofconfidence.Themanipulatorexpresslywentoutofhiswaytopraisethe

audience’scapacities.Thiscanseematoddswiththeearlieraimofunderminingconfidence.Inthe

casethatlaunchedtheconcept,thevictimlosesconfidenceinherbeliefs.Bystarkcontrast,strong

partisanstendtobeespeciallyconfidentintheirownexperiencesandperspective.Indeed,it’sthis

veryconfidencethatinspiresthemtoturnoutinhighernumbersatthepolls(Ortolevaand

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Snowberg2015).Perhapsparadoxically,thosepartisanswhoaremostsusceptibletomanipulation

alsodisplaythemostconfidenceintheirpoliticalbeliefs(Anson2018).

Ouraccountallowsforthisvariationbyfixingoneffortstolimitcitizens’exerciseoftheir

rationalcapacities.Intheinterpersonalcase,thegaslightersoughtakindofcontrol,makingthe

targetdependentonthem.Politicalcasesmakeclearthatthiscaninvolvebothunderminingand

inflatingatarget’sself-confidence.Bothtacticsmayappear–thoughperhapslessconspicuously–

ininterpersonalcasesaswell.It’snotuncommonforvictimsofinterpersonalgaslightingto

confabulatefalseperceptionsorevidenceinsupportofthegaslighter’sclaims,andtherebyto

becomeoverconfidentaswell(Spear2019).Likewise,sometargetsofpoliticalgaslightingreport

anecdotallytheexperienceofhavingtheirrealitydestabilized,asinpersonalcases(cf.Carpenter

2018,67).Eitherway,gaslighter’scentralaimistoprotecttheirownworldviewagainstthe

possibilityofchallenge.Sometimes,thisaimmightbebetterachievedbyremoving,ratherthan

creating,thesensationofself-doubt.Thegaslighter’saimscannotbefulfilledwithoutthetarget

being“insomewayinvestedinwhatthemanipulatorbelieves”(Stark2019,223).Thatis,thetarget

audiencemustsomehowshareanidentitywiththegaslighter.

Inpolitics,partisanshipfurnishesthesharedidentitythatmotivatessuchaninvestmentin

avowingthepartyline.Tribalallegiancesriskerasingtheindividualcitizen’sindependentpointof

view.BarberandPopetakeadvantageofTrump’stendencytoassertbothconservativeandliberal

opinionsinavarietyofpolicyareas(e.g.minimumwage,taxes,abortion,etc.).Theyfindthatif

primedwithastatementfromthePresident,RepublicansmostlyfollowedTrump’slead,regardless

ofwhetherhewassayingsomethingliberalorconservative(2018,42).Theyconcludethat

“partisanloyaltyismorerelevanttoalargegroupofRepublicansthanisanykindofconservative

issuepreference”(43).Becauseoftheirinvestmentinwhattheirrespectiveelitessay,partisansare

especiallysusceptibletomanipulation.Ifbeliefsareconstitutedinpartbyakindofmodalstability

—orresistancetoreconsideration(Friedman2017),thenthepartisanfollowermightlackany

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beliefsatall(cf.Mason2018;Bisgaard2015).Eveniftheydon’texhibitanyactualdoubtsabout

eithertheirbeliefsortheirbeliefformingprocesses,theydisplayafunctionallysimilarepistemic

profile.Theyspeakandactlikepeoplewhoaredependentonsignalsfromothersfortheirown

beliefs,orattitudesthatdon’tdisplaythestabilityofbeliefstates.Justasintheparadigmcase,

successfulgaslightingproducesfollowerswhodonotjustdefertoelitesonasingleissue,butwill

followthemacrossawidevarietyofissueswithoutmuchregardforaccuracy(Swireetal.2017).In

theedgecase,thegaslitcitizen’spointofviewisusheredoffthedeliberativestageofdemocratic

politicsaltogether.

Thispointstothecorecontinuitybetweengaslightinginthepersonalandpoliticalorbits.

Thechargeissuesanaccusation:thegaslighterwantstoruleoutchallengestotheirownview,and

somustutilizestrategiestopreventthetargetfromthreateningtheirfavoredstory.Inallcases,the

destinationwasnottheself-doubtofthetargetinitsownright,buttheeliminationofthetarget’s

distinctivestandpoint.By“standpoint,”wehaveinmindtheperspectivefromintowhichevidence

andobservationsarecollected,andfromwhichjudgmentsabouttheworldandintentionsabout

howtoactareissued.Inotherwords,thegaslighterisnotseekingtoeliminateanother’s

standpointby–say–druggingorkillingthem,evenifsuchoutcomescouldbeachievedwithout

consequence.Thegaslighterwantstoleavethetarget’sbasicagencyintact,albeittobedeployed

accordingtothegaslighter’sdiscretion.

Thestandpointofthegaslighter’stargetisnottheonlyperspectiveatrisk.Forinthe

domainofpolitics,whenthingsgowell,thereisn’tjustacollectionofindividualpointsofview,but

alsoapointofviewthatcanbeshared.Thisideadoesn’tturnonanextra-strongviewabout

collectiveagency.Ifweassumethere’sanotheragentintheroom,“thepeople,”anargument

revealingacollectivevictimofgaslightingcomesrelativelyeasily.Butwethinkthatthereisamore

ecumenicalpremisethatwillallowtheargumenttogothrough.Allthat’sneededistheattractive

ideathatfellowcitizens,whentheyreasonwitheachother,areengagedinsomethinglikeshared

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action(Stilz2016).Itsufficesthatmyreasoningaboutwhatweshoulddotogetherbesincerely

opentoconsiderationsprovidedbyotheragents,andthatmyjudgmentsaboutsharedplansbe

responsivetothem.WithoutanArchimedeanpointlikejointdeliberation,theveryconceptofa

“commongood”lookslikeacategorymistake(BeerbohmandDavis2017).

Ifthispremiseaboutjointdeliberationisplausible,thenpoliticalgaslightingdoes,afterall,

threatenamorallyvaluablepointofview.Recallthatthegaslighterseekstocutoffthetargetfrom

othersourcesofinformation,insteadbecominganexclusivesourceofinputsforbeliefsand

planning.Sideliningdeliberativeinputsfromothersourcesthwartscitizensfromgathering

normativeandempiricaldatafromeachother,impairingtheirabilitytoforgeashared“common

good”(Cf.Westlund2009).Itshouldn’tsurpriseusthatwhenpeoplereasononlywithco-partisans

whoalreadyholdacommonoutlook,theyaremorelikelytoshowdirectionalratherthanaccuracy

motivation(Klar2014).Wecannotgetatthetruthofcommonvalueswhengaslightershavetheir

way,andcompetingsourcesofinformationareeliminated.Gaslightingcompromisestheshared

perspectiveofcitizenstogether.

Noristhisthelastresult.Weexerciseourownreasoningcapacitiesbestwhenwehaveto

sortthroughreasonsthatinteractincomplexways.Themessinessofpoliticsrequiresthatwe

reflectondifferinginputs.Soweshouldworrythatrulingoutlisteningtopoliticalopponents–as

thepoliticalgaslighterwouldhope–willcompounddifficultieswiththinkingonourown.And

thereisreasontothinkthisfearisbornoutinreal-worldpolitics.Citizenswhoaremorereflective,

ormorewillingtoscrutinizetheirownpoliticalbeliefs,aremoreabletoseethevirtuesofthose

theydisagreewith(ArceneauxandVanderWielen2017,135-151).Hatingone’sopponentspredicts

diminishedreflectiveness.IfwefollowtheoldKantianideathatpartofbeinganagentisbeingable

toexerciseacapacitytoreflectonone’sownattitudes,theninducingincendiaryviewstoward

opponentsmightcompromiseanindividual’sownagency,afterall.Inshort,politicalgaslightingcan

damageatarget’spointofview,andalsounderminecitizens’collectivecapacitytothinkfroma

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sharedpointofview.Andthat,inturn,compoundstheproblemsforeachindividual’sownagential

perspective.Oncebegun,thegaslighting’scontagioncanspreadthroughouttheciviclandscape.

Themechanismsofpoliticalgaslightingmaybemorevariablethaninpairwisecases,and

mayrelyonsharedin-groupidentityratherthanpersonalintimacy.Ineffect,thepoliticalgaslighter

seekstoinstallthemselvesintheroleoftrustedfriendship,butwithoutanyofthefeaturesofan

ordinarypersonalrelationshipmakingthattrustappropriate.Thenthegaslighterseekstoexploit

therelationshiptoruleoutvoicesotherthantheirown.Issuchmanipulationunavoidablein

democraticpolitics?Inthenextsection,wewillconsiderwhethergaslightingcanbecircumscribed

insuchawayastoavoidcoveringmodesofcitizenshipthataremorallyimportantfordemocratic

practice.

3.AudaciousBelieving

Gaslightingtargetsanagent’sconfidenceintheirrationalcapacities.Deployedinpolitics,it

attemptstounderminetheconfidenceofgroupsofcitizensintheirrationalcapacities,oratleast

inducethemtoactasiftheirconfidencewereundermined.Theeffect,again,istoeliminatea

perspective–eitherofanindividualorofagroup–fromdeliberativeconsideration.Inpersonal

andpoliticalcasesalikeitrendersthetargetagentdependentonthegaslighterasasourceof

beliefsandothercommitments.Whenitsucceeds,thevictim’sbeliefsareresponsivetothe

gaslighter,andsobecomedisconnectedfromtheevidence.Yetseveringtheconnectionbetween

beliefandevidence“raisesthespecterofaninflexibledogmatism”amongcitizenswhotaketheir

cuesfrompartyelites,makingsuchdependence“problematicformanyconceptionsofgood

citizenship”(Druckman,Fein,andLeeper2012).Ingeneral,politicalscientistshavebeen

sympathetictotheideathatcitizens’beliefsoughttoaimataccuracyorthetruth–thatis,thatthey

shouldbeapportionedonlyaccordingtoepistemicallyrelevantconsiderations(Hochschildand

Einstein2015).Whatcomplicatesthispictureisthatthereareplentyofpracticalcasesinwhicha

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littleinflexibility—evenwhatlookslikeselectivedogmatism—canlooklikeapartofpractically

rationalagency.Thissectionwillintroducetheroleofmotivatedbelievingfordemocraticpolitics.It

willbringintofocusadilemmaforthecitizenwhowantstobothavoidgaslightingandparticipate

inpoliticalmovements.

IndividualAudacity

SupposeyoucommittoclimbMountEverest,ortorunamarathon.Eachdayoftraining,

let’spresumethatyoubelievethatyouwillcompletethisproject.Butyouarealsoawareofthe

considerableevidencethatsuggeststhatyouwillfailtomakeittothesummit,orthefinishline.

Perhapsyou’veseenthehardnumbersonthesuccessratesofpeoplewithyoursimilartrainingand

background.Ifyourbeliefthatyouwillsucceedpersists,itdoessoinspiteoftherelevantevidence.

Yourhopethatyouwillcompletethesedifficultprojectsrestontheexpectationthatyourtraining

willpayoff(Duckworth2016).Wewilldescriberationallypermissiblebeliefsthatplacegreater

credenceintheprospectsforone’ssuccessthantheevidencerequiresasaudaciousbeliefs.

Thisdefinitionprescindsfromavarietyofepistemologicalpossibilities.Audaciousbeliefs

maybeformedinpartinresponsetopragmaticratherthanevidentialconsiderations,maydiscount

evidenceoffailureforactionsthataresomehow“uptous”(Marušić2015),ormaylandonthe

optimisticsideoftherationallypermissiblerangeofpossiblebeliefs(Preston-Roedder2013)–

amongotherpossibilities.

Anagentwithaudaciousbeliefswilldifferwithwhatarationalthird-partybelievesabout

them(McCormick2014;Marušić2015).Considertheexchange:

C-3PO:“Sir,thepossibilityofsuccessfullynavigatinganasteroidfieldisapproximatelythreethousandsevenhundredandtwentytoone.”HanSolo:“Nevertellmetheodds”(Brackettetal.2006).

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HereC-3POisinvitingSolototakeupapredictivestance—perhapsasaresultofhismechanical

make-up,hemaynotbecapableoftakingP.F.Strawson’sparticipantstance(Strawson1962).But

wecanbracketthat.Soloisseekingtoavoidevidencehere,preventinghimfromacquiringabelief.

Ononeinterpretation,Solohasalreadycommittedtoflythroughthefield,andhasnootherchoices,

solearningtheoddswouldhavenovalue.ButperhapsSoloappreciatesthethreatthistestimony

poses.Asecondtakesuggeststhatheresiststheevidencebecauseitmayleadhimtoabandonhis

project.DoesSoloreallyneedtobelievethathewillnavigatetheasteroidfield?Itmaybeenough

forhimtoavoidholdingC-3P0’sprobabilisticreport.Ifhecametobelievethattheoddswere

vanishinglysmall,hecouldn’tsincerelyretainhiscommitmenttothemission.

Evenifwesupposethatbeliefsshouldberesponsivetoevidenceofwhatistrueandonly

suchevidence,thereisafurtherquestionaboutpoliciestowardsevidence.Howstrongmust

opposingevidencebeforittorationallydemandthatabeliefbeabandonedorrevised.Mortonand

Paulcallthisthe“evidentialthreshold”forbeliefchange.Evenanevidentialistaboutbeliefcould

allowthatequallyrationalagentsmightyethavedifferentthresholds(MortonandPaul2019,191;

Lawlor2014).Ifevidencealonedoesnotsettlewheretosetthethresholdforbeliefrevision,then

anagent’simplicitpolicyaboutwhentoreviseabeliefcoulddependinpartonpractical

considerations.1Individualscouldholdbeliefssensitivetotheevidence,butalsohavehigh

thresholdsforevidencecontrarytothefuturesuccessoftheiraims.Suchagentswouldhold

epistemicpoliciesexhibitingakindof“grit”(MortonandPaul2019).

Inadoptingthisevidentialpolicy,SolomayhavetoldC-3PO:“Feelfreetotellmetheodds,

butmyevidentialthresholdforconsiderationsagainstmysuccessisextremelyhigh.”Solo’s

insistencethathewillbetheexceptiontotherule—tohisdroid’smodeling—canbedefendedas

1Althoughwefindthisoutlookappealing,itdoespresupposeacommitmenttoakindofpermissivismaboutbelief,whichroughlydeniesthatone’stotalbodyofevidencealwayspicksoutauniquelyrationaldoxasticstate.Forskepticalviewsonpermissivism,see,forexample,Horowitz(2019)andWhite(2007).

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resilience.Thereissomethingaudaciousaboutthiskindofpolicy—noonewouldaccuseSoloof

modesty.Butitneedn’tbeirrationaleither.

CollectiveAudacity

Socialmovementsarepronetoself-doubt.Markedbylooseconnections,smallnumbers,

andpowerfulopponents,theirmembersregularlyencounterevidencethattheymightfail.Their

sharedaims,afterall,aredifficult,long-formandrisky—whatJamesBaldwincalledthe

“dangerousroad.”Nolessthanmarathonsandmountain-climbing,thejointcommitmenttobring

abouttransformationalchangeseemstorequireaudaciousbelievingofsomekind.Inhisclassic

workonthe1880sFarmers’Alliance,LawrenceGoodwynpicksout“collectiveself-confidence”asa

centralbuildingblockofmassdemocraticpolitics(Goodwyn1978).

Toseecollectiveconfidence—evenover-confidence—atwork,considerthelogistical

backendoftheMontgomeryBusBoycott,whichlasted381days.ThenightRosaParkswas

arrested,onDecember1,1955,JoAnnRobinsonmimeographed52,000leaflets.Withinaday,these

weredistributedtosixty-eightblacksocialorganizationsacrossMontgomery.Theboycottwas

plannedtolastoneday,onMonday,December5.Itwasfarfromclearthattheboycottcould

succeedasaone-offprotest.TosustainitthroughDecember20,1956requiredavastcarpool

network,“325privatecarstransportedpassengersfrom43dispatchstationsand42pickup

stationsfromfiveinthemorningtotenatnight”(Tufekci2017,64).

Canaudaciousbelief,seenasafirst-personalattitude,scaletocollectiveprojects?Ifso,what

rolecansharedbeliefsplayinthepersistenceofjointeffortsinthefaceofevidenceabouttheir

diminishingchancesofsuccess?Atthegrouplevel,thepoliciesofresiliencefromthelastsection

arecomplicatedintwoways.First,membersofmovementsneedn’tonlyholdbeliefsabout

15

themselves,butineachother.Sowehavetomakesenseofwhatthisother-directedattitude—

believinginourco-citizens—couldlooklike.2

ConsiderMartinLutherKingJr.’sconfidenceinthearcofthemoraluniverse’sdirection.

Thismetaphorhasthepotentialtomislead,ifwetakeKingtohaveannouncedabeliefthathehas

simplyreadofffromtheworld.Hisconfidencewasn’tmerelyafunctionofproportioninghis

(cosmic)beliefsabouthumanity’sfuturetotheevidence.Ittookconsiderableeffortandepistemic

resilience.InresponsetotheBlackPowermovement’srejectionofnonviolence,Kingconcededthat

thisapproachwasafunctionof“despairanddisappointment.”Theevidentialbasisforthis

despairingwasascleartoKingashisopponents.Itwas,inBrandonTerry’swords,“aresponseto

severaluglyfacts,includingthefrequencywithwhichwhitebrutalitycontinuedtogounpunished

(evenafterSelma)”(Terry2018,278).KingwasalivetothesenseinwhichmembersoftheBlack

Powermovementwereproportioningtheirbeliefstothecruelevidenceinfrontofthem.Iftheydug

downintheirresponsetothatevidence,Kinginsistedthatalternativestononviolencewould

backfire,furtheringthesenseofpowerlessnessandraisingthetemptationofsourgrapes-style

reasoning.

King’sworryabouttheself-defeatofsuchtacticswasn’tvolitional,butepistemic:bya

processofelimination,nonviolencewastheonlystancecompatiblewithpreservingtheconfidence

ofmovementmembersabouttheirvictory.Putintopractice,Kingthoughtthatalternativesto

nonviolencewouldleadmemberstobelievethattherewasnohope.King’sNobelPrizeAcceptance

Speechhelpsexplain,ifnotfullydefend,hisjustifiedoptimism:“WithanabidingfaithinAmerica

andanaudaciousfaithinthefutureofmankind,”KingemployslanguagecompatiblewithWilliam

2In“BelievinginOthers,”SarahPaulandJenniferMortondefendthepermissibility,and

sometimesrequirement,tobelieveourfriends’capacitytosticktotheirprojects,evenwhentheevidencepointsintheotherdirection.Theirdefenseofthiswayofbelievinginotherscloselyparallelstheirdefenseofraisingourevidentialthresholdtoprotectourbeliefsaboutoursuccess;theythinkwecanraisethatthresholdforevidencethatbearsonthesuccessofintimates.Ourquestioniswhetherthisstancecanextendtopoliticalrelationships(PaulandMorton2018).

16

James’spragmatism,“Irefusetoaccepttheideathatthe‘isness’ofman’spresentnaturemakeshim

morallyincapableofreachingupfortheeternal‘oughtness’thatforeverconfrontshim”(Kingand

Washington1991).Theacknowledgementofitsaudacityisprobativeevidencethatthiskindof

believingisn’ttextbookevidentialism.Kingadoptedanevidentialpolicythatpermittedhimtoact

—inthiscasethroughspeechacts—intheabsenceof,oragainstthegrainofevidence.

Kingfacedpressuretoaccountforthebasisofhisoptimism.RobertWilliams,inhis

extendeddebatewithKingovernonviolentmeans,asked:“Canaprogramofnonviolence...

realisticallyexpecttodealwithsuchanenormous,entrenchedevil?”(KingJr2010,52)3If

audaciousbelievinghasrationalcredentialsthatwishfulorotherkindsofmotivatedreasoninglack,

Kinghasresourcestodefendhisepistemicresiliencefromthischallenge.Inindividualand

collectivecasesofaudaciousbelieving,moralandpoliticalconsiderationsplayalegitimaterolein

howwehandleevidence.Theyraisetheevidentialthresholdforconsiderationsthatsuggeststhat

oughtdoesn’t,intheend,implycan.Theseconsiderationssupportagents’confidencethattheycan

succeedindoingwhattheymorallyoughttodo.

Forustoformaudaciousbeliefsthataresharedaboutourcause,itisnotenoughtobelieve

inanygivenco-memberofourmovement—inapairwiseway.Foritseemsthatyouneedtohold

commitmentswhosedirectobjectsarefirst-personalplural.4Theobjectofconfidence,then,is

doublycollective:notonlymustIbelievethat“we”willsucceedinourproject.Itmaybeimportant

forustosharethisattitude.5Soyouwillneedabeliefaboutmyconfidenceinourproject,andvice

versa.Efficacy-directedsloganslike“yeswecan”shouldn’tbepassedoverasmerecheaptalkor

overblownrhetoric.Theconfidence,evenoverconfidence,ofmembersofsocialanddemocratic

3ThispassageiscitedinTerry2018,307.4Beliefsingroupefficacymustbeshared,since“individualsaremorefocusedonachieving

groupgoalsthroughthejointeffortofcollectiveaction.”(VanZomeren,Leach,andSpears2010,1056).

5Insomecasesgroupefficacybeliefsareproducedbyreasoningtogether.Whengroupmembersdiscussplanstogether,theybecomemoreconfidentinthesuccessofjointprojects.Suchattitudesarefundamentallyshared.See,forexample,ThomasandLouis2013.

17

movementsmakespossiblesignalsoftheirstrengththatareoutsized.Thereisconsiderable

instrumentalvalueintheprotester’sportfolio:rallies,occupations,speechifyingmarches.Allofthat

talkingandgatheringisaproofofconceptofthedepthandbreadthofthefront-line.

4.Gaslightingvs.Mobilizing

Whenfacedwithevidencethattheirpoliticalaimsmayfail,citizenswhopersevere

demonstrateakindofepistemicresilience.Theycometoholdbeliefsthatarelessthantightly

connectedtotheevidence.Orattheveryleast,theyholdevidentialpoliciesthatareinformed,

perhapsimplicitly,bymoralconsiderationsthatsustaintheirabilitytokeeptheircommitments.To

securesteadfastness,mobilizersattempttoensurethatmembers’sharedbeliefsintheireventual

successwillresistdefeatbytheinevitablepresenceofcountervailingevidence.Themobilizer,in

otherwords,seekstoinfluencemembers’epistemicpoliciesinawaythatinsulatesthemagainst

thediversityofopposingevidence.Whileherewewillfocusonevidencerelatingtoself-efficacy,

collectiveaudaciousbeliefsmakeupamuchlargersetofviews,relatingtotheevidenceaboutthe

goodwillofone’spoliticalopponents,thestrengthofprevailingnormsandtheirsusceptibilityto

violation,thecapacityofone’shomeinstitutionstochange.

Thisslackbetweenbeliefsandevidenceisdiagnosticofgaslitcitizens.Tohiveofffollowers

frombeliefsthatmayundercuttheirauthority,gaslighterstelltheiraudiencesthatcoresensory

inputsofthecitizen—thenewsmedia—isnothingmorethanacounterfeiterofevidence.Any

beliefsthatcitizenshaveacquiredthroughthistestimonialmechanismshouldbe,byextension,

abandoned.Gaslighterswillprotecttheirfollowers’higher-orderevidencefromcertainclassesof

counter-evidenceabouttheirevidence.Ortheywillpresentdefeatersdesignedtochallengetheir

target’shigher-orderevidence.

Onemightcounterthatthereisnodeepdilemmabetweengaslightingandaudacious

believing.Afterall,it’srelativelystraightforwardtothinkthatoneshouldsetahighevidential

thresholdwhenitcomestoconfidenceinone’sindividualorcollectiveprojects,butstillregarditas

18

anobviouserrortoignoreevidencethataleaderislyingorexploitive.Why,theobjectiongoes,

shouldweworrythatanaudaciousbelieverisatsomespecialriskofgaslighting?

Togetatthisissue,itwillhelptoworkthroughspecificcases.Forsimplicity,we’llwork

withanindividualcaseofaudaciousbelief,offeredbyPaulandMorton:

Whenthecoachcheershertraineeonfromthesidelines,theswimmerneednotbeoutrightdeceivedaboutwhatthecoachisupto(thoughhemightwellrefrainfromreflectingexplicitlyonhermotives).Andifhebelievesthatbeingconfidentisgoingtohelphimsucceed,hemightreasonablyexpecthiscoachtospintheevidencepositivelytoencouragehim(PaulandMorton2018,92).

Thestoryfeaturesperfectlyfamiliarmotivationaltechniques.Thecoachistryingtogetthe

swimmertoadoptaudaciousbeliefs,butcertainlyisnotgaslighting.Foronething,theswimmer

retainsanindependentstandpointontheevidence.Onewayofseeingthisisthatwearetoldthe

swimmerandcoachshareanend,sotheswimmercan“reasonablyexpect”thecoach’sspinonthe

facts.Whenlistenersandspeakersshareanendthatisadvancedbyagivenassertion,andthereisa

kindofimplicitagreementthatspeechwillbeusedinthisway,thenitseemsmorallyinnocuous.

However,supposethecoachdecideditmighthelptoputjustalittlemorespinonthefacts.

Sayshestartstellinghimthingsthatarenot–strictlyspeaking–true,butwhichmightbemade

trueifhebecamesufficientlyconvincedofthem.Or,inastepfurther,supposeshetellshimthings

whichshedoubtscouldbemadetruebyanylevelofbelief,orwhichsheactivelydisbelieves.Still,

shemightreason,suchfalsebeliefswouldbeinstrumentaltoinspiringstillfastertimes.Perhapsit

wouldalsohelptheswimmertodevelopamorepositiveself-imagegenerally–notjustabouthis

capacitiesasaswimmer.Littlebylittle,thecoachincreasestherangeofheradvice–extendingto

swimmer’sintelligence,popularity,relationships,etc.

Eventuallythecoachmayexceedanyimplicitagreementonhowspeechshouldbeused

withintherelationship.Flaggingthisfact,theswimmermightask,“Doyoureallybelieveanyof

thesewords,orareyoujusttryingtogetmetobelieveit?”Nowimaginethatthecoachreplies,

“Don’tworryaboutit.Justkeepyourmindontheprize.FocusonwhatItellyoutillyougetyourself

19

tobelieveit.”Nowitlookslikethecoachhasenteredtheterritoryofthegaslighter.Sheisnotjust

encouragingtheswimmertosetahighevidentialthreshold,butisattemptingtogethimtoreplace

hisownjudgementswithhers.Sheisactivelytalkinghimoutofholdinghisown,independent

deliberativestandpointontheevidence.

What’sambiguousisthespaceinbetweenthecaseasdescribedbyPaulandMorton,and

thisfinalcase.Where,wemightwonder,doestheimplicitagreement(signalingthatswimmer’s

independentsharingoftheend)runout?Perhapsthereisnofinalfactofthematteraboutprecisely

howfartheiragreementextends.Thecoach,motivatedmerelytomaintaintheswimmer’s

audaciousbeliefs,mightslipintogaslightingwithoutrealizingit.

Let’sturntoapoliticalcase.ConsiderthisexchangebetweenaLatinocanvasserand

persuadablevoters::

[Icanvassed]18individualsthatwere,Mexicanos,Hispanos,evenanAsiancouple,theyallopenedtheirdoorsandactuallyhearwhatIhadtosay…Butmoreimportantly,wereenjoyingitandwerelike,“okay,we’regoingtovoteforthat.”Itwasn’toutofthejadedperspectivethatnomatterwhatwesay,they’regoingtostilldowhattheywant.Itwasmore“Ifeelwhatyou’resayingandIfeelyourpassion.AndIbelieveyounow.”AndIwaslike,“Yes!”It’simportantthatwebelievethatwehavethepowertomakechangesinsteadoffeelinglikewe’regoingtocontinuouslybeinferiortoeveryoneelse.”(Carson,Abrajano,andBedolla2020,p.126)

Wetakethistobeaparadigmcaseofanaudaciousbelief.Ourmobilizerisattemptingtochangethe

targetaudience’ssenseoftheirsocialpositionandpower.Thereisclearlyanaffectiveandgroup-

orientedcomponent.Thecanvasserisenthusiasticaboutspreadingasharedsenseofcollective

empowerment.Thereisalsoadoxasticcomponent.It’snotjustthatthemobilizerishighly

motivated.Thismotivationisconnectedto—andpartlymaintainedby—abeliefthatthegroup

doeshavethepowertomakeadifference.Third,thisbeliefingroup-efficacyisregardedbythe

speakeras“important”notmerelybecauseitisjustified,butbecauseofwhatithelpstodo.The

significanceofthebeliefisthatithelpstocounteractfeelingsofinequalityandsubservienceto

othergroups—perhapsthosewithgreaterextantpoliticalinfluence.Believinginone’spowerto

20

makeadifferenceispartofdefeatingthepoliticaltemptationtofeel“continuouslyinferiorto

everyoneelse.”

Ourmobilizerispresentinganaudaciousbelief.Itisabeliefintheprospectiveefficacyof

thegroupofwhichthespeakerisapart,basedpartlyonevidence(infact,thespeakerandthe

groupreallyarenotthepoliticalinferiorsofothersinsociety)butalsopartlyonthedesirabilityof

thebelief(itisimportanttothinkthatonehasthepowertomakeadifferenceinordertorealize

thispower).Thelattercomponentshowsthatthebeliefisnotrequiredbytheevidence;itsgrounds

includeevidenceandpragmaticusefulness.

Nowconsidertwowaysthespeakercouldproceed:

(a) Thespeakercouldcontinueto(i)talkabouthowthespeakerandthelistenercanmakeadifferencethroughexercisingtheircapacities(ii)inwaysthatwouldhelpthemrealizeendstheyselectedthemselvesand(iii)thatdemonstratetheirequalitytoothermembersofthepoliticalcommunity.

(b) Thespeakercouldtalkabouthow(i)thelistenershouldgoalongwiththespeaker’s

assertionswithoutfurtherreflection(ii)inwaysthatwouldhelpthemrealizeendsthatmayormaynotbesharedbybothparties,while(iii)insistingonorpraisingthelistener’sloyaltytothespeakerorotherleaders,asopposedtoothersourcesofinformation.

Wethinkthatinthefirstcase(whichmapsontotheactualpassage),thereareindicatorsthe

canvasserandlisteneralikeareexercisingtheirbelief-formingandrevisingcapacities.The

canvasserquotesalistenertoshowuptakeofthefactthattheyactivelysharedthesameends.Their

exchangeindicatestheyalsoshareanaffectivemotivationandsenseofsharedgroup-efficacy.The

speakeralsoindicatesthatbothoftheirbeliefsaresincere,expressedbythetoneoftheexchange

aswellastheobservationthatinterlocutorsdidnothavea“jadedperspective.”Thecanvasserhasa

politicalproject,butthereisasenseofempowermentcreatingconditionsofequalitybetween

agents.Inthesecondcase,thespeakerdoesnotwantthelistenertoexercisetheirowncapacities,

eithertoformbeliefsorselectpoliticalends.Theassuranceofequalstandinghasdisappeared,and

aneffortisafoottoexcludeothersourcesofinformation.

21

Supposewefurtherlearnedthatthespeakerandlistenerwouldcontinuetosupporttheir

currentpoliticalcauses,eveniftheleadersoftheircausepromptlyswitchedsides.Orsupposethat

ifthespeakeracquireddisconfirmingevidence,theywouldupdatetheirbeliefs(oratleasttreat

thisevidenceinotherwaysasdeliberativelyrelevant).Suchactionswouldsuggestthespeaker’s

audaciousbeliefsweremaintainedthroughcapacitieswhoseexercisedidnotdependwholesaleon

someoneelse.Alternatively,supposethatthespeakerhadtheaudaciousbeliefsasdescribed,but

wasrobustlydisposedtoswitchdirectionsentirelyuponreceivingdifferingsignalsfromthe

relevantelites.Thatwouldsuggestthatwhilethespeakerhadavowedtheirown“power”,itwas

moreaproxyforanexternalpower.

Inboththeswimmerandcanvassercases,wecanconnectgaslightingtoabelief’spedigree,

aswellastoitsmaintenance.Twoswimmersmighthavethesamesetsofaudaciousbeliefs,butif

onehadthemoutofunconstraineddeferencetoacoach’sinsistence,intheabsenceofclearly

sharedends,thenthatpedigreeisprobativeevidenceofgaslighting.Twocanvassersmighttryto

inspireothersintheaudaciousagenda,butifonewouldeasilyshiftbeliefsatthewhimofaparty

elite,thenwecouldworrytheirattitudeshadbeenmaintainedthroughgaslighting.Giventhe

ambiguitiesofeitherrelationship,thelinebetweenmobilizingaudaciousbeliefsandgaslighting

willnotbeself-explanatory.

5.ADilemmaforCitizenship

Twoaspectsofouridealofactivecitizenshipstandintension.Thefirstisanidealofshared

democraticagency.Withouttheabilitytopursuelong-termprojectswithothers,wecanfeel

hopeless—withoutasenseofco-agency.Thesecondisanidealofindependence.Wewantto

maintainourownpointofviewwithinacommunityofself-reflective,reasoningagents.Butthe

22

sameevidentialpoliciesthatcan,undersomecircumstances,empowerusasgrittyparticipants

supportinginspiredleadersmay,inlessfortuitoustimes,leaveusdupedbygaslighters.6

Cancitizensfindpoliciestomaintainactivecitizenshipwithoutfallingpreytogaslighting?

Onepossibilityistomakeamplespaceforaudaciousbelief,givingthebenefitofthedoubtto

ambitiousmobilizers.Butthepedigreeofsuchbeliefs,aswellasthepoliciesformaintainingthem,

mayrevealone’sagencyhasbeencompromised.Gaslightingcanbemorallycostly.Whenyou

believeself-servingfalsehoodsaboutyourpoliticalopponents,youriskwrongingthemwithyour

beliefs(Schroeder2018;Preston-Roedder2013).Failingtoseeevidencefromtheotherside—

eventheinabilityto“code”theirassertionsasevidentiallyrelevant—putsyouinapositionto

inflicttestimonialinjusticeonthem(Fricker2007).

Alternatively,onecouldkeepone’sfocusontheevidence,notallowingoneselftobetiedtoo

closelytoanypoliticalgroup.Whilethiswouldaverttherisksassociatedwithgaslightingand

concomitantfailuresofjustice,itwouldimposecostsonmobilizingandmaintainingthesolidarity

ofgroupsofcitizens.

Thesetwostrategiesbothsimplifytoafault.Theydothisbyreducingtheconceptualspace

betweentheevidentialistcitizenandtheactivistcitizentoasingledimension.Citizensmightopt

insteadforamiddleground,division-of-laborstrategy.Somemembersofapoliticalgroupcould

serveasthoroughgoing,hard-nosedevidentialists,whileothersarevisionarybelievers.Onthis

proposal,whatweneedisnotasingle“correct”normtofollow,butavarietyofcitizenswith

differentepistemicandpracticalvirtues.WesawKing’sself-reportsabouthisepistemicconfidence,

whichincludedthedisclaimerthattheywereindeedaudacious.ButKingdidn’texpectthatthe

activists’epistemicpolicycameinonesize.Therewasroomfornon-theistsbuy-insolongasthey

continuedtobelievethat“somethingintheuniverseunfoldsforjustice”(KingandWashington

6WilliamJamesmusedthatevidentialismwasbasedonthe“preponderanthorrorof

becomingadupe.”Hecounteredthatthereare“worsethingsthanbeingdupedmayhappentoamaninthisworld”(McDermott2013,727).

23

1991,14).ThisbeliefissurelyweakerthanKing’sown“infinitehope.”It’sevenlessrosythanits

variant,thearcofthemoraluniversestandardofpatientoptimism.ForKing,theCivilRights

Movementcanholdupevenwith,orperhapsbenefitfrom,adivisionofevidentialpoliciesamong

itsmembers.

Onecosttoadivision-of-laborstrategyisthatitbacksawayfromanidealofgenuinely

shareddeliberation.Citizensreasontogether,buttheymayhavetroublefindingwaysofreaching

agreement.Iftheevidentialnormstheyfollowdiverge,thentheymaypermanentlydifferonwhat

considerationscountasreasons,andonhowtocombinethoseconsiderations.Thissolutionrisks

leavingoutthesharedperspective,describedearlier,fromwhich“decidingtogether”ispossible

(Westlund2009).

Ifamixedstrategycouldbeforgedthatensuredgenuinedeliberativecooperationwhilealso

resistinggaslighting,itmightshedlightonhowtoretainthevirtuesofcivicmobilizationwhile

avoidingtheperilsofgaslighting.Onethingtobearinmindinthisprocessisthataudacious

believerscan–andcharacteristicallydo–remainsensitivetonewcontraryevidence,evenwhen

suchevidencedoesnotreachtheirthresholdforbeliefrevision.Kingdidnotencouragemembersof

thecivilrightsmovementtoignoreevidenceofobstaclestotheirsuccess,thoughhealsodidn’t

wantthemtoloseconfidenceeither.Thereisnoinconsistencyinthismiddleground.Evidence

mightaffectanagent’sattitudesinotherways–suchasmodifyingherplansandintentions–even

ifitdoesnotchangeherbeliefs(MortonandPaul2019,196;Friedman2017).Remainingopento

newevidencealsoensuresthatwhenthethresholdforbeliefrevisionisreached,agentswillbeable

torecognizeitandrespondaccordingly.

Here,then,isanothercontrastbetweenthemobilizerandthegaslighter.Unlikeaudacious

believers,gaslightersdonotcharacteristicallywanttheirfollowerstoappreciateopposingevidence

atall.Theirmessageisnotthattheirpoliticalgroupcanovercomeobstacles,butthatthereareno

obstacles,orthattheobstacleshavealreadybeendefeated,oraremereillusionpropagatedbytheir

24

enemiestodiscouragethem.Recalltheexamplesofprominentpoliticalgaslighting.Thefirstrelied

oninsinuationtoavoidbeingheldresponsibleforone’sclaim,therebyavoidinganydemandsto

provideevidenceforit(cf.Camp2018).Inthesecondcase,gaslightingtooktheformofaboldor

transparentlie.Ifwetreattransparentliesassupplyingfauxevidenceatthefirst-orderlevel,they

canappeardownrightpuzzling.Whyattempttodeceiveinsuchabald-facedway?Butseenasa

second-orderchallenge—asanattackonourevidenceaboutourevidence,thetransparentliecan

beacorepartofthegaslighter’stoolkit.Fortheycancurryfavorwithmembersofone’spolitical

in-group,showinghowone’sdedicationtotheircausedefiesanyopposingevidence(cf.Hahl,Kim,

andSivan2018).Inthethirdcase,the“sendthemback”chanttriedtoexcludeopponentsfromthe

setofagentswithstandingtoprovideevidenceatall.

Ineachofthesecases,thegaslighterdeploystacticstorefuseoravoidevidence,ratherthan

acknowledgeitwhileremainingsteadfastinone’sbeliefs.Toavoidtherisksofgaslighting,the

audaciousbelievercanconscientiouslyattendtoevidenceopposinghergroup’ssuccess,including

evidenceprovidedbypoliticalopponents.Theerroringaslightingisnotjustthatitraisesthe

evidentialthresholdforbeliefrevision,butthatitdeniesoravoidsopposingevidencealtogether.

Thisdifference,inturn,shedslightonwhatmakestheroleofthemobilizermorally

important.Themobilizerwillfindwaystodirectfollowerstoappreciatealloftheevidencewhile

remainingconfidentintheirownviews.Forexample,giventhechancetopassivelyignorefalse

disparaginginformationaboutapoliticalopponent,themobilizerwillcorrectfollowers’

misperceptions–evenifthosemisperceptionsmighthaveaidedtheirpoliticalcause.Or,giventhe

optiontoacceptfavorableconspiracytheorieswhich,iftrue,wouldmakesuccessmorelikely,the

mobilizerwilltakestepstoeschewsuchbeliefs.Inthisway,mobilizersbegintomakespacefor

epistemiccontributionsfromepistemicauthoritiesoutsideoftheirgroup(e.g.scientificor

journalisticsources),aswellasacknowledgingvalidcontributionsfromtheirpoliticalopponents.

25

Thislastapproachtriestomarryresistancetogaslightingtogetherwithactivecitizenship

bywayofanidealofshareddeliberation.Thinkingwithothersresistsgaslightingandimproves

politicalactivity.Ofcourse,thisisthemostfamiliarofphilosophicalproposalsfordemocratic

citizenship.Italsoisonlythebeginningofapathforwardnegotiatingthetensionbetweenbeing

opentoactivecitizenshipbutwaryofpotentialgaslighters.Exactlyhowandwhentobeopento

politicalenemiesandalliesaremattersofrecentethicalandepistemiccontroversy(cf.Fantl2018;

Rini2018).Likethejokeaboutofferingdirectionsbysuggesting,“Iwouldn’tstartfromhere,”there

maybetimeswhenourpriorbeliefscreateepistemicallyadverseconditions.Itcanhappenthat

there’ssomedoxasticresponsethatyourepistemicpositionmakesappropriate,butthatthere’sno

epistemicallygooddynamicroutefromyourcurrentattitudestothatresponse.Why?Becauseyou

mayalsohave(unjustified)beliefsinUthatgetinthewayofhavingadoxasticallyjustifiedbeliefin

Q.AnditmightnotbepermissibleforyoutorefrainfrombelievingQ,either,sinceafterall

believingQiswhatyourevidencedoessupport.

Conclusion

Nofriendofdemocracy,JamesFitzjamesStephenheldthatindemocraticpolitics,“the

rulingmenwillbethewire-pullersandtheirfriends”(Stephen1967,239).It’stemptingforcitizens

toseethemselvesaseithervictimsofmanipulationoroneofitsagents.Herewe’veswitchedback

andforthfromthesetwopointsofview.Eachsuppliesuswithawayof“seeingas”acitizen:victim

oragent.7Gaslightingandmobilizingbothtargethowcitizenshandleevidenceabouttheirpolitical

world.We’vearguedthatgaslightingmanipulatescitizensinawaythatisasmorallydistinctiveas

itisdisturbing,posingathreattoouragencythatcanperverselymakeuscomplicitintheprocess.

7LudwigWittgensteinusestherabbit-duckillusiontodistinguishbetween“seeingas”and

“seeingthat.”Herewe’veattemptedtotakeseriouslytheformer,first-personalperspectiveoncitizensastheymanagetheevidencebeforethem(Wittgenstein2009,194-99).

26

Yetinsistingonexercisingourownepistemiccapacities,andfortifyingagainstgaslighting,

canthreatenourabilitytosustainmeaningfulpoliticalactionwithothers.What’satstakeisthefelt

needofcitizenship—toseeourownagencyinourhomeinstitutions.8Inordinarylife,we

experienceouragencymostdramaticallywhenwemanagetosticktocommitmentsovertime,

allowingustocompletedifficultandriskyprojects.Thatneedisnolesssignificantindemocratic

politics,whereconfidencethatwewillbejointlyefficaciousispartofthepriceofadmission.

Mobilizers,whensuccessful,managetochangethewaytheiraudiencehandlesthedamning

evidenceinfrontofthem.Theygetthemtoholdbeliefs,orevidentialpolicies,thatprotectthem

fromasenseoffutilityandhopelessness.Weareleftwithastandingchallenge:toremainopento

thebullypulpitwhilevigilantagainstthisformofepistemicbullyingthattargetscitizenship.

8ThisthemerunsthroughWaldron1999,101-118andTuck2016.

27

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