from the president's desk 1 vol 2 -2017 dec.pdfof excellence involving public private...

FROM THE PRESIDENT'S DESK

This winter edition of Chanakya presents the views of several strategic analysts of repute on the firm responses of India to the security challenges facing the country in Kashmir, on the India-China border and in the Indo-Pacific region. In the Modi regime, India has successfully pursued international relations on the principle of bilateralism that aimed at mutual economic benefits and shared perceptions on security issues. Prime Minister Modi has achieved remarkable success in forging unanimity against the new global terror on important international forums such as BRICS and ASEAN and isolating Pakistan in the world community on the issue of safe havens being provided to Islamic terrorists by that country. The geo-political rise of India as a regional power primarily because of the outreach our country has achieved in the Modi regime during these three years, is truly outstanding. The journal carries a CCSS Paper focusing on this subject.

The journal gives special attention to the questions of security in cyber space which are becoming more complex by the day - demanding a comprehensive examination by the government with the help of practising experts. The National Cyber Security Policy of India rightly places a lot of emphasis on creating Centres of Excellence involving Public Private Partnership so that the nation uses its best resources for building sound defences against the threat of Cyber Warfare that looms large on the world horizon.

Some new contributors have joined in this time and Chanakya welcomes them.

We are confident that the journal which reaches a large circle of strategic and foreign policy experts as well as security analysts within and outside the government - including universities - will evoke keen interest and elicit constructive suggestions and views from them. The Chief Editor of the journal will be happy to receive these and share our responses with them.

DC Pathak Former Director Intelligence Bureau

President Editorial Board

CONTENTS

1 From the President’s Desk Sh DC Pathak 1

2 Editorial Dr SD Pradhan 3

3 List of contributors 6

4 Sinews of National Security V Adm P Kaushiva (Retd) 9

5 India’s foreign and security policy in a changing world – managing multipolarity

Maj Gen P K Chakravorty (Retd) 18

6 CCSS Paper - India’s geo-political ascendancy

Sh DC Pathak 25

7 The salience of the Asia-Africa growth corridor

Sh Rajesh Srivastava 29

8 Strategic significance of Doklam - 2017

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) 35

9 Afghanistan: Continuing instability Lt Gen Kamal Davar (Retd) 42

10 Aspects of security in cyber space Capt Shekhar Dutt SM, IAS (Retd)

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11 US suggestion for India’s larger role in Afghanistan

Dr Rakesh Datta 54

12 India needs to strengthen its cyber warfare capabilities

Dr SD Pradhan 60

13 Corporate social responsibility in India: An unfinished agenda

Ms Purnima Gupta 73

14 Book Review Dr SD Pradhan 77

15 Book Review Dr SD Pradhan 79

16 CCSS Organisation 81

Chanakya Journal of CCSS

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EDITORIAL

The war of words between India and Pakistan at the UNGA is not unusual. Every year this happens. Pakistan as usual rakes up the Kashmir issue projecting the backing of OIC and a few other states to boast its ‘International support’. However, this year the situation was not very comfortable for Pakistan for two reasons. First there was only lukewarm support from its “all-weather friend” China and secondly, the USA’s strong criticism of Pakistan’s policy of supporting terrorism in the region came up just prior to the meeting.

Notwithstanding an element of unpredictability about Donald Trump’s foreign policy, the US President minced no words in criticising the Pak duplicity in Afghanistan. While outlining his South Asia Policy on 21st August 2017, Trump slammed Pakistan for continually supporting terrorist groups at the same time claiming to be fighting against them. He warned Islamabad of consequences if it continued to do so. He further stated, “We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organisations, the Taliban and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond.” The second part of Trump’s policy was even more unpalatable for Pakistan. Trump, in a prime-time televised address to the nation, laid out his South Asia policy saying a “critical part” of it was to further develop US’ strategic partnership with India. The US President’s seeking an enhanced role for New Delhi, especially in the economic field, to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan, must have made Pakistan very uncomfortable.

Pakistan got yet another jolt. The BRICS meeting in its Joint Declaration this year mentioned the names of Pak based terrorist organisations - JeM and LeT - along with other global terror groups like Haqqani’s network, Islamic State and Al Qaeda. This worried Pakistan all the more as it feared that sanctions may be imposed. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister made hectic efforts to get the support from Russia and China against any sanctions being slapped on Pakistan. In this Pakistan got assurance from both these countries.

The US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson during his visit to Pakistan on 23rd

October 2017 reiterated the Trump’s line. He conveyed Trump’s stern message that Pakistan must increase its efforts to eradicate militants and terrorists operating within the country. He is reported to have given specific tasks to Pakistan to show progress on them and conveyed that in Afghanistan, Pakistan was expected to control the terrorists. The While House also slammed Pakistan’s release of Hafiz Sayeed - a US wanted militant - calling it a “step in the wrong direction” that will damage America’s relations with Pakistan. How long this pressure would be maintained and how would Pakistan react is yet to be seen. One thing, however, is noticeable that the US is now using stronger words to criticise Pak support to terrorist groups than ever before.


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One factor needs to be kept in mind as far as US is concerned. The US at the same time continues to praise the efforts of Pakistan in dealing with terrorism even if they were for a mere show. The compliments paid to Pakistan by the US President and the Secretary of State after the release of American-Canadian couple, in what was clearly a stage-managed operation by the Pak Army, is a testimony to this aspect of the US policy towards Pakistan. It strengthens the perception that the US is still under the delusion that Pakistan could be made to support US in dealing with terrorists in Afghanistan. The US policy of pressure and encouragement towards Pakistan would allow the latter to do what was minimal to keep the US hopes alive while it continued to export terrorists to India. China has strong strategic interests in Pakistan and cannot part with that country. These two factors provide the necessary sustenance to Pak to keep “snakes in its backyards”. Indian strategy has to reckon with these hard facts while dealing with Pakistan.

The Indo-Japan relations meanwhile have become stronger and they are jointly taking steps to deal with the growing challenges in Asia-Africa region with a view to promote economic growth in the entire region. On 14th September 2017, during the visit of PM Abe to India, their Joint Statement said, “the two Prime Ministers reiterated their desire and determination to work together to maintain and promote peace, stability and development in the Indo-Pacific region.” Emphasising the need to align the Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy with Act East policy, the two sides decided to work together to improve connectivity both physically and digitally within the East Asia Summit framework. Significantly, while talking about trilateral dialogue systems with US and Australia, both sides resolved to work with other countries including regional partners to ensure a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Developments in China can cause worry not only to India but to all its neighbours. President Xi has emerged from the 19th Congress with near-absolute authority. The Congress voted to enshrine Xi’s name and political “thoughts” in its constitution. It means he is elevated to the historical stature of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, long considered to be modern China’s most influential leaders. In the new Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee, the most powerful decision-making council of China’s government, all members are handpicked Xi loyalists. More importantly they are all in their 60s and in the next five years they would be too old to be considered for the top position. Xi’s aggressive foreign policy is worrisome for its neighbours. An analysis of Xi’s speech reflects that China would pursue a more muscular policy. In the opening speech of the 19th Congress, he mentioned the phrase “great power” a record 26 times and promised a “world-class military” in the next few decades. Such words along with structural changes in the armed forces meant to sharpen its capabilities do not augur well for China’s neighbours. Reports suggest that Xi has asked herdsmen to move closer to Arunachal Pradesh border to strengthen Chinese claims.


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The US policy in the East Asia reflects lack of coherence. Trump’s visit to Asia in November 2017 clearly reflected this. He lavished praise on President Xi calling him “a very special man” and “a highly respected and powerful representative of his people” and went on to congratulate him for consolidating his power at the 19th CCP Congress. This belied all earlier hopes that Trump in his visit would pressurise China to adhere to the verdict of Permanent Court of Arbitration of July 2016 on the South China Sea disputes. On North Korea Trump gave different statements. While in Japan he declared that the “era of his patience is over”, a day later in South Korea he stated that Washington was open to diplomatic efforts to resolve the standoff with North Korea. Given this approach of US, the states in the region are working on their own to deal with new challenges, though the revival of quadrilateral group involving US, Japan, India and Australia is a significant development.

PM Modi visited the Philippines to attend the 15th ASEAN-India Summit. He stated, “India’s Act East Policy is shaped around the ASEAN and its centrality in the regional security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region is evident. India assures the ASEAN of its steady support towards achieving a rules-based regional security architecture that best attests to the region’s interests and its peaceful development.” This statement regarding continued support from India in the time of uncertainty triggered by the Chinese and North Korean activities could have been reassuring to smaller states interested in finding a lasting solution to the issues in the Indo-Pacific region.

Dr SD Pradhan Former Deputy National Security Advisor

Chief Editor


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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Shri DC Pathak, IPS (Retd) is the President of the CCSS Editorial Board. He is the former Director IB; Chairman Joint Intelligence Committee and member of the National Security Advisory Board. He has extensively travelled abroad and has authored four books on intelligence and security issues, which were well received in both professional as well as academic circles. He writes regularly on matters of strategic interest.

Dr SD Pradhan is the Chief Editor and the Director General of the CCSS. He is the former Deputy National Security Adviser and Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee. He was the Chairman of Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus (2008-2010) that reviewed the functioning of all the intelligence agencies in the country. He is the Advisor, E-Raksha of Cyber Security Division, Gujrat Technological University, Ahmedabad and a member of Board of Studies, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. He has written two books on World War I and had contributed several chapters in the official history of 1971 Indo-Pak War and authored the official history of the Role of Indian Army in the Counter Insurgency Operations. He regularly writes on strategic and intelligence issues.

V Adm Pradeep Kaushiva UYSM, VSM (Retd) is a member of the CCSS Editorial Board. He is the former Commandant, National Defence College and Director, National Maritime Foundation. He had earlier served as the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet. He is a prolific writer and contributes articles on strategic affairs and maritime security issues in various newspapers and journals.


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Maj Gen (Dr) PK Chakravorty VSM (Retd) served in the Indian Army in various appointments for 38 yrs. As the Defence Attaché at the Embassy of India in Hanoi, Vietnam, he was monitoring the Chinese military activities and was providing insightful analyses. Later, he served as the Additional Director General of Artillery, at the Army Headquarters. He is academically inclined with an inherent flair for research. He is an independent researcher, an acclaimed writer and an active participant in contemporary seminars.

Shri Rajesh Kumar Srivastava is the Managing Trustee as well as Deputy Director General of the CCSS and Secretary of the Angika Development Society. He has the distinction of being actively involved in the educational field and is currently the Pro Vice Chairman of Delhi Public School, Bhagalpur; Delhi Public School, Greater Ranchi and Delhi Public School, Burdawan. He regularly organises training modules for students on national and cyber security issues. He is also an Advisor to InfoSec Consortium of India, which is a premier organization on cyber security. Shri Rajesh Srivastava had earlier worked as a Vice President with Reliance Industries Ltd and as Director Marketing with GE Spacenet BV. He has rich experience in international and domestic relations, Business Development, IT & Telecom sectors etc. He has widely travelled overseas as Secretary General for Indian Importers Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM and Bar (Retd) is one of India’s most decorated army officers. During his long career, he had served in Sri Lanka with the IPKF; in Punjab - during the heyday of militancy; in the North-East and in Jammu & Kashmir during his Seven tenures of duty. He also commanded his unit in Siachen Glacier. His most notable appointment was as GOC 15 Corps in the Kashmir Valley where he helped turn around the situation with balanced application of hard and soft power. Having served in almost all turbulent zones of the nation the General brings his vast experience to the world of strategic studies and revels in the challenge of analysing the most complex security issues facing India. He is now associated with the Vivekananda International Foundation and the Institute for Peace & Conflict Studies and contributes articles in journals and newspapers on security issues.


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Lt Gen Kamal Davar PVSM, AVSM (Retd) is one of India’s distinguished soldiers and military thinkers. He was wounded in action in the 1965 operations and had also participated in the 1971 war. He commanded the Ladakh Division, was Chief of Staff of a Corps HQ in Kashmir. Later, he was a Corps Commander responsible for the defence of Punjab, after a short stint as DG Mechanised Forces. After the Kargil war, he was appointed the first Chief of Defence Intelligence Agency and Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff. He is a prolific writer and is called upon by various institutions, both at home and abroad, to address them on strategic and security issues.

Capt Shekhar Dutt SM IAS (Retd) is a Patron of CCSS; Chairman, CCSS Advisory Council; Member, Editorial Board and Chairman, Angika Development Society. He is the former Governor of Chhattisgarh; Deputy National Security Advisor; Defence Secretary; Secretary, Defence Production; Secretary, Ministry of Health and DG, Sports Authority of India. He is also the Honorary Professor, Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. He has authored two books on defence, national security and developmental issues.

Dr Rakesh Datta is the Professor, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University. He is also the Chairman of the Governing Body of the CCSS Regional Research Studies Wing. He is a former member of the National Security Advisory Board. He has written several research papers and three books and various projects on Mercantilism and India’s Maritime Interest.

Ms Purnima Gupta is an eminent economist and is a former Economic Advisor to the Government of India. She has a vast experience and served different departments in this capacity like Human Resource Development, Tariff Commission, Central Electricity Authority and Planning Commission. She retired from the Indian Economic Service after working for more than 35 years in different departments. She has participated in several international seminars and conferences. She was a special invitee at the workshop organised by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific. She is a prolific writer and has contributed papers in several journals.


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SINEWS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Vice Admiral Pradeep Kaushiva UYSM, VSM (Retd)

Introduction

The traditional concept of national security has undergone fundamental changes over the years. It is no longer synonymous with sufficient military strength to defend the nation and its interests. In today’s world, military might alone does not guarantee either sovereignty or security. The more realistic and comprehensive approach to national security also includes economic strength, internal cohesion and technological prowess. The fundamental security of the individual citizen includes security of life and property, food security, energy security, clean environment, education and health.

Constituted by the Union Cabinet in July 1999, the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) looked into the then recent intrusion by Pakistan and brought to light many grave deficiencies in India’s security management. In pursuance of KRC recommendations, the Prime Minister set up in April 2000 a Group of Ministers (GoM) to review the national security system in its entirety and consider the recommendations of the KRC for formulating specific proposals for implementation.

This was independent India’s first comprehensive review of the national security system which made an in depth examination of the rationale of national security. According to GoM, “The traditional concept of national security has undergone fundamental changes over the years. It is no longer synonymous with sufficient military strength to defend the nation and its interests. In today’s world, military might alone does not guarantee either sovereignty or security. The more realistic and comprehensive approach to national security also includes economic strength, internal cohesion and technological prowess. The fundamental security of the individual citizen includes security of life and property, food security, energy security, clean environment, education and health. A strong sense of nationalism and good governance also form an integral part of the national security as does the ability to retain political and economic sovereignty and autonomy of decision making in an era of globalisation and increasing economic interdependence.” The GoM made out that the biggest challenge facing the country was the need to step up the pace of economic growth and to ensure fair and equitable distribution of fruits of such growth. It went on to add, that this could not be achieved without first ensuring stable peace and security in the country.

In the GoM view, therefore, the task of safeguarding the country’s security assumed an overriding primacy. Accordingly, a conscious decision was taken by


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the GoM to exclude the wide sweep of diverse issues such as nation’s economic and technological capability, its food and energy needs etc and to address in detail the management of national security while taking into account the need for meeting the newly emerging challenges. More than a decade and half downstream, many recommendations of the GoM have been implemented to varying degrees of effectiveness. But some of the most critical ones are yet to see the light of the day; possibly because of lack of political will spanning the leading national political parties. While examining what national security is all about, it is important to be clear about what it is not. In the Indian context, it is relevant to note a recent in-house cautionary administered to the oldest democracy on earth “the last thing the nation’s leaders should do is to mistake political dissent as a threat to homeland security; although surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities are necessary to combat terrorism, it is imperative that America’s leaders keep a bright line between watching terrorists and monitoring the political views of Americans”. There should be clarity on the freedom of speech and the sovereign rights of the State.

Constituents of national security

In its generic form, the notion of national security relates to things whose protection a nation considers so fundamental to survival and well-being as to be worthy of all investment of effort and resources. “The national valuables in this broad sense include current assets and national interests, as well as the sources of strength upon which our future as a nation depends. Some valuables are tangible and earthy; others are spiritual or intellectual”. India understands this well, having experienced repeated external onslaughts starting with incursions by Darius I and Alexander all the way to the Mughal invasion and British colonisation. For various reasons the narrative of our past has, focused more upon grandiose idealism than pragmatism and this needs to be corrected - not by revising history but by drawing the right lessons there from. For any generation, its distant past is nothing to be cagey about because it must be believed that those living then must have done the best for the nation, within the compulsions and imperatives of the day. We must draw out the reasons for lack of success in the past and suitably craft them for incorporating them in the best interest of the present and future generations.

There is need for us to rediscover the tenets of economics, political science, administration and security expounded 2300 years ago in Arthashastra by Chanakya who was one of the greatest exponents of State craft and then define and execute their Twenty First Century applications. Further, references to and learning from ‘Art of War’- the ancient Chinese treatise on military strategy and tactics by Sun Tzu and modern Western security thought leaders would undoubtedly place the contemporary strategy planners and executors in a much better position to deliver on their tasks. In the present age of near total transparency of professional thoughts, it is imperative that all available strands of knowledge and ideas be factored in for


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drawing up our own options. In a competitive environment disregard of views only because they are of foreign origin, could be as self denying as rigid adherence to out of date practices simply because they were our own.

In the broad swath of national security paradigm the administration, civil society and armed forces stand out as the primary constituents that bear all responsibility and whose interplay directly determines how secure a nation is. Each of these has to be examined at length.

The administration

The word administration is synonymous with regulation, management, executive, direction, command, control, charge, conduct, operation, supervision, overseeing and adjudication. In the national context, it covers all functions of the State and includes those carried out by its different organs in accordance with the Constitution and coordinated by the government.

Indian Constitution vests executive power of the State in the President and specifically puts the supreme command of Defence Forces of the Union in the latter’s hands. This makes Defence Forces of the Union of India unique and different from all other instruments of the State as no other service, cadre or force has been accorded such a recognition or stature. India provides a division of responsibility amongst the organs of the State to provide for the checks and balances that form the bedrock of democratic functioning. The executive powers of the Government are in effect, exercised by the Council of Ministers through various ministries, agencies and departments.

Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution define the political objectives of the Government, to promote welfare of the people by securing and protecting a social order in which justice – social, economic and political - prevails upon all institutions of public life. All parties define their aims and poll promises to the best of their understanding in their quest for political power. The democratic process is throbbing with vitality but many problems are showing up, too.

Firstly, poll promises are often underachieved. In more matured democracies, the underperformer is held to account by the electorate but in India the elected representative get away with failures. Some of the reasons for this are the huge illiteracy, well established pattern of patronage and favours as also appeasement politics. The reported nexus between criminals, bureaucrats and politicians is a known factor behind the distortions of the democratic process in India.

Recent initiatives to skill the youth for job markets, to break the criminal-bureaucrat-politician nexus and measures to enhance the ease of business are commendable. However, there is an imperative urgency about raising the literate


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population. In our nation there are rules that spell out requirements of educational qualifications and character verification of candidates for appointment to government service but there are no such provisions for taking over as a law maker or indeed as a minister. Also, there are no consequences for non-attendance or a publicly visible misconduct. Attempts to draw up an appropriate code of conduct for members of Lok Sabha have not succeeded so far. An implementable code of conduct for members of both houses of Parliament and State legislators, starting with a statutory job description, has to be fixed. The Election Commission of India’s must define its stand on life-time ban on politicians convicted in criminal cases. In its larger application, the British ‘Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament’ and Defence Minister Sir Michael Fallon’s resignation saying that his conduct may have fallen short of the standards expected by the UK’s military ; both set a bench mark for political leaders’ conduct and are worthy of emulation.

Secondly, the nation’s executive arm needs to be so structured as to most effectively deliver the national objectives. It is not the government’s job to conduct day to day activities or to run businesses or even to act as a regulator. It is to draw up suitable rules and regulations for each and then to ensure that all functions were carried out appropriately. In this context, in compliance with Supreme Court of India’s September 2013 directive, ‘None of the Above’ (NOTA) option was introduced as a landmark reform in India’s electoral system. This means that if the electorate has refused to accept any of the candidates as its representative by casting the maximum votes for the option, the election should be held anew with a fresh set of candidates. In practice, however, NOTA has no electoral impact, as the elective cognisance of NOTA votes has not been defined. The Election Commission of India (ECI), being an autonomous constitutional authority, is inherently empowered to examine this and it must examine how to implement the 2013 directive of India’s apex court.

Thirdly, a well-defined government binds the disparate elements of societal cohesion, economy, infrastructure, technology, industry, energy resources, environment et al into one coherent frame and views it all through the prism of security. It is for this reason that strands of security need to be integrally woven ab initio into every aspect of national endeavour. There are intelligence apparatus, both external and internal, that support and augment the nation’s security paraphernalia both overtly as well as covertly. The challenge is for concentric rings of security with graduated response mechanisms, to be ready across the various segments of the government.

A mature governance superstructure ensures that its overarching oversight is always present but remains invisible till an intervention is kicked in with full attendant responsibility. The citizenry and collaborators as well as contestants need to be reassured through demonstrated performance about the State’s readiness to support all legal activities and equally, to quell all illegal ones. The nation’s law enforcement agencies carry the burden of immense responsibility in this regard


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because their credibility itself is a deterrent against law-breaking. Even as nation awaits the many long overdue institutional reforms, depoliticising law enforcement and professionalising all regulatory activity, will be great steps forward. The current political dispensation is completely free from the compulsions of coalition politics which was a term used for long to defend many acts of omission and commission, including outright corruption and criminal misconduct. The present and the foreseeable, therefore, offer a historic opportunity to clinically rid the national governance of all wrong that has ailed it for the last seventy years and put in place modern management practices at the national level that the future would be proud of. Even if it is to state the obvious, it just does not matter where we are coming from. Where we are going is all that matters. All handicaps, prejudices, denials and deprivations of the past, need to be resolutely discarded as baggage of history.

The civil society

The Constitution assigns to every citizen of India the Fundamental Duty to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. This duty provides the security thread which runs through all individual and collective endeavours of the citizens. Since civil society is the pool from which building blocks for all pillars of the State are drawn up, it must emphasize instilling of a value system, quality education, development of an enquiring mind & scientific temper, ambition to excel and willingness to work for success as the paradigms for individual personality development. All members of the society have two roles to play in nation building. First is of being a responsible citizen and the second is of contributing to the election of the right kind of lawmakers of the country. There may, be conflicts of personal interests but it should be remembered that a personal interest in conflict with the societal/national interest is most likely to be on the wrong side of the law as well.

All citizens have the rights to equality before law; non-discrimination; equal opportunity; freedoms of speech, assemble peaceably, form associations, move freely, reside anywhere in the country and practice any profession; and the right to education.

Article 51A in Part IV A of the Constitution, which spells out Fundamental Duties, inter alia enjoins on every citizen to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform; and to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. It should be possible to evolve a mandate for all citizens that leads them to learn to stand in a queue, not obstruct vehicular traffic, drive safely & responsibly, respect other citizens’ dignity, be equally mindful of other citizens’ rights and conduct themselves with civility.

All fields of activity and endeavour draw their participants from the civil society. Some citizens have clarity about the future pursuits and are successful in exercising their choice of career out of the many available options. Defence forces


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are unique since, due to younger age profile requirements, the majority of officers as well as men exercise their option to join well before other choices become available to them. They are a readily recognised group that the civil society as a whole respectsand holds in exceptionally high esteem. Motivation levels of the predominant section of the defence services entrants are markedly higher than their counterparts on the civil street. This provides an ab-initio fillip to national security potential and makes for a case of utilizing ex-servicemen in the national endeavours as much as it can be reasonably done.

Defence forces

Civil society of the nation looks at the defence forces not only as saviours of the nation in war but also as role models for professionalism, courage, daring, adventure, upright bearing and conduct, esprit the corps and sheer way of life. It is for this reason that they are often entrusted with tasks on which the civilian responsible agencies find difficult to deliver. The defence services personnel, through training and sheer persuasion, develop military ethos which are inspired by the simplest objective of fighting through all conditions to victory no matter how much effort is required. The servicemen implicitly trust duly constituted leadership and expect to be trusted. They are loyal to the core and standby buddies & subordinates and expect loyalty from superiors. In the defence forces violations of regulations and codes of conduct are dealt with publicly, swiftly, fairly and lawfully. The fact that every salute is returned and not just acknowledged or accepted or ignored ever, encapsulates the fundamental tenet of respect being mutual even between the senior most and the junior most. All relationships among the defence forces personnel are forged on due reciprocity not quid pro quo. Where the soldier sees himself or his seniors undermined, demoralisation sets in rapidly but very quietly. Called upon to secure the national interest in all situations from war to ‘hot peace’, counter terrorism, counter insurgency, civic unrest, social agitation, breakdown of civil administration, non-professionalism of civic agencies, natural calamities et al; the soldier sees himself as the nation’s last bulwark. He readily forsakes his personal interests and neglects his own family to provide succour to all citizens of the nation and he feels pained when insensitive articulations make his service out to be a burden on the taxpayer. All of this calls for a new level of realisation on the part of the nation of the importance of keeping the defence forces at the required level of dignity and care. Our military leadership spanning generations has ensured that, as an institution, India’s defence forces steadfastly remain apolitical and exceptionally motivated.

Defence forces are a unique organisation wherein a close relationship is maintained between the serving personnel and the veterans, institutionally as well as personally. It is for this reason that veterans often bring up such issues to the notice of civil society and the government which the serving personnel feel inhibited from raising or reiterating. The veterans do so from the sense of responsibility and


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lifelong commitment to the nation which their training and colour service have instilled in them. So, instead of shooting the messenger, full value should be derived from the cautionary that they flag. And today’s serving personnel, being fully aware that they are tomorrow’s veterans, can take a lot of comfort from the knowledge that the feedback being provided was in fact being heeded.The political leadership can derive immense value from such inputs and feedbacks.

Civil-military relationship

Militaries or armed forces are the last bastion of national security after all other instruments of State fail and since they draw men and women from the civil society as well to serve for varying durations, the state of Civil-Military relationship is a crucial factor in helping them to respond for the nation’s defence. During the colour service period, the civil personnel forsake many of their fundamental rights which the Constitution guarantees all citizens, undergo specialised training and undertake most hazardous assignments to secure the nation and its citizens against threats both external as well as internal. A grateful civil society accords them recognition and honour that is the exclusively reserved for members of the armed forces during their service period and beyond. The armed forces are provided the most effective equipment to defend the nation with, that the nation can afford. Armed forces of a nation are constitutionally created instruments of the State which are manned, officered and led by their own cadres in accordance with acts of the Parliament. The Constitution vests superior management of the military and its overall tasking in the nation’s political leadership.

India’s defence forces have the most impeccable track record of professional excellence within the constitutional framework while maintaining their apolitical character. There has, however, been a steady dilution of their direct interface with the political leadership right after the Independence and a systematic erosion of their standing relative to other organs of the State, particularly since the Third Pay Commission. In the process of decline of direct engagement of the nation’s political leadership with the defence forces, a trust deficit has developed between political leadership and the defence services. The unresolved issues of 5th and 6th Pay Commissions along with new anomalies of the 7th Pay Commission have only widened the gap. The OROP imbroglio is another example of immense embarrassment being caused to the well-meaning political establishment, which had actually taken the initiative to do some good, through irresponsible turns of phrase by the vested interests. The issue of the Non-Functional Upgradation denial to the defence services, granted to all Class A civilian officers of the Government of India (GoI), is already sub judice in the Supreme Court. As our bureaucratic system relates seniority with pay and perks, the defence forces have silently witnessed their standing relative to other government functionaries, slide over the last seventy years. In the interest of national security, any matter that causes a sense of systemic set back to the defence services, needs to be reversed with utmost urgency.


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In so far as location of defence forces in the Government of India (GoI) is concerned, the KRC had reflected very succinctly eighteen years ago that “India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure….The Prime Minister and Defence Minister do not have the benefit of the views and expertise of the Army Commanders and their equivalents in Navy and Air Force so that higher level defence management are more consensual and broadbased...The present obsolete system has perpetuated the culture of the British Imperial theatre system of an India Command, whereas what we need is a National Defence HQ…The status quo is often mistakenly defended as embodying civilian ascendancy over the armed forces, which is not the real issue. In fact, locating the SHQ in the Government will further enhance civilian supremacy.” The KRC observation was based on the facts that “The legal framework for government of armed forces by the Chiefs is spelt out in respective Acts of Parliament enacted in 1950’s ( Acts) and statutory orders issued there under. Held accountable by their respective Acts, the Chiefs are responsible to the GOI. However, GOI Allocation of Business Rules ( AOB) and Transaction of Business Rules (TOB) both of 1961, make no reference to the Chiefs and place responsibility for defence of India and all parts thereof under the Defence Secretary”. Consequently, “...By trying to ‘muddle through’ with a defence management system which is clearly outdated and largely dysfunctional, we are hazarding India’s security and vital interests. Reform is an urgent necessity...”. “ Whilst the major reforms are awaited, even as measures ad interim, it is desirable to make a small start with cross posting of service officers to the Ministry of Defence and IAS officers to the defence services headquarters.” Also since the nation’s defence forces and security/law enforcement agencies are on different turfs, there should be no routine equating between the defence forces and the police/para military formations. The defence forces have a unique constitutional identity and charter of defending the nation and this should be understood and projected not only in a situation of war but also in peacetime.

Conclusion

There is an urgent need for reforms to break the politician-administrator-criminal nexus and stamp out corruption in the polity just as there is an immediate need for academic, social and economic upliftment of the large lagging section of the society.

Every nation pursues its destiny through close binding together of all its endeavours with the thread of security. The contributions of government, civil society and defence forces play a decisive role in defining the effectiveness of the security paradigm. Each one of these is distinctive in character but interdependent in execution.


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Government is a key determinant of the success or otherwise of the nation’s quest of its manifest destiny during its tenure not only because it wields the executive power of the sovereign nation but also because it underwrites the administrative support for all pillars of the State and coordinates their functioning. There is an urgent need for reforms to break the politician-administrator-criminal nexus and stamp out corruption in the polity just as there is an immediate need for academic, social and economic upliftment of the large lagging section of the society. In the last seventy years, India has experienced apex leadership provided, albeit for varying durations, by political parties across the ideological spectrum from Congress & UPA to BJP & NDA via third front coalitions. What has been consistently common to all, is the politics of appeasement & patronage in the name of welfare. Another urgent need is for the national administration to get on and deliver and not keep explaining non-delivery. Elective empowerment of the NOTA option on Electronic Voting Machines, if implemented, would be a significant electoral reform for India’s democracy.

There is need for India’s civil society to conduct itself with transparent dignity and responsibility. Our culture and traditions have stood us well over millennia. But over time, some distortions have crept in. We must diligently pick up only those values and traditions which are valid for the Twenty First Century and also import and adopt modern best practices from elsewhere. Meticulous and unexceptional compliance with the rule of law is mandatory and the strong arm of law enforcement must ensure this. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has drawn record audiences across the globe and the visuals of his personal chemistry one-on-one with world leaders of the day, are most impressive. But glory of the vibrant democracy that he represents, is paled ever so frequently by boorish, uncivilised, uncultured, illegal or otherwise unbecoming conduct of a few at home, not excluding some in positions of high responsibility. Those in positions of responsibility and authority must not condone, accept or even tolerate serious misdemeanours through official silence.

And finally, it should not be forgotten that the jawan expects his military leaders to get for him the just package that he deserves. He is bewildered when after all the lip service; he feels deprived of something that is linked to his izzat and honour. Unsympathetic and insensitive handling of military personnel, serving or retired is to be given up.

The sinews of national security - the constituents that represent them - need to function with interdependence. Stronger policies and meaningful action plans are needed for enhancing effectiveness of national security. This is a continuing process that must go on regardless of the political complexion of the ruling dispensation of India.

(The author is a former Commandant, National Defence College)


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INDIA’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD – MANAGING MULTIPOLARITY

Maj Gen (Dr) P K Chakravorty VSM (Retd)

The world is witnessing a profound rebalancing of strategic and economic power in the international order. There is a global shift in the balance of power from the West to the East. Globalization – the opening of national markets to trade, international capital and foreign investment and the resultant global flows of technology – has been the engine of this economic and strategic rebalancing. Foreign investment and global supply chains are interconnecting governments and nations as much as markets. However, globalization has ruthless side effects. Nations accustomed to being at the top of the pyramid are being forced to make harsh structural adjustments. … Rising economic powers have reawakened to their sovereign claims backed by large-scale military build-ups. Nationalism is a potent force around the world… Internal changes in important countries are also taking place which have potentials to significantly influence their external relations adding to the complexities of the fast changing global security environment.

Introduction

India has been pursuing an independent foreign and security policy ever since she gained freedom in 1947. India followed the policy of Non Alignment to remain outside of the cold war tussles and maintain strategic autonomy in the foreign affairs that was needed to protect its national interests. India managed to keep close relations with all the important powers and made specific agreements to meet the requirements of an evolving situation. India moved close to the Soviet Union during the 1971 War and later signed a Civil Nuclear Deal with the United States about a decade ago. India tried its best to avoid wars as far as possible and the ones that India had to fight were thrust upon the country either by Pakistan or by China. Even after these wars, India strove to build closer relations with both the countries. After 1962, no serious incident took place at the border with China and the two way trade increased to about $ 75 billion despite provocative actions by China in between. Even with Pakistan, sincere efforts were initiated by India to improve relations though these have not been able to achieve success. Broadly speaking, since 1947 India has been pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy after Independence which has been combined with decisiveness and clear priorities in recent times.


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Current dynamics

The world is witnessing a profound rebalancing of strategic and economic power in the international order. There is a global shift in the balance of power from the West to the East. Globalization – the opening of national markets to trade, international capital and foreign investment and the resultant global flows of technology – has been the engine of this economic and strategic rebalancing. Foreign investment and global supply chains are interconnecting governments and nations as much as markets. However, globalization has ruthless side effects. Nations accustomed to being at the top of the pyramid are being forced to make harsh structural adjustments. Rising economic powers have reawakened to their sovereign claims backed by large-scale military build-ups. Internal changes in important countries are taking place which have potentials to significantly influence their external relations adding to the complexities of the fast changing global security environment. Nationalism remains a potent force around the world in the face of globalisation.

With a new administration in the United States and France and Britain moving out of the European Union a certain degree of unpredictability in their approaches is witnessed. China which had witnessed unexceptional rise in the economic growth in the past is facing a slower rate of growth and is looking for new avenues to enhance its economic power. China’s decision to push the project of One Belt One Road (also known as BRI) is propelled by this desire. At the same time, China perceives that the current shifts in the international order are favouring its plan of emerging as one of the important global players. While the United States remains the most powerful and influential force, its relative strength has diminished. Russia is currently assertive and is seeking to be a global player like the former Soviet Union but is still far away from that goal. Japan is trying to break from the restrictions imposed by the Second World War. Its economic strength helps it to move in this direction. In India’s neighbourhood, the entire region starting from Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West Asia onwards to Morocco is witnessing growth of terrorism, fundamentalism and sharp regional rivalries involving Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Turkey, Iran, Syria and Israel.

It is against this backdrop, a self-confident India is trying to reach out to its neighbours and other powers keeping the focus on economic development and protecting its sovereignty. India’s security challenges have serious proportions. India’s most of the internal challenges are Pak supported or Pak sponsored. India’s external security challenges emanate from China and Pakistan and the inefficiency of the world institutions that were created for resolution of the global problems. The UN’s system dominated by five permanent members deserves special attention as a source for concern for India because of the free play China has there.


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The Government of Prime Minister Modi came to power in 2014. It is politically strong and is striving hard to create a climate that would enable India to achieve a high economic growth in spite of the hurdles. Recognising the importance of advance technologies, India has since 2014, declared its intentions to go in for economic reforms and place emphasis on promoting the ease of doing business. India has been successful in these objectives. In foreign policy, India has taken steps to align its approach to a significantly altered regional and international political, security and economic terrain. The foreign policy gives priority to our national security interests. The twin objectives of economic development and security despite new challenges posed by two neighbours remain in the focus of the current government. Prime Minister Modi has asserted Indian interests in ways that few had anticipated when he had assumed office. His speeches at the Raisina Dialogue reflected his policies and approaches. In his first address there in 2016, he stressed ‘connectivity’ while in the second he emphasised on ‘Multipolarity and Multilateralism,’ signalling a larger vision of India as a regional power.

Attaching priority to India’s neighbourhood, the new government in 2014 invited all heads of state of SAARC countries and Mauritius for the swearing in ceremony of the Prime Minister. The event was attended by Navin Ramgoolam of Mauritius, Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, Tshering Tobgay of Bhutan, Abdulla Yameen of Maldives, Sushil Koirala of Nepal, Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka and Speaker Shirin Sharmin of Bangladesh. This was a step taken by the new government to send a positive message to India’s neighbours. This neighbourhood policy has seen the successful launching of a SAARC satellite with the help of Geo Synchronous Launch Vehicle on the 5th May 2017. This is a geosynchronous communications and meteorology satellite operated by India for the entire SAARC region except for Pakistan which had chosen to stay away. All SAARC nations other than Pakistan are happy with the launch and appreciated efforts by India to improve the cohesiveness of SAARC.

Pakistan, of course, continues with its policy of dealing with India through a thousand cuts. After exhausting all diplomatic means to improve relations, India has now de-legitimised the state support to terrorism. This has up to some extent isolated Pakistan. The BRICS meeting of 2017 in its Joint Declaration mentioned the names of Pak based terrorist organisations - JeM and LeT - along with global terror groups like Haqqani’s network, Islamic State and Al Qaeda for the first time. US President Trump minced no words in criticising the Pak duplicity in Afghanistan. While outlining his South Asia Policy on 21st August 2017, President Trump slammed Pakistan for giving continued support to terrorist groups while pretending to be fighting against them. He warned Islamabad of consequences if it continued to do so. The US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, during his visit to Pakistan on the 23rd October 2017 conveyed Trump’s stern message that Pakistan must step up its efforts to eradicate militants and terrorists operating within the country. While it


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would be unrealistic to expect that Pakistan would change its policy, the pressure on it is building up from the world community.

India also initiated talks with special envoys from all the countries who are permanent representatives of the Security Council. This included the then Secretary of State of the United States, John Kerry. All these countries gave positive indications to the Modi government. However, India while developing close relations with the US maintains its strategic autonomy in external affairs and did not accept the US request for sanctions against Russia because of the latter’s role in Ukraine in 2014.

India is now also focussed on its ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ including the Indian Ocean region. The new Act East policy is an extension of the Look East Policy of India that dates back to 1992. Geographically the policy embraces the stretch from India Eastwards across the Pacific to the Western coast of the United States. The Act East policy has been actively pursued and it has led to the strengthening of India’s relations with ASEAN, Japan and Australia. India’s strategic relations have been deeply intensified with both Japan and Vietnam aimed at the twin objective of mutual economic development and the maintenance of status quo in the East and South China Seas. Australia like US is also concerned with the assertive activities of China and is interested in supporting US, India and Japan for the maintenance of status quo particularly in the South China Sea - a region that is witnessing tension because of the Chinese land reclamation activities and aggressive patrolling in the disputed area. The strategic linking of these countries could counter the assertive rise of China in East and South East Asia.

The Indian Ocean Region forms an important part of the foreign policy of the Modi Government. India’s area of interest extends from the Straits of Hormuz to the Malacca Straits. The focus has been on improving relations with the littoral countries, strengthening defence structures in Andaman Islands, monitor the Chinese naval submarines berthing at Sri Lanka, tracking developments in the Pakistani port of Gwadar which is the commencement of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and finding a land entry into Afghanistan through the port of Chabahar in Iran. Further, the Modi government has introduced Project Mausam which will link ports from East Africa to South East Asia for the purpose of improving geographical and cultural connectivity. While the road link from Chabahar to Afghanistan onwards to Central Asia is comparable to the CPEC, Project Mausam would be comparable to the Maritime Silk Route. All of this enhances India’s focus on the Indian Ocean. India and Japan have come up with the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) to develop linkages between the two continents for mutual economic development. The AAGC would be raised on the four pillars of development and cooperation projects, quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity, enhancing capacities and skills and people-to-people partnership. Simultaneously, India along with Japan is trying to realise a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region’ with the support of all regional and


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concerned countries. Stressing the importance of the Indian Ocean region, Prime Minister Modi at the Raisina Dialogue in 2017 said, “The arc of influence of Indian Ocean extends well beyond its littoral limits. Our initiative of SAGAR - Security and Growth for All in the Region - is not just limited to safe-guarding our mainland and islands. It defines our efforts to deepen economic and security cooperation in our maritime relationships. We know that convergence, cooperation and collective action will advance economic activity and peace in our maritime region.” Further he emphasised the need to follow international law – an indirect reference to China’s acts against UNCLOS. He said, “We believe that respecting Freedom of Navigation and adhering to international norms is essential for peace and economic growth in the larger and inter-linked marine geography of the Indo-Pacific.” India has thus spoken like a major power of the world standing for development and peace at the global level.

The present Government has also commenced a ‘Link West Policy’ to define relations with West Asian countries. India is pursuing a three pronged approach. First, diaspora in these countries is to be treated as a significant instrument of India’s foreign policy to attract remittances and investments, ensure lobbying for India and promoting Indian culture abroad for painting a good picture of India. India has been very active in providing relief and air lifting the Indian workers trapped in the conflict zones of Libya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and other parts of West Asia. Secondly, the Ministry of External Affairs has institutionalised cooperation in the fields of security, defence, anti-terror measures with these countries. Saudi Arabia and UAE have already been taken on board and are looking at these aspects seriously. And thirdly, shaping of bilateral relations with the three key players in the region Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel is to be handled cautiously. During the Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia, agreement for increased investments from the Saudi Arabian sovereign wealth fund was arrived at. His visit to Iran led to greater priority being accorded to the Chabahar port and an agreement being reached for increased oil imports. Modi’s Israel visit brought in agreements for the supply of defence products and new technology into agriculture and water conservation spheres.

Strategic balancing

Post-Cold War, India’s foreign policy began to calibrate its approach to the changed international order and the security environment. India managed to remain on good terms both with US and Russia with whom India has strategic partnerships. India imports weapons from both the countries and undertakes numerous activities with these countries. As mentioned earlier, India also maintains close relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel which among themselves have antagonistic relations. India comprehends the situation and caters for the sensitivities of these countries. As India has Sunnis, Shias and Jews as a part of its population, it is easy to relate


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to the sensitivities of these nations. Similarly India is maintaining close relations with both Palestine and Israel. India strongly supports the Palestinian cause and established diplomatic relations with Israel only in 1992. Modi visited Israel as the PM of India reflecting the stance that India does not hyphenate Palestine with Israel and considers both to be equally important for India. Crucially, India has diplomatic relations with both South Korea and North Korea. At the same time India is currently supporting the United Nations sanctions against North Korea on the issue of nuclear weapons and launch of missiles. India is also keeping good relations with Armenia, Turkey and Cyprus, which have serious differences among themselves. India has thus displayed dexterous management of diplomatic manoeuvres to serve its best interests.

Conclusion

Modi in his discourse at the Raisina Dialogue in 2017 clarified that our choices and actions are based on our national power and the strategic intent which is shaped by realism, acceptability of co-existence, willingness for cooperation and ability to have partnerships. This sums up India’s realistic approach. India’s challenges may become stronger in a fast-evolving and unpredictable world. India will have to balance its stance delicately on the complex situations to safeguard its strategic and economic interests. India needs to develop further its Comprehensive National Power to play the role of a regional power.

While India’s current foreign policy in some respect is the continuation of the past policy, there are some important differences, which gives it a new look. While India’s foreign policy is based on pragmatism and security of its national interests, the country under the Prime Minister Modi has changed the approach substantially. First, India has integrated foreign policy with priorities of economic development and acquisition of advanced technology. There is no diffidence in boldly asserting India’s interests. India has clearly announced the need for closer ties with US, Japan and Russia. India’s new partnership with the US is aimed at harnessing the USA’s capital and technology for India’s domestic development agenda. With Japan India’s relations are aimed at developing a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region’, creating the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and using the Japanese capital and technology for economic development in the country. With Russia India is not only having defence relations but in the present context, India desires to have the Russian help in the creation of an open, balanced and inclusive security architecture in the Asia Pacific that would help India in increasing the commercial operations in the region.

Further, the diplomacy is now conducted on the basis of reciprocity. India’s pandering to the Chinese sensitivities, usually imaginary, has come to an end. India


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is now building pressure points around the Chinese periphery and is not hesitant in joining hands with powers like the US, Japan and Australia to stabilize the Indo-Pacific region. Modi’s visit to Mongolia has raised the level of relations with that country which is something not to the liking of China.

What is really significant is that India is now prepared to play the role of a regional power. India feels that the present international environment represents a rare opportunity for India, which must be used to lead the world towards common economic development and peace. At the Raisina Dialogue Modi asserted, “Our economic and political rise represents a regional and global opportunity of great significance. It is a force for peace, a factor for stability and an engine for regional and global prosperity.” He further referred to a path of international engagement focused on rebuilding connectivity, restoring bridges and re-joining India with our immediate and extended geographies and shaping relationships for the benefit of India’s economic priorities.

While India’s objectives are clear, there are certain factors which can come in the way of universal acceptance of the concepts of multi-polarity and multilateralism. There are also some fundamental changes shaping the domestic political milieu in the West and India will have to navigate through them with utmost care. The Sino-Russian relationship is acquiring connotations which can have long-term consequences for the Indian interests. The North Korea issue may change the relationship between US and China, which may also impact on India’s interests. The Sino-Pak nexus is growing and China is supporting Pakistan’s anti-India policies. This is also reflected in China’s blocking UN effort to declare Masood Azhar as an international terrorist. The Pak nuclear proliferation activities are continuing with the support of China. Pakistan’s policies towards India are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future because of the attitude of the ‘Deep State’ in that country.

For India the challenge is about dealing with a situation when the frames of reference are rapidly shifting. At the Raisina Dialogue in 2017, Prime Minister Modi clarified that under such circumstances our choices and actions would be based on our national power and the strategic intent which is shaped by realism, acceptability of co-existence, willingness for cooperation and ability to have partnerships. This sums up India’s realistic approach. India’s challenges may become stronger in a fast-evolving and unpredictable world. India will have to balance its stance delicately on the complex situations to safeguard its strategic and economic interests. India needs to develop further its Comprehensive National Power to play the role of a regional power.

(The writer is a former Additional Director General of Artillery, Army Headquarters)


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CCSS PAPER

INDIA'S GEO-POLITICAL ASCENDANCYDC Pathak

During the three years of Modi regime, India has steadily gained in stature before the world community and has been recognised as the pivot of security in South Asia, a contributor to the stability of Indo-Pacific region and a strategic partner of the US in the fight against the new global terror that invoked Islam for its motivation. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has successfully implemented the policy of 'nation first' to establish strong mutually beneficial bilateral relationships with US, Japan, Israel and Russia in the sphere of technology and defence and expanded India's outreach to other nations as well, to explore cooperation in areas like energy, infrastructure and transport. In recognition of the new world order resulting from the termination of the Cold War and the advent of the "Age of Information", India has rightly shed any hangovers of the days when 'non alignment' was an ideological prop. Under Modi progress of development is steady - considering how an all-pervasive corruption was eating up the state resources earlier - and the call of 'sabka sath sabka vikas' has helped to mitigate the ill effect of communal politics that was being played in the name of the economy of the minorities.

The distinct rise in the geo-political standing of India in terms of a recognition of its potential to join up with the global efforts to counter threats to world peace, is the culmination of a number of initiatives Modi government took in the recent months. The first - and perhaps the most important - was the creation of a highly productive Indo-US grid amidst the uncertainties of the early days of Trump Presidency. The solid behind-the-scene work of our National Security Advisor and the Foreign Secretary laid the turf for the first meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Trump at Washington that proved extremely fruitful. Modi was the first foreign dignitary to be extended a red carpet welcome by Trump. Modi's White House dinner with the US President was also quite impactful. The Modi-Trump joint statement sealed the friendship between the two leaders, put India on the global map as the closest strategic partner of US in Asia and unambiguously declared their resolve to have the fullest cooperation in the spheres of both economy and security.

A remarkable outcome of the visit was that President Trump expressly condemned the ongoing cross border terrorism against India and called upon Pakistan to bring the culprits of 26/11 and Pathankot to justice. To coincide with the visit the US listed Syed Salahuddin - who had been working with Hafiz Sayeed of Lashkar-e-Toiba to direct the activities of the militant wings of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir - as a 'specially designated global terrorist' thereby putting an end to the American approach of making a distinction between 'good terrorists' and 'bad


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terrorists'. Trump, thus addressed a prime Indian concern which even the Obama administration had refused to care about. Intelligence coordination between India and US on Islamic terrorism 'across the spectrum' has consequently been pushed up to a new level.

India's second initiative is towards the Indo-Pacific that has resulted in this country now emerging as an important partner of US and Japan in working for the security of this important maritime region against the aggressive designs of China. Trump has described US and India as 'responsible stewards' whose partnership will ensure freedom of navigation, commerce and over-flight in the Indo-Pacific region and keep the area peaceful and stable.

And the third is on Afghanistan where India has - in the context of the present destabilisation in that country - secured an unequivocal acknowledgement from President Trump as a crucial player in the execution of the American strategy - the US in fact recognising India as the sheet anchor of South Asian security at large. President Trump has shed the ambiguity of the Obama regime on Afghan issue and while clearly administering a warning to Pakistan against providing safe haven to Islamic terrorists operating in Afghanistan, highlighted the importance of the role of India in bringing about speedy economic development of that country for the larger interest of South Asia's security. Since President Trump has left it to the Pentagon to take decisions on Afghanistan, India should be watchful against the reappearance of the old habit of US Generals of feeling too empathetic towards Pak Army.

The new consistency in Indo-US relations based on their convergence on issues of global security was reflected in the recent visit of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to India. On the eve of this visit, Tillerson addressed the Centre for Strategic and International Studies - a leading Think Tank based in Washington - where he affirmed the American view of India being a strategic partner in dealing with the geopolitically aggressive China and also talked of a major role for India in restoring peace in Afghanistan. What is equally significant is that he put Pakistan on the leash on the question of its role in fomenting cross border terrorism against its neighbours. Tillerson's categorical statement that Pakistan was on test in the matter of taking 'decisive action' against terror groups operating from its soil showed that President Trump's appreciation for Pakistan for getting an American citizen and her family released from the captivity of Haqqani group associated with Taliban, did not detract from the tough American stand against Pakistan on issues of terror.

In his Washington address the Secretary of State had dwelt on a joint world vision of the US and India by describing the two nations as the two 'bookends of stability - on either side of the globe - standing for greater security and prosperity of their citizens as well as the people around the world'. He had talked of greater cooperation with India to tackle global threats and challenges like ensuring a 'free and open' Indo-Pacific in the face of a 'predatory China' and envisaged the expansion


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of trilateral engagement between the US, Japan and India to include countries such as Australia to secure the region. He declared that security issues that concerned India 'also concern the US' and projected India as a partner for peace in Afghanistan saying that this was part of President Trump's new South Asia strategy. He even gave out that US and India were jointly screening known and suspected terrorists and initiating a new dialogue on terrorist designations. Around the same time Nikky Haley, US ambassador to UN, told Washington-based Indo-US Friendship Council that the US needed India's help in 'keeping an eye' on the doings of Pakistan on the Afghan front. US has appreciated India's offer of fully aiding the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

All of this is pushing Pakistan into a corner and the refuge of Pak Army in the Chinese camp is not really helping the former much. US has clearly warned China against any misadventure, emphasised that Indo-Pacific had the primacy in US grand strategy with US-India partnership playing a pivotal role in securing this maritime region and endorsed India's disapproval of China Pakistan Economic Corridor on the ground that it was an attempt to subvert the sovereignty of a neighbouring country. It goes to the credit of Modi government that Indo-US relations in its watch have expanded beyond the bilateral to embrace a multilateral understanding based on convergence on global issues of security and economic import. This will guarantee advancement of India's interests. India is now looked upon as the most important strategic partner of the US in South Asia and beyond on the basis of shared values and this is a complete turnaround in the geo-political situation of India - considering what obtained in the years before Trump.

It is in continuation of this trend that the 15th ASEAN-India summit at Manila marked a significant advance of India's 'Act East' approach that Prime Minister Modi had announced in December 2015 as a more meaningful version of the earlier 'Look East' component of our foreign policy. It has validated the success of Modi in taking India - in a short period of time - to a new recognition as a regional power in this part of the globe by pushing the country's friendly relations beyond our Eastern neighbourhood to include the nations of South East Asia and those further in the Indo-Pacific stretch. Manila hosted the ASEAN meet as well as the East Asia summit and facilitated an extensive interaction between Modi and President Trump who put their stamp once again on the common strategy for Indo-Pacific region in the long term interest of all concerned countries.

An important aspect of the ASEAN summit is that it concretised the move towards a quadrilateral grouping of US, India, Japan and Australia - since described as the Quad in diplomatic and security circles. This is now largely perceived as the response of the democratic world to the geo-political assertiveness lately shown by China in what Beijing preferred to describe as the 'Asia-Pacific' region. Modi government has to be complimented for the finesse with which it has made 'Act


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East' policy an instrument for enlarging mutually beneficial bilateral relations into multi-lateral arrangements - all in pursuance of the unchanged national objective of serving India's economic and security interests. It is a measure of the clarity on global commons shown by Modi in his foreign policy initiatives that India is succeeding - as an equal partner - in forging a geo-strategic infrastructure as also the cooperative moves in concert with other major democratic powers to counter the threat posed by China to the countries of the Indo-Pacific, including India.

Showing a rare grasp of strategy Prime Minister Modi has, along with 'Act East', steered an effective policy towards the Indian Ocean Region. The focus has been on improving relations with the littoral countries, militarily building Andaman Islands, monitoring the Chinese naval submarines berthing at Sri Lanka, watching developments in the Pakistani port of Gwadar that represents one end of CPEC and extending the arc of Indian influence well beyond the littoral limits of the Indian Ocean. India's initiative of SAGAR - Security and Growth for All in the Region - is not limited to safeguarding our mainland and islands but is a means of enhancing economic and security cooperation in India's maritime relationships. At the Raisina Dialogue early this year Modi was upfront in emphasising the need to follow International Law - this was an indirect reference to China's acts against UNCLOS - and said 'we believe that respecting freedom of navigation and adhering to international norms is essential for peace and economic growth in the larger interlinked marine geography of Indo-Pacific'.

There is little doubt that Prime Minister Modi has boosted our national pride by combining India's desire for peace and unfettered development with the nation's willingness to play the role of a regional power. At the Raisina Dialogue he had enunciated that 'our economic and political rise represents a regional and global opportunity of great significance. It is a force for peace, a factor for stability and an engine for regional and global prosperity'. He visualised a path of international engagement focused on rebuilding connectivity, restoring bridges and rejoining India with our immediate and extended geographies that would shape relationships for advancing India's economic priorities.

More specifically, it is the successful conduct of the security and foreign policy that has made India a sheet anchor of unity of major democratic powers against the China-Pak axis which is an alliance of an Islamic State and a Communist dictatorship - both opposed to the values of a democratic Republic. India has to keep up its new profile as a contributor to world peace by strengthening its defence of land, sea and air and enhancing investment in the new strategic dimensions of space and cyber. India has to live up to its potential in dealing with the adversaries on one hand and playing an active role in uniting the forces of peace at the global level against terror, proliferation and aggression, on the other.

(The writer is a former Director Intelligence Bureau)


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THE SALIENCE OF THE ASIA-AFRICA GROWTH CORRIDOR

Rajesh Srivastava

The AAGC is an important initiative which will have far reaching beneficial impact on the economic development of the two continents. Its key dimensions merit attention. .. the AAGC would be raised on the four pillars of development and cooperation projects, quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity, enhancing capacities and skills, and people-to-people partnership. The Asia Africa Growth Corridor envisages a people-centric sustainable growth strategy…. the process involves detailed consultations across Asia and Africa, engaging various stakeholders- governments, firms, think tanks and civil society, to work out its structure. .. The guiding principle will be to ensure sustainability through respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law as well as boosting regional economic connectivity through the use of responsible debt financing practices.

Introduction

The real significance of the joint venture of India and Japan for the creation of a growth corridor from Asia to Africa gets obscured as it is seen as a counter move to the Chinese One Belt, One Road Initiative (BRI). An analysis of the components of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor reflects that it is vastly different from the Chinese project.

While the launch of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor in partnership with Japan was announced by the Indian Prime Minister on the 25th May 2017 during a meeting with African Development Bank in Gandhinagar, the plan of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) had been mentioned in the joint declaration issued by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in November 2016. The dialogue in this direction was initiated in 2010 with both India and Japan realising the growing value of Africa in economic and strategic terms.

Asia and Africa have several similarities in terms of economic growth and aspirations of people. There are ongoing efforts for faster economic growth and development and people in both the continents aspire for better future. There have been a number of multilateral efforts between the nations of two continents to achieve the above objectives. There is a complementarity in the two continents. While Asia is a robust economy and needs markets and raw materials, Africa is on the growth path and can meet the requirements of both markets and raw materials.


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This provides with a significant opportunity to both to establish strong partnership for mutual economic development, which is the main objective of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.

Key features of AAGC

The AAGC is an important initiative which will have far reaching beneficial impact on the economic development of the two continents. Its key dimensions merit attention. First, the AAGC would be raised on the four pillars of development and cooperation projects, quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity, enhancing capacities and skills and people-to-people partnership. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor envisages a people-centric sustainable growth strategy, which will be its unique feature. Second, the process involves detailed consultations across Asia and Africa, engaging various stakeholders - governments, firms, think tanks and civil society, to work out its structure. Third, the strengths of AAGC will be aligned with the development priorities of different countries and sub-regions of Asia and Africa, taking advantage of simultaneous homogeneity and heterogeneity among them. This would be undertaken to improve growth and interconnectedness between and within Asia and Africa for actualisation of the concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region – an initiative that India and Japan are jointly promoting. Fourth, it would give priority to development projects in health and pharmaceuticals, agriculture and agro-processing, disaster management and skill enhancement fields, which are needed in both the continents. Fifth, it envisages adoption of the best international debt practices. The guiding principle will be to ensure sustainability through respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law as well as boosting regional economic connectivity through the use of responsible debt financing practices. In AAGC, there is no intent to convert the economic power into the political power and privileges.

India and Africa

Both India and Japan had been planning to strengthen relations with the African continent for quite some time. India has long historical linkages with African countries. In the current situation, Africa is invaluable for India both economically and geopolitically. Besides this being an area rich in minerals, it can help in diversifying India’s energy sources. Africa can also help in facing the food security challenges and provides with space for the Indian investments. Geopolitically, the African countries can provide much needed help in reforming the UN. Africa also provides India with a space to display its soft and hard power. India can and is assisting African countries in capacity building. Africa’s geostrategic importance is also significant for India. The threats of radicalism, piracy and organised crimes originate from this region and therefore the assistance of the African countries can be invaluable.


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India’s economic engagement with African countries has increased considerably in the last 15 years with a large number of public and private sector companies from India investing in Africa. India is the second largest investor in Africa after China. However, the gap is substantial and India’s investment is through Mauritius. Trade has seen a five-fold increase from US$ 11.9 billion in 2005-2006 to 56.7 billion in 2015-16. In trade too, India ranks second after China though there is a substantial gap at present between the values of trade of these two countries. It is worth mentioning that in 2000, both India and China were almost at par in terms of total value of trade with Africa.

India announced major steps to strengthen relations with African countries at the India Africa Forum Summit in 2015. The following important announcements were made:-

• India pledged $10 billion in Lines of Credit for a host of development projects over the next five years and pledged a grant assistance of $ 600 million. This grant includes an India-Africa Development Fund of $100 million and an India-Africa Health Fund of $10 million. It also includes 50,000 scholarships in India over the next five years and support to the expansion of the Pan-African e-network and institutions of skilling, training and learning across Africa.

• It brought out a blueprint for enhanced cooperation in developing blue-ocean economy. Blue economy aims at sustainable development of marine resources, which will drive growth and prosperity of India, Africa and other littoral states blessed with long coastlines.

• Support long term capital flows to Africa to stimulate investment, especially in Infrastructure and in this regard, assist the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), particularly with regard to increasing financial flows to the program.

• Work closely together within the framework of the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA) which brought together the South African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) for the expansion of trade and investment linkages and extend the framework to other Regional Economic Communities. Support the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) aimed at integrating Africa’s markets in line with the objectives and principles enunciated in the Abuja Treaty, establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) and its resolve to support the work of the Continental Free Trade Area - Negotiating Forum (CFTA-NF) towards concluding the negotiations by the end of 2017.


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• Pursue joint cooperation in the agricultural and food security fields and support the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) to increase productivity, conserve land and environment as well as ensure food and nutritional security.

• Intensify ongoing cooperation in developing renewable energy generation including solar, wind, hydro, geo-thermal and bio-mass along with building power transmission systems.

• Intensify ongoing cooperation in training, capacity building, consultancy and project implementation through concessional credit in infrastructure areas, including water supply management, maritime connectivity, road and railway construction and upgrading.

• Collaborate in capacity building and the use of remote sensing technologies for natural resource mapping, including agriculture, water, forest cover, mineral and marine resources, disaster management and disaster risk reduction, including early warning of natural disasters. Promote joint coordination and cooperation to improve the future of the youth through programs for capacity building and knowledge exchange among youths on the two sides and strengthen their capacities to meet the challenges of globalization and its repercussions.

• Continue collaboration in the fields of Peace and Security including conflict prevention, resolution, management and peace building through exchange of expertise and training programs; strengthening regional and continental early warning capacities and mechanisms; enhancing the role of women in peace keeping and propagating the culture of peace.

Japan and Africa

Similarly Japan also has a long standing relationship with African countries. The most important Japanese initiative in Africa is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which was set up in 1993 to promote Africa’s development and security through multilateral cooperation. To some extent, TICAD refocused the world’s attention on Africa. It was launched at a time when, following the end of the Cold War, Western donors had reduced their economic assistance to Africa and did not consider the region to be strategically important. It is important to note that this forum meets every five years in partnership with the United Nations Office of Special Adviser on Africa, the United Nation Development Programme, the World Bank and the African Union Commission. At the last TICAD summit, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pledged US$ 30 billion in the form of public and private sector investments in Africa.


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Conclusion

While both the India-Japan led AAGC and the Chinese One Road One Belt (BRI) are aiming to enhance connectivity between different regions, a comparison between the two projects reflects several contrasts. First, while the Chinese project is centrally designed, the AAGC is based on consultations with all concerned and their approval. Second, the Chinese project is designed to serve its interests, while AAGC is for common benefit of all in the region. Third, while the Chinese projects are to generate employment for the Chinese companies, the AAGC is to focus on generating employment for local population. Fourth, while BRI does not bother about the sovereignty of nations from where it passes through, the AAGC promises to ensure that sovereignty of nations would be respected. Fifth, while BRI is Eurasia focussed, the AAGC is focussing on connectivity between Asia and Africa. Sixthly, while the Chinese BRI envisages grant of loans at exorbitant rates, the AAGC proposes to follow the best international debt practices. The experience so far shows that the Chinese aims at making the project unsustainable and then demand political concessions for financial assistance….AAGC is a unique and positive initiative involving various stakeholders with participatory approach aimed at multiplying economic growth in the two continents. …the nations of the two continents should give it a greater push to achieve its objectives within a reasonable timeframe.

While both India-Japan led AAGC and the Chinese BRI are aiming to enhance connectivity between different regions, a comparison between the two projects reflects several contrasts. First, while the Chinese project is centrally designed, the AAGC is based on consultations with all concerned and their approval. Second, the Chinese project is designed to serve its interests, while AAGC is for common benefit of all in the region. Third, while the Chinese projects are to generate employment for the Chinese companies, the AAGC is to focus on generating employment for local population. Fourth, while BRI does not bother about the sovereignty of nations from where it passes through, the AAGC promises to ensure that sovereignty of nations would be respected. Fifth, while BRI is Eurasia focussed; the AAGC is focussing on connectivity between Asia and Africa. Sixthly, while the Chinese BRI envisages grant of loans at exorbitant rates, the AAGC proposes to follow the best international debt practices. The experience so far shows that the Chinese aim at making the project unsustainable and then demand political concessions for financial assistance.

In essence, the AAGC is a unique and positive initiative involving various stakeholders with participatory approach aimed at multiplying economic growth in the two continents. Its real worth would be known after sometime. Currently, the


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nations of the two continents should give it a greater push to achieve its objectives within a reasonable time frame. Protectionism and domestic hurdles have to be dismantled for the success of this project, which is not only difficult but is also time consuming. Efforts in this direction should be placed on fast track immediately. This also demands effective steps for the security of the strategic structures and routes, which should be ensured with the help of regional countries.

(The author is Pro Vice Chairman of DPS, Bhagalpur and Greater Ranchi)


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STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF DOKLAM 2017Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain PVSM, UYSM,

AVSM, SM, VSM and Bar (Retd)

In June 2017 the Chinese PLA decided to extend a road under construction in the Tibetan territory opposite India’s state of Sikkim, into Bhutanese territory on the Doklam Plateau, an area under dispute with Bhutan. The tactical aim of this activity was to make access as close as possible to the Indian post of Doka La at the southern tip of the Chumbi Valley. The road if constructed would afford the PLA the advantage of moving up logistics and fire support to an eventual launch pad which could undertake operations against the Indian or the Bhutanese deployment on their side of the border.

In June 2017 the Chinese PLA decided to extend a road under construction in the Tibetan territory opposite India’s state of Sikkim, into Bhutanese territory on the Doklam Plateau, an area under dispute with Bhutan. The tactical aim of this activity was to make access as close as possible to the Indian post of Doka La at the Southern tip of the Chumbi Valley. The road if constructed would afford the PLA the advantage of moving up logistics and fire support to an eventual launch pad which could undertake operations against the Indian or the Bhutanese deployment on their side of the border.More importantly a potential launch pad for operations South of the Chumbi Valley would then become available. The feasibility of China undertaking such operations in this area in stand-alone mode - detached from operations in other sectors - is remote although there has been much conjecture on the PLA’s potential to threaten the vulnerable sliver of Indian territory 50 Km South of Doklam, called the Siliguri Corridor. Any prudent military practitioner will see that a launch pad wedged between grounds held by two adversaries is a recipe for disaster. Thus the Chinese had no real intent of launching operations but the manner in which they triggered the standoff and kept escalation under strict control appeared to give an impression that there was a method in the madness at Doklam.

To analyze the real strategic value of the Doklam standoff we need to briefly examine the ground in comparison with other border areas between India and the Chinese Tibetan territory; China’s ambitions and India’s hesitation in focusing on the Chinese threats; the run of geopolitics up to the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China; and finally how China is likely to view its relationship with India considering the way the rest of the world views China, with the enhanced empowerment of Xi Jinping.


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The ground

Starting with the presumption that Doklam was a deliberate ploy to intimidate India, we need to be clear why this area was selected and why the particular timing. On the first point, it is to be noted that Doklam is away from the traditional areas of standoff such as Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh where the Indian Army and the PLA have had ‘run ins’ against each other in the past. It is in the vicinity of the Indo-Tibet border in the State of Sikkim and adjoining Bhutan; in fact it is a territory not in China’s contention with India but with Bhutan. The Chumbi Valley is a narrow wedge of land between Bhutan and the Indian State of Sikkim. The boundaries of China, India and Bhutan meet at the disputed Tri-junction, at the Southern end of the valley. Doklam is an 89 square kilometer plateau on the Eastern side of Chumbi. The Chinese claim it as theirs and so does Bhutan. Except for the border standoff in Aug 1967 at Nathula, which has always been a large Indian Army post on the border between Tibet and Sikkim, this area has been relatively quiet. In Aug 1967 there was a long standoff at Nathula between the Indian Army and the PLA which led to an exchange of intense small arms and artillery fire resulting in extensive casualties on both sides.The boundary issue with India in the Sikkim area has been resolved but China’s propensity to rake it up for its political convenience continues. Ladakh had seen transgressions of the un-demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) progressively increase through this millennium, although regular border meetings in the spirit of various instruments of border cooperation signed by the two countries have also continued side by side. China’s strategic military posturing to keep the border issue alive has been more intense in Ladakh, with well-known points of transgression in Chumar, Demchok, Chushul and Depsang. Similarly, the Arunachal Pradesh area has been used more for politico-diplomatic posturing; visits to the State by the Dalai Lama, the Prime Minister and even the Defence Minister of India have met with objections from the Chinese side. Creation of tension over boundaries was never a part of the philosophy of Chairman Deng Xiaoping who advised that China must promote peace and tranquility on the borders in order to allow its internal strengthening. However, we have progressively witnessed a departure from this over the last decade and more with a broad conclusion by analysts that as China’s comprehensive national power increased, its intent to coerce neighbours for apparent strategic advantage also became stronger.

Doklam is likely to have been perceived as one of those points of contention which India could only contest by extending support to Bhutan. China perhaps did not expect this to go beyond lip service. However, the fact that such a road as was being constructed on the plateau, could offer an operational advantage to the PLA in terms of threatening the Siliguri Corridor, showed that the Chinese wanted to show their strength without directly taking on India.

India's objection was from two angles. First was that the road construction


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altered the strategic and operational scenario. Second that it transgressed disputed territory of a country with whom India has a mutual assistance treaty.

The geopolitical and geostrategic angle

The international scenario which presented itself in mid-2017 was an interesting one. China’s President Xi Jinping was working for his reappointment for the second term. He is the most ambitious Chinese leader of the post Deng period. The 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was due in Oct 2017 and Xi’s focus was on consolidating his power in a way that would give him control possibly beyond the structured second term.

The US, China’s major competitor for power, was and remains at a cusp in its transforming foreign policy. President Trump’s arrival on the scene brought an element of disruption in policy with no clear indicator as to the direction it is heading in. Former President Obama’s policy of Rebalancing and Pivot to Asia has met with some degree of scorn. Trump’s ideas were veering towards greater isolation leaving scope for Asia’s strategic space being restructured and redefined. It is only in the last few weeks that Trump and his advisors are back to giving attention to the Indo Pacific and perceiving it as a priority. From 2011 onwards China has undertaken a strident campaign on its claims in the South China Sea, with a demonstrable willingness to even use coercion. It culminated in the defiance it displayed against the international tribunal’s decision in 2015 where it again projected its readiness to use coercion while resisting a rule based world order.

It will be prudent to very briefly keep in mind the state of Sino-Indian relations. On its Western border India has had a history of reasonable clarity on its stance towards aggression, although in recent years the proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir has tested this sense of clarity. With regard to the Northern borders with China India has at best been reticent about defining its strategy. Over the last few years it has only hesitatingly increased its military capability to somewhat match China’s. However, in the field of missilery and rocketry a fairly large asymmetric gap exists in favor of China. It is also only in recent years that the military oriented infrastructure has received a level of focus. India’s military reticence has never given it the confidence of dealing with China on matching terms in a border standoff although there are instances after 1962 when the Army has held its own; Nathula 1967 and Sumdorong Chu 1987 are two instances.

So with the above described strategic environment where do we place the Doklam standoff?

Even if we presume that the progression of events at Doklam was a grabbed opportunity or even a deliberate ploy, it is clear that China did not wish to play it


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beyond a point. Whether it was an independent PLA action to somehow intimidate Xi Jinping, embarrass him or simply display its arrogance and defiance is also something which has little evidence to support it. What does appear clear is that instead of choosing Ladakh for its yearly attempt at some kind of standoff with India, China chose the Sikkim sector. The necessity of yearly standoffs which are taken to a point of brinkmanship by China do have a purpose; this needs some explanation.

The answer lies in the basic concept of keeping India fixated on the continental dimension of its security. To do that it is important for China to draw India into such standoffs to keep the threat of the PLA alive and making it a‘two front’threat by also playing the Pakistan card. This is the domain where India is all alone as land boundary disputes do not draw as much international attention as maritime conflicts or even just the entire gamut of the maritime domain. The latter draws far greater concern as it involves freedom of navigation, sea lanes, continental shelves and exclusive economic zones. China's strength lies in the continental domain; that is the matter of detail that Chairman Deng Xiao Ping, the father of modern China possibly overlooked and did not direct as part of his four modernizations outlined in 1978. Although the military domain was the last in priority among these, within that domain the PLA Navy received even lower priority. That was surprising because China's actual security priority lies in the maritime zone. Its economy is dependent on energy transported by sea. Its disputes in South-East and East Asia are both in the oceans. The Indian Ocean in its huge expanse is vulnerability for China because located at the crown is India, which with a strong navy can remain a threat in being against China’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs). These SLOCs carry almost eighty percent of the energy needs especially to the well-developed Eastern seaboard. That is the reason for China focusing on its string of pearls strategy to enhance its footprint around South Asia, which off late has received a bit of a fillip. Some maritime experts including Raja Menon, have argued for long along the above lines. In fact China’s New Maritime Silk Route is partially based upon the need for strengthening its outreach to overcome the weaknesses of its stretched SLOCs. Doklam was thus a possible experiment to ratchet up military tension as an annual reminder of the border dispute and focus India on the Himalayan front, with greater concentration on its land forces and land based infrastructure. President Xi Jinping possibly wanted to appear at the 19th Congress as a leader who had an upper hand on India.

What China fears are not individual nations of Asia or the Indo-Pacific but collusion between them. The US-India-Japan equation is worrisome for China. Add to it Vietnam and Australia and it becomes even more troublesome for it. China has employed coercion of different kinds against Japan and Vietnam over the last few years, especially on issues relating to maritime boundaries. It was perhaps assessed that a coercive approach against India along the borders in a nontraditional area and ratcheted to the level of potential use of force could achieve two things. First,


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browbeat India, show it in poor light for its inability to assist its ally Bhutan and to stand up to China’s might. Second, was perhaps to test the extent of the emerging cooperation between countries of the Indo-Pacific and their ability to support a potential partner, India, against China. In both cases the benefit to be reaped for China and for Xi Jinping personally would be an enhancement of their strategic prestige in a world where the US seemed to be facing strategic uncertainty and the latter’s allies - Japan and South Korea - becoming unsure of US dependability. China thought its biggest neighbour (India), would be shown in poor light in terms of having unfulfilled great power ambitions. It would also be read as China’s coercion against India’s lack of cooperation on Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt & Road Initiative (BRI).

The progression of events at Doklam is by now well known. The world perceived China as having stopped at a point. Two aspects need to be highlighted here. First, India steadfastly stood by Bhutan and responded with a level of political and strategic maturity, refusing to be baited into a showdown involving use of force while standing firm. Secondly, the splurge of brash information warfare used by China on the basis of its well-known doctrine – War under Informationized Conditions, came a cropper. The propaganda employed was both ham handed and poorly conceived leading to a ‘hatch down’ approach by India which withstood it and in fact subtly used it to its own advantage.

The strategic spin off of Doklam

Doklam ended with victory for none because it wasn’t a situation in which victory could be defined. However, it potentially prepared both India and China far better for a future standoff which could be triggered by events or simply by intent. The strategic spin offs are many as described below.

A deduction could be made that China was able to achieve its larger goal of keeping India engaged on its continental security instead of venturing into prioritizing its role in maritime domain. However, as the concept of a quadrilateral cooperative mechanism involving the US, Japan, Australia and India firms up India may be able to focus on the maritime dimension far more. There are already moves afoot for the acquisition of greater maritime capability with tentative allocation of Rs 45,000 crores.

The drawdown at Doklam was followed by the 19th Congress where Xi Jinping has emerged as a demi god. Will the outcome of Doklam be a consideration by Xi in his dealings with India? My deduction is that Doklam was never part of a strategy for any outcomes but rather a ploy for advancement of Xi’s personal agenda at the 19th Congress. The inability to browbeat or coerce India at a crucial moment is unlikely to leave Xi’s memory. If anything it will impose some caution on him. The alacrity with which walk in operations to claim lines by PLA had become a routine may still continue but with a deeper contingency planning. Walk in operations will also


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need to be more carefully calibrated as there will be greater sensitivity to incidents such as the one which led to unarmed violence between the two sets of troops.

What Doklam has done is that it has given a boost to India's self-perception in a couple of domains. First is the ability to combine its military and diplomatic posturing more adroitly without too much noise. It could have played the victim card by bleating to the world about China's coercion; it did not. Quiet diplomacy won it much more support and justifying the stepping into Bhutanese territory, was competently done. The progressive actions as part of the response have probably given many lessons at the operational and tactical level. Advancing the operational alert of the Siliguri based 33 Corps, by almost two months was a good outcome.

The splurge of psychological operations undertaken by the PLA through the Global Times was aimed at brow beating both the Indian political and military leadership besides projecting to the Indian public India's weak capability against a supposedly strong China. Post Doklam the PLA will have to re-examine its doctrine of information operations. So poor was the psychological impact of its efforts, that it actually strengthened Indian resolve.

The limited gains in strategic confidence that the handling of Doklam gave India can actually give a fillip to its resolve to enhance its military capability. The stalled mountain strike corps will probably reach its slated strength and capability in a faster timeframe, as will the pending infrastructure. Field Army and Corps level war gaming will probably be executed with a new vigor and conclude with a perception that if it comes to a border war limited to the Himalayan region the Indian Army with adequate support of the Indian Air Force is capable of holding its own. Where asymmetry could hurt India is in the field of missilery, rocketry, cyber and possibly even special operations. The latter is a domain in which India's Special Forces may have displayed high tactical and even operational capability but the strategic domain of their employment remains a grey zone. The raising of Special Forces Command is almost an imperative.

It would not be prudent to imagine that Doklam was a strategic victory for India because the concept of victory and defeat has to be seen in much longer perspective. There was indeed a maturing of Indian media which kept rhetoric down, synced its assessment with responses and was not unnecessarily critical. Ideas about victory and defeat may have been overplayed but India’s virulent but free media did serve India’s cause well this time.

There has been tremendous interest generated in Pakistan’s strategic circles by the Doklam episode. Word has it that the Generals were surprised by the decisiveness with which Doklam was handled by India. If Pakistan has been watching with focus it would realize that there has been a progression in handling and decision making; from the Manipur raids in Jun 2015, to the surgical strikes in Sep


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2016 and now Doklam in 2017. Obviously there is display of greater decisiveness and that should worry Pakistan to the extent that the whole idea of the strategy of collusion between Pakistan and China would need a relook.

China is likely to be forced to re-examine its complete approach towards coercion as a tool to handle tricky borders. The handling of South China Sea and the lack of response there gave it an out of proportion confidence of repeating that strategy in the continental domain. While it is accepted that every situation in different environment has its peculiar dynamics many of the nations with which China has territorial or maritime differences would probably study Doklam more comprehensively.

China is likely to be forced to re-examine its complete approach towards coercion as a tool to handle tricky borders. The handling of South China Sea and the lack of response there gave it an out of proportion confidence of repeating that strategy in the continental domain. While it is accepted that every situation in different environment has its peculiar dynamics many of the nations with which China has territorial or maritime differences would probably study Doklam more comprehensively. It may not give pointers towards change in strategy but a tempering of approach could well follow. China would definitely not like Doklam as the point of reference for other nations to evolve their strategy. This is the only worry because China under Xi Jinping may wish to demonstrate and thus communicate through action that Doklam was a one off event. This demonstration can be anywhere, not necessarily on the Sino-India border.

Returning to the post 19th Congress strategic environment, it is unlikely that China will wish to alter the status quo in a drastic way. It will probably carefully watch the development of partnerships such as the quadrilateral between US, Japan, Australia and India and work towards the security of its SLOCs. Xi Jinping’s pegging of 2050 as the year by which China’s armed forces must be fully modernized and become capable of winning wars indicates that as in the case of Deng Xiao Ping, it is patience which will be virtue. How much will this translate into effect on ground and strategy only time will tell?

(The writer is a former Commander of the Srinagar based 15 Corps)


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AFGHANISTAN: CONTINUING INSTABILITYLt Gen Kamal Davar PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

“Afghanistan has to be rescued from itself.”

----- Pakistani author Ahmed Rashid

The radical and formidable Taliban, buttressed by a Machiavellian Pakistan --- in its eternal quest for strategic depth in the land of Hindu Kush--- is gradually but unquestionably, spreading its fangs across the harsh terrain of their parent land.

Down the centuries, Afghanistan - the ‘graveyard of empires’ and the land of ‘great games’ - persists in treading the weather-beaten path of unending violence and fratricidal conflicts. As a consequence it remains afflicted by growing political instability, the devious machinations of some of its neighbours and a booming albeit self-destructive drug trade. The country remains a pawn in the hands of global and regional players. Since 2001end, in the aftermath of the terror attacks on the US mainland when the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan - heralding the first Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) - that impoverished country continues to have political volatility with no light at the end of the tunnel. The radical and formidable Taliban, buttressed by a Machiavellian Pakistan - seeking strategic depth in the land of Hindu Kush - is gradually but unquestionably spreading its fangs across the harsh terrain of its parent land.

That many adversarial power centres, including those inside the elected government of President Abdul Ghani in Kabul, fail to sink their differences has been another factor fuelling instability in Afghanistan. The emergence, in the last few years of the West Asian terrorist outfit in Afghanistan, the fundamentalist ISIS in addition to the earlier al Qaeda, is all further compounding the problematic internal dynamics of Afghanistan.

The US dilemma

The US has been principal outside player in Afghanistan for the last 16 years since the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom - rechristened as Operation Resolute Support. The Afghanistan War for the Americans has been their longest war that consumed trillions of dollars in costs and the lives of over 2400 US servicemen. This war has rendered the US militarily and financially fatigued with its terminal objectives still in not in sight. That most Americans do not support their country’s involvement in this distant war, that did not bring any tangible strategic benefit is a commonly accepted fact. However, US policy-makers can ill afford to replicate their


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half-baked Iraq ‘exit strategy’ in Afghanistan. In the current geo-political scenario, the US, with its diminishing credibility, needs to address its strategic objectives with clarity of purpose and enlisting the collective will of non-radical elements in Afghanistan and adequate support of the international community.

In the tenures of the past two US presidents, George Bush Jr and Barack Obama respectively, American policies for Afghanistan had shown inconsistencies but President Trump, while addressing troops in Fort Myer, Arlington on 21st August 2017 in a globally televised address, declared that “……. Our troops will fight to win; from now on victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al-Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over the country and stopping mass terror attacks against the Americans before they emerge.” This was a reversal of his stand in his campaigning against the US presence in Afghanistan, the salient features of the Trump strategy were that the US intended staying on in Afghanistan till victory was achieved and that there were to be no time-lines for it. Trump committed to an increase in US troops - though he gave no precise figures but media reports quoting Pentagon sources indicate an increase of approximately 4000 additional troops in addition to the 8500 already stationed at present. Importantly, the US now plans to follow the strategy of eliminating the anti-Kabul government forces and not focusing on any nation-building effort as such. In early October 2017, the US Secretary for Defence, Gen James Mattis amplified the Trump doctrine as R Four plus S Policy (Regionalise, Realign, Reinforce, Reconciliation plus Sustain). It will be worthwhile analysing the impact of President Trump’s announced policy on Afghanistan’s stability.

Current state in Afghanistan

The intensity of the internal conflict in Afghanistan in 2017 has peaked to levels not witnessed since the last six years and insurgents of all hues have the upper hand. According to credible reports, on an average, there are dozens of terror-related incidents each day in Afghanistan.

The internecine conflict and the influence of Taliban continue to expand geographically and many provincial capitals have come in under attack and some are under siege. Till September 2017, reliable reports suggested that 231 districts of Afghanistan’s 407 districts (approximately 57%) were under governmental control while 54 districts (13.3%) were under the control of the Taliban - the remainder 122 districts (30%) being actively contested.

Importantly, the next round of district and parliamentary elections are scheduled for August 2018 as a forerunner for the vital presidential elections in 2019. Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC), however, has expressed that their assessment teams cannot even enter at least 30 districts in the nation


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owing to violent opposition from the insurgents. It is likely that the Afghan Army, will determinedly try to wrest control of these districts from the insurgents prior to the conduct of the elections. Nevertheless, the period preceding these elections will, by all accounts, be characterized by intense levels of violence - master-minded by Pakistan’s ISI and implemented by Taliban and other insurgents of the Haqqani network, al-Qaeda and ISIS elements. All these insurgents have been clamouring for the rule of the Sharia and do not believe in democracy. However, if government forces, adequately supported by the US and other foreign troops, can restore a semblance of stability in Afghanistan and keep at bay the insurgent forces in Afghanistan, it is likely that a relatively smooth transition to a new presidency in 2019 may come about. If the Taliban surmises that it cannot militarily take over Afghanistan in the next 18 months or so, it may support, indirectly, a candidate, closer to their extremist ideology, who they feel, would be able to deliver as per their dictates in the immediate future.

Emergence of the ISIS

The recent surfacing of the Islamic State (IS) elements in Afghanistan has added another serious dimension to the existing complexities there. With the rout of the IS in Iraq and Syria, it is most likely that the ISKP (as the Islamic State is known in this region) will try to spread its ultra-radical tentacles in Afghanistan which it takes as the launching pad for it to spread its evil narratives towards Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Currently, the ISKP is jostling for the common radical space in Afghanistan where the Taliban, currently, is far ahead in its influence and military superiority. However, both these groups have one thing in common, namely, targeting Shias primarily and also Uzbeks and Hazaras besides all other non-Sunni Muslim sects.

International military presence

The Operation Resolute Mission replaced the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with effect from 1st January 2015 when NATO forces ceased combat operations in Afghanistan and transformed their objective into a Train, Advise and Assist (TAA) mission. Thirty nine nations from across the world contributed around a mere 13500 troops subsequently.

According to a reasonable assessment, an increase of 3900-4000 will bring the US force levels to around 15000. Out of these, currently, only around 3000 US Special Forces are earmarked for anti-terror seek and destroy missions. On 9th November 2017, the NATO General Secretary also announced that the NATO contribution would be increased to 16000 troops. It is worth considering that US troops presence in 2010 had peaked to over 110,000 and yet the Taliban could not be conclusively defeated. What operational impact an addition of 4000 troops or so will make on the ground is anyone’s guess?


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Meanwhile, the US strategy has incorporated additional air activity with the US Air Force conducting 280 air strikes during the period from January 2017 to September 2017 - the highest since 2011 in Afghanistan. The domination of the skies by US air power will certainly degrade the Taliban’s ability to move large forces by day and night - which they have been managing to do post 2014 after the ISAF withdrawal. The use of air power will only force the Taliban to shift from open, day-light offensives to high-profile attacks, extensive use of suicide bombers against high value targets, additional use of IEDs and targeting of foreigners etc to gain publicity, instill fear and spread their terror across Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s eternal mischief

Right since 1947, Pakistan has adopted consistently a mischief-laden policy towards Afghanistan and according to many analysts and countless Afghans, Pakistan is the major factor for Afghanistan’s continuing instability. American scholar Marwin Weinbaum opines that “…….. a pure Islamic state in Afghanistan not only promised to neutralize Pashtun irredentism but also helped to train and indoctrinate jihadis for the struggle against India in Kashmir.” Even eminent Pakistani author Ahmed Rashid has stated that “Islamabad viewed its Afghan policy through the prism of denying India any advantage in Kabul.”

Without going into details of Pakistan’s machinations in Afghanistan since decades, it can be said that Pakistan’s perfidious dealings with successive Kabul governments are not doubted at all. During the Taliban regime, preceding the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, Pakistan was comfortable with the extremist driven ideologies of the Taliban government and the massacres the latter had unleashed on its own people. During the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban were comprehensively defeated by the Northern Alliance who were predominantly non-Pashtun groups with solid support from US Special Forces and its air power. With the ascendancy of President Hamid Karzai in Kabul, relations between him and then Pak President, Pervez Musharraf, remained frosty with Pakistan ISI continuing to make matters troublesome for the Afghan government through its terror conglomerate of the Taliban, the Haqqani and Gulb-ud-din Hekmatyar networks. The ISI employing its well-established terror networks not only targeted Afghan governmental assets frequently but also attacked Indian infrastructural projects and Indian consular offices. No effort was spared to keep Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan destabilized and put Indian assisted projects perpetually under threat. The same policy was rigorously followed during President Ashraf Ghani’s presidency despite the latter making a genuine outreach to Islamabad.

It is pertinent to mention here that under Pakistan’s influence, the US failed to integrate all the diverse tribal groups inhabiting Afghanistan and succumbed to the devious tactics of Pakistan. With Pakistan controlling the two major supply routes


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from the Karachi port into Afghanistan, the wily Pakistanis managed to extract from the US more than generous military and financial largesse. They even managed to sell to the naïve Americans the idea of distinguishing between the ‘good Taliban’ and the ‘bad Taliban’. Pakistan, desires to control the levers in Kabul, at any cost. Their evil strategy, which has imposed huge costs on the hapless Afghans continues with the same intensity and ferocity even today.

Thriving drug trade

For decades, Afghanistan has been one of the world’s largest and now the largest producer and supplier of opium, poppy and other varieties of drugs. Owing to the illicit drug trade having become an alternative source of livelihood for thousands of impoverished peasants, virtually all central and provincial governments in Afghanistan have looked the other way. Drugs, worth many millions of dollars, are meanwhile smuggled out of Afghanistan to Pakistan and India as also to the Central Asian Republics and importantly, to Russia which is one of the largest consumers of Afghan drugs. Drugs to many nations in Europe too find their roots in Afghanistan. Most war-lords in Afghanistan owe their and their fighters sustenance and illegal smuggling of weapons to drug money and hence they themselves indulge in poppy cultivation and smuggling of drugs.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its latest report has expressed that drug production has gone up this year by 87% compared to 2016. Additionally, the number of poppy-free provinces from 13 had slipped to a mere 10. Illicit drug cultivation and the huge revenues it is generating for the power-hungry warlords in Afghanistan remains a major factor behind the instability in Afghanistan. This grave problem appears far beyond the Kabul government to resolve and massive multi-faceted international assistance would be required to manage it.

Impact of regional players other than India

Apart from Pakistan and India, Afghanistan’s future is significantly linked with regional players like Iran, Russia and Central Asian Republics (CARs). The globally emerging major power, China, has evinced keen interest in Afghanistan’s mineral resources and invested a few billion dollars on contracts for mining and exploitation of these minerals. China’s interests have diversified and multiplied in Afghanistan in recent years. China desires first of all a trouble free China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in neighbouring Pakistan, ignoring that country’s mischief of exporting terrorists to Afghanistan or India. Despite international condemnation of the Pak terrorist outfit, Jaish-e-Mohd, China is maintaining a stoic silence over the matter. Chinese efforts in Afghanistan are aimed at restricting US influence in the region.


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Since the last year, even Russia has evinced renewed interest in Afghanistan. The changing contours of its policy for Kabul suggest that Russia wants to forge a strategic partnership with China and Pakistan and establish closer links, even with the Taliban to isolate the Americans gradually in this region. The US will need to factor in their policy an increasingly hostile tripartite alliance of Russia, China and Pakistan in Afghanistan. It needs to work out its own alliance with India, European Union and the CARs.

Iran is a country of much consequence for Afghanistan. Iran’s relationship with the US is adversarial on most fronts. As a key player that has been traditionally friendly with Kabul, Iran could become pro-active in forging warmer relationships with Afghanistan, in concert with India. With trade links, among these three nations, becoming stronger due to the commissioning of the Indian-built Chabahar Port in Iran, there is promise of mutually beneficial relations between them. Iran can also, be in a position to warn Pakistan against its continuing mischief in the region.

India’s constructive role

India has had age-old civilizational and friendly links with the people of Afghanistan. Respect and affection for India exists there even today owing to India’s political non-interference and its policy of rendering humanitarian assistance to Kabul. In recent years India has completed many civil infra-structural projects including highways, the Afghan Parliament building, transmission lines, hydro-power plants, dams, hospitals and schools etc. India has pledged over $3.1 billion in humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan. In his speech on Afghanistan, US President Trump exhorted India to do much more ironically linking this to India “earning a lot from the US”. India will on its own continue to do its utmost in soft power forays for Afghanistan.

For the last 10 years or more, India has been providing training to the Afghan National Security Forces and also given them non-lethal military equipment. India must not send any regular troops in combat roles for the Afghan Army. However, apart from the four military helicopters India has sent there, we need to dispatch some lethal military equipment to bolster the sagging strength and morale of the Afghan forces. India can conveniently send a couple of T-72 tank regiments, 3-4 artillery regiments, 3-4 BMP-2 mechanised battalions, some heavy mortars, radio and engineering equipment. A few attack helicopters will indeed be handy. Our training programmes for the ANSF needs to be also augmented.

Importantly, India must get far more proactive in stitching up a regional alliance of like-minded nations, supported by the US, EU and UN agencies to bring relief and succor to the hapless Afghan people. Additionally, the exodus of educated Afghans leaving their nation must be discouraged.


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Conclusion

Regional players must sink their mutual differences and forego their so-called strategic interests in the larger interests of peace in the region. This violence-afflicted expanse like many other parts of the globe, is falling to the ills of fundamentalism and terror. If all stake-holders do not pay immediate heed to combating this scourge for petty transient self-interest, the region will be driven to despair and destruction.

Afghanistan is a basket-case for the global community to ensure the former’s survival and stability in the immediate future. The world must never forget that Afghanistan was the first nation where the GWOT commenced and thus there can be no substitute for victory over evil in this endeavour. Regional players must sink their mutual differences and forego their so-called strategic interests in the larger interests of peace in the region. This violence-afflicted expanse, like many other parts of the globe, is falling to the ills of fundamentalism and terror - if all stake-holders do not pay immediate heed to combating this scourge for petty transient self-interests, the region will be driven to despair and destruction.

(The writer was the first Chief of DIA and the Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff)


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ASPECTS OF SECURITY IN CYBER SPACECapt Shekhar Dutt SM, IAS (Retd)

India has embraced digital technologies at a scale larger than any other nation in the world. In June 2015, the launch of the Digital India programme signified the Government of India’s commitment to digitally transforming the lives of Indian citizens. India now has the second largest Internet user base in the world as well as the largest potential user base for the future. This has been driven by the largest State led endeavour to adopt frontier technologies in public service delivery, public procurement, financial technologies, welfare programmes and public infrastructure.

The resilient people of India have taken country through the Information Technology (IT) Revolution to a level where we can legitimately be called a world power in this sphere. However, this is also the time when India faces extremely serious challenges in its National Security. The domains which have to be looked after by our security forces are not only those of land, sea and air but now also, include space and cyber. Further, internal security has also acquired a new dimension with sub conventional warfare being brought into play by our Western neighbour. National Security on the whole has become a truly complex task.

India has embraced digital technologies at a scale larger than any other nation in the world. In June 2015, the launch of the Digital India programme signified the Government of India’s commitment to digitally transforming the lives of Indian citizens. India now has the second largest Internet user base in the world as well as the largest potential user base for the future. This has been driven by the largest State led endeavour to adopt frontier technologies in public service delivery, public procurement, financial technologies, welfare programmes and public infrastructure.

Within its borders, India’s policy frameworks and governance structures have pioneered a digital revolution through a variety of forward looking programmes and schemes. However, India’s voice in key global Internet governance institutions has been disproportionately quiet and inconsistent. It is imperative that India enhances its participation at various international forums to ensure that India’s inputs and viewpoints are factored into global discussions on the future of the Internet. This requires charting a coherent stance on issues of technical governance and Internet public policy, harmonized across all levels of governance and avenues of diplomacy.

A young digitally-enabled population is reaping the benefits of the Internet, creating the world’s fastest growing start-up ecosystem that has raised over US$ 20 billion of global venture capital. The development of broadband highways has pivoted global digital trade towards India, redefining the composition of the user


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base of the largest Internet companies as being distinctly Indian. By 2020, India’s digital economy is expected to span across 730 million people and is estimated to be worth over US$ 1 trillion. India’s future, therefore, is tied inextricably with that of the Internet. There is a pressing need therefore, to initiate a dialogue on India’s vision for internet governance.

Today, most activities on the Internet involve cross-border flows of data, spawning multiple issues surrounding the determination of jurisdiction. Several responsibilities of sovereign nations have been impacted, such as managing cross-border crime, determining the basis of taxability or enforcing local laws and norms regarding speech. Further, applying principles of public international law to cyberspace is a complex task, given the multiplicity of platforms and organizations operating in cyberspace.

Traditional modes of inter-state cooperation, rooted in territorial sovereignty, have struggled to cope with the borderless nature of the Internet. Several Internet governance fora, in the course of their functioning, handle broader questions of public policy including competition policy, market entry conditions, consumer rights, cybersecurity and privacy of intellectual property that have traditionally been governed by a sovereign nation. As a result, Internet governance decisions have come to have a direct bearing on domestic legislation and policy.

Digital technologies themselves present significantly unique legal concerns. Indian law enforcement agencies regularly face difficulties with encryption or anonymising technologies, meriting discussion on appropriate remedies. Issues such as net neutrality can involve complex debates at both international and domestic levels of policy formulation. Creating sustainable solutions to these challenges requires India to collaborate with other actors and platforms to develop an international policy stance that could be suitably harmonized with domestic legal instruments.

As cyberspace expands and evolves, cyber-threats continue to escalate in sophistication and magnitude. While the Internet has ushered in a new era of socio-economic development and prosperity, it has also created easy and low-risk opportunities for non-state actors or terrorist organizations to amplify their operations. Cyberattacks targeted at critical information infrastructures can potentially devastate a country’s economy and threaten public safety. Further, some nations may choose to restrict the flow of cybersecurity technologies and products or engage in cyberwarfare as an alternative or in addition to the kinetic option. A global framework of trust, predictability and continuity must be built to safeguard Internet infrastructure against asymmetric borderless crimes at the cutting edge of technology.

A key challenge to creating cybersecurity structures has been the Internet’s borderless nature that prevents delineation of legal jurisdictions for countries.


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Simultaneously, rules drafted by a single nation can have implications for the entire global internet community, especially on issues such as data transfers or encryption technologies. As national priorities enter the Internet governance framework, it becomes necessary for countries to anchor jurisdictional, technical and other cybersecurity concerns within an appropriate international legal framework.

Beyond such concerns of national security, the evolution of technologies has increased the overall risk exposure for the global economy. Innovations in financial technology, cloud computing, big data analytics or the Internet of Things open up new vulnerabilities and opportunities for exploiting or disrupting economic activities. For instance, creating trust in IoT technologies requires building cyber security solutions that can cover entire value chains that concern industry and embedding a human agency into digital systems. As a multi-dimensional concept, cyber security has, therefore, become fundamental in shaping domestic and foreign policy agendas for nations across the world.

In 2016, India decided to move towards a cashless economy running on digital payment systems, which presented both a significant opportunity for progress, as well as an immense pressure on the country’s cybersecurity frameworks. As India undertakes this unprecedented adoption of financial technologies, it is of paramount importance to strengthen India’s cyberspace capabilities beyond domestic frameworks. India must contribute to and take leadership in global forums to protect the cybersecurity framework in the digital era. The areas of focus are role of government in cybersecurity, Internet Governance: Impact on National Security & Sovereignty, threat to Critical Infrastructure and security, privacy and ethics challenges.

As the Internet expands to become a global infrastructure of infrastructures, it is imperative that Internet governance discussions include the perspectives of different nations with unique historical contexts, differing levels of internet access and speeds and technological progress. By leading discussions on internet protocols, internationalized domain names or on Indian language support within technical standards, India can ensure the representation of the unique Indian Internet experience at the international level and create space for redefining global norms on internet governance.

Increased usage and dependence on the cyber platforms, internet, computers, communication equipment has indeed made the operations of many corporate companies and organizations especially vulnerable to cyber related crimes. Those conducting such cyber crimes can be economic criminals as also non-state players. Even certain state entities may also resort to hacking. Also, many sectors of daily life face threats from the cyber angle. These sectors are connected with energy, food, water, transport, government and public service, telecommunications, health,


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finance and emergency service. These must be able to withstand and respond to extreme events such as criminal and terrorist attacks and natural calamities. These sectors have international supply chains under-pinning the delivery of their services to customers which must also be flexible enough to adapt to changes in supply and demand. With the cooperation of private sector owners, systematic mapping and modeling needs to be carried out, listing out the interdependencies, capacity and redundancy of essential sectors to withstand and respond to extreme events.

Then there are intellectual property (IP) crimes and also counterfeiting and piracy. Counterfeiting involves illegal copying of trade marks on products such as pharmaceuticals and clothing. At the same time piracy involves the illegal copying of music, literary works, computer games and software for commercial gain, sports events, films and broadcasts. Copyright infringement includes downloading of digital content and illegal copying.

There are many corporates which are involved in business connected with the aforesaid subjects and they are especially vulnerable. Corporates need to understand the risk associated with operational activities and require Senior Managers to place risk assessment and prioritization within a logical context and suggest mitigation within their security management framework and process.

The Indian scene is even more threatened as there is no fabrication of semiconductors or chips facilities in India. All equipment which are controlled, guided and operated by chips, digital signal processers or ASICS use foreign (US, Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, even Philippines etc) made chips. Although the Indian defence facilities are relied on for the chips fabrication, the fact remains that civil and private sector in India is hugely vulnerable. The Boards of such companies which are vulnerable to cyber crimes need to acquaint themselves fully with the measures and Standard Operating Practices (SOP) to counter such threats.

The Board of the company requires to occasionally have a cyber-vulnerability scan done and integrate security with intelligence. It may be prudent to put in the system a team of risk managers who should assist the top management in identifying vulnerabilities and help develop a security culture that embraces risk assessment. This is important in identifying what controls are going to be used and how much they are likely to be effective. By having in place a workable communication mechanism, the risk managers and their teams would be able to track the threats. This whole process is an extremely involved one for such companies which are vulnerable in cyber security area. An Independent Director and some specialist should periodically review the whole system and suggest corrective measures to the Board and the concerned authorities.


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It has been recognized that more needs to be done in order to encourage and develop a pool of cyber security professionals. Issues regarding both quality and size of staff in the public and private sectors need to be addressed because of the clear short falls. It has been noticed that some criminal organizations have recruited top quality cyber and legal brains and have developed organizational structures that can operate from almost any country in the world. The Board of the company requires to occasionally have a cyber vulnerability scan done and integrate security with intelligence. It may be prudent to put in the system a team of risk managers who should assist the top management in identifying vulnerabilities and help develop a security culture that embraces risk assessment. This is important in identifying what controls are going to be used and how much they are likely to be effective. By having in place a workable communication mechanism, the risk managers and their teams would be able to track the threats. This whole process is an extremely involved one for such companies which are vulnerable in cyber security area. An Independent Director and some specialist should periodically review the whole system and suggest corrective measures to the Board and the concerned authorities.

(The writer is former Governor of Chhattisgarh; Deputy National Security Advisor and Defence Secretary)


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US SUGGESTION FOR INDIA’S LARGER ROLE IN AFHGNISTANDr Rakesh Dutta

The US under President Trump has created a lot of uncertainty about the direction of its foreign policies. Ever since he came to power, he has had a great difficulty in articulating a coherent policy for Asia, a region where major structural changes are on the anvil. His Asia tour in November 2017 strengthened this perception. … It is in this context that a hard-nosed analysis of the US suggestion for India’s enhanced role in Afghanistan is relevant.

Unpredictable nature of Trump’s foreign policy

The US under President Trump has created a lot of uncertainty about the direction and thrust of its foreign policies. Ever since he came to power, he has had a great difficulty in articulating a coherent policy for Asia, a region where major structural changes are on the anvil. His Asia tour in November 2017 strengthened this perception. In Japan, he asserted that the “Era of strategic patience” with North Korea was over but in South Korea he indicated that he was prepared to deal with North Korea diplomatically. Similarly in China he lavished praise on President Xi but later targeted China for “audacious theft of intellectual property” and resurrected the four nation diamond alliance which is to counter the Chinese attempts to have hegemony in the region. This poses a dilemma for regional nations. It is in this context that the US suggestion for India’s enhanced role in Afghanistan needs to be subjected to a careful scrutiny.

Trump’s views on Pakistan

In his address of 21st August 2017, President Trump while unfolding USA’s Afghan strategy, underlined the US concerns on Af-Pak region. Expressing his angst over continuing deaths of US soldiers, he blamed Pakistan for providing safe havens to terrorists. The tenor and tone of his speech was notable for the changed approach it suggested towards India and Pakistan. There was no major departure from his stand on pulling out US troops from Afghanistan.

India obviously was happy that its stand on Pakistan in the region had been vindicated by President Trump. More significantly, Trump stated that US would like to develop strategic partnership with India and appreciated India’s contribution for stability in Afghanistan. The US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited Pakistan in Oct 2017 and conveyed the message of Trump on specific tasks that US wanted Pakistan to fulfill expeditiously.


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Significantly reports suggest that one of the objectives of Secretary of State’s five nation tour that included Pakistan was to mend ties consequent to Trump’s criticism that had peeved Islamabad. According to Tillerson, the US may be wanting India to play a major role in the South Asian politics and in restoring balance vis a vis China but unlike Pakistan with whom America enjoys a strong geo-strategic and financial granny knots, the relations with India are generally condition based. The possibility of Trump’s new policy on Pakistan getting translated on the ground is not strong. The US considers Pakistan as its greatest geo-political ally in South Asia, a star performer and particularly important as a non-NATO partner. From Truman to Trump, Pakistan remains a favourite State of US for all reasons and has been supported substantially on economic, political and military front. In February 2017, US Defence Secretary Gen Mattis commended the sacrifice of the people and armed forces of Pakistan in battling scourge of terrorism. He affirmed US commitment for common peace and stability in the region and agreed to continue the engagement with Pakistan at multiple levels. Given Pakistan’s significance in the US strategic calculus, one cannot be sure of longevity of USA’s seemingly changed policy on Pakistan, though the US concern on the Pak support to various terrorist groups is now expressed in stronger words than ever before.

US and Afghanistan

A deeper analysis of US policy in this region can help in understanding its compulsions and interests. It may be hard to believe that the sole reason for US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 was to hunt for its one time friend Osama bin Laden who was later found and killed in Abbottabad in Pakistan. It was equally strange that the US took more than a decade to locate and eliminate him. According to the former CIA Director Henry Crompton, “We had Bin laden in our electrical-optical slide but we had no realist policy, no clear authority and no meaningful resources to engage the target with lethal speed and precision. It was all sadly absurd.” Some US diplomats are known to have expressed the view informally that the US does not fight to win wars but there are factors, mainly commercial of course that guide it. The main motive of the US invasion of Iraq was the former’s interest in oil. It was wrong to say - and this information was found to be incorrect - that Sadaam possessed weapons of mass destruction.The US attack on Iraq led to total annihilation of Mesopotamian culture, that represented one of oldest civilizations in the world.

The USA’s lack of interest in Afghanistan stems from the fact that it is now no longer economically or strategically an asset for America. A look at the Afghanistan’s data reveals poor conditions that exist in that country. According to World Bank estimate 97% of its legitimate GDP is derived from foreign aid, their indigenous contribution being hardly 2%; while only 10% of Afghanis have access to basic health facilities. The backwardness is so high that only 38% of population is connected to electric grid. An average Afghan like other nationals of any country


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is concerned with better security, good governance and basic amenities. Their traditional approach to livelihood is simple revolving around Wakte Naan, Wakte Namaz and Parva Neste, ie, eating in time, meditating in time and having no worry. Interestingly, the US which was responsible for creating the chaos in Afghanistan has been praised for its sacrifices in Afghanistan for the cause of peace, security and democracy.

An objective analysis of the factors that contributed to the disorder in Afghanistan reveals that the US was significantly responsible for it. Ever since, the beginning of 19th Century when the unfolding of “Great Game” put focus on Afghanistan as a geopolitical buffer state with marked boundaries, the country had been on the radar of Western powers. Earlier, prompted by Saur revolution, the US allotted massive funds and weapons of close to $1bn worth to Mujahideen, supporting anti-Soviet forces along and created Al-Qaeda - a global jihadist conglomerate lead by Osama and Al Zawahiri. Funded by US, this was to lay the global jihadi network.

The creation of Taliban in 1994 to control Afghanistan with the active support of Pakistan and US was the beginning of the problems in that country. After the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban began to control most of the region. The Taliban had in their possession automatic weapons, small arms, rocket launchers, tanks, armoured cars, missiles and even chemical weapons. Small arms factories were established to produce Kalashnikovs while opium became the means of wealth generation. The control by Taliban of Afghanistan suited Pakistan as it extended the latter not only advisory role but also substantial political hold. Taliban also provided the strategic depth militarily to Pakistan which was the latter’s major objective. The 9/11 sucked US back in the region unleashing a war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Later, the Bonn agreement of 2001 inducted NATO forces in Afghanistan but the continued strife amongst Taliban, Mujhadeen, Al-Qaeda and local chiefs while US-NATO combine together with Pakistan played a double game, kept the country fragile and fractured making it nearly a failed state.

The Berlin Conference of 2004 while pledging $8.2 bn for rebuilding Afghanistan also asked the latter to enhance domestic revenue that required a strong government. In the elections held in the same year, Hamid Karzai became the President but his position remained weak. The security was in the hands of US and NATO. The troop level which was 7000 US and 5000 ISAF in 2003 had gone up to 1.4 lacs in 2011 - with Obama coming on the scene and Osama bin Laden being eliminated at Abbottabad. However, the security situation did not improve as several factions against the Afghan government received support from Pakistan. Pakistan’s sole aim was to establish a government in Afghanistan that would be totally dependent on it and that would give substantial control to Pakistan. In US there was domestic pressure to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. At Lisbon Summit in 2010 it was decided to withdraw NATO and ISAF by 2014 to make way


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for Afghan National Army and Afghan Police to take charge of security. The US also declared a pullout leaving only 5000 troops by 2015 and later by 2016, enough to protect its own interests in Afghanistan. Recently, Trump pointed out the futility of war in Afghanistan lasting good sixteen years causing a loss of $1trillion with 2740 lives. Though Trump agreed to add more troops to its kitty of 8400 soldiers, yet the US now finds Afghanistan a great liability.

Problems in Afghanistan

Afghanistan at present is facing several challenges, like, ethnic struggle, factionalism in National Unity Government, Taliban, terrorist groups in Af-Pak region, lack of progress in Peace Talks and need for strengthening of domestic structures. USA’s shift of focus and Pakistan’s role in supporting Taliban are also causing difficulties. The country is infested with ethnic struggle in which every group is supported by an extraneous power. For instance, Pashtuns are financed and supported by Pakistan, US and Saudi Arabia; while Non-Pashtuns as Northern Alliance are essentially favoured by Iran, India and Russia. There is a deep cleavage between the rural and urban habitat. The current political dispensation under Ghani suffers from inherent political contradictions at the top level and fails to deliver governance at sub-national level. Consequently, it makes negligible headway in bringing in social and political stability or ensuring infrastructural development. Further, Taliban and its affiliated groups like Haqqani network and Hezb-e-Islami are deeply entrenched with ISI’s links and suspected involvement of Daesh.

In this regard, Ghani’s endeavour for consolidating the National Unity Government and fixing the role of Afghan National Security Forces becomes significant. However, being underfunded and under sourced ANSF is divided on ethnic lines lacking critically the ability to fight growing local resistance and thus emboldening Taliban. Under these circumstances, the sovereignty of Afghanistan becomes a casualty. The divisions do not allow nationalism in Afghanistan to take roots.

Conclusion

The US suggestion for an enhanced role for India in Afghanistan does not stem from the desire of giving a regional status to India. It is the product of USA’s problem of high losses of its soldiers and heavy expenditure coupled with the realization that this country has no economic or strategic value for the US… Notwithstanding the above, it is in the interest of India to have a hold in that region. .. While India has adopted a pragmatic policy towards Afghanistan, this needs to be given a greater push so that her influence in the strategically important area remains strong.


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In essence, the US suggestion for an enhanced role for India in Afghanistan does not stem from the desire of giving a regional status to India. It is the product of USA’s problem of high losses of its soldiers, heavy expenditure and a realization that this country had no economic or strategic value for US. The strategic interests have waned as Russia can hardly focus on this region with her problems in other areas. In US, domestic pressure is also building up for US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The US is, therefore, seeking a larger role for India in Afghanistan partly because this would help it to withdraw its troops from there without loss of face.

Notwithstanding the above, it is in the interest of India to have influence in that region. India needs to institute a more robust, assertive and proactive policy towards Afghanistan. The security assistance to Afghanistan in training and weapons should be enhanced and building ties with various Afghan groups as a part of future growth strategy should be given strategic priority. India and Afghanistan have a strong relationship based on historical and cultural links. The relationship is not limited to the governments in New Delhi and Kabul and has its foundations in the historical contacts and exchanges between the people. The ‘Kabuliwala’ story is still one of the most quoted instances of the historical and cultural links between India and Afghanistan.

Significantly, India has already adopted a multi-pronged approach undertaking wide range of enterprises aimed at enhancing military and economic development to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan. The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between the two sides, inter alia, provides for assistance to help rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure and institutions, education and technical assistance to re-build indigenous Afghan capacity in different areas, encouraging investment in Afghanistan's natural resources, providing duty free access to the Indian market for Afghanistan's exports, support for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, broad-based and inclusive process of peace and reconciliation and advocating the need for a sustained and long-term commitment to Afghanistan by the international community. India successfully hosted the 6th Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference in Amritsar in December 2016, which called for immediate elimination of terrorism to help the war-ravaged country in its political and economic transition. Besides supplying 2,50,000 tonnes of wheat and pledging $ 2 bn, India has completed projects in Afghanistan worth $ 899 mn, spread over to constructing Parliament Building and making of schools, dams, roads and community centres. India has also extended help in telecommunication, health, Pharmaceutical, mining and Information Technology in soft power strategy. The hard power option includes presenting 3 Mi-25 attack helicopters to Kabul and bearing expenditure for procurement of Russian, military hardware like heavy artillery, tanks, transport planes, Mi-17 copters, bridge laying equipment, APC’s and trucks etc. In a meeting between President Ghani and Prime Minister Modi on Terror, Security and Aid Review held in New Delhi on 24th October 2017, India agreed to extend further assistance depending upon the need of the Afghan defence and police forces.


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While India has adopted a pragmatic and multi-dimensional policy towards Afghanistan, this needs to be given a greater push so that its influence remains significant in this strategically important area. A stable India friendly administration in Afghanistan would not merely deny the strategic depth to Pakistan but would also help India in maintaining good connectivity with Central and West Asian regions. The existing establishment in Kabul must be strengthened and ANSF made more muscular. There is a need to invigorate the dialogue process on Afghanistan by empowering Government of Afghanistan as the principle stake holder. The attempts by Pakistan and China to keep India out of the dialogue process should be countered using all the leverages in diplomacy. It is in this area that the assistance of US may be useful.

(The writer is a Professor in the Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh.)


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INDIA NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN ITS CYBER WARFARE CAPABILITIES

Dr SD Pradhan

In view of the centrality of cyber space for national security, it has emerged as a new frontier of warfare. Several countries are setting up cyber commands and have formulated national cyber strategies to deal with the emerging threats in cyber space. They have integrated cyber warfare with general warfare in which the cyber operations play a decisive role. The cyber commands and national cyber strategies are meant to deny the use of cyber space by their adversaries, confuse their decision making loops and destroy their critical infrastructure including military command and control networks in wars. A subtext of the national cyber strategies is to use the cyber power to deter the adversaries from pursuing a particular course of action. This blurs the distinction between war and peace for cyber operations which includes psychological campaigns, Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS), attacks on critical infrastructures, espionage both for military and economic purposes and destruction of the military command and control systems of adversaries during wars.

Developments in security environment

Cyber space occupies a key position in national security. Our dependence on cyber space has immensely increased in all fields - economic, military, diplomatic, social interactions, transportation, banking transactions, education and science & technology - touching all components of national power. The cyber-attacks can disable official websites and networks, disrupt or disable essential services, steal or alter classified data, spread disinformation and cripple financial and military systems.

The cyber threats are assuming dangerous dimensions. Ordinary cyber-crimes apart, the cyber space is now witnessing increased number of higher level sophisticated organised crimes, acts of espionage both for military and economic purposes and attacks on important dimensions of national power. Several of them are state sponsored. In the last ten years the dimension of cyber warfare has gained importance. Generally speaking cyber warfare is a form of information warfare involving states. It is an Internet-based conflict involving attacks on information, information network and connected devices. The term cyber warfare is used in a wider sense and includes not only attacks on governmental structures but on all structures which strengthen national capacity to deter their adversary. While the cyber-attacks are continually evolving and evade our defences, the involvement of


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states or non-state actors in such attacks make them extremely troublesome and complex from the point of view of national security.

In view of the centrality of cyber space for national security, it has emerged as a new frontier of warfare. Several countries are setting up cyber commands and have formulated national cyber strategies to deal with the emerging threats in cyber space. They have integrated cyber warfare with general warfare in which the cyber operations play a decisive role. The cyber commands and national cyber strategies are meant to deny the use of cyber space by their adversaries, confuse their decision making loops and destroy their critical infrastructure including military command and control networks in wars. A subtext of the national cyber strategies is to use the cyber power to deter their adversaries from pursuing a particular course of action. This blurs the distinction between war and peace for cyber operations which includes psychological campaigns, Distributed Denial of Services (DDOS), attacks on critical infrastructures, espionage both for military and economic purposes and destruction of the military command and control systems of adversaries during wars. While a US report pointed out that more than 30 nations were building cyber warfare capabilities, another report suggests that about 140 nations are working on to produce cyber weapons. These are indeed scary reports which suggest that we should be prepared to face the challenges emanating from different levels of cyber threats.

There are some special characteristics of cyber warfare. First, since much of the cyber space is owned and operated by private sector, controlling the cyber space becomes complex. Second, attribution remains a problem and often it becomes extremely difficult to know the source of attacks. Adversaries can use proxies. The deterrence can work only against the known enemies. Third, early warnings like in physical world, are not possible in cyber space. One can at the best know when the system is under attack. Usually this is learnt after the attacks. All these factors add up to one conclusion: in cyberspace, offence is significantly easier than defence.

Routes of cyber attacks

The cyber-attacks can take various routes, which can be used simultaneously by adversaries. First, various malwares (commonly refers to software codes like malicious viruses, worms and Trojan horses) can be placed in our system by adversaries. Malware is simply defined as a code with malicious intent that typically steals data or destroys something on the computer. Malware is most often introduced into a system through email attachments, software downloads or operating system vulnerabilities to destroy critical data or infrastructure. It can also be implanted through moles. The insertion of Stuxnet virus in the Iranian Nuclear Facility by Israel and US using a mole to destroy the Iranian nuclear programme is an example of such an act. Phishing attacks, which are quite common, are sent via email and ask


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users to click on a link and enter their personal data. Phishing emails have become much more sophisticated in recent years, making it difficult for some people to discern a legitimate request for information from a false one.

Second, the imported equipment used by our information infrastructures, agencies and companies could have implants that can provide information to other countries, from where the equipment are imported, without the knowledge of the users. Instead of hacking, the adversaries can use or ‘own’ the companies supplying devices and export them after implanting backdoor surveillance tools to steal sensitive information. The US, China and Russia are reported to be doing this. In 2012 the US Congressional Report warned that Chinese telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE posed a “threat to US national security interests” and could sell companies equipment with backdoor surveillance tools to give the Chinese government control over American communications networks. China also purchases companies dealing with computer network with this intention. The Chinese company Lenovo, which bought IBM’ PC business in 2004, was reported to be shipping laptops with ‘superfish’ malware which undermines basic security protocols. Similarly, the US is using equipment to attack its targets. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the story of Snowden, in his book captioned “No Place to Hide” brought out that routers built by the Cisco (and perhaps by other companies too) are routinely intercepted without Cisco's knowledge by the National Security Agency (NSA) of US. The NSA implants backdoor surveillance tools, repackages the devices with a factory seal and sends them on. Snowden’s revelations confirmed this. The Russian hackers are reported to have used Kaspersky software to create vulnerability in the US National Security Agency’s system to collect classified information.

Third, the attack can take the shape of the Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks. In the DDOS attacks a number of computers are used to attack target computers or network for a pre-determined period causing complete paralysis of the system. The attack on Estonian network in 2007 is considered the biggest DDOS attack so far. In December 2015, Ukraine faced a similar attack.

Fourth, attacks can be launched through various social media platforms to manipulate public opinion for political purposes. Information is so heavily bombarded with aggregated impressions through social media platforms that it becomes almost impossible not to be influenced by the constant flow of impressions being made with images, headlines and fake videos. The implications of that are rather staggering. A vested interest could sway an election at the local, state or federal level without anyone really noticing and paradoxically by using the same technologies that people believe would provide them with better insight. These social media platforms are also used as a powerful tool for psychological campaign by hostile states and social groups. In India, all the incidents of communal violence had witnessed increased circulation of doctored social media messages and fake videos aimed at inciting people. These platforms are also being effectively used for radicalisation of youth


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by terrorist groups and are responsible for increased number of lone-wolf incidents of terrorist attacks.

Fifth, cyber-attacks can take the shape of full-fledged cyber war separately or supplement an armed conflict in which they can play a decisive role. The cyber-attacks are one of the main elements of the “Hybrid War” which includes conventional, irregular and cyber operations. As mentioned earlier, several nations have now evolved cyber warfare strategies as parts of their national security to secure their information networks. In times of conflict, an adversary can exploit our vulnerabilities in cyber space and paralyse the critical civil and military networks.

Broadly, cyber attackers are classified into three groups with each further divided into two categories based on the skills, abilities and objectives of cyber attackers. First is the group of Tier I and II attackers, who exploit the known vulnerabilities. Second called Tier III and IV, who have higher level of expertise and have the capabilities to discover new vulnerabilities in the system. Third are Tier V and VI attackers, who have sufficient funds and time to create new vulnerabilities using full spectrum in systems. Several countries like US, Russia, China, Israel and North Korea are reported to have this capability.

Cyber Strategies - US, China, Russia and UK

a) US. The US in May 2011 formulated its national strategy for cyber operations entitled as the “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace”. The main objective of this strategy is to establish linkages between the US cyber activities and operations and the US national strategy. Cyberspace in the US military strategy is deemed to be the fifth domain of warfare, which has transformed the way armed forces conduct their day-to-day operations and brought in a paradigm shift at the strategic, doctrinal and tactical levels of warfare. The Department of Defense (DoD) in concert with other agencies is responsible for defending the US and its interests from cyber-attacks. The DoD has three missions: (i) to defend its own networks, systems and information as also to prepare and be ready to operate in an environment where access to cyber space is contested; (ii) to defend the United States and its interests against cyber-attacks of significant consequence; (iii) to provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and contingency plans, if directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

In August 2017, in view of growing cyber-attacks on its governmental apparatus, the United States (US) elevated its Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to the status of Unified Combatant Command. The head of the organization will now report directly to the Defence


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Secretary. The USCYBERCOM was earlier subordinate to the US Strategic Command. The objective is to integrate expertise for having a robust system of defence and offensive action. As a unified combatant command, CYBERCOM is slated for a wider role, both in coordinating military-led cyberspace operations and also in devising the strategy for the changing nature of warfare. The USCYBERCOM, with its 6,200 personnel (military, civilian and contractors) spread across 133 mission teams, is headed by a four-star rank officer, in a dual-hat arrangement with the National Security Agency (NSA), co-located within a common headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. This arrangement allows a close coordination between the NSA and USCYBERCOM.

The United States Military Academy at West Point has a department called the Army Cyber Institute dedicated to predicting future weapons and defences used on the digital battlefield. This is a think tank for cyber warfare of the US Army. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for coordination of efforts towards national protection, prevention, mitigation and recovery from cyber incidents, vulnerability analysis, protection of critical infrastructure and investigation in association with FBI and other agencies. In addition, for consultations between the different stakeholders in the cyber security domain, the Highlands Forum has been established. The Highlands Forum is an informal, cross-disciplinary network sponsored by Federal Government with a common interest in information, science and technology and their impact on global and societal activities.

The US places significant emphasis on having deterrence. “In the face of an escalating threat, the Department of Defense must contribute to the development and implementation of a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy to deter key state and non-state actors from conducting cyber-attacks against US interests.” To achieve the objective, the US has undertaken a number of initiatives. With the creation of the operational Cyber Command, the US armed forces have unequivocally prioritised cyber offence, sending a clear geopolitical message of massive retaliation to any act of aggression in either of the natural or cyber domains. The deployment of powerful detection system known as Einstein 2 and intrusion prevention system known as Einstein 3 also indicate its stress on deterrence. These have serious implications for others.

b) China. China too, considers national security as being closely linked with cyber security. “No national security without cyber security", said President Xi Jinping to the state-run news agency Xinhua in April 2014. The establishment of the National Security Commission and Central Network Security and Informatization Leading Small Group, with Xi as


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their head, testify this. China’s concept of ‘cyber power’ is important to understand its strategy. China came up with this concept in association with the Japanese scholars and it can be regarded as the product of Chinese cyber diplomacy. China perceives that a country’s capability to conduct cyber warfare depends on its cyber power. The term ‘cyber power’ comprehensively refers to a country’s capability to both take action and exert influence in cyberspace. China assiduously is making efforts to enhance its cyber power. It includes inter alia,

• Internet and Information Technology (IT) capabilities, specifically consisting of a country’s technological research and development (R&D) and innovation capabilities;

• IT industry capabilities;

• Influence of internet culture in the country;

• Internet diplomacy and foreign policy capabilities which provide a country its bargaining power;

• Influence in modern international internet administration organizations such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Internet Governance Forum and International Telecommunication Union;

• Cyber military strength, ie, a country’s ability to defend key national and military IT infrastructure from attacks;

• The network deterrence and offensive ability - including its ability to steal secrets and to prevent others from stealing its secrets;

• The national interest in taking part in a cyberspace strategy, which must have theoretical guidance, behavioural norms and criteria for action as well as a strategic plan.

China formed a new military branch focussed on digital battleground technically called the Strategic Support Force (SSF) on 31st December 2015. This force is mainly aimed at providing resources capable of protecting China's cyber and space security. The SSF is to provide necessary support to the Chinese armed forces during the war. While it plays a crucial role in maintaining deterrence, it has a crucial part during peace time as well.

There are five conceptual dimensions of the Chinese cyber strategy. First, China considers that its cyber strategy is a part of overall Chinese


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national security strategy. In Chinese thinking, strategic deterrence has a central role in a war and the cyber operations are seen as an essential component for achieving this objective. The overall Chinese strategy depends upon several military and non-military capabilities like nuclear, conventional, space and information warfare, economic, diplomatic, scientific and technological as also the collective will of the nation. They all constitute essential components of a credible "integrated strategic deterrent." In Chinese concept, deterrence of cyber operations could serve the same purpose as the nuclear deterrence in international environment. According to analysts, the SSF forms the space and cyber legs of China’s new strategic deterrent “triad” of nuclear, space and cyber forces. For China, the cyber warfare is the decisive element in its strategy to ascend the international system and is central in military conflicts. Therefore, China deliberately maintains an aggressive cyber warfare posture to deter its adversaries. The provocations to launch offensive operations are deliberately kept ambiguous.

Second is the Chinese concept that the cyber operations play decisive role both in peace time and during wars. The Chinese “Three Warfare” strategy is mainly to deal with the adversaries in peace time though it continues during the war period as well. It includes psychological warfare to pressurise and deter the adversaries from opposing China, media warfare to project effectively its point of view before the International Community and domestic population and lawfare to publicise its ‘fabricated legal arguments’ to strengthen its claims. In all these, the cyber operations play a critical part. The cyber operations are also the essential part of the Chinese concept of Integrated Strategic Deterrence. This involves the use of its several conventional and non-conventional capabilities like nuclear, conventional, space and information warfare, economic, diplomatic, scientific and technological as also the collective will of the nation to deter adversaries and achieve its objective of war without fighting a full-fledged war if possible. It involves application of all national capabilities in an integrated manner to conduct distant operations to achieve the objective quickly by disrupting, denying and destroying the enemy’s war waging potentials and its command and control systems through remote delivery of destructive kinetic energy and effective cyber operations. This concept is in conformity with Sun Tzu’s statement that ‘the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.’

The third dimension is the reliance on the domestic products for safety of its networks. Information security concerns figure prominently in the major national R&D programmes of China. China’s Medium to Long Term Plan (MLP) for scientific and technological development, with


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its megaprojects, and the recent Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI) initiative, have incentivized Chinese research establishments and industrial enterprises to develop their own intellectual property (IP). In several cases it is reported that the Chinese have acquired foreign technology and modified it to secure Chinese IP rights. China depends on indigenous equipment and technology to maintain its networks. The 1999 encryption regulations restrict or ban outright the use of foreign encryption technology. Under the China Compulsory Certification for Information Security (“CCCI”), cyber products must undergo stringent certification procedures for sale in China. In 2003, the “National Coordinating Small Group for Cyber and Information Security" developed the “Document 27” which laid the foundation of several policy decisions for use of cyber products within the country. The Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS) introduced since 2008 to stifle the threat from foreign software is applicable to private users and small companies, business houses in strategically important sectors like finance and infrastructure and the public authorities. Since the formation of the "Central Cyber Security and Informatization Leading Group", more steps have been taken in this direction The Chinese government considers foreign software to be a potential threat to national security. The PLA has some top research organisations for cyber R&D. These include 56th (owns fastest supercomputers and is the largest computing R&D), 57th (development of communications intercepts and signal processing systems) and 58th (cryptology and information security technology) Research Institutes.

The fourth dimension is the use of domestic products and commercial firms for information gathering. A US expert Dennis F Poindexter has pointed out that China follows a simple strategy to access information from other countries. Information networks of other nations should be “owned” wherever it is possible. China is exporting its equipment which is cheaper than others and it is reported that they have chips that can redirect information to some device that is controlled by the Chinese.

The fifth relates to formulation of Cyber Security law to monitor the activities of service providers and internet users. A law has been enacted and enforced for this purpose since June 2017. According to this law, companies are bound to assist public security agencies, the government agencies are empowered to monitor the activities in cyber space, data by service providers is to be stored in servers maintained in mainland China and authority is given to government agencies to restrict internet access. It perceives that information stored with entities outside of China could be stolen by adversaries to their advantage.

c) RUSSIA. The Russian cyber doctrine gives importance to cyber


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operations in the warfare and believes that cyber operations can pay a decisive role in hybrid warfare, ie, combination of conventional and non-conventional means in the war. Russia adopted a cyber-security strategy in 2014 and later issued in 2016 through the Presidential Decree No 646 “The Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation” to update the existing approaches for the protection of Russian national interests in the information sphere, taking into account the current realities. It identifies cyber-security, privacy and information security as vital to the national interests of Russia and forms the basis of further developments in public policy and public relations as well as improving systems for the protection of information security. The Presidential Decree enumerates the national interests and emphasises the need for the protection of its critical information infrastructures from foreign aggression. The Russian doctrine also addresses the perceived threat from foreign countries seeking to influence Russia's information infrastructure for military purposes. It suggests the need to have capacity to counter aggressive acts of adversaries in this arena. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have formed an integral system of activities, which is intended to secure the efficient containment, prevention and resolution of military conflicts in the information space.

The Russian doctrine also observed that the wide use of computer equipment in the systems of command and control of troops and weapons needed special measures to reduce the chances of cyber-attacks. The doctrine notes insufficient development of the domestic IT technologies and suggests that dependence on foreign products and developments be done away with. Significantly, while paying attention to protecting the constitutional rights of citizens in the digital space, it focused on countering the ‘brainwashing' by terrorist organisations and other unfriendly propaganda. The Russian doctrine is also aimed at countering the ‘activities of the radical social groups which use nationalist and religious extremist ideologies, foreign and international NGOs, and also private citizens who work to undermine Russia’s territorial integrity and destabilize political processes’. For this purpose the Russian doctrine places emphasis on the need for advanced researches to counter such activities.

d) UK. UK is also giving top priority to cyber security and in 2015 it announced the plan to establish the National Cyber Centre and to have a dedicated cyber force. The National Cyber Centre was subsequently established and now it works round the clock along with the UK Parliamentary Digital service to assess the nature of the attack, to work out ways of containing it and formulate precautionary measures to prevent possible future breaches. In 2016, Air Marshal


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Phil Osborn – the head of the Ministry’s Defence Intelligence arm, announced that the UK was establishing a military unit dedicated to cyber and electromagnetic warfare. The budget for cyber capabilities has been substantially enhanced for 2016-2020.The £1.9bn allocated to “cyber capabilities” represented an increase of 76% on spending during the 2010-15 Parliament – and some of this, Osborn explained, will fund “the stand-up of a military joint cyber and electromagnetic group”. The group, he said, will “deliver deployable cyber support teams dealing with both offense and defence, helping both operators and planners as well as commanders and executors.” It already has an Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office that supports the Minister and the National Security Council in determining the priorities in cyber operations. Earlier in 2013, the Defence Secretary had announced that the UK was “developing a full spectrum military cyber capability, including a strike capability”. Since then the UK is developing full cyber warfare capabilities. The Defence Secretary Fallon explaining the UK’s offensive cyber operations in his speech at Cyber 2017 Chatham House Conference (in June 2017) stated that ‘the UK’s National Offensive Cyber Planning allowed it to integrate cyber into all their military operations’. He also confirmed that the UK was using offensive cyber routinely in the war against Daesh, not only in Iraq but also in the campaign to liberate Raqqa and other towns on the Euphrates. Offensive cyber operations there had a major effect on degrading Daesh’s capabilities. In the UK’s cyber strategy, which is available only in statements of officials, deterrence occupies a key position and therefore it keeps the threshold of offensive action fairly low.

The UK also realises that the cyber security is a shared responsibility and therefore takes steps to involve the private sector on regular basis. The UK cyber security strategy has four objectives. First, to make UK as one of the most secured places in the world to do business in cyberspace and enhance its capability to tackle cyber-crime effectively. Second, to make UK more resilient to cyber-attacks and better able to protect its interests in cyberspace. Third, to enable UK to have an open, stable and vibrant cyberspace which its citizens can use safely. And fourth, to acquire the cross-cutting knowledge, skills and capability which UK needs to underpin all its cyber security objectives.

Common dimensions

There are three aspects that are common in the strategies of the above mentioned countries. First, the cyber security is perceived as a part of national


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security and all are accepting the possibilities of a cyber-war. The countries are taking a number of steps like enhancing capabilities to defend the critical infrastructure, information data and network; enhancing capabilities to respond to the cyber-attacks in real time; developing abilities to identify the sources of attacks; integrating it with armed forces operations; preparing for both defensive and offensive operations; and having an empowered body (involving top policy makers) to prioritise operations and ensuring that various stakeholders act as one force. Second is the use of cyber capabilities to deter the adversaries. Cyber operations are not merely seen as supplementing military operations but are also used as a deterrent like the nuclear and missile power. And third, there is a greater thrust on developing domestic capabilities to produce necessary IT products.

Conclusion

The cyber warfare is a new development and is drastically changing the nature of warfare. … While more than 30 countries are developing cyber warfare capabilities, more than 140 countries have a cyber-weapons development program, making the cyber battle much larger, more diverse and more destructive than the typical action in conventional warfare… India requires an overarching national cyber strategy to prioritise the objectives in an evolving environment and achieve synergy between different stakeholders so they work in coordination to deal with different threats both during war and peace… India urgently needs to develop policies and capabilities in this ‘Fifth’ domain of war. …A high powered organisation to take decisions to launch operations for the protection of national critical infrastructure in changing security environment, task different entities and ensure compliance of directions is needed. Therefore, it is suggested that India should create a National Cyber Authority under the PM.

The cyber warfare is a new development and is drastically changing the nature of warfare. Hence its key dimensions merit attention. In cyber warfare there are no rules and no regulations and it has a reach to practically all fields. Cyber warfare is an ongoing war that is never declared and is not bound by any law. The issue of attribution remains a problem. The use of cyber space by hostile elements is not only increasing rapidly but their attacks are assuming new dimensions. They are becoming more diverse, becoming better at what they do and becoming more adept at using virtual attacks to inflict real damage. The Artificial Intelligence procedures can manipulate networks and devices in unthinkable ways. They engage very large elements at the very same time and calibrate the nature of the attack by self-learning depending on the method of the defence it faces. As mentioned earlier, while more than 30 countries are developing cyber warfare capabilities, more than 140 countries have a cyber-weapons development program, making the cyber battle much larger, more diverse and more destructive than the typical conventional


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warfare. The growing importance of cyberspace in the doctrines and strategies of modern armed forces has raised the stakes for nation states and pragmatism demands that they recalibrate their security strategies in accordance with these changes. For India there is an urgent need to take into account the developments in other countries in this field and strengthen its capabilities to face new challenges. In view of the foregoing the following suggestions deserve attention:-

a) India requires an overarching national cyber strategy to prioritise the objectives in an evolving environment, achieve synergy between different stakeholders so they work in coordination to deal with different threats both during war and peace. The national cyber strategy should provide guidance to all to achieve the long term and overall objective of securing cyber space (protection against multiple intrusions) and it should be a part of national security strategy. The focus should be on enhancing cyber power, which is an essential component of national power.

b) India will face increasingly sophisticated and strategically “destructive” cyber threats as compared to the “disruptive” attacks in the Indian cyberspace that are currently being faced by the nation. India urgently needs to develop policies and capabilities in this ‘Fifth’ domain of war. These cannot wait and must be taken up on top most priority in a “Mission Mode” by the Services. The situation and threats to India are unique and hence there is an urgency to develop an indigenous solution in consonance with the national cyber strategy. The element of deterrence should be an essential component of the national cyber strategy as this can keep under check the known adversaries up to some extent. All countries despite accepting that attribution remains a problem, feel that this can deter the known adversaries. The deterrence should be credible and should reflect India’s resolve to use all instruments to cause “massive and unacceptable damage” to the attackers. For this, there is a need for a special cyber command. In August 2015, the then Defence Minister had announced the decision to create three new tri-Service commands to handle the critical arenas of space, cyberspace and clandestine warfare in the form of Special Forces. This should be implemented at the earliest to make deterrence credible, if it has not been already put in action. The survival of critical data and information networks needs to be credibly ensured.

c) A high powered organisation to take decisions to launch operations for the protection of national critical infrastructure in changing security environment, task different entities and ensure compliance of directions is needed. It is suggested that India should create a National Cyber Authority under the PM.


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d) There should be closer coordination with the private sector as envisaged in the National Cyber Policy and recommended by the Standing Committee on Information Technology 2015-2016 (herein after called the Parliamentary Committee). The Joint Working Group (JWG), set up under the Deputy National Security Advisor to work out the details of the Roadmap for cyber security cooperation, has inter-alia recommended the setting up of a permanent mechanism for Public Private Partnership. This suggestion should be urgently implemented.

e) The country continues to depend on imported IT products. The Parliamentary Committee had observed that the country depends largely on imported electronics and majority of the websites were still being hosted outside India and recommended that this should be changed. This demands that domestic companies should be given attractive incentives to manufacture necessary IT products indigenously. This step would be in accordance with India’s policy of ‘Make in India’. In a time bound manner, the organisations and companies should start using indigenous products. The Parliamentary Committee had also recommended that the Government should take measures, as far as possible, to locate internet servers for critical sectors within the country. These recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee should be urgently implemented.

f) The Parliamentary Committee also noted the acute shortage of trained manpower. The Parliamentary Committee expressed disappointment over the lack of progress on this issue. More training institutes should be identified to impart training to obtain sufficient number of qualified cyber experts. The Parliamentary Committee had also recommended making the curriculum of cyber security mandatory in schools syllabus. This would help in raising young cyber security trained persons. This recommendation should be expeditiously implemented in the entire country.

g) The Parliamentary Committee noting that there are several agencies dealing with cyber-crimes had recommended the establishment of a single centralised body. Since this involves states, the Committee also recommended formation of cyber cell in each state, district and block linked to the centralised agency. These networks should be created at the earliest as it would go a long way in strengthening our capabilities in cyber security field.

(The author is former Deputy National Security Advisor)


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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INDIA: AN UNFINISHED AGENDA

Purnima M Gupta

Societal growth along a sustainable development path is recognized as the way forward both by the Government of India as well as the Corporates. The government machinery is working together with the corporates to evolve the methodology and the instrumentality for a Public-Private-People Partnership (PPPP). …A substantive thrust has been provided to sustainability by linking it to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)...A voluntary network of thirteen organizations examined in-depth the status of CSR in India. Their report addresses salient questions and looks much beyond the mechanics of 2% CSR.

Introduction

India’s growth story now imbibes characteristics of sustainability. Sustainable Development incorporating issues of inter-generational equity in harnessing natural resources is now a feature of Indian systems functioning across public and private sectors. Societal growth along a sustainable development path is recognized as the way forward both by the Government of India as well as the Corporates. The partnership of government machinery with the corporates is working to evolve the methodology and the instruments for a Public-Private-People Partnership (PPPP). Sustainable business practices are part of the agenda for corporate events across India. The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 find expression at such mega events. A substantive thrust has been provided to sustainability by linking it to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) - the agenda of CSR now incorporates to some extent goals of sustainable business practices. However, CSR itself is still largely viewed through the commercial lens of the corporates.

An overview of CSR in India

A widely accepted principle of Corporate Social Responsibility put forth by Peter Drucker and others is that CSR is more about how profits are made and less about how profits are used. By and large, industrial activities and other enterprises are driven by commercial considerations. The purpose of employing labour in an enterprise is to reap profits. The principle of Peter Drucker implies that corporates must adopt practices that are sustainable, socially just and sensitive to human rights. It is a tall order for enterprises based on profit maximization as their major goal.


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The core business operations must reflect a responsible approach towards societal assets, whether they are material or bounties of nature. A benchmark to assess business in its core operations is provided through the National Voluntary Guidelines (NVG) (2011) on social, economic and environmental responsibilities of business. A network of organizations had formed Corporate Responsibility Watch to deliberate on business matters in India. Their efforts produced CSR in India (2016).

Business operations impact communities in diverse ways. There are only 31 firms which provide systems for conducting ‘Impact Assessment’ as mentioned in the Report on CSR in India (2016), published by Corporate Responsibility Watch. This Report further mentions that only 13 companies recognized the need to hold public hearings regarding project impact which is why an assessment of the all-pervasive impact of businesses on communities is not available. This exercise has to be made a mandatory function towards meeting the 2% CSR contribution.

It is worth reiterating that the corporates must examine the impact of core business operations on Community Development. It is important to continuously examine how profits are made by businesses in India. Further, it is imperative to constantly improve the way in which profits are made from a social, environmental and even financial angle.

The practice of CSR in India is gradually evolving from what was originally a limited commercial approach. The Companies Act 2013 has made it mandatory for companies with at least Rs 5 crore net profit or Rs 1000 crore or more of turnover or Rs 500 crore in net worth, to spend at least 2 per cent of their 3 year average annual net profit on CSR activities each year. The Report on CSR in India (2016) was presented in the public domain in September 2016. As already mentioned this was the outcome of a voluntary network of thirteen organizations examining in-depth the status of CSR in India. By addressing salient questions, the Report looked much beyond the mechanics of 2% CSR and put forth its motto without mincing words – “irrespective of the nexus that exists between the government, corporates and the media, we hold the firm belief that it is in the best interest of the corporates themselves to abandon the idea of ‘chanda’ (charity) to wash sins and engage in collaborative commons between business and community to generate distributive profits from virtue”.

This laudable Report on CSR observed that while the social aspects of the corporate responsibility were taken into account, the environmental, economic and human rights aspects were not factored into the CSR. It is as if “The State which should safeguard society against inequitable wealth creation and damage to common resources and the environment seems content with a tiny CSR handout”.

An appraisal of the Annual Reports of top 100 companies for 2015-16, as regards their CSR spend, brings out that the total amount to be spent should have


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been Rs 6653 crore but only Rs 5908 crore was spent. The sectoral allocation was 27.1% on Education, 14.9% on Health, 13.3% on Rural Development and 10.2% on Water/Sanitation. At the lowest end of the allocations were the Elderly (0.04%), Renewable Energy (0.05%) and Disability (0.24%).

During 2016-17, an estimated Rs. 14,000/- crore was the fund potentially available through CSR. As several large Corporates were sent legal notices for not complying with these CSR norms, evidently the funds mobilized are likely to fall short of this estimated amount. The names of the defaulters were given in the print media (Indian Express, 3rd Oct 2017), which was a service to the cause for which CSR stands. However, only a positive and proactive approach drive home the basic principle that CSR was more about how profits were made and less about how profits are used.

Proactive role needed by the government

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs is the nodal authority in the Government of India to deal with CSR matters. The National Voluntary Guidelines (NVG) provide the interface of the corporate with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. These guidelines give a framework for viewing Corporate Business Practices from social and environmental perspectives. ..The reports on CSR have recently started coming out and they throw light on the big picture relevant to this important aspect of business. An attempt is made by these reports to exhort the companies to go beyond the mandated 2% CSR spend and examine how the profits are made in the first instance. ..the NVG may be revised. The Government’s commitment to the corporate CSR Agenda must become more concrete. The unfinished agenda on CSR has to be worked upon. The gains from this will follow in terms of improved environmental conservation, better human development indicators and all round welfare of the community.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs is the nodal authority in the Government of India to deal with CSR matters. The National Voluntary Guidelines (NVG) provide the interface of the corporates with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. These guidelines give a framework for viewing Corporate Business Practices from social and environmental perspectives. Business Responsibility Reports (BRRs) are brought forth by a series called Disclosure Matters. The reports on CSR have recently started coming out reflecting the bigger picture relevant to CSR matters. An attempt is made by these reports to exhort the companies to go beyond the mandated 2% CSR spend and examine how the profits are made rather than how they are being spent. The field reality is different as the big picture shows that the CSR department in a company is treated as the expenditure department by the


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corporates and not as a decision making wing. The CSR officials are under pressure to show the allocation of 2% to their seniors.

It appears that Corporates contribute 2% CSR on account of the legal pressure exerted on them, market reputation at stake and community appeasement. Traditionally the Indian ‘Sahukar’ entrepreneur shared his riches with the community by eating together, distributing material objects and even educating the poor. Apart from a few companies, a deeper and a more sanctified reasoning on CSR is nearly absent in the corporates. The core business operations are really outside the CSR ambit. It is here that Government intervention is required.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs working together with the corporates on the National Voluntary Guidelines may advise the latter on a deeper engagement through the CSR Agenda. Accordingly the NVG may be revised. The Government’s commitment to the corporate CSR Agenda must become more concrete and the unfinished agenda on CSR must be worked upon together further. The gains from this will follow in terms of improved environmental conservation, better human development indicators and all round welfare of the community. The community and the corporate both would then be in a win-win situation.

(The author is former Economic Adviser, Government of India)


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BOOK REVIEW

MOSSAD: THE GREAT MISSIONS OF THE ISAERLI SECRET SERVICE

by Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal, Jaico Publishing House, Mumbai, 2016, ISBN 9788184958454, 371

Dr SD Pradhan

The book by Michael Bar-Zohar a former Knesset member and a renowned historian and Nissim Mishal former chief of Isreal’s State TV describes exciting operations of Mossad - which is considered to be the best secret service in the world, both admired and feared. The book covers 21 operations by Mossad with precise details. While most of them are known to the public, the writers have competently presented the operational details in lucid and interesting style and revealed some little known operations as well. Both the authors were associated with the Israeli Government and therefore, their version is considered an insiders’ account by some reviewers. The authors have been able to re-create these missions in a readable style bringing to life the operatives who faced grave dangers to their lives.

The work is based on extensive research and exclusive interviews with Israeli leaders and Mossad agents. This adds credibility to the write up. What is also significant is that the book covers not only the successful operations but also the failures of the agency. This is an important feature of this book. Significantly, the book indicates that the role of Mossad covers domestic responsibilities as well. The incident of the kidnapped six year old boy Yossele in 1960 by the ultra-orthodox Jews with a view to starting a religious war between the secular and orthodox Jews has been presented in an interesting manner and suggests that the agency is also utilised for internal security.

The book covers operations by Mossad extended over sixty years. Important among them are: the capture of Adolf Eichmann, the eradication of Black September, the destruction of the Syrian nuclear facility and the elimination of key Iranian nuclear scientists. The details of operations against the Syrian nuclear facility and assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists are less known and these are, therefore, an important contribution of the writers. They spare no details about the gruesome killings and plots of the Israeli agency, which enhances the value of this work. They also tell the story of the push and pull from within the Prime Minister’s office and the political echelons on the Mossad to get the job done.

The book covers only the operational details and not the political or diplomatic


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dimensions of these operations. This has been criticised in some reviews but it is clear that the purpose of the book was not to get into those details.The concise and absorbing operational details do not allow readers to miss these aspects.The book directly brings the readers to the operations. The presentation of the twists and turns keeps readers totally engrossed in the operations of the operatives.

This book is an exciting read for persons interested in intelligence and espionage. Former President of Israel has aptly remarked about the book in the following words,”This book tells what should have been known and isn’t - that Israel’s hidden force is as formidable as its recognized physical strength.”

(The review author is former Deputy National Security Advisor)


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BOOK REVIEW

INDIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS: CHANGING CONTOURSby Rajiv Bhatia, Routledge, New Delhi, London, New York 2015,

ISBN 978-1-138-92959-3

Dr SD Pradhan

Myanmar usually does not receive attention of scholars and foreign policy experts despite the fact that India adopted ‘Look East policy’ in early 1990s and ‘Act East policy’ in 2014. Significantly Prime Minister, Modi announced this policy transformation in Myanmar in 2014 reflecting the growing importance of India- Myanmar relations. In recent years, India–Myanmar relations have emerged as a subject of immense interest among policymakers and in academia. For India, this country has a great strategic importance. Myanmar is at the centre of Indo-Pacific region and has been an important area for China’s Southward march towards the Indian Ocean.

There are not many well researched books on the ethnic groups in Myanmar and their inter relationship, political and historical developments in that country as also the attitude of external powers, particularly the Chinese penetration there, which became possible because of Myanmar’s isolation. Therefore, a competent and comprehensive book by a diplomat who was the India’s Ambassador in Myanmar and who dealt with the relations with country while working in New Delhi in MEA is a welcome addition.

The book is logically divided into eight chapters. The early history is well covered in the first two chapters. It brings out several lesser known facts. The historical details greatly help in understanding the relations between India and Myanmar in the past. They also provide with interesting aspects of culture and the diverse ethnic groups of Myanmar. Three chapters are devoted to India-Myanmar relations. The India-Myanmar-China triangle with all the complexities is analysed in depth. The book also brings out interesting dimensions of India’s approach which changed in 1990s, India’s anxiety about the Chinese increasing influence over that country and India’s concerns about the North-East Insurgent groups using the territory of Myanmar.

The book brings out how the two factors - China factor and significance of India’s security in the North-East - brought a change in India’s approach towards Myanmar. India’s shift from idealism to pragmatism had preceded a lot of pressure from the Indian security establishment. However, India maintained relations with both


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the military junta as well as the pro-democratic forces. The author points out how this policy helped India in strengthening its relations with a strategically important neighbour and opened up new areas of cooperation in the economic and security domains.

Crucially, the author provides with an analysis of factors that can help in charting a policy that can further help in forging closer relations between the two countries. The India-China rivalry in Myanmar has been assessed in depth. While accepting that India is “Far behind in the race,” the author believes that India has some advantages: “It possesses a few valuable assets, the principal being Myanmar’s traditional inclination to maintain and promote some kind of equilibrium, not parity, between Myanmar-China relations and Myanmar-India relations”.

In essence, the book gives a valuable insight into the historical developments and the policy that should be followed towards Myanmar to build a much stronger relationship.The author combines analysis of facts with policy prescription in an interesting and captivating style. The book also contains an impressive bibliography. It will attract a wide variety of readership: policy makers, security experts, diplomats and researchers.

(The review author is former Deputy National Security Advisor)


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CCSS ORGANISATION

PATRONSShri TN Chaturvedi Former: Governor of Karnataka, Home Secretary,

CAG and Member of Parliament. He was awarded the Padma Vibhushan in 1990. He has authored two books and edited many more.

Shri Vijai Kapoor Former: Lt Governor of Delhi, Secretary Defence Production and Chief Secretary of J & K as well as Delhi.

Shri Shekhar Dutt SM Former: Governor of Chhattisgarh, Dy NSA, Defence Secretary. Earlier, he had served in the Indian Army and was awarded Sena Medal. He is an Advisor, E- Raksha of Cyber Security Division, Gujarat Technological University, Ahmedabad and Honorary Professor, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. He has authored three books on defence and national security.


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MEMBERS OF THE CCSS EDITORIAL BOARD

Shri DC Pathak Former: Director IB; Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee; Member, National Security Advisory Board. He has authored four books on intelligence and security issues and regularly contributes articles on current security problems in various newspapers and journals.

Shri Shekhar Dutt SM Former: Governor of Chhattisgarh, Dy NSA, Defence Secretary. Earlier, he had served in the Indian Army and was awarded Sena Medal. He is an Advisor, E- Raksha of Cyber Security Division, Gujarat Technological University, Ahmedabad and Honorary Professor, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. He has authored three books on defence and national security.

Dr SD Pradhan Former Deputy National Security Adviser and Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee. He also served as the Chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus (2008-2010). He is an Advisor, E- Raksha of Cyber Security Division, Gujarat Technological University, Ahmedabad and a member of Board of Studies, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. He has authored two books and regularly contributes articles on security issues and foreign policy in various newspapers and journals.

Shri R Srivastava Secretary, Angika Development Society; Pro Vice Chairman, DPS Bhagalpur and DPS Greater Ranchi. He is also an Advisor in the India Info Sec Consortium. He contributes articles on cyber security and other current issues.

V Adm P Kaushiva UYSM, VSM (Retd)

Former: Commandant, National Defence College; Director, National Maritime Foundation; Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet. He is a prolific writer and contributes articles on strategic affairs and maritime security issues in various newspapers and journals.


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Smt Purnima Gupta She is an eminent economist and is a former Economic Advisor to the Government of India. She has a vast experience and served different departments in this capacity like Human Resource Development, Tariff Commission, Central Electricity Authority and Planning Commission. She retired from the Indian Economic Service after working for more than 35 years in different departments. She has participated in several international seminars and conferences. She was a special invitee at the workshop organised by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific. She is a prolific writer and has contributed papers in several journals.

Dr Rakesh Datta Chairman, Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University; former member National Security Advisory Board. He has authored several books on defence and security issues and regularly contributes articles in various journals and newspapers.

Shri Harpal Bawa Director, Chanakya Centre for Strategic Studies and Member Secretary, CCSS Editorial Board; former Director, National Security Council Secretariat. He had assisted the Group of Ministers in the preparation of their report on “Reforming the National Security System”. Earlier, he had occupied several important positions in the Indian Navy.


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ADVISORY COUNCIL

Shri Shekhar Dutt SMChairman

Former: Governor of Chhattisgarh, Dy NSA, Defence Secretary, Secretary Defence Production, Secretary Ministry of Health, DG Sports Authority of India.

Shri Ajai Singh Former Director ARC.

Shri Akhil Jain Former Member CAT.

Ambassador Ashok Kumar Attri

Former Diplomat.

Shri Amitabh Mathur Former Director ARC.

Shri Tejinder Singh Laschar

Senior Economic AdvisorMinistry of Commerce & IndustryGovernment of India.

Professor Meena Datta Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University.

Dr Jaskaran Singh Waraich

Department of National Security and Defence Studies, Panjab University.

Gp Capt Rajesh Mohan (Retd)

A fighter pilot of the IAF, who took part in the 1971 Indo-Pak War.


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DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL , GREATER RANCHI -SERVICE BEFORE SELF.

FUTURE CYBER WARRIORS

Cyber forensics, innovation and incubation laboratories have been set up in DPS Greater Ranchi in collaboration with CYBER PEACE FOUNDATION to teach our students about the cyber world and about their negative implications and how to tackle incidents of rising cyber crimes.

DPS Greater Ranchi also organized Cyber Security- Citizen of 2030 where influencial dignitaries came to discuss about cyber security and our students also parcitipated.

Address-Mesra, Neori Vikas, Ranchi, Jharkhand- 835217 Contact us- 9430000015, 9430000038

Blending of Technology (Cyber) and Indian Culture.


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