aaron defences

258 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [1996] 1 SLR(R)

Aaron Anne Joseph and others v

Cheong Yip Seng and others

[1996] SGCA 78

Court of Appeal — Civil Appeal No 63 of 1995M Karthigesu JA and L P Thean JA and Chao Hick Tin J26 October 1995; 27 February 1996

Evidence — Admissibility of evidence — Facts in issue — Whether evidence of childabuse relevant in view of pleadings — Whether evidence relevant to issues ofcredibility and the award of damages — Effect of wrongful admission of evidence

Tort — Defamation — Fair comment — Whether subject matter of public interest —Whether defence of fair comment made out

Tort — Defamation — Justification — Whether facts justifying imputationscontained in libel — Whether substance or gist of libel being proved — Whetherdefence of justification made out

Tort — Defamation — Qualified privilege — Press publication — Whether publisherhaving legal, social or moral duty to communicate information to general public —Whether information of general interest to public or only a section of the public —Whether defence of qualified privilege made out

Tort — Defamation — Publication — Natural and ordinary meaning of words —Whether words defamatory — Alternative claim based on innuendo — Whetherinference could be drawn from juxtaposition with other articles

FactsThe appellants and their children lived communally with some other families intwo adjoining houses as part of a community known as the House of Israel. Theappellants brought a libel action against the respondents based on a reportpublished in The Straits Times (“the report”). The report occupied about three-quarters of a page of the newspaper and consisted of three separate articles. Thefirst two articles highlighted the nature, structure and religious practices of theappellants and the House of Israel. A third article (“the third article”) containedvarious statements made by one Van Leen, about the potential dangers ofbelonging to a sect with a leader who controlled the members. These articleswere published as a result of the third appellant’s wife being convicted andsentenced for the abuse of her children and niece. The appellants argued thatparts of the first two articles bore natural and ordinary meanings that weredefamatory. In respect of the third article, the appellants also alleged defamationbased on natural and ordinary meaning with an alternative claim based oninnuendo. The trial judge considered all the evidence and concluded that theHouse of Israel was a sect; and rejected the appellants’ claim, finding that therespondents had made out the defence of justification. In the alternative, shefound that they had succeeded on the plea of qualified privilege. The appellantsappealed, on the grounds that: (a) the admission of the evidence of child abuse

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[1996] 1 SLR(R) Aaron Anne Joseph v Cheong Yip Seng 259

was erroneous as such evidence was irrelevant, inadmissible and highlyprejudicial to the appellants; (b) the defence of justification was not made out;(c) the claim based on innuendo was wrongly dismissed by the trial judge; and(d) the respondents could not, under the circumstances, avail themselves of thedefence of qualified privilege.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) In considering the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, the properapproach was to consider what meaning the words would convey to an ordinaryreasonable person who was neither unduly naïve nor suspicious, using hisgeneral knowledge and common sense. Such a meaning was not confined to theliteral or strict meaning of the words but included any inferences which couldreasonably be drawn by such a person: at [41].(2) The Court of Appeal did not accept entirely the natural and ordinarymeanings of the first two articles as ascribed by the appellants. It did not thinkthat the ordinary reader would conclude that the appellants were members of acult, that they were guilty of criminal offences and that hurt to the children weredue to the influence of the appellants. The main article made it clear that thecomplaints to the police and Ministry of Home Affairs did not lead to anycharges being brought. There was no suggestion that anyone other than Sarahwas involved in child abuse: at [43].(3) The third article could not be read in isolation. It had to be readobjectively in the context in which it was set out; the whole of the publicationhad to be considered. The juxtaposition of the third article with the first twoarticles and the photographs within the report was crucial. An ordinary reader,having read the first and second articles and having seen the photographs wouldhave, on reading the third article, come irresistibly to the conclusion that thethird article also referred to the appellants and in particular to the first appellantas the leader of the sect: at [49].(4) The imputations found by the court in the natural and ordinary meaningsof the offending words in the report tended to bring the appellants into publicodium and contempt and lower them in the estimation of right-thinkingmembers of the society. The words complained of in the report were defamatoryof the appellants: at [51].(5) The evidence of child abuse could not be said to be relevant to the plea ofjustification or the other defences and ought not to have been admitted. It wasalso not made relevant by the appellants’ pleadings. In respect of the relevance ofsuch evidence to the issue of credibility of witnesses, only cross-examination ofthe appellants should have been allowed and no evidence should have beenadduced to contradict or disprove the claims made by the appellants. In relationto character, for the purpose of the award of damages, particular acts ofmisconduct tending to show one’s character and disposition were notadmissible. The trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of child abuseadduced from the respondents’ witnesses. However, even if the evidence of childabuse was not taken into account, there were sufficient grounds to justify thelearned judge’s decision not to accept the evidence of the appellants. Thewrongful admission of evidence was not such as to justify a reversal of the trialjudge’s decision: at [59], [60], [65] and [66].

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(6) Where a defendant in a defamation action pleaded justification, he had todo so in such a way as to inform the plaintiff and the court precisely whatmeaning or meanings he sought to justify. The facts which the respondents hadproved justified the imputations contained in the libel. The defence ofjustification succeeded in respect of the first and second articles. Although partsof the third article were not pleaded and justified by the respondents, thesubstance or gist of the libel contained in that article had been proved. Thedefence of justification was also made out in respect of the third article: at [68],[71] and [73].(7) The third article contained substantially expressions of opinion and weretherefore comments. The matter in the present case concerning a religious sectwas of legitimate public interest. On the facts which the respondents had proved,an honest and fair-minded person could honestly express the comments thatwere made in the third article. The defence of fair comment succeeded inrelation to the third article: at [74], [76] and [79].(8) Privilege for publication in the press of information of general publicinterest was limited to cases where the publisher had a legal, social or moral dutyto communicate. There was no general “media privilege at common law”. Therelevant factors were by whom and to whom, when, why and in whatcircumstances the publication was made, and whether these things established arelation between the parties which gave rise to a social or moral duty. This mightentail consideration of questions of public policy. The respondents only showedthat the publication of the information was in the interest of a section of thepublic, namely, members of the Christian community. Such sectional interestdid not give rise to a moral or social duty to publish the report. The respondentsdid not succeed on the defence of qualified privilege: at [81], [87] and [88].

Case(s) referred toAdam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (refd)Allbutt v The General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1889)

23 QBD 400 (refd)Blackshaw v Lord [1984] QB 1 (refd)Chapman v Lord Ellesmere [1932] 2 KB 431 (refd)Globe and Mail Ltd, The v Boland (1960) 22 DLR (2d) 277 (refd)Hobbs v Tinling (C T) and Company, Limited [1929] 2 KB 1 (folld)Jones v Skelton [1963] 1 WLR 1362; [1963] 3 All ER 952 (folld)Kelly v Tinling (1865) LR 1 QB 699 (folld)Lee Kuan Yew v Davies Derek Gwyn [1989] 2 SLR(R) 544; [1989] SLR 1063

(folld)London Artists Ltd v Littler [1968] 1 WLR 607, QB (refd)London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, CA (refd)Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 147 (refd)Morrell v International Thomson Publishing Ltd [1989] 3 All ER 733 (refd)Prager v Times Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 77 (refd)Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (folld)Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 (folld)Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743 (refd)



Sim v Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669 (refd)Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157 (folld)Viscount De L’Isle v Times Newspaper Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 49 (refd)Yorkshire Provident Life Assurance Company v Gilbert & Rivington [1895] 2 QB

148 (refd)

Legislation referred toChildren and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 1994 Rev Ed)Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1985 Rev Ed) ss 5, 148, 155Rules of the Supreme Court (Cap 322, R5, 1990 Ed) O 73 r 3, O 59 r 19(2)

Charles Anthony St John Gray QC, R Palakrishnan, Malathi Das and Dominic Nagulendran (Palakrishnan & Pnrs) for the appellants; Tan Chee Meng, Doris Chia and Michael Palmer (Harry Elias & Pnrs) for the respondents.

[Editorial note: This was an appeal from the decision of Lai Siu Chiu J in the HighCourt. See [1994] SGHC 201.]

27 February 1996 Judgment reserved.

L P Thean JA (delivering the judgment of the court):1 This is an appeal against the decision of Lai Siu Chiu J dismissing theappellants’ libel action against the respondents based on a report publishedin The Straits Times on 9 March 1989 (“the report”) [see Anne Joseph Aaronv Cheong Yip Seng [1994] SGHC 201].

The facts2 The first appellant is a housewife; the second appellant is her husbandwho used to be a successful professional singer with his own band. Thethird appellant is a practising advocate and solicitor. The appellants livecommunally with their children and some other families in two adjoiningsemi-detached houses in Sembawang. The community is known as theHouse of Israel. The first respondent is the chief editor, the secondrespondents, the publishers and the third respondents, the printers of thenewspaper, The Straits Times.

3 The events which led to the publication of the report complained of inThe Straits Times were these. In January 1988, the third appellant’s wife,Baldev Kaur also called Sarah (“Sarah”), contacted the Ministry ofCommunity Development (“MCD”) for help, alleging that her threechildren, Daniel, Elizabeth and Michelle, were being abused at theirSembawang home. An investigation was carried out by some officers of theMCD, and as a result the children were temporarily placed in a children’shome. Between April and November 1988, a court inquiry was conductedto look into the welfare of the children pursuant to the relevant provisions



of the Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38). Surprisingly, at theinquiry, Sarah admitted that she was the one who abused the children.Consequently, criminal proceedings were brought against her. On26 January 1989, Sarah pleaded guilty in the District Court to five chargesof assault on her three children and her niece, Suzanna. On 8 March 1989,she was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of four months. On the verynext day, there appeared in The Straits Times the report which featured theappellants and the House of Israel.

4 The report did not carry any by-line giving the name of the author.But it was prepared and written by a journalist named Sandra Davie(“Davie”) who was given the assignment. The report occupied about three-quarters of a page of the newspaper and consisted of three separate articles.The main article (“main article”) bore the caption in bold print “Childabuse case focuses fresh attention on Sembawang sect” and immediatelybelow was another caption in block capital but smaller print “SPECIALREPORT” and highlighted in the form of black background with whitelettering. By the side of the main article at the top was a large photograph ofthe two houses in Sembawang and below a part of that photograph was anequally large photograph of the first and second appellants. Immediatelynext to the latter photograph and below the other part of the photograph ofthe houses were the other two articles. The first of these two articles borethe caption in block capital “BEHIND CLOSED DOORS” in the samehighlighted form, below which was another caption in larger print “Prayersat 3.00am kick off rigid schedule” (“second article”). The third article whichappeared immediately below the second article bore the caption in blockcapital “WARNING FROM CULT BUSTER” (“third article”) also in thesame highlighted form.

The claim

5 The appellants complained that all the three articles containedstatements defamatory of them. At the risk of burdening the judgment, it isnecessary to set out in full the various parts of the articles complained of.The offending part of the main article is the following:

The sentencing yesterday of a woman for child abuse has focusedattention on a religious sect she belongs to, which has been accusedseveral times of breaking up families to recruit members.

At least one man has filed a police report after his family left him forthe group, known as the House of Israel and based in two bungalows inSembawang, but no charges have been filed against them.

The sect, consisting of about 25 adults and children, is claimed to beled by Mrs Anne Aaron, whose husband Joseph Aaron was known asJoe Chandran when he was lead singer with the pop group, X-periment, before it broke up in 1985.



Yesterday, Baldev Kaur d/o Bahadra Singh, 36, was sentenced to a totalof four months’ jail after pleading guilty to abusing her three childrenand a niece while the family lived in the sect’s compound.

Her husband, a lawyer, who is also a member of the sect, … But thefather of the children wanted custody of the children and in the middleof last year asked for a court case to prove that his wife was responsiblefor the physical abuse.

After a long inquiry, the court was unable to determine who hadcaused hurt to the children but ordered them to be returned to thefather on condition that he post a bond for each child.

Mrs Aaron, a middle-aged woman whose husband also belongs to thegroup, is said to dominate the others …

People acquainted with the sect said all property and possessions arepooled, and she metes out the daily allowances. It is not clear whatdenomination of Christianity the group belongs to, but they callthemselves ‘spirit-filled Christians’…

‘They appeared a bit strange,’ the pastor recollected. ‘They used tocome dressed in clothes of the same colour. If someone wanted to talkto one of the members, they would have to ask Anne permissionfirst.’…

‘They believe that Anne can heal them of sicknesses,’ he reported. ‘Iremember, Hannah, one of the members, had a bad cut on her fingerand she looked pale. I advised her to see the doctor. But she said thatwith Anne’s prayer the bleeding stopped and it will heal.’

A 48-year-old security officer who claimed that he lost his family to thesect has complained to the Home Affairs Ministry, and another manhas filed a police report claiming that his wife and child have left himfor the group.

But no charges have been pressed…

At that meeting, the security officer claimed that about seven adultsand five children were converted to Christianity by Mrs Aaron. Healleged that Mrs Aaron was taking over his family and personal affairsafter a few months …

‘Anne told my wife and children that I had incestuous thoughts aboutmy daughter, and they left,’ declared the husband who now lives alonein his five room flat at Clementi.

In December 1987, the security officer said he suffered another blowwhen a marriage was arranged between his 23-year-old son and arelative of Mrs Aaron’s from Malaysia.

‘That was really heart-breaking – my own son married off without myknowledge,’ he said.

Another family claimed to have been broken up by the group was thatof a 41-year old man who declined to be named.



He alleged that his wife and daughter left him to join the group whenhe objected to their involvement … .A 30-year-old woman spoke of the heartbreak her family suffered inlosing contact with her sister, who joined the House of Israel with herhusband ….She claimed: ‘She is not allowed any contact with us. Once when Icalled, I could hear someone screaming at her to put down thephone.’… .Mrs Aaron told the inquiry last year that the sect bought theSembawang property after she had a vision of the group living in thetwo houses … .

6 The second article highlighted the religious practices of the House ofIsrael and the portion of which the appellants complained was thefollowing:

Prayers at 3am kick off rigid schedule.A glimpse of what goes on behind doors of the House of Israel, gleanedfrom testimony in court proceedings last year and interviews by TheStraits Times. The children’s father asked for a court case to havecustody of the children who had been placed in a home by the MCD.A rigid daily schedule begins with everyone including the children,being awakened at 3am to pray. Mrs Anne Aaron leads the prayersessions and often members of the group are made to confess theirsins.During the court inquiry last year, a woman who knew the group saidoften members are accused by Mrs Aaron of having sexual thoughtsabout another person. She said often Mrs Aaron would persist until theaccused person broke down and confessed.Baldev Kaur, the woman sentenced yesterday for child abuse, ran awayfrom the group at least three times but returned each time. The groupwould troop her to the homes of other people and in the presence ofthe whole group, including her children, she was made to confessabusing the youngsters.The members revere Mrs Aaron, believing that she can discern all thatis happening….Everyone calls her ‘Sister Anne’ including her husband … .Mrs Aaron even decides on the colour of clothes that the group shoulddon for the day – again, she says, through prayer … .The group also believes that their leader has healing powers. Mr Aaronhas told several people of how his wife has cured people by taking ontheir diseases and ailments… .

7 Finally, the third article contained various statements made by oneWalter Adrian Van Leen (“Van Leen”), the head of an organisation knownas the Concerned Christians Growth Ministries (“the CCGM”) based in



Perth, Australia. The entire article was said to be defamatory of theappellants and is now reproduced below:

Members of religious sects who become totally dependent on acharismatic leader can be risking their lives, a cult buster warned.

‘The kind of control that such a leader has over the members could bedangerous,’ claimed Mr Adrian Van Leen … ‘It could lead to a tragedylike the Jonestown incident.’

The Jonestown affair, which occurred in 1978, led to the mass suicideof 912 followers of evangelist Jim Jones in the Guyanan jungle.

Mr Van Leen explained: ‘In such a situation, if everything goes wrongand there is no way out for the leader, then he or she can get everyoneto die with them.’

He claimed that some sect leaders control their followers by instillingfear into them.

‘It can be fear of the power and ability of the leader,’ he noted, ‘Theycan also fear being humiliated when they are punished before others.’

He said such leaders are adept at using tactics designed to destroy theself-will and dignity of the individuals so that the members becometotally dependent on the leader.

Noted the Australian expert: ‘Controlling every aspect of their lives liketheir finances, even telling them what to wear and eat, is destroying theperson’s self.’

8 In their statement of claim the appellants ascribed to the offendingparts of the main and second articles their natural and ordinary meanings,which we shall set out in detail in a moment. As for the third article, theappellants averred that by featuring it within the layout of the main articleand with the two articles read together, the words in the third article in theirnatural and ordinary meaning and/ or by way of innuendo meant and wereunderstood to mean that the appellants and others referred to in the mainarticle were all members of a cult and ascribed to them their natural andordinary meanings, which again we shall set out in detail shortly.

The defence

9 In their defence, the respondents denied that the words complained ofin the main and second articles were defamatory and bore the meanings asalleged. In the alternative the respondents pleaded justification. In respectof the third article, they denied that the words bore the meaning as allegedand that they referred to the appellants. In the alternative, if the wordsreferred to the appellants, the respondents denied that they weredefamatory and bore the meaning as alleged. The respondents also pleadedthe defence of justification in relation to the third article. In the furtheralternative, the respondents averred that the alleged inference and/orinnuendo that the appellants were members of a cult were fair comment



upon a matter of public interest, namely, the activities and conduct of areligious group and/or their leader. Lastly, the respondents pleaded thedefence of qualified privilege in relation to the report.

The trial

10 Much publicity was given to the highly emotional trial which lasted38 days. In total, 33 witnesses who were acquainted or associated with theHouse of Israel gave evidence as to the nature, structure and practices of thegroup. It is necessary to give a summary of the material evidence. First, theevidence adduced by the appellants. According to the appellants, the Houseof Israel consisted of staunch Christian families related by blood ormarriage. In the beginning, members of the group merely met for prayerand Bible study sessions at the flat of the first and second appellants in AngMo Kio. At that time, they were mainly Sai Baba followers. Sometime in1983, members of the group decided to convert to Christianity. They werebaptised by one Pastor Alan Ang (“Pastor Ang”) of the Nee Soon ChristianChurch which they attended. The appellants used to contribute tithes to theNee Soon Christian Church individually. Unhappy with the fact that PastorAng announced the names of the contributors before the congregation,they decided to contribute collectively instead. After some prayers at theAng Mo Kio flat, they saw the name “House of Israel” in the Bible, and theydecided to use it when they contributed tithes. Since then, the group hasbecome known by that name in Christian circles.

11 In 1984, Sarah abandoned her family. As a result, the third appellant,feeling quite distraught, sought help from the first and second appellants totake care of his three young children. Thus, the first and second appellantswith their children, moved from their flat in Ang Mo Kio to stay with thethird appellant in his house at Fulton Road. That marked the start ofcommunal living. Shortly after, the third appellant invited his brother,Steven Joshua (“Steven”), a pilot, the latter’s wife, Deborah, and theirchildren, to join them in the Fulton Road house. Deborah could drive andwas in charge of sending the children to school. The first appellant wouldtend to the other household chores. The arrangement continued even afterSarah returned to her family in early 1985.

12 In and around 1985, others came to live with the appellants at FultonRoad for different personal reasons. There were Hannah Abraham(“Hannah”), the third appellant’s second cousin, and her two children,Priscilla and Samuel. Hannah’s husband, Kernail Singh (“Kernail”), used toabuse her physically. One day, Hannah caught Kernail committing incestwith their daughter, Priscilla. That was the last straw as far as Hannah wasconcerned; she packed up and left him for good. The group provided asanctuary to Hannah, Priscilla and Samuel. Then, there was the thirdappellant’s sister, Rachel Jacob, who was forced out of her home by herhusband, Jasbir Singh (“Jasbir”), because she converted to Christianity



against his wishes. Together with her daughter Suzanna, Rachel Jacobsought shelter with the group. Lastly there were also the third appellant’sother sister, Rebekah Isaac (“Rebekah”) and her husband, Isaac Benjamin(“Isaac”); they left Isaac’s family to join the group because of the frictionbetween Rebekah and her mother-in-law.

13 As such, the community grew and expanded. In 1986, the groupchanced upon the two houses in Sembawang. They decided to buy thehouses because in 1984, the first appellant had a vision of them living in twowhite houses with arch doors. They therefore pooled their resources to buythe properties. In the result, the house at Fulton Road belonging to the thirdappellant, Steven’s house, also at Fulton Road, and the Ang Mo Kio flatbelonging to the first and second appellants were sold to finance thepurchase of the houses. Some of the other members also contributed fundsfor the purpose.

14 In 1989, apart from the appellants’ families, there were the families ofthe third appellant’s siblings, namely, Steven, Rachel Jacob and Rebekahwho belonged to the community and lived in the houses in Sembawang; soalso were the families of the first appellant’s three sisters, namely, Joanna(also known as Grace George), Marianna and Zipporah. Finally, there wereHannah and her children. The ties between the families were furtherstrengthened by the marriages between Hannah’s and Zipporah’s children:in 1987, Hannah’s son, Samuel, married Lydia, Zipporah’s daughter, and in1994 Hannah’s daughter, Priscilla, married Zipporah’s son, Acquilia.

15 Turning to the nature of the group, the appellants said that the firstappellant did not dominate the rest of the group. The first appellant wasyounger than at least nine of the other adults in the group. She was also theleast educated of them all. The first appellant was only addressed as SisterAnne in church. At home, all the women, not just the first appellant, werecalled spiritual mothers. The first appellant did not restrict or control themin any way. Members of the group were free to mix with others. In fact,many of the group members worked. They had to socialise with colleaguesand clients. The first appellant did not prevent them from speaking tooutsiders. Moreover, there were telephones and televisions in the houses,just like in any other home.

16 Admittedly, members of the group wore clothes in the same or similarcolours. They also appeared in public dressed in the same or similarcoloured clothes. However, the first appellant did not decide or dictate thecolour to be worn for a particular day based on her prayers. The firstappellant, a former seamstress, used to design clothes for the secondappellant. The third appellant liked her taste in clothes. At the Fulton Roadhouse, the first appellant was asked to buy clothes for the third appellantand his children. Later, the first appellant began to buy clothes for the othermembers of the group.



17 As for the financial arrangement within the group, most of theworking members put their salaries and wages together. However, theyusually took out their allowances first. There were no fixed rules and no onecontrolled the funds. Living and household expenses were paid out of thepool. Deborah was in charge of such expenses. A family discussion wouldbe held before a substantial payment was made.

18 In relation to their religious beliefs and practices the appellants saidthat they were baptised in an Assembly of God or Pentecostal church andthey believed in the Holy Trinity. They considered themselves within themainstream of faith. In January 1985, the members of the House of Israelwere asked to leave the Nee Soon Christian Church. Their explanation wasthis. One day, the first appellant saw a pornographic magazine in PastorAng’s parsonage. Pastor Ang admitted it was his. Pastor Ang also confidedin the first appellant about his affair with a female member of hiscongregation. He asked her to pray for him. In turn, the first appellantasked the family to pray for Pastor Ang. Subsequently, Pastor Ang learnedabout this from Sarah and thought that the first appellant was indiscreet.Angry with the first appellant, he expelled all the members of the group,except Sarah, from the Nee Soon Christian Church. After leaving the NeeSoon Christian Church, the members of the House of Israel did not attendany particular church regularly; they practised at home what they hadlearned. When Jacob George (“Jacob”), the first appellant’s nephew, was athome, he would preach to them. Jacob had been trained at the TrinityTheological College.

19 The appellants admitted that there were prayer sessions at 3.00am inthe mornings for about 20 to 30 minutes. The first and second appellantswere the first to start praying early in the mornings. When the rest of thegroup found out that their prayers were answered, they participatedvoluntarily in these sessions. These sessions were not compulsory and thechildren were not dragged out of bed to attend them. Daniel, Elizabeth andMichelle were brought out into the prayer hall for the prayer sessionsbetween August 1987 to January 1988 only because the third appellantfeared that Sarah would abuse them. They were allowed to sleep in theprayer hall. The first appellant did not lead these prayer sessions. On thecontrary, all the other “elders”, or the older adults in the group, took turn tolead the prayer sessions, except the first appellant. Furthermore, they didnot hold confession sessions. Members of the group were certainly notpunished or humiliated before the others during confession sessions. Thefirst appellant did not bring Sarah to the homes of other people to force herto confess to the abuse of the children.

20 In addition, the first appellant did not possess healing powers. Shesaid that only God could heal. She did not tell anyone that she took on theillnesses of others. The second appellant did not claim that she had such apower either. Although they would pray when they were sick, the members



would consult doctors about their ailments. They admitted that once whenHannah cut her finger, the first appellant and Deborah held the bleedingfinger and prayed. The bleeding later stopped. It was not due to any specialhealing power possessed by the first appellant. The third appellant alsoexplained that he prevented his children from seeking medical treatmentwhen they suffered physical abuse because he did not want Sarah to beprosecuted. His reluctance had nothing to do with the belief in the firstappellant’s power to heal. Moreover, three members of the group werenurses, and the children received adequate medical attention. The firstappellant, however, did possess the power of discernment.

21 The House of Israel did not go about recruiting members. The groupcertainly did not break up families in order to do so. There were goodreasons for Hannah to leave Kernail, who was the 48-year-old securityofficer mentioned in the report. Moreover, the appellants and Hannahbrought Samuel to see Kernail before Samuel’s marriage to Lydia. Kernailobjected vehemently to the match and to Samuel’s conversion toChristianity. He refused to accept his wife and children. The 41-year-oldman referred to in the report was Jasbir, who threw his wife and daughterout of their home after they accepted the Christian faith. As for the 30-year-old woman named in the report, she was Joginder Kaur (“Joginder”),Deborah’s sister, who was baptised along with the other members of thegroup. After the baptism, she went back to Sikhism. Joginder did notchoose to keep in touch with Deborah. She did not even introduce herhusband to Deborah when they met by chance in a supermarket.

22 None of the appellants had any prior warning about the report. Beforepublication, no one at The Straits Times saw it fit to put the allegations tothe appellants for their comments. Immediately after reading the report, theappellants rushed to the premises of The Straits Times to seek clarificationof the falsehoods but to no avail. The appellants emphasised that they werebadly affected by the publication of the report. Prior to 9 March 1989, theHouse of Israel was a happy Christian community. Apart from Sarah’sdesertion of her family and her ill-treatment of the children, the voluntaryarrangement suited the members of the group admirably. Members of thegroup, especially the second appellant, used to get invitations to sing andgive testimonies in many churches. After the report, members of the groupwere ostracised by the people they knew and the churches they used toattend. Michelle’s school principal and teachers were also very insensitive.For a school test, they used a comprehension passage based on the incident.This caused Michelle and the group much distress. Everyone in the groupsuffered.

23 With that, we now turn to the evidence adduced by the respondents,beginning with the testimony of Dr Mary Varughese (“Dr Varughese”),who is a cousin of the first appellant. Dr Varughese met the first appellantfor the very first time in 1980. The second appellant was in Europe on a



singing tour. Dr Varughese noticed that the first appellant and her childrenwere barely coping in the Ang Mo Kio flat and that the children weremalnourished. The first appellant, a devout follower of Sai Baba, was atimid and submissive woman. Dr Varughese helped the family financially.She introduced the first appellant to Christianity. Later, she even bought airtickets for the first appellant and the children to visit the second appellantin Europe. A few months after her return from Europe, the first appellantcontacted Dr Varughese and informed Dr Varughese that she had met anew group of friends. Dr Varughese met the first appellant’s new-foundfriends who turned out to be the third appellant, Steven, Hannah and theirfamilies. The first appellant and her new friends were inseparable and spenta lot of time together. Dr Varughese decided to convert all of them toChristianity. She brought them to evangelical meetings. She also went alongto their meetings in the Ang Mo Kio flat. The first appellant toldDr Varughese that she had healing powers and could take on the illnesses ofothers.

24 In 1983, the group decided to accept Christ. Dr Varughese was verypleased and arranged for them to be baptised by Pastor Ang. After that,Dr Varughese continued to hold Bible study classes for the group.Dr Varughese observed the first appellant to be a changed person; she wasno longer meek and quiet. By 1984, the first appellant was already leadingthe group. She was addressed as Sister Anne by the members of the groupwho would hand their money to her. They would also kiss her hand as theyleft each meeting. The group travelled in their own van and would allow thefirst appellant to get into the van first. Sometimes, the first appellant wouldtake a couple aside to talk to them so as to correct their behaviour. She waseven in charge of disciplining Steven’s daughter. Moreover, she was alwaysaround when the group was with outsiders. The group began wearingsimilar coloured clothes. Later, they decided to leave the Nee SoonChristian Church.

25 Dr Varughese recalled an occasion when Sarah was brought to herhouse and forced to confess her sins to Dr Varughese before the othermembers of the group, including the children. The third appellant said itwas retribution for the trouble Sarah created at home for the first appellant.There was another time when the members of the group, led by the firstappellant, wanted Dr Varughese to confess her sexual sins. WhenDr Varughese had to sell her house to move into a flat, she received a letterpurportedly written by Sarah stating that it was a form of retribution. Theletter also claimed that all who defied the first appellant would suffer.Dr Varughese was very disturbed by the incidents which revealed thevindictiveness of the first appellant and the group. She confirmed that sheprovided information to Davie about the House of Israel.

26 Next, Pastor Ang confirmed that Dr Varughese introduced him to themembers of the House of Israel. He was asked to baptise them. He also



conducted Bible classes for them. When they attended the Nee SoonChristian Church, they asked for their tithes to be acknowledged in thename of the House of Israel. He agreed to do so. He denied that he openlyread out the names of the contributors before his congregation. The givingof tithes is not compulsory and is completely up to the individual.

27 Pastor Ang denied that the first appellant saw a pornographicmagazine in his parsonage, that he had an affair with a female member ofhis congregation and that he confided in the first appellant. He would onlyshare his personal problems with close friends or older pastors. It was nottrue that he was angry with the first appellant for betraying his confidence.He did not force the group to leave the church; they left on their own freewill claiming that the church was not totally committed to God. They alsorefused to sign a form of allegiance to the church. As such, letters oftermination of their membership were sent to everyone in the group.Although they did not have any voting rights by virtue of the termination,they were nonetheless welcomed at the church. However, the group did notreturn at all.

28 Pastor Ang admitted that he spoke to Davie and was the unidentifiedpastor mentioned in the report. He also reiterated that he saw for himselfhow, when Hannah cut her finger, she did not seek treatment. Instead, thefirst appellant prayed for recovery. When the group attended the Nee SoonChristian Church, he observed that they wore similar coloured clothes. Hewas also told by the second appellant that the first appellant had the powerof discernment.

29 Then there was the evidence of Isaac who married the thirdappellant’s sister, Rebekah, in 1981. He was a member of the House of Israelfrom 1986 to 1993. He is an army officer. He denied that he decided to livein Sembawang because his wife did not get along with his mother. When hewas with the House of Israel, he seldom saw his own family. He did not seehis sister at all and did not attend her wedding. He was also discouragedfrom bringing his wife and children to outings organised by the army. Thefirst appellant said that mixing with outsiders was undesirable as the wrongspirits would affect them. Isaac was very dependent on the first appellant, tothe extent that he would ask her to pray before he went jogging. He did notdare to go against her wishes because he feared her power of discernment.She correctly predicted that Rebekah would have a son. The group believedthat those who defied the first appellant would suffer retribution; she couldpredict such divine retribution. One S George who lent money to them tobuy a van later tried to get his money back. When his only son died, thegroup believed that it was retribution. In general, life in the Sembawanghouses was very much controlled by the first appellant. She checked ontheir mail and telephone calls. Isaac would also give his entire pay to thefirst appellant, keeping only what he needed for income tax. The thirdappellant, Steven, Rachel Jacob and Rebekah also gave their salaries to the



first appellant. The first appellant based on prayers would also decide thecolour of their clothes for home worship or when the family went out as agroup.

30 Isaac spoke of the prayer sessions which took place in the mornings.These were compulsory, even for the children. Only the children of the firstappellant and her sisters were spared. The first appellant claimed that herdaughters had an open channel with God and there was no need for them toattend these sessions. At these sessions, the adults were made to confesstheir sins. Only the women of the third appellant’s side of the group had toconfess. They were humiliated and punished. For instance, they wereslapped if they did not confess. He had never heard the first appellant or hersisters confess.

31 Another person with personal knowledge of the House of Israel wasRachel Israel, the wife of the first appellant’s nephew, Jacob. She confirmedthat there were prayer and confession sessions for which attendance wascompulsory, except for the children of the first appellant’s side of the group.She herself was once slapped for failing to attend. The children were notallowed to fall asleep during the sessions. Only the women of the thirdappellant’s side of the group were asked by the first appellant to confesstheir sexual thoughts and perversions. The first appellant was able toprophesy. She foretold that Rachel Israel would have a daughter. She alsoknew if Rachel Israel had called her own mother at the office and what theyhad talked about. The first appellant was able to instil fear in the rest of thegroup by threats that those who defied her would suffer retribution. Thegroup did not believe in medication and went to consult doctors for the solepurpose of obtaining medical certificates. The first appellant woulddetermine the colour of the clothes to be worn by members of the groupthrough prayers. Rachel Israel gave her entire salaries to the first appellantand in return she was given an allowance of $10 per month. For herleadership position in the group, the first appellant was called Sister Anne.Rachel Israel’s family left the House of Israel in 1990, because Jacobfrequently quarrelled with the first appellant.

32 There was one witness, Kishore Kumar (“Kishore”) who read aboutthe trial in the newspapers and came forward to give evidence. He relatedhis personal experience with the House of Israel. In 1984, he met and got toknow the second appellant. He was only 20 years old and was unemployed.The second appellant spoke to him about Christianity and about the group.He found out that members of the group used to be Sai Baba followers.Then, the first appellant had a vision for them to convert to Christianityand they did. Further, the second appellant told him that even when thefirst appellant was a Sai Baba devotee, she had healing powers and was ableto take on the illnesses and sicknesses of others. At his first meeting withthem, the group spoke of spiritual Christianity. The first appellant told himthat he had to confess his sins so as to cleanse his mind before becoming a



spiritual Christian. He thought it awkward and uncomfortable to do so infront of complete strangers. The appellants also told him that as “spiritualChristians”, they did not belong to any denomination. Subsequently, he sawthem three to four times a week for about two months. At these meetings,the first appellant played a dominant role. There were other outsiders atthese meetings. He left because he felt very dominated by the group,especially by the first appellant. For instance, she told him that his girlfriendwas not suitable for him, causing him to break up with her.

33 Allen Balakrishnan (“Allen”), a cleaning contractor, also testified forthe respondents. He employed Aquila, Zipporah’s son, for a brief spell inDecember 1987, upon the recommendation of the second appellant. Aquilawould bring his own food and drinks to work. He did not eat with any ofthe staff because they were not Christians. He refused to accept tea offeredby Allen because the first appellant did not permit him to do so. There wereother occasions when Aquila would not do things because the firstappellant did not allow him to. Allen had been invited to live with the groupin Sembawang. On the advice of his wife and some pastors, he decidedagainst it. Allen denied the allegation that he supplied drugs to his foreignworkers. He was a former civil servant and understood fully well theseriousness of drug related offences. He denied that Aquila left the jobbecause Aquila found out about the abuse of drugs among Allen’s workers.Aquila was a Malaysian and he left because he was not given a work permit.

34 Kernail and Jasbir also gave evidence for the respondents. Theyrefuted the allegations by the appellants that they were to blame for thesorry states of their families. They testified that they were the onesinterviewed by Davie and referred to in the report as the 48-year-oldsecurity guard and the 41-year-old man respectively. They maintained thatthe group broke up the families in their zest to recruit members to theirgroup.

35 Joginder, Deborah’s sister was called and she gave evidence for therespondents. She admitted that she was the 30-year-old woman mentionedin the report. She denied that she refused to keep in touch with Deborah.She confirmed that she called Deborah to inform her of her pendingmarriage. Someone on the other end screamed at Deborah to put down thetelephone. After that, Joginder’s family lost contact with Deborah. WhenJoginder called, she was told that Deborah was not available.

36 Finally, Davie testified that she had attempted to contact the group atleast four times. She identified herself each time. She made her last attemptthe night before the publication of the report. The members of the House ofIsrael refused to speak to her. Prior to the publication of the report, she didnot know any of the appellants. On the day of the publication, Steventelephoned her and accused her of publishing hearsay evidence. Davie kepta note to that effect. Steven knew that she prepared the report because shehad tried to speak to them before. The report did not carry a by-line of the



name of the author. She said she wrote the report based on informationobtained from the people she interviewed. She also verified the informationfrom other sources. She was careful not to label the House of Israel a “cult”.Instead, she referred to them as a sect or a group.

The decision below

37 In her reserved judgment, the learned judge dismissed the appellants’claim. She first dealt with the third article and rejected the appellants’ claimthat, by way of innuendo, it labelled the House of Israel as a cult. Next, shedealt with the evidence adduced and found the appellants not worthy ofbelief, preferring to accept the evidence of the respondents’ witnesses. Onthe totality of the evidence given by the respondents’ witnesses on thenature, structure and practices of the group, she concluded that the Houseof Israel was a sect. This was the very word used repeatedly in the report todescribe the House of Israel and constituted the sting of the libel. As such,she held that the respondents had made out the defence of justification. Inthe alternative, she found that the respondents had succeeded on the plea ofqualified privilege.

The appeal

38 Four main grounds of appeal were raised before us. The first involvesthe evidence relating to the abuse of Sarah’s children. Mr Gray for theappellants contended that the admission of the evidence to the effect thatthe first appellant abused the children with the knowledge and help of thesecond and third appellants was erroneous. Such evidence was irrelevantand inadmissible and was highly prejudicial to the appellants. Secondly,Mr Gray submitted that the defence of justification had not been made out.Thirdly, the claim based on innuendo was wrongly dismissed by the learnedjudge. Finally, it was contended that on the facts and circumstances, therespondents could not avail themselves of the defence of qualified privilege.To begin, it is necessary to deal with the important question of the meaningof the words complained of and also the question whether they weredefamatory of the appellants.

Meaning of the words

39 The learned judge, with respect, did not make a finding as to thenatural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of. She took a verybroad approach and formulated the issue as follows ([1] supra):

The only issue before the court and which would determine theplaintiffs’ claim is, are they members of a cult or sect known as theHouse of Israel? To make this finding, I have to look at thecharacteristics of a cult and compare those characteristics with theevidence adduced in court as to the plaintiffs’ practices.



40 Thus, she side-stepped the preliminary issue as to the natural andordinary meaning of the words complained of and the further issue whetherthe words were defamatory of the appellants.

41 In considering the natural and ordinary meaning of the words theproper approach is to consider what meaning the words would convey to anordinary reasonable person who is neither unduly naive or suspicious,using his general knowledge and common sense. Such a meaning is notconfined to the literal or strict meaning of the words but includes anyinferences which can reasonably be drawn by such person: see RubberImprovement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 at 258; and Jones vSkelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 at 958.

42 In para 6 of the amended statement of claim, the appellants ascribedto the offending words in the main and second articles the natural andordinary meanings as follows:

(a) that the plaintiffs were all members of a heretical group;

(b) that the plaintiffs are members of some deviant Christian group,

(c) that the plaintiffs were strange people,

(d) that the plaintiffs were members of a cult with the first namedplaintiff as the leader,

(e) that the first plaintiff dominated and controlled the group inevery aspect of their lives,

(f) that the first plaintiff had supernatural occultic powers to healand convert,

(g) that the first plaintiff had some psychic power in mind reading,

(h) that the plaintiffs were responsible for breaking up numerousfamilies at random for recruitment purposes and for financial gain,

(i) that the plaintiffs were guilty of criminal offences,

(j) that the hurt was caused to the children because of the influenceof the plaintiffs,

(k) that the plaintiffs indulged in some ritualistic practices startingat 3.00am,

(l) that the third plaintiff engineered and requested for the courthearing,

(m) that the second and third plaintiffs lacked self-will,

(n) that the inquiry court had insufficient evidence to make afinding on the identity of the abuser.



43 We do not accept entirely the natural and ordinary meanings soascribed by the appellants. In particular, we do not think that the ordinaryreader would conclude that the appellants were members of a cult and wereguilty of criminal offences and that the hurt that was caused to the childrenwas due to the influence of the appellants. The main article made it quiteclear that the complaints to the police and to the Ministry of Home Affairshad not led to any criminal charges being brought, much less proved,against any of the appellants. There was no suggestion there that anyoneother than Sarah was involved in the child abuse.

44 In our opinion, applying the test that has been laid down, the naturaland ordinary meanings of the words are as follows. The appellants belongedto a Christian sect or group called the House of Israel with the firstappellant as their leader. The members and their families lived in the twohouses in Sembawang which were bought from resources of the members.Baldev Kaur, ie Sarah, the wife of the third appellant, left the Sembawanghome in January 1988 and reported that her three children had beenabused. The third appellant who is a lawyer also made a report to the policeof abuse of the children after she had left. The Ministry of CommunityDevelopment carried out an investigation and put the children in theWilkie Road Children Home. But the third appellant as the father wantedcustody of the children and sought to prove that his wife was responsiblefor the abuse. The court held an inquiry but could not find who had causedhurt to the children and ordered the children to be returned to the thirdappellant on condition that he posted a bond. Subsequently Baldev Kaurpleaded guilty to the charge of having abused her three children and herniece. The first appellant controlled the members of the group in manyaspects of their lives. They lived communally: they pooled their resourcesand the first appellant meted out to them their daily allowances. Themembers of the group believed that the first appellant had the power to healand was able to read their minds. The group has broken up families inrecruiting members. The members of the group engage in early morningprayers starting at 3.00am daily and also in confession sessions. The groupbehaved strangely; they wore clothes of the same colour which was decidedby the first appellant after prayer. Before they spoke to anyone who was nota member of their group they had to ask the permission of the firstappellant. The group was a deviant sect.

45 We now turn to the third article. At this juncture, it is appropriate toaddress the third ground of appeal that the claim based on innuendo waswrongly dismissed by the trial judge. The claim in relation to the thirdarticle was pleaded by the appellants in para 7 of the amended statement ofclaim as follows:

In the same page the defendants featured another article under theheading ‘WARNING FROM CULT BUSTER’… By featuring thearticle in a window display within the layout of the main article … the



defendants knew or ought to have known that the two articles wouldbe read together by any reader and by the said words in the article intheir natural and ordinary meaning and/or by way of innuendo thedefendants meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiffs andothers referred to in the main article were all members of a cult.

46 Particulars expressed to be pleaded pursuant to RSC O 78 r 3 were asfollows:

(a) that the plaintiffs and others referred to in the main article wereall members of a cult.(b) that the characteristics of a cult are similar to that of theplaintiffs as a sect, namely:

(i) that there would be a charismatic leader;(ii) that such a leader would have control over the othermembers of the cult;(iii) that a cult leader could ask other members to die with himor with her;(iv) that leaders control followers by instilling fear into them;(v) that members lose their self-will and dignity;(vi) that members become totally dependent on the leader;(vii) that every aspect of the life of members is controlled.

(c) that ordinary people or members of the public or right thinkingmembers of society should shun the company of the plaintiffs.(d) that those who associate with the plaintiffs run the risk of theirlives.

47 It seems to us that there was some confusion in the way the appellantspleaded this claim. Looking at para 7 and the particulars relied on, it seemsto us that the claim was not based on a true innuendo, which arises onlywhere the defamatory meaning put on an article is derived from facts whichare extraneous to the article. The appellants were, in effect, relying on aninference drawn from the juxtaposition of the third article with the othertwo articles such that the third article read in the context of the wholereport referred to the House of Israel. More specifically, the claim was that,in the context in which the third article was set out in the report, anordinary reader would inevitably draw the inference that the words in thethird article referred to the appellants as well, and that the words in thearticle bore the meanings as set out in the particulars. However, presumablybecause the pleading referred to the meaning of the words as derived “byway of innuendo”, the learned judge considered the claim only on that basisand dismissed it, and, in our view, rightly. She said ([1] supra):

The law is that where the words are defamatory by innuendo theplaintiffs must specifically give particulars of the facts and mattersupon which they rely in support of the secondary meaning of those



words … . In their claim based on innuendo the plaintiffs alleged thatthe third article in the special report being featured in a windowdisplay within the layout of the special report under the headingWARNING FROM CULT BUSTER meant that the plaintiffs andothers referred to in the main article were all members of a cult –pursuant to O 78 r 3 of the RSC they went on to particularise thelibellous imputations to be attached to such a label but no extrinsic factswere pleaded in connection with that innuendo to infer that the wordsrefer to the plaintiffs and that they are members of a cult. On thepleadings, I agree with counsel for the defendants that the plaintiffshave failed in their alternative plea of innuendo; they are thereforeconfined to their claim based on the natural and ordinary meanings ofthe words. [emphasis in original]

48 Notwithstanding what she said in the last sentence, the learned judge,with respect, did not consider the claim based on the natural and ordinarymeanings of the words drawn inferentially from the positions in which thethree articles were set out.

49 The respondents have denied that the third article referred to theappellants or the House of Israel at all. The first question to be considered,therefore, is the identity of the party referred to in the article. On the face ofit, the third article did not make any reference to any of the appellants orthe House of Israel. It contained comments by Van Leen on religious sectsand behaviour of members of such sects, and referred to the “Jonestownincident”. However, plainly, the third article cannot be read in isolation. Itmust be read objectively in the context in which it was set out; the whole ofthe publication must be considered: see Lee Kuan Yew v Davies Derek Gwyn[1989] 2 SLR(R) 544, at [28]. In the present case, the juxtaposition of thethird article with the first two articles and the photographs within thereport is crucial. The report commenced with the main article in twocolumns. Next to it was the photograph of the two houses and below thisphotograph there appeared the photograph of the first and the secondappellants and the second and third articles. In the main and secondarticles, members of the House of Israel were repeatedly referred to as asect. Further, the second article specifically said that the first appellant wasthe leader of the sect; that she led the prayer session and even decided onthe colour of the clothes members of the group or sect should wear; that themembers revered her believing that she had the power to heal and discernall the happenings; and that she was called “Sister Anne” and was referredto as the “spiritual mother”. In our opinion, an ordinary reader, having readthe main and second articles and having seen the photographs would, onreading the third article, come irresistibly to the conclusion that the thirdarticle also referred to the appellants and in particular to the first appellantas the leader of the sect.

50 Having dealt with the question of identity, we turn to the natural andordinary meaning of the words in this article. Substantially the whole of this



article contained statements uttered by Van Leen in relation to the natureand extent of control exercised by leaders of religious sects over theirmembers. Contrary to the contention of the appellants we do not think thatan ordinary reader on reading the third article would infer that theappellants and other members of the House of Israel were members of acult with a charismatic leader who controlled them in every aspect of theirlives so much so that the members would even die with her and that thosewho associate with them would run the risk of their lives. That is tooextreme a meaning to be ascribed to the article. In our opinion, to anordinary reader the meaning that is conveyed by the third article is that theHouse of Israel is one of the religious sects referred to by Van Leen, and thataccording to Van Leen the kind of control exercised by the leader of a sect,such as the House of Israel, over its members could be dangerous and ifeverything went wrong, they could come to harm and their lives could be atrisk, and that a leader of such a sect applied various tactics to control themembers including instilling fear in them, and they became totallydependent on their leader as a result of which the members lost or wouldlose their will and dignity.

51 We now turn to the question whether the offending words in thereport are defamatory of the appellants. In the well-known case of Sim vStretch (1936) 52 TLR 669, at 671, Lord Atkin stated that whether words aredefamatory must be determined by an objective test, being whether “thewords tend to lower the [appellants] in the estimation of right-thinkingmembers of society generally”. In the natural and ordinary meanings wehave found, the imputations were that the House of Israel was a particularreligious sect and a deviant sect with members living communally in thetwo houses in Sembawang and observing strange and deviant practices andthat the first appellant was the leader of the sect controlling the members inmany aspects of their lives; that the members lost contact with members oftheir families who were not members of the sect and that because of thecontrol exercised by the first appellant the members lost their will anddignity and were totally dependent on the first appellant. We are of the viewthat these imputations tend to bring the appellants into public odium andcontempt and lower them in the estimation of right thinking members ofthe society. In our judgment, the words complained of in the report weredefamatory of the appellants.

Admissibility of the evidence of child abuse

52 We now return to the remaining grounds of appeal before us. Thefirst ground concerns the inadmissibility of the evidence of abuse of Sarah’schildren. When we set out the evidence adduced at trial, we steered clearfrom the issue of child abuse. Much evidence in relation to that matter wasadduced at trial and considered by the learned judge. It was urged on usthat the admission of such evidence was erroneous. To understand the



objections raised, it is necessary, at this juncture, to recount some of theevidence.

53 In their narrative of the events, the appellants spoke of the abuse ofthe children by Sarah and the court inquiry which followed. In cross-examination, the first and third appellants confirmed their evidence at theinquiry that Sarah was the one who abused the children. However, specificallegations of child abuse were not put to them.

54 On the other hand, the respondents’ witnesses alleged that it was thefirst appellant who was guilty of abusing the children, aided by the secondand third appellants, and specific instances were given of such abuse. Therewas the evidence of the MCD officers, Sum Cheong Kee and Mrs Khoo SooFern, who testified that when they first visited the children at their home inSembawang, Elizabeth and Michelle revealed that the first appellant ill-treated and abused them. Next, there was the evidence of Rujok Pandi(“Rujok”), then a senior welfare officer of the MCD. According to him,Sarah told him that the children were abused and punished by the first andthird appellants. He observed that Sarah was afraid and frustrated. When heread about her conviction, he was shocked and thought that there was amiscarriage of justice. Based on his investigations, Sarah could not havebeen the person who abused the children. Rujok’s evidence was set out inconsiderable detail in the judgment. Also, Pastor Ang said that Sarahconfided in him that the children were being abused by the first appellantand another person and Sarah herself was falsely accused of sexuallyabusing them; thus she was very depressed.

55 Then, there was the evidence of Isaac, a former member of the Houseof Israel. He said that the first appellant admitted in the presence of theother members of the group at the dining table that she had burnt thechildren with a fork on the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and that she haddone so as the children were abusing themselves sexually. However, sheexhorted the members to take a united stand at the court inquiry so that thechildren would remain with them. His wife, Rebekah, testified thatmembers of the House of Israel were coached by the third appellant to givefalse evidence at the court inquiry. She perjured herself because the firstappellant said that the Holy Spirit told them to do so. Otherwise, thechildren would go to Sarah. Rebekah had never seen the children sexuallyabusing themselves. However, she has seen the first appellant punishingthem many times for the alleged sexual abuse. She specified the instances ofpunishment, such as the burning of the children by a heated fork and thepouring of hot water on Daniel. The second and third appellants had alsopunished the children on the orders of the first appellant. Lastly, RachelIsrael said that she had never seen Sarah scolding her children, let alonepunishing them. Along with the others, she lied at the inquiry on theinstructions of the first and third appellants. She described some incidentsof punishment of the children she witnessed.



56 Counsel for the appellants cross-examined the respondents’ witnesseson the matters raised. The appellants were allowed to call two main rebuttalwitnesses, namely, Sarah and the third appellant. Sarah admitted that sheabused the children. The third appellant was only permitted to rebut theallegation that he coached the witnesses who appeared at the court inquiryto give false evidence. As for the first and second appellants, the learnedjudge refused to allow them to be recalled. An objection was raised in theappellants’ closing submissions to the admissibility and relevance of theevidence. In her judgment, the learned judge said ([1] supra):

[A] preliminary objection should have been taken by counsel for theplaintiffs when such evidence was adduced from the ex-members ofthe Group and a ruling then obtained from the Court. Counsel did not,instead he recalled the third plaintiff to the witness stand to rebut[evidence relating to the coaching of the witnesses]; he also cross-examined the three ex-members at length to refute their allegation aswell as that made by the MCD officers and school teachers … that thechildren were tied up at night. It was also part of the plaintiffs’ case …that the second article gave the impression ‘that the inquiry court hadinsufficient evidence to make a finding on the identity of the abuser’.That contention made the proceedings at the inquiry and … [theatrocities committed on the children and perjury by the members ofthe group who testified at the inquiry] relevant … I would add that theplaintiffs conducted their case on the basis that the inquiryproceeding[s] were highly relevant, they cannot now do a volte-faceand shut out evidence which is not in their favour. [emphasis inoriginal]

57 Mr Gray contended that the evidence of child abuse should not havebeen admitted because it was not relevant to the pleaded issues at all. Theappellants had not made the issue of child abuse as an integral part of theircase. Nor have the respondents either. It was for the respondents to pleadthe issue if they wished to rely on it as part of their justification plea, and therespondents had not done so. In the premises, such evidence should nothave been allowed to go to prove the plea of justification. The publication ofthe report was triggered by the sentencing of Sarah. It was inevitable that intheir evidence-in-chief, the appellants would refer by way of background tothe fact of child abuse. Mr Gray conceded that in cross-examination of aplaintiff in a libel suit, additional questions which do not go to the pleadedissues but to credit may be asked: see s 148 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97,1990 Ed). Such cross-examination is subject to the discretion of the court.There is a further limitation. By s 155 of the Evidence Act, when a witnesshas been asked and has answered any question as to credit, “no evidenceshall be given to contradict him”. Therefore, in this case although thelearned judge was not bound to accept the denials of the appellants, nofurther evidence should be called to rebut the denials. In addition, suchevidence is not relevant on the issue of mitigation of damages, but onlyserves to destroy the witness’s credibility in respect of other evidence: see



Hobbs v Tinling (C T) and Company, Limited [1929] 2 KB 1, at 9, 18–20,39–40 and 50–51. Reverting to the present case, although it was permissibleto ask the appellants about the abuse of the children to impeach theircredibility, evidence should not have been adduced from the respondents’witnesses at all as to the instances of such abuse. Finally, Mr Gray pointedout that substantial parts of the evidence were hearsay, especially theevidence of Rujok. Rujok also in his evidence gave opinion when hecommented that Sarah could not have been the person who abused thechildren. Such opinion is not admissible.

58 On the other hand, Mr Tan for the respondents submitted that theevidence concerning the abuse of the children was admissible on four maingrounds. First, the issue formed part of the appellants’ pleaded case.Secondly, the appellants referred to the issue of child abuse in theirevidence-in-chief. Thirdly, the evidence went to impeach the credibility ofthe appellants. Finally, the evidence had bearing on the character of theappellants which in turn would have affected the award of damages had theappellants succeeded in their claim before the learned judge.

59 We begin with the general proposition that only evidence as torelevant facts may be given in a trial: see s 5 of the Evidence Act. Thequestion therefore is whether the fact that Sarah’s children had been abusedwas relevant to the issues before the court. In so far as the pleadings areconcerned, paras 6(j) and 6(n) of the amended statement of claim had somereference to or connection with the question of abuse of the children. Thelearned judge relied on para 6(n) to admit the evidence of child abuse.However, what the appellants pleaded in paras 6(j) and 6(n) were part ofthe natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of. In otherwords, both paras 6(j) and 6(n) were averments as to the natural andordinary meanings of the words complained of. They were not avermentsof facts or events on which the appellants relied. Where the plaintiff relieson the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, as in theinstant case, no evidence is admissible of their meaning or the sense inwhich they were understood: Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157, at173. Therefore, we do not see how the evidence of child abuse was maderelevant by reason of paras 6(j) or 6(n). In our opinion, child abuse was notmade relevant by the appellants’ pleadings. While it is true that in theirevidence-in-chief the appellants mentioned in passing the court inquiryand Sarah’s abuse of the children, child abuse was not made part of theappellants’ case by virtue of such evidence. Turning to the amendeddefence, we find that the particulars of justification as pleaded in para 9made no reference to child abuse at all and child abuse was certainly not amatter the respondents relied on in their plea of justification. Nor was it amatter relied on in the other defences. Hence, the child abuse was not partof their case either. In the light of the foregoing, the evidence adduced ofchild abuse could not be said to be relevant to the plea of justification or the



other defences and ought not to have been admitted. Moreover, part of suchevidence was purely hearsay which ought to have been excluded at any rate.

60 If the issue of child abuse was of any relevance at all, it was relevant tothe issue of credibility of the witnesses. In this respect, we agree withMr Gray’s submission that only cross-examination of the appellants shouldhave been allowed and no evidence should have been adduced to contradictor disprove the claims made by the appellants. In relation to character, forthe purpose of the award of damages, only evidence of general badreputation, not of particular acts of misconduct of the plaintiff tending toshow his character and disposition is admissible: Scott v Sampson (1882)8 QBD 491. Therefore, evidence of specific acts of abuse of the children wasnot relevant and admissible. For all these reasons, in our opinion, withrespect, the learned judge erred in admitting the evidence of child abuseadduced from the respondents’ witnesses.

Effect of wrongful admission of evidence61 It was urged upon us that the finding below should be reversed on theground of improper admission of evidence. In this connection, Mr Grayargued that the gravamen of the appellants’ complaint was two-fold. First,on the issue of the credibility of the appellants, the learned judge wasunduly influenced by the prejudicial evidence of child abuse. Secondly, onthe defence of justification, it was patent that the learned judge wasmanifestly and decisively influenced by the irrelevant question of childabuse. To support his contentions, Mr Gray pointed out that substantialportions of the judgment were devoted to the issue of child abuse where thelearned judge criticised the first appellant in forthright terms. Moreimportantly, there were the damning observations made by the learnedjudge on the first appellant. We agree with Mr Gray’s submission to theextent that the learned judge should not have dealt at such length with thequestion of child abuse and her observations of the appellants and inparticular the first appellant in that respect were unnecessary. Nonetheless,the crucial question is whether any grave miscarriage of justice has beenoccasioned by the wrongful admission of evidence.

62 We turn first to the question of the credibility of the witnesses. In thisconnection, the learned judge set out ten instances which influenced herview on the credibility of the appellants. She said ([1] supra):

In so far as the credibility of the witnesses is concerned, there is nodoubt that the plaintiffs and their witnesses were untruthful. I highlightsome instances of their patently false testimony:

1 that Hannah and the third plaintiff are cousins … I do notfor a minute believe let alone accept the convoluted ‘ties’between them …2 the first plaintiff’s preposterous claim that she knew Davieand Davie’s parents and that Davie knew Jacob;



3 the third plaintiff’s explanation of the word ‘elder’ in theletter … and why it was written on Jacob’s behalf;4 the third plaintiff’s … lack of involvement in the baptisms(his son’s, Isaac’s and Rebekah’s) and wedding ceremonies(Rachel’s and Priscilla’s) of members of the group;5 that the group’s name arose by circumstance (albeit bydivine inspiration) and not by choice …;6 that the comprehension passage … was taken fromMichelle’s school test;7 the third plaintiffs’ explanation that he did not want thechildren to be warded in hospital … because he feared Sarahwould be prosecuted pursuant to the police report he had lodgedagainst her … I have no doubt that his police report was falseand was lodged as a prelude to blaming Sarah for the abuse ofthe children. The real reason why the children were nothospitalised was the plaintiffs’ fear that the identity of the trueabuser would come to light for which the same reason thechildren were spirited off to Butterworth to stay with Zipporah;8 the plaintiffs’ claim that Isaac and Rebekah did notcontribute enough or at all towards the common pool forhousehold expenses …;9 the plaintiffs’ claim that the Group believes in modernmedicine …;10 that the plaintiffs were not aware until the discovery stagein this suit that Davie wrote the special report … .

…I agree with the defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs have noqualms in changing their evidence midstream when it suits theirpurpose … .

63 Of the above, only the seventh instance referred to the abuse of thechildren. In respect of the other areas, the learned judge was entitled, on theevidence, to take them into account in considering the issue of credibility ofthe appellants and their witnesses.

64 The learned judge considered the evidence of the respondents’witnesses and observed as follows ([1] supra):

[A]part from Davie and Soh [Felix Soh, the editor], the defendants’witnesses were independent persons and in the case of the ex-membersof the group and Davie’s interviewees, they were subpoenaed to attendcourt. I cannot believe that their testimony relating to the unhappyexperiences they had had with the Group and or the plaintiffs, sprangfrom a fertile imagination.

65 Hence, the trial judge considered the credibility not only of theappellants and their witnesses but also of the respondents’ witnesses and



came to her findings on the basis of the totality of the evidence. In ourjudgment, even if the evidence of child abuse was not taken into account,there were sufficient grounds to justify the learned judge’s decision not toaccept the evidence of the appellants. Having assessed their credibility, thelearned judge, on the totality of the evidence, made 16 findings which, so faras relevant, are as follows:

1 the first plaintiff is the leader of the Group and the adultmembers including her own husband calls her ‘Sister Anne’, … Thefirst plaintiff dominates and controls every facet of the lives of themembers including their finances, their clothes , their social contacts,their leisure activities … and also their correspondence …;2 the group pooled all their resources including the funds topurchase Sembawang, salaries were controlled by the first plaintiff …;3 members of the Group revere the first plaintiff, they/she believesshe can heal …;4 the plaintiffs and other members of the Group were baptised byPastor Ang in the Pentecostal faith but thereafter they consideredthemselves non-denominational ‘spirit filled’ Christians; theyconducted their own church services, baptisms and weddingceremonies …;5 attendance at the 3am services was compulsory for all adults andchildren save for members of family B [the first appellant’s side of thegroup];6 the Group left the church of their own volition, not because ofany threats made by Pastor Ang …;7 the Group was not shunned after the publication of the specialreport — indeed the plaintiffs made it a point to go out and showpeople they had nothing to be afraid of;8 the 20 odd members of the Group caused a stir wherever theywent … because of the same colour of clothes they wore …;9 the group only started attending a regular church (Charis) after9 March 1989;10 families ‘A’ and ‘B’ have no blood relationship … The firstplaintiff engineered the marriages between Hannah’s children and hersister Zipporah’s children …;11 members of the group, including the first and third plaintiffs,Hannah, Rebekah and Rachel Jacob gave false evidence against Sarah atthe inquiry;12 the children were abused by the first plaintiff, it was unlikelySarah was their abuser …;13 the Group or more appropriately the first plaintiff fabricated theincest allegation against Kernail and similarly the allegation againstJasbir … Jasbir and Kernail lodged a complaint with the Ministry ofHome Affairs and the police respectively…;

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14 double standards prevail in the Group and I accept Isaac’sevidence of what goes on at Sembawang as accurate;15 the Group attempted to recruit Kishore and Allen as members;16 the first plaintiff believes she has the ability to discern … herinterpretation of discernment is the ability to read other people’sminds and thoughts which is contrary to and an abuse of, theChristian/Pentecostal belief … that some believers are able to discernright from wrong.[emphasis added]

66 And she then came to the conclusion that the respondents haveaccurately set out the activities at Sembawang and that the House of Israelwas a sect. Only findings in items 11 and 12 relate to child abuse andadmittedly these two findings were based on inadmissible evidence, and forthat reason should have been excluded. However, there remain 14 otherimportant findings of fact made by her which were clearly not based on anyevidence relating to child abuse. For all these reasons, we do not find thatthe wrongful admission of evidence was such as to justify a reversal of thelearned judge’s decision.

Justification

67 We now turn to the second ground of appeal which concerns the issueof justification. Mr Gray contended that the defence of justification had notbeen established. He submitted that the particulars pleaded wereinsufficient to justify the libellous material in the report and the learnedjudge did not make a finding as to which particulars of justification shefound proved and which she did not. Further, the particulars ofjustification, even if proved, were insufficient to justify the sting in the libel.Finally, many of the findings adverse to the appellants were outside theparticulars of justification.

68 On this issue it is necessary to consider first what precisely therespondents sought to justify. The law on this point is now quite clear.Where a defendant in a defamation action pleads justification, he must doso in such a way as to inform the plaintiff and the court precisely whatmeaning or meanings he seeks to justify: see Lucas-Box v News GroupNewspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 147, at 153; Viscount De L’Isle v TimesNewspaper Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 49, at 60 and Prager v Times Newspapers Ltd[1988] 1 WLR 77, at 86. All these three cases were decided by the EnglishCourt of Appeal and the relevant passages of the judgments of variousmembers of the court were set out and commented on in Lee Kuan Yew vDavies Derek Gwyn [1989] 2 SLR(R) 544 at [45] to [48], and it isunnecessary to repeat them here. Lucas-Box and Viscount De L’isle weresubsequently considered in Morrell v International Thomson Publishing Ltd[1989] 3 All ER 733. May LJ after referring to the two earlier cases said, at737–738:



In any event I think the position now is that a defendant who pleadsjustification must do so in such a way as quite clearly, withoutcircumlocution or obfuscation, to inform the plaintiff and the court ofprecisely what meaning or meanings the defendant may seek to justify.Although this may be done in the particulars of justification, there isthen a substantial risk that the precise meaning will be lost in words. Isee no reason why the meaning or meanings should not be set outdirectly, briefly and at the start of the plea.

69 With that, we now turn to the plea of justification as appearing in theamended defence and ascertain the meanings the respondents sought tojustify. The respondents pleaded as follows:

Further and/or in the alternative if (which is denied) the said wordsand the words set out in para 6 of the statement of claim are found tobe defamatory of the plaintiffs, the defendants will say that in relationto paras 3, 5 and 6(b), (c), (d), (e) and (n) of the statement of claim thewords set out thereunder are true in substance and fact:Particulars(i) The word ‘deviant’ is defined in the Longman Dictionary ofContemporary English as that which is different or moves away from anaccepted standard.(ii) The word ‘cult’ is defined in the Longman Dictionary ofContemporary English as a ‘group of people believing in a particularsystem of religious worship, with its special customs and ceremonies.’(iii) The plaintiffs’ group pooled all possessions and property andallowed the first plaintiff to mete out a daily allowance.(iv) The members of the group wore clothes of the same colour, thecolour having been announced by the first plaintiff after prayer.(v) Members of the group would not and/or could not speak tooutsiders without the first plaintiff’s permission.(vi) Members of the plaintiffs’ group broke off contact with theirfamilies on joining the group (where their family members were notmembers of the group).(vii) Members of the plaintiffs’ group lived together in two adjacenthouses purchased with the group members’ funds.(viii) The group had daily prayer sessions at 3am led by the firstplaintiff.(ix) The group members believed that the first plaintiff could cureillnesses and injuries with prayer.(x) The group members believed that the first plaintiff was able toread their thoughts.

70 To some extent Mr Gray was justified in his criticisms of therespondents’ plea of justification and the way they conducted that defence.First, the particulars as pleaded on behalf of the respondents are far from



ideal. Second, some of the evidence led or adduced in support of the plea ofjustification fell wholly outside the pleaded particulars. Third, the trialjudge in finding that the defence of justification had been made out, withrespect, did not confine herself to the particular case as pleaded by therespondents. The law on this is clear: the issues to be tried under the plea ofjustification are limited to the matters referred to in the particulars:Yorkshire Provident Life Assurance Company v Gilbert & Rivington [1895]2 QB 148, at 152. Be that as it may, the crucial question is whether withinthe confines of their pleadings the respondents have succeeded in provingthe facts averred in the particulars and, on the basis of these facts, injustifying the sting in libel. On that issue we need to turn to the evidenceagain and examine whether the particulars of the justification have beenproved by the respondents.

71 We have already set out the material evidence of the respondents’witnesses. We would refer to the evidence of Dr Varughese, Kishore, Allen,Pastor Ang, Kernail, Joginder, Jasbir, Isaac, Rebekah and Rachel Israel. Inconsidering their evidence, we accept the learned judge’s assessment oftheir credibility. On the evidence, the respondents have proved thefollowing. The House of Israel was a sect and the appellants were members.The sect was led by the first appellant and as their leader she dominated themembers in many aspects of their lives. The members and their families livecommunally in the two houses in Sembawang which were purchased out ofthe funds of the members. Possessions and properties of the members werepooled and allowances were meted out by the first appellant to themembers. Persons on joining the sect broke off contact with members oftheir families who were not members of the group. The members weredressed in clothes of the same colour and the colour was decided by the firstappellant. They had to ask the first appellant’s permission to speak tooutsiders. There were daily prayers which started at 3.00am. The membersbelieved that the first appellant had healing powers through prayers and thepower to discern or read the minds of others. By their conduct and practicesthey were members of a deviant sect. Our findings here are wholly confinedto what the respondents had pleaded and in our opinion, the facts provedjustified the imputations contained in the libel which we have mentioned.In our judgment, the defence of justification succeeds in respect of the mainand second articles.

72 We come to the third article. In their defence of justification, therespondents again relied on the same particulars which have been earlier setout verbatim. It is unnecessary to repeat what we have found. Suffice it hereto say that the respondents have proved that the House of Israel was adeviant sect; that the first appellant was the leader; that she dominated andcontrolled the members in many aspects of their lives; and that themembers believed that she had the power to heal and discern and read the



minds of others, and in consequence the members had lost their will anddignity and became wholly dependent on her.

73 It is true that the parts of the article which the respondents have notpleaded and justified were Van Leen’s comments that the control exercisedby a leader of a sect could be dangerous, that it could lead to a tragedy likethe Jonestown incident, and that if things were to go wrong the lives of theleader and the members could be at risk. Such statements of Van Leen wereno more than a warning of the extreme results which could ensue. But thesubstance or gist of the libel contained in the article has been proved, ie thenature and extent of the control exercised by the first appellant over themembers of the House of Israel resulting in their loss of self-will anddignity. Gatley on Libel and Slander (8th Ed, 1981) in para 361 states:

Substantial justification sufficient. It is not necessary to prove thetruth of every word of the libel. If the defendant proves that ‘the maincharge, or gist, of the libel’ is true, he need not justify statements orcomments which do not add to the sting of the charge or introduce anymatter by itself actionable. ‘It is sufficient if the substance of thelibellous statement be justified; it is unnecessary to repeat every wordwhich might have been the subject of the original comment. As muchmust be justified as meets the sting of the charge, and if anything becontained in a charge which does not add to the sting of it, that neednot be justified’ (per Burrough J in Edwards v Bell (1824) 1 Bing 403 atp 409).

Fair comment

74 The next defence raised by the respondents with respect to the thirdarticle is that of fair comment. The article contained statements made byVan Leen and his views on the nature and extent of control exercised by aleader of a sect over its members. If, as we have held, in the context of thereport, the article referred to the appellants, it means that what Van Leenhad said could apply in the case of the appellants. In our opinion, the thirdarticle contained substantially expressions of opinion and were thereforecomments. In particular, the parts of the articles to the effect that thecontrol exercised by a leader of a sect over its members could be dangerousand could lead to a tragedy like the Jonestown incident, that the members ofthe group and their leader could come to harm and their lives could be atrisk, and that the members by virtue of the control over them by the leaderlost their self-will and dignity were comments. The comments were madeby Van Leen but were published by the respondents.

75 In order to succeed on the plea of fair comment, the subject matter ofthe comments must be on a matter of legitimate public interest. What islegitimate public interest has been given a wide scope. Lord Denning MRsaid in London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, at 391:



Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they maybe legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or whatmay happen to them or to others; then it is a matter of public intereston which everyone is entitled to make fair comment.

76 In our opinion, the matter in the instant case concerning a religioussect is of legitimate public interest; church matters have been held to be oflegitimate public interest: see Kelly v Tinling (1865) LR 1 QB 699.77 The next question is whether an honest and fair-minded person onthe basis of the facts which the respondents have proved can honestly holdand express such opinions. We refer to the very concise and oft-quotedpassage of Diplock J’s direction to the jury in Silkin v BeaverbrookNewspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743, at 749:

I will remind you of the test once more. Could a fair-minded man,holding a strong view, holding perhaps an obstinate view, holdingperhaps a prejudiced view – could a fair-minded man have beencapable of writing this? That is a totally different question from thequestion: Do you agree with what he said?

78 The essential thing is the honest opinion of a fair-minded person andin this connection every allowance or latitude must be given for anyprejudice and exaggeration entertained by such a fair-minded person.

79 With this, we now turn to consider if the comments can be expressedby a fair-minded person. The test is an objective one. Once again we have torefer to the proved facts. The facts proved by the respondents are brieflythese. The House of Israel was a deviant sect with the first appellant as theleader. The members and their families lived communally in the two housesat Sembawang which were purchased out of the resources of the members.All their possessions and properties were pooled and they left it to the firstappellant to mete out their allowance. On joining the group the memberslost contact with members of their family who were not members of thegroup. They had daily prayer session which started at 3.00am. The firstappellant as the leader dominated the members in many aspects of theirlives. The members revered the first appellant and would not speak topersons outside the group without her permission, and she even decidedthe colour of the clothes they wore. They believed that she had the power toheal and to discern and read the minds of others. The control exercised bythe first appellant over the members was quite extensive. The memberswere totally submissive to her domination and were dependent on her asthe leader. On these facts we find that a fair-minded man could honestlyexpress the comments that were made in the third article. For these reasons,we are of the opinion that the defence of fair comment succeeds in relationto the third article.



Qualified privilege

80 There was yet a third defence raised by the respondents. In paras 16and 17 of the amended defence, the respondents pleaded the defence ofcommon law qualified privilege. The respondents relied on the fact that therespondents and the readers of The Straits Times had a common andcorresponding interest in the subject matter of the report and that therespondents were under a moral or social duty to publish the report toreaders of The Straits Times and the readers of The Straits Times had areciprocal interest to receive the information. The learned judge agreedwith the respondents that common law qualified privilege applied. She said:

The defendants have also succeeded in their alternative plea ofqualified privilege as the special report was on a matter of interest to STreaders, the public should be alerted to sects and cults alike for generalinformation if nothing else.

81 Generally, qualified privilege is available to newspapers as much as toany other person. Privilege for publication in the press of information ofgeneral public interest is limited to cases where the publisher has a legal,social or moral duty to communicate. The law does not recognise aninterest in the public strong enough to give rise generally to a duty tocommunicate in the press; such a duty has been held to exist on specialfacts, and there is no general “media privilege at common law”. Gatley onLibel and Slander (8th Ed, 1981) in para 560 states:

[I]t is now the general rule that the law does not recognize an interestin the public strong enough to give rise to a duty to communicate inthe press. Such a duty has been held to exist on special facts, but there isno general ‘media privilege at common law’.

82 In London Artists Ltd v Littler [1968] 1 WLR 607, Cantley J said, at619:

The cases to which I have referred show a uniformity of approach. Inmy view the privilege for publication in the press of information ofgeneral public interest is confined to cases where the defendant has alegal, social or moral duty to communicate it to the general public, ordoes so in reasonable self-defence to a public charge, or in the specialcircumstances exemplified by Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309.A duty will thus arise where it is in the interests of the public that thepublication should be made and will not arise simply because theinformation appears to be of legitimate public interest.

83 Along with the duty to communicate is a corresponding interest toreceive such information on the part of the public. It is apposite to quotehere what Lord Atkinson said in Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 334:

A privileged occasion is … an occasion where the person who makes acommunication has an interest, or a duty, legal, social or moral, tomake it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is


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so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. Thisreciprocity is essential.

84 In addition, the duty must be a duty to publish to the public at largeand the interest must exist in the public at large to receive the publication. Itis insufficient if only a section of the public is concerned with the subjectmatter of the publication. In Blackshaw v Lord [1984] QB 1 Stephenson LJsaid, at 26:

There must be a duty to publish to the public at large and an interest inthe public at large to receive the publication; and a section of the publicis not enough.The subject matter must be of public interest; its publication must be inthe public interest. That nature of the matter published and its sourceand the position or status of the publisher distributing the informationmust be such as to create the duty to publish the information to theintended recipients, in this case the readers of the Daily Telegraph.

85 And Dunn LJ said, at 310:

[T]he court must look at the circumstances of the case before it inorder to ascertain whether the occasion of the publication wasprivileged. It is not enough that the publication should be of generalinterest to the public. The public must have a legitimate interest inreceiving the information contained in it, and there must be acorrelative duty in the publisher to publish, which depends also on thestatus of the information which he receives, at any rate where theinformation is being made public for the first time. Differentconsiderations may arise in cases such as Adam v Ward … where thematter has already been made public, or correction of a mistake madein a previous publication.

86 In Chapman v Lord Ellesmere [1932] 2 KB 431, the stewards of ajockey club, under powers given by the rules of racing, disqualified a horsetrained by the plaintiff on the grounds that a drug had been administered toit. Subsequently, their decision was published in the Racing Calendar, asauthorised by the rules, as well as in The Times. While the first publicationwas held to be privileged, the second was not. Racing was not a matter ofsufficient public interest to create such a privilege for publication in thepress. In contrast, in Allbutt v General Council of Medical Education (1889)23 QBD 400, the General Medical Council published a book containing theminutes of the proceedings of the council, including the name of theplaintiff who had been removed from the register of medical practitionerson the ground of gross professional misconduct. It was held that thepublication was privileged. In Chapman, Allbutt was distinguished on thebasis that there was a general, not a sectional, interest in the matterconcerning the misconduct of a doctor.

87 The relevant factors are by whom and to whom, when, why and inwhat circumstances the publication is made, and whether these things


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establish a relation between the parties which gives rise to a social or moralduty, and the consideration of these things may involve the consideration ofquestions of public policy. It does not follow that publication of all mattersof public interest is in the public interest such that it would give rise to aduty to publish them. The right of a publisher of a newspaper to reporttruthfully and comment fairly on matters of public interest must not beconfused with a duty of the sort that gives rise to an occasion of qualifiedprivilege: per Cartwright J in The Globe and Mail Ltd v Boland (1960)22 DLR (2d) 277 at 280–281.

88 The onus was on the respondents to establish the circumstanceswhich will support a plea of qualified privilege. The respondents have onlyshown that the publication of the information was in the interest of asection of the public, namely, members of the Christian community. That issectional rather than general interest of the public at large. On theauthorities, such sectional interest does not give rise to a moral or socialduty to publish the report. The respondents have, therefore, not succeededon the defence of qualified privilege.

Conclusion

89 The appeal, therefore, fails on the ground that the defence ofjustification has been made out in respect of the report. The defence of faircomment in respect of the third article has also been made out.Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Costs

90 We now turn to the question of costs. As the appellants havesucceeded on the two substantial issues relating to the inadmissibility of theevidence of child abuse and the defence of qualified privilege, it is unfairthat they should bear the entire costs here and below. Further, by adducingirrelevant and inadmissible evidence the respondents had prolonged thetrial. Accordingly, we vary the order made below as to costs by ordering theappellants to pay only two-thirds of the costs. Similarly, we order theappellants to pay only two-thirds of the costs of the appeal; one set of costsis to be allowed. We have also considered whether we should grant acertificate of two solicitors under RSC O 59 r 19(2) in respect of the costs ofthe appeal, and we have come to the conclusion that no such certificateshould be ordered. There will be the usual consequential order for paymentto the respondents to account of costs the deposit in court as security forcosts.

Headnoted by Douglas Chi Qiyuan.


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