from fujimori to toledo: the 2001 elections and the vicissitudes of democratic government in peru

Lewis Taylor

From Fujimori to Toledo: The 2001Elections and the Vicissitudes ofDemocratic Government in Peru

SINCE JANUARY 2000 PERU HAS EXPERIENCED CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL

turmoil, even by the standards of one of Latin America’s morevolatile polities. Passions first aroused by Alberto Fujimori’s injudicious decision to seek re-election for a third term heightenedduring two bitterly contested presidential ballots in April and May2000. Widespread protests through May–August 2000 against a government-orchestrated fraud produced a level of delegitimizationthat fatally undermined the seemingly immovable fujimorista powerstructure: mounting internal indignation, mass demonstrations andextensive international criticism accentuated divisions within anincreasingly discredited regime, which collapsed with a speed thatsurprised most observers. Barely four months after his controversialinauguration in July 2000, Fujimori had been driven from office fol-lowing a succession of bizarre events appropriate to a John le Carréthrilller: a scandal involving the smuggling of 10,000 rifles to FARCguerrillas in Colombia masterminded by the head of Peru’s intelli-gence services, Vladimiro Ilich Montesinos; the transmission of avideo showing Montesinos bribing an opposition parliamentarian(14 September); the president’s announcement that his third termwould be limited to one year (16 September); the loss of executivecontrol over Congress (16 November); Fujimori faxing his resigna-tion from the safety of Japan (19 November); followed by Montesinosfleeing the country by sea, reputedly en route to an appointmentwith a plastic surgeon in Caracas. This opera bouffe ended with thenomination on 22 November 2000 of Valentín Paniagua as head ofa transitional government charged with overseeing transparent elec-tions and handing over power to a legitimately chosen successor on28 July 2001. To assist the move from authoritarianism to a moredemocratic polity, on 25 November 2000 representatives of 14

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566 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

political groups signed an Acuerdo Nacional (National Accord), inwhich they pledged commitment to a list of minimal consensualagreements on democratization: economic stability and poverty alleviation, free elections, establishing an independent judiciary,upholding the rule of law, press freedom, reorganization of the security services and limiting the role of the armed forces.

Remarkably (and felicitously) given Peru’s recent history, this seachange in political fortunes occurred with little bloodshed. Aftertrouble-free ballots in April and June 2001, Alejandro Toledoassumed the presidency, voicing a commitment to raise living stan-dards and rebuild Peru’s weakened institutions. Three years into histerm in office, this article assesses political developments in post-Fujimori Peru. To what extent has Peru jettisoned the authoritari-anism of the Fujimori era? How successful have moves to re-establisha more democratic polity been? Most comment on these issues hasbeen extremely pessimistic. Typical in this regard is a recent articleby Jeremy Adelman. Engaging critically with the ‘failed states’ litera-ture currently in vogue, in a comparative analysis of Colombia, Peruand Venezuela, Adelman argues that:

The foundations of democratic states in the Andes are in serious trouble.Governments seldom complete their terms without armed insurrections, andeconomies have not grown in a generation . . . The worst case is Colombia. . . but the condition of Peru, racked by misery and unrest, and strife-tornVenezuela is little better . . . Everywhere legal powers of the state have atrophied, while politics has become more militarized and social and civicfreedoms less secure.1

It is claimed that the demise of Fujimori ‘has left Peru in disastrousstraits. The economy is contracting, the treasury is empty and socialunrest is mounting’.2 Highlighting a resurgence of Peru’s oldest sur-viving political party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana(APRA), executive instability, a frustrated ‘mutinous population’ andrising support for Fujimori, Adelman posits that ‘Peruvian citizens

© Government and Opposition Ltd 2005

1 Jeremy Adelman, ‘Andean Impasses’, New Left Review, 18 (November–December 2002), p. 41. Adelman’s thoughtful article illustrates the difficulties of comparative political analysis in the Andean region – the origins of instability and correlation of social forces in contemporary Colombia, Peru and Venezuela (as wellas Bolivia), vary significantly and are highly complex, rendering attempts to find com-monalities problematic. For a recent survey of literature on ‘failed states’, see thespecial issue of Development and Change, 33: 5 (November 2002).

2 Adelman, ‘Andean Impasses’, p. 59.

confront the prospect of an increasingly paralysed state’.3 But is sucha bleak assessment warranted? To what extent are the democraticfoundations of the Peruvian state ‘in serious trouble’? Are ‘social andcivic freedoms less secure’? Has the Peruvian state under the Toledopresidency suffered from atrophy, paralysis and advancing milita-rization? When considering these issues, it is first necessary toexamine key political developments during Fujimori’s presidency(1990–2000).

THE FUJIMORI REGIME AND ITS LEGACY

Following the military’s return to the barracks in 1980, gross eco-nomic mismanagement coupled with widening corruption under the Acción Popular administration headed by Fernando Belaunde(1980–85) and the APRA government of Alan García (1985–90), pro-duced a haemorrhaging of support for Peru’s main centre-right andcentre-left political parties in the late 1980s. GDP declined by 12.3per cent in 1989 and inflation soared to 7,650 per cent in 1990, bring-ing plummeting incomes (by 1989 real wages for blue-collar workersstood at 45 per cent of their 1985 level, while white-collar salaries fellby 47.6 per cent between 1985 and 1989). To compound matters,neither Belaunde nor García proved able to control the insurgencymounted by Sendero Luminoso guerrillas, whose activities hadspread over most of the Andes and deep into the capital by 1989–90.Understandably, as the date for the 1990 general election loomed,disillusion with the political class, all major parties and a failingsystem of government flourished, providing an opportunity for anon-establishment ‘outsider’ to attract a substantial protest vote. Thisfigure appeared in the persona of Alberto Fujimori who, against allexpectations, defeated Mario Vargas Llosa in a second-round ballotby garnering votes from an electorate mortified by the novelist’sextreme neo-liberal manifesto and open commitment to imple-menting drastic ‘shock’ measures to control hyperinflation.4

FROM FUJIMORI TO TOLEDO 567


3 Ibid., pp. 59–60.4 On the García administration, see John Crabtree, Peru Under García: An Oppor-

tunity Lost, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1992; and Carol Graham, Peru’s APRA: Parties, Pol-itics, and the Elusive Quest for Democracy, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1992. A personalaccount of the 1990 elections can be found in Mario Vargas Llosa, El pez en el agua,Barcelona, Editorial Seix Barral, 1993.


Upon assuming office, Fujimori was completely unprepared, pos-sessing no detailed programme, no solid party base – only a few seatsin the Senate and House of Deputies – or any experience in gov-ernment. He nevertheless proved a quick learner and astute opera-tor. Ably assisted by Montesinos, Fujimori cultivated relations withthe military and proceeded to construct an authoritarian regime con-cealed behind a democratic veneer. A crucial step in this processoccurred in April 1992, when, in response to deepening conflict withCongress, the president, Montesinos and the head of the armedforces launched a palace coup (‘autogolpe’) that dissolved Congress.The Constitution was suspended, opposition politicians and journal-ists detained, with most of the Supreme Court dismissed as a preludeto purges throughout the judiciary. In a televised address to thenation, Fujimori announced that a ‘Government of Emergency andNational Reconstruction’ would rule by decree and undertake ‘an in-depth reform of the state and its institutions, in order that they maybecome true activators of development and social justice’.

Given the electorate’s contempt of politicians and judicial cor-ruption, these measures attracted broad cross-class support, whichincreased significantly when the administration proved able to stabi-lize the economy and reduce inflation. Fujimori’s popularity wasfurther bolstered by the capture of Sendero Luminoso’s leader,Abimael Guzmán (12 September 1992), enabling the president towin a majority in the November 1992 elections for a ‘streamlined’single 80-member chamber whose main task was to redraft the 1979Constitution. A subservient legislature duly rewrote the Constitutionto allow presidential re-election in 1995 and acceded to the govern-ment’s preference to rule by executive fiat. Fujimori won comfort-ably in 1995 with an impressive 64 per cent of valid ballots andgarnered a level of support sufficient to deliver a majority in the reor-ganized 120-member single chamber Congress. Buffeted by con-tinued high levels of popular condemnation, defections and fallingmemberships, Peru’s traditional parties failed to mount an effectiveopposition to subsequent regime initiatives to solidify its grip onpower: the 1993 Constitution prohibiting the president from stand-ing for a second re-election was rewritten in 1996. The following year,three members of the Constitutional Tribunal who ruled against Fujimori’s desire for a third term were removed. Legislation decree-ing that a referendum was required on the re-election question wasannulled, approval being given by an executive-dominated National


Election Tribunal, the body charged with overseeing the constitu-tionality of the election process. Placemen beholden to Montesinoswere also appointed to run the National Office of Electoral Pro-cedures (ONPE), the institution responsible for administering elections.

In addition to controlling all agencies involved in electoral affairs,a significant strengthening of executive authority occurred in otherareas of government. Judicial autonomy was undermined via theongoing removal of independent-minded magistrates and theirreplacement with regime-friendly advocates disposed to deal appro-priately with potentially embarrassing cases involving drug traffick-ing, as well as corrupt behaviour surrounding public and privatesector business deals. Under the pretext of combating insurgency,military courts staffed by ‘faceless’ judges acquired draconianpowers. Executive intervention in cases concerning human rights violations became standard, critics being accused of supporting ‘terrorism’ and subjected to harassment by the security services, whooperated their own death squad. By the late 1990s, therefore, a situ-ation had been reached whereby key democratic checks and balanceshad suffered substantial erosion, to a degree that few meaningfulrestraints on the executive remained. Apart from wielding suzeraintyover every important state institution, Fujimori and his narrow circleof associates moved to consolidate their grip on power via subven-tions to most of the tabloid press, Peru’s leading right-wing broad-sheet (Expreso) and television companies – all financed out of a slushfund controlled by Montesinos. A more overt use of state funds tobolster Fujimori’s standing occurred through a newly created depart-ment, the Ministry of the Presidency, which came to consume around40 per cent of the annual budget. Its main task was to establishpatron–client relations with the poor via the distribution of inter-national food aid and development projects (such as the construc-tion of schools and health centres in shanty towns and peasant communities), the message being that these investments were ‘given’to the dispossessed as acts of presidential largesse.5



5 For background information on the Fujimori regime, see Philip Mauceri, StateUnder Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1996;Maxwell Cameron and Philip Mauceri (eds), The Peruvian Labyrinth: Politics, Society,Economy, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; John Crabtree andJim Thomas (eds), Fujimori’s Peru: The Political Economy, London, Institute of Latin


Initially, a large swathe of the population were willing to toleratethis retooling of the state along authoritarian lines in return for eco-nomic stability and a greater measure of personal security. The abilityto resist this concentration of power and hollowing out of Peru’sdemocratic institutions was not only undermined by popular backingfor Fujimori and the travails of the traditional political parties. Keycomponents of civil society that had played important roles duringthe 1980s also suffered decline: trade unions were rendered impo-tent by deindustrialization and mass unemployment, while membersof grassroots organizations became overwhelmed by the daily grindof trying to eke out a living, producing a drop in activism – a trendreinforced by attempts at state co-optation mixed with repression. Tocompound matters, social movement leaders faced the threat ofassassination at the hands of Sendero Luminoso.

Following the 1995 election, Fujimori reached the zenith of hispower, exercising almost uncontested control over the state whilebeing confronted with a weak opposition. A plethora of labels wereemployed to describe his government: for some political scientists it comprised the classic Latin American ‘neo-populist’ regime(Weyland, Crabtree); for others it formed a ‘delegative democracy’(O’Donnell); ‘guardian democracy’ (McSherry); ‘illiberal democ-racy’ (Zakaria); ‘authoritarian’ democracy (Collier and Levitsky); a‘benevolent authoritarianism’ (Wise); or, more colourfully, a ‘mafiastate’ (Michnik).6 No matter what descriptor they employed, most


American Studies, 1998; Carlos Iván Degregori, La década de la antipolítica: auge y huidade Alberto Fujimori y Vladimiro Montesinos, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2000;Raúl Wiener, Bandido Fujimori: el reeleccionista, Lima, WWW Editores, 2001. On the web of corruption spun by Montesinos, see Sally Bowen and Jane Holligan, El espíaimperfecto: la telaraña siniestra de Vladimiro Montesinos, Lima, Peisa, 2003.

6 Kurt Weyland, ‘Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: UnexpectedAffinities’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 31: 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 3–31;John Crabtree, ‘Populisms Old and New: The Peruvian Case’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 19: 2 (April 2000), pp. 163–76; Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘DelegativeDemocracy’, Journal of Democracy, 5 ( January 1994), pp. 55–69; Patrice McSherry, ‘TheEmergence of “Guardian Democracy” ’, NACLA Report on the Americas, 32: 3 (Novem-ber 1998), pp. 16–24; Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs,76: 6 (November 1997), pp. 22–44; David Collier and Steven Levitsky, ‘Democracy withAdjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research’, World Politics, 49: 3(April 1997), pp. 430–51; Carol Wise, ‘State Policy and Social Conflict in Peru’, inCameron and Mauceri (eds), The Peruvian Labyrinth, pp. 70–103; and Adam Michnik,‘The Montesinos Virus’, Social Research, 68: 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 905–16.

analysts underestimated the web of influence woven by Fujimori andMontesinos, the extent of their corruption, as well as the fragility oftheir position. The latter was not unappreciated, however, by thepresident and his close advisers. Despite the appearance of uncon-tested power, after 1997 Fujimori’s popularity began to wane. TheAsian crisis tipped the economy into recession, impacting negativelyon employment and living standards. Privatization income alsodiminished, reducing the amount of state funds available to bolsterFujimori’s personal standing via Ministry of the Presidency develop-ment projects. Amid falling popularity ratings, manoeuvres to securea third term through resort to extensive electoral fraud furtherundermined the government’s legitimacy, producing a surge inopposition in 2000 that spelt the end of the regime.7

As Adelman noted, Fujimori’s demise left Peru’s democracy in‘disastrous straits’: parliament and the judiciary had lost substantialautonomy from executive domination, as had the electoral machin-ery of government. An important sector of the media had been suborned by money channelled through Montesinos’s security appa-ratus. Corruption was rampant within the higher echelons of theadministration (Montesinos, for example, held $239 million inforeign bank accounts). All institutions of state (except the Ombuds-man’s office) were discredited and the speed of Fujimori’s downfallhad created a real crisis of governability – the democratic polity estab-lished in 1980 appeared under threat. Clearly, the post-Fujimoriexecutive faced a daunting task.

THE PANIAGUA TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

A longstanding member of the centre-right Acción Popular party,Valentín Paniagua’s nomination as interim president attracted broadsupport among all anti-Fujimori sectors of Peru’s political class. Hisreputation for probity, experience, publicly stated lack of personalambition and recognized democratic credentials meant that Pani-agua possessed the qualities necessary to steady a buffeted ship of



7 Accounts of the 2000 elections and their immediate aftermath can be found inLewis Taylor, ‘Patterns of Electoral Corruption in Peru: The April 2000 General Elec-tion’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 34: 4 (December 2000), pp. 391–415; and LewisTaylor, ‘Alberto Fujimori’s Peripeteia: From “re-reelección” to regime collapse’, EuropeanReview of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 70 (April 2001), pp. 3–24.


state. Responding astutely to prevailing circumstances, Paniaguaappointed ministers from across the political spectrum. Prestigiousindividuals from civil society were placed in charge of key ministries(foreign affairs, economics, justice, interior), and Javier Pérez deCuéllar installed as prime minister. Steps were quickly initiated to dismantle pillars of the Fujimori–Montesinos power structure: theNational Intelligence Service (SIN) was disbanded and high-rankingmilitary officers thrown in jail; corrupt judges embedded in theSupreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal were dismissed, withcriminal investigations being opened against them. A similar fatebefell leading officials at the ONPE responsible for ratifying Fuji-mori’s fraud in 2000. Reflecting the new openness, they werereplaced by a team led by Trotskyist lecturers from Lima’s CatholicUniversity – probably the first time in history where supporters of theFourth International have supervised a bourgeois transition!

Despite difficult circumstances created by the deep disgust gener-ated among a population reeling under daily exposures of endemiccorruption under Fujimori, Paniagua’s transitional administrationproved capable of restoring stability to the political system and faith insome institutions. Several ministers were applauded for their per-formance in office, while Paniagua’s measured behaviour, transparenthonesty and political craftsmanship (virtù) attracted overwhelmingpublic support.8 In addition to the qualities of Paniagua’s ministerialteam, the transitional government’s task was eased by the stance of allimportant anti-Fujimori groups. Cognizant of the delicate politicalconjuncture, party leaders collaborated with the administration in theinterests of guaranteeing democratic governance and the smoothestpossible transition. It is to a consideration of the 2001 elections andtheir political repercussions that we now turn.

THE FIRST-ROUND CAMPAIGN

When the January deadline for registering to contest the April 2001presidential election passed, the forthcoming competition appeared


8 Polling data from the Apoyo agency published in El Comercio, 23 April 2001, indi-cated that voter approval regarding the conduct of ONPE and the National ElectoralTribunal, both highly questioned organizations under Fujimori, stood at 74 and 71 percent respectively. The president’s personal standing registered 68 per cent, that of hisgovernment 62 per cent; a substantial 42 per cent wanted Paniagua to remain in office.

to be a relatively uncomplicated affair involving two main con-tenders. The first major survey of public opinion in 2001 placed theleader of Perú Posible (PP), Alejandro Toledo, on 33 per cent ofvoter preferences, well clear of Lourdes Flores representing UnidadNacional (UN), with 12 per cent support.9 Toledo’s substantial advan-tage flowed from the political kudos accumulated through his coura-geous leadership during the struggle against Fujimori. Furthermore,as public awareness regarding endemic corruption at the heart of theFujimori regime spread throughout January 2001 via nightly trans-missions of vladivídeos and disclosures about vast sums secreted awayin foreign bank accounts, his pivotal role in toppling the discreditedex-president appeared to be a factor attracting additional support forToledo. A poll taken in mid-December 2000 had given him 23 percent – his rating had consequently climbed 10 points in a matter ofweeks. At this juncture, the prospects of an outright first-roundvictory for the PP candidate seemed possible, even probable.

In a country as complex as Peru, however, trends in public senti-ment are rarely so straightforward: unpredictability in matters polit-ical being enhanced by the demise of the traditional party systemduring the 1990s, a concomitant proliferation of amorphous groupsled by maverick caudillos full of personal ambition but possessing nofirm political base, and weak loyalties on the part of a mistrustful electorate.10 Volatility had also increased due to the extraordinary circumstances under which the April 2001 campaign was fought. Fujimori, until recently the recipient of approximately 40 per centof votes, had disappeared precipitously from the political scene,leaving many of his erstwhile supporters either disoriented or har-bouring rancour towards the políticos they deemed responsible forthe demise of ‘el Chino’ (‘the Chinese’ – Fujimori’s nickname). Notsurprisingly, therefore, a poll conducted by the Datum agency in mid-January 2001 indicated that a substantial 22 per cent of the electorate



9 El Comercio, 23 January 2001.10 Such attitudes had been spread initially by the actions of incompetent govern-

ments in the 1980s, which produced a collapse of the party system. They were encour-aged by Fujimori throughout the 1990s as a ploy to neutralize potential opposition.On this, see John Crabtree, The 1995 Election in Peru: End of the Road for the Party System?,Occasional Paper No. 12, London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 1995; andMartín Tanaka, Los espejismos de la democracia. El colapso de un sistema de partidos en elPerú, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1998.


remained undecided as to how they would cast their vote in the forth-coming ballot.11

To this backdrop, revelations about fujimorista corruption andelectoral manipulation proved to be a double-edged sword thatbrought support for Toledo as the instrument of Fujimori’s downfall,while simultaneously placing a ceiling upon his advance in the polls.Toledo’s vulnerability arose from a situation whereby many electorswho (primarily on anti-Fujimori grounds) voted for him in 2000,remained unconvinced about his presidential qualifications – due toan impetuous nature and a propensity for making lavish off-the-cuffpromises when electioneering. Importantly, by avoiding a DNA test,claims resurfaced about an illegitimate daughter whom he refusedto recognize or maintain. Doubts about his suitability for office werealso heightened by a succession of other accusations, the most seriousconcerning events on 16 October 1998, when Toledo alleged he hadbeen kidnapped and drugged by agents of the SIN with the inten-tion of taking compromising photographs.12 This succession ofembarrassing scandals led Toledo to claim that he was the victim ofa concerted fujimontesinista dirty tricks campaign aimed at prevent-ing him from becoming president. The origin or veracity of theseallegations notwithstanding, Toledo’s failure to provide convincingand transparent rebuttals, brought to the fore questions concerninghis aptness for office and cost valuable support during the latterstages of the first-round election – and have plagued his presidency(see below).

Initially, the main beneficiary of scepticism towards Toledo wasLourdes Flores, who witnessed her standing in the polls double to 25per cent during February 2001. This surge owed much to her char-acter and public image. Amid an environment dominated by disclo-sures of bribery and underhand dealing, Flores’s reputation forrectitude in personal and political matters played well with the elec-torate. By mid-March, however, the Flores campaign faltered. Oneextremely damaging criticism raised by her opponents concernedthe composition of UN lists to contest the congressional election. An‘inorganic’ political group cobbled together hastily amid the rubble


11 El Comercio, 18 January 2001.12 On this incident, see Caretas, 1615 (19 April 2000); 1662 (22 March 2001); 1663

(29 March 2001) and the reports in La República and El Comercio, 22 March 2001 and23 March 2001.

of Fujimori’s collapsing government, UN parliamentary candidatesat the departmental level contained several prominent fujimoristasseeking a new vehicle to advance their political ambitions. Thisopened Flores to accusations that her movement represented con-tinuismo, i.e. the old regime without its leader, a severe problem at atime when the electorate was being plied with constant disclosuresabout corruption and human rights violations under Fujimori.

The difficulties facing the two leading candidates presented anopportunity for another contender: Alan García. Upon returningfrom exile a mere 10 weeks prior to the 8 April poll, García faced a daunting task. Voter recollection of the chaos that characterizedhis presidency remained strong, especially among older electors.13

Despite the obstacles, Latin America’s most consummate electioneerthrew himself wholeheartedly into the campaign and began to reg-ister political headway. García strove to reinvent himself as a ‘NewAlan’, more mature, conciliatory and inclusive, whose chief goal wasnot personal or party ambition, but a desire to work for the benefitof the country and help rebuild Peru’s weak institutions. To this end,the ex-president opined that ‘we should all work towards nationalunity’ after the trauma of Fujimori’s denouement, promising to givesubstance to this sentiment by supporting whoever became the nextpresident and, if elected, pledged the formation of a ‘broad basedgovernment’ that would incorporate the best technocrats in Peru,‘even if they belong to economic teams attached to other parties’.14

In addition to advocating ‘big tent’ politics, García opted to con-centrate on socio-economic issues that focus-group discussions indi-cated electors felt most concerned about, so positioning himself topick up votes from erstwhile Toledo and Flores supporters alienatedby the proximity of their economic programmes. This would allowhim to fill unoccupied terrain on the centre-left of the political spec-trum. Whereas Toledo and Flores gave the impression of remainingfirmly glued to the neo-liberal economic policy pursued by Fujimori,García berated its inability to deliver sustained growth and its perni-cious social consequences. Drawing on experiences assimilatedduring his European exile and close connection with the Socialist



13 Early opinion polls indicated that 65 per cent would ‘definitely not’ support theAPRA candidate, while a substantial 74 per cent stated that García’s pronouncementswere ‘not believable’. El Comercio, 3 February 2001.

14 El Comercio, 12 March 2001.


International, he advocated a Blairite ‘third way’, embracing a raftof policies aimed at tackling unemployment (the electorate’s mainpreoccupation), low wages and the high tariffs levied by privatizedutility companies. Pitching his discourse at the poor, young (21.2 percent of the electorate were aged 18–26) and rural voters, Garcíapromised to resurrect the Agrarian Bank, reduce interest rates,augment salaries for public employees, invest in education, as well asprovide credit for small- and medium-scale businesses.

This focus enabled APRA’s candidate to tap widespread public dis-content – which he was able to exploit to the full as a result of hisextraordinary ability to communicate and work crowds at publicrallies, along with the quick intelligence and wit with which hehandled hostile interviews on television.15 Apart from charisma,García possessed the advantage of backing from Peru’s sole survivingpolitical party of consequence. APRA’s apparatus proved capable ofconcentrating its experience and talent to mount a punchy propa-ganda campaign that far eclipsed its rivals. Via a combination of polit-ical prowess and tactical errors committed by his opponents, duringthe final phase of the campaign García proved able to attract dis-proportionate numbers of undecided voters to converted what at theoutset appeared to be a straightforward election triumph for Toledointo a tight contest.

THE VOTE: PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL BALLOTS

Unlike the previous year, few irregularities were reported by moni-toring organizations. The attitude of the police and armed forcesstood in marked contrast to the 2000 elections. Officers charged withguarding polling stations went out of their way to cooperate with personnel from ONPE, the Ombudsman’s office and independentobservers. As no ‘official’ candidate was standing, acting on instruc-tions issued by interim president Paniagua, strategically placed statefunctionaries (prefects, sub-prefects and district governors) main-tained a neutral stance.

Compared to the previous year, a key feature of the April 2001presidential election involved the dispersal of votes. Whereas in April


15 The level of voter rejection towards García fell from 74 per cent to 46 per centin the month following his return to Peru. Caretas, 1658 (26 February 2001).

2000 extreme polarization over the issue of presidential re-electionensured that two candidates (Fujimori and Toledo) accrued 90 percent of valid votes, in April 2001 three candidates garnered 86 percent. This spread meant that despite not having to contend with hos-tility from the state apparatus and a Montesinos-controlled media,Toledo’s share of the poll fell from the 40 per cent achieved in April2000 to 36.50 per cent, well below the hoped-for first-round targetof 50 per cent. This was largely due to the corrosive impact of scandaland doubts about his fitness for office. Following an initial surge,Flores experienced a similar stagnation in support, failing to progressbeyond 25 per cent in the month leading up to polling day. García’sability to attract votes from both leading candidates and woo unde-cided electors produced a major surprise, as he pipped Flores forsecond place and forced a run-off with Toledo (Table 1). Here Garcíabenefited from a split in the anti-APRA vote, with the million ballotscast for the FIM proving crucial in deciding the outcome.16

The ballot also indicated significant dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the polit-ical class in general and the particular array of candidates on offer. As



16 FIM presidential candidate, Fernando Olivera, had built his reputation duringthe 1990s by fulminating consistently against political corruption. This included a per-sonal crusade directed at ex-president García, conducted via protracted parliamentaryinvestigations into allegations of personal enrichment and foreign bank accounts.While only a small percentage of the FIM’s supporters would have found an alterna-tive home in APRA, Olivera wrested many votes from Toledo and Flores.

Table 1First Round Presidential Election Results, April 2001

Candidate Group No. Votes % Valid Votes

Alejandro Toledo Perú Posible 3,871,167 36.51Alan García APRA 2,732,857 25.78Lourdes Flores Unidad Nacional 2,576,653 24.30Fernando Olivera FIM 1,044,207 9.85Carlos Boloña Solución Popular 179,243 1.69Ciro Gálvez Renacimiento Andino 85,436 0.81Marco Arrunátegui Proyecto País 79,077 0.75Ricardo Noriega Todos por la Victoria 33,080 0.31Blank votes 1,260,193Null and void votes 402,436

Source : ONPE, ‘Resultados Votación Presidencial Primera Vuelta’, atwww.onpe.gob.pe/cd_onpe/Elecciones.

http://www.onpe.gob.pe/cd_onpe/Elecciones


voting is compulsory, with non-participation sanctioned by a fine,numerous electors opted to cast an unmarked or invalid ballot: blankvotes rose from 708,603 in April 2000 to 1,260,193 in April 2001, whilethe respective figures for spoilt ballots increased from 271,308 to402,436. The combined total of 13.56 per cent (up from 8.1 per cent inthe previous year) represented the highest since military governmentended in 1980. Equally striking was the collapse in electoral support forfujimorismo. Officially, Fujimori registered 49.9 per cent of valid votes in2000; in 2001 Fujimori loyalist and ex-minister of finance CarlosBoloña garnered a paltry 1.7 per cent (Table 1).

Continued political fragmentation and weak party loyalty wasreflected in the ballot for the single-chamber 120-member Congress(dispersal being exacerbated by the large number of competing listsand a voting system based on departmental constituencies, whichencouraged voting for provincial caudillos). All the main groupingssuffered a decline in support compared to the presidential poll, withUN experiencing the largest fall, the result of many ex-Fujimori loy-alists inscribed in local party lists (Table 2). Only the FIM managedto buck this trend. Its anti-corruption and anti-establishment messageappealed to the considerable swathe of electors who remained hostileto professional politicians and wished to see a bloc of recalcitrant


Table 2Congressional Election Results, April 2001

Party/Group Votes % Valid Votes Seats

Perú Posible 2,477,624 26.30 45APRA 1,857,416 19.71 28Unidad Nacional 1,304,037 13.84 17Frente Independiente Moralizador 1,034,672 10.98 11Somos Perú 544,193 5.78 4Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría 452,696 4.80 3Acción Popular 393,433 4.18 3Unión por el Perú 390,236 4.14 6Solución Popular 336,680 3.57 1Todos por la Victoria 191,179 2.03 1FREPAP 156,264 1.66 0Proyecto País 155,572 1.65 0Renacimiento Andino 127,707 1.36 1Blank votes 1,213,152Null and void votes 1,352,780

Source : ONPE, ‘Resultados de las elecciones generales por el Congreso’, atwww.onpe.gob.pe/cd_onpe/Elecciones.

http://www.onpe.gob.pe/cd_onpe/Elecciones

‘outsiders’ in Congress who, they hoped, would keep a watchful eye on the executive and denounce any chicanery by their fellow parliamentarians.

Of the traditional parties, Acción Popular (which governedbetween 1963–68 and 1980–85), obtained less than 5 per centsupport and only three seats. Problems still besetting the left (one ofthe strongest in Latin America during the 1980s) were evinced by theUnión por el Perú vote (4.14 per cent) – although in this case strate-gically concentrated levels of support proved sufficient to elect sixmembers. Boosted by García’s impressive performance as presiden-tial candidate, the more ‘organic’ APRA machine mobilized voterswith greater efficiency, attaining a level of representation (anincrease from six to 28 seats) far exceeding the leadership’s expec-tations at the start of the campaign. Again, the congressional pollhighlighted the demise of fujimorismo. Groups loyal to the disgracedex-president returned four members (Cambio 90–Nueva Mayoríaand Solución Popular), well down on the 52 seats garnered in the1995–2000 Congress. As with the presidential ballot, a significant pro-portion of Peruvians (over 2.5 million) registered their dissatisfac-tion by casting blank or spoilt votes (Table 2).

Importantly, the congressional ballot signified that a future exec-utive would not enjoy a parliamentary majority and would need toengage in coalition-building – an outcome viewed positively by manyelectors holding memories of the ‘rubber stamp’ congresses thatcharacterized the Fujimori era, but one that was to have importantconsequences for the Toledo administration.

THE SECOND ROUND

The second-round ballot was scheduled for 3 June 2001. Early pollssignalled high levels of scepticism among the electorate and a lackof enthusiasm for either candidate. Acutely aware of public opinion,both candidates manoeuvred to minimize those aspects of theirpersona that provoked greatest voter antipathy. When on the hus-tings, Toledo strove to project a more measured, less improvisedimage. For García, the major hurdle remained memories about thehyperinflation and bloody civil conflict that characterized his lastyears in office. To counter fears of a return to the chaos of the late1980s, throughout the second round García argued that he was more




mature, had made mistakes during his presidency and promised torun an open government dedicated to seeking consensus on impor-tant issues. To guarantee economic stability, APRA would allow theopposition to appoint ‘independent’ directors of the central bankand national audit office. While pledging fiscal prudence, emphasiscontinued to be placed on the need to modify the neo-liberal devel-opment model in order to create a more just society.

As the campaign developed, García’s superior electioneering skillsenabled him to close on Toledo (early polls saw him trailing by 58 to 42per cent of the valid vote), a trend reinforced in the aftermath of a tele-vised debate in which APRA’s candidate presented a calmer, more con-ciliatory image. He also focused more effectively on the economic dif-ficulties facing the population and questions of social rights, so that aweek before polling, the gap between the candidates had closed toaround 5 per cent, with García apparently enjoying greatest momen-tum. Yet again, what had initially appeared a comfortable victory forToledo had developed into a close contest. In a final twist, two daysbefore election day García’s campaign team circulated false pollingdata via the internet, indicating that the ex-president had overtakenToledo, their motive being to attract wavering voters disposed to backthe winner. No matter how ingenious in conception, the ploy back-fired. Prospects of a García victory frightened many undecided electorsto plump for Toledo as the ‘least bad’ option, a last-minute shift invoting intentions that diminished the number of spoilt/blank ballotsand propelled Toledo to victory: he garnered 53.08 per cent of validvotes to García’s 46.92 per cent. Toledo had finally achieved his lon-standing ambition. Although defeated, the result also represented atriumph for García. From being an exiled, discredited outcast, withinsix months he had re-established himself as a central political player, inthe process helping APRA recover from its marginalized positionduring the Fujimori era. The 2001 election campaign and its outcomehave had important implications for governability and prospects fordemocratic consolidation in Peru – it is to a consideration of theseissues that we now turn.

TOLEDO IN OFFICE

Upon entering office, the PP administration enjoyed a large mea-sure of public goodwill. It was elected legitimately through two


transparent ballots and in the aftermath of the turbulence sur-rounding Fujimori’s demise an overwhelming majority of Peruviansdesired a period of stability and effective government. Reflecting thismood, two important blocs in Congress announced that they wouldact as ‘a loyal, constructive and fiscalizing opposition’ (Flores onbehalf of UN), providing support for the executive ‘unconditionallyand without calculation’ (García for APRA).17 To bolster the execu-tive’s position in parliament, agreements were negotiated with theFIM, Acción Popular, Renacimiento Andino and Somos Perú(totalling 64 members), alliances being cemented via appointmentsfor non-PP politicians – the most controversial being the selection ofFIM caudillo Olivera to the key post of minister of justice. Toledo alsoattempted to benefit from favourable voter sentiment by requestinga political truce of 12 to 16 months, so that the executive could con-centrate on lifting the economy out of recession and initiate thereform of state institutions.18

Despite a widespread desire for the new administration to succeed,it came to power amid fragile circumstances, given pent-up socialpressures for improvements in jobs, incomes and governance. Toledoconsequently enjoyed a fleeting political honeymoon. By May 2002,less than a year into his presidency, his personal approval ratings hadslipped to 25.4 per cent, ignominiously below that of the disgracedFujimori (31.5 per cent), and plummeted to 16 per cent by Septem-ber 2002, when serious doubts were first voiced about Toledo’s abilityto survive. At the time of writing ( June 2004) the president’s approvalrating stood at a dismal 6 per cent.19 Such persistent low levels ofpopularity can be attributed to three main factors: (1) poor politicalcraftsmanship; (2) a perceived inability to fulfil campaign promises;and (3) political constraints inherited from the Fujimori years andthe 2001 elections.

Early into his presidency, Toledo demonstrated the personal fail-ings, political inexperience and difficulty in transforming himselffrom candidate to president that many electors feared. Upon assum-ing office he announced that his monthly salary of $18,000 had been set purposefully high to ‘avoid corruption’. Following a public



17 El Comercio, 5 June 2001.18 La República, 6 June 2001.19 El Comercio, 16 May 2004. The poll was conducted among electors in Lima.


furore, Toledo was compelled to reduce his stipend to $12,000 inNovember 2001. Ministers and parliamentarians also awarded them-selves substantial salaries. Such behaviour logically attracted hostilityfrom a population where over 50 per cent subsist on $1.25 or less perday and 54.8 per cent live in poverty, with 24.4 per cent experienc-ing extreme poverty. The ongoing paternity suit continued to inflictdamage on Toledo who, after stubbornly refusing to undergo a DNAtest, was finally forced to recognize Zaraí Toledo and reach a settle-ment with her mother (October 2002). Such unnecessary faux pas have reinforced Toledo’s reputation for erratic behaviour, withserious consequences for his and the government’s credibility.20

Under pressure from growing support for Flores during the first-round campaign, followed by a tight second-round contest withGarcía, Toledo understandably opted to bolster his position throughtempting voters with a plethora of promises: attain annual GDPgrowth of 6–7 per cent, create a million new jobs over five years;double exports by 2006; restore labour rights and the 8-hour day;halt privatizations; combat corruption, decentralize and allocate 15per cent of the national budget to local government, as well as 30per cent for education and double teachers’ salaries by the time heleft office; thorough reorganization of the judicial system, militaryand intelligence services, etc. Inevitably, delivery of such an ambi-tious programme remains uneven. Privatization has been one policyarea where prevarication has seriously damaged the government’sstanding. After pledging to halt the sell-off of public utilities plannedby Fujimori, under pressure from Finance Minister Kuczynski andother neo-liberal ministers, Toledo announced the sale of two electricity enterprises in southern Peru, leading to large-scale


20 Peru’s deep ethnic and class divisions compound the negative impact of Toledo’spersonal foibles, for his behaviour is subjected to intense scrutiny and ridicule by aLima-based media. Television and the press are staffed largely with coastal Spanish-speaking white or mestizo journalists of elite or middle-class extraction, who focus obses-sively on the president’s humble Andean peasant background. Toledo’s accent anderrors in syntax form the topic of extensive comment and generate much derisionaround dinner tables in well-heeled neighbourhoods. On occasions the abuse goesbeyond the normal rough-and-tumble of everyday politics (one satirical piece labelledToledo a ‘shitty half breed’). His red-haired partner is also targeted regularly, beingreferred to as ‘the raw carrot’, ‘the crazy carrot’, ‘the raging carrot’ and similar jibes.Fujimori would not have tolerated such mockery. It undermines Toledo’s standing,but is an indication of greater press freedom.

demonstrations in Arequipa in May–June 2002 which left two dead,scores injured and forced Toledo into an embarrassing volte-face:after declaring that he would not bow to ‘mob rule’, the sell-off wasshelved, the interior minister resigned (19 June 2002) and pro-privatization cabinet members sidelined in a subsequent reshuffle.Such irresolution reinforced Toledo’s image as a weak president,without strong convictions, easily manipulated and incapable ofsetting the political agenda.

The Arequipa debacle points to another difficulty faced by thegovernment. Following IMF stabilization package after stabilizationpackage (over 20 since 1976), the public is understandably disillu-sioned with an orthodoxy that demands sacrifice from the poor whileinequality increases and mass poverty persists. The degree of dissat-isfaction and scepticism is so pervasive that voters are loth to give theadministration credit in one area where it has registered somesuccess – the economy. Buffeted by the Asian crisis and falling com-modity prices, Peru experienced recession post-1997. When Toledoassumed office in 2001, GDP growth attained 0.2 per cent, but recov-ered to 4.8 per cent in 2002 (the strongest rate in Latin America),4.0 per cent in 2003 and was predicted to approach 5.0 per cent in2004.21 Inflation was running at 2.3 per cent/annum, the exchangerate was stable, exports had risen sharply (by 14 per cent in 2003,bringing the first trade surplus in 30 years), as had foreign currencyreserves and investment. Contrary to Adelman’s claim, the economywas not ‘contracting’ and the treasury was not ‘empty’. Expansionhad occurred across the board – agriculture, mining, constructionand manufacturing – while between 2002 and 2004 some 180,000new jobs were created via the ‘A Trabajar’ government work pro-gramme and an acceleration in low-cost housing schemes. Unem-ployment was predicted to fall from 9.4 per cent in 2002 to 7.5 percent in 2004. Unfortunately for Toledo, most households had not yetexperienced improvement in employment opportunities or incomes,so relatively successful economic management had failed to translateinto support for his administration.22



21 Figures in this paragraph are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit, PeruCountry Report, January 2004.

22 On the rift between investment/economic growth and employment/incomes,see the article by eminent Peruvian economist Javier Iguíñiz published in La República,2 June 2003.


Apart from positive economic trends, moves have been under-taken to fulfil other campaign pledges: Peru’s first regional electionswere held in November 2002, creating 25 regional governments,offering the long-awaited prospect of diminished central control andmore localized decision-making processes. In 2002 spending on edu-cation accounted for 21 per cent of the budget (the highest in Peru’shistory) and continued to rise as the government strove to honourpledges to increase teachers’ salaries. An independent Truth Com-mission established to examine human rights abuses committed onall sides during Peru’s civil war (1980–96) was able to work withoutgovernment interference and reported in August 2003. Policy imple-mentation, however, has been hampered by a legacy from the Fujimori era: the demise of political parties. Although this affordedToledo space to challenge for the presidency, the organization hecreated to pursue this goal comprises a disparate ragbag of ambitiousindividuals possessing no deep history of common struggle, sharedpolitical culture or coherent binding ideology. Other features of PP’s‘inorganic’ composition include a prevalent internal caudillismo,limited membership and a lack of solid grassroots activism. Not sur-prisingly, the PP bloc in Congress is low on talent but high on per-sonal appetite (usually in inverse proportion) and faction-riddenalong several lines: between limeños and provincianos; between‘founders’ and ‘guests’ who jumped on to the Toledo bandwagonwhen Fujimori’s star began to wane; between neo-liberal evangelicalsand ex-militants of the Marxist left. The absence of any semblanceof ideological clarity has hampered coherent policy-making in gov-ernment, while as Toledo’s popularity diminished, the resultantweakening of caudillo power meant that maintaining internal disci-pline became more problematic: PP national congresses had to bepostponed on two occasions, in 2001 and 2002, due to personal ani-mosity and factional rivalry; when a congress was finally held (April2002), Toledo encountered considerable difficulty in forcingthrough a leadership-approved unitary list for membership of keypositions in PP organs. Such intense infighting has not only erodedthe executive’s already fragile position in Congress (four PPmembers were expelled in January 2003), regular spats between PPpoliticians reinforce public perceptions that the administration isweak and divided.

The nature of the PP legislature–executive link has underminedgovernment performance in another respect. Given the dearth of


talent among PP representatives elected in 2001, Toledo was left withlittle option but to copy the successful Paniagua model of appoint-ing respected independents to key ministerial positions. Of the newcabinet headed by Prime Minister Carlos Ferrero in January 2004,for example, only three out of 16 ministers were party members. Thissituation has alienated PP parliamentarians hopeful of gaining a well-paid post, producing regular calls for a ‘truly PP government’ andthe resignation of several effective ministers who enjoyed public con-fidence and support.

The 2001 election result also created problems for the Toledo gov-ernment. A minority position in parliament forced an alliance withthe FIM, whose elected members comprise the most unpredictableand undisciplined group in Congress. To compound matters, FIMleader (Fernando Olivera) is a veritable loose cannon, held in lowesteem in political circles and regularly portrayed as a buffoon by theserious media. Olivera’s appointment as Minister of Justice damagedthe administration on three counts: (1) his long animosity towardsGarcía and APRA strained relations with the largest and most coher-ent opposition bloc in Congress, complicating the passage of theexecutive’s legislative programme; (2) as widely predicted, Oliveraproved to be an incompetent minister, hindering the implementa-tion of urgently required judicial reform; and (3) his erratic behav-iour and proclivity for engaging in unproven accusations broughtwidespread public criticism, tarnishing the government’s image.Eventually, Olivera was marginalized via his appointment as ambas-sador in Madrid (October 2002). These difficulties could have beenavoided if Toledo’s original intention of keeping Paniagua’s popularand effective minister of justice in post had been realizable.

PERUVIAN DEMOCRACY: TERMINALLY ILL OR INVIGORATED?

Throughout 2003 and the first semester of 2004, Toledo’s govern-ment was rocked by waves of popular mobilization. Farmers protest-ing against taxes and legislation regulating water rights blocked roadsand fought with the police. Angry truck owners brought the trans-port system to a standstill. Strikes by public sector workers (health,judiciary, education) attracted significant public sympathy. Con-fronted by mounting protests, on 27 May 2003 the executive felt compelled to declare a 30-day state of emergency, which sparked




disturbances in Peru’s main towns. Clashes between students and thearmy in Puno (30 May) resulted in one demonstrator killed anddozens injured. In response, Peru’s main labour confederation calleda national day of protest (2 June 2003), the growing sense of dis-order being capped by the seizure of 71 workers constructing a gaspipeline by a renegade column of Sendero Luminoso insurgents. Fol-lowing the announcement on 14 June 2003 of tax increases to fundthe settlement of a month-long teachers’ strike (the governmentagreed to provide yearly wage rises so as to double salaries by thetime it left power), irresistible demands for greater social justice andequality in economic sacrifice forced a 30 per cent drop in the pres-ident’s salary, along with reductions of 20–25 per cent for ministersand unspecified cuts for all officials earning over $2,740 per month.Such levels of unrest led to a questioning of the survival of demo-cratic government, including the possibility of removing the presi-dent – ‘Will Toledo Get To 2006?’ blazed a headline in Peru’s mostinfluential magazine. Polling data published in mid-2003 indicatedthat 87 per cent of voters believed that Toledo would not see out histerm; some 78 per cent felt that new elections would be held in 2004.These attitudes have persisted among a majority of voters for over ayear – a survey conducted in May 2004 indicated that 60 per cent ofrespondents felt that the president would not survive until 2006; 56per cent opined that he should resign.23

Despite the commotion, to what extent is popular discontentthreatening elected government in Peru? At first sight, recent chaossupports Adelman’s claim that the country is ‘racked by misery andunrest’, with a ‘mutinous population’ and an ineffective executivecreating ‘an increasingly paralysed state’, which in turn places thefoundations of the democratic system ‘in serious trouble’. Such awholly negative assessment, however, belies the complexity of Peru’spresent political conjuncture. Under normal circumstances, a com-bination of an embattled president and tear gas wafting through thestreets of downtown Lima would trigger a coup d’état, but this ‘solu-tion’ to Peru’s present difficulties is highly unlikely given that the military is a discredited institution still reeling from charges of corruption and human rights violations committed during the


23 Caretas, 1776 (13 June 2003); El Comercio and La República, 16 June 2003; El Comercio, 16 May 2004.

Fujimori period (four ex-chiefs of staff are currently being tried forlarge-scale larceny, hundreds of officers have been forced into retire-ment and are under investigation). Likewise, the once-powerful intel-ligence service disintegrated in 2000–1 and possesses a limitedoperational capacity (the National Intelligence Council has hadseven directors since 2000). For his part, Montesinos has been pros-ecuted successfully and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment ( June2004), with further charges pending. While remnants loyal to theprevious regime remain in the army and secret service, civiliancontrol over these organs is at its strongest since the 1920s. Paniaguaand Toledo have appointed civilian ministers of defence (althoughthe current incumbent is a retired general), a contentious issueduring the 1980s but an imposition now conceded by the top brass.October 2001 saw the establishment of a Commission for Restruc-turing the Armed Forces (another was created for the police), com-prised of non-military and retired army specialists. Its report,submitted in January 2002, is being implemented, including recom-mendations for a severe culling of the officer corps and the placingof military courts under civilian jurisdiction. Military spendingdeclined 11.5 per cent in 2001–2 and continues at a reduced level(by January 2004 approximately 95 per cent of the armed forcesbudget went on salaries, pensions and rations). Efforts have beenmade to reach agreement with Chile and Ecuador on loweringexpenditure on weaponry, equalizing forces and withdrawing basesfrom frontier positions. New contracts for arms purchases are subjectto public scrutiny in Congress and the media. Many privileges andimmunities enjoyed by the officer class under Fujimori have disap-peared. Importantly, the present high command accepts the need fora thoroughgoing reform of their institution in partnership with civil-ian advisers and realizes that any attempt to overthrow the Toledogovernment would encounter fierce opposition, provoke a blood-bath and be unsustainable beyond the short term.24



24 On the question of military reform, see the interview with Defence MinisterDavid Waisman in La República, 14 October 2001. The following examples illustraterecent changes in civilian–military relations. After the televising (5 April 2001) of avideo showing scores of high-ranking military personnel signing a pledge of loyalty toFujimori–Montesinos and the 5 April 1992 autogolpe that dissolved Congress, the armychief of staff broadcast a public apology, promised reform of the institution and a commitment to democracy. A purge of Montesinos loyalists sent 486 officers into


Successful military intervention in Latin America has usuallydepended on support from sectors of civil society. Today the onlyindividuals who back this option comprise the rump of Fujimori loy-alists who yearn for the perceived ‘stability’ and ‘order’ of the oldregime. Their popular appeal has diminished sharply as a result ofdisclosures about embezzlement and abuse of power on a massivescale during the 1990s, as well as the ignominious nature of Fujimori’s departure. Moreover, controversy over the ex-president’sJapanese nationality has offended nationalist sentiment and repre-sents a serious impediment to Fujimori making a handcuff-freereturn to Peru. While a third of voters have traditionally voicedauthoritarian tendencies to pollsters, despite the recent disorder,such attitudes show no sign of gaining ground – harrowing televiseddeclarations to the Truth Commission were compulsive viewing formillions of Peruvians in 2003, leading to a questioning of straight-forward ‘strong arm’ solutions to the nation’s problems among awider swathe of the population.25

Adelman asserts that APRA’s resurgence following the 2001 elec-tions has increased potential for instability and gridlock, as the party‘is using its honed congressional skills to sabotage executive policies,forcing Toledo to back down on reforms’.26 The reality is somewhatdifferent. Being in poll position to win the 2006 general election,


retirement in December 2001. March–April 2002 saw an arms sale involving the airforce closely scrutinized by the Congress Audit Commission. This has become regularprocedure. Arms deals conducted under Fujimori’s watch (when no auditingoccurred) are being investigated and comprise part of the prosecution case in trialsagainst disgraced ex-generals. In November 2002, ex-major Santiago Martín and othermembers of the ‘Grupo Colina’ paramilitary death squad (allegedly responsible for35 killings and 15 disappearances in the early 1990s), were arrested and proceedingsopened against them. On the military during the 1990s, see Fernando Rospigliosi,Montesinos y las fuerzas armadas, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2000. On pro-posals for reform, see Daniel Mora et al., Las fuerzas armadas en la transición democráticaen el Perú, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2001.

25 In a typical opinion poll, 88.4 per cent of respondents voiced preference for ademocratic polity, some 7.6 per cent for an authoritarian government. El Comercio, 3May 2003. On the authoritarian tradition in Peruvian politics, see Mitchell Seligsonand Julio Carrión, ‘Political Support, Political Skepticism, and Political Stability in NewDemocracies: An Empirical Examination of Mass Support for Coups d’État in Peru’,Comparative Political Studies, 35: 1 (February 2002), pp. 58–82.

26 Adelman, ‘Andean Impasses’, p. 60.

Alan García and APRA have no interest in undermining the currentpolitical order. Rather, APRA’s strategy is to appear as a ‘responsible’opposition committed to consensus-building and furthering the‘national interest’, while directing a level of criticism at the execu-tive sufficient to prevent a serious challenger emerging from amongToledo’s ministers.27 This stance was evident in February 2004, whenAPRA parliamentarians abstained during a vote of confidence onpolicies presented to Congress by the newly formed cabinet of PrimeMinister Ferrero, allowing the government to win the day. Indeed,relations between the executive and APRA have eased since the deci-sion, in January 2004, of FIM ministers to resign (they still back theadministration in parliament). The UN adopts a similar position toAPRA, as does Acción Popular leader Valentín Paniagua. All mainopposition forces therefore attack the government, but do so in ameasured fashion and make regular calls for a continuance of theAcuerdo Nacional to strengthen the democratic order. Rather thanhindering the reform of state institutions, they have regularly backedexecutive initiatives regarding the judiciary, police, military and civilservice. APRA, UN and AP have nothing to benefit by fomentinginstability or inheriting a country in chaos in 2006.

What of threats from outside the system? Although theMovimiento Nueva Izquierda (New Left Movement) garnered oneregional government and another three independent leftists wereelected on other tickets in the November 2002 poll, the Peruvian leftremains weak and divided. Party memberships and influence amonggrassroots organizations are well below the 1980s position, a reflec-tion of the left’s continuing inability to develop a feasible and attrac-tive alternative programme. Given high underemployment and theconsequent informalization of economic life over the last 20 years,trade union power has diminished, so that while mobilizations occurthey lack coordination, typically fail to expand beyond one segmentof the workforce and (particularly in the case of social movements)remain localized. Fragmentation and lack of organizational solidityundermines effectiveness, for it allows the government to: (1) tackleone sector at a time; and (2) engage in divide and rule tactics



27 In the words of APRA veteran Armando Villanueva, ‘We want this governmentto complete its term and that’s what will happen. Alan García has reiterated this whenToledo’s approval rating has been very low and rumours of a conspiracy circulated’.Expreso, 18 December 2002.


through exploiting the personalistic caudillo structures that charac-terize most groups – as occurred in the schoolteachers’ dispute (May2003) and the as yet unsuccessful attempts by coca growers (Febru-ary–April 2004) to construct a movement similar to that whichhelped bring down Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia. Likewise, indige-nous organizations are far weaker than in neighbouring Ecuador andBolivia. So while Adelman correctly notes widespread discontent,shortcomings regarding mobilization capability make it improbablethat extra-parliamentary protests will topple the Toledo administra-tion or threaten the democratic order.

HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

If a continuance of elected government seems assured, what of trendsvis-à-vis the quality of Peruvian democracy? After an initial spate ofoptimism, since the mid-1990s literature on Latin American ‘third-wave’ democracies has become more circumspect. Political systemsare commonly labelled ‘fragile, hybrid regimes, unsettling, delegative,debilitating, illiberal, in crisis, in need of deepening and consolida-tion, inchoate’, or ‘hollowed out’, in the sense that governments arechosen via reasonably clean ballots, but meagre advances occurregarding effective citizen participation, respect for the rule of law,and the protection of minority and individual rights.28 It is argued thatalthough regular elections and political competition has established adegree of ‘vertical accountability’, significant progress still needs to bemade to improve ‘horizontal accountability’, i.e. embedding effectivecitizens’ rights at a collective and personal level through enhancingthe capacity of state institutions to monitor and redress abuses by otherpublic entities, while simultaneously eroding the military veto overinvestigations into past/present human rights abuses and curtailinginterference by the armed forces in civil decision-making processesoutside the defence domain.29


28 Felipe Agüero and Jeffery Stark (eds), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-TransitionLatin America, Miami, University of Miami Press, 1998, p. 2; Larry Diamond, Develop-ing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999,pp. 48–9.

29 On accountability, see Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna (eds), Democ-ratic Accountability in Latin America, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. On

Echoing this pessimistic vein in the democratization literature,Adelman states that politics across the three largest Andean republicshas ‘become more militarized and social and civic freedoms lesssecure’.30 Such a claim may be true for Colombia and Venezuela, butpolitical developments in Peru post-2000 contrast markedly with thisassessment. Since Fujimori’s denouement, in addition to a significantdiminution of military political influence allied to greater civiliancontrol over the defence and internal security agencies, duringrecent years awareness inside the armed forces (and police) of theneed to respect human rights and the rule of law has risen signifi-cantly – due to a heightened appreciation of the counterproductiveimpact of past illegal behaviour and the educative labours ofOmbudsman’s office personnel. A chastened officer class under-stands the need to rebuilt its reputation and reconnect with the civil-ian population. Peruvian politics is consequently far less ‘militarized’in 2004 compared to 2000. Post-Fujimori, ‘the “reserved domains” ofmilitary power over which elected governments have little or noauthority’, have been much reduced – on this score Peru comparesfavourably with Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador and otherLatin American countries.31



continuing military influence, see Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountabilityin New Democracies’, in Andreas Schedler et al. (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Powerand Accountability in New Democracies, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1999, pp. 29–51;Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Reflections on Contemporary South American Democracies’,Journal of Latin American Studies, 33: 3 (October 2001), pp. 599–609; Consuelo Cruzand Rut Diamint, ‘The New Military Autonomy in Latin America’, Journal of Democ-racy, 9: 4 (October 1998), pp. 115–27.

30 Adelman, ‘Andean Impasses’, p. 41.31 Collier and Levitsky, ‘Democracy with Adjectives’, p. 443. Peru’s armed forces

have contained various ideological strands since the 1930s and relations with civilsociety have always been more complex than one of straightforward repression (asepitomized by the Velasco regime, 1968–75). In the late 1980s some commandersmoved beyond a ‘shoot to kill’ policy when confronting Sendero Luminoso, initiatinga ‘hearts and minds’ strategy that involved minimizing civilian casualties and armingthe population. Since the late 1990s the Ombudsman’s office has been runningcourses on human and citizens’ rights among the military and police. An apprecia-tion of levels of awareness on human rights can be attained from Eduardo Fournier,‘Feliciano’: captura de un senderista rojo, Lima, NRC Corporación Gráfica, 2002. A formergeneral in the intelligence services, Fournier headed the team that captured theleader of the dissident Sendero Luminoso faction that opted to continue insurrec-tionary politics after the arrest of Abimael Guzmán. On changes in counter-insurgency


Improvements can also be observed in police–civil relations. Since2001 Policía Nacional directors have been pushing through reformsin areas such as legal education (aided by the Ombudsman’s office),internal discipline and career structure. Clampdowns on corrup-tion have witnessed high-ranking officers dismissed or demoted. Acommunity-policing initiative in urban areas has been introduced,whereby citizen participation in law and order matters is promotedvia the creation of grassroots networks that coordinate with officersin crime prevention at the neighbourhood level. Although robberyand violence remains a problem, these organizations (as well as thepolice’s willingness to work with community groups and NGOs onissues such as street gangs) have helped Peru experience less of anexplosion in criminality compared to other Latin American countriesin recent years (Brazil, Colombia, Central America, Mexico, etc.).

If, as has been recently argued, assessment of a democratizationproject should focus less on formal institutions and more on a ‘citi-zenship approach’ that ‘entails addressing questions of power . . .popular consent, popular participation, accountability and a practiceof rights’, what of social and civic freedoms post-Fujimori?32 Account-ability in these areas has been enhanced during Toledo’s adminis-tration despite a paradoxical development: while the intense socialmovement activity of the 1980s declined after 1990 (partly due to co-option and control by the Fujimori regime) and remains at a rela-tively low level, state institutions are now confronted by a far morevigilant and vociferous civil society. Pressure groups, human rightsNGOs, the media, grassroots organizations, intellectuals and indi-vidual citizens, today enjoy greater opportunity to denounce actionsby the armed forces, police, politicians, judges and other publicemployees. Since 2001 networks of Citizen Watch (Vigilancia Ciu-dadana) groups have been established in Lima and provincial towns,with projections to extend them into rural areas. These projectspromote citizenship-building, awareness of rights and popular par-ticipation. They aim to advance good governance through monitor-


practices, see Lewis Taylor, ‘Counter-insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminosoand the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 17: 1( January 1998), pp. 35–58.

32 Jean Grugel, ‘Democratization Studies: Citizenship, Globalization and Gover-nance’, Government and Opposition, 38: 2 (2003), p. 250.

ing state activities at the national and local level, denouncing cor-ruption and pressurizing the authorities to respond to popular social,economic and cultural needs. Indicatively, the formation of CitizenWatch groups has not been opposed by the Toledo government, norbeen targeted for co-option by state institutions. Indeed, their effortsat empowerment have been welcomed and supported by Ombuds-man office staff throughout the country, who provide previouslyexcluded sectors of the population with free legal advice, access tothe courts and channels for the redress of abuses committed by stateagencies and private organizations.33 At the other end of the socialspectrum, the corrupt ties certain capitalists maintained with the Fuji-mori administration compromised its reputation, creating an envi-ronment propitious for a heightened monitoring and questioning ofbusiness sector behaviour in the media. The flow of information intothe public domain has also improved due to greater press freedom,as the government does not engage in the extensive media manipu-lation practised by Montesinos.34

Apart from wider scope for citizens to organize autonomously andcriticize without threats from the security services, since 2000 impor-tant power shifts have occurred at various levels within the polity. TheToledo government operates with greater transparency and respectfor the rule of law. To paraphrase O’Donnell, it is ‘more friendly’ tothe popular sectors and less of ‘the cruel enemy’ that characterizedstate–citizen relations during much of the 1980s and 1990s, a changethat has allowed extra leeway for protest while not producing



33 On the Citizen Watch movement, see Peru Solidarity Forum, 37 (May 2003). ‘Judi-cial Watch’ (Vigilancia de Justicia) groups are currently being established to monitorprovincial courts and improve their performance. An informed discussion of recentinitiatives in the area of judicial reform is provided via the ‘Justicia Viva’ series circu-lated by the Instituto de Defensa Legal at [email protected].

34 One high-profile case of media control under Fujimori involved the owner ofTV Channel 2, Baruch Ivcher, who was stripped of his citizenship and business in June1997, after his station transmitted accusations embarrassing to the regime. In the run-up to the 2000 elections, Montesinos distributed $180,000 per week to buy supportfrom the publishers of seven tabloids. The owner of national daily Expreso, EduardoCalmell del Solar, was captured on video receiving a payment of $1 million from Mon-tesinos in return for supporting Fujimori’s third presidential campaign. Calmell andfellow members of the business community are in prison and facing trial, while othersin exile attempt to keep one step ahead of Interpol.

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Adelman’s ‘paralysed state’.35 Social and civic freedoms are more, notless, secure. Indicative of improved protection from official abuse isthe end to trial by ‘faceless’ judges presiding over closed militarycourts. Hundreds of convictions on charges of ‘terrorism’ handeddown during the 1990s have been overturned (one victim releasedunder this scheme was elected president of a regional governmentin November 2002). A healthier balance between the executive andlegislature exists. Presidential power has diminished, partly as a reac-tion against Fujimori’s autocratic behaviour, partly as a consequenceof Toledo’s unpopularity. Toledo and his ministers issue far fewerexecutive decrees than was customary under Fujimori. Congressionalcommittees also operate more independently. Although in theirinfancy, the creation of regional governments is distributing poweraway from the president and Lima. New electoral legislation outlawspresidential re-election. Instead of representing a ‘crisis of govern-ability’, therefore, the unrest and civil disorder of 2003–4 reflects anew openness in Peruvian politics. Over the period 2000–4, both ver-tical and horizontal accountability have increased significantly.

ONGOING PROBLEMS

This has not been without human cost and many problems clearlypersist. Poverty and unemployment are rife. In the political sphere,a dearth of talent among the political class compounds the uncer-tainty generated by the near absence of mass parties embedded incivil society. Within the democratization literature ‘organic’ partiesare regarded as crucial for managing a successful transition, pro-moting ‘consolidation’ and improving the quality of democracy.They provide a conduit connecting the political elite and citizenry,channel interests and facilitate collective action, enhance the flow ofinformation and establish an environment more propitious for fairelections. A system dominated by strong political organizationsmakes it more difficult for ‘outsiders’ to attain strategic positions.


35 O’Donnell, ‘Reflections’, p. 607. Advances and retreats have occurred in thereform of state institutions, with criticism regularly being made about the pace ofchange. However, momentum over the past three years has clearly been in a forwarddirection vis-à-vis the military, police, legal system, local government, fiscal manage-ment, tax collection and related areas of public administration.

Parties also encourage longer-term decision-making and cooperationamong politicians, so reducing the likelihood of executive–legisla-ture gridlock and associated problems of governability.36 Although ithas recently been argued that the Fujimori regime’s collapse and theoutcome of the 2001 general election has caused a ‘resurrection’ and‘partial rebirth of the 1980s party system’, this remains a tenuousdevelopment at best.37 Today, APRA remains the only organizationwith a solid apparatus enjoying mass support and a history of voteridentification. The two other surviving long-established parties,Acción Popular and the Partido Popular Cristiano, lack a meaning-ful national presence. Nearly all APRA’s main competitors comprisefragile ‘independent’ groupings (most hardly merit the label ‘party’)headed by caudillos attracting transient backing from elected repre-sentatives and voters alike. This situation introduces instability intothe political system on various counts. Many non-APRA members ofCongress possess scant loyalty to ‘their’ organization, which encour-ages short-term calculation based on personal advancement. As the2006 election approaches, the number of politicians switching alle-giance looks set to increase, with PP being most effected: parlia-mentarians seeking re-election will not want to be associated with anunpopular government.38

Such blatant opportunism impacts negatively on popular percep-tions of the political class, Congress and other state institutions.39 Acombination of weak parties and a sceptical electorate also boosts



36 Larry Diamond et al., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, Boulder,CO, Lynne Rienner, 1999, pp. 25–9; Steven Levitsky and Maxwell Cameron, ‘Democ-racy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori’s Peru’, LatinAmerican Politics and Society, 45: 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 3–5.

37 Charles Kenney, ‘The Death and Rebirth of a Party System, Peru 1978–2001’,Comparative Political Studies, 36: 10 (December 2003), pp. 1235–6.

38 According to one report, 10 PP members of Congress intend to resign and joina new organization, Perú Ahora, established by parliamentarians who left in February2003. See the anti-Toledo daily Correo, 28 June 2004. Such defections would make theToledo government more dependent on reaching consensus with APRA and UN topass legislation through Congress. The potential negative impact on governability ledthe executive to strive to consolidate the Acuerdo Nacional with opposition politicalforces during the first semester of 2004.

39 Throughout Latin America between 1996 and 2001, legislatures, parties and keystate institutions have experience a collapse in public confidence. Peru forms part ofthis wider trend: one recent poll placed the approval rating of Congress at 8 per cent,


voter volatility, providing greater opportunity for an ‘outsider’ togarner significant support in 2006. Paradoxically, awareness of thispossibility encourages political stability, for key figures within thepolitical elite (García, Flores, Ferrero, etc.) have more incentive tocooperate and temper their differences in order to minimize the like-lihood that another Fujimori might emerge. To this end they havealso approved legislation regulating the creation, legal inscriptionand internal operation of political parties. As ever in Peru, things arenot quite what they seem. Rather than Adelman’s paralysis, advanc-ing militarization and atrophy, disorder in parliament and turbu-lence on the streets masks an improvement in democratic health.


the executive at 9 per cent and judiciary at 12 per cent. El Comercio, 15 March 2004.For the continent-wide data, see Marta Lagos, ‘Public Opinion’, in Jorge Domínguezand Michael Shifter (eds), Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 2ndedition, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 145.

from fujimori to toledo: the 2001 elections and the vicissitudes of democratic government in peru

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