The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chávez and Alberto FujimoriAuthor(s): Steve EllnerSource: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 139-162Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875581Accessed: 18/03/2009 12:31

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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 35, 139-162 zoo00 Cambridge University Press 139 DOI: I0.IoI7/Soozzz26Xo2oo6685 Printed in the United Kingdom

COMMENTARY

The Contrasting Variants of the

Populism of Hugo Chaivez and Alberto Fujimori*

STEVE ELLNER

During the i990s Peru's Alberto Fujimori and Argentina's Carlos Menem were the two main political successes of Latin American populism. Both

completed two successive presidential terms, a unique accomplishment in the continent, and overcame the political instability that previously beset their nations. Scholars who analysed these and other contemporary regimes concluded that Latin American populism was flexible and resilient enough to

adapt to a radically different environment from that of the 193os and 194os, when it had emerged as a major force. Some political scientists labelled as

'neopopulism' the newer variant of populism in the context of globalisation and widespread acceptance of neoliberal policies. These scholars stressed two salient features of neopopulism that contrasted with 'classical populism' of the 1930s and 1940s: its social base consisting of members of the informal

economy, as opposed to the organised working class; and its implementation of neoliberal policies, as against the model of import substitution and state interventionism.'

From the perspective of the early years of the twenty-first century, however, neopopulism appears less politically viable and less useful as an analytical category than ten years before. Unlike classical populism of half a century earlier, neopopulism has failed to produce leaders and movements that serve as a point of political reference in their respective nations over a considerable

period of time. Thus the administrations of Carlos Andres P&rez in Venezuela

Steve Ellner is Professor of History at the Universidad de Oriente, Venezuela. * The author would like to thank Susan Berglund, Miguel Tinker Salas, Paul Drake, Richard

Hillman and Ralph Van Roy for their critical comments. 1 Kurt Weyland, 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities,'

Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 3 5, no. I (Spring 1 993); Kenneth Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case,' World Politics, vol. 48, no. I (Oct. 1995).

140 Steve Ellner

and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil ended in their impeachment, while Carlos Salinas de Gotari was forced into exile shortly after leaving office in Mexico. Subsequently, Fujimori and Menem fell into disgrace as a result of accusations of unethical conduct. Fujimori was ousted and his movement's

presidential candidate received a paltry 1.3 per cent of the vote in the April zooi elections. Menem's popularity was also reduced to single digit percent- ages.

Following the initial publication of literature on neopopulism, Venezuela's

populist leader Hugo Ch•ivez was elected president, infusing the phenomenon of Latin American populism with new relevance. Chivez - unlike Fujimori, Menem and other neopopulists - succeeded in creating a movement that identified with him and with the slogans, symbols and goals he embraced.

Chivez was frequently compared to Fujimori by political analysts and actors, ranging from ex-President Clinton to Venezuelan and US journalists.2 Most of these non-academic comparisons were narrow in scope, if not superficial, in that they focused on demagoguery and authoritarian tendencies. They passed over the essential characteristics that Chi~vez and Fujimori (even more than Menem) had in common and that defined them as populists: special appeal to the marginalised sectors of the population (those belonging to the informal economy), anti-elite discourse, status as 'outsiders' and charisma. The following article attempts to determine whether this common denomi- nator also included policies, discourse, and contextual factors. Specifically, the article provides a systematic comparison of the two leaders and their govern- ments in order to identify similarities and antithetical positions that may shed light on the applicability of the neopopulist concept to the Venezuelan case.

In a more general sense, the article addresses itself to the proposition formulated by political scientists beginning in the mid-i99os that novel de-

velopments in the continent have given rise to a democratic system and

society of a new type. For this purpose, scholars have developed the models of 'neopopulism', 'delegative democracy',3 and 'neopluralism'.4 All three models coincide in stressing the emergence of strong national executives in a democratic framework (referred to as 'hyperpresidentialism') and the

2 ElNational, March 19, zooz. For scholarly works, see Steven Levitsky, 'Fujimori and Post-

Party Politics in Peru,'Journal of Democracy, vol. 10, no. 3 (July 1999), pp. 89-90; Kenneth

Roberts, 'Populism in Latin America,' Carter Center, Challenges to Democracy in the Americas (Oct. 2000).

3 Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy,' Journal ofDemocray, no. 5 (Jan. 1994). 4 Philip D. Oxhorn, 'Is the Century of Corporatism Over? Neoliberalism and the Rise of

Neopluralism,' in Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler (eds.), What Kind ofDemocracy

? What

Kind ofMarket? Latin America in the Age ofNeoliberalism (University Park, PA, 1998).

The Contrasting Variants of Populism 141

concomitant weakening of institutions including the legislature, the judicial system, political parties, organised labour, and organisations of civil society.

Each model, as well as their components, can be placed on a continuum. At one extreme is an optimistic assessment of the efficacy of recent Latin American heads of state and the possibility that their movements will remain an important point of reference in a democratic setting for years to come. These scholars highlight the 'creativity' of the presidents in meeting the chal- lenges of globalisation, the popular support for their policies, and the doc- trines they embrace that serve as an antidote to personalism.5 Policies and class alliances that are conducive to instability and jeopardise democratic norms are located at the opposite extreme. According to the pessimistic evalu- ation, the new breed of presidents are veritable caudillos who lack a solid base of support in the country. Furthermore, their authoritarian tendencies threaten to clash with the international community which is more committed to the defence of democracy than in the past.

The following article will locate the positions, strategies and class backing of the Chivez and Fujimori movements on this continuum. The overriding objective is to ascertain whether the two regimes are predominately person- alistic and authoritarian or, to the contrary, have pursued strategies and policies that are consistent with their social base and represent new models with long-term possibilities. Certainly, the credibility of the claims of Fujimori and Chaivez to represent the marginalised sectors of the population has a bearing on whether both movements (regardless of the duration of their stay in power) will retain the backing of that class over a significant period of time. In addition, the novelty of the models forcefully defended by both leaders, and their ability to convince followers that they represent a clear break with the past, determines whether the movements will remain cohesive, and their activists committed, over time.

The Optimistic-Pessimistic Continuum

Political scientists writing in the I990os concurred that a new type of democracy was emerging in Latin America, with Fujimori as a leading example. One of the common denominators of these governments was the adoption of neoliberal economic policies. Scholars differed widely, however, as to just how demo- cratic and stable the democracies were. Guillermo O'Donnell and others stressed institutional backwardness and simplicity and the national executive's accumulation of inordinate power. They ascribed this imbalance to structural and cultural factors and warned that the political stagnation could last

5 Kurt von Mettenheim and James Malloy, 'Introduction,' and 'Conclusion,' in Mettenheim and Malloy (eds.), Deepening Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1998).

142 Steve Ellner

indefinitely. Most important, regime legitimacy was undermined by the ab- sence of a popular mandate to implement neoliberal formulae, which lacked champions among organised sectors within the nation.6

The optimistic view of regime change was persuasively put forward by Kurt von Mettenheim and James Malloy. They praised the 'creativity' of Latin American leaders who boldly responded to the imperatives of globalisation by accepting the political cost of neoliberal policies, in the process preserving national sovereignty and democracy.' Writing in the same vein, Karen Rem- mer viewed neoliberal reforms as a viable political strategy and not one imposed by the IMF or cabinet technocrats, nor contingent on the national executive's usurpation of authority. Remmer claimed that the electoral suc- cesses of Menem, Fujimori and other neoliberals substantiated her thesis.8 Finally, David Leaman argued that leaders such as Carlos Menem went be- yond mere personalism by developing a comprehensive doctrine that justified neoliberalism but built on the populist tradition of radical transformation. He went on to criticise O'Donnell for overemphasising the non-democratic aspects of Latin America's fledgling democracies.9

The model of neopopulism developed by Kurt Weyland, among other political scientists, may be situated between the two extremes. On the one hand, these scholars recognised the institutional weakness of neopopulist regimes and the tension between neoliberal and populist imperatives. On the other hand, Weyland commended neopopulists for their adroitness in forg- ing alliances. He argued that by winning over a large segment of the popular classes, neopopulists gained legitimacy for their governments and the neo- liberal policies they implemented. He also claimed that neopopulism went beyond rhetorical arguments and rested on a material base. The marginalised sectors of the population, having lost out as a result of long-standing import substitution policies, were responsive to neopopulist discourse. Weyland concluded by praising neopopulism for having faced up to entrenched in- terests and implementing difficult but necessary neoliberal policies, and in the process fortifying democracy.10 The rest of this article will evaluate this thesis in light of recent developments in Peru and Venezuela.

6 O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy'; Oxhorn, 'Is the Century of Corporatism Over?'

7 Mettenheim and Malloy 'Introduction,' and 'Conclusion'. 8 Karen L. Remmer, 'The Politics of Neoliberal Economic Reform in South America,

1980-1994', Studies in Comparative International Development 33, no. z (Summer 1998); Re-

mmer, 'The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America, 198o-9 ', American Political Sdence Review, vol. 87, no. z (July 1993), PP. 393-407.

9 David E. Leaman, 'Populist Liberalism as Dominant Ideology: Competing Ideas and

Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Argentina, 1989-1995 ', Studies in Comparative Interational Development, vol. 34, no. 3 (Fall 1999), PP. 99-I02 oz.

10 Kurt Weyland, 'Populism in the Age of Neoliberalism', in Michael L. Conniff (ed.), Populism in Latin America (Tuscaloosa, 1999), P. 190.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism 143

Fujimori and Chdvez in comparative perspective

General overview

The abortive coup staged by Hugo Chavez on February 4, 1992 catapulted him onto the centre stage of Venezuelan politics. Subsequently, his Bolivarian

Revolutionary Movement-zoo (MBR-200) pursued a policy of electoral ab- stention until April 1997, when it changed its name to the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) and ran Chivez as presidential candidate for the December

1998 elections. For nearly a year, Chbvez lagged behind in an open field of candidates, but by early I998 he unexpectedly became the front runner. In response, Venezuela's two major parties, Democratic Action (AD) and

Copei, dropped support for their own candidates and backed Chivez's

principal rival. Political polarisation also manifested itself in the special presidential elections held in July 2000 when Chivez increased his support from 56 to 60o per cent while his main rival received 38 per cent. The polar- isation was also evident in the unsuccessful coup of April 2002, which was

initially supported by all the parties of the opposition, and over subsequent months when they concentrated their efforts on forcing Chivez out of office

by legal means. Fujimori was a dark horse candidate in the 1990 elections and, like Chivez's

first candidacy, was initially given little chance of winning. Fujimori appealed to the popular classes by opposing the neoliberal economic platform of his main rival, Mario Vargas Llosa. At the same time, Fujimori lashed out at the nation's established political parties. In order to avoid openly coming to terms with the traditional parties that endorsed Vargas Llosa, Fujimori turned down the renowned novelist's offer to concede defeat by mutual accord. In 1992 top military officers collaborated with Fujimori in carrying out an autogolpe, which

suspended congress, the courts and constitutional guarantees. In response to international repudiation of the coup, Fujimori convoked elections for a constituent assembly that replaced the constitution of 1979. As was the case with Chaivez in 1999 and 2ooo, Fujimori faced a weak opposition and tri-

umphed in a series of elections during the I990s, including the referendum for the constitution in 1993 and the presidential election of 1995. Both Vargas Llosa in 1990 and presidential candidate Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1995 were white and closely associated with the nation's elite; both went into exile

following defeat, thus depriving the opposition of a supra-party leader. Pol- itical polarisation also characterised the presidential elections of April 2ooo, when Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo virtually monopolised the electoral results. In subsequent months, Toledo represented the entire opposition in

claiming that electoral fraud had been committed, in opposing the presidential inauguration of Fujimori, and in calling for the removal of Montesinos. In November zooo2000 Fujimori resigned during a trip to Japan.

144 Steve Ellner

Rise to power

Various developments in Venezuela beginning in the 1970s explain the emergence of a group of middle-level officers headed by Chiivez who were committed to political activism and radical change. In the first place, with the subsidence of guerrilla activity in the 196os, the government implemented the 'Andres Bello Plan', which enrolled young officers in Venezuelan uni- versities as an alternative to military institutions including the School of the Americas. The experience of interacting with university students and selec- ting courses in the social sciences politicised a large number of officers in their formative years. A second, albeit less important, factor was the strategy pursued by a group of guerrilla leaders in the I96os led by Douglas Bravo, of engaging in political work within the armed forces in order to capture young officers for the revolutionary cause.n A third factor explaining radicalisation was the experience of Chaivez's group in the military of organising a clan- destine movement between 1982, with the formation of the MBR-2oo, and the coup attempt in 1992. This protracted organising effort among middle- level officers had no precedent in Latin America and served to strengthen the long-term commitment and determination of Chivez's early followers.12

In the 1990 elections Fujimori also appealed to the popular classes by stressing his status as an 'outsider' and other qualities antithetical to those of the political class, which was predominately white, wealthy, ageing and Lima-based. Indeed, he was more of an 'outsider' than other Latin American neopopulists. Fujimori did not run as the candidate of a mass-based political party with dominant influence in organised labour (as did Menem), enjoy the backing of a major media group (as was the case with Collor de Mello), or count on well-established organisations at the regional level or of powerful business interests.

Nevertheless, Chaivez had greater credentials as an 'outsider' than Fujimori, who was an outsider from an ethnic and political viewpoint, but not from a social and economic perspective. Fujimori and his parents before him had been successful in their respective professions, in contrast to Chivez who had reached the middle ranks in the army shortly before the 1992 coup, only to see his military career ended. Chiivez's physical traits, his personality and his social standing were more akin to those of the popular classes than was

n According to Bravo, the Communist Party first designed this strategy in the struggle against dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez in the 195 os. Alberto Garrido, Guerrillay conspiraddn militar en Venezuela (Caracas, 1999), pp. 8-i8. Chavez himself has stated that as a young army officer, a leftist friend advised him not to abandon the armed forces since 'you, as a lieutenant, are worth more than a trade unionist with 20,00ooo workers.' Venezolana de Televisi6n TV, 11:30 a.m., 27 Sept. 2002.

12 Hugo Chivez [interviewed by Agustin Blanco Mufioz], Habla elcomandante (Caracas, 1998),

pp. I23-7; Luis Miquilena, personal interview, 29 March 2000, Caracas.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism 145

the case with populist leaders from Per6n and Haya de la Torre to Fujimori, who came from middle and upper-class backgrounds.

The presidential candidacies of Fujimori and Chivez set off political polar- isation, but the process was more intense in Venezuela. Chivez frightened the establishment due to his past as a military rebel and the radical thrust of his

candidacy. Many members of the Peruvian political class felt less threatened by Fujimori. Indeed, leaders of the APRA party decided to endorse his candidacy in the second round of the i990 elections under the assumption that they would be able to influence his government due to his lack of political ex-

perience. These different trajectories at the time that Fujimori and Chivez reached

office are significant. They support the thesis that the general thrust of Fuji- mori's electoral movement was more personalistic than that of Chivez at the time of their respective rise to power. The shared experiences of Chaivez's followers over a twenty-year period, their greater commitment to far-reaching change, and the greater polarisation in Venezuela beginning in 1998 were conducive to the emergence of a political movement with superior staying power and sense of self-identification. In these aspects, chavismo resembled classical populism of the I930s and 1940s more than it did the short-lived

neopopulist phenomenon of the 1990s.

Discourse and style

Certain common characteristics of the discourse of Chivez and Fujimori fall under the rubric of modern-day Latin American populism. Both emphasised their status as 'outsiders' and lashed out at the 'elite', specifically the political class. Furthermore, they appealed to marginalised sectors of the population, which traditional politicians had failed to target. Both advocated 'participatory democracy' as a corrective to the excessive power of political party bureau- cracies that failed to represent popular interests. Fujimori embodied certain

qualities that the popular classes in Peru, which are of overwhelming Indian extraction, could readily identify with. This was the case with his Japanese family origin and his apparent reticence. In addition, Fujimori played on his

image (and that of his parents) as a self-made man in order to appeal to the members of the informal economy, who saw themselves as 'independents' lacking the backing of state institutions and economic elites. Chavez, for his

part, emphasised his Indian and black features and ancestry at the same time that he used the term 'sovereigns' to refer to the vast majority of the popu- lation in a way that conjured up images of 'the masses'.

In spite of common themes, aspects of the discourse that Fujimori and

Ch~ivez embraced differed in fundamental ways. Most important, Fujimori de- fended a technocratic vision and emphasised hard work, individual initiative,

146 Steve Ellner

honesty and competence, values that were associated with his Japanese background. Consistent with Fujimori's preference for technocratic notions was his extreme anti-political rhetoric, which was reflected in his lack of in- terest in building a political party, or promoting social movements as a sub- stitute for the moribund party system. Another aspect of Fujimori's discourse that had no equivalent in the chavista movement was his determination to extirpate terrorism and his avid support for capital punishment (which was incorporated into the 1993 constitution). As is common among dictators in Latin America, Fujimori extolled ambitious national projects (as did Chivez) and stressed the role of technology and private investments.13

Chaivez's discourse, more than that of Fujimori, conveyed the notion that the Venezuelan government was concerned with the well-being of the lower classes above that of any other sector. Not only did he state that poor people needed his help and attention more than other sectors, but he sometimes viewed class relations as a zero-sum game. In addition, technocratic symbols and slogans, which appealed mostly to the middle classes, were absent in Chbvez's discourse. In contrast to Fujimori's faith in the constructive role of private investments, Ch•ivez frequently assailed neoliberalism, the acceptance of which in Venezuela and elsewhere correlated with income and privileged status.14 While Fujimori emphasised the war against terrorism, Chivez gained popular support by claiming he would never order troops to 'fire on the people'. Indeed, he claimed that the 1992 coup represented a reaction to the traumatic experience of the mass disturbances of the week of 27 February 1989, when soldiers gunned down hundreds of people. Finally, more than Fujimori, Chiivez viewed himself as one of the people, a relationship he de- scribed in metaphorical terms as 'a fish in water'.15 In short, Chavez's dis- course was directed more at underprivileged sectors of the population, which came to represent his exclusive social base of support.

Authoritarian tendencies and unethical behaviour

In the mid- I99os, at the time of the initial scholarly literature on neopopulism, the Fujimori regime appeared to meet the minimum requirements to be considered democratic. The accusations of human rights violation generally centred on 'low-intensity' repression. These 'dirty tricks' included the infil- tration of rallies of opposition candidates, the threat to collect back taxes to

xa Roger Atwood, 'Democratic Dictators: Authoritarian Politics in Peru from Leguia to Fujimori,' SAIS Review, vol. 21, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. i6i-2.

'4 Kenneth Roberts, 'Social Polarization and Popular Resurgence in Venezuela,' in Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the ChdveZ Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict (Boulder, CO, 2003), p. 64.

15 Chivez 'Alo Presidente', Venezolana de Televisi6n TV, I I:oo00 a.m., 23 June 2002.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism 147

pressure the media, and the use of sensationalist tabloids tied to the govern- ment to discredit adversaries.1" In addition, analysts considered Fujimori less corrupt than his neopopulist counterparts elsewhere since his greater control of the state obviated the need to raise money to finance parallel structures lacking in official status.7

Events leading to Fujimori's exit from power and its aftermath demon- strated that the abuses committed throughout the i99os were more grave than was previously thought. Most important, the sinister Vladimiro Montesinos consolidated control following the removal of his rival Nicolas Hermoza as commander-in-chief of the army in 1997, and he may in the end have wielded more power than the president himself. Peru's record in combating the drug trade, which had previously represented a big advantage for the ad- ministration, was called into question as Pablo Escobar's brother claimed that narco-money had financed Fujimori's 199o campaign. Also hundreds of captured videos, which had been Montesinos' modus operandi of extortion, demonstrated that an intricate network of corruption pervaded the nation's major institutions. Dozens of books expose the details of this underworld.'8 One publication contained the results of a congressional committee probe into Fujimori's previously much lauded privatisation programme.19 Such corruption in the sale of state companies undermined Fujimori's stated policy of assigning half of the privatisation proceeds to programmes for under- privileged sectors, which scholars considered basic to the neopopulist social and electoral strategy.

In addition, reports by the Carter Center and other probes during the last year of Fujimori's rule pointed to the lack of autonomy of the national electoral commission and the unreliability of the electoral process. These accounts placed in doubt not only the voting tallies of the 2000 presidential contests, but the electoral results during Fujimori's entire rule, particularly in the I993 constitutional referendum.

Finally, the Truth Commission investigating human rights violations dem- onstrated that the vast majority of the victims of the counterinsurgency campaign against the Sendero Luminoso (SL) were not involved in terrorism. Throughout Fujimori's presidency the government justified secretive and repressive actions by alluding to the SL's statement that 'the Party has a

16 Guillermo Rocharbrin, 'Deciphering the Enigmas of Alberto Fujimori,' NACLA: Report on the Americas, vol. 30, no. i (July-Aug. 1996), pp. 17-18.

17 Weyland, 'The Politics of Corruption in Latin America,'Journal of Democrag, vol. 9, no. 2

(April 1998), p. Iz, ft. 15. 18 One bestseller was Manuel Dammert, Elestado mafioso Fujimori-Montesinos: elpoderimagocrditico

en las sociedadesglobali.Zadas (Lima, 2ooi). 19 National Congress, Comisidn Investigadora sobre los delitos econdmicos yfinancieros cometidos entre z99o

y 2001 (Lima, June 200ooz). Carlos Esteves (congressional commission advisor), personal interview, 11 July 2002, Lima.

148 Steve Ellner

thousand eyes and ears'. The assassination of secretary-general Pedro Huillca of the Peruvian Workers General Confederation (CGTP), previously attribu- ted to the head of SL's Lima organisation, was now blamed on Montesinos' infamous death squad 'Grupo Colina'.20 In retrospect, regardless of the de-

gree of threat from SL, the government's anti-terrorist programme had a secret agenda, namely the suppression of critical and autonomous centres in civil and political society and even in the military. The repression was most successful against social movements and organised labour, which had become

increasingly combative over the previous two decades (beginning with the rule of General Juan Velasco Alvarado). Thus civil society in Peru was subject to old-fashion state repression, which was at least as significant as the societal

fragmentation and other features associated with neopopulism and other models of Latin American democracy in the age of globalisation.21

Fujimori, who at first lacked sympathy among military officers, followed a strategy of winning them over as allies and at the same time gaining control of the institution. The military partnership was sealed by Fujimori's neoliberal

policies, his refusal to investigate human rights violations, and his willingness to grant the military complete authority in highland departments where guer- rilla activity was most pronounced. Military support during the early months of

Fujimori's rule compensated for the president's isolated position in the pol- itical world, particularly in the national congress. A law passed in 1991 gave the president carte blanche in the appointment of the commander-in-chief and the removal of top officers. The law signalled the beginning of the effort by Fujimori and Montesinos to penetrate the institution and eliminate dissension.

Shortly thereafter, the autogolpe facilitated the interrogation of officers in order to identify members of several military lodges that championed institutional concerns. These groups did not oppose Fujimori, but they criticised Mon- tesinos and his National Intelligence Service (SIN), opposed the 'Grupo Colina' and the atrocities committed in the war against the SL, and resented the preference given to the president's unconditional supporters in the

military.22 In short, in the early years of the regime, the armed forces were split between 'institutionalists' and Fujimori loyalists. Subsequently, Fujimori and Montesinos relied on the SIN to gain complete control of the institution.

20 Victor Gorriti (secretary of organisation of the Confederaci6n General de Trabajadores del Peri), personal interview, 9 July 2002, Lima.

21 See, for instance, Frances Hagopian, 'Democracy and Political Representation in Latin America in the I99os: Pause, Reorganization, or Decline?,' in Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey Stark (eds.), Fault Lines of Democragy in Post-Transition Latin America (Coral Gables, 1998), pp. 99-141.

22 Enrique Obando,' Fujimori and the Military: A Marriage of Convenience,' NACLA: R~port on the Americas, vol. 30, no. I (July-Aug. 1996), pp. 3 s-6; Confidential interview with retired military officer, ex-member of 'Le6n Dormido' military lodge, zo20 July 2002, Lima.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism 149

Chaivez's adversaries characterised his government's efforts to revamp the political system as steps in the direction of authoritarian rule. Indeed, the criticisms of Chivez for assuming excessive power resembled the accusations against Fujimori. The new constitutions sponsored by both governments (in 1993 in Peru and 1999 in Venezuela) embraced 'direct democracy' as a corrective to party-dominated rule. But in the process of weakening political parties and their stronghold which was the legislative branch of government, the constitutions buttressed the national executive, contributing to hyper- presidentialism. Both presidents also reversed the tendency toward decen- tralisation of previous years, thus undermining another check on executive authority. Furthermore, according to public opinion surveys, many of the fol- lowers of both presidents had uncertain democratic values.23 Finally, the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution provided the armed forces with a dangerous degree of autonomy with respect to the previous I961 Constitution. With the appointment of a large number of military officers to top government and party positions, Chiavez ran the risk of transforming the armed forces into the nation's dominant institution, as occurred in Peru after the 1992 autogolpe.

Chiivez's critics stressed the government's arbitrary actions of the 'low intensity' type as well as widespread corruption. Determining the veracity of these accusations is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, govern- ment repression in no way approximated that of Peru in the 199os, as has been documented since Fujimori's resignation. As of the writing of this article in September 2002, Chivez has refrained from jailing representatives of the press, even though the media frequently carry declarations calling for the president's removal from office. Similarly, the government has avoided the violent repression of street mobilisations that have also demanded Chivez's removal. Finally, the opposition's claims that the government had annulled the system of checks and balances lost much relevance when the Chavista faction led by Luis Miquilena split off from the MVR in early 2002. Subsequently, Miquilena's followers in the Supreme Tribunal and the National Electoral Council supported decisions that favoured the opposition.

At the outset of the Chaivez presidency, the chavista movement definitively rejected the military-caudillo model that was inspired by the examples of Gamal Abdul Nasser, Muammar Qaddafy and Saddam Hussein and was promoted by the Argentine theoretician Noberto Ceresole. At that time, Foreign MinisterJos6 Vicente Rangel (who later became Defence Minister and then Vice-President) virtually declared Ceresole persona non grata, after which the latter returned to Argentina and began to criticise the Chivez government

23 Damarys Canache, Venezuela: Public Opinion and Protest in a Fragile Democragy (Coral Gables, Florida, zooz), pp. 146-51; Flavia Freidenberg, 'Actitudes hacia la democracia de las 1lites parlamentarias argentina y peruana,' Amirica Latina Hoy, no. I6 (Aug. 1997), p. 80.

15 o Steve Ellner

sharply.24 The origin of the Rangel-Ceresole confrontation dated back to the early years of the MBR-zoo when the organisation defined itself as a 'civilian- military movement', rather than a military lodge. In doing so, Chivez's group committed itself to a non-militarist approach. Referring to the decision years later, Chaivez stated that the civilian-military alliance was 'the best demon- stration that we were not bent on establishing a military dictatorship'.25

The Venezuelan armed forces under Chivez were more internally divided than its Peruvian counterparts under Fujimori. This greater complexity was made evident during the April zoo 2 coup attempt when a three-way split manifested itself in the military. Chaivez's military foes were pitted against his followers while a third, 'institutionalist' current supported his overthrow on April i i and his return two days later. In contrast, the 'institutionalist' faction within the Peruvian military was suppressed following the autogolpe. Unlike the apolitical Fujimori, Chaivez promoted military participation in politics by fulfilling the MBR-2oo's demand, formulated at the time of the 1992 coup, in favour of the military's right to vote.26 In short, while the Fujimori govern- ment resembled the caudillo-masses model in some respects, the political dimension of the Chivez phenomenon is more complex as authoritarian and personalistic tendencies coexist with a democratic impulse.

Class support

A fundamental component of neopopulist movements in the 1990os was the special appeal to the marginalised class, which had failed to benefit from state interventionist policies and felt largely ignored by traditional parties. While both Fujimori and Chaivez counted on the backing of these sectors, the latter's government established more solid and exclusive ties with them. Fujimori's class support shifted during his ten years in office, though he managed to retain considerable lower class sympathy throughout his stay in power.

Neither leader enjoyed dominant influence among organised sectors of the working class. The chavista worker movement failed to attract any important veteran labour leader or to successfully challenge the control of the traditional leadership of the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV). Chiivez's appeal to industrial sectors of organised labour was undermined by his initial policy of maintaining the currency overvalued, which benefited the margin- alised class, among others, at the expense of factory workers. Fujimori, for his part, lacked any following at all in the Peruvian labour movement.

24 Jose Vicente Rangel, personal interview, I2 Sept. 1999, Caracas. 26 Chivez, Habla el comandante, pp. 126-7. 26 Angela Zago, La rebelidn de los angeles: reportaje (Caracas, 1998), pp. 37-47.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism I 5I

Fujimori triumphed in the 1990 elections as the candidate of the popular classes. The marginalised class, unlike influential economic groups, was re-

presented in Fujimori's Cambio-9o electoral slate. Furthermore, Fujimori proposed the legalisation of the status of street vendors and the creation of a special bank for them. Nevertheless, with his government's application of neoliberal policies which brought inflation under control, and successes in the war against the Sendero Luminoso, Fujimori made inroads in the middle and upper class at the same time that he lost some lower class backing. This shift was manifested in the 1993 referendum on the nation's new con-

stitution, which Fujimori won with a mere 5 2 per cent of the vote.27 The poor showing convinced Fujimori of the need to make a concerted effort to rein in lower class voters. With this in mind, Fujimori implemented a massive social programme administered by the ministry of the presidency with the

proceeds from privatisation, which had exceeded expectations. These allo- cations were designed for electoral purposes to win the vote of poor people in those departments where the opposition parties did well in the 1993 municipal elections. As a result, independents (but not the governing party) displaced opposition parties throughout the country at the same time that Fujimori was re-elected president in the 1995 national elections.28 Thus social expenditures created personal loyalty to Fujimori, but not his party. The support continued

throughout the 2000 elections when, according to surveys, the president retained a high degree of popularity among the poor.29

Nevertheless, during his presidency, Fujimori lacked the solid support of the marginalised sectors that he had enjoyed at the time of his election in 1990. Public opinion surveys showed that the poor voted for him because of his personal qualities and his discourse, but disapproved of his neoliberal

policies and stopped short of calling themselves 'fujimoristas'.30 The sym- pathy of the lower classes for Fujimori was largely contingent on the failure of the opposition to speak the language of the people or to take up popular causes. Fujimori's popularity among the poor also depended on state revenue

27 Kenneth Roberts and Moises Arce, 'Neoliberalism and Lower Class Voting Behavior in Peru,' Comparative Politics, vol. 3 i, no. 2 (April 1998), p. 220. Carlos Ivin Degregori, La dicada de la antzpolitica: auge y huida de Alberto Fujmioriy Vladimiro Montesinos (Lima, zooo), p. 71.

28 Carol Graham and Cheikh Kane, 'Opportunistic Government or Sustaining Reform? Electoral Trends and Public Expenditure Patterns in Peru, 1990-1995,' Latin American Research Review, vol. 33, no. I (1998), pp. 67-104.

29 US News and World Report, 31 Jan. 2000, p. 34. Doris Sinchez (secretary of organisation of Peru Posible party), personal interview, 10 July 2002, Lima.

30 Susan C. Stokes, 'Democratic Accountability and Policy Change: Economic Policy in Fujimori's Peru,' Comparative Politics, vol. 29, no. 2 (Jan. 1997), p. 222; Maxwell A. Cameron, Democracy andAuthoritarianism in Peru: Political Coalitions and Sodcial Change (New York, 1994), p. 50o; Rocharbrain, 'Deciphering the Enigmas of Alberto Fujimori', p. 24; Gregory D. Schmidt, 'Delegative Democracy in Peru? Fujimori's 1995 Landslide and the Prospects for 2000,' in Journal ofInteramerican Studies and WorldAffairs, vol. 42, no. I (Spring zooo2000), p. 107.

15 2 Steve Ellner

for social programmes. That activity, however, was by nature short-term. It was curtailed once the money dried up with the phasing out of privatisation and the nation's economic contraction that set in after 1997. According to the newspaper La Rep iblica, the social programmes were designed as a 'quick fix', a term particularly applicable to Fujimori's electoral strategy.31

Unlike the case of Fujimori's Peru, social polarisation characterised Venezuelan politics from the outset of Chaivez's rise to power and steadily deepened during his presidency. The pro- and anti-Chaivez mobilisations in zooz placed in evidence the degree to which the middle class was pitted against the lower classes. The marches and rallies calling for Chi~vez's ouster, which became weekly occurrences before and after the i i April coup attempt, were held in the affluent eastern part of Caracas and attracted few slum-dwellers. In contrast, most of the pro-government marches originated from the poorer, western half of the city. The reaction of large numbers of slum dwellers to the

S11 April coup showed that Chaivez counted on considerable active support, not just electoral or passive backing. On 13 April large numbers of poor people, some of whom had walked ten to twenty miles due to the absence of public transportation, surrounded the presidential palace and military bases in Caracas and other cities to demand Chaivez's release from confinement. The pacific nature of these mobilisations, and the personal danger that the protesters faced because of the complete media blackout, reflect a high degree of commitment among Chivez's followers and a certain organisational capacity on the part of the Chivez movement.

Chaivez's success in maintaining lower class support rested on the plausi- bility of his anti-neoliberalism. The president's leftist and labour critics characterised his anti-neoliberal discourse as empty rhetoric and dema- goguery, and pointed to his failure to design an anti-neoliberal programme. If popularly perceived as true, this accusation would undoubtedly have un- dermined the support of nonprivileged sectors, which according to polls disapproved of neoliberal formulas.32 Although President Chivez undeniably lacked a coherent economic programme, he halted nearly ten years of wide- spread privatisation (in sharp contrast to the record of Fujimori, who some- times claimed to be an 'anti-neoliberal'). Thus, the 1999 constitution prohibits the sale of stock in the state oil company PDVSA and guarantees state control of the social security system. Furthermore, Chivez favoured 'strategic as- sociations ' over privatisation, specifically in the case of the aluminium industry and the shipyard company DIANCA.

ax Bruce H. Kay '"Fujipopulism" and the Liberal State in Peru, I990-I995,'Journal oflnter- american Studies and WorldAffairs, vol. 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997).

82 Roberts, 'Social Polarization and Popular Resurgence'.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism 153

In one important aspect, the class backing of the Chavez movement may end up resembling classical populism of the I930s and I940s more than neopopulism of the 1990s. Scholars have pointed to the heyday of classical populism and the initiation of import substitution policies in Latin America as representing a critical juncture.33 Populist parties promoted the par- ticipation of excluded sectors of the population, specifically peasants and workers, in trade union, party, and state structures. The incorporation assured that populist parties would retain the loyalty of large numbers of these fol- lowers for an entire lifetime, and often for that of their children. The Chaivez movement has succeeded in attracting largely unincorporated members of the marginalised class. Many of these chavista militants have overcome their long-standing sense of exclusion by actively participating in the de- fence of the regime and linking up with incipient structures - albeit much more fragile than the burgeoning labour movement in the era of classical populism.34 If the experience of classical populism is any indication, the Chaivez movement may retain the loyalty of these sectors for years to come.

Political party system

Venezuela's near two-party system (based on AD and Copei) began to falter in the I990s when smaller parties made inroads, particularly at the local level. After Chivez's election in 1998, AD, Copei and other pro-establishment parties receded from the political scene. Business organisations, the CTV and the media, rather than parties of the opposition, played the major role in articulating and channelling discontent when Chavez's popularity plummeted in 2001. The governing party failed to fill the vacuum created by the weakening of traditional parties. From its inception, the MVR was conceived of as an electoral front and not a disciplined organisation with ongoing societal links.35 Furthermore, the MVR went nearly unrepresented during Chaivez's first presidency (1999-2000) in the cabinet and at the gubernatorial level. Con- vinced that the MVR had succumbed to clientelistic practices and lacked revolutionary fervour at the time of the radicalisation of the government in 2001, Chivez announced his intentions to create parallel structures and thus reactivated the MBR-200. In 2002 Chaivez promoted the formation of

33 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the PoliticalArena: CriticalJ unctures, the Labor Movement, andRegime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, 199 1) ; Charles Bergquist, Labor in LatinAmerica: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia (Stanford, 1986).

34 Steve Ellner, 'The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela: The First Year-and-a-Half in Power,' Latin American Perspectives, vol. 28, no. 5 (Sept. zooi).

a Margarita L6pez Maya, 'The Movement and Presidency of Hugo Chivez Frias,' in Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the ChdiveEra: Class, Polarization and Conflict (Boulder, 20zo03), p. 82.

I 5 4 Steve Ellner

'Circulos Bolivarianos', although it was unclear whether they were designed to serve as MVR cells or autonomous community organisations.

The fragility of the Peruvian political party system was put in evidence by the sharp fluctuation in the electoral intake of major parties in the seven elec- tions held between 1980 and I990. After I990, opposition parties lost further credibility because they concentrated their efforts on disputing the legality of Fujimori's candidacy in 1995 and 2000, while neglecting socio-economic con- cerns. During this period, the nation's traditional, mass-based parties were displaced by makeshift ones designed to further the presidential candidacies of Alejandro Toledo (Perti Posible), Luis Castafieda (Solidaridad Nacional) and Alberto Andrade (Somos Peri), in addition to Fujimori. The weakening of party loyalties was reflected in Congress where by 1999 the anti-government group Union for Peru had lost ten of its seventeen members.36 As was the case in Venezuela, the Peruvian governing party failed to fill the vacuum created by the weakening of the parties of the opposition. Not only did Fujimori's party lack a presence at the local level, but it was not considered for top presidential appointments. Indeed, Montesinos preferred to keep the party at bay in order to avoid the emergence of a rival centre of power.37 When Fujimori's proteg' Jaime Yoshiyama was defeated in Lima's mayoral race of 1996, the pro-government camp had no prominent leader as candidate for the zooo presidential elections other than the president himself.38

Thus a weak political party system characterised both Peru and Venezuela and explains the relative ease with which Fujimori and Chivez carried out thoroughgoing political changes at the outset of their rule. In both nations, the traditional parties had lost vitality over the previous decade. In subsequent years the opposition continued to lose credibility because it failed to formulate alternative socio-economic policies, nor did it engage in self-criticism re- garding its past failures.

Nevertheless, the decline of the political party system during Fujimori's ten- year rule was more pronounced than in Venezuela under Chivez. Only the APRA party somewhat surprisingly reemerged in Peru after Fujimori left office. In contrast, Venezuela's political parties gradually began to recover following their electoral defeats of 2000. As a result of the errors committed by

36 David Scott Palmer, 'Democracy and its Discontents in Fujimori's Peru', Current History, vol. 99, no. 634 (Feb. 2000), p. 65; Rolando Ames, Enrique Bernales, Sinesio L6pez and Rafael Roncagliolo, Situacddn de la democracia en el Peru

(2ooo-2oo0) (Lima, zooI), p. 131.

37 Julio Coder, 'La gobernabilidad en el Peru: entre el autoritarismo y la democracia,' in Coder and Romeo Grompone, Elfujimorismo: ascenso y caida de un regimen autoritario (Lima, 2000),

P-. 37- 38 Martin Tanaka, 'Perd, I980-2000: Cr6nica de una muerte anunciada? Determinismo,

voluntarismo, actores y poderes estructurales,' Conference 'Advances and Setbacks in the Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America'. Notre Dame University, 23-24 April 2001, p. 17.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism 15 5

the political independents who led the abortive April 2002 coup, the parties insisted on playing a more central role in the struggle to oust Chi~vez. Three

types of political organisation played a central role: traditional parties such as AD and MAS; new parties with new leaderships such as Union and Justice First; and parties formed by ex-AD and Copei leaders such as Antonio Ledezma (former mayor of Caracas), Manuel Rosales (governor of Zulia), Carlos Navarro (former CTV secretary general), and Agustin Berrios (former Copei leader). Unlike the Peruvian labour movement that was nearly deci- mated under Fujimori, the CTV led by two AD labour leaders played a key role in the struggle against Chivez.

Venezuela's MVR party was more complex and institutionalised than its Peruvian counterparts. While Chaivez's MVR had internal currents with distinct programmatic orientations,39 Fujimori's parties were completely per- sonalistic and lacking in ideological debate and prominent leaders. Finally, the

pro-government mobilisations in Peru usually consisted of rallies for electoral

purposes and inaugurations of public works projects that featured the presi- dent as speaker. This was not always the case in Venezuela, as was demon- strated on 13 April zooz2002 when chavistas surrounded the presidential palace and

military bases to demand Chivez's return to power. Other mobilisations were

tenuously linked to the MVR. Thus, for example, student takeovers of the Central University in early 2001, violent protests against the August 2002

supreme court decision absolving military coup leaders, and diverse land invasions were all justified or encouraged by some chavista leaders, while others

(including Chivez himself) expressed caution and outright opposition.40 In short, the institutional barrenness of Peru under Fujimori resembled that of traditional caudillos. In contrast, the more institutionally complex scenario in Venezuela included diverse organised currents within the MVR and a

greater mobilisation capacity on the part of both pro and anti-government blocs.

Relations with the United States

The USA displayed a critical and at times hostile attitude toward Chivez from the moment he launched his presidential candidacy for the I998 elections and the State Department denied his request for a visa. Indeed, Washington had

39 Steve Ellner and Fred Rosen 'Chavismo at the Crossroads: Hardliners, Moderates and a Regime under Attack,' in NACLA: Report on theAmericas, vol. 35, no. 6 (May-June zooz). 40 The takeover of the Central University, for instance, was harshly criticised by Chavez's university spokesman Luis Fuenmayor for lacking legitimacy and community support and representing a heavy political cost for the government. Similarly, Chivez attempted to discourage land takeovers by excluding squatters from the benefits granted by the agrarian reform.

156 Steve Ellner

good reason to oppose the Chivez government, and view with favour the

coup attempt of ii April 20oo. In the first place, Chivez played an activist role in OPEC with the aim of strengthening oil prices, for which purpose he visited Iraq, Iran and Libya on several occasions. His government also

opposed US-sponsored resolutions in international bodies and so, for ex-

ample, voted against censorship of China, Cuba and Iran for human rights violation. Furthermore, Chivez's rhetoric in favour of a 'multi-polar world'

implied rejection of US hegemony including Washington's proposals for a

hemispheric union. Finally, his staunch defence of national sovereignty led him to turn down US requests to fly drug interdiction missions in Venezuelan

space as well as Washington's offer to send the Army Corps of Engineers following the devastating floods in the state of Vargas in December I999.

Chivez's discourse in favour of a multi-polar world and in opposition to the neoliberal-based Washington Consensus coincided with the groundswell of anti-globalisation sentiment at the international level. Indeed, his stands on these issues represented a possible future point of reference in Latin America. Chivez's foreign policy would have undoubtedly had less appeal ten years earlier at a time when world-wide acceptance of neoliberalism had reached an

apex, as did US supremacy with the unexpected collapse of the Soviet bloc.

Although Chivez's nationalist positions were a throwback to the third-world movement of the I96os and I97os, they were unique in the Latin American

setting of the I990s. This novelty contributed to the notion that Chivez was

striking out in new directions, thus enhancing the possibility that chavismo would retain its appeal regardless of the outcome of the Chivez presidency.

Unlike the relative consistency of its attitude toward the Chaivez govern- ment, Washington reversed itself twice in its relations with Fujimori; these turnabouts reflected the contradictory thrust of Fujimori's neopopulist re-

gime. As a result of his neoliberal policies, Fujimori secured the approval of international lending agencies following the autogolpe in 1992, which was

thoroughly condemned by nations throughout the world including the USA.

Fujimori defended the coup by arguing that the USA failed to comprehend Peru's predicament of Sendero Luminoso-sponsored terrorism, which made

necessary the interruption of constitutional guarantees.41 Subsequently, Fujimori authorised US-piloted surveillance missions in the Amazonian

region to combat drug trafficking (in contrast to Chaivez's rejection of DEA-

sponsored flights) and as a result coca export was largely checked. Neoliberal

policies, the all-out war on terrorism, and collaboration with the DEA all

explain the harmonious relations with the USA during the remainder of

Fujimori's first term and most of the second.

41 Cotler, 'La gobernabilidad en el Peri', pp. 32-3.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism 157

Nevertheless, following Fujimori's re-election in 1995, Montesinos con- solidated his hold over the Peruvian state and cases of corruption, complicity with drug traffickers, and human rights violations reached the public. These incidents culminated in 2000 with the scandal over the sale of arms originating from Jordan to Colombian guerrillas. An additional source of irritation for the USA was Fujimori's backtracking from his commitment to market re-

forms, and his explicit criticism of neoliberalism for electoral purposes during the 2000 presidential campaign. Some scholars attribute Fujimori's exit from

power to USA pressure rather than to the resistance of political parties of the

opposition or to popular mobilisations, which were in any case poorly organised.42

The US reconsideration of its relations with Fujimori put in evidence the contradictory components of neopopulist governments: neoliberalism, populism, the electoral road to power, initial widespread popular support, and hyperpresidentialism. The populist features of the Fujimori government became increasingly salient toward the end of his rule and prompted the USA to reverse its position. This tendency included state interventionism in the

economy and clientelism, which was conducive to corruption and duplicity in the war against drug trafficking. Another dimension that the USA could not

ignore was the Fujimori government's increasingly visible authoritarian orien- tation. In short, neopopulism (even more than classical populism) was subject to acute internal contradictions, thus explaining Washington's reformulation of its policy toward Fujimori and the brief duration of the movement of those who supported his government.

Conclusion

The first scholarly writing in the mid-i99os on the resurgence of Latin American populism set off a conceptual debate among political scientists. Theoretical discussion centred on whether the definition of populism should take in a wide diversity of features ranging from class following and economic

policy to leadership qualities. Writers who defended the affirmative position argued against applying the concept of populism to contemporary govern- ments in Latin America, which fell short of meeting these varied require- ments.43 Although regimes such as that of Fujimori and Menem resembled classical populism of the 1930s and 1940s in some respects, they lacked several essential characteristics including a popularly accepted economic programme

42 Cotler, Drogas ypolitica en el Per : la conexidn norteamericana (Lima, 1999). 43 Anibal Quijano, 'Populismo, representaci6n y Menemismo,' in Felipe Burano de Lara (ed.),

Elfantasma delpopulismo (Caracas, I998). See also, Paul W. Drake,' Conclusion: Requiem for Populism?,' in Michael L. Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, I982).

I 8 Steve Ellner

and a mobilisation strategy. A second school, which labelled the Fujimori and Menem governments populist, rejected this position as 'conceptual con- servatism' and as purist. Kurt Weyland, one of the school's leading members, proposed a 'minimal procedural' definition of populism that had proved fruitful for political scientists in describing the emergence of democratic

regimes during the previous decade. Weyland and others considered populism a predominately 'political strategy', and thus discarded socio-economic fac- tors as extrinsic to the phenomenon's definition.44

This article avoids such a definitional debate and has instead employed a

comparative approach in order to determine the importance of neopopulism as a model followed by Latin American leaders. It has examined develop- ments since the publication of the original works on neopopulism in the mid-

I990s in order to evaluate the viability not only of neopopulist governments but also of neopopulist movements and strategies. The contrast between

Fujimori, who lacked a movement of hard-core followers, and Ch~vez, who counted on such backing, is designed to shed light on the long-term prospects of neopopulism and the continued relevance of certain aspects of classical

populism. In the mid-199os political scientists pointed out that neopopulist govern-

ments were not likely to be stable, but it was noted that at least the cases of Menem and Fujimori demonstrated long-term potential.45 This article con- cludes that the position of neopopulist leaders was even more fragile than scholars recognised at the time. For instance, the Argentine economic crisis of 200oo-2 has been attributed to the Menem regime's fiscal irresponsibility, including the social programmes that represented a basic prop of the neo-

populist strategy. Furthermore, revelations about the Fujimori government during his later years in office and since then have called its democratic credentials sharply into question. These shortcomings and failures place in doubt the political future of both leaders as well as the long-term impact of

neopopulism. The real issue is not the duration of neopopulist governments but the

survival of neopopulist movements. That Fujimori, the neopopulist leader who lasted the longest in office, failed to maintain a political presence once he was forced out of power, suggests that the neopopulist model is less important than previously appeared to be the case. The contrast with classical populism could not be greater. Classical populist leaders could boast of having initiated an economic model of major consequence, having incorporated large num- bers of workers into the nation's political life through the labour movement,

44 Kurt Weyland, 'Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics,' Comparative Politics, vol. 34, no. I (Oct. zooI), pp. 8, 9, i8.

4 Weyland, 'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America,' p. 398; Roberts, 'Populism and Democracy in Latin America'.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism I59 and having created parties that also lasted for decades. Most of these parties eventually abandoned their far-reaching goals, accepted clientelism as a modus operandi, and became completely institutionalised, thus ceasing to be populist, as Weyland points out.46 However, such a process was gradual, encompassing several decades. If neopopulism cannot claim a similar set of accomplish- ments, then it can hardly be assigned the same degree of importance as classical populism.

Fujimori's political decision-making and strategies invariably obeyed short-term considerations. This proved successful in a period of economic expansion and policy-making achievements, but backfired when economic contraction set in.47 Some of the defects of this approach were evident in the mid- 1990s and were acknowledged by scholars writing on neopopulism, while other shortcomings became increasingly conspicuous with Fujimori's sub- sequent political decline.

The short-term thrust of Fujimori's strategies expressed itself on many fronts. In the first place, the government's social programme was financed from the proceeds of privatisation, which dwindled during Fujimori's second presidential period. These allocations based on electoral considerations, like the 'targeted programmes' against dire poverty promoted by neoliberals,48 were by nature short-term. In the second place, Fujimori, whose actions were invariably informed by public opinion surveys,49 used gimmicks to bolster his popularity at key moments. This consideration may have influenced the timing of the conflict with Ecuador in 1995 and the capture of top Sendero guerrillas. While successful at first in boosting Fujimori's poll ratings, a large number of Peruvians soon began to perceive these actions as manipulative. In the third place, Fujimori made no effort to build a political party that would have provided neopopulism a long-term presence in Peru. As a result, the political benefits of clientelism, which was basic to the government's social programmes, were minimised. The extreme personalism that substituted pol- itical party rule was prone to generate corruption, thus eventually discrediting Fujimori and his discourse stressing personal honesty. A cohesive political party may have organised and incorporated members of the marginalised sectors in order to convert tenuous sympathy for Fujimori into fervent and long-lasting support.

Despite his similarities with traditional Latin American demagogues and caudillos, Fujimori displayed political adroitness and originality; his approach

46 Weyland, 'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America,' p. 14. 47 Classical populists such as Juan Domingo Per6n and R6mulo Betancourt, who reached

power in the 1940s at a time when their nation counted on abundant resources, faced a similar dynamic.

48 Weyland, 'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America,' p. 398. 49 John Crabtree and Jim Thomas (eds.), El Pen~ de Fujimori (Lima, 1999), p. 63.

I6o Steve Ellner

clearly distinguished him from dictators such as Pinochet, who was an un-

qualified authoritarian, pro-neoliberal and primarily backed by the middle class. Most important, Fujimori maintained considerable lower class support in spite of the government's neoliberal policies. This backing explains the massive turnout at Fujimori's electoral gatherings during the 2000 presidential campaign and his front-runner status according to reliable polls.50 Further- more, Fujimori's divergence from neoliberalism was more than nominal. His social programmes, which reached the remote highland areas, created tensions with multilateral lending agencies that preferred to use privatisation money to pay off the foreign debt.51 Fujimori's appeal to anti-neoliberal sentiment also strained relations with technocrats such as Minister of Finance Carlos

Bolofia (who compared himself with his Argentine counterpart Domingo Cavallo - whose differences within the Menem administration led him to form his own political party).52

In short, the strategy pursued by Fujimori diverged from traditional auth- oritarian regimes that imposed austere economic measures on the popu- lation. Those political scientists who write off the neopopulist phenomenon as demagoguery fail to recognise the novel aspects of Fujimori's approach. Although the long-term importance of the neopopulist phenomenon should not be overdrawn, the uniqueness of Fujimori's political strategies cannot be denied, nor the appropriateness of the term neopopulism.

The political movement led by Hugo Chiivez, like those of the classical

populists in the 1930s and I940s, is likely to leave an indelible mark on the

political life of the nation. Most important, large numbers of the marginalised class consider the chavista movement to be theirs, and identify with its stated

goals and visions. If the experience of organised workers in the heyday of classical populism is any indication, the incorporation of these excluded sectors in activist structures, albeit rudimentary, will guarantee long-time political loyalty. In addition, Chivez has created a political party and a coalition that are likely to form part of the nation's political landscape for some time to come. Nevertheless, the high degree of polarisation in Venezuela is a double edged-sword. It generates fervent loyalty to Chivez, with long-term implications, at the same time as it intensifies rejection for the president among influential sectors, limiting his options and the possibility of achieving stability.

50 Romero Grompone, 'El Fujimorismo como proyecto inconcluso,' in Cotler and Grom- pone, El Fujimorismo, p. I2 5.

51 Nelson Manrique, 'The Two Faces of Fujimori's Rural Policy,' NACLA: Report on the Americas, vol. 30, no. I (July-Aug. 1996), pp. 42-3. 62 Carlos Bolofia Behr, De Paniagua a Toledo: de la confusidn al caos (Lima, oo2002), p. 5 8; Cotler, 'La gobernabilidad en el Peri,' p. 45.

The Contrasting Variants of Populism I16

Political scientists and actors have pointed to the Chivez movement's authoritarian and demagogic tendencies, its failure to promote institution-

alisation, and its actions depriving civil society of autonomy and an inde-

pendent mobilisation capacity. These characteristics would place in doubt the ability of the chavistas to participate efficaciously in a democratic setting according to the rules of the game over an extended period. Nevertheless, when Chivez's brand of populism is placed alongside neopopulism, and the

Fujimori regime in particular, these characteristics appear to be less severe. In

spite of a dangerous degree of military autonomy and cases of 'low intensity' repression, the government generally refrained from using force against an

extremely aggressive opposition. At the same time, the chavistas drafted the constitution of 1999 with the aim of deepening the nation's democracy. Finally, the chavista movement was not at all monolithic. The mobilisations conducted in its name were not always externally controlled; and internal factions such as the Chavista labour branch sometimes embraced positions that the rest of the movement did not officially endorse.53 These features indicate a degree of complexity that is more compatible with the democratic system than is the extreme personalism characteristic of neopopulism. In a similar vein, classical

populist movements in the 1930s and 1940s maintained close ties with fac- tions within the military and were often accused of being demagogic, un-

democratic, and anti-institutionalist, but they also made lasting contributions to their nation's democracy.

The principal overlap of the Fujimori and Chivez phenomena is their

special appeal to the marginalised class. Unlike in the case of Fujimori, Chivez's exclusive social base was the marginalised sectors, which provided him with active support that was crucial for his political survival. The mo- bilisation capacity of the marginalised class, and specifically its response to the coup of i i April 2002, had no equivalent under Fujimori's rule.

Political analysts need to explore in detail the relations between the mar-

ginalised sectors, on the one hand, and Chaivez and Fujimori, on the other.

Specific features worthy of exploration include paternalist ties, attitudes toward the positions upheld by both leaders, and levels of participation and

incorporation (such as the highly polemical, but little known, Circulos Boli-

varianos). The 'bottom up' methodological approach of labour historians who have explored the reaction of unionised workers to classical populist movements of the 1930s and 1940S needs to be applied now to the margin- alised sectors in Latin America.54 Such research focusing on the era of

53 Steve Ellner, 'Organized Labor and the Challenge of Chavismo,' in Ellner and Daniel

Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the Chdive Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict (Boulder,

2003), pp. I169-7I. 54 See, for example, Daniel James, Doha Maria's Stoty: Life, History, Memory and Political Identity

(Durham, NC, zooo).

162 Steve Ellner

globalisation would test the accuracy of long-held stereotypes that portray the

marginalised class as susceptible to paternalistic relationships and authori- tarianism,55 politically volatile, and revolutionary.56 Given the marginalised class's political independence vis-a-vis workers of the formal economy in recent years, and the importance it has assumed under Chaivez, Fujimori and other populist governments in Latin America, such a study is of paramount importance.

55 Gino Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism (New Brunswick, 1978), pp. I53-208.

56 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York, 1963).