From Airport Scanners to License Plate Readers, DHS Has Your BacksideJeremiah Riley

September 11, 2001 is a day that many still remember. I was an LDS missionary living

in McCook, Nebraska when the towers fell. In a lot of ways, Nebraska is far removed from New

York City, but the tragedy still felt close to home. I assume it felt that way for all Americans. It

certainly did for the Bush administration. In the wake of the attack, President Bush promised

that the government would “come together to improve air safety…and take new measures to

prevent hijacking.” Moreover, he promised that the government “will come together to

strengthen [its] intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act and to find

them before they strike.”1

To a large extent, Bush kept that promise. The government responded to the 9-11 events

with remarkable speed and force. Its response included a new, massive cabinet-level department

charged with securing our boarders and preventing future terrorist attacks.2 In a way, the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stands as a monument to the tragedy’s fallen, and it is

evidence of our country’s persistent fear of a repeat attack. The threat of another large-scale

terrorist attack is so real that almost overnight DHS became the third largest department in the

Federal Government.3 The Department employs over 200,000 individuals and operates through a

budget that exceeds $40 billion annually.4 DHS provides our vast country—and its busy modes

of travel—increased security. There have been no large-scale terrorist attacks within our

boarders over the past 12.5 years. That is commendable and, to an extent, it is remarkable. 1 President Bush Addresses the Nation, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Our Mission (Feb. 24, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission3 Is DHE Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats, 112th Cong. 1-3 (2012) (Committee on Homeland Security).4 Id.

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However, our increased security comes with a price beyond the multi-billion dollar budget. The

additional price for us—the average, innocent, and semi-free among us—is privacy.

DHS extends its protective tentacles into our lives regularly—in ways both seen and

unseen.5 But perhaps the most obvious way that the DHS “interacts” with Americans is through

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and its many ever-probing, light-blue, latex

hands. With bureaucratic enthusiasm, TSA personnel herd thousands of travelers—families,

workers, lovers, and friends—through America’s airports. Like interest, TSA never sleeps. In

airports around the country, TSA agents are always present. In fact, TSA’s operations are so

extensive that it screens every commercial airline passenger in the U.S.6

Like the DHS, TSA (an agency within the DHS) was a response to the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001. Less than two months after 9-11, President Bush signed the Aviation and

Transportation Security Act (ATSA) into law, which created TSA. A year after the ATSA

became law, TSA assumed all passenger and baggage screening at domestic airports.7 TSA

screens over two million travelers daily at various airports throughout the United States.8 TSA’s

screening process is thorough—similar to a jail booking, really. The main difference between

the two is that not even low threat inmates can bring their MacBook Airs—and quart-sized bags

of liquids—into the local big house. But when someone gets booked into jail, there is a good

chance that he/she did something wrong. When TSA “books” a traveler into his/her flight, there

is a good chance that person did nothing wrong. In fact, TSA has caught very few terrorists

5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Who Joined DHS (Feb. 25, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs6 Transportation Security Administration, About TSA (Feb. 26, 2014, 12:03 PM), http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa7 Brittany R. Stancombe, Fed Up with Being Felt Up: The Complicated Relationship Between the Fourth Amendment and TSA's "Body Scanners" and "Pat-Downs", 42 Cumberland L. Rev. 181, 183 (2012).8 Id. at 184

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attempting to board passenger flights in the U.S.9

1. DHS and AIT Scanners

But the threat of a repeat attack is real. It is real enough that most Americans support

TSA’s various screening methods, including body and belonging searches. However, TSA’s

body searches expose more than many travelers think. For instance, TSA’s Advanced Imaging

Technology (AIT) captures a naked image of each traveler who walks through it.10 TSA views

the AIT scanners as a valuable tool in their fight against terrorism.11 Although AIT scanners

supposedly blur the outline of naked travelers, some judges and scholars view them as a major

encroachment on privacy rights.12

Before the current AIT scanners, TSA used another intrusive system. It is called

backscatter x-ray technology. Like AIT scanners, backscatter is superman-like. It can see

through travelers’ clothing with ease. In fact, the images that backscatter produces are so

detailed that they look like a low-budget “adult” magazine. It is that bad.

I vividly recall the first time that I saw backscatter technology in use. It was a year

before the first traveler stood sheepishly under its all-glaring eye. I saw the technology at the

Force Protection Equipment Demonstration (FPED) outside of Washington, DC. FPED is an

industry show where defense contractors showcase the most advanced defense technology

available. However, at FPED, the consumers are high-ranking military officers from the U.S.

and various allied countries throughout the world. At FPED it is common to see a group of

9 Stephen Dinan, TSA Profiling at Airports Has yet to Nab a Terrorist, The Wash. Times, Nov. 14, 2013 at , http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/14/tsa-profiling-at-airports-has-yet-to-nab-a-terrori/?page=all.10 U.S. Senate Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs Comm., TSA Airport Screening (2010).11 Transportation Security Administration, Advanced Imaging Technology (Mar. 8, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/advanced-imaging-technology-ait12 Yofi Tirosh & Michael Birnhack, Naked in Front of the Machine: Does Airport Scanning Violate Privacy, 74:6 Ohio St. L. J. 1263, 1265 (2012).

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multi-star generals evaluating star technologies. And the backscatter inspection system was no

different.

With a group of military elite looking on, the backscatter demonstrator explained the

advanced abilities of the machine. He assured the generals that nothing—absolutely nothing—

could escape the backscatter’s discriminate gaze. And then he proved it. The demonstrator

walked into the machine. The crowd could see it. The man’s stark naked body flashed onto a

life-sized screen mounted off to the side of the remarkable technology. After a few moments, the

demonstrator walked out of the machine and shamelessly explained how the technology could

change the way that TSA processed travelers. After the demonstration, I walked away

wondering what Hobbes would have thought. Maybe the federal government had become the

great Leviathan. To ensure that we are safe from terrorists, the government has begun treating us

all as if we were one.

Backscatter x-ray and AIT scanners are key components to TSA’s threat detection and

mitigation. But the scanners see through citizens’ clothing. And as such the technology literally

“butts up” to the Constitution in notable ways. For instance, the Fourth Amendment guarantees

that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”13 The Amendment at least implies that the

government shouldn’t use advanced technology to see through the clothing of millions of

innocent citizens.

ACLU argues that, “passengers expect privacy underneath their clothing and should not

be required to display highly personal details of their bodies—such as evidence of mastectomies,

13 U.S. CONT. amend. IV.

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colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter tubes, and the size of their breasts or genitals—as

a prerequisite to boarding a plane.”14 Although the ACLU and others make compelling

arguments against TSA’s screening practices, courts have declined to extend the Fourth

Amendment to airport screenings.

In her article, “Fed Up With Being Felt Up,” Brittany Stancomb calls attention to cases

that highlight the judicial stance on TSA’s security methods.15 In New York v. Burger, officers

searched a private scrap yard without a warrant.16 In that case, the officers were searching for

stolen vehicles and auto parts.17 The officers conducted their search pursuant to a New York

state statute, which regulated the purchase and sale of vehicles.18 The Court held that business

owners who operate in highly regulated industries should have a reduced expectation of privacy,

and moreover, the officers in Burger acting pursuant to a statute did not require a warrant to

conduct the search.19

New York v. Burger limited the Fourth Amendment in an unfortunate way. However,

Burger is not alone. The Court’s decision in Burger largely turned on two prior cases, which

were Colonnade Catering v. U.S. and U.S. v. Biswell. The cases combined create what is known

as the Colannade-Biswell doctrine—a major Fourth Amendment limiter.20 In Colonnade the

Court reviewed the constitutionality of a federal statute, which authorized warrantless searches

of liquor license holders.21 In that case, an IRS agent was a patron on the Colonnade premises

14 Stancombe, supra. at 202.15 Id. at 203.16 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).17 Burger, 482 U.S. at 693-9418 Id.19 Id. at 712.20 John S. Morgan, The Junking of the Fourth Amendment: Illinois V. Krull and New York V. Burger, 63 Tulane L. Rev.355 335, 342 (1988).

21 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75, 90 S. Ct. 774, 776, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1970).

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when he witnessed a possible violation of excise tax law.22 The IRS agent requested that the

owner of the premises unlock a storage room so he could inspect it.23 When the owner declined,

the agent broke the lock and forced his way in without a warrant.24 The Court held that although

the agent acted beyond his statutory authority, the statute itself, which granted IRS agents the

authority to conduct warrantless searches—under certain circumstances—was constitutional.25

Although Colonnade inhibited the Fourth Amendment’s reach, U.S. v. Biswell is the true

Fourth Amendment limiter. Indeed Biswell, is the heavier half of the Colonnade-Biswell

doctrine. In Biswell the Court considered the constitutionality of the Gun Control Act of 1968,

which authorized warrantless searches on the premises of licensed firearms dealers.26 In Biswell

the respondent was a licensed dealer who was going about his business when a city police officer

and a U.S. treasury agent visited him and demanded that he open his locks and his books for their

perusal.27 The respondent complied with the officials’ demands; however, the officials found

him in violation of the law.28 The Biswell Court held that because the search was administrative,

the officials did not need a warrant; therefore, their search did not violate the Fourth

Amendment.29

The holdings in Colonnade and Biswell support the federal government’s practice of

conducting warrantless inspections in closely regulated industries.30 The Colonnade-Biswell

doctrine stands for the principle that the federal government is given great deference to search

without a warrant so long as the administrative searches are limited in their “time, place, and

22 Id. at 73.23 Id.24 Id.25 Id. at 82.26 Morgan, supra. at 344.27 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 312, 92 S. Ct. 1593, 1594, 32 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1972).28 Id.29 Id. at 317.30 Morgan, supra. at 342.

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scope.”31 And for better or worse—mostly worse—courts view airport passenger screenings as

“administrative searches” that do not require a warrant.32

Although courts hold that TSA does not require a warrant to conduct its passenger

screenings, the practice is still very controversial. In part because individuals do not know what

TSA does with its passenger images after the screening is complete. And that concern is well

founded.

According to a letter from TSA to Congressman Thompson, Chairman of the House

Committee on Homeland Security, TSA requires that all airport passenger scanners are capable

of storing and transmitting images for “testing, training, and evaluation purposes.”33 Moreover,

Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), says

that TSA’s body scanners are, “designed and deployed in a way that allows the images to be

routinely stored and recorded.”34 In fact, a TSA procurement notice for body scanners says that

the scanners must “allow exporting of image data in real time” and allow for “high-speed

transfer of image data” over TSA’s network.35 Like many things in DHS—and the current

Executive for that matter—TSA’s practices are veiled in secrecy. Travelers rightfully wonder

where the images go. Many are left to assume that images of their naked bodies leave the airport

before their flights actually do.

Because courts do not recognize the Fourth Amendment in the passenger-screening

context, TSA is free to search as it pleases—and that it does. As such travelers have few options.

31 Stancombe, supra. at 203.32 See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that airport screenings are reasonable administrative searches because they are part of a broad regulatory scheme intended to protect passengers from terrorist threats).33 Declan McCullagh, Feds Admit Storing Checkpoint Body Scan Images, 2010 CNET, Aug. 4, 2010 at (2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20012583-281.html.34 Id.35 Id.

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Citizens can choose between TSA’s thorough pat-downs or TSA’s electronic strip-search. No

other choice—except the bus. But on the Grey Hound, your privacy violator probably isn’t kind

enough to wear latex gloves.

2. DHS and License Plate Readers

Although TSA is the “touch point” of the DHS in the lives of most Americans, the DHS

oversees much more than passenger screenings at U.S. airports. Its operations are extremely

broad and, as such, its privacy issues are too. DHS’ “components”—from TSA and Customs and

Border Protection (CBP) to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—monitor a lot of

things and they capture, store, and share a lot of images. There is an emerging DHS practice that

concerns privacy advocates as much as TSA’s use of body scanners. Like airport screening, the

practice involves images of citizens’ backsides. However, the “backsides” at controversy here

are the backs of cars, not people.

When DHS captures an image of the back of a vehicle, it does so to capture the vehicle’s

license plate. License plates function as vehicle owners’ nametags and by capturing license

plates, DHS can determine individuals’ locations—both citizens and non-citizens. DHS utilizes

a technology called License Plate Readers (LPRs) to capture the license plate images. The

technology is so advanced that it captures license plate images of moving vehicles, sometimes at

great distances.36

ACLU calls attention to governments’ increasing use of LPRs saying, “The information

captured by the readers…is being collected and sometimes pooled into regional sharing systems.

As a result, enormous databases of innocent motorists’ location information are growing rapidly.

This information is often retained for years or even indefinitely.”37 Moreover, according to the

36 ACLU, You Are Bing Tracked, How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:23 PM), https://www.aclu.org/alpr37 Id.

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ACLU, the use of LPRs has few, if any, restrictions to protect individuals’ privacy rights.38

Still more disconcerting is DHS’ interest in establishing a national license plate tracking

system that would provide the government with a treasure trove of information that reveals

where innocent and guilty Americans are at all times.39 The proposed license plate database

would be massive and could easily contain over 1 billion records.40 DHS could share these

records with myriad agencies and potentially open the doors for the government to scrutinize the

movements of ordinary citizens.41

According to Jennifer Lynch, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),

DHS’ proposal would “ultimately [create] a national database of location information.”42 And

the networked LPRs would be powerful enough to “track somebody as they’re going through

their life.”43 DHS’ LPRs and database would be huge. In fact, the proposed database would be

the first of its kind—in both size and scope.44 Needless to say that the proposed program raises

significant privacy concerns.45

Just days after releasing a solicitation for bids to begin developing its massive LPR

database, the DHS abruptly canceled its plans.46 Why the cancelation? According to Jeh

38 Id.39 Ellen Nakashima & Josh Hicks, Homeland Security Is Seeking a National License Plate Tracking System, The Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 2014 at 9:33 AM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/homeland-security-is-seeking-a-national-license-plate-tracking-system/2014/02/18/56474ae8-9816-11e3-9616-d367fa6ea99b_story.html.40 Id.41 Id.42 Id.43 Id.44 Jennifer Lynch, Update: National License Plate Recognition Database: What It Is and Why It's a Bad Idea, Electronic Frontier Found., Feb. 19, 2014 at 9:52 AM, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/national-license-plate-recognition-database-what-it-and-why-its-bad-idea.45 Id.46 DHS Cancels Plan to Collect License Plate Data, Fox NewsPol., Feb. 19, 2014 at , http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/02/19/dhs-plan-for-national-license-plate-tracking-

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Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, DHS canceled the solicitation because it was posted

without “the awareness of ICE leadership.”47 Johnson’s reason for the cancelation should

concern privacy advocates. Within hours of DHS’ solicitation, civil liberties groups around the

country began calling attention to the privacy issues of DHS’ proposal. In fact, DHS canceled

the solicitation the day after The Washington Post reported on Homeland Security’s plans.48 One

could suspect that Johnson canceled the program in response to the negative press and public

uproar. I think that’s likely. But Johnson said nothing about the program’s future.

Although DHS managing a national database of license plates is alarming (to say the

least), private companies are quietly amassing billions of license plate reads and storing the data

with little oversight. Seeking to put the brakes on this shadow industry, Utah State Senator,

Daniel McCay sponsored a state bill that would restrict the private collection of LPR data.49

Although the Utah legislation would be a boon to personal privacy, two major LPR firms saw the

issue differently and filed a lawsuit.50 Their suit is seeking a “permanent injunction against the

application or enforcement of the Act.”51 Moreover, the LPR firms claim that the Act violates

the First Amendment because taking photographs is Constitutionally protected, and the Act

would prohibit the firms from taking photographs of license plates in the public.52

There are countervailing Constitutional currents relating to the use of LPRs. On one

hand companies seek to enjoin the government from prohibiting their use of LPRs for First

Amendment reasons, and on the other hand privacy advocates argue that in light of the Fourth

system-raises-privacy-concerns/.47 Id.48 Id.49 Cyrus Farivar, Private Firms Argue First Amendment Right to Collect License Plate Data, Ars Technica, Feb. 14, 2013 at 11:00 AM, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/private-firms-argue-first-amendment-right-to-collect-license-plate-data/.50 Id.51 Id.52 Id.

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Amendment, the government should limit its use of the technology.53

Parties disagree as to whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the government’s use of

LPRs. Although the Fourth Amendment deals with privacy, it does not explicitly outline a right

of privacy; the Amendment simply implies that the right exists.54 Much of the law concerning

individuals’ privacy rights comes from the Court applying the Fourth Amendment in case law.55

A great deal of privacy law comes from Katz v. United States. In that famous case the Supreme

Court articulated a two-part, objective and subjective, privacy rights test.56

In Katz the FBI attached an electronic bug to a telephone booth, which the defendant

routinely used for illegal gambling.57 The FBI recorded the defendant’s conversations, and the

government later used the recordings as evidence to convict the defendant of “transmitting

wagering information by telephone” among other things.58 The defendant challenged his

conviction, and ultimately the Supreme Court held that because the defendant entered the booth

and closed the door, he assumed his conversations were private and would not be “broadcast to

the world.”59 In conclusion the Court held that the “government’s activities in electronically

listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably

relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”60

The Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine resulting primarily from Katz focuses on three

53 Tyson E. Hubbard, Automatic License Plate Recognition: An Exciting New Law Enforcement Tool with Potentially Scary Consequences, Syracuse Sci. & Tech. L. Rep. 1, 9, http://jost.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/automatic-license-plate-recognition_an-exciting-new-law-enforcement-tool-with-potentially-scary-consequences.pdf.54 Id. at 13.55 Id.56 Id.57 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).58 Id. at 349.59 Id. at 353.60 Id. at 353.

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issues: (1) whether an individual had a subjective expectation of privacy (prong one of Katz test);

(2) whether society deems the individual’s privacy expectation as reasonable (prong two of Katz

test); and (3) the relative intrusiveness of the supposed privacy violation.61 Although the privacy

doctrine affirms individuals’ privacy rights in private places, it does little for Fourth Amendment

rights in the public. Under the traditional view of the Katz framework, DHS’ warrantless use of

surveillance technology—like LPRs—fits within the Constitutional doctrine of the Fourth

Amendment because individuals do not have an objectively reasonable expectation to privacy

when driving their cars in public.62

Although the practice of DHS recording the license plates of vehicles is not particularly

intrusive, individuals likely expect that their movements—in aggregate—are private. And if so,

DHS’ proposed national system of LPRs would be counter to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy

rights. Let me explain. Average people—you, me, most of us in society—subscribe to the

“large school of fish safety doctrine;” that is, we expect that many of our actions in public or

private go unnoticed because there are so many of us. When you are in public, you would

rightfully assume that someone is watching each thing you are doing, but you would not expect

someone to watch everything you are doing. So when an individual goes about his/her day, that

person expects that no one is keeping track of everything; therefore, that individual has a

reasonable expectation that the aggregate of his/her actions is private.

DHS’ national LPR network could also violate the objective prong of the Katz test

because society would probably accept that an individual’s public actions—if aggregated

together—should be private. Most people are fine with the government seeing snippets of their

public actions. But few people are fine with the government compiling their actions into a large,

61 Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 281 U. of Ill. J. of Law, Tech. & Pol'y 282, 282-283 (2011) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).62 Id.

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detailed mosaic because that view into their lives would undoubtedly be intrusive.

Constitutional or questionable, many agree that both the LPR technology and DHS’

proposed applications are intrusive. Speaking of the intrusive nature of LPR technology itself,

UT State Senator Todd Weiler, the author of Utah’s LPR bill, said: “this [LPR] technology…can

cut through fog, it can see in the dark, it’s very invasive—it doesn’t matter if you’re going 80

mph. It’s not just a photograph, it’s the direction of travel, time, and GPS location…I think it’s

an invasion of privacy. This technology is very intrusive…”63 And if LPRs are an invasion of

privacy, they are an invasion everywhere. Due to the widespread use of LPRs, the government

—federal, state and local—knows where you are, whether in a large city or in a small town.64

Like many emerging technologies, LPR technology is developing faster than the

associated privacy regulations.65 The existing LPR privacy laws are a patchwork of state and

local regulations.66 In light of the limited legal oversight, many government agencies—from

small counties to DHS—are free to use LPR technology as they choose. And agencies are not

regulating themselves in the public’s best interest. As an example, ACLU compiled data on LPR

usage within 293 agencies; only a fraction had internal policies governing LPR use.67

Before considering a nationwide network of LPRs, lawmakers should make note of the

way LPRs compromise privacy in other countries. For instance, Australia’s active use of LPR

63 Cyrus Farivar, Private Firms Argue First Amendment Right to Collect License Plate Data, Ars Technica, Feb. 14, 2013 at 11:00 AM, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/private-firms-argue-first-amendment-right-to-collect-license-plate-data/.64 Allie Bohm, "Limited Only By the Imagination": The Need for Legal Limits on License Plate Reader Use, Free Future, Protecting Civ. Liberties in the Digital AgeYou Are Bing Tracked, July 19, 2013 at 10:13 AM, https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/limited-only-imagination-need-legal-limits-license.65 Id.66 Id.67 Id.

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technology rightfully concerns many of its citizens.68 Australian critics condemn the LPR

networks as “a Pandora’s box for abuse of power, mistakes and illegal disclosure” because the

network allows the government to “compile an extraordinary amount of data about [individuals].

This includes your name, address, contact details, driving history and license status.”69 David

Jancik, a privacy advocate and critic of Australia’s LPR networks observed that “Innocent people

are increasingly being treated with suspicion due to the tiny chance that some offence [sic] may

be committed.”70 Undoubtedly a lot of people in the U.S. feel the same way about DHS’ strong,

emerging interest in the lives’ of innocent Americans.

Privacy stands at the basis of liberty. Many believe—and far too many accept—that

privacy is dying. As Howard Rheinglod said, “You can’t assume any place you go is private

because…surveillance [is] becoming so affordable and so invisible.” I agree that very few

places are truly private. However, each public stop—although not private itself—is a

brushstroke in the portrait that composes an individual’s private life. When citizens open their

doors and step out into the world, they do not leave the Fourth Amendment behind.

DHS’ proposed national LPR network compromises our Constitutional privacy rights.

DHS’ plan should fail under the Katz privacy test—assuming the test is applied broadly—in part

because individuals have an expectation that the aggregate of their public actions are private.

Moreover, the privacy expectation would be objectively reasonable. As such, the federal

government should not pursue a national LPR network. Furthermore, state and local

governments should ensure that their LPR networks do not compile information on innocent

people going about their innocent lives.

68 Paul Joseph Watson, Homeland Security to Activate 'National License Plate Recognition Database', INFOWARS.com, Feb. 13, 2014, http://www.infowars.com/homeland-security-to-activate-national-license-plate-recognition-database/.69 Id.70 Id.

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In principle, our Founders would abhor the federal government’s pervasive surveillance.

In practice, our watchful, all-knowing, all-powerful government is just steps away from using

advanced technology to monitor most of our public actions. This means that DHS will have the

ability to monitor an innocent individual’s drive from his home to the airport. And after he

arrives at the airport, DHS will use another advanced technology to electronically remove his

clothing. It’s just an administrative inconvenience—while his naked body flickers on a screen.

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