french indochina war

7/30/2019 French Indochina War

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Tonkin: Getting Started

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1. Introduction p.22. Getting Started p.33. The View From Paris p.44. Viet Minh Opening Strategy p.45. Tieu Doan p.66. The Turn Sequence p.67. Viet Minh Setup p.78. The Highlands p.89. The Viet Minh in the Western Highlands p.910. Winning the HighlandsLosing the Game p. 11 11. French Defense of the Western Highlands p.1312. Laos: All In p.1613. Life in The Delta p.1714. France Unleashed p.19

15. Political Objectives p.2216. Replacements p.2217. Step Losses, Eliminated Units and Victory Points p.2318. Combat Results p.2419. Disorganization p.2420. Battle Results p.2621. Combat Tactics p.28


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1. IntroductionWhen I am learning a new game I always reach a point where I have read the rules, set up thecounters, studied the charts and I look at the map and think Okay, now what? Its sort of likewriters block you know the overall goal but taking the first steps can be daunting whenconfronted with the seemingly endless possibilities of the opening move. And it does not helpthat you only have vague understanding of how the rules hang together. Like most gamers, Isimply plunge in and muddle through a practice game or two, reviewing the rules as I go.

I recently did this with Tonkin , designed by Kim Kanger (2 nd edition, Legion Games). It is a fun,well designed game on a slightly unusual topic: French colonial forces vs. the Viet Minh inFrench Indochina,1950-1954. This is not a review of the game, I will leave that to others.Instead, I wanted to share with other gamers how I got through my writers block with Tonkin:my initial impression of how it works, what struck me as the salient factors in the game, andsome basic suggestions on strategy and tactics. And along the way I will point out all the rules

that I broke so that you can learn from my mistakes.

This is by no means expert advice I was not a play tester and my observations are borne of solitaire play, which is prone to all sorts of bias. While I hope that some of what I say is useful toothers learning Tonkin, I expect that much of this will be debunked by others with more insightinto the game. That is fine - if this article inspires a discussion of Tonkin, all the better. One note:I assume the reader has Tonkin and may have even muddled through a turn or two. But I will tryto explain the game mechanics as I go so that if you do not own the game you can follow along.For map references, see http://www.kangerproject.com/tonkin2/

If you wish to send comments directly to me, I can be reached at [email protected].

Happy gaming,Mike HennesseyNYCOctober 2012
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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2. Getting StartedThere are five scenarios in Tonkin but they can be linked together to play a full campaign game.Use the setup for scenario one starting in October of 1950, but instead of stopping at the end of the December 1950 turn as per the rules for scenario one, just continue on to what would be thenext four scenarios until you reach May of 1954 where you use the victory conditions forscenario five to determine a winner. You can play a shorter campaign by stopping on the last turnof any of scenario, using the victory point (VP) threshold for that scenario.

Each scenario has a starting VP total and the Viet Minh (VM) can lower it by eliminating French(FEF) units and taking geographical objectives. Conversely, the FEF can increase the VP levelby inflicting casualties on the VM and controlling the same objectives. In addition, whenreinforcements become available to the FEF, he can bring them in only at the cost of victorypoints. If he defers the reinforcements they are delayed six turns when he once again has theoption to bring them in at the cost of VP (this VP penalty also applies to eliminated FEF units

which are brought back via replacements points). At the end of the scenario if the VP level isbelow a specified threshold, the VM wins. Otherwise, the FEF wins. But draws are possible.

But note that the difference between the starting VP level of a scenario and the cost of acceptingreinforcements is such that if the FEF take all of the reinforcements available in a scenario, theycan do no better than a draw if the rest of the VPs earned and lost balance out. In other words, if the FEF plan on using everything they can get their hands on, then they will have to engage in amore pro-active strategy in order to win.

VM reinforcements are available per the turn record track, but cannot be brought on unless the

VP level has fallen to a certain minimum: 75 VP by turn three, 65 VP by turn nine, and so on. Atfirst I thought this would be a critical driver of the game as the VM would scramble to pushdown the VP level in order to acquire critical reinforcements. But as it turns out, not so much.

The first set of reinforcements are three combat units that each have one strength point. The turnnine reinforcements are three regular regiments and two replacement points. While the VM couldcertainly use them, they are not a game breaker either way. Its not until turn 16 that substantialreinforcements are at stake - including truck transports!

The starting VP level for the first scenario (and the campaign game) is 88 and the VM needs tobring it down to 14 by the end of May, 1954 in order to win. This means that they must earn 74more VP than the French, not an easy task. In this article I will take the vantage point of the fullcampaign as that provides the largest context for discussion. Most of this applies to the shorterversions of the campaign game and the individual scenarios, but perhaps with more or lessemphasis on certain factors.


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But beware of the automatic victory conditions! If the VM ever occupies Hanoi he wins thegame immediately. And if the FEF ever eliminate Ho Chi Minh (personified in the VM HQ unit)it is an automatic French victory.

3. The View From ParisFEF forces have a fixed setup so there is no decision making there. The initiative will belong tothe VM in the first few turns so the French will simply be responding to what the Viet Minh do.Obviously you have to garrison Hanoi at all times. And if the opportunity to kill the Viet MinhHQ presents itself, definitely take the shot. But otherwise just keep in mind that the VP fortaking a hex is dynamic the VP level changes immediately with change of possession. It is nothe who has it first that matters, but he who has it last that wins. This means you can cede someterritory early to consolidate your forces, giving you the opportunity to seize the initiative laterand score enough victory points to deny Ho Chi Minh a seat at the negotiating table in Geneva.

The French start the game in reasonably good shape. They control the Delta, the westernHighlands of Vietnam, and Laos. They have a sizeable forces in both the Delta and on thenorthern border with China at Lang Son (CC-11). They have interior lines of communication, airand navel transport, and a decent amount of firepower. The French can respond to a variety of threats and inflict a great deal of punishment on VM forces.

The only no-brainer first turn move I can recommend regardless of what the VM do is to airliftthe 2/2 RTA out of Lao Kay (Q-7) to someplace useful. Lao Kay has no value to the FEF andabandoning this outpost will not make a difference in terms of controlling the Highlands forvictory points (see discussion below). And because Lao Kay is friendly to the French, if the VM

want to control it they will have to occupy it, which means sending a unit across the board togarrison it for the rest of the game.

4. Viet Minh Opening StrategyThe initial communist setup is fairly fixed, with some units beginning within a space or two of astart hex. This facilitates game play as you dont have to start from scratch in deciding where toput units. The exception is that the VM may place 18 Tieu Doan battalions (each with onecombat factor) one per mobilization cent er in Vietnam and then move them two hexes, theonly rule being that they cannot finish in the same hex as an enemy unit. This was my first rulesglitch: I put a Tieu Doan in I-10 to threaten Lai Chau (K-8), based on the mobilization center inPhong Saly. Unfortunately that is in Laos, so it cannot be used for this initial deployment. Ohwell I will return to the Tieu Doan deployment in a moment.

The VM start with their forces in basically three clusters: a group of regiments on the south coastat Thanh Hoa (R-23), units in the Red River Valley running from Yen Bay (S-12) to Thai


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Nguyen (X-11), and a force in the Eastern Highlands near Dong Khe (CC-8). The basic drama of Tonkin is in coordinating these three clusters to seize real estate and inflict losses on FEF forces.

If the VM consolidates his forces for maximum striking power, then the French will be able to dothe same. And because of their interior lines, they can do this more efficiently than the VM. Inaddition, the VM have a few victory point hexes of their own to protect, so consolidating theirforces on either side of the Delta means ceding easy VP to the FEF. My initial impression fromthe setup is that the VM need to spread the FEF out by attacking on multiple fronts. Not onlydoes this stop the French from concentrating their strength, it allows the VM to maintain theinitiative by keeping the French off balance.

But conversely, attacking everywhere means dissipating ones forces, making them vulnerable toa French counter stroke. The key is to apply enough pressure at multiple points so that the Frenchare spread thin, but have enough strength at the point of contact to survive when he responds in

force. For my initial VM strategy I decided to apply direct pressure at opposite ends of theplaying field.

First, I committed my forces in Thanh Hoa to taking Phat Diem in hex T-22 (10 VP) and thenthreaten Nam Dinh in V-19 (30 VP). At the other end of the Delta, I launched the forces nearDong Khe (CC-8) against the French at Lang Son (CC-11). Historically the VM were able todrive the French from this part of the Highlands by late 1950 and I was also successful. But thatis where I diverged from the historical script. Instead of pushing on to Hanoi for a series of futile(and bloody) assaults like General Giap, I marched through the forest towards the coast and laidsiege to the port cities of Hong Hay (BB-16) and Cam Pha (CC-16) from the relative safety of

the nearby mountains. This cut off the forces in Tien Yen (EE-14) and Mong Cai (HH-13) andput me within reach of Haiphong (Z-17). At 40 VP it is the most important city after Hanoi.

I decided to play defense in the Red River valley, opting to protect the critical supply center of Thai Nguyen (X-11) instead of attacking Hanoi. My reasoning was that if I went after Hanoi theFrench would be willing to temporarily sacrifice Phat Diem or Hong Hay to save the capital. Buthe would not abandon Hanoi for the sake of any other city. In this way I could force the Frenchto split their forces between three places while allowing me concentrate mine on just two.

And as we shall see when we talk about supplies and activations below, bringing pressure to bearis not simply a matter of throwing combat units around you have to support them with material(supply dumps) and leadership (activations). My sense is that the VM do not have the resourcesto support three major offensives at the start of the game so I went with just two thrusts. Butmore on that in a moment.


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Lastly, I decided to pursue a very low cost strategy in Laos and the western Highlands, alongRoute Colonial 6 (RC 6), the road running from Hoa Binh (S-17) to Lai Chau (K-8). There arevictory points to be had, FEF units to be destroyed, and the French can only reinforce this part of the map via air transport. At the cost of a small Viet Minh force I hoped to tie down substantialFrench resources and still earn some victory points. And the Tieu Doan would be perfect for thistype of assignment.

5. Tieu Doan Tieu Doan have four unique qualities. First, they can be absorbed by regular regiments to replacelost steps in the reinforcement phase if they are within two hexes of each other. Second, theirlosses do not count for VP. Third, in the mobilization phase the VM can bring back onedestroyed Tieu Doan for every two VP hexes he holds (rounding up), deploying them within twohexes of a mobilization center in Vietnam (even if occupied by a French force). Fourth, duringthe supply phase at the end of the turn they are always in general supply if they are in Vietnam or

China. This does not count as combat supply, but it is still valuable as units out of general supplycan suffer attrition losses and the VM have no supply centers on the west side of the map. Eitherthey use regular forces and supply dumps in the western Highlands or they use Tieu Doan.

6. The Turn SequenceSpeaking of the reinforcements, mobilization, and supply checks, a brief overview of the turnsequence would probably help those of you who do not own Tonkin. In the reinforcement phaseboth players receive new units, replacement points, and supply dumps. Replacements can bespent to bring eligible units back up to strength (this is where Tieu Doan can be absorbed).

Next is a VM movement phase followed by an FEF movement phase. Then there is a jointoperations phase. During your movement phase you may move all of your units and thesemoving units may overrun defending units. But forces in separate hexes may not combine theirmove or jointly overrun. In the ensuing operations phase the players alternate taking a variablenumber of actions during which they can activate a hex for movement (and thus overruns) ormay declare an assault where multiple forces in different hexes that are already adjacent to anenemy hex may combine for an attack (there is no movement allowed with this type of activation). As one can see, overruns become the principal form of combat.

There is no limit to the number of times a unit can be activated. And you may get up to threeactivations in a row. You can double your movement factors if you do not enter an enemy ZOCor overrun, which means a stack of VM regiments with 9 MF can double move from deep in theHighlands to just outsides Hanoi in one activation and then overrun the capital on the secondactivation. Its these kind of threats that keep the French up at night and why they have to defendHanoi even if there is only a token VM force in the Red River Valley.


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There are other actions a player can take during the operations phase such as removingdisorganization markers, building trenches, etc. After the ops phase, check supply status. Andthat ends the turn. I have glossed over some game mechanics here, so please dont use thissummary as an actual turn outline.

7. Viet Minh SetupThe critical factor in setting up of the Tieu Doan is knowing that the first things that will happenonce the game starts is that depleted VM regiments can absorb them and then the VM will getthe first move. There are two divisions on the south coast within one hex of Thanh Hoa (R-23)that each have a step loss. There are three mobilization centers within two hexes of this startingspace: Nghe An, Than Hoa itself, and Ninh Binh (remember, you can use a mobilization centereven if it is occupied by FEF forces).

Looking north just a few hexes is the mobilization center in Nam Dinh. If you set up a Tieu Doan

within two hexes at T-20, it will be within the two hex absorbing range of a VM regiment inR-22 or S-22 (both of which are within the required one hex setup range of Thanh Hoa). In thisway, both divisions in the south can be brought up to full strength even before the first roll of thedice and you will have two more Tieu Doan available for future loss replacement. Because therewill be some heavy fighting in the south, I put one more Tieu Doan in S-21, two hexes south of Phu Ly (V-18).

I put three Tieu Doan with the VM force near Lang Son - another place that can be counted on tosee some action: BB-10 from Lang Son, AA-13 from Uong Bi and Z-10 from Thai Nguyen. TheTieu Doan in BB-10 will be absorbed right away by the regiment in DD-8 with a single step loss.

In the Red River Valley, I placed three Tieu Doan to shield Thai Nguyen (X-11) by placing themin X-12 (from Phu Lang Thuong, X-14), W-12 (from Vinh Yen, V-14), and V-12 from TuyenQuang (V-11).

Three Tieu Doan went into the western Highlands, within two hexes of the mobilization centersof Lai Chau (K-8), Dien Bien Phu (I-13), and Son La (N-13). The remaining four went in thefollowing hexes, with their corresponding mobilization center in parentheses:Q-17 (Hoa Binh, S-17)R-15 (Phu Tho, T-14)O-8 (Lao Kay, Q-7)R-14 (Yen Bay, S-12)

On the first move they all use double movement towards Tuan Giao (K-2). Units moving westalong RC 6 can still double move when bypassing Na San (N-14) even if they move adjacent.You many not enter an enemy ZOC while using double movement but FEF units do not project aZOC into forest or mountain hexes (I overlooked this rule in my first playing). The idea is to


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mass the Tieu Doan in one hex so that the entire force can overrun using a single activation. Agood spot is K-1, from there they have enough movement factors to overrun Lai Chau (K-8) orDien Bien Phu (I-13), forcing the French to reinforce both right away. And with two consecutiveactivations this force could overrun Na San (N-14). All are VP hexes which will lead to moreTieu Doan mobilizations in future turns. And, to state the obvious, they are VP hexes !

8. The Highlands Speaking of VP hexes, lets look at little more closely at how to earn VP. Ill start with thegeographical objectives (the Highlands, the Delta, victory point hexes, and political objectives)first and then address step losses. Let s start in the Highlands, w here there are 23 communities(towns, villages, and cities). If the VM controls 20 of them, he earns 10 VP. In addition, nineHighland communities are worth an additional 50 VP (the ones marked L are in Laos):

Lai Chau 5

Dien Bien Phu 5Na San 5Nghia Lo 5Hoa Binh 5Lang Son 5Muong Khou (L) 5Luang Prabang (L) 10Xien Khouang (L) 5

At the beginning of the game the VM controls none of the Highland VP hexes and just handful

of the non-VP ones. His main forces are in the eastern Highlands on the Chinese border or in theDelta, far from the western Highlands and Laos. Worse, all of the communities in Laos and thewestern Highlands are friendly to the FEF. This means the VM has to garrison them in order tosatisfy the victory conditions, which will tie up units. Finally, since 5 of the 23 communities arein Laos, the VM will have to take at least two Laotian communities to control the Highlands.


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9. The Viet Minh in the Western HighlandsThe only VM units that can start the game in the western Highlands are the Tieu Doan battalionswith their combat value of one. But these units are very restricted in terms of what they can do inLaos. They can only attack FEF units within one hex of the border and cannot finish a movemore than one hex into Laos. And while they are automatically in general supply anywhere inVietnam, that does not apply in Laos. So it is not a viable strategy to use them in Laos.

The Viet Minh allied Pathet Lao start the game in the mobilization box and the VM can onlybring them onto the board during the reinforcement phase if there are more mobilization centersin Laos under his control than there are Pathet Lao units on the map (all five Laos communitiesare mobilization centers). So, with no Pathet Lao on the map to start the game and the Tieu Doanrestricted to border operations, the VM will have to use his regular regiments if he wants toinvade Laos.

Given that this area of the map is well beyond the three hex radius of the supply centers printedon the map, the VM will have to commit at least one supply dump (SD) to this theatre of operations. Reminder: the VM HQ unit cannot be used as a supply source in the way that theFrench HQ can. And independent VM regiments are in automatic supply only while in Vietnamor China, not Laos.

Unfortunately, supply dumps will slow the pace of operations while his regiments have 9 MF(18 with double movement), a SD has 6 MF (12 with double movement). The principal terrain inLaos is forest, which costs the VM 3 MF per hex, limiting a VM force with a supply dump to 4hexes per double move. And a force cannot overrun while double moving.

It is possible for VM regiments to run ahead of the SD to overrun FEF garrisons. As long as theSD is within three hexes to provide combat supply, there is no -2 combat DRM. But the VMneed to finish their move within three hexes of the SD otherwise it will be out of general supplyat the end of the turn. I actually made this mistake twice the first time I played Tonkin!

Suppose you have a VM regiment in M-20 and a SD in N-24. In the movement phase you doublemove the SD to M-21. The regiment spends 6 MF to reach M-18 and announces an overrun of the FEF garrison in Sam Neua. This uses up his last 3 MF (2 MF to overrun, 1 MF for the terraincost of the hex being overrun). Because the VM regiment in M-18 is within three hexes of theSD in M-21, it avoids the -2 combat DRM for being out of combat supply. You roll the dice andthe overrun is a success. So far, so good.

But, as per the rules, an attacker is required to occupy the hex after a successful overrun. TheVM unit does so, taking Sam Neua. But now the regiment is four hexes from the SD, whichmeans that at the end of it the turn it will be out of supply (OOS) unless it moves back a hex or


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the SD move up. Either way costs an activation. And as you will see, the only thing moreprecious than supply dumps are activations!

This example also illustrates another problem of combat units racing ahead of their supplies. Inthe movement phase you can move all of your units. But in the operations phase, you activateindividual hexes for movement. In this example, the VM regiment and SD would each requiretheir own activation in the operations phase in order to make this work. By keeping combat unitsand SDs stacked together you can economize the expenditure of activation points.

Since I am talking about economizing here, Id l ike to mention hex P-15. In a later playing of the game, I parked a supply dump on this hex and used it on consecutive activations to supply astack of Tieu Doan that overran Na San from O-14 and a VM regiment that overran Sam Neuafrom M-18 (supply dumps are not consumed when supporting overruns). There are other spotson the map where the VM can put a supply dump to support overruns against multiple targets (I-

16 for Dien Bien Phu and Muong Khoua, J-11 for Lai Chau, Phong Saly and Dien Bien Phu,etc.). The only question is whether they need a combat unit to provide security.

SD do not have a ZOC or a combat factor and cannot retreat before combat so an enemy unit thatoverruns them does so automatically without having to expend the extra 2 MF. However, it isstill an overrun, which means that units cannot use double movement to overrun a SD. Thismatters because the FEF garrisons have a MF of 7 and forest hexes cost them 4 MF. Movingalong on a road in the forest costs them 2 MF and along a river 3MF). Thus it is safe to leave asupply dump without a combat unit just two or three hexes from FEF garrisons in Sam Neua orNa San.

Or is it? Suppose the VM uses the movement phase to move a SD to K-17 to support overruns of Na San and Sam Neua in the following operations phase. The FEF garrisons could stay put andfight it out, hoping to inflict a step loss in an exchange. But if the FEF garrison unit is going todie anyway, why not go after that SD? In the FEF movement phase use double movement to getadjacent to the SD, allowed because SDs do not have a ZOC. This will force the VM to waste anactivation to move it out of harm s way.

Even if this allows the VM to take a community uncontested, the now foot-loose FEF garrisonstill has a whole turn to harass the supply dump before being marked Out of Supply. And eventhen it has the movement phase of the next turn to reach a friendly community to get back insupply before it suffers attrition. Supply dumps are critical to the VM in the Highlands and Laos.Given that the loss of said unit would bring operations to a halt for the VM on that side of theboard, it is certainly worth it for the FEF to cede a community he would have lost anyway to takeout a VM Supply Dump.


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The counterpoint to this analysis is that the FEF garrison units are not necessarily doomed: theFrench could airlift in reinforcements, entrench, and make a fight of it. And the VM could sendmore than a single SD into the Highlands so that losing one would not be so costly (and he couldalso send sufficient forces to shield the supply dumps from opportunistic FEF units). But theseare tactical responses that beg the larger question: whats the Highland strategy for both players?

10. Winning the HighlandsLosing the Game? While both sides can earn valuable VP on this section of the map, neither player can win thegame solely by taking the Highlands. But if they overcommit resources to this sector that couldbe better used in the Delta, it could lose them the game. One of my first impressions fromplaying Tonkin is that the key to the Highlands is to force your opponent to over-spend hisresources there while you minimize your own commitment.

All the French have to do to deny the VM control of the Highlands (10 VP) is hold any four

Highland communities. And if three of those include Muong Khou, Luang Prabang, and XienKhouang (the three hardest for the VM to each) thats another 20 VP denied to Uncle Ho. Fromthis perspective, the French could dig in around the Lao capital, devote his resources to theDelta, and leave the rest of the Highland to its fate. The most the VM would get is 30 VP,leaving him 44 short of victory.

And even if the French cede the Highlands in this manner, the VM still has to commit forces totaking it, starting with an attack on Hoa Binh at S-17 and then working his way down RC 6 to NaSan, Dien Bien Phu, and Lai Chau (and dont forget Nghia Lo at R-12, just over the mountains).These first two each have a garrison of 4 CF so the VM will need to commit two regular

regiments with 6 CF each to get a 3:1 (see below for an analysis of combat). After that, the FEFgarrisons have 2 CF, so two regiments might be a bit of overkill. But some of these garrisons areentrenched and it is possible the VM will suffer some exchange results in combat, reducing themby a step or two. So, it would not hurt to have a little extra padding.

Sending some Tieu Doan battalions along with the two regiments invading the Highlands is agood strategy as they can secure the slower moving SD, provide replacements to the regiments asthey take losses, and they can garrison communities as they fall (some of which will generateeven more Tieu Doan units in the ensuing mobilization phases because they are victory hexes).Assuming that the French invest nothing in the Highlands, this force should be enough to get the

job done. But how long will it take?

The supply dump will always double move and it should move at least twice per turn (once in themovement phase and once again during the operations phase). If it originates out of the supplycenter in Thanh Hoa (R-23) it could fuel an overrun on Hoa Binh (S-17) on turn one. Movingwest on RC 6 after that it could be in position to support an overrun of Na San on turn three,


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Dien Bien Phu on turn five, then Lai Chau on turn six. Meanwhile the VM regiments stackedtogether will also move twice a turn. But because they will be initiating overruns about everyother time, they will not be double moving as often. But then again, they wont have to as theyhave 9 MF to the SDs 6 MF and they need to stay within three hexes of each other.

However, six turns to conquer the Highlands might be a bit optimistic, even if the French arecompletely passive. The FEF garrisons may need more than a single attack to be dislodged andgoing over the mountain to Nghia Lo will take some time. In addition, at the start of theOperations Phase both players have the option of expending a supply dump in order to expandthe list of possible actions they may take (the principal one being an assault where forces indifferent hexes can combine for an attack on single hex). But if both players decline to expend anSD, then skip the Ops phase and go straight to the supply phase and the next turn. This ruleneatly captures the lulls in the action that can occur when both sides need to catch their breathand given that the pace of operations will likely be quite frantic at the start of the game, there is

bound to be one such lull somewhere in the first half dozen turns.

With this in mind, the VM should not expect to take the Highlands before turn ten. That leaves28 turns to go in the full campaign game. The five Highland VP hexes will mobilize three TieuDoan a turn. Although there is a theoretical maximum that can be on the board at any time (18 tostart the game), given that VM regiments will be absorbing them to replaces losses, this is not anissue. This means that the Highlands are worth about 85 replacement points to the VM over therest of the game. This is pretty significant - the VM only get 18 replacements the entire game aspart of their scheduled reinforcements. Never mind the VP, the French need to fight for theHighlands to keep this from happening!

Given the replacement points available, should the VM consider committing more forces to theHighlands to bring this benefit forward? If they create a second Highland force (two regiments, asupply dump and a handful of Tieu Doan) to work in parallel with the first force, the VM couldpull the conquest of the Highlands forward a few turns as one force focuses on Lai Chau andDien Bien Phu while the other tackles Na San, Nghia Lo, and Hoa Binh. If they accomplish thistask in half the time, that is five more turns of Tieu Doan mobilizations at the rate of three a turn,for a total of 15 units (each with 1 CF). Each VM regiment has 6 CF, so each force is about 15CF overall. Is it worth tying down another 15 CF for five turns to generate another 15 CF?Maybe. After all, you are not losing those original 15 CF, they will return the Delta eventually.Think of it lending 15 CF to the Highlands for five turns and then having 30 CF for the rest of the game. But can the VM afford this kind of commitment in the Highlands?

At the start of the game, the VM has five divisions on the board, each consisting of threeregiments with 6 CF. That is 90 CF. There are five independent regiments at 5 CF each foranother 25 CF. And there are 18 Tieu Doan at 1 CF a piece. That is about 130 CF (some units


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start with a step loss). A Highland force of 15 CF is about 12% of the VM total. Adding a secondforce of 15 CF means 25% of your army is not available for operations in the Delta.

But the real cost to the VM is in activations. A Highland force will probably need two activationsin the Operations phase because the SD and its security force will probably not be stacked withthe regiments. So two forces would need four of the ten activations per turn. Well, need might be too strong of a word here. But if you go to the effort of putting two forces in the Highlands tocapture the VP hexes more quickly but then dont support th em by allocating the activations theyneed to finish the job quickly, then why bother?

And leaving only six activations for the Delta seems like a mis-allocation of resources. That is,25% of the VM combat strength would be consuming 40% of the command bandwidth. It seemsthat putting two forces in the Highlands might be mistake (I would be interested in hearing whatother gamers think).

Which brings us back to the initial opening move I outlined above where I pursued a low coststrategy in the western Highlands by sending just six Tieu Doan down RC 6 and committing allmy regulars in the south to taking Phat Diem. This Highland force was just too week to make adifference: the best they could do against the Thai garrison in Na San was a 1:1 and the Frenchhad sufficient time to airlift troops into Dien Bien Phu and Lai Chau to produce similar odds. Inmy follow-up games I have added regiment to the western Highlands and so far my insight intothe matter can be boiled down to at least two, but no more than four . And that is all the Frenchneed to know with an eye towards getting the communists to over commit resources here.

11. French Defense of the Western HighlandsI hope you did not think I was serious about the French just giving up the western Highlandswithout a fight and decamping to Luang Prabang! That was just to establish the best the VMcould do when faced with no resistance. And there is plenty the French can do to resist.

First order of business is supply. The negative DRM for not being in combat supply only appliesto attackers, not defenders and the early disposition of forces in the Highlands would suggest anoverall defensive posture for the French. Eventually the French will want to launch a counteroffensive and will need SDs to fuel that. But for now, the main logistical concern for Frenchforces in the Western Highlands is general supply.

Units in trenches are automatically in general supply when checked at the end of the turn so itwould appear that the only vulnerable unit is the garrison at Na San (N-14). But not so it is aThai FEF unit and Thai units are in general supply if they are within three hexes of a friendlyHighland community. But building a trench here will allow you to reinforce with other FEF unitsso that they wont be out of supply, plus the combat benefit.


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But it is important to remember that the French build trenches differently in the Highlands thanin the Delta. In both cases you consume a supply dump and build up to three entrenchments. Thedifference is that if the SD is on a FEF supply center in the Delta you can build your trenchesanywhere in the Delta that you have combat units in supply. But in the Highlands, you can onlyentrench units within three hexes of the SD being spent (but note that if the SD is on an airstrip,then you can entrench any three airstrips on the map at the cost of 1 air transport).

The FEF has two air transports per turn to start and each can move three stacking points of infantry or one SD. In the first FEF movement phase I like to use one air transport to move a SDinto Sam Neua (M-17) and in the ensuing operations phase activate it to entrench Sam Neua andNa San. That leaves the second air transport: what else do you airlift to this side of the map?How much is enough to hold the Highlands? Or better yet, how little is enough?

Tonkin uses limited intelligence in that the FEF can only see the top unit in a communist stack (naturally, the VM can inspect the contents of an FEF force anytime he wants). But you can seelone units until they form a stack so it should be relatively easy to figure out what is going on inthe first turn. The VM have six regular regiments at Thanh Hoa on the south coast. If Phat Diemcomes under attack by that many regiments on the first movement phase then you know that verylittle effort is going into the western Highlands. The key is the 138 th independent regiment thatstarts within two hexes of Hoa Binh (S-17). If it moves south to support the assault on Phat Diemor moves north to bolster the Red River Valley, then the VM is going with just Tieu Doan intothe Highlands and will thus only have six or seven combat factors per attack.

While that is not enough to get 3:1 against Hoa Binh, it is enough for everywhere else. But itonly takes two more combat factors in Na Son, Dien Bien Phu and Lai Chau to drive this downto 2:1 or less. Not that this makes it impossible for the VM to take these communities, just that itcause more losses for both sides and takes longer. And once the Tieu Doan suffer a few losses,the invasion momentum will dry up. Further, since the Tieu Doan cannot invade Laos, if the VMgoes light ly into the western Highlands, the FEF does not have to invest resources shoring upthe Lao defenses (although you might as well build that trench in Sam Neua when you burn thesupply dump to entrench Na San).

If the French use their second air transport to move a single infantry unit into each the threecommunities (member that infantry unit in Lao Kay [Q-7] that should bail on the first move?)then he has a good chance of holding the western Highlands until the VM step up their game andcommit at least two regiments to the cause. If they do, this is something of a win for the FEF your 4 CF from the Delta forces the VM to pull 12 CF from the Delta (I am not counting the FEFunit from Lao Kay because it was in the Highlands already).


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While we are busy earning frequent flyer miles here, one detail of air transport I messed up inmy first playing is that you can only move units between any two friendly occupied airfields. Inmy first game I moved the garrison in Na San up the road to Dien Bien Phu in the movementphase and then airlifted an infantry unit into Na San in the operations phase. You cannot do that

you have to airlift in the unit first and then the garrison can move out.

Back to the 138 th independent regiment: if it moves west along Route Colonial 6, then the Frenchhave another 5 CF to account for in the Highlands. And independent regiments are automaticallyin supply anywhere in China and Vietnam, so it is not going to attrition to death. If a regimentfrom Thanh Hoa joins the fray (it will have to bring a SD), then the FEF are dealing with around16 CF. This is enough to get a 4:1 against any garrison of two infantry units (of 2 CF each). Andit means the invasion force can hit Laos, stretching the French defensive line.

Faced with this force, and a stack of four Tieu Doan near Tuan Giao threatening Dien Bien Phu

and Lai Chau, my response was to airlift three infantry units into Na San so that it had 9 CF,preventing the VM from getting better than a 1:1 (and I entrenched right away). I also had theinfantry unit abandon Dien Bien Phu (I-13) and double move towards Lai Chau (K-8). If it canmake it, the 3 CF in Lai Chau are enough to stop the Tieu Doan from doing better than a 1:1.

So what if the Tieu Doan take Dien Bien Phu uncontested? Yes its 5 VP and half a mobilizationfor the Tieu Doan. But they cannot invade Laos and are not strong enough to do anything else. If the invasion force of regulars continues up RC 6, the French should have enough time to airlift 6CF to Muong Khoua (F-16) to join the 2 CF already there. It has a trench, the minor river adds a-1 combat DRM and since the Tieu Doan will not be available, the best the VM can do is a 1:1.

Instead of going for Muong Khoua, this VM force would be able to take Lai Chau for 5 VP andanother half Tieu Doan mobilization. But then what? If the VM regulars heads back to the Delta,the 8 CF in Muong Khoua can easily strike lowly Tieu Doan garrisons in Dien Bien Phu and LaiChau. So those two VM regiments will have to stick around to secure these VP hexes. And inthat stalemate, who wins?

French garrisons of 9 CF in Na San and Muong Khoua means 18 CF are tied down. For the VM,its about the same (two regiments at 6 CF each plus a few Tieu Doan). But there is no way theVM will be able to take the 20 communities it needs to control the Highlands. If the two VMregular regiments take Hoa Binh and Nghia Lo before marching on Lai Chau, then their max VPon this side of the board is 20, leaving them 54 short of victory. If the VM control the Delta (10VP) and take the VP hexes of Phat Diem (10 VP), Cam Pha (5 VP) and Lang Son (5VP), thatstill leaves them 24 VP short with the only two VP hexes left to fight for being Haiphong (40VP) and Nam Dinh (30 VP). And if a French cannot hold the 20 or so hexes that connect thesetwo cities with Hanoi, then what good is he anyway?


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This assumes that the French will target a hex with an airstrip. Since there are eight airstrips inthe western Highlands, this seems reasonable. Which means that the cost of garrisoning all thesehexes against air assaults would be quite high. The maximum air assault strength the French canmuster is 9 CF (three para at 3 CF a piece), so the VM would have to commit at least 4 CF toeach airstrip to prevent the FEF from getting better than a 2:1. That is 32 CF doing nothing.Holding 9 CF of elite French troops in reserve on an airstrip in the Delta to tie down almost fourtimes as many combat factors in the Highlands seems like a good deal for the French. Perhapsthis is why I have yet to try the all in strategy in Laos as the VM pla yer.

But if I do try this in my next playing, the general outline of the strategy is to move all theregulars and some SD from Thanh Hoa west along row 24 towards Xieng Khouang (F-1). Thiswould be a strong force of 25 CF and the French would have to commit serious resources toshoring up the Lao defenses. The 138 th independent regiment and what ever else I can spare fromthe Red River valley moves south to secure the supply base at Thanh Hoa. The VM force on the

Chinese border push the FEF out of Lang Son and drives on Cam Pha. Hopefully the need tomeet the dual threat to Haiphong and Laos (plus the ever present need to protect Hanoi) willprevent the French from launching a drive on Thanh Hoa or the Red River Valley.

13. Life in The DeltaThe Delta is the clear / forested terrain of Vietnam that stretches from the ocean inland to therough terrain. If the VM can control 10 Delta communities he earns 10 VP. And there are sevenvictory hexes here worth another 100 points. The VM start with control five communities andthree victory hexes worth15 VP so their strategy revolves around protecting what they havewhile looking to get more, with Haiphong at 40 VP being the big prize. Well, Hanoi is the big

prize as it is an automatic victory should the VM ever occupy it.

Previously I outlined a VM strategy of pushing the FEF out of Lang Son and driving towardsCam Pha, holding in the Red River Valley while the forces near Thanh Hoa attack Phat Diem inthe south. With that basic approach in mind, lets look at French strategy in the Delta.

First, I would not bother trying to deny the VM control of 10 communities in the Delta, at leastnot at the start. There are 29 communities in play and most of them are VM friendly so thatunless the FEF occupy them they atomically become VM controlled. And the VM start with fivealready under control.This means the French would have to garrison 20 hexes to prevent the VM from taking fivemore. And it is not like the French can create a perimeter to keep VM out as the Tieu Doan canbe placed within two hexes of any mobilization hex, even if it is enemy occupied. A quick glanceat the map shows that about 80% of the Delta is within two spaces of a mobilization hex, so theTieu Doan can pop up just about anywhere that really matters.


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It would tie down quite a few units to garrison those 20 hexes, units that could be better usedelsewhere. Worse, the French would have to spread them pretty thin in order to cover this manyspaces, probably no more than a single unit per hex. Such garrisons would make ideal targets foropportunistic VM regiments raiding from the Highlands that can overrun a colonial battalion at5:1, get the victory points for killing an FEF unit, and return to the safety of the forest. The VietMinh can play that game aaaalllll daaaaay .

Instead, as the French I focus on securing the Inner Triangle first and look to take the initiativelater. The Inner Triangle is the space bounded by the roads that connect Hanoi, Haiphong andNam Dinh. Lose control of this and you lose the game.

The first line of defense is to push the perimeter out. For Haiphong this means holding ontoUong Bi (AA-15) and Hong Hay (BB-16). In the south, Phat Diem (T-22) can screen Nam Dinh(V-19). But the Hanoi perimeter is a little harder to extend as moving north of Vinh Yen is to

essentially invade the Red River Valley. There is something to be said for the idea that the bestdefense is a good offense, but lets not get ahead of ourselves here! We will come back to the RedRiver Valley once we secure the Inner Triangle.

For now, it is essential that the FEF hold Vinh Yen V-14 and W-14 as VM forces in these twohexes can assault Hanoi while drawing combat supply from Thai Nguyen. The max strength of aVM force attempting an overrun is 25 CF, so keep these hexes entrenched with at least 9 CF toprevent the VM from getting better than a 2:1. Include an armor unit or paratrooper to get themorale bonus in combat and for the disorganization DRM (see the combat example below).

A VM attack on Hanoi from the south is less of a threat. If the VM regulars from Thanh Hoamarch north they will have to double move in one activation (which means they cannot overrun)and then overrun in the next activation. While they would have sufficient MF to attempt overrunson Ha Dong in Hanois southern suburbs, they would not have sufficient MF to overrun Hanoiitself. At best they would be able to overrun Hanoi on the third activation. And because that willtake 5 of the 9 MF, they can only attempt one such attack per activation. In other words, it wouldbe very difficult to surprise the French with a lighting strike from the south. And since three isthe maximum number of steps that can be lost in a single round of combat, no matter how weak the garrison is in terms of CF, if the French keep four steps worth of combat units in Hanoi, hecan guarantee that it will not fall in a single attack.

Another problem with a thrust from the south is that it leaves the supply center at Thanh Hoaunprotected, making it vulnerable to the French forces in Nam Dinh. And because a forceattacking from the south will be out of the range of any supply center, the VM will have toinclude a SD, which reduces its mobility.


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In my first playing of Tonkin, as the French I dug in at Lang Son (CC-11). I inflicted somecasualties on the VM but eventually had to retreat in disorganization with several units havinglost a step. But in my second playing I simply abandoned the Chinese border on the first moveand pulled everyone back to the Delta, moving south on RC 4 to Cam Pha and Hong Hay. I alsodouble moved the garrisons from Mong Cai (HH-13) and Tien Yen (EE-14) to Uong Bi (AA-15)

This was a radical move as it meant abandoning some supply dumps (which are immobile) andsurrendering a victory point hex (Lang Son) without a fight. But it also meant that I could secureHaiphong, free up units to support the other two legs of the Inner Triangle, and airlift a few unitsfrom the Delta to the western Highlands to blunt the VM advance down RC 6. In addition, MongCai and Tien Yen are FEF friendly, which means they are the rare communities in the Delta thatthe French can abandon that will not automatically flip to VM control.

With the Inner Triangle relatively secured, the French can think about semi-offensive strategies

to knock the VM off stride. I say semi -offensive because the French does not need to getcarried away. The burden of action is on the VM to earn enough VP to win the game. From thatperspective, French can pursue the old adage that the best defense is a good offense in anopportunistic manner. Lets look at four possible French strategies in this vein.

14. France UnleashedThe first French offensive strategy to consider is choking off the flow of men and material intoFrench Indochina by controlling the northern border with China. This has intuitive strategicappeal and is what the French tried historically - that is why they start the game camped out atLang Son. But this strategy failed in 1950 and the game well illustrates why.

There is just too much ground to cover and the terrain is unfriendly to the French, who are morelikely to become disorganized when attacking in forest hexes. They move slower than the VM asit costs them 4 MF to march through forest hexes while the VM only pay 3 MF. And since FEFSD are nearly immobile, once you airlift them to a hex, it anchors that force to a three hex tether.

Worse, the French are leaning into the punch here. There are two VM supply centers just acrossthe border in China, which means VM forces can overrun without needing SD. The VM canrebuild depleted units right on the front lines and they can retreat into the sanctuary of China,where FEF units cannot tread. You simply could not pick a worse place to pick a fight with theVM and that is why I abandon the Chinese border on the first move and never look back.

The second offensive front for the French to look at is the Red River Valley. Historically the FEFdrove into this region with some initial success before getting bogged down and suffering criticalreverses. Again, operating far from their supply centers in rough terrain is not very attractive forthe French. But there is one target the French should consider here: Thai Nguyen (X-11).


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Thai Nguyen allows VM forces to attack Hanoi while in combat supply and can be used to bringon reinforcements. And its a victory point hex that controls the road network in the Highlands.If the French can take Thai Nguyen they go a long way to securing Hanoi while putting a dent inthe VM ability to maneuver on this part of the map. Even better, Thai Nguyen is within combatsupply range of Hanoi, meaning FEF units can overrun without a negative DRM. On top of that,there is actually a clear terrain hex the French can attack from, reducing their chances of

becoming disorganized. Given Thai Nguyens importance and the fact that it is within reach, Iwould make it my first choice for a French offensive.

The only caution is to not get greedy. If you take Thai Nguyen (not a given as the VM will putup a fight) it might be tempting to go after Tuyen Quang and the rest of the Red River Valley.But the terrain gets tricky, the supply line gets longer, the captured communities need to begarrisoned, etc. All of which extends French forces and makes them vulnerable to the VM.. As

tempting as it might be, I would be reluctant to push beyond Thai Nguyen.

Third on the list of offensive targets to consider is Thanh Hoa (R-23), the southern version of Thai Nguyen. It is victory hex, can bring on VM reinforcements, and is a source of combatsupply for VM attacks on Phat Diem and Nam Dinh. But the French can strike at Than Hoa andstill be in supply via Nam Dinh, kill a few units, and deny the VM 5 VP. From there it becomesdifficult for the VM to get regular units into the southern part of the map, allowing the French toreduce his defense of Nam Dinh and commit those forces elsewhere.

Fourth is Laos. While not part of the Delta, devoting some resources here at the right moment

can force the VM to respond in kind, easing the pressure on the Delta. The French will want toreinforce a few garrisons in Laos and the western Highlands to blunt VM forays. At some pointhe should airlift a few units and a SD into one of the forward camps to overrun a VP hex or two.For example, Sam Neua can be used to attack Na San.

For each of these strategies, the French should bear in mind the potential contribution of airassaults landing three paratroopers on Thai Nguyen or Thanh Hoa in the movement phase andsuccessfully overrunning either (and then airdropping a SD on the hex) is certain to derailwhatever plans the VM had for the turn. And as discussed above, VM controlled VP airstrips inthe western Highlands garrisoned with a single Tieu Doan are just ripe for the picking.

The key here is to realize that air assaults can be used to support your strategy, but are not astrategy unto themselves. What makes an air drop on Thanh Hoa viable is that you can useground troops from Phat Diem or Nam Dinh to consolidate these positions in the operationsphase. Without such follow-up support, the paratroopers will be battered by VM regimentsdesperate to re-take these vital hexes. If you are not in a position to coordinate an air assault with


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your ground forces, then dont bother distracting the VM for a turn or two at the cost of yourparatroopers is not worth it. Think Dien Bie n Phu.

And what about the western Highlands, where follow-up ground support is not really viable?Again, its not the air assault that counts, its what you do next that matters. In this case, overrun adistant airfield, airlift in a regular infantry battalion with a SD, entrench, and bring the para back to Hanoi for its next mission. This will drive the VM nuts as he will have to devote resourcesbacktracking through the Highlands to re-take these VP airstrips while the FEF eyes his nexttarget of opportunity.

The exception to all of this talk about supporting the strategy is using air assaults to gain anautomatic victory. If the VM is sloppy and leaves his HQ unit lightly defended in a rough orclear terrain hex anywhere on the board, it is worth paying a surprise visit with the paratroopersto see if you can win the game outright.

Its important to remind the FEF player that there are only two airstrips in the Delta that he cancount on using throughout the game, Hanoi and Haiphong (Hoa Binh may fall to the VM at somepoint). To keep the VM on his toes, you need to keep a few paras and a SD in either city inexcess of what is necessary for securing them from a VM attack. In other words, if the only troops you have in Hanoi are two para units, then you really dont have a credible air assaultcapability and the VM will know it.

Ill close this section on the Delta with a tactical suggestion for the VM player and a reminder forthe French player. One advantage the French posses in the Delta is their interior lines. Hanoi is 6

MF from Haiphong and 5 MF from Nam Dinh. Haiphong and Nam Dinh are 4 MF apart. Theslowest FEF units have 7 MF, which means that any of these cities can reinforce each other witha single activation in the operations phase. But not if there is a Tieu Doan blocking the road.

Tieu Doan can be placed within two hexes of a mobilization hex, of which there are many in theInner Triangle. While they only have a single combat factor, it costs two MF plus the cost of terrain to overrun. Further, you cannot use road movement for an overrun, so if that pesky TieuDoan is occupying a river hex, the FEF will have to pay an additional one or two MF. And thereare only two hexes in the Inner Triangle that do not have rivers. You cannot double movethrough an enemy ZOC, so going around them is not really an option. All of which means that itwill be impossible for the French to shift their units between these cities in a single movement if a Tieu Doan is clogging the roads. As part of an overall strategy, the sacrifice of a Tieu Doan inthis manner can pay big dividends.

Consider VM pressure in the south. The VM could mobilize a Tieu Doan in Vinh Bao and HungYen and then overruns Nam Dinh. Assume he inflicts some losses on the French garrison and


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disorganizes it. In the Operations phase, the French roll two activations (about average). Ideallythey would spend one activation removing the disorganized marker and use the second to sendreinforcements from Haiphong. But with a Tieu Doan blocking the road at X-18, the French willnot be able to do both and will have to choose between reinforcing and reorganizing. To addinsult to injury, if the French decide to reinforce, the eliminated Tieu Doan will not count on theVM losses track for VP as only regimental losses count there.

The final note for the French is to remember that when you spend a supply dump to build threetrenches in the Delta, you can build them wherever you have combat forces. It is only in theHighlands that have to build them within three hexes of the supply dump (the VM can buildtrenches within three hexes of a supply dump or supply center across the board).

15. Political ObjectivesEach scenario has two political objectives on the map, one specified by the setup and the other

chosen by the VM. Both are marked with a counter but only one is real, the other is fake. Andonly the VM knows which is which. At the end of the scenario if he controls the real objectivethe VP level is lowered by five. If not, the VP level increases by five. In the campaign game,these objectives are re-set and VP calculated five times for a total of 25 possible VP.

Given the open ended nature of choosing these objectives and the fact that which ones areselected by the VM player will depend on the game situation, I just dont have any insight onhow to pick them. I mention political objectives only in the context of estimating VP levelsneeded for victory. Since only the VM knows which one is real, he will have the inside track onseizing the correct one so I will assume that he achieves this objective four out of the five times,

with a net result of lowering the VP level by 15.

16. ReplacementsEach turn there is a fixed replacement /supply dump allotment. The VM may choose betweentwo SD, four replacement points, or a single SD and two replacement points. The FEF can tradeoff between six replacements, one SD and four replacements, or two SD and two replacements.

The way the numbers stack up, if the VM can inflict even a few casualties on the FEF every turn,the French will have to choose between SDs and replacements. And if the French choosereplacements, his ability to entrench or launch offensives will be diminished. On the other side of the coin, the VM receives Tieu Doan units in the mobilization phase that can be used asreplacements. And when the VM take a hex after combat, if the battle result was Ex-DL or 2DLthey add one to their replacement track. These two game mechanics allow the VM to minimizethe need to choose to between SDs and replacements as long as the casualty rate is only a fewsteps per turn.


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Each turn the VM counts the number of VP hexes he controls and receives half that amount(rounded up) in Tieu Doan. If he has seven such hexes, he will receive four Tieu Doan, whichmeans that during the replacement phase he can take two replacements and effectively match theFrench maximum of six and still take a supply dump . Its a minor advantage on an incrementalbasis but over the course of the game can give the VM a decisive edge. The VM start withcontrol of three VP hexes and should make it four early in the game with the capture of LangSon. Denying the VM that seventh VP hex is something the French should keep track of.

17. Step Losses, Eliminated Units and Victory Points

One clarification: VP are earned for all step losses, not just combat losses.

VM regimental losses are marked on a track and when they reach ten the VP level increases byfive. The math here is easy each VM step is worth half a victory point. When FEF units with

one or two steps are eliminated the VP level decreases by one. Larger units (three and four steps)push the VP level down by two. So each FEF step is also worth about half a VP. But as withmany things in Tonkin, its not quite that simple.

Each regimental step loss for the VM is irreversible in terms of its impact on winning the game.It may take a while for those losses to show up in the VP column, but sooner or later they will.The same cannot be said for French losses: the VP level is reduced only if a unit is actualltyeliminated. This is a crucial difference, one the French should try to exploit where possible.

Consider a stack of FEF units worth six steps that is overrun by a VM forces of ten steps. The

result is an exchange and each side loses a step. The VM repeat the attack and get the sameresult. The VM regimental loss track now shows two steps lost while two FEF units are flippedto indicated they have each lost a step. During the next French activation he activates the hex andwithdraws the reduced units back to a French supply center. During the next reinforcement phasehe spends two replacement points to bring them back up to full strength. If this cycle is repeatedfour more time, the VM regimental loss track will reach ten and the VP level will increase byfive. But no French units will have been eliminated so no adjustment to the VP level will takeplace despite the fact that both sides have taken identical losses!

The French may not always be able to move reduced units out of harm s way in time. And evenif they do, the FEF may not have the replacement points to restore all of his damaged unitsbefore they have to fight their next battle, putting them at risk of being eliminated. But consideran average turn where t he VM conducts two overruns in the movement phase . Lets assumeaverage results for each battle, exchanges in which both sides lose a step. In the Frenchmovement phase he conducts an overrun. During the operations phase the VM devotes seven of his ten activations to movement (but no assaults) and four of these include overruns. The FEF


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use his activations to move units, build trenches, barrage, and remove disorganized markers,conducting a single overrun. Thats seven overruns total, resulting in seven loses per side.

After three average turns the VM will have suffered about 20 step losses and the VP level willincrease by 10. If the French are able to spread his losses out so that none of his units areeliminated, the French will not lose any VPs, giving the FEF a 10 VP advantage. However, asstated, it will be tough for the French to juggle his losses so that not a single unit is eliminated. Inthat context, a conservative French player might plan on only being able to earn a 5 VPadvantage every few months by diligently managing his losses.

I will be the first to admit that is an fairly abstract analysis, one that can be hard for a Frenchplayer to use a source of strategy. But even allowing for lulls in the action in which fewer lossesare taken, the point is that turns of average combat intensity where each side takes about thesame number of losses can be a 2:1 advantage in VP for the French if they are able to rotate their

depleted units back to supply centers for replacement points. And it is this dynamic that informsthe VM need for sustained pressure on a given target.

Simply put, the VM should lean towards multiple attacks in a row on a single target with an eyetowards depleting, disorganizing and destroying FEF units rather than spreading his attacks outacross the map. If the VM gets three activations in a row during the Operations phase he couldlaunch overrun attacks on Phat Diem, Lang Son and Hanoi. It is doubtful that any one of thethese will destroy an FEF unit. Yes, he will inflict losses but the French can withdraw thedepleted units out of the line of fire in his next activation. But if the VM hammers three straighttimes a Phat Diem, he has a much better chance of destroying a unit and thus taming the VP ratio

for combat losses.

18. Combat ResultsThere are two die rolls for each battle. First you roll for losses then you roll for disorganization.And the disorganization result can lead to more losses. Combat losses are pretty uncomplicated.In an exchange (EX) each side loses a step. An EX-AL is the same as an EX except that theattacker loses an extra step. And an EX-DL does the same to a defender. You can guess wholoses what with a 2AL or 2DL result.

19. DisorganizationBoth players then roll one die for disorganization (defenders in a trench -1, if any unit in thestack has a morale of 5+ you get a -1 DRM, terrain mods, etc.). If the defender took any lossesand becomes disorganized and the attacker is not disorganized, the defender will take anadditional step loss if he does not retreat. L ets call this a D-Loss for Disorganization Loss to differentiate it from a combat loss. If the defender chooses to retreat he does not suffer this D-Loss. And the defender can reduce his combat losses by one if he retreats a hex.


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For example, suppose a defender suffers a 2DL result and becomes disorganized while theattacker does not. If the defender chooses to retreat, the two step combat loss is reduced by oneso that it suffers only a single step loss. But if it stands, then it suffers the full two step combatloss and the D-Loss for a total of three steps lost. Note that a 2DL result where both sides aredisorganized the defender could refuse to retreat and suffer just the two step combat loss.

The interplay of retreating and loss taking can make for some difficult decisions. If you occupy ahex that you want to deny your opponent (like Hanoi!) then your casualty rate can double fromone to two during exchanges (the most common result) if you become disorganized and theattacker does not. Another problem is supply dumps because they cannot retreat. A stack with aSD can retreat but it has to leave it behind. Or it can stay put and take the extra loss.

It quickly becomes apparent when setting up your defenses, not only do you want to create a

strong enough force to deny you opponent a high odds attack, you want to reduce your chancesof becoming disorganized. That means building trenches. And if you are the French, then you arelucky because only you have units in the game with a morale of five. And remember that whenyou include an armor unit in a stack, any one unit (including fellow armor units) will have theirmorale raised by one for all purposes. That infantry battalion with a morale of four suddenlybecomes a five with a tank company in the neighborhood.

Once I understood the impact of disorganization, I had a new found respect for barrages. InitiallyI was skeptical of bothering with such attacks as a quick review of the barrage table shows thatthey are not likely to inflict any losses, but they do consume activations and supplies. While

causing a step loss might be hard to do, its not hard to disorganize an enemy stack. And once youhave rendered that result on a defending unit (especially in a trench) you have greatly increasedyour odds of inflicting extra losses (or forcing a retreat). Conversely, if you are defending againstan adjacent enemy force that is making a major push on your position, a barrage that disruptsthem will eliminate the need to decide between taking extra losses and retreating.

However, when it comes to retreating there is one interesting wrinkle that benefits the VM: if they take a hex via a Ex-DL or 2DL result they add one step to their replacement track. This isone of the interesting asymmetries of the game the French do not get this benefit when theytake a position. In some cases the French may want to stay put and absorb the loss just to denythe replacement point to the VM. Given that the FEF have a higher replacement rate per turn,this is a practical consideration.

Lets look at the statistics to shed some light on disorganization. Exchanges are neutral in thateach side loses a step. The disorganization table under the exchange result shows that either sidebecomes disorganized on a roll of four or higher on a single die. This means that each side has a


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50% chance of becoming disorganized and a 50% chance of remaining in good order. So far theresults seem pretty equal for both sided.

But the chance of two separate events happening together is the percentage chance of eachoutcome multiplied against each other. For example, in an exchange there is a 50% chance thedefender will become disorganized. And there is a 50% chance the attacker will not becomedisorganized. Thus the percentage chance of both of these outcomes occurring is 50% x 50% =25%. Thus, even though the losses in an exchange are the same for both sides, there is only a25% chance that the defender will suffer the additional penalty of having to take an extra lossunless he retreats.

Now look at what happens when the defender is a French unit with a morale of five in a trench.This is good for a -2 modifier on the disorganization roll, meaning the French will only becomedisorganized on a 6. That is one sixth of the time, or 16%. The percentage chance of the defender

becoming disorganized while the attacker remains in good order during an exchange drops from25% to 8% because 50% x 16% = 8%.

20. Battle Results Take a look at the table below. This is the percentage chance of rolling this number with twosixed dice. The CRT in Tonkin uses a range of die roll numbers to determine battle results. Toget the percentage chance of a specific outcome for given set of odds simply add together thepercentage chances of rolling all of the results that would yield that outcome.

Die Roll Combinations

Possible

Total

Combinations

Percentage

Chance

Percentage of Rolling

This Number or Less2 1 36 3% 3%3 2 36 6% 9%4 3 36 8% 17%5 4 36 11% 28%6 5 36 14% 42%7 6 36 17% 59%8 5 36 14% 73%9 4 36 11% 84%10 3 36 8% 92%11 2 36 6% 98%12 1 36 3% 100%

For example, an attack at 2:1 will result in an exchange on a roll of 6-9. There is a 14% chanceof rolling a six, a 17% chance of a seven, a 14% chance of getting an eight, and an 11% for anine. So the chance of rolling an exchange is 14 + 17 + 14 + 11 = 55%. On the other hand, a 5:1has only a 25% chance of getting an exchange (6% + 8% + 11%). The last column is thepercentage chance of rolling that value our less. If you need to roll a 4 or less, that is 17%.


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But this does not take into account die roll modifiers. Suppose you attack a unit in a trench at2:1. This terrain effect subtracts two from the die roll so that you will get an exchange on a rollof 8-11 instead of 6-9. There is a 39% chance of that outcome. But your chance of getting thedreaded 2xAL result jumps from 9% (by rolling a three or less) to 28% by rolling a five or less.And a 2xAL result all but guarantees a disorganized attacker.

I dont want to get too crazy calcul ating percentage outcomes here, I just wanted to provide aframework to estimate the chances of winning a given battle. But there is one observation worthmaking about the CRT. In general, most gamers expect to win a battle if they can get 3:1 odds.The on ly outcomes that can clearly said to be wins for the attacker are EX-DL and 2xDL. Withno die roll mods, an attacker wins at 3:1 by rolling eight or higher. But there is only a 41%chance of getting that result as a 3:1 attack has 59% chance of getting an exchange or worse.And since we have seen that exchanges result in D-Losses for the defender only 25% of the time,

I can t call an exchange a win for the attacker.

Now take a look at a 1:1 battle in which the attacker has a +3 DRM, the maximum allowed. Herehe gets an EX-DL or 2xD result on a roll of eight or more. That is just as good as attacking at 3:1with no die roll mods.

For example, suppose the VM activates a hex with a few VM regular regiments (one of whichhas a morale of four) and overruns a trench with several FEF units with a morale of three. Theodds are 1:1. The VM unit is within three hexes of a supply dump so it does not suffer a -2 DRMfor being out of combat supply. The trench is a -2 DRM but the VM gets a +1 for the morale

differential and there is a +1 for French incompetence in early 1951 so those two balance out.The VM declares Bolshevik Spirit and gets to roll one die, using that result as a combat DRM.The average die roll is 3.5 but the max combat DRM is -3 or +3 so assume that the VM gets +3.Suddenly this 1:1 attack has just as much chance of succeeding as a regular 3:1 attack.

Conversely, a 5:1 with no DRMs has zero percent chance of a getting a 2XAL result. Butsuppose the attacker does not have combat supply and the defender is in a trench. Both of thoseare a negative 2 DRM and there are no positive DRMs for the attacker. So that tops out at -3DRM. Now a roll of 2 or 3 is a 2XAL result. And there is a 9% chance of that happening.

The take away here is obvious: you can t just count combat factors, you have to take into accountDRMs. And that means tracking terrain modifiers, morale differentials, combat supply, Frenchincompetence and monsoons. And then there is the wildcard, Bolshevik Spirit.

It costs the VM one extra step in combat losses to use Bolshevik Spirit, getting a DRM of plus orminus 1D6 in return. But the maximum DRM possible after all mods have been totaled is three.


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Suppose the VM are attacking a French unit early in the game at 3:1 and the VM have a onemorale point advantage. This works out to a +2 DRM. The best the VM can get by expending astep for Bolshevik Spirit is another +1 DRM because the maximum DRM is -3/+3. This is anexpensive way to buy a single DRM for a battle the French do not have much chance of winningin the first place. In this case, the automatic step loss for using Bolshevik Spirit is something of agift to the French.

On the other hand, suppose a stack of VM units attack an entrenched French position at 2:1 withthe DRMs working out to -2. Using Bolshevik Spirit here makes sense as the single step loss hasa 33% chance of changing this from a -2DRM to a +3DRM. And as we have seen above, a +3DRM is as good as column shift (or two). Yes, you lose a step for employing the Spirit. But thebetter combat results might lower the combat losses you otherwise would have taken, so this isprobably a wash.

21. Combat TacticsI had quite a few a -ha moments in my first playing of Tonkin and many of them revolvedaround combat. Its not a complicated system by any means but there are several game mechanicsthat will conspire to punish a lazy gamer (or a bold beginner). Lets look at a few of these.

First, keep in mind that when you move a stack in the movement phase or activation phase, it canoverrun but it cannot combine with forces in other hexes. You can only combine separate forcesby declaring an assault in the activation phase, in which case all the units already adjacent to anenemy hex may combine to attack. This is worth emphasizing - there is no movement in anassault activation . The obvious point here is that if you want to assault a hex you have to move

everyone into place first and attack second.

For example, in the first movement phase of the first VM turn I moved the six regular regimentsfrom Thanh Hoa towards into two hexes adjacent to the FEF forces in Phat Diem (T-22). Seeingthis, the French could elect to withdraw or reinforce in his movement phase, knowing that theVM will get the first activation in the operations phase. In my game, the French reinforced. Inthe operations phase I declared an assault and activated both stacks for a combined attack onPhat Diem.

Another aha moment was having to unlearn the standard gaming convention that when youattack a unit in your ZOC, you have to attack all the enemy occupied hexes in your ZOC. This isnot required in Tonkin and can have serious implications for the defense of Hanoi as aninterlocking set of ZOCs from a bunch of infantry battalions adjacent to the city does not effectively double the defensive strength of the perimeter. A VM force can move adjacent to twoFEF occupied hexes and attack just one of them while ignoring the other.


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Stacking is limited to 13 stacking points. VM regiments have stacking value of three and acombat factor of six. This means that the max strength of an overrunning VM force would be 24,plus a Tieu Doan (one step) for a total of 25 CF. Knowing that, the French will want 9 CF atcritical defensive positions so that the best a VM overrun can get is 2:1.

Actually, I would suggest 10 CF. The most likely result of a 2:1 attack is an exchange and thatmeans a 25:9 becomes 24:8 in the next combat, which is now a 3:1. By starting with 10 CF, theFEF can stay ahead of the odds for three exchanges as a 24:9 becomes a 23:8 and then a 22:7. Itis likely that will you have a chance to reinforce your position (or withdraw) before the VM canmount a fourth consecutive attack.

Another tactic to consider is the VM two step. Suppose a VM force launches an overrunagainst an FEF hex and the French retreat in order to reduce their losses. The VM take the hexand are thus allowed to keep moving. Lacking sufficient MF to execute another overrun, it goes

back to its original hex and ends its move there so that at the start of the next French activation itis not adjacent to an FEF force.

This matters because the French can only barrage VM forces that are already adjacent to his units(there is no movement in a barrage activation ). The VM two step forces the French spend amovement activation to put a unit adjacent to his force in order to barrage it in the secondactivation. By pulling back after wining an overrun, the VM has doubled the activation cost for the FEF to barrage this stack.

Lets take a look at different kind of tactic, one where discretion is the better part of valor. By

retreating, the defender can reduce his losses by one. In a series of battles resulting in exchanges,a defender can maintain his original strength while the attacker will lose a step in each round of combat. Trading a hex of terrain for a step loss advantage over several battles can pay dividendsas the attacker will eventually attrition himself into less attractive combat odds. For example, twoVM regiments (12 CF) attacking a FEF force of 6 CF is a 2:1. After an exchange in which theFrench retreat, the VM can do no better than 11:6 or 1:1.

Finally, lets consider ambushes. This is available only to the VM and only on defense (the VMcan ambush anywhere on the board - initially I had thought they had to be in forest hexes to dothis). Select an FEF unit from the attacking stack as the target, select a VM unit as the ambushunit, and roll 1D6. If the result is equal to or greater than the FEF unit s morale, it takes a steploss and becomes DG. And on a 6, the VM ambush unit loses a step.When should you ambush and which units should you target? The short ans wers are alwaysand it depends. Okay, maybe not always . Take advantage of your intelligence advantage toexamine the FEF stack. You have a 16% chance of losing a step yourself, but since a six will


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also guarantee a step loss to the French, it usually wont effect the subsequent combat odds if thathappens, as your losses will be equal. But beware of a few break points where it will matter.

For instance, if the FEF has 23 to 8 and you each lose a step, that French 2:1 just became a 3:1.Other break points to look out for are 14 to 5 and 8 to 3. In those situations I am reluctant toambush because losing a step and giving the French a column shift is just too much to give awayin exchange for making a unit DG and inflicting a step loss.

As for which unit to ambush, this is a tough call. Going after a paratrooper with its morale of fiveis very attractive. The French are probably going to use that unit for its morale advantage to gaina DRM in combat and for the modifier on the subsequent DG role. So bringing that morale downfrom five to four is probably more important than the single combat factor the French will lose.And there is a 33% chance of getting that result.

But there are two considerations for picking on a lower value unit, one with a morale of four orthree. First, your chances of a successful ambush go from 33% to 50% to 66%. And that means aunit in the attacking stack is DG. Which in turn means that you, as the VM, do not have to takelosses instead of retreating if you become DG yourself. If you are defending a critical hex likeThai Nguyen or are stacked with a SD (which cannot retreat) then this is a real factor to consider.And there will be cases where the French will have more than one unit with a morale of five inthe stack, so knocking one of them down a notch does not help on the DRMs.

The second factor to consider is the combat odds the French will get in the following battle. If heis attacking at 3:1 or better, there is a good chance he will not become DG but that you will. That

means extra losses for the VM or a retreat. Ambushing a lesser unit to get a DG result in thissituation is a good defensive play. On the other hand, if the French are at 2:1, the chances of youbecoming DG and the French not becoming DG are quite a bit lower. Thus, going for the DGresult via an ambush is a bit less important. And if a French 2:1 contains a unit with a morale of five and he is counting on the DRM from that units morale, then I would make that the target.

The French do not have a lot options in countering ambushes. You can t examine VM stacks tofigure out the exact factors you need to get a 3:1 and thus take into account potential ambushresults. But when attacking at 2:1 or less and including a unit with a morale of five to get the dierolls mods, just know that the VM is probably going to target that unit and that he will succeed athird of the time. If its a critical attack (arent they all?) then make sure to include two units witha morale of five to make sure that at least one is able to contribute its morale to the fight.

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