Salonga v HermosoThis is not the first time petitioner Jovito R. Salonga came to this Tribunal by way of a mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case, Salonga v. Madella, 1 the case became moot and academic as the Office of the Solicitor General, in its answer to the petition, stated that the travel eligibility certificate was not denied and, as a matter of fact, had been granted. Nonetheless, a brief separate opinion was filed, concurring in the resolution, and worded thus: "Clearly this petition had assumed a moot and academic character. Its dismissal is thus indicated. May I just add these few words as my response to the plea of petitioner in his Manifestation and Reply dated October 28, 1978. This is how I would view the matter not only where petitioner is concerned but in all other similar cases. Respondent Travel Processing Center should discharge its injunction conformably to the mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the right to travel. One of the highlights of the keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of the World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was the lifting of 'the ban on international travel.' There should be fidelity to such a pronouncement. It is the experience of the undersigned in his lectures abroad the last few years, in the United States as well as in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, that respect accorded constitutional rights under the present emergency regime had elicited the commendation of members of the bench, the bar, and the academe in foreign lands. It is likewise worthy of notice that in his keynote address to the International Law Association, President Marcos made reference to martial law being instituted in accordance with law and that the Constitution had been applied in appropriate cases. As an agency of the executive branch, therefore, the Travel Processing Center should ever be on its guard, lest the impression be created that such declarations amount, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, to no more than munificent bequests in a pauper's will. Petitioner, to my mind, is justified, the more so in the light of the Answer of Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza, to an affirmative response to his prayer in his Manifestation and Reply 'that under the circumstances mentioned in the Petition, Petitioner is entitled to travel abroad, and that it is in recognition of this right that Respondents have issued his Certificate of Eligibility to Travel, as mentioned in the Answer. 2

The present petition is likewise impressed with a moot and academic aspect. In the motion to dismiss of the Solicitor General dated April 21, 1980, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner. A xeroxed copy was enclosed. A resolution for dismissal is, therefore, in order.

From the docket of this Court, it appears that other petitions of this character had been filed in the past, namely, Santos v. The Special Committee on Travel Abroad, 3 Pimentel v. Travel Processing Center, 4 and Gonzales v. Special Committee on Travel. 5 In the aforesaid cases, as in this and the earlier Salonga petition, there was no occasion to pass on the merits of the controversy as the certificates of eligibility to travel were granted. The necessity for any ruling was thus obviated. Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that in the future this Court may be faced again with a situation like the present which takes up its time and energy needlessly, it is desirable that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In the address of President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos before the American Newspaper Publishers Association last Tuesday April 22, 1980, emphasized anew the respect accorded constitutional rights The freedom to travel is certainly one of the most cherished. He cited with approval the ringing affirmation of Willoughby, who, as he noted was "partial to the claims of liberty." 6 Burdick 7 and Willis, 8 both of whom were equally convinced that there be no erosion to human rights even in times of martial law, likewise received from President Marcos the accolade of his approval. It would appear, therefore, that in case of doubt of the Officer-in-Charge of the Travel Processing Center, the view of General Fabian Ver should immediately be sought. It goes without saying that the petition for such certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any disclaimer as to the person desiring to travel being in any way responsible for any delay.WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Marcos v ManglapusIn its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major arguments:1.to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;2.the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and3.there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.We deny the motion for reconsideration.1.It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.2.After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]3.Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the Constitution...In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides:Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.4.Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

Silverio v CAThis is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying reconsideration, be set aside.On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to decide the case.Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."We perceive no reversible error.1)Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:1.The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;2.Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never appeared in person before the Court;3.The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been issued against him all for the same reason failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more than enough consideration. The limit had long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.2)Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision.1wphi1 Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired.The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health (Article IV, Section 5).The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently, to wit:Sec. 6.The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."The submission is not well taken.Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C. Silverio.SO ORDERED.

Cojuangco v SANDIGANBAYANThis petition for prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to dismiss Criminal Case No. 22018 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al." now pending before respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division), and to prohibit said court from further proceeding with the case. Petitioner invokes his constitutional right to due process, a speedy trial, and a speedy determination of his cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. Further, he prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) from further enforcing and or implementing its order dated February 20, 1995 which bans petitioner from leaving the country except upon prior approval by said court. 1Criminal Case No. 22018 is an offshoot of a complaint filed on January 12, 1990, by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), docketed as I.S. No. 74, against the former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) and the former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. In said complaint, the respondents were charged "for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines. 2Subsequently, however, this Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action. 3In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioner and five other respondent.As set out in the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, subsequently, the following relevant incidents took place:The above Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information.In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2, 1992.However, on August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by respondent Lobregat.In a Memorandum dated November 18, 1992, the panel of investigators found that Civil Case No. 0033 does not pose a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the filing of the criminal case.The aforesaid Memorandum was received by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera on December 1, 1992 who submitted his comment thereto on December 16, 1992 to then Ombudsman Vasquez.On December 23, 1992, then Ombudsman Vasquez ordered the panel of investigators to go to the specifics and not the general averments on issue of prejudicial question.In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted.On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial question.In a Memorandum dated January 16, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Daniel B. Jovacon, Jr. resolved that no prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings which recommendation was approved by then Ombudsman Vasquez on January 26, 1995. The Information, together with the case record of OMB-0-90-2806, was forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman on February 10, 1995.On February 16, 1995 Criminal Case No. 22018 was filed with the Sandiganbayan and thereafter raffled to the First Division.On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan.On February l9, 1995 petitioner filed with respondent court an Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File Motion For Reconsideration of Ombudsman Resolutions. In his Opposition, petitioner alleged that since the only documents attached to the Information and submitted to respondent Sandiganbayan were the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the panel of investigators and the Memorandum dated January 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the same were not adequate for the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, petitioner claims the respondent Sandiganbayan should recall the warrant of arrest already issued or desist from issuing a warrant of arrest. Petitioner, avers, furthermore that the filing of the information was premature considering that he was not furnished a copy of the Ombudsman's Resolution in violation of Section 27 of R.A No. 6770 and prays that he be given leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution dated June 2, 1992 and the Office of the Special Prosecutor's Memorandum dated January 16, 1995.On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed.In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court.In an Order dated February 22, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan gave petitioner and the other accused twenty (20) days to file their respective motions for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution with the Office of the Ombudsman. PCGG was likewise given a similar period within which to file its comments to the motions for reconsideration. Furthermore, the respondent Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to supplement or amplify his existing motion on the issue of the propriety of the issuance of an Order of Arrest based merely on the resolution of the Ombudsman in support of the filing of the Information, among others.On March 9, 1995, petitioner filed a Memorandum in Amplification of Oppositon To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.In a Resolution dated March 14, 1995, petitioner was granted additional fifteen (15) days or until March 29, 1995, within which to file his motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman.Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on March 28, 1995.In a Resolution dated, April 3, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion seeking the recall of the issuance of the warrant for his arrest.On April 7, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 of the respondent Sandiganbayan.On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the Information. The arraignment was undertaken solely to accommodate the petitioner in his request to travel pending the determination of probable cause against him at the reinvestigation stage. The conditional arraignment is subject to the condition that if petitioner is exonerated at the preliminary investigation, the arraignment is set aside. On the other hand, should there be cause against the petitioner either as already charged or a separate charge which might be related to the case pending, the arraignment will not serve as basis for the invocation of the right against double jeopardy.In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner and the other accused in Criminal Case No. 22018 and recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.On December 6, 1996, Special Prosecutors Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil filed a Manifestation attaching a copy of the Memorandum dated October 22, 1995 with the respondent Sandiganbayan for its consideration.On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondent Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant case.On December 23, 1996 the Office of the Solicitor General, in representation of the OCGG, filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration of the Memorandum dated October 22, 1996 recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioner and the other accused in Criminal Case No. 22018.In an Order dated January 6, 1997, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil merely noted the motion for reconsideration dated December 23, 1996 oft he Office of the Solicitor General.On January 13, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion To Strike Out Alternatively, Opposition To Complaint's Motion For Reconsideration dated December 23, 1996 alleging that the motion was filed out of time.In an Order dated January 9, 1997, the respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the prosecution to justify the relationship that may be established with respect to the COCOFED on one hand and the Philippine Coconut Authority on the other, as a basis for justifying the position of the prosecution in the case. Furthermore, upon information provided by Prosecutors Tabanguil that the Office of the Solicitor General has sought a reconsideration on the desire of the prosecution to withdraw the information, the Office of the Solicitor General was given fifteen (15) days to submit its comment to the Motion to Withdraw Information. The petitioner and the other accused were given the same period to reply to the comment if they so desire. After which the matter will be deemed submitted for resolution.On January 17, 1997, the prosecution filed its compliance to the Order dated January 9, 1997. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment on January 24, 1997.In an Order dated February 4, 1997, the respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the PCGG lawyers to "present themeselves before the respondent court and respond to the claim of the OSG that the exhibits necessary are with the PCGG so that the Republic might effectively substantiate its position that probable cause exists. Furthermore, it is as much the function of the court to determine the existence of probable cause and the propriety of the withdrawal of the Information to be assured that the evidence for the complainant has been properly presented or the accused is properly protected at preliminary investigation.In an Order dated February 17, 1997, the respondent Sandiganbayan, with the agreement of the parties, gave the Office of the Solicitor General ten (10) days within which to submit some form of cataloging and explanation of the documents on record to the prosecution. On the other hand, the prosecution was given fifteen (15) days from receipt of the submission within which to review the matter once more and to respond thereat.On June 13, 1997, the PCGG filed its Entry of Appearance dated June 3, 1997.On June 19, 1997, petitioner filed a Second Motion To Resolve the Urgent Motion To Dismiss dated December 12, 1996.On July 3, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out (Re PCGG's Entry of Appearane) dated June 30, 1997.On July 16, 1997, the PCGG filed a Opposition to the Motion to Strike Out (Re: PCGG's Entry of Appearance).On July 18, 1997, petitioner filed a Reply to the Oppositions to Strike Out.On July 31, 1997, the PCGG filed a Rejoinder to the Reply of petitioner.On July 23, 1998, petitioner filed a Third Motion To Resolve the Urgent Motion To Dismiss dated December 12, 1996.In an Order dated January 26, 1998, respondent Sandiganbayan duly noted petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. 4Hence, the present petition.On July 22, 1998, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondents to file their respective comments to the petition. 5On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed a motion reiterating his application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of prelimary injunction with urgent motion for hearing thereon 6 citing the urgency of lifting the travel restriction on him in view of the various problems involving the investments of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) abroad which must be immediately attended to by petitioner as duly elected Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SMC. Petitioner asserts that quite often, it becomes necessary for him to attend meetings and conferences abroad where attendance must be confirmed promptly. Considering that he must first secure the permission of respondent Sandiganbayan before he can travel abroad and abide by the conditions imposed by said court upon the grant of such permission, petitioner contends that it becomes impossible for him to immediately attend to the aforecited tasks.On September 2, 1998, the Court noted the respective comments to the petition filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor General and required petitioner to file a consolidated reply within ten (10) days from notice. 7On September 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Second Motion Reiterating Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Motion for Hearing, 8 arguing among others that the continued maintenance of the hold-departure order against him has deleterious consequence not only on him personally but also on San Miguel Corporation, a publicly listed stock company, of which he is now Chairman and Executive Officer. 9On September 7, 1998, the Court resolved to defer action on the aforementioned second motion reiterating the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction until the filing of petitioner's Consolidated Reply and required the Sandiganbayan to file its own Comment on the petition in view of the Comment filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor divergent from the position taken by respondent Sandiganbayan. 10On September 10, 1998, petitioner filed a Consolidated Reply 11 and prayed that his Second Application for a Tempory Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Motion for hearing dated September 2, 1998 be now acted upon.On September 17, 1998, respondent Sandiganbayan filed a motion for extension of time to file its Comment to the petition. Subsequently, petitioner filed his Third Motion Reiterating Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Motion for Hearing 12 in view of the urgency of lifting the ban on foreign travel imposed on him by respondent Sandiganbayan.After respondent Sandiganbayan filed its comment on October 5, 1998, the Court in its Resolution dated October 7, 1998, noted the aforesaid comment and resolved to set the case for oral argument on October 21, 1998. 13During the oral argument, the Court suggested that the parties take up in their arguments the following issues:(1)whether the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if initially valid;(2)whether petitioner's basic rights to due process, speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case have been violated as to warrant dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018; and(3)whether the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner per Order of February 20, 1995 should be vacated to enable petitioner to go abroad without prior permission of, and other restrictions imposed by the respondent Sandiganbayan.After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court resolved to require them to submit their respective memoranda on the related issues taken up on the hearing including the merits of the case within twenty (20) days. The motion of counsel for petitioner that the issue of lifting the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner be resolved first, was held under advisement. 15On November 6, 1998, petitioner filed another Motion to Resolve Petitioner's "Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction" Enjoining Enforcement of Respondent Sandiganbayan's Order dated February 20, 1995 (Hold Departure Order) with an alternative prayer to travel abroad within a period of six (6) months. 16In its Resolution dated November 9, 1998, the Court noted the aforesaid motion and directed petitioner that in the meanwhile, he may address his request for permission to travel abroad to the Sandiganbayan. 17On November 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's resolution dated November 9, 1998 and argued that:(6)While the petitioner may indeed obtain some relief by addressing his "prayer for permission to travel abroad to the Sandiganbayan" to a large extent, this defeats the purpose of the petition because petitioner has precisely come to the Supreme Court to obtain relief from an oppressive regime of authorization to travel abroad that the Order of the Sandiganbayan of February 20, 1995 (Annex 'E', Petition) has imposed. Significantly, not any of the respondents have opposed petitioner's application for the issuance of temporary restraining order, and/or writ of preliminary injunction or for permission to travel abroad. 18On November 20, 1998, petitioner filed a Manifestation 19 in support of his motion for reconsideration, setting forth the urgency of lifting the ban on foreign travel imposed on him in view of the need to oversee the critical stages in the international operations of SMC as its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.On November 20, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation indicating that it is not interposing any objection to petitioner's prayer that he be allowed to travel abroad.With the submission of the parties' respective memoranda, the Court now proceeds to resolve the petition.As postulated during the oral argument, three main issues confront us in this petition, to wit:(1)whether the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if initially valid;(2)whether petitioner's basic rights to due process, speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case have been violated as to warrant dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018; and(3)whether the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner per Order of February 20, 1995 should be vacated to enable petitioner to go abroad without prior permission of and other restrictions imposed by the respondent Sandiganbayan. 20On the first issue, petitioner and the Office of the Special Prosecutor both argue that the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void for lack of sufficient basis upon which it could have "personally" determined the existence of probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against him. They contend that there was a violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution because the Information in Criminal Case No. 22018 was accompanied only by the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Graft Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the information and the Memorandum dated January 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the filing of the criminal case. Their argument is principally anchored on the pronouncements made in the case of Ho vs. People that reliance on the prosecutor's report alone is not sufficient in determining whether there is probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Consequent to the nullity of the warrant of arrest, petitioner further argues that the Sandiganbayan has not acquired jurisdiction over him and is without power to exercise the same.However, the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General maintain that any infirmity that may have attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest was cured by petitioner's voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the respondent Sandiganbayan when petitioner posted bail and subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by filing numerous motions wherein he sought affirmative reliefs.Now, pertinent to the issue at hand is the second clause of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that:Sec. 2. . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)In Ho vs. People, 22 the Court had the opportunity to elucidate on the matter of determining of probable cause to merit the issuance of a warrant of arrest:First, . . . the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of a probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer. 23As alleged by petitioner, in the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to issue the warrant of arrest against the accused: (1) the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the Information and (2) the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its resolution.In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, 24 we struck down as invalid an order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest which were based only on "the information, amended information and Joint Resolution", without the benefit of the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And in Ho vs. People, 25 we declared that respondent "palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and recommendation.Similarly, we are now constrained to rule that herein respondent court failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. For the two cited documents were the product of somebody else's determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the warrant of arrest issued by respondent court on February 17, 1995 against herein petitioner is palpably invalid.Consequent to the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the crucial issue now posed is whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan could still exercise jurisdiction over the petitioner and proceed with the trial of the case.As already adverted to, the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General are in agreement, that whatever infirmity might have attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest against petitioner, it was cured by petitioner's subsequent act of voluntarily submitting to respondent court's jurisdiction by posting his bail and filing the following pleadings which sought affirmative relief, to writ: (1) Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration; (2) Motion for extension of time to file Motion for Reconsideration. (3) seven Motions to Travel Abroad and two Motions for Extension of time to stay abroad. 27 Hence, they contend that respondent court's jurisdiction over petitioner has remained in effect.Petitioner objects to this contention, and asserts that "since the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, it never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner; as a consequence, it never acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charged and to issue any order adverse to the rights of petitioner, including an Order restricting his right to travel. 28 According to petitioner, the submission of both the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General is not only absurd but also oppressive and offensive to the Bill Rights since it would mean that to preserve his right against the issuance of a warrant of arrest without probable cause determined in accordance with Sec. 2, Article III of the Constitution, petitioner should have allowed himself to be incarcerated or imprisoned from the time the warrant of arrest was issued on February 20, 1995 up to the present, or for more than three (3) years now, and continue to be imprisoned until the Supreme Court decides to declare the arrest void. 29On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. 30 Thus, it has been held that:When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person.Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond. 31By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA 32.[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction.Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person. 33Verily, petitioner's participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court's jurisdiction over him. Nor can we ignore the long line of precedents declaring that where the accused had posted bail, as required, to obtain his provisional liberty, "it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest.As to petitioner's contention that he should have just allowed himself to stay in jail pending the resolution of his opposition to the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him, if only to avoid waiving his right to question the jurisdiction of respondent court, the Office of the Special Prosecutor has pointed out that petitioner is not without a remedy. Petitioner could have filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, rather than actively participate in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. And as exemplified by the case of Allado vs. Diokno, 35 this remedy has already proved to be effective.Against the continued exercise of jurisdiction by respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 22018, petitioner also invokes the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor dated October 22, 1995 recommending the dismissal of the case against him due to the absence of probable cause, which was later on approved by the Ombudsman on November 15, 1996. Citing the case of Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan, 36 petitioner argues that this Memorandum is an integral part of the preliminary investigation and should take precedence notwithstanding the fact that the same was made after the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan, for to deny any efficacy to the finding of the Office of the Special Prosecutor would negate the right of the petitioner to a preliminary investigation.The well-entrenched rule however, as laid down by the case of Crespo vs. Mogul 37 is that:. . . once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does nor matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.Nevertheless, petitioner claims exception to this rule by making this distinction:b.The preliminary investigation in Crespo vs. Mogul, supra, was conducted by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and, following established procedure with respect to such preliminary investigations, the preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal, in the language of Crespo, is "terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court" (at p. 470). On the other hand, the instant case involves a preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor pursuant to Sec. 11[4](a), and under Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770. In preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the respondent has the right to file a motion for reconsideration of any resolution within five (5) days from receipt of written notice, and pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman), the respondent has the right to file a motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Resolution of the Ombudsman. Until the motion for reconsideration is resolved, preliminary investigation is not terminated notwithstanding filing of information in court. In the instant case, no copy of the Resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor which brought about the filing of the Information, was served on the petitioner; consequently, when the Information was filed, the preliminary investigation had not yet been terminated. It follows that the Resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (approved by the Ombudsman) resolving in petitioner's favor the "Motion for Reconsideration" he had filed, now finding no probable cause, was an integral part of the preliminary investigation, not subject to review by the Sandiganbayan (see Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan, 230 SCRA 33 [1994]. 38Petitioner's reliance on Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan is not, in our view, persuasive. In that case the petitioners were not given any chance at all to seek reconsideration from the Ombudsman's final resolution because they were not furnished with a copy of the final resolution of the Ombudsman that could have enabled them to file a motion for reconsideration. As a result, the Court declared that "petitioners were not only effectively denied the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's final resolution but also deprived of their right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the information against them. 39In the case at bar, however, notwithstanding the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was able to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution with leave of court, and in fact his two motions for extensions to file the same were granted by the respondent court. 40 This eventually paved the way for the filing of subsequent Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which was later on approved by the Ombudsman, recommending the dismissal of the case against him. However, since the Information has already been filed before the Sandigabayan, the resolution of the aforesaid recommendation now lies within the jurisdiction and discretion of respondent court. Parenthetically, in the Torralba case, we did not altogether deprive the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction to proceed with the case, despite the defect in the conduct of the preliminary investigation, since we declared that:The incomplete preliminary investigation in this case, however, does not warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the proceedings already had. Neither is the court's jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely affected by deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings therein and to remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary investigation, the outcome of which shall then be indorsed to Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action. Clearly, consistent with the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul, after the filing of the information in court, "any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.Proceeding now to the second issue, petitioner maintains that the long delay that characterized the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 22018 before respondent Sandiganbayan has resulted in the violation of his Constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy determination of his case. Thus, petitioner submits that:409. It has been more than three (3) years since the Information in Criminal Case No. 22018 was filed with respondent Sandiganbayan. More than one and a half (1/2) years have elapsed since the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its Manifestation seeking the dismissal of the case. Based on the Office of the Special Prosecutor's finding of the absence of probable cause, petitioner filed on December 13, 1996, an "Urgent Motion To Dismiss". Three times, on March 24, 1997, June 18, 1997 and January 23, 1998, petitioner has sought resolution of his "Urgent Motion To Dismiss." These notwithstanding, the dismissal of the information as to petitioner remains pending and petitioner continues to be under criminal indictment constrained to suffer without justification in law and the Constitution, the humiliation, the restraints to liberty and the tormenting anxieties of an accused.Respondents concede that there has indeed been some delay but deny that it amounted to a violation of petitioner's right of speedy disposition of his case. They cite as justification the reorganization of the Sandiganbayan on September 23, 1997 wherein it was reconstituted into five (5) Divisions; 44 (2) the filing of motions by petitioner seeking affirmative reliefs from the Sandiganbayan; (3) the failure of petitioner himself to invoke his right to speedy resolution of his pending motions prior to the filing of this petition; 45 (4) the heavy caseload of respondent court. 46The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. 47 It should be emphasized that the factors that must be taken into account in determining whether this constitutional rights has been violated are as follows: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for such delay and (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. 48As in previous occasions, the Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that structural reorganizations 49 and the ever increasing case load of courts have adversely affected the speedy disposition of the cases pending before them.In the instant case, however, the Court finds that delay concerns the resolution of petitioner's "Urgent Motion to Dismiss", which is an offshoot of the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. Such delay is now far from excusable. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss has been filed as early as December 13, 1996 and, on three occasions, petitioner has moved for the urgent resolution of this motion. 50 What further militates against further delay in resolving this case is the fact that the government prosecutors themeselves concede that this case is of paramount importance, involving as it does "the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth or government funds, unlawfully used or misused by persons close or percieved to be close to the Marcoses. 51 Respondent court declared in its Order dated February 17, 1997 that the matter would be deemed submitted for resolution upon compliance with the Office of the Special Prosecutor as to whether there is indeed no probable cause against petitioner, 52 which compliance was submitted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor on March 17, 1997. 53 Under these circumstances, the Court does find the period of more than one year that elapsed for resolving petitioner's motion to dismiss quite long, considering that all pertinent pleadings required by the Sandiganbayan were already submitted.Even if petitioner himself might have contributed to said delay, as contended by respondent, in our view it is best that the case be resolved on the merits by the Sandiganbayan with due regard to petitioner's right to due process, speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case against him and his co-accused.Finally, with respect to the issue of whether or not the ban on foreign travel should be continued, as imposed on petitioner by respondent Sandiganbayan per its Order dated February 20, 1995 with accompanying restrictions in effect, we resolve to rule in the negative. The travel ban should be lifted, considering all the circumstances now prevailing.The rule laid down by this Court is that a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail does not have an unrestricted right to travel, the reason being that a person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system ofjustice. 54 But, significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation dated November 20, 1998 indicated that it is not interposing any objection to petitioner's prayer that he be allowed to travel abroad based on the following considerations:. . . (1) that it is well within the power of this Court to supend its own rules, including the second paragraph, Section 23, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; (2) that it has been shown in the past that the petitioner has always returned to the Philippines after the expiration of the period of his allowed travel; and (3) that petitioner, now Chairman of the Board of San Miguel Corporation, may be constrained to leave the country for business purposes, more often than he had done in the past,It however recommended that the period of travel should be reduced to three (3) months instead of six (6) months as requested by petitioner and that the latter should be required to post an additional cash bond equivalent to the present cash bond posted by him. 56Moreover, prescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner by respondent court is invalid, it now becomes necessary that there be strong and compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction on petitioner's right to travel abroad. Admittedly, all of petitioner's previous requests to travel abroad has been granted and that, as confirmed by the Office of the Solicitor General, that petitioner has always returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on him. The necessity of further denying petitioner's right to travel abroad, with attendant restrictions, appears less than clear. The risk of flights is further diminished in view of petitioner's recent reinstatement as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of San Miguel Corporation, though he has now more justification to travel so as to oversee the entire operations of that company. In this regard, it has to be conceded that this assumption of such vital post has come at a time when the current economic crisis has adversely affected the international operations of many companies, including San Miguel. The need to travel abroad frequently on the part of petitioner, to formulate and implement the necessary corporate strategies and decisions, could not be forestalled. These considerations affecting the petitioner's duties to a publicly held company, militate against imposing further restrictions on petitioner's right to travel abroad.WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the petition insofar as the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018 against the petitioner is concerned. Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) is hereby ordered to proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents in Criminal Case No. 22018 with utmost dispatch. Meanwhile, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (First Division), dated February 20, 1995, imposing a ban on petitioner's travel abroad without its prior approval pending the resolution of Criminal Case No. 22018 is, for the reasons heretofore advanced, hereby LIFTED for a period of three (3) months counted from the finality of this decision. Any similar request during the pendency of said case before the Sandiganbayan shall be addressed to that court.No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.

Yap v CAThe right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City1 and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years."2 He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 17,1999.After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail.The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals4, issued on October 6, 1999, upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General; thus, its dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Motion to Fix Bail For Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal" is hereby GRANTED. Accused-appellant Francisco Yap, Jr., a.k.a. Edwin Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the amount of Five Million Five Hundred Thousand (P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the following conditions, viz.(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court;(2) The Commission of lmmigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a hold departure order against accused-appellant; and(3) The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of Court for safekeeping until the court orders its return;(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-appellant's bail bond, the dismissal of appeal and his immediate arrest and confinement in jail.SO ORDERED.A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by respondent court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999. Hence, this petition.Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of the provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5 .5 million.The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail for the provisional liberty of the petitioner on his civil liability.The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted petitioner's constitutional liberty of abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. He prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail he posted during the trial of the case.6On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to the Court of Appeals for fixing the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the severity of the penalty imposed, the weight of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of the offense of which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to civil liability but also to the amount of fraud imputed to petitioner. The Solicitor General further pointed out the probability of flight in case petitioner is released on bail, it having been established that petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and had in fact left the country several times during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. It was also shown that petitioner used different names in his business transactions and had several abodes in different parts of the country.As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the Solicitor General advanced that all that the Court of Appeals requires is notice in case of change of address; it does not in any way impair petitioner's right to change abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence during the pendency of the appeal.Petitioner's case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states:SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party.7There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission he went out of the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution.8 The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,9 is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abano,10 this Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath as he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;(c) Penalty for the offense charged;(d) Character and reputation of the accused;(e) Age and health of the accused;(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;(h) Forfeiture of other bail;(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements.12 In the present case, where petitioner was found to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-departure order against him.Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail.The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,13 or whenever so required by the Court14. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.15 To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioner's submission that bail in the instant case be set at P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29, 2000, maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa where the amount of fraud is P142,000.00 or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal). True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts, "merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the enforcement of criminal laws."16 Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal justice.17 This notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances.It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal is non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years and circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled.18 In the same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact convicted by the trial court.19 In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Francisco's disquisition on why bail should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion; thus:The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years --the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court", claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order.21 In fact, the petition submits that "the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape. Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is already unnecessary."The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision.23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced from P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other respects, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated October 6, 1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Mirasol v DPWHThis petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Decision dated 10 March 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 147, Makati City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-034, as well as the RTCs Order dated 16 June 2003 which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners assert that Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Department Order No. 74 (DO 74), Department Order No. 215 (DO 215), and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) violate Republic Act No. 2000 (RA 2000) or the Limited Access Highway Act. Petitioners also seek to declare Department Order No. 123 (DO 123) and Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1)2 unconstitutional.Antecedent FactsThe facts are not in dispute. As summarized by the Solicitor General, the facts are as follows:1. On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01-034. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957:a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993;c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).2. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.3. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Mo