8/13/2019 France's Last Tests

1/2

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1995

Thrse Delpech

58

VIEWPOINT:

FRANCES LAST TESTS:

A CATALYST FOR

NEW POLICIES by Thrse Delpech

Thrse Delpech is Deputy Director of the International Relations Department at the French Commissariat for Atomic Energy in Paris.

T he resumption of nuclear testing by France hastriggered such a wave of protests worldwide thatthe prosecution has an easier role than the de-fense. Yet, there are a number of points that should bepart of this debate. We need to keep in mind a broaderperspective that goesbeyond current events. Inthis brief essay explain-ing the French position,I will raise seven keypoints that critics some-times fail to consider.

First, the decisionshould not have taken theentire world by surprise.During his campaign,President Jacques Chirac

never concealed his in-tentions in this area. In France and abroad, everyoneknew of his opposition to his predecessors policy. Hehad opposed the nuclear testing moratorium from its ini-tiation in April 1992.

Second, the French negotiators at the Non-Prolifera-tion Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference inNew York showed great openness on the testing issuewhen the group, led by President Jayantha Dhanapala,took part in the debate on the three decisions later adoptedby the Conference. Here again, everyone knew that theprobability of resumption of testing by France was high.Of course, this knowledge did not prevent hostile feel-ings from arising when France actually moved to resumetesting. But, it is a significant point, especially in re-gards to the outcome of the NPT Extension Conference.The delegations convened in New York were well awarethat the utmost restraint concept applied by consensusto nuclear testing (on the basis of a proposal by a non-nuclear weapon state) had been adopted because theyhad failed to agree on any language implying a universalcommitment to abide by the current moratorium or toextend it to China. Therefore, French testing should not

be seen as a violation of the understandings reached atthe Conference.Third, the decision to complete French nuclear test-

ing within a period limited to a few months and involv-ing a maximum of seven or eight tests, was made publicon June 13, 1995, in the context of a solemn Frenchcommitment to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) in the autumn of 1996. Those who attended theNPT Extension Conference will recall that there is no

reference to an exact date for signing the CTBT and thatthe parties commitments were limited to concluding atreaty. In his announcement, President Chirac statedhis intention of abiding by the commitment made, whiletaking a further essential step (i.e., the commitment to

sign the treaty). Thisis clearly the essentialgoal, namely: the com-plete cessation of nuclear testing in thenear future. This spe-cifically applies to thefive nuclear weaponstates, which must faceup to their responsibili-ties.

Fourth, on June 29,

1995, a few days afterPresident Chiracs announcement, the French delega-tion in Geneva declared itself in favor of an unlimitedtreaty, stating clearly that a complete ban was intended.This point had been under discussion for one year andcould rightly be considered an indication of a sincerecommitment by the nuclear powers to the CTBT.

Fifth, on the crucial subject of the treatys scopeamajor stumbling block in the CTBT negotiationsFrancedeclared on August 10, 1995, that it accepted the Aus-tralian language. Therefore, the ban would apply to anytesting of nuclear weapons and to any nuclear explo-sion. This statement was not just a significant reversalof the position previously held by France. It also helpedcontribute to the successful conclusion of difficult de-bates on the same issue in other capitals. On the nextday, the president of the United States announced thathe too had chosen the zero option. The prospects of concluding and signing a CTBT in 1996 have becomemuch brighter as a result. The United Kingdom wasprompt in announcing its support of the proposal. Onthis point, the French government made a difficult de-cision and should be credited with showing more sensi-

tivity to international expectations than some would havethe world believe. As the French prime minister re-peated in early September, this decision, which is irre-vocable, will presumably be the one regarded as hav-

8/13/2019 France's Last Tests

2/2

59

Thrse Delpech

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1995

ing been crucial one year from now, after a CTBT hasbeen concluded.

Sixth, another issue of great importance to the NewYork negotiators was the future of the Rarotonga Treaty.After rejecting, until now, any language that might im-ply signing of the protocols involving France, the Frenchgovernment has now announced its intention of closingdown or converting the Pacific test site. Moreover, itsrepresentative, Minister for Cooperation JacquesGodfrain, stated in Port Moresby that France wouldconsider signing the protocols after the completion of the nuclear tests.

Seventh, other important developments have no doubtbeen accelerated by the resumption of French nucleartesting. They would probably have occurred in anycase, but in a more protracted and laborious way. Franceis now engaged in a broad reappraisal of its defense

policy, including its nuclear aspects. The fact that itsfuture will be decided in Europe, and not just in territo-rial France, is now understood by all. This impliesmomentous consequences in defense-related fields. Itrepresents an upheaval of the basic principles behindFrench defense strategy. For this to have been stated,more clearly than ever before, by a Gaullist president atthe beginning of his term, says a great deal about theirreversible nature of this shift. Many consequencesfollow from this reorientation:

France is gradually abandoning the solitary modelthat was once its image in the world, especially in thenuclear area, and is concentrating instead on a col-lective framework for the formulation of its futuredefense policies. France is publicizing its highly satisfactory contactswith the United Kingdom on defense issues. Thetwo countries are actually closer than they would havebeen willing to admit until recently. Neither wouldnow consider a situation where their defense inter-ests might differ on basic issues. France is acknowledging the wide differences amongthe European Union (E.U.) members on nuclear is-sues. These differences are partly the result of a di-versity of status regarding the NPT. Thirteen E.U.members have renounced acquiring nuclear weapons,and there is no question that this position is unam-biguous, especially in the very year when the NPTwas extended indefinitely. Differences also result fromvariations in appreciation of the purpose of nuclearweapons in the post-Cold War context. This is nota-bly the case in Germany, centrally-located through-

out the period in the part of Central Europe inappro-priately called the theater and likely to have beenthe first victim of a nuclear conflict. France declares itself ready to discuss nuclear is-sues and the role of nuclear weapons in Europe withits major partners. Such concerted action is neitheroriented toward sharing its nuclear weapons, whichwould be contrary to the intent of the NPT, nor toextend the French deterrent to those countries alreadycovered by the U.S. deterrent. In the immediate fu-ture, its purpose is to consult with the major partnerson the possible future role of nuclear weapons in thedefense of Europe. As everyone knows, this issuewas until now at the core of French sovereignty. Thisopening should not be ignored. It paves the way fora gradual reconciliation of a resolutely European for-eign policy and a defense policy which is still rather

nationalistic. This reconciliation can only be welcome.