food defense among meat processing and food service establishments in kentucky

Western Kentucky UniversityTopSCHOLAR®

Masters Theses & Specialist Projects Graduate School

5-1-2013

Food Defense Among Meat Processing and FoodService Establishments in KentuckyMorgan Webb-YeatesWestern Kentucky University, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/thesesPart of the Agriculture Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Food Microbiology

Commons, Food Processing Commons, and the National Security Commons

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Recommended CitationWebb-Yeates, Morgan, "Food Defense Among Meat Processing and Food Service Establishments in Kentucky" (2013). Masters Theses& Specialist Projects. Paper 1249.http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/1249

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FOOD DEFENSE AMONG MEAT PROCESSING AND FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS IN KENTUCKY

A Thesis Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Physics and Astronomy Western Kentucky University

Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Science

By Morgan Webb-Yeates

May 2013

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to everyone who has helped and supported me throughout the

entirety of this extremely long, and sometime painful, project. I’d first like to thank my

parents, who have supported me emotionally and financially for the ten long years I have

been a college student. I could not have been anywhere near as successful without them.

I would also like to thank my advisor, Dr. Vijay Golla, for providing sound advice

and encouragement along the way. I would also like to mention that he has been

exceedingly patient with me as I have plodded along slowly towards this project’s

completion. Thank you, also, to the other members of my thesis committee, Dr. Fred

DeGraves and Dr. Moon-Soo Kim. They have provided excellent suggestions for

improving my research and writing skills.

I would like to thank David Burton at the Barren River District Health

Department, as well as the other members of the Environmental staff: Patrick Davis, Joe

Ives, Craig Patterson, and Susan Davis. They provided me with the internship that I

needed to complete my research. They also went out of their way to ensure that I was

able to collect the data I needed. For that, I will always be eternally grateful.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Alexander Barzilov for not giving up on my

fellowship for the Homeland Security Sciences program, when I would have given up

months earlier.

iv

CONTENTS

Introduction & Background .................................................................................................1

Introduction ..............................................................................................................1

Bioterrorism .............................................................................................................1

Agroterrorism ...........................................................................................................6

Documented Incidences of Agroterrorism ...............................................................9

Potential Economic Impacts of an Agroterrorism Event .......................................11

Potential Public Health Impacts of an Agroterrorism Event .................................11

Food Tampering .....................................................................................................13

Methodology ......................................................................................................................15

Institutional Review Board ....................................................................................15

Meat Processing Survey .........................................................................................15

Food Service Establishment Survey ......................................................................17

Results ................................................................................................................................18

Meat Processing Facilities .....................................................................................18

Section 1: Type of Meat Processed ...................................................................18

Section 2: Agroterrorism...................................................................................19

Section 3: Outside Security Measures ..............................................................20

Section 4: Shipment Security ............................................................................20

Section 5: Mail Security....................................................................................21

Section 6: Indoor Security Measures ................................................................22

Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security .................................................24

Section 8: Water System Security .....................................................................27

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Section 9: Hazardous Material Security ...........................................................29

Section 10: Information Security ......................................................................30

Section 11: Employee/Non-Employee Security ...............................................31

Section 12: Incident Response ..........................................................................33

Food Service Establishments .................................................................................34

Section 1: Descriptive Statistics........................................................................34

Section 2: Terrorism and Food Defense ...........................................................34

Section 3: Management Responsibilities in Food Defense...............................37

Section 4: Staff Responsibilities in Food Defense ............................................39

Section 5: Customer/Visitor Security ...............................................................42

Section 6: Outdoor/Indoor Security ..................................................................44

Section 7: Food Security ...................................................................................46


Section 9: Hazardous Materials ........................................................................51


Discussion ..........................................................................................................................55

Meat Processing Facilities .....................................................................................55

Section 1: Study Design ....................................................................................55

Section 2: Agroterrorism...................................................................................56

Section 3: Outside Security Measures ..............................................................57

Section 4: Shipment Security ............................................................................58


Section 6: Indoor Security Measures ................................................................60

vi

Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security .................................................62

Section 8: Water System Security .....................................................................64

Section 9: Hazardous Material Security ...........................................................64


Section 11: Employee/Non-Employee Security ...............................................66

Section 12: Incident Response ..........................................................................67


Implications and Recommendations ..................................................................................70

Meat Processors .....................................................................................................70


Conclusions ........................................................................................................................72

Appendix A: IRB Approval Form .....................................................................................73

Appendix B: Questionnaire Used in Study of Meat Processing Facilities ........................75

Appendix C: Questionnaire Used in Study of Food Service Establishments ..................100

Appendix D: List of Responses from Free Response Questions-Meat Processors .........121

Appendix E: List of Responses from Free Response Questions-Food Service ...............124

Literature Cited ................................................................................................................131

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Products Distributed By Participating Meat Processing Facilities ....................18 Table 2. Knowledge and Concern of Meat Processors Regarding an Agroterrorism Attack .................................................................................................................19 Table 3. Meat Processors Responses Regarding Physical Security of the Premises .......20 Table 4. Security of Shipments Delivered and Received By Meat Processors ...............21 Table 5. Security of Incoming Mail Received By Meat Processors ................................22 Table 6. Security of the Inside of Meat Processing Facilities..........................................23 Table 7. Security of Slaughter and Processing Areas By Meat Processors .....................25 Table 8. Security of Water Systems By Meat Processors ................................................28 Table 9. Security of Hazardous Materials and Waste By Meat Processors .....................29 Table 10. Security of Information Stored at Meat Processing Facilities ...........................30 Table 11. Security of Employees and Non-Employees By Meat Processing Facilities ....32 Table 12. Incident Response By Meat Processing Facilities .............................................33 Table 13. Distribution of Food Service Establishments ....................................................34 Table 14. Concern About Bioterrorism, Food Tampering, and Food Defense Expressed By Food Service Establishments .......................................................................35 Table 15. Probabilities Associated with Students’ t Analysis of Table 14 ........................36 Table 16. Managerial Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service Establishments ...................................................................................................37 Table 17. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 16 .............................................................................39 Table 18. Staff Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service Establishments ...................................................................................................40 Table 19. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Section 4 .............................................................................42

viii

Table 20. Security of Customer and Visitors to Food Service Establishments .................43 Table 21. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 20 .............................................................................44 Table 22. Physical Security of Food Service Establishments ............................................45 Table 23. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 22 .............................................................................46 Table 24. Security of Food in Food Service Establishments .............................................47 Table 25. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 24 .............................................................................49 Table 26. Mean and Standard Deviation of the Number of Days between Inventory Updates for Restaurants and Non-Restaurants ..................................................50 Table 27. Security of Incoming Mail Received By Food Service Establishments ............51 Table 28. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 27 .............................................................................51 Table 29. Security of Hazardous Materials and Waste in Food Service Establishments ..52 Table 30. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 29 .............................................................................53 Table 31. Security of Information Kept By Food Service Establishments ........................54 Table 32. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 31 .............................................................................54 Table 33. Statistically Significant Differences Found from a Study of Security in Food Service Establishments ......................................................................................69

ix

FOOD DEFENSE AMONG MEAT PROCESSING AND FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS IN KENTUCKY

Morgan Webb-Yeates May 2013 136 Pages

Directed by: Vijay Golla, Fred DeGraves, and Moon-Soo Kim Department of Physics and Astronomy Western Kentucky University Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of a plant or animal disease with the

goal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death. After the 2002 terrorist

attacks on the World Trade Center, the security of the food supply is of increasing

concern to the United States. A major incidence of agroterrorism or food tampering

would have far reaching impacts on the economy and public health. The first objective of

this project was to determine knowledge and concern of agroterrorism in meat processing

facilities in Kentucky, and to determine knowledge and concern of food tampering and

food defense in food service establishments in Warren County, Kentucky. The second

objective was to determine security strategies that were being implemented by these

facilities. Two separate surveys, one for meat processors and the other for food service

establishments, were designed to meet these objectives.

An observational study was conducted for meat processing facilities. It was

found that these facilities were generally unconcerned with agroterrorism, although a

reasonable amount of security implementations were in place at these facilities. A

statistical comparison between restaurants and non-restaurant food service

establishments, such as schools, hospitals, and hotels, was performed. Both types of food

service establishments expressed little concern about a food tampering event. Non-

x

restaurant food service establishments were slightly more concerned than restaurants

about both food tampering and food defense.

1

Introduction & Background

Introduction

This project had two primary goals. The first was to determine how meat

processors in Kentucky feel about the likelihood of an agroterrorism event and what

prevention and security strategies were being implemented in these facilities. The second

was to determine the knowledge and concern of managers in food service establishments

about food tampering and food defense and what security strategies were being employed

in their establishments. Agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate introduction of a plant

or animal disease with the goal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death.1

Agroterrorism is considered a subset of bioterrorism, so this review begins with an

introduction to this concept and follows with a description of agroterrorism and factors

that make agroterrorism unique from other types of terrorism events. It concludes with a

review of food tampering in food service establishments.

Bioterrorism

According to the United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a

biological attack, or biocrime, is considered “the intentional release of a pathogen or

biotoxin against humans, plants, or animals.”2 Biocrimes can be further subdivided into

bioterrorism related events and non-bioterrorism related events.3 For the purposes of this

review, Carus’ definition of bioterrorism will be used. Bioterrorism is defined as the

threat or intentional use of a biological agent against a person or group for ideological

reasons, which include those crimes that are politically, ecologically, or religiously

inspired.4 A non-bioterrorism biocrime is defined as the threat or intentional use of a

biological agent against a person or group for personal profit, such as those crimes that

2

are committed for personal revenge or for monetary gain.3 Bioterrorism, in general, is

considered a low-incidence, high-impact event.4 Essentially this means that, although the

total number of bioterrorism events is modest, the potential health and economic impacts

of a single event could be devastating. For this reason, it is critical that resources be

devoted to the prevention of such an attack.

Fortunately, there have been few documented instances of bioterrorism in the U.S.

Information concerning terrorist attacks that have occurred worldwide from 1970 to

today can be accessed on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Currently, the GTD

contains more than 98,000 instances of terrorism.5 Of these, only 25 documented the use

of biological material as a weapon. Nineteen of these 25 instances of bioterrorism

occurred in the U.S.5 Each case is described in further detail below.

• The first cases occurred in 1984 in The Dalles, Oregon. A religious

extremist group known as the Rajneeshees poisoned local restaurant salad

bars with Salmonella typhimurium (S. Typhi), which is a bacteria that

causes salmonella food poisoning.4 Four of the 19 cases of bioterrorism in

the U.S. are attributed to this group. Three cases of S. Typhi poisoning by

the Rajneeshees resulted in injury.5 A total of 778 people5 were injured in

these attacks, including 45 hospitalizations.4 No deaths were reported.

The Rajneeshees were attempting to temporarily incapacitate people in

order to prevent them from voting in an upcoming election.4

• The second occurred in 2001. Letters containing spores of the bacteria

Bacillus anthracis, otherwise known as anthrax, were mailed to several

news media outlets in New York and Florida and two U.S. Senators.6 The

3

first letters were postmarked one week after the September 11 attack on

the World Trade Center in New York City.6 The first case of inhalational

anthrax was identified on October 4, 2011.7 The remaining letters were

postmarked on October 9, 2001. In total, 22 people were infected with

anthrax, including five deaths.6 The scope of this case is relatively small.

However, it is estimated that the total economic cost of the outbreak,

including clean-up costs for contaminated buildings, was more than $1

billion.8 It is estimated that a mass bioterrorist attack could cost anywhere

from $200 billion into the trillions.9

• In 2003, a letter containing ricin was mailed to both the United States

Department of Transportation10 (DoT) and the White House.11 Both

letters were discovered in postal facilities prior to their final delivery

destination. Both letters had the words “caution RICIN POISON

Enclosed in sealed container Do not open without proper protection” on

the outside of the envelope.12 Enclosed in each envelope was a metal vial

containing ricin and a letter. The writer of the letter claimed to be an

owner of a trucking company that was unhappy with new federal

regulations regarding truck driver hours of service. He/she claimed to be

able to produce large amounts of ricin, which the writer was planning to

use if the new laws were not repealed. The writer signed each letter with

the moniker “Fallen Angel.”12

4

• On February 2, 2004, the office of senate majority leader Bill Frist was

delivered an envelope containing ricin. The sender was never discovered.

No injuries were reported.13

• In 2005, anthrax was discovered in a mail facility in Arlington, Virginia.

One hundred people received antibiotic treatment as a result of this

incident, but no casualties were reported. No responsibility was ever

claimed for this incident.14

• The final incident occurred in 2010. Members of an animal rights group,

known as the Justice Department, sent razor blades they claimed were

contaminated with AIDS-infected blood to two employees of the

University of Los Angeles in California.15 The group was threatening

these employees for their work on animal research involving primate

vivisection. Although the razor blades contained blood, the presence of

AIDS was never confirmed.16

Since much damage can be caused by one bioterrorism event, it seems fortunate

that few attacks have occurred on U.S. soil. It seems especially fortunate given that

evidence has been documented proving that terrorist groups present in the U.S. have been

discussing the use of biological weapons since the 1960s.4 Several examples are listed

below. This list is by no means exhaustive, and many other incidents are documented by

Carus in his working paper entitled Bioterrorism and Biocrimes.4

• In 1972, a white supremacist organization in Chicago known as R.I.S.E.

was found with possession of S. Typhi, the organism that causes typhoid

fever.4 The group was planning to contaminate the city’s water supply in

5

an attempt to kill people. The members of the group described themselves

as “inoculated,” so that they would survive the outbreak. The surviving

members of the group would then be the base for a new “master race.”17

• In 1974, a safehouse operated by the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)

was discovered to contain, among other items, a book entitled “Germ

Warfare.” There was no evidence found to suggest that the SLA ever

developed the ability or means to commit acts of biological terrorism.18

• In 1992, four members of a group known as the “Patriot’s Council” were

found in violation of The Biological Weapons and Antiterrorism Act of

1989.19 These members were involved in a plot to bomb a federal

building4 and murder a sheriff’s deputy and a U.S. Marshall with the

toxin, ricin.19 One member was found in possession of the ricin they were

planning on using.4

• In 1998, three men, all members of a Texas separatist organization, were

arrested for threatening to use biological weapons against key members of

the U.S. government and their families.20 Threats were sent to former

U.S. president Bill Clinton, former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, and

the director of the U.S. Secret Service, among others. The men were

found with devices they were developing for the purpose of injecting

biological material into victims. No materials for use in biological

weapons were discovered, however, it was found that the men were

planning to manufacture botulinum toxin with a mixture containing rotten

chicken meat, dirt, and green beans.20

6

• In 1999, an Egyptian extremist military group known as the World Islamic

Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders was reported to have biological

weapons. The report noted that the group planned to use the weapons

against targets in the U.S. and Israel. The possession of biological

weapons by this group was never confirmed.4

While bioterrorism events remain few in number, agroterrorism events are fewer

still. There are only a handful of documented agroterrorism events that have occurred

around the world. This is fortunate; however, it may have the unfortunate consequence

of luring the population into a false sense of security. The discussion will continue with a

description of agroterrorism and some unique factors that make it both simple to

accomplish and potentially devastating. The next section reviews the published literature

on agroterrorism.

Agroterrorism

Agroterrorism is a relatively recent term and only came to be studied in earnest in

the late 1990s.21 It was a term developed to describe the deliberate introduction of a plant

or animal disease in order to cause fear, economic devastation, illness, or death.1 To

summarize this concept further, agroterrorism is terrorism against agriculture.

Agriculture includes animal and plant husbandry, as well as the cultivation of any other

product intended for human consumption.22 The World Fact Book, published by the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), estimates that agriculture consisted of 1.2% of the

U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 and 0.7% of the U.S. labor force in 2009.23

In 2011, meat production contributed $84.9 billion to the U.S. economy.24 These

7

numbers seem to imply that agriculture does not represent a significant portion of the

economy. However, the food and fiber system, which includes agriculture and any

activity which utilizes agriculture products, supplied 11% of the GDP and 16% of the

labor force in 2002.1 Due to the heavy influence it has on public health and the economy,

agriculture falls under the definition of critical infrastructure.

In the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Section 1016(e), critical infrastructure was

defined as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States

that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating

impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any

combination of these matters.”25 This definition is very apropos in a discussion of the

potential impacts an agroterrorism event would have on the United States. The 2009

National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) lays the foundation for the federal

government’s role in infrastructure protection. In section 2.2.2 of the NIPP, the bulk of

the responsibility for agriculture protection is assigned to the United States Department of

Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).26 These agencies

and others have a number of policies in place to protect agriculture, although food

defense plans continue to be voluntary.27

In general, agroterrorism is not considered to be the primary choice for a typical

terrorist.1 Agroterrorism does not usually involve immediate human casualties, and it

does not have the shock factor that many other methods of terrorism employ. In addition,

it is often difficult to identify the source of an outbreak, whether it is started deliberately

or accidentally. Thus, an agroterrorism event may be incorrectly labeled as accidental,

and the perpetrator will never receive credit unless he/she comes forward.1 Although this

8

may explain why there are few incidences of agroterrorism, it is not a topic that should be

ignored. In 2002, right after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade

Center in New York City, hundreds of pages of documents were discovered in Al Qaeda

hideouts indicating that this group was interested in committing acts of agroterrorism

against the U.S. and had documented plans to accomplish this task.28 In addition, there

are aspects of an agroterrorism event that make it extremely difficult to prevent and

contain. As the focus of this portion of the project is meat production, this discussion

will be focused on the difficulties of securing livestock and meat processing facilities.

Firstly, the majority of livestock on farms are stored on large open pastures that

are difficult to secure against intruders.1 Nearly one-quarter of U.S. land is devoted to

grazing land for livestock.29 This amounts to approximately 525 million acres of land29

that is widely spread across the U.S. Securing such a large land area is a daunting task.

Furthermore, the livestock on these farms are often sent away for slaughtering, packing,

and processing, widening the spread of infection. In general, a pound of meat travels an

average of 1,000 miles before it is consumed.21 Once present in slaughtering facilities,

the livestock are contained in confined, and often overcrowded, areas. Confining animals

in enclosed spaces increases the likelihood of spreading disease.1

Secondly, there has been a widespread eradication effort by the U.S. against

animal diseases. Several complications have arisen as a result of this. First, the same

effort at eradication has not been made in many other countries. This means that many

animal diseases, although not prevalent in the U.S., are endemic to other countries.1 This

gives potential terrorists easy access to certain diseases. Second, veterinarians, who are

generally considered the most trusted source of advice on sick animals,27 often have

9

never seen cases of certain animal diseases and may have a difficult time recognizing the

signs and symptoms.30 This may result in a large amount of time passing before

realization that an attack has occurred. Third, livestock have been subjected to overuse of

antibiotics, resulting in increased bacterial resistance to multiple drugs.30 This may make

it more difficult to treat livestock that have become contaminated with a bacteria.

Documented Incidences of Agroterrorism

There are very few documented incidences of agroterrorism. This section will

examine cases occurring after the year 1900.

• The first documented cases of agroterrorism in the 20th century occurred

during World War I, when Germany targeted horses and other livestock of

various Allied countries.21 The first instance of this took place in 1915.

The specific targets were horses and mules that the U.S. was planning to

take overseas to its military in Europe. German agents attempted to infect

these animals with Burkholderia mallei bacteria, known for causing the

disease Glanders.5 This disease is highly contagious among horses,

donkeys, and mules but is only seen sporadically in other species of

animals.31 Very few human cases have been reported among people

working closely with infected animals, however, no human-to-human

cases have been documented in the U.S.32 It is unclear if the initial

attempt was successful.21 Similar attempts by Germany were conducted

between 1915 – 1918, targeting the U.S., Romania4, Spain, Norway,

Argentina, and France.21

10

• In 1952, an agroterrorism incidence occurred as part of the Mau Mau

uprising in Kenya.21 The conflict centered around an anti-colonial

military group, known as the Mau Mau. This group was responsible for

the poisoning of 33 head of cattle belonging to citizens of a British colony

in Kenya. The Mau Mau used a toxin found in African milk bush,

resulting in the death of eight of the poisoned cattle. The British believe

that this was one of many attacks targeting livestock by this group,

although documented evidence of this is poor.4

• In 1979, a massive outbreak of anthrax occurred in Zimbabwe. It is

postulated that a Rhodesian military group deliberately infected cattle with

the bacteria, however evidence for this theory is circumstantial at best.33

The deliberate nature of this attack has never been confirmed. Carus

states that although responsibility for this attack has been publicly

associated with nationalist guerillas, this may be nothing more than

Rhodesian propaganda.4 As a result of this outbreak, more than 10,000

people became ill, including 182 deaths.33

• In 1985, Carus reported a possible instance of agroterrorism among

Mexican workers employed to remove screwworms from livestock. The

workers may have deliberately infected the livestock with screwworms in

order to keep their jobs. However, the only evidence for this appears to be

a statement from a USDA official, and the attack was never confirmed.4

• In 1997, New Zealand farmers introduced rabbit hemorrhagic disease

(RHD) in an effort to control the feral rabbit population.33 The perpetrator

11

of the initial attack was never found, although some farmers did admit

contributing to the further spread of the disease. RHD is not transmissible

to humans.4

Potential Economic Impacts of an Agroterrorism Event

While the global incidence of agroterrorism remains low, there is enough

evidence from other, non-deliberate agricultural crises to indicate that the economic

burden from a single act of agroterrorism would be extremely costly. In Belgium during

the year 1999, animal feed became contaminated with the chemical compound, dioxin.

Meat production in the Netherlands was significantly impacted with an estimated cost of

more than $493 million.34 In Canada, a minor outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease

occurred between 1951 and 1953. As a result, approximately 2,000 head of cattle were

destroyed. The direct cost of this for Canada was $2 million. However, the outbreak

caused the value of Canadian livestock to decrease, resulting in the loss of $650 million

in beef exports.35 Using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data published by the Bureau of

Labor Statistics, a $650 million loss in 1951 would be approximately a $5.8 billion loss

in 2012.36 In a study published in The Journal of the American Veterinary Medical

Association in 2002, the estimated cost of a major outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in

the U.S. may be upwards of $14 billion.37

Potential Public Health Impacts of an Agroterrorism Event

The public health burden in an agroterrorism attack can be viewed in multiple

ways. First is the impact on food production. In 2011, the U.S. produced over 49 billion

12

pounds of beef, hog, and sheep meat products. Approximately eight billion pounds of

these meat products were exported to other countries. Approximately 4.5 billion pounds

of meat products were imported from other countries.38 In total, the U.S. produced and

imported 45.5 billion pounds of beef, hog, and sheep meat products meant for

consumption. Given the current United States population of approximately 300 million39,

if all this meat was consumed and none wasted (a fairly unlikely outcome), this would

amount to approximately 152 pounds of meat per person per year. The 2010 Dietary

Guidelines for Americans published by the United States Department of Agriculture

(USDA) and the Unites States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

publishes a range of recommended calorie intake of 1600 – 2400 calories for women and

2000 – 3000 for men, dependent upon the level of physical activity.40 For the purpose of

this analysis, it will be assumed that the average American needs 2,000 calories per day

to maintain a healthy weight. In one year, a healthy American should consume

approximately 730,000 calories. Although different types of food contain differing

amounts of calories per pound, it is generally assumed that there are 3,500 calories per

pound.41 Therefore, in one year, a healthy American should consume approximately 208

pounds of food. If a healthy American consumes 152 pounds of meat per year, nearly

75% of his/her diet would be meat products. This is a bit extreme, however, even if it is

assumed that 10% of a healthy American’s diet is meat products, a major agroterrorism

event could potentially result in a deficit of 20 pounds of food per person per year.

The second impact on public health that may result from an agroterrorism event is

the transfer of disease between animals to humans. This type of disease is known as a

zoonotic disease. The problem of containing zoonotic disease is an ongoing one. Nearly

13

75% of new emerging diseases are considered zoonotic. Approximately 62% of known

diseases in humans have come from an animal source.42 One of the more familiar cases

of a zoonotic disease pandemic is the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak

in the early 2000s. This disease affected more than 8,000 patients, including 916

deaths.43 The World Health Organization (WHO) published a fatality rate of 0% to 50%

that was highly dependent on the age of the patient.44 Public health agencies all over the

world were on high alert, and it caused widespread global panic. The Hong Kong

Department of Public Health issued a quarantine of a small street block containing 264

apartments. More than half of the residents of these apartments were not home at the

time of the quarantine, implying the spread of the disease was continuing. Police

presence was required to keep the remaining residents from violating the quarantine

order.45 This scenario illustrates the difficulty for public health departments everywhere

to contain an epidemic. As the number of cases increase, quarantining the infection

becomes more and more impossible and the economic cost continues to escalate.45 In a

study on the role of law enforcement in an agroterrorism event, it stated that police

presence may be required to enforce quarantine for up to 60 days following the outbreak

of a foreign animal disease.46

Food Tampering

The subject of the second portion of this project was food service establishments.

To discuss food defense for these establishments, the focus must shift from a large scale

form of attack, such as agroterrorism, to a smaller scale form of attack, such as food

tampering. Food tampering is defined as the deliberate contamination of food with the

14

intent to cause harm. Food tampering can be caused by an employee or former employee

of the establishment.47 An example of this occurred in a supermarket in Grand Rapids,

Michigan on December 31, 2003.48 This particular supermarket was forced to recall

1,700 pounds of ground beef after 111 people fell ill with nicotine poisoning.49 It was

discovered that an employee of the supermarket had deliberately contaminated the meat

with insecticide.49 Many similar examples can be found with a simple Internet search.

Food service establishments can also be targeted by customers, who may tamper

with easy access self-service areas, such as buffets.47 An example of a customer

tampering with a buffet is mentioned in a previous section, Introduction to Bioterrorism.

The case of the Rajneeshees is mentioned as an example of bioterrorism, but it can also

be used as an example of food tampering. This particular group visited restaurants with

salad bars and deliberately contaminated these salad bars with salmonella bacteria.4

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates 80% of the foods consumed

by Americans and is responsible for developing a plan to prevent food contamination,

both deliberate and accidental.50 The FDA published a guidance document meant to

provide security recommendations to facility operators in the food service industry,

including producers, processors, transporters, and retailers. This document provides

suggestions in seven areas: management of food security, security of the physical facility,

employee security, protection of computer systems, safety of raw materials and

packaging, security of operations, and security of finished products.51 This document is

freely available to the public.

15

Methodology

Institutional Review Board

Western Kentucky University (WKU) requires that all research involving human

subjects must be approved by an independent Institutional Review Board (IRB). In

cooperation with this rule, permission to conduct the research was requested on June 20,

2012. IRB approval was granted on June 27, 2012 under reference code IRB12-312. The

IRB approval document can be viewed in Appendix A.

Meat Processing Survey

A survey was designed to assess security implementations and industry

expectations of an agroterrorism or food tampering event for meat processing facilities

and food service establishments. The questionnaire for meat processing facilities was

based on the General Food Defense Plan published by the United States Department of

Agriculture (USDA).52 No identifiable information was collected. The first section of

this questionnaire was designed to determine how familiar meat processing executives in

Kentucky are with the concepts of bioterrorism and agroterrorism. There were also

questions in this section asking these executives to rate how likely they perceive an

agroterrorism event is to occur both in general and at their facilities specifically, as well

as whether or not each facility has a functional food defense plan in place. The next ten

sections assessed security in the following areas: outside security measures, shipment

security, mail security, indoor security measures, slaughter/processing area security,

water system security, hazardous material security, information security, employee/non-

16

employee security, and incident response. The questionnaire given to meat processing

facilities is shown in Appendix B.

A phone call was administered to every meat processing facility (n = 61)

published in the 2007 Directory of Kentucky Livestock Processors. The call solicited

participation in the survey. If permission by the owner was obtained, an interview was

scheduled with each owner or manager at his/her place of business. If permission was

denied, no further phone calls were made to the refusing facility. A second round of

phone calls was made to the facilities that were not contacted with the first round of

phone calls. If contact was made, participation in the survey was solicited. If contact

was not initiated, a final round of calls was made. Eight appointments were made

following the first round of calls, one appointment after the second round, and none after

the final round. Nine surveys in total were completed.

The surveys were personally delivered and completed by the owner or manager in

a private room. Due to the secure nature of the survey, the completed survey was sealed

in an envelope and locked in a box. When the survey period was completed, the survey

responses were entered into a Microsoft Excel file for analysis. An attempt was made to

do a statistical comparison of the responses based on the size of the facility.

Unfortunately, only processing facilities that described themselves as ‘small’ completed

the survey, so a statistical comparison was unable to be made. An observational study

was done instead.

17

Food Service Establishment Survey

The questionnaire given to food service establishments is shown in Appendix C.

No identifiable information was collected. The first section is similar to the first section

of the questionnaire for meat processing facilities. This section solicited information

regarding the owners’/managers’ familiarity with bio- and agro-terrorism, as well as how

secure they perceive their establishments to be. It also enquired about the presence or

lack of a functional food defense plan for the establishment. The remaining sections

assessed security in the following areas: general security measures, employee security,

food security, hazardous materials security, information security, and incident response.

The target population for this study was all food service establishments in the

state of Kentucky. However, due to time and budget constraints, the actual population

was all restaurants in Warren County, Kentucky. The sampling frame was all food

service establishments that have a food service permit on file at the Barren River District

Health Department (BRDHD).

Initially, a mail-based survey was attempted. One hundred surveys, along with a

self-addressed and stamped return envelope, were mailed to a random sample of food

service establishments from the sampling frame. Only four were completed and returned.

Due to the poor return rate and the relatively high cost of mailing questionnaires, it was

decided to attempt a different survey methodology.

During the second attempt, the survey was administered to food service managers

that attended a food manager certification course taught at the BRDHD during the

months of December 2012 and January 2013. Solicitation for participation in the survey

was requested at the time of the course. Completed surveys were collected at the end of

18

the course by either the researcher or the instructor of the course. In total, 31

questionnaires were completed during this time, for a total of 35 completed

questionnaires. The survey responses were entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet,

and a statistical comparison between restaurants and non-restaurants was performed. A

students’ t test was used to compare means, and Fishers’ exact test was used to compare

categorical data between the two groups.

Results Meat Processing Facilities Section 1: Type of Meat Processed

In order to determine the size of the meat processing facility, the study

participants were asked whether their facilities were small, medium, or large. Only four

of nine participants answered this question. All of them answered they are ‘small’

facilities. The study participants were also asked to name the meat products distributed

by their facility. They were given a list of meats to choose from: beef/veal, pork, poultry,

sheep/lamb, other, and none. Four of nine participants answered this question. Table 1

lists the products sold by these participants.

Table 1. Products Distributed By Participating Meat Processing Facilities

Product Number of Facilities Selling Product

Beef/Veal 3

Pork 3

Poultry 3

Sheep/Lamb 1

Other 0

None 0

19

Section 2: Agroterrorism The purpose of this section was to determine meat processing facility owners’

familiarity with the terms ‘bioterrorism’ and ‘agroterrorism’, as well as their concern that

such an attack may occur against the U.S. and their facility specifically. Questions one

and two asked the participants to rank from one to four their familiarity with both terms,

with one being “completely unfamiliar” and four being “completely familiar”. Questions

three and four asked the participants to rank from one to five their concern that a

deliberate agroterrorism attack may occur against both the U.S. and their facility, with

one implying “no concern” and five implying “extreme concern”. The means and

standard deviations from these questions are given in Table 2.

Table 2. Knowledge and Concern of Meat Processors Regarding an Agroterrorism Attack

Question Mean Standard

Deviation

Familiarity with Bioterrorism 3.1 0.9

Familiarity with Agroterrorism 3.0 1.1

Concern About Agroterrorist Attack Against U.S. 2.7 0.7

Concern About Agroterrorist Attack Against

Facility

1.7 0.7

Participants reported that they were on average ‘somewhat familiar’ with the

terms ‘bioterrorism’ and ‘agroterrorism’. They reported slight concern that an incidence

of agroterrorism may occur against the U.S. and hardly any concern that an attack could

happen to their facilities specifically. Questions five and six asked participants if their

facilities had ever been evaluated for security risks, and if not, if they were interested in

undergoing such an evaluation. Five facilities reported that they had undergone security

evaluations, and three reported they had not. Of those three, two were not interested in

being evaluated and one was unsure.

20

Section 3: Outside Security Measures This section sought to determine what sorts of physical security measures were

implemented by meat processors to protect the facility itself. This includes the main

facility building, as well as any outside storage buildings that may be present. Questions

were asked regarding perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras and alarm systems, and the

locking of doors and windows. Table 3 shows the total number of responses regarding

physical security at these meat processing facilities.

Table 3. Meat Processors’ Responses Regarding Physical Security of the Premises

Physical Security Type Facilities with Facilities without

Perimeter Fencing 1 7

Surveillance Cameras 1 7

Locked Entrances 7 1

Locked Windows/Air Vents 8 0

Presence of Outdoor Storage

Facilities 2 7

Access to Outdoor Facilities 0 2

Locked Entrances to Outdoor

Facilities 0 2

Alarm Systems 4 5

Maintenance of Alarm Systems 3 2

Among the respondents, locking windows and doors of the facility was very

commonly done. Surveillance cameras and perimeter fencing were not very common.

Alarm systems were utilized by approximately half the participating facilities. Among

those facilities with alarm systems, approximately half stated they were updated regularly

according to the manufacturer’s instructions.

Section 4: Shipment Security This section sought to determine the security procedures in place at the processing

facilities for incoming and outgoing packages. Participants were asked if packages were

21

examined before entering or exiting the facility, if vehicles were examined before

entering or exiting the facility, and if loading docks were secured and monitored when in

use. Table 4 presents the total number of responses regarding security of shipments.

Table 4. Security of Shipments Delivered and Received By Meat Processors

Security Type Facilities with Facilities without

Examination of Incoming

Packages 7 2

Examination of Outgoing

Packages 8 1

Examination of Incoming

Vehicles 1 8

Examination of Outgoing

Vehicles 0 9

Presence of a Loading Dock 3 6

Security of Loading Dock 2 1

Among the respondents, it was common to examine packages both upon entering

and exiting the facility. It was not common to examine vehicles either upon entering or

upon exiting. Most facilities stated they did not have a loading dock. Among those that

did have a loading dock, two stated that the loading dock was secured and monitored, and

one stated it was not.

Section 5: Mail Security The purpose of this section was to determine the facilities’ policies for handling

suspicious mail. Participants were asked if mail was examined for possible threats, if

employees were trained to recognize suspicious mail, and if mail handling was done in a

safe location. This section included questions 30 through 33. Question 33, which asked

participants to elaborate on the procedure for handling suspicious mail, was a free

response question. Free response questions are questions where the participant is not

22

given answer choices. The response to this question is documented in Appendix D. The

rest of the questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t

know’. Table 5 shows the total number of each response in this section for the non-free

response questions.

Table 5. Security of Incoming Mail Received By Meat Processors

Security Type Facilities With Facilities Without

Safe Mail Handling 9 0

Examination of Mail 5 4

Employee Training

Regarding the Safe Handling

of Mail 2 7

All participants responded that mail handling was done in a safe location, away

from any animal or meat processing activities that may be occurring. Approximately half

the respondents stated that they examined mail before opening it, and only two stated that

employees at their facilities were trained to look for suspicious mail.

Section 6: Indoor Security Measures The purpose of this section was to determine what attempts were made by meat

processing facilities to secure the inside of the facility. Participants were asked about

whether or not restricted areas of the facility were clearly marked, whether or not

emergency lighting was present, and whether employees were familiar with any

emergency exit policies that may be in place. Questions regarding whether or not new

materials brought into the facility were examined before use, as well as questions about

inventory documentation were also asked in this section.

This section included questions 34 through 43. One free response question asking

participants how often they update their inventory is included. The rest of the questions in

23

this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 6 shows the

total number of each response in this section for the non-free response questions.

Table 6. Security of the Inside of Meat Processing Facilities


Restricted Areas 2 7

Examination of New or Unused

Materials 7 1

Documentation of Inventory 6 2

Reporting of Unexpected

Changes in Inventory 5 2

Presence of Emergency Lighting 4 5

Existence of Emergency Exit

Policies 6 3

Awareness of Employees of

Emergency Exit Policies 4 0

Periodic Emergency Drills 3 1

Awareness of Emergency

Response Personnel of

Emergency Exit Policies 3 1

The majority of respondents stated that restricted areas of their facilities were not

clearly marked. Most of the respondents also stated that new materials entering the

facility were examined before use, and that inventory was documented. Just over half the

respondents stated that unexpected changes in inventory would be reported to appropriate

authorities. Approximately half the facilities have emergency lighting in place, and 2/3

of the respondents stated that their facilities had emergency exit policies. Of those that

have emergency exit policies, only one stated that their employees were unfamiliar with

them.

Question 37 asked respondents how often they updated their inventory. Six

participants responded to this question. The responses were highly variable, ranging

from those that update inventory every day to those that update every 90 days. The

24

average number of days between updates was 22.7 days, with a standard deviation of

34.7 days.

Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security The purpose of this section was to determine the security measures in place in the

slaughtering area, for those facilities that store live animals, and the processing area.

Respondents were asked whether live animals were stored at their facilities. For those

that answered in the affirmative, questions were asked regarding whether animals were

inspected, whether screening was performed to detect diseased animals, and what policies

were in place when a diseased animal was discovered. Questions regarding access to

animals and animal records were also addressed in this section. For any facilities with

active meat processing, questions were asked about access to the meat products, testing

of meat products, and inventory documentation of any non-meat products used in food

meant for human or animal consumption.

This section included questions 44 through 76. Questions 45 through 67 were

only answered by those respondents that stated live animals were stored at their facilities.

Free response questions asking participants which institutions were alerted when a

disease animal was discovered, other procedures used for responding to a diseased

animal, and how long purchase receipts are kept onsite are included. The responses to

these questions are documented in Appendix D. The rest of the questions in this section

required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 7 shows the total

number of each response in this section for the non-free response questions.

25

Table 7. Security of Slaughter and Processing Areas By Meat Processors

Security Type Facilities

With

Facilities

Without

Storage of Live Animals 4 5

Federal Inspection of Stored Animals 4 0

Abnormal Behavior Screening 4 0

Slaughter of Diseased Animal 0 3

Laboratory Testing of Disease Animal 4 0

Quarantine of Remaining Animals 2 1

Restricted Access to Animals 3 1

Recording of Visitation to Animal Storage 1 3

Recording of Stored Animals 4 0

Recording of Animal Purchase Site 2 2

Recording of Animal Purchase Date 2 2

Onsite Maintenance of Records 2 2

Visitor Access to Animal Storage Facilities 1 3

Requirement of Visitors to Animal Storage to Sign In 0 2

Accompaniment of Visitors to Animal Storage by

Appropriate Personnel 2 0

Performing of Animal Slaughter 4 0

Restriction of Access to Slaughtering Area 4 0

Recording of Visitation to Slaughtering Area 1 3

Recording of Specific Animal Slaughtered 4 0

Recording of Date of Slaughter 4 0

Periodic Testing on Slaughtered Animals 4 0

Access of Non-Employees to Slaughtering Areas 2 2

Requirement of Non-Employees to Sign In When

Visiting Slaughtering Area 0 2

Accompaniment of Non-Employees to Slaughtering

Facility by Appropriate Personnel 2 0

Restriction of Access to Animal Control Equipment 2 0

Storage of Meat Products 8 1

Restriction of Access to Meat Products 8 0

Recording of Inventory of Date of Storage of Meat

Products 6 2

Periodic Testing of Meat Products 5 3

Storage of Non-Meat Products used in Food 6 3

Restriction of Access to Non-Meat Products 6 0

Recording of Non-Meat Product Purchase Site 6 0

Recording of Non-Meat Product Purchase Date 6 0

26

Table 7. Security of Slaughter and Processing Areas By Meat Processors

Security Type Facilities

With

Facilities

Without

Recording of Non-Meat Product Storage Date 6 0

Periodic Examination of Non-Meat Products 6 0

Four respondents stated that live animals were stored on their facilities. At these

facilities, all animals are inspected by a veterinarian, and all animals are screened for

symptoms of disease. If disease is found, the animals are not slaughtered but are instead

sent away for laboratory testing. Other animals in the facility are quarantined and tested.

Access to the animals is restricted by all but one facility.

All respondents with live animal storage state that records are maintained for

every animal stored at the facility. Two facilities stated that these records included where

and when the animal was purchased. Two respondents stated that purchase receipts for

animals were maintained onsite and kept for a range of one to seven years. All four

respondents keep records regarding which animals are slaughtered and when, and each

respondent conducts periodic testing on slaughtered animals. Two of the facilities

allowed visitor access to the slaughtering area. Neither of these facilities required visitors

to sign in when entering the area, although both facilities stated that any visitors are

accompanied by appropriate personnel.

All but one respondent stated that meat products were stored at their facilities. Of

these respondents, all stated that access to the meat products was restricted. Inventory

records regarding the date of storage for the meat products is available for 75% of

respondents. Five respondents stated that periodic testing was performed on meat

products to detect disease and ensure quality. Six respondents stated that ingredients

other than meat were stored in the facility. Of these respondents, all six stated that access

27

to these ingredients was restricted, and that inventory records were kept regarding the

company the ingredients were purchased from, the date of purchase, and the date of

storage. All six respondents stated that periodic examination of the ingredients was

performed to check for evidence of tampering.

Section 8: Water System Security The purpose of this section was to determine the policies for securing the water

systems present at each meat processing facility. The systems included in this section

were potable water storage tanks, water reuse systems, transfer lines, and ice-making

equipment. This section included questions 78 through 89. The questions in this section


number of each response in this section for each question.

28

Table 8. Security of Water Systems By Meat Processors


Presence of Storage

Tanks of Potable Water 1 8

Restriction of Access to

Potable Water Tanks 1 0

Examination of Potable

Water Tanks 1 0

Periodic Testing of

Water in Potable Water

Tanks 1 0

Presence of Water Reuse

System 9 0


Water Reuse System 0 0

Monitoring of Water

Reuse System 0 0

Use of Transfer Lines 2 7


Transfer Lines 1 1

Examination of Transfer

Lines 1 1

Use of Ice Making

Equipment 1 8


Ice Making Equipment 1 0

Only one respondent stated that storage tanks of potable water were in use at that

facility. This respondent stated that access to the storage tanks was restricted, and the

tanks were monitored for evidence of tampering. No facilities reported use of a water

reuse system. Two facilities reported use of transfer lines for moving water or feed. Of

these two facilities, one reported that access to the lines was restricted and that the lines

were periodically examined for evidence of tampering. One respondent reported use of

ice-making equipment. This respondent stated that access to the ice-making equipment

was restricted.

29

Section 9: Hazardous Material Security The purpose of this section was to determine the policies regarding storage and

disposal of hazardous materials for meat processing facilities. Questions regarding

access to stored hazardous materials were also posed in this section. This section

included questions 90 through 95. One free response questions asking participants what

their procedures were for handling inconsistencies in their inventory of hazardous

materials was included. Responses to this question are documented in Appendix D. The

rest of the questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t

know’. Table 9 shows the total number of each response in this section for the non-free

response questions.

Table 9. Security of Hazardous Materials and Waste By Meat Processors


Storage of Hazardous Materials 2 7


Hazardous Materials 2 0

Documentation of Inventory of

Hazardous Materials 0 2

Proper Disposal of Hazardous

Waste 5 2


Hazardous Waste 5 1

Only two respondents reported the storage of bulk quantities of hazardous

materials at their facilities. Both facilities restrict access to the hazardous materials, but

neither keeps an inventory of the materials in use at the facility. Five facilities reported

the proper disposal of hazardous waste. These five facilities also reported that access to

hazardous wasted was restricted. Two respondents stated that hazardous waste was not

properly disposed of at their facilities, and one respondent stated that access to the

hazardous waste was not restricted.

30

Section 10: Information Security The purpose of this section was to analyze methods for securing information and

computer systems in meat processing facilities. Respondents were asked about

controlling access to documents regarding facility layout, processing procedures, and

inventory documentation. Respondents were also asked whether or not they secured their

computer systems with passwords, firewalls, and virus protection. This section included

questions 96 through 102. The questions in this section required an answer of either

‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 10 shows the total number of each response in this

section for each question.

Table 10. Security of Information Stored at Meat Processing Facilities



Information About Facility

Layout 6 3


Information About Facility

Processing 8 1


Inventory Documentation 8 1

Use of Computer System 6 3

Password Protection 6 0

Use of Firewall 5 0

Use of Virus Protection Software 5 0

Six respondents reported that access to information regarding facility layout was

restricted. Eight respondents reported that access to information regarding processing

procedures and inventory documentation was restricted. Six respondents reported use of

a computer system in their facilities. Of these respondents, all six reported that

passwords were required to access the system, and five reported use of a firewall and

virus protection software.

31

Section 11: Employee/Non-Employee Security The purpose of this section was to determine what requirements are in place for

employees and visitors of meat processing facilities in order to promote safety and

security. Respondents were asked if employees and visitors were required to wear

identification materials or sign in and out when entering or exiting the facility. Questions

asking about restricting the use of cameras and cell phones with cameras and background

checks and security training for new employees were also posed in this section. This

section included questions 103 through 114. The questions in this section required an

answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 11 shows the total number of each

response in this section for each question.

32

Table 11. Security of Employees and Non-Employees By Meat Processing Facilities


Identification Materials on

Employees 1 8

Requirement of Employees to

Sign In and Out 5 4

Background Checks for

Employees 4 5

Restriction of Use of Cameras

and Cell Phones for Employees 3 6

Requirement of Security

Training 2 7

Interest in Providing Security

Training 1 6

Availability of Information On

Threat Response Policies for

Employees 4 4

Requirement of Employees to

Report Suspicious Activity 8 1

Timely Investigation of

Employee Reports 7 0

Requirement of Visitors to

Sign In 2 6

Requirement of Identification

Materials For Visitors 1 7

Restriction of Cameras and

Cell Phones for Visitors 3 5

Eight respondents stated that employees were not required to wear identification

materials. Five facilities require employees to sign in and out when entering and exiting

the facility. Four facilities require background checks, and two facilities provide security

training for new employees. Of the seven facilities that do not provide security training,

only one respondent expressed interest in providing such training in the future. Three

facilities restrict employees and visitors from carrying cameras or cell phones with

cameras onto facility grounds. All facilities but one require employees to report

suspicious activity, and all respondents reported that employee reports are investigated

33

immediately. Only two facilities require visitors to sign in when entering the facility, and

only one facility requires visitors to wear identification materials.

Section 12: Incident Response The purpose of this section was to determine whether meat processing facilities

have policies in place to deal with an actual incidence of terrorism. Respondents were

asked about quarantine procedures and food recall plans. They were also asked if

emergency contact information was kept up to date. This section included questions 115

through 118. The questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I

don’t know’. Table 12 shows the total number of each response in this section for each

question.

Table 12. Incident Response By Meat Processing Facilities


Existence of Product

Quarantine Procedures 7 2

Existence of Food Recall

Plan 8 1

Testing of Food Recall Plan 4 4

Up-To-Date Emergency and

Personnel Contact

Information 8 0

Seven respondents reported that they did have policies in place to quarantine

animals when an attack is suspected. Eight respondents reported having a food recall

plan, although only four respondents reported having tested their plan. Eight respondents

reported that all emergency contact information was kept up to date.

34

Food Service Establishments

Section 1: Descriptive Statistics This section asked participants to describe the type of food service establishment

they worked for. The types included in the section were chain restaurant, non-chain

restaurant, school or child day care cafeteria, hospital or long-term care facility, hotel or

bed and breakfast, and other. This section was completed by 30 respondents. Table 13

shows the distribution of respondents.

Table 13. Distribution of Food Service Establishments

Type Number of Respondents

Chain Restaurant 5

Non-chain Restaurant 7

School/Child Day Care Cafeteria 9

Hospital/Long Term Care Cafeteria 3

Hotel/Bed and Breakfast 1

Other 5

Unanswered 5

Total 35

The data from this section was used as a basis for comparison during the rest of

the analysis. Two groups composing of restaurants (chain and non-chain) and non-

restaurants (schools, hospitals, hotels, and others) were created. A comparison of these

two groups was conducted.

Section 2: Terrorism and Food Defense This section sought to determine familiarity with the term “bioterrorism”, concern

about an incidence of food tampering, and concern about food defense among food

permit holders in Warren County, Kentucky. The first, third, and sixth questions required

participants to rank from one to four their familiarity with bioterrorism, food tampering,

and the Guidance Document, with a rank of one implying complete unfamiliarity and

35

four implying complete familiarity. The second, fourth, and fifth questions required

participants to rank from one to five their concern about a bioterrorism attack against the

U.S., a food tampering incident in their establishment, and food defense for their

establishment, with one implying no concern and five implying extreme concern. The

mean and standard deviation for each of these questions are listed in Table 14.

Table 14. Concern About Bioterrorism, Food Tampering, and Food Defense Expressed By Food Service Establishments

Question Mean for

Restaurants

Standard

Deviation for

Restaurants

Mean for

Non-

Restaurants

Standard

Deviation for

Non-

Restaurants

Familiarity with

Bioterrorism

2 1.1 2.9 0.9

Concern About

Bioterrorism

Attack Against

U.S.

2 1.7 3.4 1.4

Concern About

Food Tampering

Incident in U.S.

2.5 1.0 2.8 0.8

Concern About

Food Tampering

Event in

Establishment

1.5 1.9 1.5 1.0

Concern With

Food Defense

1 1.7 1.8 1.3

Familiarity with

Guidance

Document

1.5 1.2 2.1 1.2

A student’s t-test was used to compare the means for each of the two groups

under discussion. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 15.

36

Table 15. Probabilities Associated with Students’ t Analysis of Table 14

Question p-value

Familiarity with Bioterrorism 0.5

Concern About Bioterrorism Attack Against U.S. 1.0

Concern About Food Tampering Incident in U.S. 0.8

Concern About Food Tampering Event in Establishment* 0.05

Concern With Food Defense* 0.08

Familiarity with Guidance Document 0.5

*Implies statistical significance

Since the sample size was so small, a higher than usual level of significance, 0.1,

was used throughout this analysis. At a significance level of 0.1, it was determined that

there was a significant difference in the two groups for questions four and five.

Restaurant managers are less concerned about a targeted food tampering incident in their

establishment and less concerned about food defense overall than non-restaurants.

The final question in this section inquired whether food permit holders would be

interested in reviewing “Guidance Document for Retail Food Stores and Food

Establishments” published by the FDA. This document provides recommendations on

food defense for food service establishments. Participants were asked to respond with

‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. In the restaurant group, seven participants responded ‘yes’,

three responded ‘no’, and three responded ‘I don’t know’. In the non-restaurant group,

eleven participants responded ‘yes’, one responded ‘no’, and six responded ‘I don’t

know’. To simplify analysis, those that responded ‘no’ and ‘I don’t know’ were

combined. A Fisher’s exact analysis was used to compare the groups and resulted in a p-

value of 0.5. There is no significant difference in the interest level for reviewing this

document between the two groups.

37

Section 3: Management Responsibilities in Food Defense This section compared managerial responsibilities for food defense between the

restaurant and non-restaurant groups. Questions enquired about food defense plans,

availability of contact information for the police department, fire department, ambulance,

the public health department, and homeland security, and whether managers encouraged

staff to be vigilant about food tampering. Each question in this section required an

answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. This section comprised questions eight

through seventeen of Appendix C. Table 16 shows the total number of each response in

Section 3.

Table 16. Managerial Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service Establishments

Type of Security

Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant

Group

Yes No I don't

know Yes No

I don't

know

Existence of Food Defense Plan 5 4 3 5 7 6

Familiarity with Food Defense Plan 3 2 0 3 1 1

Exercise of Food Defense Plan

Within One Year 3 2 0 3 1 1

Periodic Security Inspections by

Manager or Designated Employee 10 2 0 12 5 1

Familiarity with Contact

Information for Police 12 0 0 16 0 2


Information for Fire Department 12 0 0 16 0 2

38

Table 16. Managerial Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service Establishments

Type of Security


Group

Yes No I don't

know Yes No

I don't

know


Information for Ambulance 12 0 0 16 0 2


Information for Public Health

Department

11 1 0 16 1 1


Information for Homeland Security

Agency

4 4 4 10 3 5

Encouragement of Vigilance in Staff

Members 11 0 1 15 1 2

Awareness of Employees of

Manager to Report to 11 0 1 13 1 4

Timely Investigation of Staff

Reports 11 0 1 14 0 4

Presence of “Person in Charge” 9 3 0 15 1 2

Restriction of Employees With

Symptoms of Foodborne Illness 11 1 0 15 2 1

A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups. For

statistical analysis, those that responded ‘no’ and ‘I don’t know’ were combined. They

were combined in this way in all following Fisher’s analyses. Table 17 shows the results

of the Fisher’s analysis for each question in this section.

39

Table 17. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 16

Security Type p-value

Existence of Food Defense Plan 0.5

Familiarity with Food Defense Plan 1.0

Exercise of Food Defense Plan Within One Year 1.0

Periodic Security Inspections by Manager or Designated Employee 0.4

Familiarity with Contact Information for Police 0.5

Familiarity with Contact Information for Fire Department 0.5

Familiarity with Contact Information for Ambulance 0.5

Familiarity with Contact Information for Public Health Department 1.0

Familiarity with Contact Information for Homeland Security Agency 0.3

Encouragement of Vigilance in Staff Members 0.6

Awareness of Employees of Manager to Report to 0.4

Timely Investigation of Staff Reports 0.6

Presence of “Person in Charge” 0.7

Restriction of Employees With Symptoms of Foodborne Illness 0.6

At a significance level of 0.1, no significant differences were found between the

two groups.

Section 4: Staff Responsibilities in Food Defense The purpose of this section was to determine what the responsibilities and

requirements for staff were in each establishment. Respondents answered questions

regarding background checks for new employees, staff uniforms, access to employee-

only restricted areas, and security training for employees. Questions regarding security

training included whether or not employees were trained to monitor for suspicious

activity and foodborne illness. This section contains questions 18 through 30. Each

question in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.

Questions 23 and 24, which asked about restricted areas, had an additional option of ‘Not

Applicable’ for those establishments without restricted areas. Table 18 shows the total

number of each response in Section 4.

40

Table 18. Staff Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service Establishments

Security Type

Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group

Yes No

I

don't

know

Not

Applicable Yes No

I

don't

know

Not

Applicable

Background

Checks 6 6 0 ~ 16 1 0 ~

Identification

Materials For

Staff 9 3 0 ~ 12 6 0 ~

Uniforms For

Staff 11 1 0 ~ 15 3 0 ~

Collection of

Identification

Materials

From Former

Staff 10 2 0 ~ 9 6 3 ~

Documentation

of Which

Employees Are

Working 11 1 0 ~ 16 2 0 ~

Clearly

Marked

Restricted

Areas* 6 3 0 3 13 2 0 3

Access to

Restricted

Areas For

Necessary

Employees

Only* 7 1 0 4 13 2 0 3

Security

Training 3 7 2 ~ 7 11 0 ~

Availability of

Threat

Response

Information 6 4 2 ~ 13 2 3 ~ *This question had an additional option of ‘Not Applicable’ for those establishments without restricted areas.

41

Table 18. Staff Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service Establishments

Security

Type


Yes No

I

don't

know

Not

Applicable Yes No

I

don't

know

Not

Applicable

Requirement

of

Employees

to Report

Suspicious

Activity 12 0 0 ~ 15 0 3 ~

Monitoring

For Unusual

Activity

Conducted

by Staff 11 0 1 ~ 14 1 2 ~

Foodborne

Illness

Training

Provided

For Staff 8 3 1 ~ 12 1 4 ~

Requirement

to Report

Symptoms of

Foodborne

Illness 12 0 0 ~ 15 2 1 ~

A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups. Those that

responded ‘Not Applicable’ in questions 23 and 24 were left out of the analysis for those

specific questions. Table 19 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each question

in this section.

42

Table 19. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Section 4


Background Checks* 0.01

Identification Materials For Staff 0.7

Uniforms For Staff 0.6

Collection of Identification Materials From Former Staff* 0.1

Documentation of Which Employees Are Working 0.3

Clearly Marked Restricted Areas 1.0

Access to Restricted Areas For Necessary Employees Only 1.0

Security Training 0.7

Availability of Threat Response Information 0.3

Requirement of Employees to Report Suspicious Activity 0.3

Monitoring For Unusual Activity Conducted by Staff 0.6

Foodborne Illness Training Provided For Staff 1.0

Requirement to Report Symptoms of Foodborne Illness 0.3

*Implies statistical significance At a significance level of 0.1, significant differences between the two groups were

found in the questions regarding background checks and collection of identification

materials. The percentage of establishments in the non-restaurant group that require

background checks on new employees is significantly higher than in the restaurant group.

The percentage of establishments that collect name tags, uniforms, or other means of

identifying employees after the employee is no longer employed at the establishment is

significantly higher in the restaurant group.

Section 5: Customer/Visitor Security

The purpose of this section was to determine what the policies for dealing with

customers and visitors were for each establishment. For this survey, a ‘visitor’ was

defined as “those that are present in an official capacity, including but not limited to

delivery staff, health inspectors, contractors, or sales representatives.” Questions

included customer and visitor restrictions, as well as policies for accepting visitors such

as requiring proper identification and maintaining records of all official visitations. Each

43

question in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table

20 shows the total number of each response in Section 5.

Table 20. Security of Customer and Visitors to Food Service Establishments

Security Type


Yes No I don't know Yes No I don't know

Restriction of

Customers

From Food

Preparation

Areas 12 0 0 15 2 1

Proper

Identification

Required For

Visitors 11 1 0 16 2 0

Documentation

Regarding

Purpose of

Visitor

Required 8 4 0 12 4 1

Requirement

For Visitors to

Sign In 1 11 0 10 4 4

Availability of

Documentation

of Visitor

Access 2 8 1 11 3 3

Accompaniment

of Visitors by

Appropriate

Personnel 10 2 0 14 1 2

A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups. Table 21

shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each question in Section 5.

44



Restriction of Customers From Food Preparation Areas 0.3

Proper Identification Required For Visitors 1.0

Documentation Regarding Purpose of Visitor Required 1.0

Requirement For Visitors to Sign In* 0.02

Availability of Documentation of Visitor Access* 0.02

Accompaniment of Visitors by Appropriate Personnel 1.0

*Implies statistical significance

At a significance level of 0.1, significant differences between the two groups were

found in the questions regarding visitor sign-in requirements and visitor access

documentation. A higher percentage of establishments in the non-restaurant group

require visitors to sign in than in the restaurant group. A higher percentage of

establishments in the non-restaurant group maintain records of each time an official

visitation occurs than in the restaurant group.

Section 6: Outdoor/Indoor Security The purpose of this section was to determine what steps establishment managers

take to ensure the physical security of the property. Questions in this section enquire

about locking and securing entrances and windows, whether or not surveillance cameras

and alarm systems are in use, and the security of any outdoor storage facilities that may

be present at each establishment. This section included questions 37 through 50 of

Appendix C. Several free response questions asking participants to elaborate on how

they ensured all doors and windows were locked, how often they ensured their alarm

system was working, and any other security measures they used to prevent unauthorized

entry were included in this section. The responses to these questions are documented in

Appendix E. The rest of the questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’,

45

‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 22 shows the total number of each response in this section

for the non-free response questions.

Table 22. Physical Security of Food Service Establishments

Security Type



Locked

Entrances 11 1 0 15 2 1

Locked

Windows/Air

Vents 10 2 0 11 4 3

Surveillance

Cameras Inside 8 4 0 11 7 0

Surveillance

Cameras

Outside 6 6 0 10 7 1

Alarm Systems 6 6 0 11 4 3

Appropriate

Maintenance of

Alarm Systems 8 1 1 9 0 2

Presence of

Outdoor

Storage

Facilities 5 7 0 9 7 2

Restriction of

Access to

Storage


Locking of

Storage


A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each non-

free response question. Table 23 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each non-

free response question in Section 6.

46

Table 23: Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 22


Locked Entrances 0.6

Locked Windows/Air Vents 0.2

Surveillance Cameras Inside 1.0

Surveillance Cameras Outside 1.0

Alarm Systems 0.7

Appropriate Maintenance of Alarm Systems 1.0

Presence of Outdoor Storage Facilities 0.7

Restriction of Access to Storage Facilities 0.5

Locking of Storage Facilities 0.5


two groups.

Section 7: Food Security The purpose of this section was to determine each establishment’s policies for

potential targets of a food tampering incident, such as food delivery, food storage, and

food preparation activities. This section also sought to determine which establishments

keep a food inventory, what the inventory contains, and how often it is updated. This

section included questions 51 through 73 of Appendix C. Free response questions asking

participants to elaborate on their establishments’ policies for receiving unexpected food

in a delivery, their procedures for inconsistencies discovered in inventory records, and

their policies for discovering unlabeled food were included. The responses to these

questions are documented in Appendix D. The rest of the questions in this section


number of each response in this section for the non-free response questions.

47

Table 24. Security of Food in Food Service Establishments

Security Type


Group

Yes No I don't

know Yes No

I don't

know

Delivery of Food by Approved

Sources 12 0 0 12 3 0

Inspection of Delivered Food By

Employees 12 0 0 15 1 0

Inventory Documentation

Available 12 0 0 14 2 0

Inventory Includes Which Foods

Delivered 12 0 0 15 0 1

Inventory Includes Food

Purchase Site 10 1 1 15 0 1

Inventory Includes Food Storage

Date 12 0 0 12 2 2

Inventory Includes Food Storage

Location 12 0 0 13 1 2

Inventory Includes Food

Expiration Date 11 1 0 11 3 1

Appropriate Labeling of Foods 12 0 0 16 0 0

Inspection of Stored Foods By

Employees 12 0 0 15 0 1

Appropriate Storage of Foods

According to FDA Guidelines 12 0 0 15 0 1

Appropriate Preparation of

Foods According to FDA

Guidelines

12 0 0 15 0 1

Foods with Potential For

Contamination Stored Separately 12 0 0 14 1 1

Laboratory Testing of

Contaminated Foods 2 8 2 3 8 4

Discarding of Expired Foods 12 0 0 16 0 0

Cleaning of Equipment Before

Each Use 12 0 0 16 0 0

Separate Storage of Different

Foods 12 0 0 16 0 0

Bulk Products Stored in Easily

Monitored Areas 4 7 0 12 4 0

48

Table 24. Security of Food in Food Service Establishments

Security Type


Group

Yes No I don't

know Yes No

I don't

know

Appropriate Cleaning of

Foods Before Use 12 0 0 13 1 2

Presence of Self-Service Areas 2 9 1 9 5 0

Monitoring of Self-Service

Areas 3 0 0 9 0 0

Presence of Vending

Machines 0 12 0 9 7 0


Vending Machine Products 0 0 0 8 1 0




49



Delivery of Food by Approved Sources 0.2

Inspection of Delivered Food By Employees 1.0

Inventory Documentation Available 0.5

Inventory Includes Which Foods Delivered 1.0

Inventory Includes Food Purchase Site 0.6

Inventory Includes Food Storage Date* 0.1

Inventory Includes Food Storage Location 0.2

Inventory Includes Food Expiration Date 0.3

Appropriate Labeling of Foods 1.0

Inspection of Stored Foods By Employees 1.0

Appropriate Storage of Foods According to FDA Guidelines 1.0

Appropriate Preparation of Foods According to FDA Guidelines 1.0

Foods with Potential For Contamination Stored Separately 0.5

Laboratory Testing of Contaminated Foods 1.0

Discarding of Expired Foods 1.0

Cleaning of Equipment Before Each Use 1.0

Separate Storage of Different Foods 1.0

Bulk Products Stored in Easily Monitored Areas* 0.06

Appropriate Cleaning of Foods Before Use 0.2

Presence of Self-Service Areas* 0.05

Monitoring of Self-Service Areas 1.0

Presence of Vending Machines* 0.002

Restriction of Access to Vending Machine Products^ ~

*Implies statistical significance ^ As there was no response from the restaurant group for this question, a Fisher’s exact analysis could not be performed. At a significance level of 0.1, significant differences between the two groups were

found in the questions that asked about food storage dates, bulk products, presence of

self-service areas, and presence of vending machines. A higher percentage of restaurants

keep a food inventory that documents when foods are stored than non-restaurants. A

higher percentage of non-restaurants keep food products stored in bulk in easily-

monitored public areas than restaurants. A higher percentage of non-restaurants contain

self-service areas, such as buffets and salad bars, and vending machines than restaurants.

50

Question 56 asked participants to state how often their establishment updates the

food inventory. The average and standard deviation of the number of days between

updates was determined for each of the two groups. This is displayed in Table 26.

Table 26. Mean and Standard Deviation of the Number of Days between Inventory Updates for Restaurants and Non-Restaurants

Group Mean Number of Days Between Updates

Standard Deviation (Number of Days)

Restaurants 4.9 2.7

Non-Restaurants

17.8 16.8

A students’ t test was performed to compare the means between the two groups.

A p-value of 0.02 resulted from this analysis. At a significance level of 0.1, it is

determined that there is a significant difference in the number of days between inventory

updates between restaurants and non-restaurants. On average, restaurants update their

inventory more often.

Section 8: Mail Security The purpose of this section was to determine each establishment’s policies for

handling suspicious mail. Questions in this section enquired about where mail was

handled, whether or not mail was examined before opening, and what the procedures

were when suspicious mail was discovered. This section included questions 74 through

77 of Appendix C. One free response question asking participants to elaborate on their

procedures for handling suspicious mail was included. The responses to this question are

documented in Appendix E. The rest of the questions in this section required an answer

of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 27 shows the total number of each response

in this section for the non-free response questions.

51

Table 27. Security of Incoming Mail Received By Food Service Establishments

Security Type



Appropriate

Location for

Mail Handling 8 2 2 15 1 0

Examination of

Mail 7 4 1 9 1 6

Training of

Employees For

Mail Handling 4 7 1 4 5 7






Appropriate Location for Mail Handling* 0.1

Examination of Mail 1.0

Training of Employees For Mail Handling 0.7

*Implies statistical significance At a significance level of 0.1, a significant difference was found between the two

groups for question 74. A higher percentage of non-restaurants handle the mail away

from food preparation areas than restaurants.

Section 9: Hazardous Materials The purpose of this section was to determine each establishment’s policies on

storing and disposing of hazardous materials. Questions in this section enquired about

whether these types of materials were stored, and if so, whether or not an inventory of

these materials was kept and if these materials were disposed of properly. This section

included questions 78 through 83 of Appendix D. One free response question asking

52

participants to elaborate on their procedures for inconsistencies discovered in their

inventory of hazardous materials was included. The responses to this question are

documented in Appendix E. The rest of the questions in this section required an answer

of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 29 shows the total number of each response

in this section for the non-free response questions.

Table 29. Security of Hazardous Materials and Waste in Food Service Establishments

Security Type



Storage of

Hazardous

Materials 4 7 0 15 1 0

Restriction of

Access to

Hazardous


Documentation

of Inventory

For Hazardous


Proper

Disposal of

Hazardous

Waste 10 0 1 13 0 2

Restriction of

Access to

Hazardous

Waste 10 0 1 13 1 2




53



Storage of Hazardous Materials 1.0

Restriction of Access to Hazardous Materials 0.5

Documentation of Inventory For Hazardous Materials 0.6

Proper Disposal of Hazardous Waste 0.6

Restriction of Access to Hazardous Waste 1.0


two groups.

Section 10: Information Security The purpose of this section was to determine the security of information and

computer systems for each establishment. Questions in this section enquired about

access to inventory documents and security of computer systems, including inquiries

about password protection, firewalls, and virus protection for the computer. This section

contains questions 84 through 88. Each question in this section required an answer of

either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 31 shows the total number of each response in

this section.

54

Table 31. Security of Information Kept By Food Service Establishments

Security

Training



Restriction of

Access to

Inventory

Documentation 10 2 0 13 0 3

Use of

Computer

System 8 4 0 16 0 0

Use of Password

Protection 7 1 0 15 0 1

Use of Firewall 7 0 0 12 0 4

Use of Virus

Protection

Software 7 0 0 13 0 3




Table 32: Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-Restaurants in Table 31


Restriction of Access to Inventory Documentation 1.0

Use of Computer System* 0.02

Use of Password Protection 1.0

Use of Firewall 0.3

Use of Virus Protection Software 1.0

*Implies statistical significance At a significance level of 0.1, a significant difference between the two groups was

found for question 85. A higher percentage of non-restaurants utilize a computer system

than restaurants.

55

Discussion

Meat Processing Facilities

Section 1: Study Design

Before getting started with this portion of the project, it was understood that data

collection would be difficult. It was assumed that there would be some resistance on the

part of the processors to give out potentially compromising security information. To

combat this, a face-to-face survey was designed with the thought that the processors may

be more likely to trust someone they could speak with directly. It was also thought that a

face-to-face survey would be the best way to ensure a large enough sample size. In order

to boost the legitimacy of the survey, the processors were given the names and contact

information of everyone involved in the project, including the researcher, the research

advisor, and the Institutional Review Board. An incentive of the chance to win one of

two iPod Touches was also included.

Despite all of this, it was very difficult to solicit participation. Several common

reasons for refusal were given at the time of first contact by telephone. Many processors

were uninterested in the research itself, and therefore had no interest in participating.

Many felt that they were too busy to take any time out of their day to complete a survey.

Most commonly, many processors felt that their operation was too small to attract

attention for potential attack. Those that cited this reason felt that it was unnecessary for

them to participate in research concerning terrorism in the meat industry. Several meat

processing facilities stated that their businesses had closed as a result of the economic

downturn. It is possible that other facilities in the sampling population had similarly

56

closed. For these reasons, although 61 meat processors were solicited, only nine agreed

to participate in the research.

Originally, a statistical comparison of meat processing facilities was planned

based on the size of the operation: small, medium, or large. Unfortunately, the question

(D1 of Appendix B) that asked the respondent to classify his/her operation by size was

printed on the back of the title page, making it very difficult to see. Many respondents

were unaware of this question. As a result, only four respondents answered it, and each

responded with ‘small’. Due to the low response rate and the lack of variability of the

size classification question, a statistical comparison could not be made. Instead, an

observational study was conducted.

The questionnaire for this portion of the project was divided up into twelve

sections, each with its own underlying theme. This chapter will follow the questionnaire,

with a discussion of each section separately.

Section 2: Agroterrorism

A deliberate attack by terrorists on agriculture has potentially devastating

economic and public health impacts. This section was designed to quantify the

familiarity of meat processors about the concepts of bioterrorism and agroterrorism, as

well as to quantify their concern that such an attack will occur against the U.S. or against

their operations specifically. The processors professed a modest familiarity with these

concepts but were generally unconcerned that an attack would occur, either against the

U.S. or their own operations. Slightly more concern was expressed that an attack would

occur against the U.S. than their operations. This lack of concern is reflective of the

57

general attitude that was found among processors in Kentucky that their operation was

too small to warrant attention from terrorists.

This section also asked respondents if their facilities had ever been evaluated for

security risks. Three of eight respondents reported that they had not undergone any

security evaluations. None of these three respondents expressed any interest in having

their facilities evaluated, which reflects the general lack of concern for an attack against

their facilities found during this investigation.

Section 3: Outside Security Measures

Physical security measures taken to protect the facility itself are often the first line

of defense against attack. Features such as perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras, and

alarm systems may deter would-be attackers long enough for police to arrive or prevent

an attack from ever occurring. This section was designed to research what sorts of

physical security measures were being taken by meat processing facilities in Kentucky.

Respondents were asked a series of yes/no questions enquiring about the three features

discussed above, as well as whether or not doors and windows were locked during hours

of non-operation.

The locking of doors and windows was the most commonly reported security

measure. All facilities reported that the windows and air vents were locked and secured.

All but one facility reported that all entrances were secured during hours of non-

operation. Alarm systems, utilized by approximately half the respondents, were reported

as the next most common security measure. Approximately half of those that reported

having an alarm system also reported that the alarm systems maintained according to

58

manufacturing instructions. Two users of alarm systems reported that the alarm systems

were not maintained according to manufacturing instructions. This is quite discouraging

but reflective of the general lack of concern against an attack. Perimeter fencing and

surveillance cameras were reported least commonly among the respondents. One facility

reported perimeter fencing, and one facility reported surveillance cameras. As the

majority of facilities visited were in metropolitan areas, the lack of perimeter fencing

makes sense. There was just no room at these facilities for a fence around the property.

Surveillance cameras are a major expense, and given the lack of concern against an

attack, they may be seen as an unnecessary expense.

Section 4: Shipment Security

Packages, both incoming and outgoing, are potential sources for attack on a meat

processing facility. These packages may contain contaminated material designed to

sicken animals or the human beings working with them. Examining packages prior to

sending or receiving them is an important preventative measure against an attack. Every

facility should have a plan for dealing with suspicious packages, if the need should ever

arise. For facilities with loading docks, these may be potential sources of entry for an

attacker. It is important to secure these areas during times of loading and unloading.

This section was designed to research whether or not meat processors in Kentucky

undertake preventative measures in these areas. Respondents were asked a series of

yes/no questions enquiring whether incoming and outgoing packages were examined,

whether incoming and outgoing vehicles were examined, and whether loading docks

were securing during periods of loading and unloading.

59

The majority of facilities reported that packages were examined, both incoming

and outgoing. Although simple examination may not prevent every contaminated

package from entering or leaving the facility, this step will decrease the likelihood of an

attack through shipments. Only three facilities reported having a loading dock. Of these,

only one reported that loading and unloading was not monitored. As there were only

three respondents with loading docks, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this.

Certainly, it would be inappropriate to make any generalizations about the security of

loading docks among all meat processors in Kentucky based on this data.

Section 5: Mail Security

This section of the questionnaire is related to Section 4 and seeks to examine

preventative security measures taken by meat processors in Kentucky against deliberate

attack through the mail. The best way to prevent attack by mail is to ensure that all mail

is opened away from any animal and meat processing activities at the facility. Similar to

the examination of packages, all mail should be examined for evidence of tampering prior

to opening. Employees should be trained to recognize suspicious mail. For this section,

respondents were asked a series of yes/no questions enquiring whether or not they opened

mail in a safe location, whether or not mail was examined prior to opening, and whether

or not employees were trained to recognize suspicious mail.

All nine respondents reported that mail was handled away from processing

activities occurring at the facility. This is quite encouraging, and it is likely that this is a

typical behavior exhibited by meat processing facilities in Kentucky. Approximately half

the respondents reported that mail was examined before opening. Ideally, all respondents

60

should examine mail prior to opening, as this is a simple preventative measure to

undertake. It is one that does not require much additional time or expense. Only two

respondents reported that employees at their facilities were trained to recognize

suspicious mail. It makes sense that this number should be low, as employees are often

not responsible for opening mail at all.

Section 6: Indoor Security Measures

Although security measures designed to protect the exterior of the facility can

prevent an attack from ever occurring, security measures to protect the interior of the

facility also need to be implemented. If contaminated material ever manages to enter the

facility, security measures on the interior of the facility designed to detect such material

and protect the safety of employees may minimize the damage. These security measures

include appropriate inventory documentation, clear demarcation of restricted areas, and

emergency exit policies. This section was designed to research whether or not meat

processing facilities in Kentucky used some or all of these indoor security measures.

Questions were posed to respondents enquiring about inventory documentation and

updates, what the policy was for an unexpected change in the inventory, whether or not

restricted areas were clearly demarcated, whether or not new or previously unused

materials were examined before use, and whether or not emergency lighting and

emergency exit policies were present.

Surprisingly, only two respondents stated that restricted areas were clearly

marked and secured. This is alarming, as customers may unwittingly enter these areas,

which would compromise security and set-up a situation where potential contamination

61

may occur. All but one meat processor reported that new and previously unused

materials are examined before use. This result is likely the case for most meat processors

in Kentucky and gives no cause for concern.

Six facilities reported that inventory was documented, and two facilities reported

that inventory was not documented. This is not a surprising finding. Many meat

processing facilities in Kentucky do not store meat products. These facilities process

meat brought in directly by the customer and return the meat the same day. Inventory at

these facilities is not required under federal law. For those facilities that do document

inventory, inventory is updated, on average, every 22.7 days, although a wide range from

every day to every 90 days was reported. The length of time between updates is likely

related to how often product moves in and out of a facility. If unexpected changes in

inventory occur, five of the six facilities reported that appropriate authorities are alerted,

and one respondent was unsure. This is an encouraging observation.

If an emergency does occur, having emergency exit policies in place greatly

improves the safety and likelihood of survival for employees. Safety can also be

improved by providing emergency lighting and periodically drilling employees.

Emergency response personnel should be aware of the facility’s emergency exit policies,

in order to improve rescue efficiency. Given the small size of the participating facilities,

it was expected that there would be little necessity for emergency lighting. Surprisingly,

nearly half the respondents reported that they did have emergency lighting. Six

respondents reported that emergency exit policies were in place at their facilities, and

three respondents reported that they had no emergency exit policies. Ideally, all facilities

would have emergency exit policies, as this can greatly decrease confusion during an

62

emergency. However, many of the facilities had very few entrances, which may make

having an exit policy unnecessary.

Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security

The slaughtering and processing areas of a meat processing facility are the most

likely sources for potential contamination. The meat is handled directly in these areas, so

security is necessary. This section also included security measures implemented for the

protection of live animals stored at the facility. Questions were asked regarding access to

the animals or meat products, inspection of animals and products, inventory of animals

and products, and visitation records and policies for handling visitors to any of these

areas.

Only four of nine respondents reported storage of live animals on their facilities.

All respondents reported that appropriate federal inspections and laboratory testing were

carried out, which is greatly encouraging. All facilities kept some kind of inventory of

each animal stored there, however only two facilities reported that the inventory

contained the site of purchase. If this information is missing during a federal

investigation of an incident, it may be difficult to trace the source of contamination

should that have occurred prior to the animal arriving at the facility. All facilities

reported that access to the animals was restricted to appropriate personnel and only one

facility reported allowing visitation. All facilities reported that visitors would be

accompanied by personnel of the facility during the visit, but only two reported requiring

the visitors to sign-in. Ideally, complete visitation records would be kept by all facilities.

63

This information gives investigators documentation of potential sources of contamination

during an incident.

When live animals are stored at a meat processing facility, these animals are

generally put to slaughter at some point. The four facilities that stated that live animals

were stored also stated that slaughtering was performed. Visitation to the slaughtering

facility was only allowed by one respondent. Two stated that visitors were not required

to sign in but were always accompanied by personnel of the facility. A recording of who

visited the facility was only kept by one respondent, likely the same one that allowed

visitors. All facilities reported that records of which animals were slaughtered as well as

the date of slaughter were kept onsite. All facilities reported that periodic laboratory

testing was performed on slaughtered animals to detect the presence of disease, which is

important to prevent the spread of contamination.

Finally, the majority of meat processing facilities reported that meat products

were stored onsite. All of these facilities reported restriction of access to the meat

products, which is potentially the most important security measure to take to prevent

contamination of the products. Six facilities reported that an inventory of all products

stored at the facilities was kept onsite, while two stated an inventory was not kept. If

inventory is not documented and maintained, it may be difficult to prevent contaminated

product from being slipped onto shelves or accidentally shipped. Periodic laboratory

testing of meat products was performed by five facilities, which is a good security

measure to implement to detect and stop the spread of contamination.

64

Section 8: Water System Security

Water sources can be potential sites of contamination by waterborne pathogens.

These areas are commonly used by multiple animals, so the spread of contamination from

these pathogens could be devastating. Securing these sources can prevent attackers from

getting near enough to any water sources to deliberately contaminate the source.

Potential water sources in use by meat processing facilities are storage tanks of potable

water, water reuse systems, transfer lines, and ice making equipment.

Among the respondents in this study, water systems were very uncommonly

utilized. The most commonly used water system were transfer lines, utilized by two

facilities. Given the lack of positive response to this section of the study, no accurate

conclusions may be drawn.

Section 9: Hazardous Material Security

Hazardous materials are potential sources of contamination for water and feed

supplies at meat processing facilities. The storage of such materials should be properly

inventoried and secured, and the disposal of such materials should be performed

according to current federal standards. Any hazardous waste that may have to be

temporarily stored onsite should be secured.

Only seven respondents reported the storage of bulk quantities of hazardous

materials. Both of these respondents stated that access to these materials was restricted

but an inventory for these materials was not kept. Although it is difficult to draw

conclusions about meat processing facilities from the data of two respondents, it is

alarming that a proper inventory of these materials is not available. If such

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documentation exists, it is possible to detect theft of hazardous materials before a

contamination incident would occur.

Section 10: Information Security

Information regarding facility layout or processing procedures is often kept onsite

using paper-based or electronic systems, or both. This information can be utilized by

attackers to engineer a targeted attack against a specific area of the facility. Securing this

information is vital to protecting the integrity of the facility and preventing an attack. If

an electronic system is used, this system should, at minimum, be protected by a password

and antivirus software. Use of a firewall is also encouraged. If a paper-based system is

used, access to important documents should be locked and access should be restricted to

only those that require the information to perform their daily duties.

Three respondents reported that access to information regarding facility layout

was not restricted. This is likely due to the small size of the facilities managed by these

respondents. Many facilities were comprised of only one or two rooms, negating the

necessity for maps or floor plans. Nearly all facilities reported restriction of access to

information regarding facility processing procedures and inventory documentation.

Computer systems were utilized by six facilities, all of whom reported use of password

protection. Five of these respondents reported use of a firewall and virus protection

software, all encouraging signs.

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Section 11: Employee/Non-Employee Security

The purpose of this section was to determine policies in place at meat processing

facilities to prevent attacks by employees and visitors to the facility. Employees at these

facilities should be trust-worthy individuals, as determined by both a background check

and an onsite interview. Employees should always be recognizable to visitors by the use

of identification materials, such as name tags or uniforms. For larger facilities, both

employees and visitors should be restricted from entering the facility with cameras.

Security training for employees is recommended, and any employee reports of suspicious

activity should be investigated immediately. Identification material for visitors in an

official capacity, such as federal inspectors, should have material identifying them as well

as the intent of their visit.

The majority of respondents in this study stated that employees were not required

to wear identification materials. It was explained that because of the small size of the

facility in question, there were a very limited number of employees. Those that were not

employed by the facility were very recognizable to the employees. However, it is unclear

if the employees were very recognizable to the visitors. Background checks were only

used by half of the respondents. This is likely because many of the facilities were family-

owned and family-run facilities. These types of facilities would not require background

checks. Security training was generally not provided, likely due to the small size of the

facilities. There was very little interest in providing security training, which is reflective

of the general lack of concern about an attack by the respondents. Visitors were

generally not identified in any tangible way.

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Section 12: Incident Response

Timely and efficient response to a contamination incident, either intentional or

unintentional, minimizes damages and can prevent further spread of the contamination.

Quarantine procedures and food recall plans should be in place and periodically tested.

Facilities that implement such plans will be better prepared, should an incident arise.

Seven facilities had product quarantine procedures in place. This is encouraging

and shows that food safety is of concern to facility owners. Eight respondents stated that

a food recall plan was in place, although only four reported having tested it. Although it

could be a difficult and inconvenient undertaking, testing the plan is important for

improving efficiency and minimizing damages from an incident.


This study was originally designed as a mailed questionnaire, with all food

service establishments with permits at the BRDHD as the sampling frame. The total

sampling frame contained 536 food service establishments, and the original plan called

for 316 of these establishments to receive surveys. These 316 potential respondents were

chosen randomly. To test the response rate, 100 initial samples were sent out with a self-

addressed stamped envelope to return the survey. Four of these surveys were returned. It

was decided that this methodology would not generate the necessary responses for the

study, and a new methodology was designed. In order to combat the lack of response, an

attempt was undertaken to deliver the survey at the time of inspection by the local health

department, in this case, the BRDHD. It was thought that this would give the survey

some credibility, as it was being supported by a trusted government source. Several

68

surveys were completed in this manner. The other surveys were completed by

participants in the food manager certification classes taught by the health inspectors at the

BRDHD. This methodology reduced the sampling frame to only those food service

establishments with permits in Warren County, Kentucky.

As with the study designed for meat processing facilities, it was difficult to solicit

participation in the security study for food service establishments. The most commonly

cited reason for refusal was a lack of time to complete the survey. Many managers,

particularly those that managed large chain restaurants, stated that further permission to

participate in the study was required by upper-level management. These managers stated

that it was unlikely that permission would be granted and were disinclined to participate.

In total, 35 surveys were completed.

A statistical comparison between restaurants, including chain and non-chain, and

non-restaurants, including schools, hospitals, and hotels, was performed. A student’s t-

test was used to analyze those questions where a mean was calculated, and Fisher’s Exact

test was used to analyze those questions containing count data. Fisher’s Exact test was

used instead of chi-square due to the small sample size present in the study. An alpha

significance level of 0.1 was used to determine statistical significance. In total, there

were statistically significant differences between the two groups found in twelve survey

questions. These questions are shown in Table 33.

69

Table 33. Statistically Significant Differences Found From a Study of Security in Food Service Establishments

Question p-value

(4) Concern About Food Tampering Event in Establishment 0.05

(5) Concern With Food Defense 0.08

(18) Background Checks 0.01

(21) Collection of Identification Materials From Former Staff 0.1

(34) Requirement For Visitors to Sign In 0.02

(35) Availability of Documentation of Visitor Access 0.02

(55C) Food Inventory Includes Food Storage Date 0.1

(68) Bulk Products Stored in Easily Monitored Areas 0.06

(70) Presence of Self-Service Areas 0.05

(72) Presence of Vending Machines 0.002

(74) Appropriate Location for Mail Handling 0.1

(85) Use of Computer System 0.02

Several of these significant differences are easy to explain, such as the presence of

vending machines and self-service areas. These two items are often found in schools,

hospitals, and hotels but are less likely to be found in restaurants. Computer systems are

also commonly utilized by schools, hospitals, and hotels, but are less commonly utilized

by restaurants. It is very unlikely to be required to sign-in when visiting a restaurant,

however schools and hospitals often utilize this practice. It goes along with this that

visitation records would be maintained by schools and hospitals but not restaurants.

It is surprising that a significant difference should be found in the level of concern

about a deliberate food tampering incident. It was assumed that concern would be high

amongst both groups, however, neither group expressed particular concern regarding

food tampering or food defense. Non-restaurants were slightly more concerned with both

food tampering and food defense. As these include schools and hospitals, where security

is considered of the utmost importance, it was surprising that little concern was

expressed.

70

Background checks were more likely to be conducted by non-restaurants, which is

not particularly surprising as this group contains schools and hospitals. However,

collection of identification materials, including name tags and uniforms, from former

employees is most likely to be conducted by restaurants. As security is significantly

more important to non-restaurants, it was surprising that more respondents in this group

did not collect identification materials from former employees. If one or more of these

employees is considering an attack, it may be easier for them to blend in if they are

wearing appropriate work attire.

It was found that the restaurant group was more likely to include the date of food

storage in their food inventories than the non-restaurant group. This is surprising, as the

non-restaurant group is more concerned with food defense. It is less surprising that non-

restaurants were more likely to store commonly used products stored in bulk, such as

flour, spices, and sugar, in easily monitored areas. However, as these products are likely

to be targeted during a food tampering event, it is important that both groups be equally

likely to place these items in easily monitored areas.

Implications and Recommendations

Meat Processors

Food defense is of little concern to meat processing facilities in Kentucky. As

most of these facilities in this area are very small, it was found that many processors felt

that they were too small to be a target for terrorism. These facilities may also lack the

financial and technological resources necessary to implement a food defense plan.

Several steps need to be taken to promote food defense among these facilities. First, an

education program with information about agroterrorism and the risk to very small

71

processing facilities should be developed. Further studies could be conducted to

determine the efficacy of these programs in raising awareness. Second, the USDA

should provide an inspector specifically trained in food defense. This inspector could do

a thorough examination of the facilities and make individual recommendations for

improvements to be made. Third, public funding should be made available for these

facilities to use to improve defense. Finally, the data collected during this study is only

applicable to meat processing facilities in Kentucky. Further research on meat processors

around the U.S. is recommended.


Food service establishments in Warren County profess little concern with food

defense. The non-restaurant group was slightly more concerned overall with food

defense than the restaurant group. This is likely because the non-restaurant group

contains schools and hospitals, which are locations where security is considered

extremely important. However, restaurants provide food service to many different people

every day. According to the USDA, full-service restaurants and fast food chains are the

two largest locations where Americans eat out.53 Since so many more Americans

patronize restaurants than patronize non-restaurants, food defense should be of highest

concern to the restaurant group. In order to promote food defense in this group, several

recommended actions should be undertaken. First, education programs promoting food

defense should be provided to restaurant owners and managers. Further studies could be

conducted to determine the efficacy of these programs in raising awareness. Second,

more media coverage of food tampering incidences may increase awareness of risk.

72

Finally, the FDA should develop programs to provide incentives to restaurants that take

action to improve food defense.

Further research on this subject is required. The data collected during this study

is only applicable to Warren County, Kentucky. A more national study of food service

establishments is recommended. It was difficult to collect this data without the help of

the local health department, so further cooperation with local government agencies will

be required in any future studies.

Conclusions

Agroterrorism and food tampering are of increasing concern to the U.S. Although

few documented incidences of agroterrorism have been reported, hundreds of pages of

documented plans to attack the U.S. in this way have been discovered from Al Qaeda.28

For this reason, it is important to implement security strategies in food processing plants

and food service establishments. Meat processing facilities in Kentucky express little

concern that they will be the target of an attack. Regardless of this, these facilities

implement strategies to promote food defense and safety. In order to improve defense of

these facilities, programs need to be developed to educate food industry operators and

managers about agroterrorism and the risk to very small operations. Among food service

establishments, non-restaurant type establishments are slightly more concerned with food

tampering and food defense than restaurants, however neither group expressed particular

concern with either. Although these groups take food safety very seriously, food defense

should also be of great concern.

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APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL FORM

A LEADING AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WITH INTERNATIONAL REACH

OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE

DATE: June 27, 2012

TO: Morgan Webb-Yeates, MPH

FROM: Western Kentucky University (WKU) IRB

PROJECT TITLE: [340998-1] Food Security Protocols Utilized in Meat Processing

and Food Service Establishments in Kentucky

REFERENCE #: IRB12-312

SUBMISSION TYPE: New Project

ACTION:

AP

PROVED APPROVAL DATE:

Jun

e 27, 2012

REVIEW TYPE: Exempt from Full Board Review

Thank you for your submission of New Project materials for this project. The Western Kentucky

University (WKU) IRB has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a project design wherein the risks have been minimized. All

research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission.

This submission has received Exempt from Full Board Review based on the applicable federal regulation. Please remember that informed consent is a process beginning with a description of the project and insurance of participant understanding followed by an implied consent form. Informed consent must continue throughout the project via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Federal regulations require each participant receive a copy of the consent document.

Please note that any revision to previously approved materials must be approved by this office

prior to initiation. Please use the appropriate revision forms for this procedure. All UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS involving risks to subjects or others and SERIOUS and

UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. Please use the appropriate reporting forms for this procedure. All FDA and sponsor reporting requirements

should also be followed.

74

All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must be reported

promptly to this office. This project has been determined to be a Minimal Risk project.

Please note that all research records must be retained for a minimum of three years after the completion of the project.

If you have any questions, please contact Paul Mooney at (270) 745-2129 or

[email protected]. Please include your project title and reference number in all

correspondence with this committee.

This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within Western Kentucky University (WKU) IRB's records.

75

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE USED SECURITY STUDY OF MEAT PROCESSING FACILITIES

Project Title: Food Security Protocols Utilized in Meat Processing and Food Service Establishments in Kentucky Investigator: Morgan Webb-Yeates, Western Kentucky University Department of Physics and Astronomy, 937-657-8108 Research Advisor: Dr. Vijay Golla, Western Kentucky University Department of Public Health, 270-745-2448

Questionnaire for Meat Processing Facilities

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Section 1: Descriptive Statistics

This section is for analysis purposes only.

D1. How would you describe the size of this facility?

О Small

О Medium

О Large

D2. What meat products are processed at this facility? Check any that apply.

О Beef/Veal

О Pork

О Poultry

О Sheep/Lamb

О Other Please List:____________________________

О None

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Section 2: Agroterrorism This section is designed to assess industry concerns about bioterrorism, agroterrorism, and security.

1. Bioterrorism is defined by the Department of Homeland Security as “the intentional

release of a pathogen or biotoxin against humans, plants, or animals.” How familiar are

you with the concept of “bioterrorism”?

1 2 3 4

Completely Unfamiliar Somewhat Unfamiliar Somewhat Familiar Completely Familiar

2. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism. It is defined as the deliberate introduction of a

plant or animal disease with the goal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death.

How familiar are you with the concept of “agroterrorism”?

1 2 3 4


3. Given what you know about agroterrorism, are you worried about an agroterrorism

attack occurring against the United States?

1 2 3 4 5

Not At All Worried Extremely Worried

4. Given what you know about agroterrorism, are you worried that your facility may be the

target of an agroterrorist attack?

1 2 3 4 5

Not At All Worried Extremely Worried

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5. Has this facility ever been evaluated for security risks? О Yes skip to Question 7 О No proceed to Question 6

О I don’t know proceed to Question 6

6. Are you interested in undergoing evaluation for security risks?

О Yes О No О I don’t know

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Section 3: Outside Security Measures The following ten sections are designed to assess security implementations in Kentucky meat processing facilities. They will be used to document trends in security strengths and vulnerabilities in facilities across Kentucky. They are not designed for me to identify strengths and weaknesses at individual facilities, however, you may use them for that purpose if you wish. I would be happy to provide more information about USDA food defense recommendations upon request. Contact information for me, my research advisor, and the Institutional Review Board will be provided to you. 7. Is there a perimeter fence that encloses the entire facility?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 8. Are surveillance cameras used in this facility?


9. Are all entrances locked and secured during non-working hours?

О Yes proceed to Question 10 О No skip to Question 11 О I don’t know skip to Question 11 10. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked?

11. Are windows and air vents locked and secured?

О Yes proceed to Question 12 О No skip to Question 13 О I don’t know skip to Question 13 12. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure?

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13. Are there any outdoor animal or meat storage facilities?

О Yes proceed to Question 14 О No skip to Question 17 О I don’t know skip to Question 17

14. Is access to these facilities controlled and/or restricted?


15. Are the entrances to these facilities locked and secured during non-working hours?

О Yes proceed to Question 16 О No skip to Question 17 О I don’t know skip to Question 17 16. How do you ensure they are locked?

17. Are there any alarm systems in place to detect unauthorized entry?

О Yes proceed to Question 18 О No skip to Question 20 О I don’t know skip to Question 20 18. Are these regularly maintained and updated according to manufacturer instructions? О Yes О No О I don’t know

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19. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly?

20. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized entry? Please

describe.

82

Section 4: Shipment Security 21. Are incoming packages examined for evidence of tampering?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 22. Are outgoing packages examined for evidence of tampering?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 23. What is the procedure if tampering is suspected?

24. Are incoming vehicles examined before entrance to the facility?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 25. Are outgoing vehicles examined before exiting the facility?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 26. Is there a loading dock at this facility?

О Yes proceed to Question 27 О No skip to Question 29

О I don’t know skip to Question 29

27. If so, are loading and unloading secured or monitored? О Yes proceed to Question 28 О No skip to Question 29


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28. How is loading and unloading secured or monitored?

29. Are there any other security measures in place regarding incoming and outgoing

shipments?

84

Section 5: Mail Security 30. Is mail handling done away from any animal or meat processing activities or from any

ingredients used at this facility?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 31. Is mail examined for suspicious-looking envelopes?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 32. Are employees trained to look for suspicious mail?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 33. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail?

85

Section 6: Indoor Security Measures 34. Are restricted areas of the facility clearly marked and secured?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 35. Are new materials or previously unused materials examined before use in the facility?

Materials may include any new ingredients, animal feed, cleaning supplies, etc. that are

purchased for use in this facility.


36. Is inventory documented?


37. How often is inventory updated, e.g. once a week, once a month, etc?

38. If unexpected changes in inventory occur, are they reported to appropriate authorities?


39. Is emergency lighting present in this facility?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 40. Are there emergency exit policies in place for this facility?



86

41. Are employees aware of the emergency exit policies?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 42. Are employees periodically drilled on where to go in the event of an emergency?


43. Are emergency response personnel, such as police or fire departments, aware of the

emergency exit policies?


87

Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security 44. Are live animals stored at this facility?


О I don’t know skip to Question 68 45. Are animals in this facility inspected by a federal, state, or local veterinarian?


46. Are animals screened for abnormal behavior that may indicate the presence of disease?


47. What is the procedure in place when a diseased animal is discovered? Please answer the

following:

a. What institutions (CDC, USDA, FDA, state or local government), if any, are

alerted when the animal is discovered?

b. Is the diseased animal slaughtered? Yes No I don’t know

c. Is the animal or animal carcass sent for testing? Yes No I don’t know

d. Are other animals in this facility quarantined and tested? Yes No I don’t

know

e. Are there any other procedures you would like to mention? 48. Is access to animals in this facility controlled and/or restricted?


88

49. Are records maintained of who entered and exited animal storage areas?


50. Are records maintained for every animal stored at this facility?


51. Do the records include where the animal was purchased from?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 52. Do the records include when the animal was purchased?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 53. Are purchase receipts maintained onsite for animals stored in this facility?


О I don’t know skip to Question 55 54. For how long are these receipts kept at this facility? _________________________________

55. Are visitors allowed access to animal storage facilities?



89

56. Are visitors required to sign in?


57. Are visitors accompanied by appropriate personnel at all times?


58. Is animal slaughtering performed at this facility?



59. Is access to the slaughtering area controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 60. Are records maintained of who entered and exited the slaughtering area?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 61. Are records maintained regarding which animals are slaughtered?


62. Are records maintained regarding when each animal was slaughtered?


90

63. Is periodic testing on slaughtered animals done in order to detect the presence of

diseases?

О Yes proceed to Question 64

О No skip to Question 65


64. Are visitors ever allowed access to the slaughtering facilities?



65. Are visitors to the slaughtering facility required to sign in?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 66. Are visitors to the slaughtering facility accompanied by appropriate personnel at all

times?


67. Is access to equipment used for animal handling controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 68. Are meat products stored at this facility?




69. Is access to meat products controlled and/or restricted?


91

70. Are inventory records regarding the date of storage of meat products available?


71. Is periodic testing performed on meat products to detect disease and ensure quality?

О Yes

О No

О I don’t know

72. Are ingredients or products other than meat, used in food meant for animal or human

consumption, stored here? О Yes proceed to Question 73



73. Is access to these products controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 74. Are inventory records regarding the company these ingredients were purchased from

available?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 75. Are inventory records regarding the date of purchase of these ingredients available?


76. Are inventory records regarding the date of storage of these ingredients available?


92

76. Is periodic examination of the ingredients performed to check for evidence of

tampering?


93

Section 8: Water System Security 78. Are storage tanks of potable water used in this facility?




79. Is access to the water tanks controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 80. Are the water tanks monitored for evidence of tampering?


81. Is periodic quality testing performed on the water in these tanks?


82. Is a water reuse system in place at this facility?



О I don’t know skip to Question 85 83. Is access to the water reuse system controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 84. Is the water reuse system monitored for evidence of tampering?


94

85. Are transfer lines employed to move water or ingredients used in animal or human food

consumption?




86. Is access to the transfer lines controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 87. Are the transfer lines periodically examined for evidence of tampering?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 88. Is ice-making equipment in use at this facility?




89. Is access to the ice-making equipment controlled and/or restricted?


95

Section 9: Hazardous Material Security 90. Are any hazardous materials stored at this facility in bulk quantities? These may

include cleaning materials, laboratory materials, or sanitizers.



91. Is access to stored hazardous materials controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 92. Is an inventory of all hazardous materials stored at this facility on file?



93. What is the procedure for any inconsistencies discovered in the inventory of hazardous

materials?

94. Is all hazardous waste at this facility disposed of properly according to appropriate

federal guidelines?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 95. Is access to hazardous waste controlled and/or restricted?


96

Section 10: Information Security 96. Is access to information regarding facility layout controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 97. Is access to information regarding facility processing controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 98. Is access to any inventory documents kept at this facility controlled and/or restricted?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 99. Is a computer system in use at this facility?



100. Is a password required for access to the computer system?


101. Is a firewall in place to protect the computer system?


102. Is virus protection software used to protect the computer system?


97

Section 11: Employee/Non-employee Security 103. Are employees required to wear identification materials, such as badges or name tags?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 104. Are employees required to sign in and out at the beginning and end of their work

period?


105. Are new employees required to undergo background checks before beginning work at

this facility?


106. Are employees restricted from taking cameras, or cell phones with cameras, on to this

facility?


107. Are employees required to undergo security or awareness training at this facility?

О Yes skip to Question 109 О No proceed to Question 108

О I don’t know proceed to Question 108

108. Are you interested in providing security or awareness training for your employees?


109. Is information available for employees on the policies for responding to threats?


98

110. Are employees required to report suspicious activity or unidentified individuals at this

facility?



111. Are employee reports investigated at the time of submission?


112. Are visitors required to sign in when entering restricted areas of this facility?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 113. Are visitors required to wear identification materials, such as badges or name tags

when entering restricted areas of this facility?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 114. Are visitors restricted from taking cameras, or cell phones with cameras, on to

restricted areas of this facility?


99

Section 12: Incident Response 115. Are there procedures in place at this facility to quarantine products suspected of being

tampered with?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 116. Is a food recall plan in place at this facility?




117. Has the food recall plan undergone testing?

О Yes О No О I don’t know 118. Are all emergency and personnel contact information kept up to date?

О Yes О No О I don’t know This is the end of the survey. Thank you for taking the time to respond.

100

APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN STUDY OF FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS

Project Title: Food Security Protocols Utilized in Meat Processing and Food Service Establishments in Kentucky Investigator: Morgan Webb-Yeates, Western Kentucky University Department of Physics and Astronomy, 937-657-8108 Research Advisor: Dr. Vijay Golla, Western Kentucky University Department of Public Health, 270-745-2448

Questionnaire for Food Service Establishments

101

Section 1: Descriptive Statistics

This section is used for analysis purposes only.

D1. How would you describe this food service establishment?

О Chain Restaurant

О Non-Chain Restaurant

О School/Child Day Care Cafeteria

О Hospital/Long-term Care Cafeteria

О Hotel/Bed and Breakfast

О Other

102

Section 2: Terrorism and Food Defense

1. Bioterrorism is defined by the Department of Homeland Security as “the

intentional release of a pathogen or biotoxin against humans, plants, or animals.”

How familiar are you with the concept of “bioterrorism”?

1 2 3 4


2. How concerned are you about a bioterrorism attack occurring against the United

States?

1 2 3 4 5

Not At All Concerned Extremely Concerned

3. Food tampering is related to bioterrorism. Food tampering is defined as the

deliberate contamination of food products with the intent to cause harm. How

concerned are you about an incident of food tampering occurring in the United

States?

1 2 3 4


4. How concerned are you about an incident of food tampering occurring in your

establishment?

1 2 3 4 5


103

5. Food defense is defined by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)

as “protecting the food supply from intentional contamination…by people that want

to do us harm.” How concerned are you with food defense in your establishment?

1 2 3 4 5


6. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) publishes a Guidance Document for

Retail Food Stores and Food Establishments with information and voluntary

recommendations regarding food defense. Are you familiar with this document?

1 2 3 4


7. Are you interested in reviewing this document?


104

Section 3: Management Responsibilities in Food Defense

8. Is there a food defense plan in place at this establishment?


О I don’t know skip to Question 11 9. Are all employees at this establishment familiar with this plan?


10. Has this plan been exercised within the last year?


11. Are periodic security inspections of the establishment conducted by a manager

or designated member of the staff?


12. Are management employees familiar with 24-hour contact information for

federal, state, and local (if available):

• Police Yes No I don’t know

• Fire Yes No I don’t know

• Ambulance Yes No I don’t know

• Public Health Department Yes No I don’t know

• Homeland Security Agency Yes No I don’t know

105

13. Food tampering is the deliberate introduction of a contaminant to a food

product. Are staff members encouraged to be vigilant about food tampering?


14. Are staff members aware of whom they should report a suspected tampering

incident to?


15. Are staff reports of food tampering investigated immediately by an appropriate

authority?


16. Is a manager or designated “person in charge” present at all hours of operation?


17. Are managers trained to restrict/exclude employees that are experiencing

symptoms of foodborne illness, as required by law?


106

Section 4: Staff Responsibilities in Food Defense

18. Are new employees required to undergo a background check before being hired

at this establishment?


19. Are employees required to wear name tags to identify them during their shift?


20. Are employees required to wear uniforms to identify them during their shift?


21. Are name tags, uniforms, or other means of identifying employees collected

when an employee no longer works at this establishment?


22. Is documentation available for which employees are working in this

establishment at any given time?


23. Are restricted areas of this establishment clearly marked?


О Not Applicable

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24. Is access to restricted areas granted only to those employees who require access

to perform their job duties?


О Not Applicable

25. Are employees required to undergo security training at this establishment?

О Yes О No

О I don’t know

26. Is information available for employees on the policies for responding to threats?


27. Are employees required to report any activity they feel is suspicious? Suspicious

activities may include unauthorized access to restricted areas or suspected

tampering of food products.


28. Is monitoring for unusual activity in staff members conducted by this

establishment? Unusual activity may include: arriving unusually early or staying

unusually late without an appropriate excuse, accessing restricted documents,

removing documents from the facility, or bringing cameras to work.


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29. Are employees trained to recognize symptoms of foodborne illness?


30. Are employees trained to report if they, or other employees, are experiencing

symptoms of foodborne illness?


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Section 5: Customer/Visitor Security

31. Are customers restricted from entering food preparation areas of this

establishment?


32. Visitors to the establishment are those that are present in an official capacity,

including but not limited to delivery staff, health inspectors, contractors, or sales

representatives. Are visitors required to show proper identification before being

admitted to restricted areas?


33. Are visitors required to show documentation as to the purpose of their visit?


34. Are visitors required to sign in before entering restricted areas?


35. Are visitor access records maintained in this establishment?


36. Are visitors accompanied at all times when present in restricted areas?


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Section 6: Outdoor/Indoor Security

37. Are all entrances locked and secured during non-working hours?

О Yes proceed to Question 37 О No skip to Question 39 О I don’t know skip to Question 39 38. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked?

39. Are windows and air vents locked and secured?


40. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure?

41. Are surveillance cameras used to monitor suspicious activity inside the

establishment?


42. Are surveillance cameras used to monitor suspicious activity outside the

establishment?


111

43. Are there any alarm systems in place to detect unauthorized entry?


44. Are these regularly maintained and updated according to manufacturer

instructions?



46. Are there any outdoor storage facilities?


47. Is access to these facilities controlled and/or restricted?


48. Are the entrances to these facilities locked and secured during non-working

hours?


112

49. How do you ensure they are locked?

50. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized entry? Please

describe.

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Section 7: Food Security

51. Is food delivered to this establishment by approved outside sources?


52. Is food that is delivered to this establishment inspected by employees for

evidence of tampering?


53. What is this establishment’s policy for receiving unexpected food in a delivery?

54. Is an inventory maintained of all foods present in the establishment?


55. Does this inventory contain records for:

• What foods have been delivered Yes No I don’t know

• Where delivered foods have been purchased from Yes No I don’t

know

• When foods are stored Yes No I don’t know

• Where foods are stored Yes No I don’t know

• Expiration dates of stored food Yes No I don’t know

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56. How often is inventory updated, i.e. once a week, once a month, etc?

57. What is the procedure for any inconsistencies discovered in the inventory

records?

58. Are all foods stored in this establishment labeled?


59. What is the policy at this establishment when unlabeled food is discovered?

60. Are stored foods inspected by employees before use?


61. Are all foods stored according to the time/temperature controls required by the

FDA?


62. Are all foods prepared according to the time/temperature controls required by

the FDA?

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63. Are potentially contaminated foods stored separately from usable foods?


64. Are foods suspected of contamination sent away for laboratory testing?


65. Are expired or uneaten foods discarded according to FDA guidelines?


66. Is equipment used for food preparation cleaned before use with another type of

food?


67. Are different types of foods stored separately? For example, are meat products

kept separate from produce?


68. Are commonly used food products stored in bulk placed in easily-monitored

public areas? These products may include herbs, spices, oils, coffee grounds, salt,

pepper, flour, sugar, baking soda/powder, etc.

О Yes

116

О No О I don’t know

69. Is all produce washed according to FDA guidelines?


70. Self-service areas are areas where customers are allowed to serve themselves

food products. Buffets and salad bars are examples of self-service areas. Are self-

service areas used in this establishment?


71. Are self-service areas constantly monitored for tampering activity?


72. Are vending machines used in this facility?


73. Is access to vending machine products restricted to authorized personnel?


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Section 8: Mail Security 74. Is mail handling done away from any animal or meat processing activities or

from any ingredients used at this facility?


75. Is mail examined for suspicious-looking envelopes?


76. Are employees trained to look for suspicious mail?


77. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail?

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Section 9: Hazardous Materials

78. Are any hazardous materials stored at this establishment in bulk quantities?

These may include cleaning materials or sanitizers.



79. Is access to stored hazardous materials controlled and/or restricted?


80. Is an inventory of all hazardous materials stored at this establishment on file?



81. What is the procedure for any inconsistency discovered in the inventory of

hazardous materials?

82. Is all hazardous waste at this facility disposed of properly according to

appropriate federal guidelines?


83. Is access to hazardous waste controlled and/or restricted?


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Section 10: Information Security

84. Is access to any inventory documents kept at this facility controlled and/or

restricted?


85. Is a computer system in use at this facility?

О Yes proceed to Question 86 О No skip to End

О I don’t know skip to End

86. Is a password required for access to the computer system?


87. Is a firewall in place to protect the computer system?


88. Is virus protection software used to protect the computer system?


This is the end of the survey. Thank you for taking the time to respond. If you would like to participate in the iPod Touch give-away drawing, please email your name, address, and phone number to Morgan Webb-Yeates. Contact information for Morgan is provided below. Feel free to contact Morgan with regards to any questions you may have about this research. Morgan Webb-Yeates, MPH Western Kentucky University Department of Physics and Astronomy Cell: 937-657-8108

120

Work: 270-781-8039 Ext. 122 Email: [email protected]

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APPENDIX D: LIST OF RESPONSES FROM FREE RESPONSE QUESTIONS-MEAT PROCESSORS

10. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked?

1) “staff responsible” 2) “two walkthroughs by employee, management” 3) “padlocks, regular locks on doors” 4) “phisical (sic) check” 5) “alarm system”

12. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure?

1) “Vents are locked inside building. There are no windows at this facility” 2) “constantly locked” 3) “have locks on them” 4) “check on daily basis” 5) “phisical (sic) check” 6) “they were constructed that way & we have motion detectors on our alarm” 7) “there (sic) bolted”

16. How do you ensure they (entrances to outdoor animal or meat storage) are

locked?

1) “check”


1) “6 Months” 2) “Everyday” 3) “once a year” 4) “Daily” 20. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized

entry? Please describe.

1) “No” 2) “We are a fairly small operation where all the employees know one another,

someone whose is not employeed (sic) by us is obvious to the workers here” 3) “N/A” 4) “Payed security guard in house outside facility. Police circle frequently” 5) “N/A” 6) “No” 7) “No” 8) “police drive by”

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23. What is the procedure if tampering is suspected?

1) “The outbound are samples headed for labs, they have a special tape and are taken directly to shipment”

2) “Ask employees if anyone noticed anything. If find something an intruder had done, would call authorities”

3) “Pull it aside, retain the product” 4) “visual” 5) “Incoming package are rejected outgoing are held & examined” 6) “Product is examined and a decision is made to properly discard” 7) “Never had problem” 8) “hold for management”

28. How is loading and unloading secured or monitored?

1) “The dock area is headed up by a owner of the business, he knows all people who work at facility”

2) “All loading & unloading is approved and monitored by our employees” 3) “Troopers meat truck backs up to front door & meat is wheeled in under our

inspector”

29. Are there any other security measures in place regarding incoming and

outgoing shipments?

1) “Incoming shipments have scales that must be checked before accepting the product. Outgoing shipments are held inside overhang until drivers arrive to leave for the day.”

2) “examination” 3) “retain products for testing before shipped, testing products” 4) “No-just visual inspection” 5) “No” 6) “No” 7) “No” 33. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail?

1) “None. Never had that problem” 2) “N/A” 3) “call sheriff” 4) “We throw it away or call authorities” 5) “Management takes care of mail”

47a. What institutions (CDC, USDA, FDA, state or local government), if any, are

alerted when the animal is discovered?

1) “Federal inspector observes before slaughter; sheriff” 2) “district office of USDA – federal office of USDA” 3) “FSIS, USDA”

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47e. Are there any other procedures you would like to mention?

1) “N/A” 2) “’suspect animals’ – has a puncture mark, goes into freezer locked by USDA until

testing can occur” 3) “N/A”

93. What is the procedure for any inconsistencies discovered in the inventory of

hazardous materials?

1) “none”

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APPENDIX E: LIST OF RESPONSES FROM FREE RESPONSE QUESTIONS-FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS

38. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked?

1. “double check doors” 2. “Have signs posted to keep doors locked at all times” 3. “locked with keys, set alarm” 4. “Door locks, check list, mgt” 5. “We lock them” 6. “I am responsible for door #3. for example and certain people are responsible for

a area.” 7. “With a key & alarm” 8. “Manager locks them” 9. “yes” 10. “locking them and checking before leaving” 11. “shut doors” 12. “Checked by management” 13. “Lock” 14. “At all times” 15. “-Alarm is set & doors are check; - Also all doors must have to have a key to get

in” 16. “We are required to have someone in kitchen at all times. All other doors are

controlled by electronic code keypads” 17. “pull door shut thrght (sic)” 18. “Periodic checks conducted” 19. “Check them myself” 20. “We all have a code that we have to use going & coming” 21. “Alarm” 22. “When locked doors are pulled on to make sure they have properly latched.” 23. “Check locks twice” 24. “lock doors, double check when closed”

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40. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure? 1. “Solid windows vents on roof duct to (sic) small for person to enter” 2. “inaccessible” 3. “windows don’t open. Air vents locked with screens & vents. Access to Roof

locked with pad⋅lock” 4. “check list, mgt.” 5. “Can’t open” 6. “yes” 7. “The (sic) remain locked/closed” 8. “look at them” 9. “Checked weekly” 10. “Lock them” 11. “Daily” 12. “they get checked once a week” 13. “Lock windows” 14. “Routine checks and maintenance” 15. “Check daily” 16. “Check them” 17. “They are checked daily” 18. “double check” 19. “Windows don’t open”

45. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly? 1. “Weekly” 2. “Every 6 months” 3. “daily, weekly,” 4. “no alarm – camera systems” 5. “Don’t know” 6. “Never” 7. “Monthly” 8. “Daily” 9. “Maintained daily by security staff” 10. “Daily” 11. “Daily” 12. “Every day” 13. “Daily” 14. “Once month” 15. “Every 6 weeks” 16. “Everyday” 17. “At least annually” 18. “Weekly test” 19. “every week” 20. “Monthly” 21. “just started” 22. “monthly”

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49. How do you ensure they (outdoor storage facilities) are locked? 1. “Pad lock. 8ft tall fence” 2. “check list, mgt.” 3. “Locked and always double checked” 4. “Only unlocked by management” 5. “Check every day” 6. “Check before leaving” 7. “they are checked nightly” 8. “Regular manager inspections” 9. “use a key” 10. “Door automatically locks – alarm is set each night and door secured and locked.” 11. “They are checked daily & a code is used” 12. “Lock on outside of the door & cameras are outside as well” 13. “key & lock”

50. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized

entry? Please describe. 1. “I don’t know” 2. “No” 3. “all maintenance/services are set to a routine, and service must be requested by

manager, must be signed by management on invoice stating start & finish time and who preformed (sic) service.”

4. “We have to clear back door before opening.” 5. “No” 6. “No” 7. “We haved (sic) a specially trained security dep. at our facility” 8. “any visitor has to go through front office of school to enter premises.” 9. “Door Cover – Alarm System” 10. “Keypad on door code protected” 11. “Every Entrance is Locked until Opening Business” 12. “no” 13. “-All doors are lock but main entrance during working hours; -cameras; -Alarm

system” 14. “the front doors usually stay unlocked but can be locked internally” 15. “Security cameras” 16. “camaras (sic)and locks.” 17. “Monitored by management.” 18. “Just the codes that we use. no one else knows the codes” 19. “N/A” 20. “no”

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53. What is this establishment’s policy for receiving unexpected food in a

delivery? 1. “N/A” 2. “Sent back” 3. “Return to delivery company” 4. “return it.” 5. “check invoice to insure it was to be delivered here. All things “auto shiped” (sic)

from company we are made aware of befor (sic) hand. Ex. menu change, food provider change,”

6. “Send it back.” 7. “Call our Supervisor to see if it is a special order.” 8. “I do not get unexpected food in a delivery.” 9. “Send it back” 10. “Decline” 11. “Returning if now quality” 12. “Return” 13. “I.D. Know how manager handles that” 14. “Don’t know” 15. “We have more delivered” 16. “Send it back to supplier” 17. “do not accept – return for credit” 18. “Call & send back” 19. “refuse or discard immediately” 20. “We immediately contact food supplier and separate unexpected food from

normal delivery” 21. “Notification of our corporate office as well as food vendor” 22. “Don’t” 23. “No” 24. “We notify the deliverer & the manager” 25. “Report to manager asap, let them speak to delivery person” 26. “Reject” 27. “I don’t know”

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57. What is the procedure for an inconsistencies discovered in the inventory

records? 1. “N/A” 2. “Call owners” 3. “I call the company” 4. “talk to central office, make note and corrections” 5. “check product usages/wastes. Keep prep items to a minamum (sic)” 6. “call higher mgt right then” 7. “We would have to look back on History.” 8. “Adjustments” 9. “Search for it” 10. “Tell a manager” 11. “Operation change” 12. “investigated & corrected” 13. “their (sic) is no inconsistencies” 14. “discussions” 15. “documented & tell manager” 16. “go back and recheck. further investigate inventory. check security tapes.” 17. “Audit” 18. “Dispose of it” 19. “We notify the correct people” 20. “not sure.” 21. “small mom & pop. inventory has been pretty good” 22. “Removal”

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59. What is the policy at this establishment when unlabeled food is discovered? 1. “Throw away” 2. “Throw away” 3. “1) check with cook first 2) tell them to put label” 4. “throw out.” 5. “correct the action. Remind all employees the importance of proper labeling.” 6. “Discard” 7. “I (sic) would be dystroyed (sic).” 8. “Trash” 9. “Remove it” 10. “1. verbal warning 2. write up 3. termination” 11. “Trashed” 12. “Label it” 13. “give to manager” 14. “Discarded” 15. “Throw out” 16. “management” 17. “Open or throw away if no date” 18. “discard immediately” 19. “Discard” 20. “to throw away and not use” 21. “Food is opened but not used.” 22. “Discard” 23. “Dispose” 24. “Throw out” 25. “Toss it out” 26. “everything is labeled” 27. “Removal” 28. “Ask”

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77. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail? 1. “I don’t know” 2. “Report it to authorities” 3. “contact corporate” 4. “call higher mgt.” 5. “Don’t get it here” 6. “Show a manager” 7. “I don’t know” 8. “Don’t know” 9. “Not handling it” 10. “I don’t know” 11. “report to authorities; discard” 12. “None” 13. “Call police” 14. “The (sic) notify the correct authorities” 15. “Call security” 16. “Opened mail anything on mail” 17. “employees do not handle the mail”

81. What is the procedure for any inconsistency discovered in the inventory of

hazardous materials? 1. “find out why” 2. “talk to central office, make note and corrections” 3. “all access is approved By management we hand out what is needed.” 4. “We would contact our prinicple (sic) & my supervisor” 5. “I don’t inventory our chemicals, they would only be delime for the lime in the

dishwasher” 6. “n/a” 7. “Investigate & correct” 8. “same as food” 9. “Audit” 10. “Dispose” 11. “We notify the correct authorities” 12. “Report to manager asap”

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