focus question why were australians in malaya and borneo...

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Using the evidence 1 Mapping exercise a Look at the map, Source 11.1, and highlight these places: Malaya, Thailand-Malaya border, Netherlands East Indies, Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, West New Guinea. b Look at a current atlas and give the modern name for each of these places. 2 Malaya a Briefly summarise what the problem was in Malaya after 1945. 3 Look at the cartoon, Source 11.2. a Describe what it shows. b How can a cartoon about China help to explain why Australia was prepared to help Malaya at this time? c What other reasons were there for Australia being prepared to help Malaya? 4 What was Australia’s role in the war? 5 How could Australian involvement be seen as helping: Malaya Britain? Australia’s own interests? 6 Look at Source 11.3 to 11.6. Use them to select some of the objects, documents or items which you might include in your museum display. 7 Borneo Look at Source 11.7 to 11.10. Use them to select some of the objects, documents or items which you might include in your museum display. 67 Wars of diplomacy: Malaya 1950–1960 and Borneo 1964–1966 ACTIVITY 11 FOCUS QUESTION Why were Australians in Malaya and Borneo? What was the nature of the experience? To list and caption 10 key items , objects or documents for a museum display on the Australian experience of these conflicts. For example, you might select a key weapon a map a soldier’s account a piece of uniform which help to illustrate and explain the experience. Your task In the nineteenth century Britain claimed Malaya and parts of Borneo as colonies. Many local Malays did not want their country to be a colony of Britain’s but they were not strong enough to remove the colonial power. This continued through to World War 2, when, in 1941, the Japanese invaded and defeated the British, and occupied the area, ‘liberating’ it from colonialism (but in fact imposing their own often brutal colonial rule.) During this period the British trained and equipped many local Malays and Malay Chinese as guerrilla groups to fight the Japanese. The Chinese in particular hated the Japanese because of their invasion of and brutal behaviour in parts of China in the 1930s. At the end of the war, the British wanted non- communist Malays to take control – but the Malay Chinese, many of whom were communists, wanted Malaya to be a Communist country, so they started to fight the British. 1957 population figures for Malaya: Malays 3.12 million Chinese 2.33 million Indians 0.69 million Others 0.12 million. (Federation of Malaya Year Book 1959) They had the potential support of many local Malay Chinese – who had been badly treated by the government, denied land rights, and were economically very poorly off after the war. They sometimes helped, but rarely hindered, the active Malay Communists. On 16 June 1948 three British planters were executed by Communist terrorists (‘CTs’) and a State of Emergency declared by the British Government. One early tactic of the British was to move many Malays in fringe areas to New Villages, to keep them away from the Malay Chinese Communist influence - and this was initially resented, although it improved their living conditions eventually. From 1951 the British started a campaign to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Malays, as well as defeating the CT guerrillas. The tactic was to isolate the guerrillas from community support, and drive them into the jungle where Background briefing existence was difficult. Patrolling would keep them on the move, and break up their concentration of strength, wear them down, and destroy their hidden supply and ammunition caches. Aerial bombing would also be a part of this continual harassment. The Malay and British Governments asked Australia for military support. The Australian Government was keen to help: Communism seemed to be on the spread in Asia; support would stabilise a friendly government in the region; it would also maintain a traditional commitment to Britain; it would also show that Australia was a good ally ready to help its South East Asian Treaty Organisation allies. It also suited Australia to meet any potential enemy in other countries: Prime Minister Menzies said in 1955, ‘if there is to be war for our existence it should be carried on as far from our shores as possible’. By 1955, when Australian troops arrived in Malaya, the war against the CTs was being won, but needed a long and wearying ‘cleaning up’ process – which the Australians were part of.

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Page 1: FOCUS QUESTION Why were Australians in Malaya and Borneo ...svc029.wic009tp.server-web.com/waridentity/War-Identity11.pdf · to fight the Japanese. The Chinese in particular hated

Using the evidence

1 Mapping exercisea Look at the map, Source 11.1, and highlight these

places:Malaya, Thailand-Malaya border, Netherlands EastIndies, Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, West New Guinea.

b Look at a current atlas and give the modern name foreach of these places.

2 Malayaa Briefly summarise what the problem was in Malaya

after 1945.

3 Look at the cartoon, Source 11.2.a Describe what it shows.b How can a cartoon about China help to explain why

Australia was prepared to help Malaya at this time?c What other reasons were there for Australia being

prepared to help Malaya?

4 What was Australia’s role in the war?

5 How could Australian involvement be seen as helping:• Malaya• Britain?• Australia’s own interests?

6 Look at Source 11.3 to 11.6. Use them to select someof the objects, documents or items which you mightinclude in your museum display.

7 BorneoLook at Source 11.7 to 11.10. Use them to select some ofthe objects, documents or items which you might includein your museum display.

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Wars of diplomacy: Malaya 1950–1960 and Borneo 1964–1966

A C T I V I T Y 11

F O C U S Q U E S T I O NWhy were Australians in Malaya and Borneo?What was the nature of the experience?

To list and caption 10 key items , objects or documents fora museum display on the Australian experience of theseconflicts. For example, you might select• a key weapon• a map• a soldier’s account• a piece of uniformwhich help to illustrate and explain the experience.

Your task

In the nineteenth century Britain claimed Malaya and partsof Borneo as colonies. Many local Malays did not wanttheir country to be a colony of Britain’s but they were notstrong enough to remove the colonial power. Thiscontinued through to World War 2, when, in 1941, theJapanese invaded and defeated the British, and occupiedthe area, ‘liberating’ it from colonialism (but in factimposing their own often brutal colonial rule.)

During this period the British trained and equippedmany local Malays and Malay Chinese as guerrilla groupsto fight the Japanese. The Chinese in particular hated theJapanese because of their invasion of and brutalbehaviour in parts of China in the 1930s.

At the end of the war, the British wanted non-communist Malays to take control – but the MalayChinese, many of whom were communists, wanted Malayato be a Communist country, so they started to fight theBritish.

1957 population figures for Malaya:Malays 3.12 millionChinese 2.33 millionIndians 0.69 millionOthers 0.12 million.

(Federation of Malaya Year Book 1959)

They had the potential support of many local MalayChinese – who had been badly treated by the government,denied land rights, and were economically very poorly offafter the war. They sometimes helped, but rarely hindered,the active Malay Communists.

On 16 June 1948 three British planters were executedby Communist terrorists (‘CTs’) and a State of Emergencydeclared by the British Government.

One early tactic of the British was to move manyMalays in fringe areas to New Villages, to keep them awayfrom the Malay Chinese Communist influence - and thiswas initially resented, although it improved their livingconditions eventually.

From 1951 the British started a campaign to ‘win thehearts and minds’ of the Malays, as well as defeating theCT guerrillas. The tactic was to isolate the guerrillas fromcommunity support, and drive them into the jungle where

Background briefing

existence was difficult. Patrolling would keep them on themove, and break up their concentration of strength, wearthem down, and destroy their hidden supply andammunition caches. Aerial bombing would also be a partof this continual harassment.

The Malay and British Governments asked Australiafor military support. The Australian Government was keento help: Communism seemed to be on the spread in Asia;support would stabilise a friendly government in theregion; it would also maintain a traditional commitmentto Britain; it would also show that Australia was a goodally ready to help its South East Asian Treaty Organisationallies. It also suited Australia to meet any potential enemyin other countries: Prime Minister Menzies said in 1955, ‘ifthere is to be war for our existence it should be carried onas far from our shores as possible’.

By 1955, when Australian troops arrived in Malaya,the war against the CTs was being won, but needed a longand wearying ‘cleaning up’ process – which the Australianswere part of.

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8 Now select, caption and plan the display of yourchosen museum pieces.

Examining representations of history

9 Is Australia justified in fighting ‘other people’s wars’?This is a question about which you can form some

hypotheses, or tentative conclusions, but you will need tocarry out more research to test those ideas.

Here are some areas to consider:• Australia’s place in the region• Australia’s security• The security of the region• Relations with other countries – United States of

America, Great Britain, Malaysia, Indonesia• The training of the Australian Military Forces.

You may find other aspects to investigate as well. Forexample, it is not widely recognised that Australia hadtraining advisers in Vietnam at the same time that therewere regular forces in Malaysia and Borneo, and that manyof the first Australian combat troops sent to Vietnam wereMalayan Emergency and Confrontation with Indonesiaveterans. How did this affect their standard as troops in theVietnam War?

Applying issues to today

Using the web

To see if you would have been a good decision-makerat this time, look at the exercise on diplomacy duringthe Confrontation with Indonesia on the ANZACDay Commemoration Committee of Queensland web sitehttp://www.anzacday.org.au

Source 11.1 Map of south-east Asia

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Source 11.2 ‘The Red River’

Source 11.3 The Australian commitmentto Malaya

Cartoon by Schofield in The Bulletin, 1954

• Lincoln Bombers from No 1 Squadron RAAF delivered85 per cent of all bombs dropped during the campaign.

• Dakotas from No 38 Transport Squadron RAAF suppliedtroops with food, ammunition and equipment, droppedpropaganda leaflets, flew paratroops in, evacuatedinjured, and provided aid to people.

• Between 1955 and 1962 infantry troops from 1st,2ndand 3rd Battalions of the Royal Australian Regimentrotated through Malaya.

• There were also artillery, engineering and signalsspecialist troops as part of Australia’s commitment.

• Royal Australian Navy ships involved were HMAS Anzac,Arunta, Melbourne, Quadrant, Queenborough, Quiberon,Quickmatch, Sydney, Tobruk, Vampire, Vendetta,Voyager, Warramunga.

Source 11.4 Experiences of the war in Malaya

A David Richardson remembers

his serviceI was 22 when I went to Malaya with 3 RAR in 1957

as a riflemen, for a 21 month tour of duty.

We did lots of patrol work - mainly to keep theenemy on the move. A patrol might last 10 to 12days, lugging heavy packs through the thick,steaming jungle, followed by a few days of rest back

at base, then out on patrol again.

It was often tense on patrol - every now and again

the hairs on the back of your neck would stand up. It

might be because of a shadow, or a noise, or a lack

of noise. It would just be a feeling that something

was not right. The terrain was awful - really hot,steamy jungle. Or tropical downpours.

It wasn’t glamorous or exciting, but we had a job to

do, and we did it well, even though there was nothing

spectacular or heroic about it. But I reckon a lot of

locals were sleeping better at night knowing we were

around somewhere.Interview 1999

B Spud Spurgeon remembershis serviceI was a pilot in No 1 Squadron, flying LincolnBombers. I was 35 in 1956.

It was a funny war for us. It was safe in that therewas no opposition from the air or the ground, but itwas very hard to see let alone hit a target. ‘Gonghunting’, we called it. The two or two and a half hourflights could get pretty difficult, but that was becauseof the weather - flying in a tropical storm can be veryscary.

We would get the word that there was a target, thena marker aircraft would drop smoke, and we wouldtry to hit the area. Well we never were told the resultof our raids. I don’t suppose anybody really knew - itwas usually too hard for anyone to get into the jungleto see what had happened. We know we hit anelephant once, and destroyed plenty of trees, but Idon’t know what else we might have hit.But I’m sure we had an impact - we kept the CTsguessing and scared and isolated, and that was ourmain task, not to kill them.

Interview 1999

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Source 11.4 Continued

C Colin Bannister remembers his

serviceProblems with mites and mosquitoes

Malaria was the main concern… On patrol in the jungle it was

sleeves down all the time and mosquito lotion sloshed on exposed

skin all the time… Mites were the carriers of unpleasant things like

typhus so anti-mite fluid …had to be rubbed into the seam of shirts

and trousers and then re-applied periodically to counter the fluid’s

dilution through rain, sweat and washing.

The enemy (CTs)

The CT [Communist Terrorist] soldier was well used to living in the

jungle… Food and other supplies came from the jungle gardens of

the fringe squatters and surrounding kampongs [villages]. He had

jungle workshops to repair his weapons and equipment, jungle

hospitals for first aid treatment, a network of agents and

sympathisers in village, town and city, and a cowed rural population

to coerce for food, money, information and sanctuary. His

discipline, fieldcraft, navigation and minor tactics were good and

his weapon handling adequate. He relied on surprise in ‘hit and run’

tactics such as the ambush and, [initially] could be ruthlessly cruel

in murdering, mutilating or kidnapping people of influence and their

families – village headmen, teachers, local government officials.

Waiting in ambush

Squirming to get comfortable, there’s time to become familiar again

with the local vegetation as darkness descends and the mosquitoes

try to penetrate your clothes and the lotion on your skin. After a

while legs get numb, arms ache and the mind wanders. Suddenly

there’s a noise and the skin tingles and the heart thumps but no

shadowy figure comes into view and slowly you relax. Animals

were often the cause of springing of premature ambushes,

particularly at night when pigs, monkeys or deer could blunder into

the site.

Returning from patrol

But when they were home sweet home, with loving wives to greet

the returning warriors who by this time were rather hot, sweaty and

smelly warriors. Ah, the bliss the bliss of climbing out of uniform

whose starched pristineness had deteriorated into black sweat

patches and creases, to shower, change, have a drink and think

about what to do for the next few days. The [servants] would whisk

away the soiled clothes and confer with ‘Mem’ about dinner that

night while I would sit back in sheer content.

Colin Bannister, An Inch of Bravery. 3 RAR in the Malayan Emergency 1957–59,

Directorate of Army Public Affairs, Canberra, 1994, pages 38, 50, 76, 80

D Bob Gibbs remembershis service

I joined the Navy at 17 in 1956, andserved in Malayan waters on HMASQuickmatch in 1956 and 1957.We didn’t see action in the sense that wewere attacked, but we were in the warzone. There were several fatalities amongmen – and these are not on the Roll ofHonour, and I think they should be. We’llkeep fighting to get them on one day.We were always busy – there were regularfour-hourly watches, and then there wasplenty of maintenance and cleaning jobs tocarry out during other times, trainingexercises with other ships, and such. So itcould have been boring, but we werealways busy.

We did our bit – basically blockading thearea, keeping potential enemy supplies bysea out of the picture, and stoppingpotential disruption of the busycommercial sea lanes by mines. We wereunnoticed, but successful.

Interview 1999

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Source 11.5 Images from the warBob

Gibbs

AWM NAVYS0327

AWM ELL/51/283/ML

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Source 11.5 Continued

RAAF

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Source 11.9 Experiences of the war in Borneo

A Peter Schumann remembershis service

Peter Schuman on leading his four man SAS patrol

in Borneo

It was absolutely horrendous… The maps wereabsolutely atrocious. Sometimes half the maps you

had were just white with ‘No reliable data because

of cloud cover all year round’… I travelled through

moss forests, saw packs of orang-outangs in the

wild and wild deer. It was just hard slogging – day

after day of patrolling. That was what I called the

‘loneliness time’. That was the first time that I was

a million miles away from home, all by myself, in

command – it was bloody lonely, it really was.

Winning hearts and minds

Initially we did win ‘hearts and minds’ where wewere located in small areas that included one or two

kampongs [villages] and our medics looked after

their health. We tried to get information out of them,

learnt their language, and learnt their customs. We

lived away from them but each day we would go in.

We gave them kerosene, and caught food with them

using explosives. We played cricket . . . and footy

with them. We learnt more about living in the jungle

ourselves, learnt more about them, and gained a lot

of information on the areas.

Peter Schuman in Gary McKay, Sleeping With YourEars Open. On Patrol with the Australian SAS.

Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999, pages 53, 55

B Max Cannon remembershis service

I was a rifleman with 3 RAR 1965 in Borneo.Our main role on patrols was ambushing, and keepingthe enemy on the move. Most ambushes didn’t catchanyone. It was a very long and tedious process. We knewthat we were going into Indonesian territory, but had tokeep it hush hush.

Conditions were very hilly, very hot and humid. Conditionsdiffered. If we went through a recovering rice paddy,there would be thick growth underfoot, that you wouldhave to hack through foot by foot, under a boiling sun. Atother times you would be going through this clear area oreven moss ground, while above would be this unbrokenjungle canopy. When it rained, you would hear the rainhitting the canopy, but it took a long time to comedripping through. In other areas it might be swampy, upto your chest in water, and slipping on the slimy bottom.We carried five days rations and ammo, easy 75–85pound loads

We had dehydrated ration packs – but it was often hardto get the water to add to them to cook. Clothes didn’tlast long – canvas boots with rubber soles were quiet,but would wear out very quickly.

Few combat situations, and few combat casualties. Themost damage was done by diseases – some got malaria,but that was pretty much under control. The worst wasscrub typhus, passed on by a bite from a mite. It broughtyou out in a terrible, delirious fever, that burned you up,caused terrible cramps and such. It took several weeks toget over it. The other great problem was water – it wasusually contaminated, and you would get leptospirosis.To kill the germs you had to add chlorine tablets – wellthat did wonders for the taste. We’d try to find fastrunning water and drink that, and take the risk.

Interview 1999

Source 11.6 Casualties Malayan Emergency1950–1960

Casualties Navy Army Air Force All ServicesOperationalFatal – 13 2 15Non-Fatal – 24 3 27

Non-operationalFatal 4 21 11 36Non-Fatal 43 111 18 172

TOTAL 47 169 34 250

Approximately 7000 troops served. The main causes ofdeath included killed in action (6), illness (7), accidental gunshots (4), vehicle accidents (8), ground accidents on airbases (6).

Jeffrey Grey, A Military History Of Australia,CUP, Melbourne, 1990 page 219

Source 11.8 Casualties during theConfrontation 1964–1966

Casualties Navy Army Air Force All ServicesOperationalFatal – 7 – 7Non-Fatal 1 6 1 8

Non-operationalFatal 2 10 4 16Non-Fatal 83 14 3 100

TOTAL 86 37 8 131

Approximately 3500 served. Causes of death included motorvehicle accidents (3), mines (3), crushed by a falling tree(2), crushed by a wild elephant (1), drowning (1),electrocution (1), illness (1).

Jeffrey Grey , A Military History Of Australia,CUP Melbourne, 1990, page 228

Source 11.7 The Australian forces involved

• Royal Australian Engineers

• 3 and 4 RAR with tracker dogs and indigenous guides

• Special Air Services (SAS) – the newly formed elitereconnaissance/patrol force

• Artillery support units

• HMAS Curlew, Gull, Hawk, Ibis, Snipe, Teal, Duchess,Vampire, Vendetta, Derwent, Parramatta, Yarra.

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Source 11.10 Images from the war

Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation,Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1996 AWM LES/66/174/MC

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