Fishing Vessel Stability

A Draft GuidelineA Draft Guideline

Harvey Linton, Industry Services ManagerHarvey Linton, Industry Services Manager

Shane Neifer, OSO, Fish Team LeaderShane Neifer, OSO, Fish Team Leader

BackgroundThe Human Case

• 1975, the Bravado– Sank crossing Hecate Straits, light with net on

the drum

– 7 lives lost

– Coroner and jury recommends:• Inspection should include stability• Modifications that effect stability be reported• Stability criteria down to 40 feet (from 80)• Modifications recorded and reported

BackgroundThe Human Case

• 1997, the Pacific Charmer– Sank in Georgia Strait while trawling for herring

– 5 persons on board, 3 rescued, 2 died

– Corners jury recommended• Any major modifications or changes to vessel’s weight

that effect stability be documented and forwarded to proper authorities

BackgroundThe Human Case

• 2002, the Cap Rouge II– Returning to Fraser River from fishing

– 7 people on board, 2 children. Only two adult survivors

– Corner and jury recommendations• Current vessels without stability data have roll period

test and freeboard verification• Fishing stability taught in a manner understandable to

fishermen

BackgroundThe Human Case

• 2002, the Cap Rouge II (cont)• All vessels at risk undergo a full inclining

experiment and provide complete instructions to master

• Safe maximum load line placed on every vessel

• Addition of a maintenance modification log documenting changes to the vessel, remaining with the vessel for life

• 30 years, same recommendations

BackgroundThe Human Case

0

5

10

15

20

25

FRC's (x 1000) Fatalities Claims (x 100)

Fatalities, Claims & Participation: 1991 - 2003

BackgroundThe Human Case

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

% Fishing Fatals % Fishermen

Fishing Percentages of BC Workforce

BackgroundThe Human Case

Fatalities by Gear Type 1991 – 200185% Drown

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2

4

6

8

10

12

14T

rap

Lo

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Div

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Tra

wl

Gil

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Tro

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Sein

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In water

On deck

TOTAL

BackgroundThe Human Case

BackgroundThe Human Case

• Summary of the Human Case– 85% of fishing fatalities are from drowning or being lost at sea

– About 50% of these result from vessels sinking or capsizing

– A ‘good’ year (1997) 1 in 7238 fishermen died

– A ‘bad’ year (2001) 1 in 1425 fishermen died

– Last year (2004) 1 in 1214 fishermen died

• Industry wrongly accepts this high fatality rate as part of the “life at sea”!

BackgroundThe Financial Case

• In 2000, Mike Ross Senior Operating Officer Fishing

• Initiate cross divisional review of fishing industry activities

• WCB forgives approximately $35 million in unfunded liability

• Introduce 6 CU’s to replace the single CU

• Addressed areas of revenue leakage

BackgroundThe Financial Case

• In Fishing, fatalities are claims cost driver (injuries drive claim costs in other industries)

• Approximately 43% of fishing fatal claims result from unstable fishing vessels

• Since 2000, back to unfunded liability

BackgroundThe Financial Case

• Financial State of Fishing CUs

-10,000,000

-8,000,000

-6,000,000

-4,000,000

-2,000,000

0

2,000,000

4,000,000

Funding Level

• A Brief History– 1991 Supreme Court of Canada denies appeal

of Ontario Labour Board decision determining that “business of fishing” falls to provincial jurisdiction

– January 1995, WCB of BC introduces Canada’s first and only Provincial fishing specific safety regulation

– Spring 2002, WCB and Transport Canada enter into an MOU on jurisdiction on fishing vessel safety

BackgroundThe Legal Case

BackgroundThe Legal Case

• OHSR Stability related requirements:– S.24.70 Fishing vessels maintained in a seaworthy

condition

– S.24.71(2) The owner must ensure that major modifications do not affect stability

– S.24.72(b) The owner must provide documentation on vessel characteristics, including stability

– S.24.76(a) The master must ensure that the vessel is capable of safely making the voyage, due consideration to seaworthiness

BackgroundThe Legal Case

• Prevention Policy around vessel stability sections of the OHSR is fairly extensive

• Policy allows officers to require formal stability when stability is suspect

• Policy also details responsibilities of owners and vessel masters

Why a Guideline

• The Cap Rouge II investigation highlighted the complexities of determining adequate vessel stability

• Prevention Policy does not address what is expected from officers and by industry as acceptable stability criteria

• There are no formal federal stability requirements for most small fishing vessels

Why a Guideline

• Requirements in the regulation around vessel stability are general and offer no guidance for consistency

• Industry will require a “level playing field” from which to measure the stability of their vessel

• The Guideline is a proactive measure to allow industry to address these issues before enforcement is initiated

• The Guideline will offer consistency of enforcement so that industry will be aware of what the enforcement criteria are

• Administration of Guideline should ensure regulatory due diligence

Why a Guideline

• What does the Guideline say?– S.24.72(b) of the OSHR requires the owner to offer appropriate

instructions for the stability of the vessel

– As in all other equipment operations, these instructions need to be meaningful

– A vessel must be formally assessed to determine a baseline from which various operating conditions can be modeled and described

– Suggests inclining experiments for vessels with closed (void) spaces and freeboard verification and sailing restrictions for vessel with no void spaces

• It is only from these formal assessments that owners can offer appropriate and meaningful instructions on vessel stability to their crew

Consultations

• Transport Canada– They will be required to approve stability books

and will see a significant increase in work load. They accept this and are working at increasing staffing levels in anticipation

– Stability is a federal responsibility but they are a few years away from formal requirements and support the efforts of the WCB. They are hopeful that this specific initiative will aid in their national agenda on fishing vessel stability

Consultations

• Industry– A recent formal meeting was held on this issue.

Represented were:• BC Seafood Alliance• BC Council of Professional Fish Harvesters• Fishing Vessel Owners Association• Fishermen’s Mutual Marine Insurance• Northern Native Brotherhood• Ocean Fisheries• Underwater Harvesters Association• Transport Canada• Transportation Safety Board

– This issue was also discussed with the UFAWU who were unable to attend this recent meeting

Consultations

• Industry Comments– Industry is concerned about the cost for this

requirement ($2 to $10 K per vessel, plus need repairs if required)

– They do not dispute the need for this work to be completed

– They understand that this is a one time requirement as long as the data are maintained

– They want to be proactive and participate in the required educational component of this initiative

Conclusion

• This Guideline will ensure that fishing vessels are afforded the same level of stability assessment as all other commercial vessels, vehicles, rail, aircraft and mobile equipment

• There is a significant education component required once the Guideline has been approved. Work in this regard is underway

• The Guideline, and the ensuing action coming from it, addresses may years of recommendations from Coroners Courts and Accident Investigations. It also advises on what WCB accepts as compliance of these stability requirements

Example

Modified, overloaded(?) in Prince Rupert Harbour

Example

Any Problems?

Example

Another questionable operation.