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First Offensive: The MarineCampaign for Guadalcanalby Henry I. Shaw, Jr.

n the early summer of1942, intelligence re-ports of the construc-tion of a Japaneseairfield near Lunga

Point on Guadalcanal in the Solo-mon Islands triggered a demand foroffensive action in the South Pacif-ic. The leading offensive advocate inWashington was Admiral Ernest J.King, Chief of Naval Operations(CNO). In the Pacific his view wasshared by Admiral Chester A.Nimitz, Commander in Chief, PacificFleet (CinCPac), who had alreadyproposed sending the 1st MarineRaider Battalion to Tulagi, an island20 miles north of Guadalcanal acrossSealark Channel, to destroy aJapanese seaplane base there.Although the Battle of the Coral Seahad forestalled a Japanese amphibi-ous assault on Port Moresby, the Al-lied base of supply in eastern NewGuinea, completion of the Guadal-canal airfield might signal the begin-ning of a renewed enemy advance tothe south and an increased threat tothe lifeline of American aid to NewZealand and Australia. On 23 July1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)in Washington agreed that the line ofcommunications in the South Pacif-

On the cover: A Marine machine gun-ner and his Browning .30-caliber M1917heavy machine gun stand guard while1st Marine Division engineers clean upin the Lunga River. (Department ofDefense [USMC] Photo 588741)

At left: It was from a Boeing B-I 7 Fly-ing Fortress such as this that LtCol Mer-rill B. Twining and Maj William B.McKean reconnoitered the Watch towertarget area and discovered the Japanesebuilding an airfield on Guadalcanal.(National Archives Photo 80-G-34887)

ic had to be secured. The Japaneseadvance had to be stopped. Thus,Operation Watchtower, the seizure ofGuadalcanal and Tulagi, came intobeing.

The islands of the Solomons lienestled in the backwaters of theSouth Pacific. Spanish fortune-hunters discovered them in the mid-sixteenth century, but no Europeanpower foresaw any value in the is-lands until Germany sought to ex-pand its budding colonial empiremore than two centuries later. In1884, Germany proclaimed a protec-torate over northern New Guinea, theBismarck Archipelago, and thenorthern Solomons. Great Britaincountered by establishing a protec-torate over the southern Solomonsand by annexing the remainder ofNew Guinea. In 1905, the Britishcrown passed administrative controlover all its territories in the region toAustralia, and the Territory ofPapua, with its capital at Port Mores-by, came into being. Germany's hold-ings in the region fell under theadministrative control of the Leagueof Nations following World War I,with the seat of the colonial govern-ment located at Rabaul on New Bri-tain. The Solomons lay 10 degreesbelow the Equator—hot, humid, andbuffeted by torrential rains. Thecelebrated adventure novelist, JackLondon, supposedly muttered: "If Iwere king, the worst punishment Icould inflict on my enemies would beto banish them to the Solomons."

On 23 January 1942, Japaneseforces seized Rabaul and fortified itextensively. The site provided an ex-cellent harbor and numerous posi-tions for airfields. The devastatingenemy carrier and plane losses at the

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Battle of Midway (3-6 June 1942) hadcaused Imperial General Head quart-ers to cancel orders for the invasionof Midway, New Caledonia, Fiji, andSamoa, but plans to construct amajor seaplane base at Tulagi wentforward. The location offered one ofthe best anchorages in the South Pa-cific and it was strategically located:560 miles from the New Hebrides,800 miles from New Caledonia, and1,000 miles from Fiji.

The outposts at Tulagi andGuadalcanal were the forward evi-dences of a sizeable Japanese force inthe region, beginning with the Seven-teenth Army, headquartered atRabaul. The enemy's Eighth Fleet,Eleventh Air Fleet, and 1st, 7th, 8th,and 14th Naval Base Forces also wereon New Britain. Beginning on 5 Au-gust 194 2,Japanese signal intelligenceunits began to pick up transmissionsbetween Noumea on New Caledoniaand Melbourne, Australia. Enemyanalysts concluded that Vice AdmiralRichard L. Ghormley, commandingthe South Pacific Area (ComSoPac),was signalling a British or Australianforce in preparation for an offensive inthe Solomons or at New Guinea. Thewarnings were passed to Japaneseheadquarters at Rabaul and Truk, butwere ignored.

The invasion force was indeed on itsway to its targets, Guadalcanal, Tula-gi, and the tiny islets of Gavutu andlànambogo close by Tulagi's shore. Thelanding force was composed of Ma-rines; the covering force and transportforce were U.S. Navy with a reinforce-ment of Australian warships. There wasnot much mystery to the selection ofthe 1st Marine Division to make thelandings. Five U.S. Army divisions werelocated in the South and Southwest Pa-

cific: three in Australia, the 37th In-fantry in Fiji, and the America!Division on New Caledonia. None wasamphibiously trained and all were con-sidered vital parts of defensive garri-sons. The 1st Marine Division, minusone of its infantry regiments, had be-gun arriving in New Zea!and in mid-June when the division headquartersand the 5th Marines reached Welling-ton. At that time, the rest of the rein-forced division's major units weregetting ready to embark. The 1st Ma-rines were at San Francisco, the 1stRaider Batta!ion was on New Caledo-nia, and the 3d Defense Battalion wasat Pearl Harbor. The 2d Marines of the2d Marine Division, a unit whichwould replace the 1st Division's 7thMarines stationed in British Samoa,was loading out from San Diego. Allthree infantry regiments of the land-ing force had battalions of artillery at-

tached, from the 11th Marines, in thecase of the 5th and 1st; the 2d Marinesdrew its reinforcing 75mm howitzersfrom the 2d Division's 10th Marines.

The news that his division wouldbe the landing force for Watchtowercame as a surprise to Major GeneralAlexander A. Vandegrift, who hadanticipated that the 1st Divisionwould have six months of training inthe South Pacific before it saw ac-tion. The changeover from adminis-trative loading of the various units'supplies to combat loading, wherefirst-needed equipment, weapons,ammunition, and rations were posi-tioned to come off ship first with theassault troops, occasioned a never-to-be-forgotten scene on Wellington'sdocks. The combat troops took theplace 'of civilian stevedores and un-loaded and reloaded the cargo andpassenger vessels in an increasing

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round of working parties, often dur-ing rainstorms which hampered thetask, but the job was done. Succeed-ing echelons of the division's forcesall got their share of labor on thedocks as various shipping groups ar-rived and the time grew shorter.General Vandegrift was able to con-vince Admiral Ghormley and theJoint Chiefs that he would not beable to meet a proposed D-Day of 1August, but the extended landingdate, 7 August, did little to improvethe situation.

An amphibious operation is avastly complicated affair, particularlywhen the forces involved are assem-bled on short notice from all over thePacific. The pressure that Vandegriftfelt was not unique to the landingforce commander. The U.S. Navy'sships were the key to success and theywere scarce and invaluable. Although

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General Alexander A. Vandegrift

A distinguished military analyst once noted that iftitles were awarded in America as they are in Eng-land, the commanding general of Marine Corps

forces at Guadalcanal would be known simply as "Van-degrift of Guadalcanal." But America does not bestowaristocratic titles, and besides, such a formality would notbe in keeping with the soft-spoken, modest demeanor ofAlexander A. Vandegrift.

The man destined to lead the 1st Marine Division inAmerica's first ground offensive operation of World WarII was born in 1887 in Charlottesville, Virginia, where hegrew up fascinated by his grandfather's stories of life in theConfederate Army during the Civil War. It was axiomaticthat young Alexander would settle on a military career.Commissioned a Marine lieutenant in 1909, Vandegriftreceived an early baptism of fire in 1912 during the bom-bardment, assault, and capture of Coyotepe in Nicaragua.Two years later he participated in the capture and occupa-tion of Vera Cruz. Vandegrift would spend the greater partof the next decade in Haiti, where he fought Caco bandits,and served as an inspector of constabulary with the Gen-darmerie d'Haiti. It was in Haiti that he met and wasbefriended by Marine Colonel Smedley D. Butler, whocalled him "Sunny Jim" The lessons of these formative yearsfighting an elusive enemy in a hostile jungle environmentwere not lost upon the young Marine officer.

He spent the next 18 years in various posts and stationsin the United States, along with two tours of China dutyat Peiping and Tientsin. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Vandegriftwas appointed assistant to the Major General Comman-dant, and in April 1940 received the single star of abrigadier general. He was detached to the 1st Marine Di-vision in November 1941, and in May 1942 sailed for theSouth Pacific as commanding general of the first Marinedivision ever to leave the United States. On 7 August 1942,after exhorting his Marines with the reminder that "God

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favors the bold and strong of heart;' he led the 1st MarineDivision ashore in the Solomon Islands in the first large-scale offensive action against the Japanese.

His triumph at Guadalcanal earned General Vandegriftthe Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross, and the praise of agrateful nation. In July 1943 he took command of I Ma-rine Amphibious Corps and planned the landing at Em-press Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, on1 November 1943. He then was recalled to Washington, tobecome the Eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.

On 1 January 1944, as a lieutenant general, Vandegriftwas sworn in as Commandant. On 4 April 1945 he waspromoted to general, and thus became the first Marineofficer on active duty to attain four-star rank.

In the final stages of the war, General Vandegrift direct-ed an elite force approaching half-a-million men and wom-en, with its own aviation force. Comparing his Marineswith the Japanese, he noted that the Japanese soldier "wastrained to go to a place, stay there, fight and die. We trainour men to go to a place, fight to win, and to live. I canassure you, it is a better theory'

After the war, Vandegrift fought another battle, this timein the halls of Congress, with the stakes being the survivalof the Marine Corps. His counter-testimony during Con-gressional hearings of the spring of 1946 was instrumentalin defeating initial attempts to merge or "unify" the U.S.Armed Forces. Although his term as Commandant endedon 31 December 1947, General Vandegrift would live to seepassage of Public Law 416, which preserved the Corps andits historic mission. His official retirement date of 1 April1949 ended just over 40 years of service.

General Vandegrift outlived both his wife Mildred andtheir only son, Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., whofought in World War II and Korea. He spent most his finalyears in Delray, Florida. He died on 8 May 1973.—RobertV. Aquilina

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the Battles of Coral Sea and Midwayhad badly damaged the Japanesefleet's offensive capabilities and crip-pled its carrier forces, enemy navalaircraft could fight as well ashore asafloat and enemy warships were stillnumerous and lethal. American loss-es at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, andMidway were considerable, andNavy admirals were well aware thatthe ships they commanded were inshort supply. The day was comingwhen America's shipyards and facto-ries would fill the seas with warshipsof all types, but that day had not ar-rived in 1942. Calculated risk was thename of the game where the Navywas concerned, and if the risk seemedtoo great, the Watchtower landingforce might be a casualty. As it hap-pened, the Navy never ceased to riskits ships in the waters of the Solo-mons, but the naval lifeline to thetroops ashore stretched mighty thinat times.

Tactical command of the invasion

force approaching Guadalcanal inearly August was vested in Vice Ad-miral Frank J. Fletcher as Expedition-ary Force Commander (Task Force61). His force consisted of the am-phibious shipping carrying the 1stMarine Division, under Rear Ad-miral Richmond K. Turner, and theAir Support Force led by Rear Ad-miral Leigh Noyes. Admiral Ghorm-ley contributed land-based air forcescommanded by Rear Admiral JohnS. McCain. Fletcher's support forceconsisted of three fleet carriers, theSaratoga (CV 3), Enterprise (CV 6),and Wasp (CV 7); the battleshipNorth Carolina (BB 55), 6 cruisers,16 destroyers, and 3 oilers. AdmiralTurner's covering force included fivecruisers and nine destroyers.

The Landing and August Battles

On board the transports approach-ing the Solomons, the Marines werelooking for a tough fight. They knewlittle about the targets, even less

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about their opponents. Those mapsthat were available were poor, con-structions based upon outdatedhydrographic charts and informationprovided by former island residents.While maps based on aerial photo-graphs had been prepared they weremisplaced by the Navy in Auckland,New Zealand, and never got to theMarines at Wellington.

On 17 July, a couple of divisionstaff officers, Lieutenant ColonelMerrill B. Twining and Major Wil-liam McKean, had been able to jointhe crew of a B-17 flying from PortMoresby on a reconnaissance missionover Guadalcanal. They reportedwhat they had seen, and their anal-ysis, coupled with aerial photo-graphs, indicated no extensivedefenses along the beaches ofGuadalcanal's north shore.

This news was indeed welcome.The division intelligence officer (G-2),Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge,had concluded that about 8,400

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Japanese occupied Guadalcanal andTulagi. Admiral Turner's staff figuredthat the Japanese amounted to 7,125men. Admiral Ghormley's intelli-gence officer pegged the enemystrength at 3,100— closest to the3,457 actual total of Japanese troops;2,571 of these were stationed onGuadalcanal and were mostlylaborers working on the airfield.

To oppose the Japanese, the Ma-rines had an overwhelming superiori-ty of men. At the time, the tables oforganization for a Marine Corps di-vision indicated a total of 19,514officers and enlisted men, includingnaval medical and engineer (Seabee)

units. Infantry regiments numbered3,168 and consisted of a headquart-ers company, a weapons company,and three battalions. Each infantrybattalion (933 Marines) was or-ganized into a headquarters compa-ny (89), a weapons company (273),and three rifle companies (183). Theartillery regiment had 2,581 officersand men organized into three 75mmpack howitzer battalions and one105mm howitzer battalion. A lighttank battalion, a special weaponsbattalion of antiaircraft and antitankguns, and a parachute battalion ad-ded combat power. An engineer regi-ment (2,452 Marines) with battalions

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of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees,provided a hefty combat and serv-ice element. The total was roundedout by division headquarters battal-ion's headquarters, signal, and mili-tary police companies and thedivision's service troops — service,motor transport, amphibian tractor,and medical battalions. For Watch-tower, the 1st Raider Battalion andthe 3d Defense Battalion had beenadded to Vandegrift's command toprovide more infantrymen and muchneeded coast defense and antiaircraftguns and crews.

Unfortunately, the division's heav-iest ordnance had been left behind in

First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II

The United States Marine Corps entered World WarII wearing essentially the same summer field uni-form that it had worn during the "Banana Wars."

The Marines defending America's Pacific outposts onGuam, Wake Island, and in the Philippines in the latemonths of 1941 wore a summer field uniform consistingof a khaki cotton shirt and trousers, leggings, and aM1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform hadbeen underway for at least one year prior to the openingof hostilities.

As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-f it-ting blue denim fatigue uniform for work details and somefield exercises since the 1920s. This fatigue uniform waseither a one-piece coverall or a two-piece bib overall andjacket, both with "USMC" metal buttons. In June 1940, itwas replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform andthe summer field uniform were replaced by what wouldbecome known as the utility uniform. Approved for generalissue on the Marine Corps' 166th birthday, 10 November1941, this new uniform was made of sage-green (although"olive drab" was called for in the specifications) herring-bone twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian workclothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (oftenreferred to as a "jacket" by Marines) and trousers. In 1943,a cap made of the same material would be issued.

The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by fourtwo-piece rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bear-ing the words "U.S. MARINE CORPS" in relief. The cuffswere closed by similar buttons. Two large patch pocketswere sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a single patchpocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had theMarine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and theletters "USMC" stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers,worn with and without the khaki canvas leggings, had twoslashed front pockets and two rear patch pockets.

The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruitscrowding the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 andwas first worn in combat during the landing on Guadal-canal in August 1942. This uniform was subsequently wornby Marines of all arms from the Solomons Campaign tothe end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat andthe trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency al-ternate specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eightdays after the landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed fora variety of finishes on the buttons. Towards the end ofthe war, a new "modified" utility uniform which had beendeveloped after Tarawa was also issued, in addition to avariety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uni-forms, along with Army-designed Ml helmets and MarineCorps-designed cord and rubber-soled rough-side-outleather "boondocker" shoes, would be worn throughout thewar in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into theKorean War. — Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas

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Fletcher added some bad news. Inview of the threat from enemy land-based air, he could not "keep the car-riers in the area for more than 48hours after the landing:' Vandegriftprotested that he needed at least fourdays to get the division's gear ashore,and Fletcher reluctantly agreed tokeep his carriers at risk another day.

New Zealand. Limited ship space andtime meant that the division's bigguns, a 155mm howitzer battalion,and all the motor transport battal-ion's two-and-a-half-ton trucks werenot loaded. Colonel Pedro A. delValle, commanding the 11th Marines,was unhappy at the loss of his heavyhowitzers and equally distressed thatessential sound and flash-rangingequipment necessary for effectivecounterbattery fire was left behind.Also failing to make the cut in thebattle for shipping space, were allspare clothing, bedding rolls, andsupplies necessary to support thereinforced division beyond 60 daysof combat. Ten days supply of am-munition for each of the division'sweapons remained in New Zealand.

In the opinion of the 1st Division'shistorian and a veteran of the land-ing, the men on the approachingtransports "thought they'd have a badtime getting ashore:' They were con-fident, certainly, and sure that theycould not be defeated, but most ofthe men were entering combat for thefirst time. There were combat vete-ran officers and noncommissionedofficers (NCOs) throughout the di-

vision, but the majority of the menwere going into their initial battle.The commanding officer of the 1stMarines, Colonel Clifton B. Cates,estimated that 90 percent of his menhad enlisted after Pearl Harbor. Thefabled 1st Marine Division of laterWorld War II, Korean War, VietnamWar, and Persian Gulf War fame, themost highly decorated division in theU.S. Armed Forces, had not yet es-tablished its reputation.

The convoy of ships, with its out-riding protective screen of carriers,reached Koro in the Fiji Islands on26 July. Practice landings did littlemore than exercise the transports'landing craft, since reefs precluded anactual beach landing. The rendez-vous at Koro did give the senior com-manders a chance to have aface-to-face meeting. Fletcher,McCain, Turner, and Vandegrift gottogether with Ghormley's chief ofstaff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Calla-ghan, who notified the conferees thatComSoPac had ordered the 7th Ma-rines on Samoa to be prepared to em-bark on four days notice as areinforcement for Watchtower. Tothis decidedly good news, Admiral

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On the 28th the ships sailed fromthe Fijis, proceeding as if they wereheaded for Australia. At noon on 5August, the convoy and its escortsturned north for the Solomons. Un-detected by the Japanese, the assaultforce reached its target during thenight of 6-7 August and split into twolanding groups, Transport DivisionX-Ray, 15 transports heading for thenorth shore of Guadalcanal east ofLunga Point, and Transport DivisionYoke, eight transports headed forTulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and thenearby Florida Island, which loomedover the smaller islands.

Vandegrift's plans for the landingswould put two of his infantry regi-ments (Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt's 5thMarines and Colonel Cates' 1st Ma-rines) ashore on both sides of theLunga River prepared to attack in-land to seize the airfield. The 11thMarines, the 3d Defense Battalion,and most of the division's support-ing units would also land near theLunga, prepared to exploit the beach-head. Across the 20 miles of SealarkChannel, the division's assistant com-mander, Brigadier General WilliamH. Rupertus, led the assault forcesslated to take Tulagi, Gavutu, andTanambogo: the 1st Raider Battalion(Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Ed-son); the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines(Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rose-crans); and the 1st Parachute Battal-ion (Major Robert H. Williams).Company A of the 2d Marines wouldreconnoiter the nearby shores ofFlorida Island and the rest of ColonelJohn A. Arthur's regiment wouldstand by in reserve to land whereneeded.

As the ships slipped through the

Naval Historical Photographic Collection 880-CF-117-4-63

Enroute to Guadalcanal, RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the Am phi-bous Force, and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander,review the Operation Watchtower plan for landings in the Solomon Islands.

channels on either side of ruggedSavo Island, which split Sealark nearits western end, heavy clouds anddense rain blanketed the task force.Later the moon came out and sil-houetted the islands. On board hiscommand ship, Vandegrift wrote tohis wife: "Tomorrow morning atdawn we land in our first majoroffensive of the war. Our plans havebeen made and God grant that ourjudgement has been soundwhatever happens you'll know I didmy best. Let us hope that best willbe good enough."

At 0641 on 7 August, Turner sig-nalled his ships to "land the landingforce' Just 28 minutes before, theheavy cruiser Quincy (CA 39) hadbegun shelling the landing beaches atGuadalcanal. The sun came up thatfateful Friday at 0650, and the firstlanding craft carrying assault troopsof the 5th Marines touched down at

0909 on Red Beach. To the men's sur-prise (and relief), no Japanese ap-peared to resist the landing. Huntimmediately moved his assaulttroops off the beach and into the sur-rounding jungle, waded the steep-banked Ilu River, and headed for theenemy airfield. The following 1stMarines were able to cross the Ilu ona bridge the engineers had hastilythrown up with an amphibian trac-tor bracing its middle. The silencewas eerie and the absence of oppo-sition was worrisome to the riflemen.The Japanese troops, most of whomwere Korean laborers, had fled to thewest, spooked by a week's B-17 bom-bardment, the pre-assault naval gun-fire, and the sight of the shipsoffshore. The situation was not thesame across Sealark. The Marines onGuadalcanal could hear faint rum-bles of a firefight across the waters.

The Japanese on Tulagi were spe-

cial naval landing force sailors andthey had no intention of giving upwhat they held without a vicious, no-surrender battle. Edson's men land-ed first, following by Rosecrans' bat-talion, hitting Tulagi's south coastand moving inland towards the ridgewhich ran lengthwise through the is-land. The battalions encounteredpockets of resistance in the under-growth of the island's thick vegeta-tion and maneuvered to outflank andoverrun the oppostion. The advanceof the Marines was steady but casual-ties were frequent. By nightfall, Ed-son had reached the former Britishresidency overlooking Tulagi's harborand dug in for the night across a hillthat overlooked the Japanese finalposition, a ravine on the island'ssouthern tip. The 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, had driven through to thenorthern shore, cleaning its sector ofenemy; Rosecrans moved into posi-

MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine Division,confers with his staff on board the transport USS McCawley(APA-4) enroute to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift;

LtCol Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol RandolphMcC. Pate, logistics officer; LtCol Frank B. Goettge, intelli-gence officer; and Col William Capers James, chief of staff.

National Archives Photo 80-G-17065

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National Archives Photo 80-CF-112-5-3)

First Division Marines storm ashore across Guadalcanal's Barnett (AF11) and attack cargo ship Fomaihaut (AK-22). Thebeaches on D-Day, 7 August 1942, from the attack transport invaders were surprised at the lack of enemy opposition.

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LANDING ON GUADALCANAL

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Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.When the 5th Marines entered the jungle from the beachhead, Division engineers hastily constructed a bridge supported byand had to cross the steep banks of the Ilu River, 1st Marine amphibian tractors. Though heavily used, the bridge held up.

Photographed immediately after a prelanding strike by USS Gavutu Islands lie smoking and in ruins in the morning sun.Enterprise aircraft flown by Navy pilots, Tanambogo and Gavutu is at the left across the causeway from Tanambogo.

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tion to back up the raiders. By theend of its first day ashore, 2d Battal-ion had lost 56 men killed andwounded; 1st Raider Battalioncasualties were 99 Marines.

Throughout the night, theJapanese swarmed from hillside cavesin four separate attacks, trying topenetrate the raider lines. They wereunsuccessful and most died in the at-tempts. At dawn, the 2d Battalion,2d Marines, landed to reinforce theattackers and by the afternoon of 8August, the mop-up was completedand the battle for Tulagi was over.

The fight for tiny Gavutu andTanambogo, both little more thansmall hills rising out of the sea, con-nected by a hundred-yard causeway,was every bit as intense as that onTulagi. The area of combat was much

smaller and the opportunities for firesupport from offshore ships and car-rier planes was severely limited oncethe Marines had landed. After navalgunfire from the light cruiser SanJuan (CL 54) and two destroyers, anda strike by F4F Wildcats flying fromthe Wasp, the 1st Parachute Battal-ion landed near noon in three waves,395 men in all, on Gavutu. TheJapanese, secure in cave positions,opened fire on the second and thirdwaves, pinning down the first Ma-rines ashore on the beach. MajorWilliams took a bullet in the lungsand was evacuated; 32 Marines werekilled in the withering enemy fire.This time, 2d Marines reinforcementswere really needed; the 1st Battalion'sCompany B landed on Gavutu andattempted to take Tanambogo; the

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attackers were driven to ground andhad to pull back to Gavutu.

After a rough night of close-infighting with the defenders of bothislands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,reinforced the men already ashoreand mopped up on each island. Thetoll of Marines dead on the three is-lands was 144; the wounded num-bered 194. The few Japanese whosurvived the battles fled to Florida Is-land, which had been scouted by the2d Marines on D-Day and foundclear of the enemy.

The Marines' landings and theconcentration of shipping in Guadal-canal waters acted as a magnet to theJapanese at Rabaul. At AdmiralGhormley's headquarters, Tulagi's ra-dio was heard on D-Day "franticallycalling for [the] dispatch of surface

After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shornof their foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air sup port

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231

hitting the enemy emplacements, Japanese opposition fromcaves proved to be serious obstacles for attacking Marines.

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