figure 7.1-7—safety automation system architecture
TRANSCRIPT
U.S. EPR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
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Tier 2 Revision 0Figure 7.1-7—Safety Automation System Architecture
U.S. EPR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
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re
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Figure 7.1-8—Priority and Actuator Control System Architectu
U.S. EPR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
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MSI
M2-
SU
SA I&
C -
SIC
S
M2-
G1
M2-
G2
CU
PACS
DCM
Note 1
EPR3040 T2
Division 4
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Figure 7.1-9—Severe Accident I&C System Architecture
CU
PACS
GW 1 GW 2SU
Plant Data Network
MSI
M1-
SU
SA I&
C -
SIC
S
DCM
Note 1
M1-
G1
M1-
G2 M
1-SU
M1-
G1
M1-
G2
M2-
SU
M2-
G1
M2-
G2
Note 1 – Hardwired inputs may be from sensors or other I&C systems
CU
PACS
DCM
Note 1
CU
PACS
DCM
Note 1
Division 1 Division 2 Division 3
U.S. EPR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
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rchitecture
MSI
M4-
SU
M4-
G1
M4-
G2
AU
Note 1
DU DU
CUDU
-M1
DU
-M2
CRDCS
EPR3045 T2
Division 4
Tier 2 Revision 0
Figure 7.1-10—Reactor Control, Surveillance, and Limitation System A
AU
GW 1 GW 2 SU
Plant Data Network
MSI
M1-
SU
Note 1
M1-
G1
M1-
G2
M1-
SU
M1-
G1
M1-
G2
M4-
SU
M4-
G1
M4-
G2
Note 1 – Hardwired inputs may be from sensors or other I&C systems
AU
Note 1
AU
Note 1
CU
DU DU
DU
-M1
DU
-M2
CRDCS
Division 1 Division 2 Division 3
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Subsystem)
CUB
CUA
Note 1
PAS-PACS
EPR3050 T2
Division 4
Tier 2 Revision 0
Figure 7.1-11—Process Automation System Architecture (Nuclear Island
CUB
CUA
Plant Data Network
Note 1 – Hardwired inputs may be from sensors or other I&C systems
Note 1
CUB
CUA
PAS-PACS
Note 1
CUB
CUA
Note 1
PAS-PACS
PAS-PACS
Division 1 Division 2 Division 3
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ce of Plant Subsystem)
Plant m
CUB
EPR3055 T2
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Figure 7.1-12—Process Automation System Architecture (Turbine Island and Balan
Turbine Island Subsystem
Balance of Subsyste
Plant Data Network
Note 1 – Hardwired inputs may be from sensors or other I&C systems
CUB
CUA
Note 1
CUA
Note 1
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on Subsystem)
DAU
Note 1
PACS
EPR3060 T2
Division 4
Tier 2 Revision 0
Figure 7.1-13—Process Automation System Architecture (Diverse Actuati
DAU
Plant Data Network
Note 1 – Hardwired inputs may be from sensors or other I&C systems
Note 1
DAU
PACS
Note 1
DAU
Note 1
PACS PACS
Division 1 Division 2 Division 3
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2 Power Range Detectors
etectors
e Range Detectors
EPR3065 T2
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Figure 7.1-14—Measuring Ranges of Excore Instrumentation
Po
we
r R
an
ge
4 x
3 Source Range D
Inte
rmedia
te R
ange
Sourc
e R
ange
100
10-1
10-2
10-3
10-4
10-5
10-6
10-7
10-8
10-9
10-10
Rela
tive R
eacto
r P
ow
er
P/P
r (P
r =
Rate
d P
ow
er)
4 Intermediat
U.S. EPR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
Figure 7.1-15—Excore Instrument Detector Locations
O SRD Div 2
Ø 0° ØIRD Div 2 I IRD Div 3 PRD Div 2 I PRD Div 3
315° 45° I
I
I
I
I
I
O 270° - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - 90 ° OSRD Div 1 I SRD Div 3
I
I
I
I
I
225° I 135° I
I
Ø 180° ØIRD Div 1 IRD Div 4PRD Div 1 PRD Div 4
Notes:1. PRD : Ø Power Range Detector 4 locations of 2 detectors 2. IRD : Ø Intermediate Range Detector 4 locations of 1 detector 3. SRD : O Source Range Detector 3 locations of 1 detector
EPR3070 T2
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ement
l Processing To PS
EPR3075 T2
Tier 2 Revision 0
Figure 7.1-16—Boron Concentration Measurement System Arrang
Flow
Counter Tube
Neutron Source
TemperatureDetector
Signa
B-10
Container
U.S. EPR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
Figure 7.1-17—Implementation of Defense-In-Depth
OPERATIONAL I&C FUNCTIONS
LIMITATION I&C FUNCTIONS
PREVENTIVE LINE
OF DEFENSE
MAIN LINE
OF DEFENSE
SAFETY I&C FUNCTIONS
(Mitigate DBE’s, Achieve Safe Shutdown)
RISK REDUCTION I&C FUNCTIONS
(Mitigate BDBE’s, Severe Accidents)
RISK REDUCTION
LINE OF DEFENSE
RCSL PAS TG I&C
PAS
PS SAS
SA I&C
RCSL PAS TG I&C
EPR3080 T2
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DigitalNon-TXS
DigitalNon-TXS
PAS
PICS
CStrol ic
EPR3085 T2
Tier 2 Revision 0
Figure 7.1-18—Implementation of Diversity
Non-Digital
DigitalTXS/HW
DigitalTXS
LEVE
L 2
UN
IT S
UPE
RVI
SIO
N A
ND
CO
NTR
OL
LEVE
L 1
SYST
EM A
UTO
MA
TIO
NLE
VEL
0PR
OC
ESS
INTE
RFA
CE
PSSAS RCSL
PACS
SA I&C
SICS
A B
PlatformDiversity
PlatformDiversity
PlatformDiversity
DiverseSensors
FunctionalDiversity
Diversity in Reactor Trip Devices
Trip Breakers(UV Coils)
Trip Breakers(ST Coils)
Trip Contactors
CRDConLog
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Divisions
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Figure 7.1-19—Implementation of Independence Between Redundant
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n-Safety I&C
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Figure 7.1-20—Implementation of Independence Between Safety and No