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FI N A L RE P O RT

O F T H E

AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S

RE V I E W BO A R D

“All government records concerning the assassinationof President John F. K e n n e d y

should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure.”

LE T T E R O F TR A N S M I T T A L

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BO A R D ME M B E R S: John R.Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. NelsonEX E C U T I V E DI R E C T O R: Laura A. Denk • DE P U T Y DI R E C T O R: Tracy J. Shycoff


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AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D

The Honorable John R. Tu n h e i mC h a i r m a n

Henry F. Graff

Kermit L. Hall

William L. Joyce

Anna K. Nelson

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AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D STA F F( SE P T E M B E R 1 9 9 8 )

Laura A. Denk, Esq.Executive Director

Tracy J. ShycoffDeputy Director

Ronald G. Haron, Esq.General Counsel

K. Michelle CombsAssociate Director for Research and Analysis

Eileen A. Sullivan Douglas P. HornePress and Public Affairs Off i c e r Chief Analyst for Military Records

Robert J. Skwirot Kevin G. Ti e r n a nChief Analyst for CIA R e c o r d s Chief Analyst for FBI Records

Irene F. Marr, Senior Analyst

Sarah Ahmed, AnalystMarie Fagnant, Analyst

James C. Goslee, II, AnalystBenjamin A. Rockwell, Analyst

Peter H. Voth, Analyst/Assistant Computer Specialist

Charles C. Rhodes, Computer Specialist

Jerrie Olson, Executive SecretaryCatherine M. Rodriguez, Technical Assistant for Research and Analysis

Janice Spells, Administrative Assistant

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Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x x i i i

Chapter 1: The Problem of Secrecy and the Solution of the JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A. The Problem of Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1B. Prior Investigative Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

1. The President’s Commission to Investigate the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Warren Commission) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2. The President’s Commission on Central Intelligence Agency Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

3. The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

4. The Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (Pike Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

5. The Select Committee on Assassinations of the House of Representatives (HSCA) . 36. Additional Congressional Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37. Records Held by Executive Branch Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48. Investigative Records in the Custody of Non-Federal Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

C. Skepticism Concerning the Government’s Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4D. The Solution: The JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6E. Legislative History of JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6F. Key Provisions of JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter 2: Establishment of the Review Board and Definition of “Assassination Record” . . . . . 13

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13B. Delay in Start Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1. JFK Act Deadlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13a. Ninety days for President to appoint Review Board members.b. 300 days for government offices to review, identify,

and organize assassination records.c. 300 days for NARA to establish JFK Collection.d. Three years for Board to complete work.

2. Passage of H.R. 1553 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15C. Defining “Assassination Record” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1. Statutory Definition of “Assassination Record” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162. Congressional Intent Concerning Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163. Review Board’s Early Deliberations and Draft Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174. Comments from Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

a. Notice and Comment.b. Public Hearings.

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TA B L E O F CO N T E N T S

5. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18a. Scope of assassination records.b. Scope of additional records and information.c. Sources of assassination records and additional records and information.d. Types of materials included in scope of assassination records and additional

records and information.e. Assassination records released in their entirety.f. Originals and copies.

D. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Chapter 3: Public Activities of the Assassination Records Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23B. Public Hearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23C. Public Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24D. Experts Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24E. Outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

1. Outreach to Academics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252. Outreach to Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263. Outreach to Assassination Researchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264. Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

F. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Chapter 4: Developing the Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29B. JFK Act Requirements for Processing Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29C. Basic Elements of the Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30D. Electronic Identification Aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31E. Tracking the Review of Assassination Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

1. Review Track Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322. Fast Track Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

F. Consent Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34G. Board Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34H. Miscellaneous Bottlenecks and Problems in the Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

1. Duplicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352. Equities and Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

a. Managing referrals.b. Dunning letters.c. Review Board joint declassification sessions.

I. Document Processing After Review Board Votes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37J. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Chapter 5: The Standards for Review: Review Board “Common Law” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

A. Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411. Current Guidelines for Release of Assassination-Related Information . . . . . . . . 412. Key Distinctions Between Standards of Release Under the FOIA,

the Executive Order, and the JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of assassination records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence. . . . . . . . 43c. JFK Act requires the Review Board to balance evidence for postponement against

public interest in release. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

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d. Segregability and substitute language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443. Federal Agency Record Groups and the Standards Applied to Them . . . . . . . . . 44

a. The FBI’s “core and related” files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44b. The CIA’s Lee Harvey Oswald “201” file. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45c. The FBI’s “House Select Committee on Assassinations” (HSCA) subject files. . . 45d. The CIA’s “segregated collection” files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45e. FBI re c o rds on the congressional committees that investigated the assassination. . 45f. Requests for additional information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

B. Declassification Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451. Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

a. Review Board guidelines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46b. Commentary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

i. “Rule of Reason.”A. “NBR” Guidelines: Records that Review Board judged were

“not believed relevant” to the assassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47B. Segregated Collection Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

2. Intelligence Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48a. CIA officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

b. “John Scelso” (pseudonym). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

c. Information that identifies CIA officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

d. Names of National Security Agency employees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

3. Intelligence Sources and Methods and Other Matters Relating to the National Security of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50a. CIA sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51


b. CIA pseudonyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

c. CIA crypts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

d. CIA sluglines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

e. CIA surveillance methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

f. CIA installations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

h. CIA job titles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

i. CIA file numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

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j. CIA domestic facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

k. CIA official cover. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

l. Alias documentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

m. Foreign intelligence cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

n. Human sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence (assets). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

o. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary and overview of foreign counterintelligence appeals.

A. The FBI’s May 1996 Appeals to the PresidentB. Post-appeal decisionmaking

p. Information that reveals the FBI’s investigative interest in a diplomatic establishment or diplomatic personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

q. Technical sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

r. Other classified file numbers relating to FBI foreign counterintelligence. . . . . . . 60i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary

s. FBI mail cover in foreign counterintelligence investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60i. Review Board guidelinesii. Commentary

t. FBI tracing of funds in foreign counterintelligence investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . 61i. Review Board guidelinesii. Commentary.

u. FBI physical surveillance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

v. Operational details concerning Department of Defense operations. . . . . . . . . . . 62i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

w. National Security Agency sources and methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary

x. National Security Agency intercept traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63i. Review Board guidelinesii. Commentary

4. Personal Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63a. Personal privacy generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

i. Review Board guidelinesii. Commentary.

b. Prisoner of War issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64i. Review Board guidelines.

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ii. Commentary.c. Names of individuals in Secret Service “threat sheets.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64


5. Informant Postponements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65a. Informant postponements generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65


A. A note on the statutory framework for review of FBI informant postponements

B. History of Review Board’s decisionmaking on informant postponementsC. Effect of prior disclosures

b. Individuals who provided information to the FBI, but who did not have an ongoing confidential relationship with the FBI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

c. Individuals who gave the FBI information to which they had access by virtue of their employment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

d. Deceased informants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

e. “Negative Contacts”: Informants who provided no assassination-related information to the FBI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

f. “Positive Contacts”: Informants who provided at least some assassination-related information to the FBI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

g. FBI informant symbol numbers and file numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70i. Review Board guidelines.ii. Commentary.

6. Confidential Relationships Between Government Agents and Cooperating Foreign Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71a. Foreign liaison postponements in FBI files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71


7. Presidential Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74C. JFK Act Exemptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

1. Tax Return Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 742. Records Under Seal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

D. Appeals to the President Pending as of September 30, 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75E. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Chapter 6, Part I:The Quest for Additional Information and Records in Federal Government Off i c e s . . . 81

A. Records Related To Lee Harvey Oswald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821. Pre-assassination records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82a. CIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

i. Security file.ii. Records in the defector file.iii. HTLINGUAL records.

b. FBI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

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c. Secret Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83d. IRS/Social Security Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83e. INS records on Lee and Marina Oswald. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84f. House Un-American Activities Committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

2. Military records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84a. U.S. Marine Corps records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

i. U.S. Marine Headquarters copy of enlisted personnel file and medical file.ii. Additional relevant U.S. Marine Corps unit diaries.

b. Military identification card. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84c. Possible ONI post-defection investigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

3. In the U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85a. CIA operations in Moscow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85b. American Embassy personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85c. Search for American Embassy records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86d. DCD/OO alleged debriefing of Lee Harvey Oswald. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

4. In Mexico City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86a. Technical surveillance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

i. Audio and photographic.ii. Tapes, transcripts, and photographs in existence.

b. Cable traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88c. Win Scott files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90d. Sylvia Duran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90e. Legat administrative files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90f. Anne Goodpasture deposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

B. Records On Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911. CIA Record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912. Military Records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

a. Joint Staff Secretariat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91b. Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92c. Office of the Secretary of Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92d. Joint Chiefs of Staff history. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

3. Presidential Library collections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92a. JFK Library records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92b. LBJ Library records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

4. Church Committee Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93C. Records On Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

1. CIA Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932. Military records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

a. Joint Staff Secretariat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94b. Office of the Secretary of Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94c. Joint Chiefs of Staff history. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

3. Presidential Library collections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94a. JFK Library. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94b. LBJ Library. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

4. Church Committee Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94D. Records of Senior Agency Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

1. CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95a. Allen Dulles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95b. John McCone. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95c. Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95d. Richard Bissell, William Colby, and Richard Helms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95e. James J. Angleton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96f . Lawrence Houston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96g . William Harvey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

2. FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

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a. Hoover and Tolson records, including “Official and Confidential” files, chronological files, and phone logs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

b. Miscellaneous administrative files from the Director’s Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97c. John P. Mohr Records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

3. Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974. Office of the Secretary of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985. Office of Naval Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986. Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987. National Security Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

a. Office of Information and Privacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99b. Criminal Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

10. Department of the Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9911. IRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

E. Pro and Anti-Castro Cuban Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001. Fair Play for Cuba Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

a. FBI field office files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100b. CIA records on Richard Gibson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101c. Department of Justice Criminal Division files on FPCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

2. Cuban COINTELPRO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013. Anti-Castro Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014. Cuban Intelligence Activities in the U.S.; Cuban Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025. Anti-Castro Cuban Groups, Including DRE, Alpha 66,

SFNE, JURE, FRD, CRC, and Commandos-L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026. Threats Against the Life of Fidel Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

a. CIA DS&T records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102b. FBI file captioned “Threats Against the Life of Fidel Castro.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

7. American Gambling Interests in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038. Sergio Arcacha-Smith, Antonio Veciana, and Bernardo de Torres . . . . . . . . . . . 103

F. Records on Organized Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031. Sam Giancana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032. FBI Electronic Surveillance of Carlos Marcello: BriLab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043. Department of Justice Criminal Division Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

G. Warren Commission Staff and Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041. FBI Files on Warren Commission Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052. CIA and FBI Files on Warren Commission Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

a. Mark Lane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105b. Harold Weisberg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106c. Josiah Thompson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106d. Edward J. Epstein. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106e. Paul Hoch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106f. David S. Lifton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106g. Sylvia Meagher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

H. Name Searches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071. John Abt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072. Edward Becker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073. Carlos Bringuier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074. George Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085. Ed Butler and Information Council of the Americas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086. Claude Barnes Capehart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087. Lawrence Cusack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098. Adele Edisen, Winston de Monsabert, Jose Rivera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099. Billie Sol Estes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10910. Judith Campbell Exner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10911. H.L. Hunt and Family and Clint Murchison and Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

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12. Joseph P. Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11013. Oswald LeWinter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11014. Marita Lorenz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11015. John Thomas Masen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11116. John Anthony McVickar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11117. Elizabeth Catlett Mora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11118. Gordon Duane Novel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11119. Orest Pena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11120. Carlos Quiroga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11121. Charles Small . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11222. Clarence Daniel Smelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11223. Richard Snyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11224. Marty Underwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11225. General Edwin Walker/Minutemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

I. Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131. CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

a. The U-2 connection and the fake manuals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113b. The “Family Jewels.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

2. FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114a. “Research Matters” file on John F. Kennedy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114b. Liaison with other federal agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

i. Secret Service/Protection of the President.ii. CIA.iii. NSA.iv. Customs.v. ATF.

3. Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115a. Protective survey reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115b. Shift reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115c. Eileen Dinneen memoranda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

4. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155. Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

a. U.S. Army’s Investigative Records Repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115b. Army Security Agency records and files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116c. Army Inspector General 1973 report on domestic surveillance abuses in the U.S. 116

6. White House Communications Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167. Presidential Library Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

a. William Manchester interviews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117b. Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes at the LBJ Library. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

J. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Chapter 6, Part II: Clarifing the Federal Record on the Zapruder Film and the Medical and Ballistics Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121B. Medical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

1. Medical issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121C. Zapruder Film . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

1. Ownership of the Zapruder film . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242. Staff examination of films designated as “in-camera” original, and

first-generation copies, by NARA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253. Eastman Kodak’s Pro Bono Work for the Review Board Related to the

Zapruder Film (and Autopsy Photographs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254. The Review Board Staff’s Study and Clarification of Paul Hoch’s

FOIA Lead “CIA Document 450” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126D. Ballistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

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Chapter 7: Pursuit of Records and Information from Non-Federal Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

A. Pursuit of Records and Papers from Private Citizens and Organizations . . . . . . . . 1311. Gary Aguilar: Interviews with Drs. Humes and Boswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1312. Richard Barnes: AP Wire Copy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1313. Dr. George Burkley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1314. E d w a rd Scannell Butler: Materials from the Information Council of the A m e r i c a s . 1325. Mrs. Marion Ebersole: Records of Dr. John J. Ebersole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1326. President Gerald Ford: Desk Diaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1327. Justice Abe Fortas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1328. Captain J.W. “Will” Fritz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1329. Jim Garrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13210. James P. Hosty, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13211. Wesley Liebeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13212. David Lifton: Medical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13313. Holland McCombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13314. Richard Case Nagell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13315. New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13416. Gerald Posner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13417. Frank Ragano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13418. J. Lee Rankin: Warren Commission Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13419. Clay Shaw: Personal Papers and Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13520. Walter Sheridan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13521. Sixth Floor Museum Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13522. Martin Underwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13523. Edward Wegmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13624. Thomas W. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

B. Pursuit of Audio-Visual Material from Private Citizens and Organizations . . . . . . 1371. Tom Alyea: Film from Inside the Texas School Book Depository . . . . . . . . . . . . 1372. Charles Bronson: Film of Dealey Plaza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1373. CBS Outtakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1374. Robert Groden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1375. Lt. Everett Kay: Audio Surveillance Tape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1376. Vincent Palamara: Interviews with Secret Service Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1387. David Powers: Film of Motorcade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1328. David Taplin: November 24, 1963, Coverage of Dallas Police Department . . . . . 1329. Stephen Tyler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13210. Janet Veazey: KTVT Outtakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13211. Moses Weitzman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13812. Robert White: Evelyn Lincoln Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

C. Pursuit of State and Local Government Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1391. New Orleans District Attorney Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1392. Dallas City and County Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

D. Pursuit of Records from Foreign Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401. Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1412. Belarus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1413. Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1414. Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1425. Other Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

E. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Chapter 8:Compliance with JFK Act by Government Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145B. Federal Agency Compliance with the JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

1. Central Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1452. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1473. Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1494. National Security Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1495. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1506. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

a. Office of Information & Privacy.b. Criminal Division.c. Civil Division.d. Civil Rights Division.e. Office of Legal Counsel.

7. Department of the Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153a. Main Treasury.b. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms.c. Customs Service.d. Internal Revenue Service.

8. National Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1559. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15510. Immigration & Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15511. Office of the Secretary of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15612. Defense Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15613. Department of the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

a. Investigative Records Repository.14. Department of the Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

a. Office of Naval Intelligence.b. National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda.

15. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15816. Department of the Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15817. Joint Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15918. White House Communications Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15919. U.S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15920. Social Security Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15921. Drug Enforcement Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16022. NARA, including Presidential Libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

a. NARA, Washington, D.C.b. NARA, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, Texas.c. Gerald R. Ford Library.d. John F. Kennedy Library.e. Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

23. General Services Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163C. Congressional Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

1. House Select Committee on Assassinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1632. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1643. House Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1644. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil & Constitutional Rights

(the Edwards Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16555. House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information

and Individual Rights (the Abzug Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1656. House Committee on Un-American Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1657. Library of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1658. Other Congressional Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

D. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

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Review Board Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Appendices

Appendix A: The Members of the Assassination Records Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Appendix B: The Staff of the Assassination Records Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Appendix C: President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 . . . . . 183

Appendix D: Assassination Records Review Board Guidance for Interpretation and Implementation of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Appendix E: Meetings of the Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Appendix F: Summary of Review Board Votes on Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

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AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D FI N A L RE P O RTPR E FA C E

This Final Report of the A s s a s s i n a t i o nRecords Review Board details the Board’sextensive work in fulfilling its statutory man-date. The JFK Act, however, necessitates thatthe Review Board’s report be different fromreports of other assassination-related com-missions and committees. Previous assassi-nation-related commissions and committeeswere established for the purpose of issuingfinal reports that would draw conclusionsabout the assassination. Congress did not,however, direct the Review Board to drawconclusions about the assassination, but torelease assassination records so that the pub-lic could draw its own conclusions. Thus, thisFinal Report does not offer conclusions aboutwhat the assassination records released didor did not prove. Rather, it identifies recordsthat the Board released and describes theprocesses and standards that the Board usedto release them. The Board believes that itsmost substantial contribution has been toenhance, broaden, and deepen the historicalre c o rd relating to the assassination. TheAmerican public ultimately will be the bene-ficiaries of the JFK Act and the ReviewBoard’s work in ensuring access to the exten-sive reach of the JFK Collection.

The first two chapters of the Report describethe Review Board and its establishment.Chapter one describes the context in whichCongress passed the JFK Act and brieflyintroduces some of the records that Congressdirected the Review Board to examine andrelease if appropriate. Chapter two describeshow the JFK Act both enabled and delayedthe Review Board’s start-up. Chapter twoalso explains the Review Board’s first chal-lenge—defining the statutory term “assassi-nation record”—so that its search for recordswould be broad enough to ensure public con-fidence in the Board’s work but narro wenough not to consume Board time andresources on unrelated documents.

Chapter three explains how the ReviewB o a rd interacted with a very intere s t e dAmerican public. Chapter three outlines theways in which Review Board members andstaff worked with members of the public todevelop policy and seek records.

Chapters four through eight of the Reportdescribe the heart of the Review Board’swork—the identification and release of assas-sination records. Chapter four explains howthe Review Board developed a re v i e wprocess that would ensure consistent reviewof an enormous volume of records. Chapterfive describes in detail the standards that theReview Board established for the release or,in some cases, protection of federal records.Chapter six lists the numerous requests foradditional information and records that theReview Board made to federal agencies toensure that it did not leave important stonesunturned. Throughout its brief history,countless individuals and groups maderequests of the Board for specific informa-tion. The Board had to respond to these byasking whether meeting these re q u e s t swould yield additional documents. Chapterseven describes the Board’s quest for addi-tional information and records, albeit fromnon-federal sources, and thus expands uponchapter six. Chapter seven also describes thetypes of assassination re c o rds that theReview Board sought from state and localgovernments as well as foreign governments.Chapter eight provides details about thecooperation, or lack thereof, that the ReviewB o a rd received from each federal agencywith which it dealt, outlining in detail theReview Board’s “compliance program.”

The last part of this report consists of theReview Board members’ conclusions andtheir recommendations to the President, toCongress, and to existing and future federalagencies. The Board recognizes that for

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decades to come the federal government willcontinue to face the challenge of finding themost efficient way to declassify its records,an activity the Board believes is essential tomaintaining our freedom. Although theproblems caused by government secrecy are

magnified in the context of an assassinationof a President in which there is great publicinterest, these problems are indeed presentt h roughout the federal government. Theremedies for excessive secrecy can be univer-sally applied with positive results.

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EX E C U T I V E SU M M A RY

The Assassination Records Review Boardwas a unique solution to a unique problem.Although the tragic assassination of Presi-dent John F. Kennedy was the subject oflengthy official investigations, beginningwith the Warren Commission in 1964, andcontinuing through the House Select Com-mittee on Assassinations, in 1978-79, theAmerican public has continued to seekanswers to nagging questions raised by thisinexplicable act. These questions were com-pounded by the government penchant forsecrecy. Fears sparked by the Cold War dis-couraged the release of documents, particu-larly those of the intelligence and securityagencies. Even the records created by theinvestigative commissions and committeeswere withheld from public view and sealed.As a result, the official record on the assassi-nation of President Kennedy re m a i n e dshrouded in secrecy and mystery.

The suspicions created by governmentsecrecy eroded confidence in the truthfulnessof federal agencies in general and damagedtheir credibility. Finally, frustrated by the lackof access and disturbed by the conclusions ofOliver Stone’s JFK, Congress passed the Pres -ident John F. Kennedy Assassination RecordsCollection Act of 1992 (JFK Act), mandatingthe gathering and opening of all records con-cerned with the death of the President.

The major purpose of the Review Board wasto re-examine for release the records that theagencies still regarded as too sensitive toopen to the public. In addition, Congressestablished the Review Board to help restoregovernment credibility. To achieve these loftygoals, Congress designed an entity that wasunprecedented.

T h ree provisions of the Act were at the heartof the design. First, Congress established theReview Board as an independent agency.

Second, the Board consisted of five citizens,trained in history, a rchives, and the law, whow e re not government employees but whohad the ability to order agencies to declas-sify government documents—the first timein history that an outside group has hadsuch power. Third, once the Board made thedecision that a document should be declassi-fied, only the President could overrule itsdecision. Fortunately, Congress also gavethe Board a staff whose work was critical toits success.

The JFK Act required all government agen-cies to search for the records in their posses-sion concerning the assassination and placethem in the National Archives. The Act pro-vided for the appointment of the members ofthe Review Board within ninety days, but thetransition between the Bush and Clintonadministrations caused an 18-month delaybetween passage of the Act and the swear-ing-in of the Board members. Only thencould the Board hire staff and arrange foroffice space. This delay had two ramifica-tions. First, the Act stated that the work of theBoard was to be completed in three years, anunrealistic goal since more than 18 monthshad already elapsed. (The Board’s work waseventually extended to four years.) Second,agencies were sending documents to theNational Archives before the Board estab-lished its guidelines for their release. Conse-quently and unfortunately, once the ReviewBoard did provide guidance to the agencies,much of their initial work had to be revised,further slowing the processing and re -reviewing by the Board and its staff.

The Board’s first task was to define the term“assassination record” in order to frame thesearch for relevant records. The statutory def-inition, a record “related to the assassinationof President John F. Kennedy,” specificallyincluded any record from the investigating

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agencies, and records in the possession of thefederal government, and any local or stategovernment that assisted in the inquiry intothe assassination. But, as noted in the Senatereport, “it is intended and emphasized thatthe search and disclosure of records underthis Act must go beyond those records.” Con-gress empowered the Board to determinewhether a document was an assassinationre c o rd and to cast a broad net for suchrecords. Board members engaged in exten-sive discussion and sought advice from thepublic before finally issuing its broad defini-tion. The definition enabled the Board to lookbeyond the narrower confines of the assassi-nation to find and release valuable docu-ments from the early 1960s that enhance thehistorical understanding of that era, and thepolitical and diplomatic context in which theassassination occurred.

The Review Board overcame its early chal-lenges and, with the help of its able staff,developed guidelines for the release of docu-ments. These served as the yardstick for bothits staff and the federal agencies.

The Board’s most important task was toreview the information the agencies wishedto postpone rather than release and then tovote either to sustain the postponement orrelease the information. Since the Board wasworking in uncharted territory, it developedc reative methods. Three review stagesevolved over the four years of the Board’sexistence. At first, the Board scrutinized eachdocument with infinite care, and by choosingto meet often, made decisions on a docu-ment-by-document basis working to under-stand both the body of information at issueand the balance required by the JFK Act. Iteschewed the more generic issue approachwhich was preferred by the agencies.

During the second stage, the Board dele-gated some routine decisionmaking to itsB o a rd staff, which proceeded with such carethat even the slightest question about a doc-ument brought it to the Board’s attention.F i n a l l y, agencies recognized the voting pat-tern of the Board and for purposes of eff i-ciency began bypassing the review pro c e s son their own initiative and releasing re c o rd sunder the Board’s guidelines. The Board ’ sreview process ultimately ensured that theReview Board scrutinized each piece of

withheld information so that the A m e r i c a npublic would be confident that assassina-tion re c o rds were open to the fullest extentpossible.

The JFK Act established a stringent standardfor postponing the opening of a record. Itsminimal list of required postponements andemphasis on the bias toward disclosure sepa-rated it from either the Freedom of Informa-tion Act (FOIA) or the Executive Order thatprovides for disclosure of national securityinformation. The Board proceeded cautiouslyas it examined its first documents under theprovisions of postponement in Section 6 ofthe JFK Act. In particular, the Board balancedevidence for postponement against the pub-lic interest in release, bearing in mind theAct’s “presumption of immediate disclo-sure.” Before agreeing to postponement, theBoard applied the stringent requirements forthe “clear and convincing evidence” requiredby the Act. Decisions had to be made onnames, dates, places, crypts, pseudonyms,file numbers, sources of information and themethod by which it was obtained. Ulti-mately, the Board created a set of principles,a kind of “common law,” that could beapplied to many of the documents. Althoughthe agencies often objected to the Board’sdecisions, they accepted both the statute andthe Board’s interpretation of it and, for themost part, cooperated.

The JFK Act specifically instructed the ReviewB o a rd to go beyond the scope of pre v i o u sinquiries. Since both the Board and its staffhad high level security clearances, no agencycould prevent a search through every file.After locating files designated by the agencies,the Review Board staff members pursued news o u rces of assassination re c o rds. Most of theReview Board’s additional requests forre c o rds went to the CIA and FBI, but therew e re also requests to the Secret Service, theDepartments of State snd Defense, theNational Security A g e n c y, and The Pre s i d e n t ’ sF o reign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Given the massive volume of federal records,the search for additional records was timeconsuming and often frustrating. For everyassassination record located and included inthe collection, the staff literally re v i e w e dh u n d reds of documents. The documentslocated through this search for additional

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records are among the most important in thecollection—many were never reviewed bythe prior investigations.

The Review Board, in its effort to make theJFK Collection valuable to historians, encour-aged private citizens and organizations thatpossessed records of their own to donatethem to the JFK Collection. The collectionwas significantly enriched by these dona-tions. They included, for example, the deskdiaries of former President and Warren Com-mission member Gerald Ford, the personalfiles of Jim Garrison, the New Orleans prose-cuting attorney, notes taken during inter-views with Lee Harvey Oswald by both aDallas Police Captain and a former FBI agent,and films from individuals in Dallas andP resident Kennedy’s aide, Dave Powers.They also include a donation of papers fromthe son of J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel ofthe Warren Commission, and the diary ofClay Shaw, the only person tried for the mur-der of John F. Kennedy (and subsequentlyacquitted). The Review Board added to thecollection, too, information from state andlocal offices and officials who were tied to theOswald investigation.

The JFK Act also encouraged the ReviewBoard to work with the Department of Stateto include documents from foreign govern-ments. The Board sought records from Rus-sia, Belarus, Cuba and Mexico. For the mostpart, these attempts proved frustrating andfruitless owing to political and diplomaticconstraints. Although many leads were pur-sued, only a few new records were obtained.Although this is a genuine loss to the histori-cal completeness of the assassination records,work continues on these attempts and theB o a rd is hopeful that eventually theserecords, particularly the voluminous KGBsurveillance re c o rds on Oswald, will beadded to the JFK Collection.

In the spirit of openness embodied in the JFKAct, the Review Board devoted a significantamount of time and resources listening toand corresponding with its various con-stituencies. It held a total of seven publichearings, one each in Dallas, Boston, NewOrleans, and Los Angeles and three in Wash-ington, DC. In addition, Board members par-ticipated in meetings of historical associa-tions, spoke to countless public groups, and

cooperated with assassination re s e a rc h e r sand the Coalition on Political Assassinations.Over 100 press releases were issued, andBoard members made themselves availablefor many media interviews.

Twice, the Review Board called together ag roup of invited guests who are “experts” intheir fields. The first conference was held inMay 1995. It provided the Review Board andthe staff with the opportunity to discussprior investigative efforts that werethwarted due to lack of access to re c o rd s .The participants provided the Board staffwith recommendations for further searc h e s .The second conference, held in April 1998,focused narrowly on the issue of documentdeclassification. This informative meetinghelped Board members to formulate re c o m-mendations for this final re p o r t .

From time to time the frequent and sustainedcontact with the public diverted the stafffrom its primary responsibilities—identify-ing and releasing records. However, the ben-efits far outweighed the costs. The ReviewBoard received valuable leads from the pub-lic about the existence of other assassinationrecords and, more important, received dona-tions that enhanced the collection at theNational Archives.

Finally, the Review Board staff implementeda program to ensure, to the fullest extent pos-sible, that each agency complied with the JFKAct. A signed declaration was required fromeach agency, under penalty of perjury. Thiscompliance statement described the recordsearches that the agency completed, recordsthat it located, and other actions it took tocomply with the law.

Before agencies submitted their Final Decla-rations of Compliance, the staff worked withthem to resolve outstanding problems. In thecompliance statement, each agencyaddressed the scope and adequacy of itssearch, the adequacy of its response to therequests for additional information, and thetimeliness with which it processed its recordsfor release. The Board and staff also decidedto depose officials of agencies with poorrecords systems and those that failed to com-ply with the spirit of the Act.

The legacy of the JFK Review Board lies in

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Major Accomplishments of the Assassination Records Review Board

• Reviewed and voted on over 27,000 previously redacted assassination records;

• Obtained agencies’ consent to release an additional 33,000+ assassination records;

• E n s u red that the famous “Zapruder Film” of the assassination belonged to the A m e r i c a npeople and arranged for the first known authenticity study of the Zapruder Film;

• Opened previously redacted CIA records from the Directorate of Operations;

• Released 99% of the “Hardway/Lopez Report” documenting the CIA’s records on Lee Har-vey Oswald’s trip to Mexico City before the assassination;

• Conducted a three-day audiotaped interview of former FBI Special Agent James P. Hosty,one of two agents who were responsible for the FBI’s cases on Lee and Marina Oswald priorto the assassination;

• Acquired for public release two sets of original notes from Lee Harvey Oswald’s interroga-tion in the Dallas Police Department taken by FBI Agent James Hosty and Dallas HomicideDivision Captain “Will” Fritz (prior to the Board’s existence, it was thought that no originalnotes existed);

• Clarified the controversial medical record of President Kennedy’s autopsy and his treatmentat Parkland Hospital by deposing 10 Bethesda autopsy participants, five Parkland Hospitaltreating physicians, and conducting numerous unsworn interviews of Parkland and Bethesdapersonnel;

• Secured records relating to District Attorney Jim Garrison’s prosecution of Clay Shaw forconspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy, including Shaw’s diaries, records from Shaw’sdefense attorneys, investigative records from the District Attorney’s office, and grand juryrecords;

• Obtained the full release of FBI documents that describe the FBI’s attempts to trackOswald’s activities in Europe prior to the assassination;

• Made available to the public all FBI and CIA documents from previous official investiga-tions;

• Acquired for the American people film footage depicting events surrounding the assassina-tion, portions of which had never been seen before, including the Dallas television stationKTVT outtakes of President and Mrs. Kennedy in Dallas and the aftermath of the assassina-tion;

• S p o n s o red ballistics and forensic testing of Wa r ren Commission Exhibit 567, the bullet“nose fragment” from the front seat of the Presidential limousine, (the HSCA F i rearms Panelfirst recommended the testing in 1978, but the testing was not conducted until the ReviewB o a rd existed);

the more than four million pages of recordsnow in the National Archives and availableto the public with remarkably few redac-tions. These records include critical docu-mentation on the events in Dallas, Lee Har-vey Oswald, and the reactions of government

agencies to the assassination. They alsoinclude documents that enhance the histori-cal understanding of that traumatic event inrecent American history by placing it in thebroader context of political and diplomaticevents.

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• Permanently preserved all the autopsy photographs of President Kennedy in digitized form,and conducted sophisticated digital enhancement of selected, representative images;

• Reviewed IRS and Social Security tax, employment, and earnings records on Lee HarveyOswald, the authenticity of which has been questioned by researchers who have not beenallowed access to such material. Required IRS to prepare a releasable report without releasingtax return information, the disclosure of which is prohibited by Federal law.

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Review Board Recommendations

With the passage of the JFK Act and the cre-ation of the independent Review Board, Con-g ress took a large step toward rebuilding pub-lic confidence in the federal government,confidence lost through years of excessives e c re c y. The Review Board urges the Congre s s ,government agencies, and the public to con-tinue the effort to open documents under thep rovisions of the JFK Act and to build on thefoundation created by the Board. To that end,the Review Board makes the following re c o m-m e n d a t i o n s :

Recommendation 1:The Review Board recommends that futuredeclassification boards be genuinely indepen-dent, both in the stru c t u re of the org a n i z a t i o nand in the qualifications of the appointments.

Recommendation 2:The Review Board recommends that any seri-ous, sustained effort to declassify recordsrequires congressional legislation with (a) apresumption of openness, (b) clear standardsof access, (c) an enforceable review andappeals process, and (d) a budget appropri-ate to the scope of the task.

Recommendation 3:The Review Board recommends that its“common law” of decision, formed in thecontext of a “presumption of disclosure” andthe “clear and convincing evidence of harm”criteria, be utilized for similar information infuture declassification efforts as a way tosimplify and speed up releases.

Recommendation 4:The Review Board recommends that futuredeclassification efforts avoid the major short-comings of the JFK Act: (a) unreasonable timelimits, (b) employee restrictions, (c) applicationof the law after the Board terminates, and (d)p roblems inherent with rapid sunset pro v i s i o n s .

Recommendation 5:The Review Board recommends that thecumbersome, time-consuming, and expen-sive problem of referrals for “third partyequities” (classified information of oneagency appearing in a document of another)be streamlined by (a) requiring representa-tives of all agencies with interests in selectedgroups of records meet for joint declassifica-tion sessions, or (b) uniform substitute lan-guage be devised to deal with certain cate-gories of recurring sensitive equities.

Recommendation 6:The Review Board recommends that a com-pliance program be used in future declassifi-cation efforts as an effective means of elicit-ing full cooperation in the search for records.

Recommendation 7:The Review Board recommends the followingto ensure that NARA can exercise the pro v i-sions of the JFK Act after the Review Board ter-minates: (a) that NARA has the authority andmeans to continue to implement Board deci-sions, (b) that an appeals pro c e d u re be devel-oped that places the burden for pre v e n t i n gaccess on the agencies, and (c) that a jointoversight group composed of re p re s e n t a t i v e sof the four organizations that originally nomi-nated individuals to serve on the Review Boardbe created to facilitate the continuing executionof the access provisions of the JFK A c t .

Recommendation 8:The Review Board recommends that theReview Board model could be adopted andapplied whenever there are extraordinarycircumstances in which continuing contro-versy concerning government actions hasbeen most acute and where an aggressiveeffort to release all “reasonably related” fed-eral records would serve usefully to enhancehistorical understanding of the event.

Recommendation 9:The Review Board recommends that both the

Freedom of Information Act and ExecutiveOrder 12958 be strengthened, the former tonarrow the categories of information auto-matically excluded from disclosure, the latterto add “independent oversight” to theprocess of “review” when heads of agenciesdecide that records in their units should beexcluded from release.

Recommendation 10:The Review Board recommends the adoption ofa federal classification policy that substantially(a) l i m i t s the number of those in governmentwho can actually classify federal documents, (b)re s t r i c t s the number of categories by which doc-uments might be classified, (c) re d u c e s the timeperiod for which the document(s) might be clas-sified, (d) e n c o u r a g e s the use of substitute lan-guage to immediately open material whichmight otherwise be classified, and (e) i n c re a s e sthe re s o u rces available to the agencies andN A R A for declassifying federal re c o rd s .

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CH A P T E R 1

TH E PR O B L E M O F SE C R E C YA N D T H E SO L U T I O N O F T H E J F K AC T

A. THE PROBLEM OF SECRECY

Uncage the documents.Let them see light. 1

The P resident John F. Kennedy AssassinationRecords Collection Act of 1992 was a uniquesolution to the problem of secre c y. The pro b-lem was that 30 years of government secre c yrelating to the assassination of President JohnF. Kennedy led the American public to believethat the government had something to hide.The solution was legislation that re q u i red thegovernment to disclose whatever informationit had concerning the assassination.

The American public is well aware of thefacts of this particular case: at approximately12:30 p.m. on November 22, 1963, as Presi-dent Kennedy traveled in a motorc a d ethrough Dealey Plaza in downtown Dallas,Texas, he was shot and suffered a massivehead wound. Doctors at Parkland MemorialHospital in Dallas pronounced the Presidentdead shortly thereafter—at 1:00 p.m.

Later that day, Dallas police officers arrestedLee Harvey Oswald as a suspect in the Presi-dent’s murder. Oswald was also a suspect inthe murder of a Dallas patrolman that hadoccurred that afternoon. By 1:30 p.m. onNovember 23, the Dallas police had chargedOswald with assassinating the Pre s i d e n t .Less than 24 hours later, Lee Harvey Oswaldwas shot and killed by Jack Ruby during theDallas Police Department’s transfer ofOswald from the city jail to the county jail.Television cameras captured the scene ofRuby shooting Oswald.

Dallas police officers arrested Jack Ruby. Hewas tried and convicted of Oswald’s murderin March 1964. (In October 1966, the TexasCourt of Criminal Appeals reversed the ver-dict and ordered a new trial. Ruby died of

cancer three months later before his new trialbegan.) Ruby maintained that he was notinvolved in the assassination of the Presidentand that he had not known Oswald prior tohearing his name in connection with theassassination. Ruby claimed that his furyover the assassination led him to kill Oswald.

Aside from the assassination investigationsthat the Dallas police, the FBI, and the Secre tService conducted, President Lyndon B. John-son immediately established the Pre s i d e n t ’ sCommission to Investigate the A s s a s s i n a t i o nof President Kennedy. Chief Justice of the U.S.S u p reme Court Earl Wa r ren headed thee fforts of the Wa r ren Commission. Te nmonths later, the Wa r ren Commission Reportconcluded that Lee Harvey Oswald actedalone and shot the President from a sniper’ snest on the sixth floor of his workplace, theTexas School Book Depository. For a varietyof reasons, not the least of which was that theWa r ren Commission conducted some of itsinvestigations in secret and sealed many of itsre c o rds, the American public never tru s t e dthe Commission’s conclusion. Subsequently,other federal entities conducted partial orcomplete reinvestigations of the assassina-tion. The most significant of these re i n v e s t i-gations was the House Select Committee onAssassinations (HSCA), which concluded in1979 that President Kennedy’s death was theresult of a probable conspiracy.

In 1991, Oliver Stone’s JFK popularized a ver-sion of President Kennedy’s assassinationthat featured U.S. government agents fromthe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA), and themilitary as conspirators. While the moviewas largely fictional, the information thatStone conveyed in the movie’s closing trailerwas true: the HSCA had reinvestigated themurder and issued a provocative report, buttheir records were sealed until the year 2029.

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Stone suggested at the end of JFK that Amer-icans could not trust official public conclu-sions when those conclusions had been madein secret. Congress passed legislation—theJFK Act—that released the secret records thatprior investigations gathered and created.

N u m e rous re c o rds of previous investigativebodies such as the Wa r ren Commission, theC h u rch Committee, and the HSCA w e res e c ret. Yet members of these commissionsreached conclusions based on these investiga-tive re c o rds. The American public lost faithwhen it could not see the very documentswhose contents led to these conclusions.

B. PRIOR INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS

T h e re exists widespread suspicionabout the government’s dispositionof the Kennedy assassination recordsstemming from the beliefs that Fed-eral officials (1) have not made avail-able all Government assassinationrecords (even to the Warren Commis-sion, Church Committee, HouseAssassination Committee) and (2)have heavily redacted the re c o rd sreleased under FOIAin order to coverup sinister conspiracies.2

The American public has expressed its dissat-isfaction with both the work and the conclu-sions of the official investigations of the assas-sination and it was this dissatisfaction thatwas primarily responsible for Congress’ ini-tiative to establish the Assassination Record sReview Board (Review Board). Section 3(2) ofthe JFK Act defines the re c o rds of each ofthese official investigative entities as assassi-nation re c o rds. As such, the Review Boardworked to review and release a l l re c o rds thatthese investigative entities used in re a c h i n gtheir conclusions about the assassination.

At the same time, a brief description of eachentity and the records it generated is usefulfor understanding the enormity of theReview Board’s task.

1. President’s Commission to Investigatethe Assassination of President John F.Kennedy (Warren Commission)

The Warren Commission was the only inves-tigative body to identify a specific individ-

ual—Lee Harvey Oswald—as the lone assas-sin of President Kennedy.

The Wa r ren Commission did not, however,reach its conclusion before conducting anextensive investigation.3 During its tenure ,the Wa r ren Commission deposed or inter-viewed 552 witnesses and generated org a t h e red approximately 360 cubic feet ofre c o rds, including some artifacts andexhibits. The Wa r ren Commission’s Sep-tember 1964, 888-page report came with 26volumes—over 16,000 pages—of testimonyand exhibits.

President Johnson recognized the high publicinterest in the Warren Commission’s unpub-lished records and initiated a plan for releaseof the material. The Johnson plan resulted inthe release of 98% of the Warren Commis-sion’s records by 1992. Thus, at the time thatC o n g ress passed the JFK Act, only 3,000pages of Wa r ren Commission materialremained for the agencies and the ReviewBoard to release.

All Wa r ren Commission re c o rds, exceptthose records that contain tax return informa-tion, are available to the public with onlyminor redactions.

2. The President’s Commission on Central Intelligence Agency Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission)

The 1975 Rockefeller Commission investi-gated the CIA’s illegal domestic activities.4 Inthe course of its work, the Commissiontouched on several assassination-related top-ics, including the identity of the “thre etramps,” the possibility of CIA involvementin the assassination, and ballistics issues.5

The Commission concluded that the CIAwasnot involved in the assassination, and thatthe President had not been hit by a shot firedfrom in front of the Presidential limousine.

As of 1992, the Commission’s assassination-related files consisted of approximately 2,500to 4,000 pages, 95% of which were still secretand in the custody of the Gerald Ford Presi-dential Library when Congress passed theJFK Act.6

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3. The Senate Select Committee to StudyGovernmental Operations with Respectto Intelligence Activities (Church Committee)

In 1975 and 1976, the Senate investigated ille-gal domestic activities of government intelli-gence agencies.7 The Church Committee’sinvestigation uncovered allegations such asCIA assassination plots against Cuban Pre-mier Fidel Castro in the 1960–1963 period.The CIA did not communicate the existenceof the plots to the Warren Commission, eventhough former CIA Director Allen Dulles (aWarren Commission member) was aware ofthem.

The Church Committee’s initial findings ledCommittee member Senator RichardSchweiker to call for a reinvestigation of theassassination. Through Senator Schweiker’sefforts, the Church Committee formed a sub-committee to evaluate the intelligence agen-cies’ handling of the JFK assassination inves-tigation. The subcommittee interviewed ordeposed over 50 witnesses, acquired over5,000 pages of evidence from intelligenceagencies, and reviewed thousands of addi-tional pages.8

As of 1992, the Senate Select Committee onIntelligence possessed approximately 5,000pages of assassination-related material fromthe Church Committee’s investigations.9

Although the Church Committee publishedsome material in its reports, the bulk of theCommittee’s records remained closed.

4. The Select Committee on Intelligenceof the House of Representatives (Pike Committee)

In 1975, the House of Representatives alsoestablished a committee to investigate illegaldomestic activities of government intelli-gence agencies. The Pike Committee devotedless time to issues related to Pre s i d e n tKennedy’s assassination than did the ChurchCommittee, but it completed some relevantwork. However, due to the Pike Committee’sinternal conflicts, as well as conflicts that ithad with the executive branch over access torecords, the Committee never issued a report.The Committee did touch on some issuesrelated to the assassination of Pre s i d e n tKennedy. At the time that Congress passed

the JFK Act, the number of Pike Committeere c o rds that contained information thatmight be related to President Kennedy’sassassination was unknown.

5. The Select Committee on Assassinations of the House of Representatives (HSCA)

In 1976, the House of Representatives estab-lished its Select Committee on Assassina-tions. The HSCA reinvestigated Pre s i d e n tKennedy’s assassination and the assassina-tion of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The HSCAconcluded that President Kennedy was prob-ably murdered as a result of a conspiracy andsuggested that organized crime may haveplayed a role in the conspiracy. At the sametime, the HSCA concurred with the WarrenCommission’s findings that Lee HarveyOswald fired the two bullets that hit the Pres-ident, and that one of those bullets struckboth President Kennedy and Governor JohnConnally of Texas (the so-called “single-bul-let theory”).

During its tenure, the HSCA took testimonyfrom 335 witnesses and held 38 days of pub-lic hearings. The HSCA generated approxi-mately 414,000 pages of records relating tothe assassination.11 In 1992, the HSCA’ sunpublished records resided with the HouseAdministration Committee (now the HouseOversight Committee).

Because the HSCA investigated so many dif-ferent possibilities in its investigation intopossible conspiracies, its records, and federalagency records that the HSCA used, havebeen among the most important records thatthe Review Board processed.

6. Additional Congressional Investigations

In addition to investigations of the above-re f-e renced special committees and commissions,various congressional committees haveexamined aspects of the assassination story.

The House Un-American Activities Commit-tee, for instance, compiled a small number ofp re-assassination re c o rds relating to Lee Har-vey Oswald’s activities in New Orleans. At thetime of the assassination, the Senate InternalSecurity Subcommittee, had ongoing investi-

3

gations into the political situation in Cuba and,when the President was killed, it conducted alimited inquiry into the assassination.

To the extent that these two committees pro-vided materials to the Warren Commission,their records remained under the control ofsucceeding congressional committees andhad not been released prior to considerationof the JFK Act.

L a t e r, in 1975, two House subcommittees heldpublic hearings on issues relating to the tre a t-ment of assassination re c o rds. These were theHouse Judiciary Committee’s Civil and Con-stitutional Rights Subcommittee (Edward sCommittee) that investigated the destru c t i o nof the so-called “Hosty note” which Lee Har-vey Oswald had left at the FBI Dallas fieldo ffice for Special Agent James Hosty onNovember 6, 1963. After the assassination,Hosty destroyed the note on the instru c t i o n sof his superior, Special Agent in Charge J.G o rdon Shanklin. Its existence re m a i n e dunknown outside the FBI for 12 years. TheGovernment Information and IndividualRights Subcommittee of the GovernmentOperations Committee (Abzug Committee)examined issues of access and openness re l a t-ing to Wa r ren Commission re c o rds.

While the latter two hearings were pub-lished, it was not known during considera-tion of the JFK Act whether additional andunpublished records remained in the com-mittees’ files.

7. Records Held by Executive Branch Agencies

All of the major investigative efforts re c e i v e dassistance from the FBI and the CIA. Otheragencies, such as the Secret Service, theDepartment of State, and the Department ofJustice, were also involved in official investi-gations. Federal agencies generated re c o rd sfor the investigative entities they workedwith, but they also retained a vast body ofre c o rds. At the time of legislative considera-tion of the JFK Act, for instance, the FBI hada l ready released some 220,000 pages of assas-s i n a t i o n - related material under the Fre e d o mof Information Act (FOIA). Nonetheless, theB u reau estimated that approximately 260,000pages of additional assassination re c o rd sremained withheld or unpro c e s s e d .1 2 At the

same point in time, the CIA had re l e a s e da p p roximately 11,000 pages of an estimated250,000 to 300,000 pages of assassinationre c o rd s .1 3 Other agencies with smaller cachesof assassination re c o rds had released varyingp e rcentages of their holdings by 1992.

8. Investigative Records in the Custodyof Non-Federal Sources

The JFK Act also provided the Review Boardwith authority to seek assassination recordsfrom non-federal sources. Various local lawe n f o rcement agencies assisted the Wa r re nCommission and the FBI in their post-assas-sination investigation. Some local authoritiesalso possessed relevant pre - a s s a s s i n a t i o nrecords. New Orleans District Attorney JimGarrison’s investigation and trial of ClayShaw for complicity in the assassination is aprominent example of a non-federal inves-tigative effort that generated extensive assas-sination records. Other potential assassina-tion records, however generated, exist in thecustody of private citizens and foreign gov-ernments. Subject to time and resource con-straints, the Review Board also identified andsecured as much of this indeterminate groupof records as possible.

C. SKEPTICISM CONCERNING THEGOVERNMENT’S CONCLUSIONS

The circumstances of President Kennedy’sassassination invited public skepticism fromthe start. His death raised profound doubtsin the minds of many Americans who couldnot understand the apparently confused andobscure motives of the alleged assassin, LeeHarvey Oswald. The murder of Oswald byJack Ruby caused further skepticism as itsuggested both a conspiracy and a cover-up.

When President Johnson established theWarren Commission in an apparent effort toprevent parallel investigations, calm domes-tic fears, and defuse any potential interna-tional re p e rcussions of the assassination,many Americans welcomed a simple expla-nation of this event. Others, however,observed incongruities in the Warren Com-mission’s investigation.

Wa r ren Commission member and future Pre s-ident Gerald Ford declared early on that “themonumental re c o rd of the President’s Com-

4

mission will stand like a Gibraltar of factuall i t e r a t u re through the ages to come.”1 4 T h re edecades later, an American author likened theCommission’s work to “a dead whale decom-posing on a beach.”1 5 The juxtaposition ofthese similes, as well as their temporal dis-tance from one another, tells a story about thechanging perception of the Wa r ren Commis-sion’s work over time. And while neither isfully accurate, they concur, at least, on theissue of size. The Wa r ren Commission’s workp roduct was massive. The size and scope ofthe published material provided critics with“a species of Talmudic text begging for com-mentary and further elucidation.”1 6

Critics found ammunition with which toattack the Commission’s work. First, theCommission’s time and resource constraintsforced it to rely mainly on the FBI to conductthe day-to-day investigation of the murder.Second, the Commission failed to examinesome of the most critical evidence in the case:the photographs and x-rays from PresidentKennedy’s autopsy.

Chairman Earl Warren felt that these materi-als were too gruesome to allow into the pub-lic record. He thought that it “would make amorbid thing for all time.” The Commissionrelied instead on artistic renderings of thephotographs pre p a red by an illustratorworking from verbal descriptions providedby the chief autopsy prosector. Some criticsviewed the Commission’s failure to view thephotographs and x-rays as gross negligence.

Doubts about the medical evidence werecompounded for critics by the Commission’sforensic conclusion that the President’s backand neck wounds, and Governor Connally’sback, chest, wrist, and thigh wounds, wereall caused by the same bullet. Nothing theCommission wrote or subsequently saidcould convince critics that CommissionExhibit 399, the so-called “magic bullet”(usually described as “pristine”), could havecaused so many wounds while sustaining solittle damage itself. Critics argued that if theCommission was incorrect about the single-bullet theory, then the Commission’s conclu-sion that Oswald acted alone could not stand.

Critics found a number of inconsistencieswhen they measured the report against the26 volumes of published evidence. Critics

believed that the unpublished evidencewould further undermine the report’s con-clusions. Once additional Warren Commis-sion records dribbled out to the public at theNational Archives in the mid-1960s, criticssuch as Mark Lane and Edward Epsteinbegan to publish books that questioned theCommission’s conclusions.

In 1967, New Orleans District Attorney JimGarrison’s indictment and trial of Clay Shawfor conspiracy to murder the President pro-vided a credible platform and new momen-tum for Wa r ren Commission critics. Flam-boyant and articulate, Garrison was a mediasensation. Although the American publichad differing opinions concerning Garrison,his investigation altered the assassinationdebate. The investigation popularized a rad-ical critique of the official version of theassassination. In addition to generatingassassination re c o rds, the Clay Shaw trialwas also the venue for an important assassi-nation re c o rd milestone: the first publicshowing of Abraham Zapru d e r ’s filmfootage of the assassination.

When President Gerald Ford established theRockefeller Commission, he started a trendto examine U.S. government intelligenceactions during the 1960s and early 1970s. Aspart of its forensic review of the assassina-tion, the Rockefeller Commission viewed theZ a p ruder film in February 1975. Shortlythereafter, the television program GoodnightAmerica showed the film. When the Ameri-can public saw the film, many concluded thatPresident Kennedy’s fatal head wound hadbeen caused by a shot from the front.

At the same time, the Church Committeeu n c o v e red U.S. government assassinationplots against foreign leaders, includingCuba’s Fidel Castro, during the 1960–1963period. Some of these plots involved orga-nized crime figures. The Committee foundthe intelligence agencies (primarily the CIAand the FBI) deficient in their investigation ofPresident Kennedy’s death, and critics calledfor a reinvestigation.

In September 1976, the HSCA began itswork. By this time, skepticism concerningthe official explanation of the assassinationhad hardened in the minds of millions ofA m e r i c a n s .1 7 This skepticism was fueled by a

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small cottage industry of authors, lecture r s ,and assassination re s e a rchers who notedthat the government had not released ger-mane re c o rds and had even lied to itselfabout the case.

Initially critic-friendly, the Committee eventu-ally sought to establish some distance betweenits inquiry and that of Wa r ren Commissioncritics. In the end, the Committee’s re p o r treflected an interesting mix of conclusionswhich only whetted re s e a rchers’ appetites forthe Committee’s re c o rds. Although theH S C A’s report stated that it believed the Pre s-ident’s death was the result of a conspiracy, itcould not conclusively identify any conspira-tors other than Lee Harvey Oswald.

The HSCA criticized the performance of theWarren Commission and investigative agen-cies like the FBI and the CIA for their initialassassination investigations, but it concludedthat Lee Harvey Oswald had killed the Pres-ident and that the single-bullet theory wassound. Despite these conclusions, however,the HSCA did validate some of the criticismsof the Warren Commission by concludingthat there was a “high probability” that twogunmen fired at President Kennedy.18

Under House rules, the HSCA’s unpublishedrecords were sealed for 50 years, until 2029.Because the HSCA investigation was markedby internal squabbling and disillusionedstaffers, the Committee’s records were thesubject of ongoing contro v e r s y. Some ex-staffers claimed the HSCA report did notreflect their investigative work, and thatinformation that did not conform with theCommittee leadership’s preconceived con-clusions was ignored or left out of the reportand supporting volumes.

Four years after the HSCAissued its report, aformer member of the Committee introducedlegislation to open the Committee’s records.19

The House Administration Committee heldhearings, but the House never voted on theresolution and the HSCA records remainedclosed until Congress passed the JFK Act.

When Congress did finally vote to openHSCAand other assassination records, it hadless to do with the ameliorative effect oftime’s passage than it did with a popular ifcontroversial film, JFK.

D. THE SOLUTION: THE JFK ACT

This resolution was introduced becauseof the renewed public interest and con-cern over the records pertaining to theassassination of President John F.Kennedy.... There has been considerabledebate about these records, includingaccusations that these re c o rds, ifreleased, would contain evidence of agovernment coverup or complicity ofgovernment agencies in the assassina-tion of President Kennedy.20

By 1992, the American public had expressedits desire for legislative action. Even execu-tive branch agencies, who were more insu-lated than Congress from public outrage,were anxious to put the issue of assassinationrecords behind them. The Senate report ulti-mately stated that “records related to theassassination of President John F. Kennedya re the most publicly sought-after, unre-leased records of our government.”21

E. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF JFK ACT

When the second session of Congress openedin January 1992, members of Congress beganto introduce bills and resolutions that wouldmandate the release of assassinationrecords.22 While none of these early proposalsenjoyed support from the Congre s s i o n a lleadership, they did start a discussion inCongress about secrecy and the assassinationthat resulted in passage of the JFK Act. Mean-while, influential voices joined the call toopen the government’s assassination records,perhaps most notably former President Ger-ald Ford, the last surviving member of theWarren Commission.23

On March 26, 1992, Congressman LouisStokes introduced H.J. Res. 454 in the Houseof Representatives with 40 co-sponsors.24 Onthe same day, Senator David Boren intro-duced S.J. Res. 282 in the Senate with nine co-sponsors.25 Within weeks, both the Houseand Senate held hearings on the legislation.26

In the hearings, members of Congress, repre-sentatives from government agencies, andthe public agreed on the need to open assas-sination records. The CIAand the FBI, in par-ticular, committed themselves to full cooper-ation with Congress. Only the Department ofJustice, on behalf of the White House, raised

6

serious concerns about the legislation. Thesehad to do, first, with constitutional issuesrelating to the appointment process and sta-tus of the proposed Review Board and, sec-ond, the proposed criteria for the continuedwithholding of certain types of information.

The hearings established that existing mecha-nisms for the release of assassination re c o rd sw e re not working and the only way to re l e a s eassassination re c o rds was legislation.

During the summer of 1992, committees inboth the House and Senate reported favor-ably on the legislation.2 7 The full Senatepassed the legislation on July 27, 1992. TheHouse of Representatives passed a some-what different version on August 12, 1992.Differences between the House and Senatebills were unresolved as the end of the leg-islative session drew near, so the House ofRepresentatives passed the Senate version onSeptember 30, 1992, the date of enactment ofwhat was Public Law 102–526, The PresidentJohn F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collec -tion Act of 1992 .

President George W. Bush signed the bill intolaw on October 26, 1992, just days before the1992 federal election, but left the appoint-ment of the Review Board to his successor,President William J. Clinton. President Clin-ton nominated the five members of theReview Board in the latter half of 1993 and,after Senate review and confirmation, theywere sworn in on April 11, 1994. The JFK Actincluded a specific sunset date (two yearsfrom the date of the statute’s enactment) withan option for a one-year extension. This time-frame proved unrealistic, mainly due to thelong delay between the date of enactmentand the actual appointment, confirmation,and swearing in of the Review Board. Con-gress therefore decided to reset the time clockin 1994, passing the President John F. KennedyAssassination Records Collection Extension Actof 1994 .28 In 1997, Congress extended the lifeof the Review Board one final time, until Sep-tember 30, 1998, through enactment of PublicLaw 105–25.29

The JFK Act is a unique statute. Its intent is tosecure the public release of records relating toPresident Kennedy’s assassination and, indoing so, assure the public that the federalgovernment was not withholding material

information about this tragic event.

The JFK Act established a neutral and inde-pendent body—the Review Board — t h a tcould ensure maximum disclosure of federalgovernment records on the Kennedy assassi-nation and, in the process, restore the pub-lic’s confidence that their government wasnot keeping secret any relevant information.The JFK Act envisioned that governmentagencies and the Review Board could achievec o m p rehensive and rapid disclosure ofrecords, unimpeded by the usual obstacles torelease. Congress crafted each of the JFKAct’s statutory provisions to accomplishthese objectives.

F. KEY PROVISIONS OF JFK ACT

Congress stated that records relating to theassassination would “carry a presumption ofimmediate disclosure.” Since most assassina-tion records were more than 30 years old,Congress stipulated that, “only in the rarestof cases is there any legitimate need for con-tinued protection.”

Accordingly, Congress declared that the gov-ernment would establish a collection ofre c o rds on the assassination of Pre s i d e n tKennedy at the National A rchives andRecords Administration (NARA). The JFKCollection’s purpose would be to makerecords available to the public.

C o n g ress defined the term “assassinationrecord” broadly to encompass all relevantrecords. In the JFK Act’s legislative history,members of Congress specifically stated thatthey expected the Review Board to furtherdefine the term “assassination record.”

The JFK Act obligated all government officesto identify, review, process, and transfer toNARA all assassination records within theirpossession. The Act directed agencies not todestroy or alter assassination records in theirc u s t o d y. The Act prohibited governmentoffices from withholding or redacting anyassassination records if those records hadpreviously been disclosed to the public. Andgovernment offices could not withhold orredact any assassination records created out-side the government.

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To the extent that a government office had“any uncertainty” as to whether its recordswere “assassination record[s] governed by”the JFK Act, the Act directed the governmentoffice to transmit the records to the ReviewBoard, which would determine whether therecords were, indeed, assassination records.

The Act empowered the Review Board toobtain physical custody of federal re c o rd s“for purposes of conducting an independentand impartial review” or “for an administra-tive hearing or other Review Board function.”In addition, this section re q u i red governmento ffices to “make available to the ReviewB o a rd any additional information andre c o rds” that the Review Board had reason tobelieve it re q u i red for conducting a re v i e w.

Once government offices identified assassi-nation re c o rds, the Act re q u i red them totransmit the records to the Archivist, andmake the records immediately available tothe public to the extent possible. If govern-ment offices believed that release of certainassassination records should be postponed,in full or in part, the Act instructed the officesto transmit the original record to NARAto beincluded in a “protected collection,” whichwould not be publicly available.

H o w e v e r, the JFK Act mandated that allpostponed assassination re c o rds be openedto the public no later than the year 2017 (25years from the date of enactment of the JFKAct). Government offices could continue topostpone public release of material in assas-sination re c o rds after the year 2017 if “theP resident certifies” that (1) “continued post-ponement is made necessary by an identifi-able harm to the military, defense, intelli-gence operations, law enforcement, orconduct of foreign relations” and (2) “theidentifiable harm is of such gravity that itoutweighs the public interest in disclosure . ”Without such certification, NARA w i l lrelease all postponed re c o rds or portions ofre c o rds in 2017.3 0

The JFK Act established standards for post-ponement to ensure that the JFK Act wouldrelease more information than was releasedunder the FOIA and Executive Orders gov-erning declassification. Thus, governmentoffices could request the Review Board toagree to postpone the release of information

in an assassination record only if the agencycould demonstrate—by providing “clear andconvincing evidence” to the Review Board—a compelling need for postponement.

Section 7 of the JFK Act was perhaps theAct’s cornerstone in that it created a trulyindependent board that would oversee thefederal government’s implementation of theAct. The Act instructed the President to nom-inate five citizens “to serve as members of theReview Board to ensure and facilitate thereview, transmission to the Archivist, andpublic disclosure of government re c o rd srelated to the assassination of President JohnF. Kennedy.” The Act required members ofthe Board to be “impartial private citizens”who were not presently employed by the fed-eral government and had not “had any pre-vious involvement with any official investi-gation or inquiry conducted by a federal,state, or local government, relating to theassassination of President John F. Kennedy.”

The Act further instructed the President tonominate “distinguished persons of highnational reputation in their respective fieldswho are capable of exercising...independentand objective judgment.” The Act envisioneda board consisting of at least one professionalhistorian and one attorney, and it stated thatthe President should consider recommenda-tions from the following professional associ-ations: the American Historical Association,the Organization of American Historians, theSociety of American A rchivists, and theAmerican Bar Association.

The Act called for the President to appoint theB o a rd members and the Senate to confirmthem. To ensure independence, the Act stipu-lated that the President could not re m o v eB o a rd members except by “impeachment andconviction” or for specific cause. It alsore q u i red that the President issue a report toC o n g ress specifying the reason for re m o v a l .

Having set out the parameters for establish-ing an independent board, the Act delineatedthe Board’s responsibilities and powers. TheAct gave the Review Board the power toidentify, secure, and release records relatingto President Kennedy’s assassination.A c c o rd i n g l y, the Review Board possessedauthority to “render decisions” on (1)“whether a record constitutes an assassina-

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tion record” and (2) “whether an assassina-tion record or particular information in anassassination record qualifies for postpone-ment of disclosure under this Act.”

In addition, the JFK Act gave the ReviewBoard power to obtain additional recordsand information from government offices.Further, the Act authorized the Review Boardto issue “interpretive regulations.”

The Act gave the Review Board certainresponsibilities to fulfill upon completion ofits work. Thus, “[u]pon termination,” the Actrequired the Review Board to submit a finalreport to the President and Congress. Inaddition, the “Review Board shall transfer allof its records to the Archivist for inclusion inthe collection, and no records of the ReviewBoard shall be destroyed.”

The JFK Act directed the Review Board toappoint an Executive Director and staff toperform the work of, and report to, membersof the Review Board. To ensure indepen-dence, staff members could not be presentemployees of the federal government, norcould the Executive Director be affiliatedwith any prior official investigation of theKennedy assassination.

The Act directed the Board to provide, if pos-sible, a summary of the redacted informationor a substitute record explaining the redactedinformation. The Act further instructed theReview Board to release parts of records thatcould not be released in full.

In addition to notifying NARA of its deci-sions to release or postpone assassinationrecords, the Act also required the ReviewBoard to notify the originating agency as wellas the public of any Board determination todesignate a record as an assassination record.

While the JFK Act authorized the ReviewB o a rd to make final and binding determina-tions concerning the release or postponementof a re c o rd, it provided that the Pre s i d e n tcould reconsider any Board determination:“After the Review Board has made a formaldetermination concerning the public disclo-s u re or postponement of disclosure of anexecutive branch assassination re c o rd orinformation within such a re c o rd,...the Pre s i-dent shall have the sole and nondelegable

authority to re q u i re the disclosure or post-ponement of such re c o rd or informationunder the standards set forth in section 6 [ofthe JFK Act]....” Thus, if agencies disagre e dwith a Review Board determination to re l e a s einformation in a re c o rd, the affected agencycould “appeal” to the President and re q u e s tthat he overturn the Review Board’s decision.

Finally, the Act required the Review Board tosubmit, to the President and Congre s s ,annual reports regarding its work.

The Act addressed public release of certainspecial categories of records that may relateto the assassination, including records underseal of a court and foreign records. The lawexpressed the “sense of Congress” that theSecretary of State should contact Russia tosecure public release of records of the formerSoviet Union that may relate to the assassina-tion. Congress also urged the Secretary ofState to contact other foreign governmentsthat might have relevant records.

Congress clearly emphasized the supremacyof the JFK Act over other laws that might pre-clude disclosure of assassination-re l a t e drecords. Thus, where the JFK Act requiredpublic disclosure of a record, the Act would“take precedence over any other law..., judi-cial decision construing such law, or commonlaw doctrine that would otherwise prohibitsuch transmission or disclosure....” The onlyre c o rds that the Act exempted from its“supremacy clause” were (1) IRS tax-relatedrecords in which Section 6103 of the IRS Codep recluded disclosure, and (2) re c o rd sdonated to the United States under a deed ofgift whose terms precluded disclosure.

The Act provided that provisions of the JFKAct pertaining to the operation of the ReviewBoard ceased to be effective when the term ofthe Review Board expired. However, allremaining provisions of the JFK Act continuein force: “The remaining provisions of thisAct shall continue in effect until such time asthe Archivist certifies to the President and theCongress that all assassination records havebeen made available to the public in accor-dance with this Act.” This provision is signif-icant because it underscores the continuingobligation of federal agencies to re l e a s erecords on the assassination after the ReviewBoard’s term expires.

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F i n a l l y, Congress recognized that theReview Board would need power to re q u e s tmaterials that the agencies themselveswould not have identified as assassination-related. The Act guaranteed that the ReviewB o a rd could enforce its authority through itsuse of the subpoena power and the power togrant immunity.

In sum, the JFK Act pro-vided a new and unusuallegislative remedy to theproblem of governmentsecrecy. It required fed-eral agencies to disclose,forthwith, their re c o rd son the assassination andit empaneled an inde-pendent board to ensurethe full identification andrelease of those records.

Years of secrecy about the Kennedy assassi-nation investigations finally fell with the pas-sage of this unique new law guaranteeing apresumption of openness and independentreview of the records.

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The American public believesthe truth has been hidden fromthem for over three decades. Ifthere is truly nothing to hide,then there is no better reason forany and all classified docu-ments to be herewith declassi-fied. Only then can the people’strust be restored.—Stephen Ty l e r, June 28, 1 9 9 5

CHAPTER 1ENDNOTES

1 House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, Assassina -tion Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearings on H.J. Res. 454, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 96.(Prepared Statement of Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to President Johnson from November1963 to June 1966).

2 Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hear -ings on S.J. Res. 282, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 1992, 96. (Prepared Statement of Athan G. Theoharis,Professor, Department of History, Marquette University).

3 Exec. Order No. 11,130 (1963) (Issued by President Lyndon B. Johnson).

4 Exec. Order No. 11,828 (1975) (Issued by President Gerald R. Ford. The Rockefeller Com-mission released its report on June 16, 1975 and terminated that same month).

5 P resident’s Commission on Central Intelligence Activities Within the United States, F i n a lReport of the Pre s i d e n t ’s Commission on Central Intelligence Activities Within the United States ( Wa s h-ington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 251–269.

6 In accordance with practice at the time, President Ford retained Rockefeller C o m m i s s i o nre c o rds as part of his personal papers when he left office. This practice was ended by the Pre s i-dential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (1994). President Ford subsequently donatedthese and other re c o rds to his presidential library in Ann A r b o r, Michigan.

7 The United States Senate established the Church Committee with S. Res. 21 on January 27,1975. The Committee formally terminated on May 31, 1976.

8 U.S. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelli-gence A c t i v i t i e s , The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of theIntelligence Agencies, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976. S. Rept. 755, 1 (Book V).

9 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2dsess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, 15. This was the House Judiciary’s report on H.J. Res. 454.

10 Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations 19 (July 17, 1979).

11 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2dsess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, Part 1.

12 Ibid., 12.

13 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2dsess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, 13.

14 Quoted in Summers, Anthony and Robbyn Summers, “The Ghosts of November,” VanityFair, December 1994, 88.

15 Mailer, Norman. Oswald’s Tale: An American Mystery. New York: Random House, 1995, 351.

16 Ibid. Author Norman Mailer, like many before and after him, would find it “startling to dis-cover, as one pans these government volumes for bits of gold, how much does gleam in thesludge” (352).

17 Doubts about the Warren Commission’s findings were not restricted to ordinary Ameri-cans. Well before 1978, President Johnson, Robert Kennedy, and four of the seven members ofthe Warren Commission all articulated, if sometimes off the record, some level of skepticismabout the Commission’s basic findings.

18 House Select Committee on Assassinations, Findings and Recommendations, 95th Cong., 2dsess., 1979, H. Rept. 1828, 65.

19 H. Res. 160 was introduced by Congressman Stewart McKinney of Connecticut. It was co-sponsored by four additional former members of the HSCA: Representatives Robert Edgar,Harold Sawyer, Harold Ford, and Walter Fauntroy.

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20 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2dsess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, 33. (Statement of Representative Louis Stokes).

21 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3006, The President John F.Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rept. 328.

22 These early proposals were H.R. 4090, introduced by Congressman Trafficant of Ohio onJanuary 3, 1992, H. Res. 325, introduced by Congressman Gonzalez of Texas on January 22,1992; H. Res. 326 and H.R. 4108, both introduced by Congressman DeFazio of Oregon on Jan-uary 24.

23 George Lardner, Jr., “Ford Urges House Leaders to Seek Release Of All Records onKennedy Assassination,” Washington Post, 30 January 1992, A–12.

24 Congressional Record, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 138, daily ed. (26 March 1992): H1984– 86.

2 5 C o n g ressional Record, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 138, daily ed. (26 March 1992): S4392–97.

26 The House Government Operations Committee held hearings on April 28th, May 15th andJuly 22nd. The House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on May 20th. In the Senate, the Gov-ernmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on May 12th.

2 7 The House Government Operations Committee approved the legislation in June (Report102–625 I, June 29, 1992) and the House Judiciary Committee in August (Report 102–625 II,August 11, 1992). The Senate Governmental A ffairs Committee approved legislation in July(Report 102–328, July 22, 1992). The Senate committee approved an amendment in the nature ofa substitute; the bill forwarded to the full Senate for its consideration there f o re had a new desig-nation, S. 3006. This was the bill the full House eventually voted on in September.

28 Public Law 103–345 was enacted October 6, 1994. The Extension Act had been introducedas H.R. 4569.

29 Introduced as H.R. 1553 by the Chairman of the Government Reform and Oversight Com-mittee, Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana, the bill was approved by the House on June 23,1997 and by the Senate two days later. President Clinton signed the bill into law on July 3, 1997.

30 Many of the postponements agreed to by the Review Board in fact have release dates thatare much earlier than 2017.

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CH A P T E R 2

ES TA B L I S H M E N T O F T H E RE V I E W BO A R D A N DDE F I N I T I O N O F “ AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D”

A. INTRODUCTION

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Col -lection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) provided opti-mistic deadlines by which Congress believedthat government offices, the NationalA rchives and Records A d m i n i s t r a t i o n(NARA), and the Assassination Record sReview Board should complete particularactivities. This chapter describes the actionstaken by the Review Board to begin its work.Initially, it was clear that the Review Boardneeded to provide critical guidance by defin-ing the term “assassination re c o rd.” TheBoard’s definition of that term was the foun-dation that enabled the Board to begin thecritical task of reviewing records.

B. DELAY IN START UP

When Congress drafted the JFK Act, it esti-mated that the Review Board would requirea maximum of three years to accomplish itswork. There were, however, a number ofdelays in the early phase of the Board’s oper-ation that affected the ability of the Board tomeet the deadline set by Congress.

Although President Bush signed the JFK A c tinto law on October 26, 1992, and although theact re q u i red the President to make nomina-tions within ninety days, President Bushmade no nominations. President Clinton didnot nominate the members of the ReviewB o a rd until September 1993, well after he tooko ffice in January 1993, and the Board was notconfirmed and sworn in until April 1994. Dur-ing the 18 month period between the passageof the JFK Act and swearing-in of the ReviewB o a rd members, some government agenciesp roceeded with independent reviews of theira s s a s s i n a t i o n - related files, as the JFK A c tre q u i red, but without the Review Board ’ sguidance. Unfortunately, once the ReviewB o a rd began work, it became apparent that

government offices re a l-ized that they wouldneed to re - review filesunder the Review Board ’ sstrict standards. Thus,while Congress passedthe JFK Extension Act in1 9 9 41 to reset the clockand to give the Board afull three-year mandate, it did not foresee theadditional delays that occurred as a result ofgovernment offices’ early attempts to complywith the JFK Act without the Review Board ’ sg u i d a n c e .

1. JFK Act Deadlines

a. Ninety days for President to appoint ReviewBoard members. Section 7(a)(2) of the JFK A c tstated that the President would appointReview Board members within ninety daysafter enactment of the statute. The statuteenvisioned that the Board members wouldstart work by the end of January 1993. Ofcourse, the Review Board members could notbegin work until after they were sworn in onApril 11, 1994, 15 months later than Congre s shad intended. During the original ninety dayperiod set out by the JFK Act, the Bush admin-istration was replaced by the Clinton adminis-tration, and although the delay caused by thechange in administration was fully under-standable, it significantly affected the sched-ule originally contemplated by Congress. TheReview Board’s early pro g ress was alsoslowed by the fact that the Congress did nota p p ropriate funds for the Board’s operationuntil October 1, 1994. The early months werefunded solely by a small transfer of fundsf rom the White House budget.

b. 300 days for government offices to re v i e w,i d e n t i f y, and organize assassination re c o r d s. Sec-tion 5 of the JFK Act re q u i red each govern-ment office to re v i e w, identify and org a n i z eassassination re c o rds within its custody.2 N o

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The term or definition of the term“assassination records” is likelyto be the most important admin-istrative decision the Board willm a k e .—Mark Zaid and CharlesS a n d e r s, October 11, 1 9 9 5

government office completed its workwithin 300 days as the statute directed, andas the Review Board terminated its opera-tions in September 1998, some governmento ffices still had not reviewed, identified, ando rganized all assassination re c o rds withintheir custody. For example, the ReviewB o a rd entered into memoranda of under-standing with the FBI and the CIA to allowthem to process selected groups of re c o rd ssuch as duplicate documents and newly dis-c o v e red CIA audiotapes from its MexicoCity Station after the Review Board termi-nated its operations.

The Act specifically re q u i red each govern-ment office to: (1) determine which of itsre c o rds fit within the statutory definition ofassassination re c o rds, (2) determine whichof its assassination re c o rds contained infor-mation from another government office andconsult with the other government off i c econcerning the information in the re c o rd, (3)determine which of its assassination re c o rd sit could release, unredacted, to the public,and (4) determine which of its assassinationre c o rds were eligible for withholding underSection 6 of the Act, and then pre p a re thosere c o rds for review by the Review Board .3 Tothe extent that a government office had “anyuncertainty” as to whether its re c o rds were“assassination re c o rd[s] governed by” theJFK Act, the Act directed the governmento ffice to transmit the re c o rds to the ReviewB o a rd for a determination as to whether there c o rds were, indeed, assassination re c o rd s .4

Federal agencies, particularly the CIA andFBI, did not review and process the statuto-rily defined “assassination records” in thetime allotted and make them available forReview Board action. Moreover, even if gov-ernment offices had been able to meet the300-day deadline, the delay in the appoint-ment of the Review Board prohibited federalagencies from obtaining early guidance onthe questions of the definition of “assassina-tion record” and the standards for postpone-ments under Section 6 of the JFK Act.

Congress realized that agencies would begintheir JFK Act compliance before the ReviewBoard began to operate, but as the SenateReport on the JFK Act states, they trustedthat the pre-Review Board compliance wouldnot cause additional delays.

T h e re is a sufficient volume of knownassassination re c o rds [for the agencies] too rganize and review at the outset. How-e v e r, it is intended that the Review Boardissue guidance to assist in articulatingthe scope or universe of assassinationre c o rds as government offices and theReview Board undertake their re s p o n s i-bilities. Such guidance will be valuablenotwithstanding the fact that govern-ment offices will begin to organize andreview their re c o rds before the ReviewB o a rd is established. Government off i c e sa re re q u i red to begin the review and dis-c l o s u re of re c o rds upon enactment toexpedite public access to the manyre c o rds which do not re q u i re additionalreview or postponement. However, theultimate work of the Review Board willinvolve not only the review of re c o rd srecommended for postponement, butrequiring government offices to pro v i d eadditional information and re c o rd s ,w h e re appropriate. Guidance, especiallythat developed in consultation with thepublic, scholars, and affected govern-ment offices, will prove valuable toe n s u re the fullest possible disclosure andc reate public confidence in a workingdefinition that was developed in an inde-pendent and open manner.5

Unfortunately, once the Review Board pro-vided guidance to the agencies, much of theinitial work of the agencies needed to berevised, which, in turn, slowed down theirprocessing and reviewing of assassinationrecords. For example, after Congress passedthe JFK Act in 1992, the FBI began to reviewand release to NARAthe records that it madeavailable to the HSCA. Once the ReviewBoard came into existence and establishedstrict standards for release, the FBI re -reviewed every page of its HSCA files usingthe Board’s standards. The FBI then made“supplemental” releases to NARA.

In summary, the agencies, for different rea-sons, had not completed the work assignedto them by the JFK Act. The Review Boardattributed such delays by the CIAand the FBIboth to the manner in which the agenciesdeclassified material and to the enormousvolume of work that they had not been ableto complete within the short deadlines pro-vided by Congress.

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c. 300 days for NARA to establish JFK Collec -t i o n. Section 4 of the JFK Act instru c t e dNARA to establish the JFK Collection within300 days after Congress enacted the Act. OnAugust 23, 1993, exactly 300 days after theenactment of the JFK Act, NARA officiallyopened the JFK Collection.

d. Three years for Board to complete work. TheJFK Act envisioned that the Review Boardcould start up, complete its work, and closedown within three years. The Act, however,contained certain provisions that considerablyslowed the early phase of the Review Board ’ soperation and delayed the point at which itcould operate effectively in its review ofre c o rds. As an independent agency, the Boardhad to locate and construct office space thatwas suitable for the storage of classified mate-rial. At the same time, the Board had to hire as t a ff and obtain clearances for the staff at theTop Secret level. In an effort to ensure theindependence of the Board, the JFK Act pro-vided that the Review Board could not hire (ordetail) individuals employed by other federalagencies. The Review Board did not haveenough staff members to begin to review andp rocess government re c o rds until the begin-ning of 1995—two and one-half years afterP resident Bush signed the JFK Act.

F i n a l l y, federal agencies submitted to theReview Board more requests for postpone-ments than the framers of the statute antici-pated. While the JFK Act states that “only inthe rarest cases” would agencies have a “legit-imate need for continued protection” of assas-sination re c o rds, agencies submitted tens ofthousands of pages of re c o rds to the Boardwith requests for postponements. Thus, Con-g ress’ three-year timeline for the Review Boardto fulfill its mandate was based on a view ofagency re c o rds that the agencies did not share.

By the spring of 1996, the Review Boardbelieved that in order for it to be faithful to itshistorical responsibility and commitment torelease to the public all known assassinationrecords, it required an additional year. There-fore, it recommended to Congress that theJFK Act be extended for one year.

2. Passage of H.R. 1553

On May 8, 1997, Congressman Dan Burtoni n t roduced H.R. 1553, a bill that would

amend the JFK Act to provide one addi-tional year for the Review Board to com-plete its work. Congressman Louis Stokesand Congressman Henry Waxman co-spon-s o red the bill.

On June 4, 1997, the National Security, Inter-national Affairs, and Criminal Justice Sub-committee of the House Government Reformand Oversight Committee held a hearing onH.R. 1553. The Honorable Louis Stokes,Review Board Chair John Tunheim, writerMax Holland, and teacher Bruce Hitchcockall testified in support of H.R. 1553. On July3, 1997, President Clinton signed H.R. 1553into law, thus extending the authorization ofthe Review Board for one additional year, toSeptember 30, 1998.

Following the passage of H.R. 1553, the Com-mittee on Government Reform and Over-sight required the Review Board to providemonthly status reports regarding the pro-jected completion of the Board’s mandate.Beginning in August 1997, the Review Boardsent monthly letters to the Committee Chair-man, Congressman Burton.

The Review Board used its additional year tocomplete its work and terminated its opera-tions, as promised, on September 30, 1998.

C. DEFINING “ASSASSINATION RECORD”

In order for the Review B o a rd to begin thed e c l a ssification of re c o rds related to theassassination of President Kennedy, it first hadthe task of establishing the definition of an“assassination record.”

The Review Board wasaware that prior commis-sions and committeesthat examined the assas-sination operated insecret, and that the prob-lems caused by suchs e c recy had ultimatelyled Congress to pass theJFK Act and establish theReview Board. Thus, theB o a rd determined thatits deliberations on how to define the term“assassination record” must be conducted inthe public eye.

15

[H]ow the term “ K e n n e d yAssassination Records” shouldbe defined. . .is a very significantquestion because it goes to theheart of this Board’s capacity torestore the confidence of theAmerican people that they havea right to know their own his-tory.. . .”—James Lesar, October 11,1995

In an effort to receive as much comment aspossible from members of the public, theReview Board held public hearings devotedto its definition of the term. In addition, theBoard published its proposed definition inthe Federal Register to attract additional pub-lic comments.

Through its solicitation of public opinion, theReview Board received affirmation of itsposition in favor of a broad definition, asmembers of the public supported a broaddefinition of the term “assassination record.”Given the wide range of assassination theo-ries that existed, the Board members believedthat the definition could not exclude recordsthat would enhance the historical under-standing of the event, even if those recordsdid not mention the assassination.

As their definition reflects, the Review Boardmembers ultimately concluded that the term“assassination re c o rd” had to encompassrecords beyond those that mentioned centraltopics such as one of the assassination inves-tigations, Lee Harvey Oswald, his wifeMarina, his mother Marguerite, or Jack Ruby.The Review Board, four of whom weretrained historians, recognized that the defin-ition had to encompass records that wouldenhance the historical understanding of theevent. Although the Review Board intendedto search for any “smoking gun” documentsthat might still exist, the Board knew that itsgreatest contribution would likely be to pro-vide to the public those records that wouldframe the tragic event.

1. Statutory Definition of “Assassination Record”

The JFK Act defined “assassination record”as a record “related to the assassination ofPresident John F. Kennedy, that was createdor made available for use by, obtained by, orotherwise came into possession of” the fed-eral government (or state or local lawenforcement offices that assisted in an inves-tigation of President Kennedy’s assassina-t i o n ) .6 C o n g ress noted specifically that“assassination re c o rds” encompassedrecords relating to the Kennedy assassinationamong the files of the Warren Commission,the Rockefeller Commission, the Pike Com-mittee, the House Select Committee onAssassinations (the “HSCA”), the Library of

Congress, the National Archives, “any Presi-dential Library,” “any Executive agency, ”“any independent agency,” and “any otheroffice of the federal government,” as well as“any state or local law enforcement office”that assisted in an inquiry into the assassina-tion of President Kennedy.7

The Senate Report on the JFK Act explainsthat Congress carefully crafted its definitionbut expected that the Review Board wouldneed to further define the term.

The definition of assassination re c o rds isa threshold consideration for the suc-cessful implementation of the Act. Itsscope will be the barometer of publicconfidence in the release of assassinationre c o rds. While the re c o rds of past pre s i-dential commissions and congre s s i o n a lcommittees established to investigatethe assassination of President Kennedya re included as assassination re c o rd sunder this Act, it is intended and empha-sized that the search and disclosure ofre c o rds under this Act must go beyondthose re c o rds. While such re c o rds arevaluable, they reflect the views, theories,political constraints and prejudices ofpast inquiries. Proper implementation ofthis Act and providing the A m e r i c a npublic with the opportunity to judge thes u r rounding history of the assassinationfor themselves, re q u i res including noto n l y, but going beyond, the re c o rds ofthe Wa r ren and Rockefeller Commis-sions, and the Church and House SelectAssassination Committees.8

The JFK Act explicitly empowered theReview Board to decide “whether a recordconstitutes an assassination re c o rd . ”9 T h eReview Board took seriously its obligation tolocate assassination records that fell outsidethe scope of previous inquiries. Before theReview Board could embark on its search forsuch records, however, it had to grapple withthe question of how extensive its searc hshould be.

2. Congressional Intent Concerning Definition

Having directed the Review Board to furtherdefine the term “assassination re c o rd,” Con-g ress specifically gave the Review Board the

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power to issue interpretive re g u l a t i o n s .1 0 T h elegislative history of the Act explains whyC o n g ress thought that the Review Board — a n dnot the Congress—had to define the term.

The term “assassination record” was notmore specifically defined by the Com-mittee because to do so before more isknown about the universe of recordswould have been premature, and wouldhave further injected the governmentbetween the records and the Americanpublic.11

C o n g ress was so interested in how theReview Board would define “assassinationrecord” that it requested each Board memberto provide written answers to the followingquestion as part of the confirmation process:

The definition of “assassination re c o rd s ”contained in the Records Review A c testablishing this Board was intentionallyleft very broad. What kinds of criteriaand factors will you use in determiningwhether or not a document or other itemwill fall within the definition?

All of the Review Board members answeredthat they favored a broad definition of theterm, but each recognized that the Boardmembers would, in Judge Tunheim’s words,have to “more fully understand the scope ofthe potential records before attempting todefine the term.”12 Congress also asked theReview Board members to respond to ques-tions concerning assassination records in thepossession of private citizens, as well asquestions concerning the Board’s authorityto administer oaths and subpoenas and grantimmunity to witnesses in furtherance of com-pelling disclosure of assassination recordsfrom private and foreign sources.13

3. Review Board’s Early Deliberationsand Draft Definition

On July 12, 1994, at one of the ReviewBoard’s first meetings, it began to considerthe scope of its definition of “assassinationrecord.” At that meeting, the Board membersa g reed that they would need to conductmore research before they would be able tocraft a definition as Congress intended. Thepurpose of the Review Board’s October 11,1994, public hearing was to gather public

input on how to definethe term. At that hearing,members of the publicencouraged the Board todefine the term broadly.By mid-November 1994,only weeks after theBoard’s senior staff hadbegun work, those staffmembers were circ u l a t-ing draft definitions ofthis crucial statutoryterm. The Review Boardand its senior staff spentthe month of December1994 discussing the mostimportant sections of thedefinition, including pro-visions about whethercertain types of recordsw e re relevant to theassassination, whetherassassination artifactsshould become part of the JFK Collection,and whether the Collection could includecopies of original documents.

The Review Board members ultimatelydecided on a proposed definition and pub-lished the draft in the Federal Register in anattempt to solicit public comment. The Janu-ary 8, 1995, Federal Register contains theBoard’s proposed definition.

4. Comments from Public

With their proposed definition complete, theBoard members began to solicit commentsfrom members of the public and from gov-ernment agencies about the definition.

a. Notice and Comment

The Review Board sought public commenton a proposed definition and set a 30-dayperiod for the purpose of receiving writtenc o m m e n t s .1 4 The Review Board re c e i v e dwritten comments on its proposed definitionfrom numerous federal agencies, state andlocal government entities, and individuals.

Nearly all of the commentators supportedthe comprehensiveness and flexibility of theBoard’s definition. Respondents made bothsubstantive and technical suggestions, manyof which the Board adopted into the final def-

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One involves setting the bound-aries of, q u o t e , “ a s s a s s i n a t i o nm a t e r i a l .” The joint resolutiondefines the term “ a s s a s s i n a t i o nm a t e r i a l ”as “a record that relatesin any manner or degree to theassassination of President Jo h nF. K e n n e d y .” Given the wideranges of theories that havedeveloped as to who killed Pres-ident Kennedy and why , m a n ytypes of records arguably relatein some way to the assassina-t i o n .What records regarding, f o re x a m p l e , C u b a , Vi e t n a m , a n dorganized crime should be cov-ered? This matter requires care-ful consideration.—Senator David L. Boren,May 12, 1992

inition. Commentators addressed a bro a drange of concerns, such as whether theBoard’s proposed definition was too broad ortoo vague, and whether the Board shouldprovide a list of names and subjects that, tothe extent they appeared in documents,would presumptively be assassinationrecords. The Board also received commentsabout whether the definition should coverstate and local government records, privaterecords, and assassination artifacts.

b. Public Hearings. The Review Board alsoh e a rd testimony at public hearings onaspects of the proposed interpretive regula-tions. In these public hearings, the ReviewBoard received testimony from NARA andthe FBI on the scope of the definition. Mem-bers of the public also offered comments onthe Board’s proposed definition.

The Review Board considered all commentsand created its final draft of the definition.The Board discussed its final draft at a publicmeeting, and explained how it had incorpo-rated many of the comments received by theReview Board on the proposed definition.

The Review Board’s Federal Register n o t i c eestablishing the final definition of the term“assassination re c o rd” summarized the princi-pal substantive comments received and theReview Board’s responses to those comments.1 5

5. Definition

The Review Board’s final definition of an“assassination record” was published in theFederal Register on June 28, 1995.

As the Supplementary Information accompany-ing the proposed definition stated, the ReviewB o a rd’s goal in issuing the guidance was:

to implement congressional intent thatthe JFK Collection contain ‘the most com-p rehensive disclosure of re c o rds re l a t e dto the assassination of Pre s i d e n tK e n n e d y. ’1 6 The Board is also mindful ofC o n g ress’s instruction that the Boardapply a ‘broad and encompassing’ work-ing definition of “assassination re c o rd ”in order to achieve the goal of assemblingthe fullest historical re c o rd on this tragicevent in American history and on theinvestigations that were undertaken in

the assassination’s aftermath. The Boardrecognizes that many agencies havea l ready begun to organize and re v i e wre c o rds responsive to the [JFK Act] evenb e f o re the Board was appointed andbegan its work. Nevertheless, the Board ’ saim is that this guidance will aid in theultimate assembly and public disclosureof the fullest possible historical re c o rd onthis tragedy and on subsequent investi-gations and inquiries into it.1 7

The Review Board’s definition intended “toidentify comprehensively the range ofre c o rds reasonably related to the assassina-tion of President Kennedy and investigationsundertaken in its aftermath,” and “to aid inthe consistent, effective, and efficient imple-mentation of the JFK Act and to establish pro-c e d u res for including assassination re c o rds inthe JFK Assassination Records Collectionestablished by Congress and housed atN A R A’s facility in College Park, Maryland.”1 8

a. Scope of assassination re c o r d s.1 9 The Boardultimately determined that any re c o rds thatw e re “reasonably related” to the assassinationwould be assassination re c o rds. The ReviewB o a rd believed that its mandate from Congre s swas to assemble all materials reasonably re l a t e dto the assassination in the JFK Collection.

Section 1400.1 of the Board’s final definitionof “assassination record” reads:

(a) An assassination record includes, butis not limited to, all records, public andprivate, regardless of how labeled oridentified, that document, describe,report on, analyze, or interpret activi-ties, persons, or events re a s o n a b l yrelated to the assassination of PresidentJohn F. Kennedy and investigations ofor inquiries into the assassination.

(b) An assassination re c o r d f u r t h e rincludes, without limitation:

(1) All records as defined in Sec. 3(2)of the JFK Act;

(2) All re c o rds collected by or segre g a t e dby all federal, state, and local governmentagencies in conjunction with any investi-gation or analysis of or inquiry into theassassination of President Kennedy (for

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example, any intra-agency investigationor analysis of or inquiry into the assassi-nation; any inter-agency communicationre g a rding the assassination; any re q u e s tby the House Select Committee on A s s a s-sinations to collect documents and othermaterials; or any inter- or intra-agencycollection or segregation of documentsand other materials);

(3) Other records or groups of recordslisted in the Notice of A s s a s s i n a t i o nR e c o rd Designation, as described in§1400.8 of this chapter.

In its work, the Review Board often turnedback to the breadth of its definition of the term“assassination re c o rd.” Indeed, in the Board ’ slast weeks of work, a re p resentative from onegovernment office told the Review Board thathe did not believe that his office’s re c o rds wereassassination re c o rds because the re c o rds didnot mention the assassination, or any of thecentral assassination figures. When it wasdefining the term “assassination re c o rd,” theB o a rd anticipated that federal agencies andothers who possessed relevant re c o rds wouldchallenge the Board’s judgment.

b. Scope of additional records and informa -tion.20 The Review Board determined that itwould request additional records and infor-mation when necessary for identifying, eval-uating, or interpreting assassination records,including assassination records that agenciesmay not have initially located or identified.The Review Board’s regulatory definitionincluded a description of some items theReview Board might request from govern-ment agencies that included backgro u n dinformation about how the agencies operateand, in particular, how agencies performedtheir declassification review.

The work of the Review Board staff hinged onthe breadth of the Board’s definition of “addi-tional re c o rds and information.” Often, thes t a ff located a particular code name or num-ber in a federal agency re c o rd and needed theauthority to re q u i re the federal agency to pro-vide information that would reveal theunderlying information. For example, in CIAdocuments, the Review Board staff encoun-t e red pseudonyms and needed to know thet rue name of the individual in the re c o rd .S i m i l a r l y, in FBI re c o rds, the Review Board

s t a ff often reviewed re c o rds that contained“symbol number informants” where the FBIhad substituted a number in place of an infor-mant’s name. In part because of the ReviewB o a rd’s regulation, the staff could request theFBI to reveal the informant’s true name andreview the informant’s file.

c. Sources of assassination records and addi -tional records and information.21 The ReviewBoard sought to cast a wide net in terms ofwhere it might locate assassination records.The Board’s regulation, therefore, allowed itto seek assassination records in the posses-sion of all federal government entities, allstate and local government entities, privateindividuals, private institutions, all courts,and all foreign governments.

When the Review Board later sought toobtain re c o rds from non-federal sourc e s ,their regulatory definition proved useful.Over the objection of New Orleans DistrictAttorney Harry Connick, Sr., the ReviewBoard was able to obtain for the JFK Collec-tion records that had been in the possessionof the New Orleans District Attorney’s officesince the 1960s when former New OrleansDistrict Attorney Jim Garrison prosecutedClay Shaw for conspiring to murder Presi-dent Kennedy. In litigation over the records,the Review Board relied in part on its regula-tion defining the term “assassination record.”

The regulation also proved helpful in theReview Board’s efforts to secure assassina-tion records from former government offi-cials. For example, the Board sought therecords of Walter Sheridan, former investiga-tor for Robert F. Kennedy, whom the ReviewBoard had reason to believe might possessassassination re c o rds. Although Sheridanwas deceased, he owned such records “byvirtue of [his] service with a governmenta g e n c y, office, or entity” and thus, theReview Board was able to subpoena Mrs.Sheridan to determine whether he retainedany assassination records.

d. Types of materials included in scope of assassi -nation records and additional records and informa -t i o n .2 2 The Review Board tried to be as inclusiveas possible in identifying the type of material itcould seek for inclusion in the JFK Collection,and it included papers, maps, and other docu-mentary material, photographs, motion pic-

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t u res, sound and video re c o rdings, machine-readable information in any form, and artifacts.

N A R A wanted the Review Board to excludethe term “artifacts” from its definition of“assassination re c o rd.” NARA believed thatextensive public access to assassination arti-facts would undermine NARA’s ability to pre-serve them. The Board members concludedthat the term must become part of the defini-tion, but agreed to establish pro c e d u res forplacing artifacts in the JFK Collection.2 3 T h eB o a rd agreed to allow NARA to make judg-ments about when and to whom it wouldallow access to artifacts. To the extent thatN A R A could not allow access to members ofthe public who wished to view particular arti-facts, the Board’s regulation allowed NARA t op rovide the public with photographs, draw-ings, or similar materials depicting the artifact.

The Review Board did act on its inclusion ofthe term “artifacts” in the definition when itrequested that NARA become involved inthe testing of Warren Commission Exhibit567, a bullet fragment found in PresidentKennedy’s limousine on November 22, 1963,and stored at NARAin the intervening years.The Review Board oversaw testing of tinystrands of fiber on that bullet fragment aswell as testing of other material on the bulletfragment. NARA was hesitant to approvetesting of the fragment, but had the ReviewBoard not included the term “artifact” in itsdefinition, the Board almost certainly couldnot have played a role in the testing.

e. Assassination records released in theirentirety.24 The Review Board further requiredthat, in accordance with the JFK Act, assassi-nation records be released in their entiretyunless the Board sustained agency postpone-ments. Practically, the Board meant thatagencies could not object to the disclosure ofall or part of an assassination record “solelyon grounds of non-relevance.” The Boardspecifically wrote that it, not the agencies,would make determinations about whetherparticular records were relevant.

This section of the Board’s 1995 Guidancespecifically affected the FBI. From early 1993until the Board issued its definition in 1995,the FBI designated large parts of FBI files as“NAR,” or “not assassination re l a t e d . ”Indeed, with re g a rd to the majority of the

re c o rds to which the FBI assigned the “NAR”a c ronym, the Review Board agreed that there c o rds were not relevant to the assassination.For example, the FBI designated as “NAR”those sections of their HSCA a d m i n i s t r a t i v efile that related to the HSCA’s investigationinto the assassination of Martin Luther King,J r. However, the Board’s regulation mandatedthat the Board, and not the FBI, make deter-minations as to relevance, so the FBI abolishedthe “NAR” designation and made all suchre c o rds available to Board staff for re v i e w.

On the other hand, in several of the FBI’sappeals to the President, the FBI argued that theinformation that the Review Board had voted torelease was not relevant to the assassination. Inthose cases, the Review Board was able to arg u ee ffectively that the Board should determinewhether information was relevant to the assas-sination and the appeals were withdrawn.

f. Originals and copies. The Review Boarddefined when it would be willing to acceptcopies of assassination re c o rds in lieu of originalassassination re c o rds for the JFK Collection.2 5

With regard to motion pictures, the ReviewB o a rd stated that “the camera original,whenever available,. . . may be placed in theJFK Collection.” The regulation quietlyexpressed the Review Board’s preference fororiginal motion pictures, but when theReview Board resolved that the JFK A c tworked a “taking” of the Zapruder film suchthat the film belonged to the U.S. govern-ment and not the Zapruder family, the Boardbelieved that a copy of the camera originalZapruder film could not substitute for thecamera original.

Finally, the Board’s regulation established ap ro c e d u re by which it would designaterecords as assassination records.26

D. CONCLUSION

Congressional and presidential delays, com-bined with unrealistic statutory deadlines,unfortunately contributed to a delay in thecommencement of the Board’s work. Oncethe Review Board began to meet, however, itscareful determination, following full publicdebate, of the scope of the term “assassina-tion record” laid the foundation for laterreview of thousands of important records.

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CHAPTER 2ENDNOTES

1 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. 1998).

2 JFK Act at § 5(c)(1).

3 JFK Act at § 5(c)(2)(A)–(H).

4 JFK Act at § 5(c)(2)(F).

5 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3006, The President John F.Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d. sess., 1992, S. Rept.102–328, at 21. (hereafter “Senate Report”).

6 JFK Act at § 3(2).

7 JFK Act at § 3 (2)(A)–(L). Section 3(2) of the JFK Act specifically excluded from the defini-tion of “assassination re c o rd” autopsy re c o rds donated by the Kennedy family to the NationalA rchives pursuant to a deed of gift.

8 Senate Report at 21.

9 JFK Act at § 7(I)(2)(A).

10 JFK Act at § 7(n).

11 Senate Report at 21.

12 Nominations of Graff, Tunheim, Nelson, Joyce, and Hall. The Review Board’s preciseanswers to the question as to how they would define the term “assassination record” follow:

Henry Graff wrote, “Plainly any document that directly or tangentially deals with the assas-sination will be subsumed under the head of ‘assassination record,’ but I believe that somedocuments and classes of documents will have to labeled such on an ad hoc basis.” Judge Tun-heim wrote that it was his view that, “the Board should more fully understand the scope ofthe potential records before attempting to define the term. I favor a broad definition in orderto fulfill the clear intent of Congress. One important criteria will be the extent to which therecord adds to the public understanding of the events and characters involved in the assassi-nation and its aftermath.” Anna Nelson explained that, “My sense at this point is that theBoard should encourage this broad definition of records while we establish the parameters ofthe issue. Defining the records is the perfect topic for public hearings. Most individuals whohave extensively studied the available information have opinions on this matter. In addition,the index of names from the [HSCA] report, and the subject index in the National Archives willhelp clarify the issues for us. I’m sure the Board will spend considerable time on this issuebecause of its importance to the work of the Board.” William Joyce wrote that, “The definitionof ‘assassination records’ will be a major challenge for the Review Board to resolve in a work-able manner. In my view, the Review Board will need to establish criteria addressing: (a) thetemporal proximity of the record in relation to the assassination, (b) the content of the recordrelative to the assassination, and (c) the relation of the record to important factors and issuesperceived to be related to the assassination.” And Kermit Hall stated that, “The statute creat-ing the Review Board defines an assassination record as [statutory definition]. These materialsare certainly, therefore, the core of what constitutes the ‘assassination records’ that the Boardis duty bound to treat. Any of these materials that are held in private hands are also coveredby the statute and are subject to its provisions. In general, I think that the Board should take abroad view of what constitutes an assassination record within the terms of statute.”

13 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Nominations of Graff, Tunheim, Nelson, Joyce, andHall, 103d Cong., 2d sess., 1994, S. Rept. 103–877.

14 In an effort to receive comments from all interested parties, the Review Board sent copiesof the proposed interpretive regulations to agencies known to have an interest in and to beaffected by the Review Board’s work, particularly those that either created or now hold assas-sination records, and to the appropriate oversight committees in Congress. The Review Board

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also sent notices of the proposed interpretive regulations and requests for comments to manyorganizations and individuals who have demonstrated an interest in the release of materialsunder the JFK Act or who have engaged in research into the assassination of PresidentKennedy.

15 Guidance for Interpretation and Implementation of the President John F. Kennedy Assas-sination Records Collection Act of 1992, 36 C.F.R. § 1400 et seq. (1995). (hereafter “Definition”).

16 Senate report at 18.

17 60 Fed. Reg. 7506 (1995).

18 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400 et seq.

19 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.1.

20 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.2.

21 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.3.

22 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.4.

23 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.7.

24 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.5.

25 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.6.

26 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.8.

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CHAPTER 3PU B L I C AC T I V I T I E S O F T H E AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S

RE V I E W BO A R D

The underlying principles guiding thelegislation are independence, public con-fidence, efficiency and cost eff e c t i v e n e s s .1

A. INTRODUCTION

While the Review Board members and stafffocused the majority of their efforts on theidentification, re v i e w, and release of assassina-tion re c o rds, the P resident John F. KennedyAssassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ( J F KAct) also directed the Review Board to “re c e i v einformation from the public re g a rding theidentification and public disclosure of assassi-nation re c o rds” and to “hold hearings.”2

Prior commissions and committees thatexamined the assassination conducted theirwork in secret and then closed their records.The Review Board members recognized thatthey must set themselves apart by conduct-ing their work in public. Thus, when theBoard confronted major policy decisions, itsolicited comments from the public. Forexample, when the Review Board defined theterm “assassination record,” it held a publichearing on the topic and solicited publiccomments. Likewise, the Review Board rec-ognized that the government’s secretive han-dling of the Zapruder film has been fodderfor conspiracy theorists. In an effort to avoidcausing further speculation about the film,the Board determined that it must conduct itsdeliberations about the Zapruder film inpublic. To that end, the Board held a publichearing on the issue of whether the Zapruderfilm was already or should become the prop-erty of the American people.

The Board did not, however, consult the pub-lic only on major policy decisions. It alsoreceived thousands of comments from mem-bers of the public as to where the Boardmight locate additional records and informa-tion related to the assassination. The Board

received such comments through its expertsconferences, open meetings, public hearings,and extensive, ongoing contact with mem-bers of the public who wrote and called theReview Board.

To fulfill its statutory obligations, the ReviewBoard held public hearings, open meetings,and conferences, and it actively solicitedinput from the public and conducted ongo-ing efforts to keep the public informed of allReview Board decisions.

B. PUBLIC HEARINGS

In an effort to gather asmuch information as pos-sible from the A m e r i c a npublic about the exis-tence and location of“assassination re c o rd s , ”the Review Board con-ducted a total of sevenpublic hearings—one eachin Dallas, Boston, NewOrleans, and Los A n g e-les, and three in Wa s h i n g-ton, D.C. The ReviewB o a rd believed that in order to ascertain whatmaterials existed throughout the country, itwas important to hold such hearings outsideof Washington, D.C., and primarily in citiesw h e re key witnesses might be located orw h e re important assassination-related eventshad occurred. At each hearing, the ReviewB o a rd invited members of the public to tes-t i f y, and the witnesses provided input aboutmaterials related to the assassination of Pre s i-dent Kennedy.

By all accounts, the Review Board’s publichearings were a success. One of the firstReview Board hearings was held in Dallas,Texas. In Chairman Tunheim’s openingremarks he said, “We are holding this hear-ing in Texas because we believe there are

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[N]o one is going to get every-thing they want out of thisBoard or out of this govern-m e n t , but I think it is terriblyimportant to start the rightwa y , as you are, by plugginginto the research , being open,being inclusive; that is a verygood sign.—John Newman,October 11, 1995

records in this area, in this state, that areessential to a complete record of this event.”In all, 19 witnesses testified and providedsuggestions to the Review Board as to whereit might find records related to the assassina-tion. Of all Review Board hearings this par-ticular one had the most witnesses, and itwas at this hearing that many members of thepublic and the Review Board members metfor the first time.

The Boston hearingallowed the ReviewB o a rd to meet PriscillaJohnson McMillan, ajournalist who had con-ducted extensive inter-views with MarinaOswald Porter for herbook, Marina and Lee. Asa result of her positivecontacts with the ReviewB o a rd, Ms. McMillandetermined to include a

provision in her will donating to the JFK Col-lection at NARA all of the material she gath-ered for her book. Likewise, in New Orleans,Lindy Boggs, United States Ambassador tothe Vatican and wife of the late CongressmanHale Boggs, served as the Review Board’sambassador in New Orleans. Hale Boggs’papers are available at Tulane University,and Lindy Boggs granted the Review Boardaccess to her husband’s papers from his ser-vice on the Warren Commission.

One of the Review Board’s primary goals inconducting its public hearings was to informthe American public that the Review Boardexisted and that it sought assassinationrecords. In New Orleans, the public hearingferreted out a treasure trove of assassinationrecords, including long-lost grand jury tran-scripts from New Orleans District AttorneyJim Garrison’s prosecution of Clay Shaw forconspiring to murder President Kennedy.Prior to the public hearing, the man who pos-sessed the grand jury transcripts, Gary Ray-mond, a former investigator on Connick’sstaff, maintained the records in his home. Asa direct result of the Review Board’s hearing,Mr. Raymond decided that he had a duty toturn the records over to the custody of thegovernment. Several days after returning toWashington, the Review Board membersreceived a package containing grand jury tes-

timony of individuals such as MarinaOswald Porter, Ruth Paine, and Perry Ray-mond Russo, who played a role in OliverStone’s JFK.

These stories of the Review Board’s acquisi-tions of invaluable records relating to theassassination of President Kennedy arerecounted in the other chapters of this report,but they serve as excellent examples of thebenefits that resulted from the ReviewBoard’s public hearings.

Finally, the Review Board used the publichearing format to make policy on its defini-tion of the term “assassination record” andon the disposition of the famous “Zapruderfilm.” Thus, the Review Board did take seri-ously Congress’ guidance to “receive infor-mation from the public” on its most impor-tant decisions.

C. PUBLIC MEETINGS

While the majority of the Review Board’smeetings were not open to the public,because of the need to review and discussclassified or confidential material, theReview Board did hold twenty public meet-ings. As opposed to the public hearings,where the Review Board would hear testi-mony from witnesses, public meetingsallowed members of the public to observe theBoard at work. The Review Board discusseda variety of business in its public meetings,including such topics as its policy regardingdocuments that the Review Board found tobe of no believed relevance to the assassina-tion, and the drafting of its Final Report.

D. EXPERTS CONFERENCES

Twice during the Review Board’s tenure, itdetermined that it would benefit from thereflections of a group of invited guests whoare specialists in their fields. The ReviewB o a rd held each “experts conference” inWashington, D.C.

The first conference occurred in May 1995, andincluded a group of authors and re s e a rc h e r swho had studied the assassination, as well ass t a ff members from both the Wa r ren Commis-sion and the HSCA. The roundtable discus-sion provided the Review Board and staffwith an opportunity to determine which

24

I know that you are trying toredress the harm and the woundthat was done to the Americanspirit in 1963 and the confu-sions that have arisen since sothat we may—the Americanpeople may be free to move onto the current history, w h i chclamors for its attention.—Priscilla Johnson McMillan,March 24, 1995

re c o rds were of the most interest both to thepublic and to those whose prior investigativee fforts had been thwarted due to the lack ofaccess to re c o rds. The participants in the dis-cussion also provided a great number of re c-ommendations about where the ReviewB o a rd might find assassination re c o rds.

P rofessor Robert Blakey, former Chief Coun-sel of the HSCA, reminded the ReviewB o a rd of the HSCA’s belief that it wouldhave benefitted from the FBI’s fuller disclo-s u re of its electronic surveillance materialsf rom its organized crime files. As a dire c tresult of Professor Blakey’s suggestion, theReview Board requested from the FBI ab road cross-section of organized crime elec-t ronic surveillance files, the most significantof which was certainly the FBI’s electro n i csurveillance of Carlos Marcello, allegedNew Orleans crime boss.

Another participant, Paul Hoch, suggestedthat the Review Board obtain the records inthe possession of Clay Shaw’s attorneys. InApril 1996, the Review Board released thefiles of the late Edward Wegmann, who wasa member of the legal team that defendedClay Shaw at his 1969 assassination conspir-acy trial. Mr. Wegmann’s family agreed todonate the files, consisting of approximately6,000 pages, to the JFK Collection.

In April 1998, the Review Board held anotherexperts conference, this time narro w l yfocused on the issue of declassification ofgovernment documents. The Review Boardtailored its invitation list to include experts inWashington’s declassification world. Ulti-mately, the Review Board gathered twelverepresentatives from both the private andpublic sector to discuss access—and lackthereof—to government records, the prob-lems and possible solutions to the problem ofsecrecy, lessons learned from the implemen-tation of the JFK Act, and possible recom-mendations to be made by the Review Boardin its Final Report. The participants includedrepresentatives from the Project on Govern-ment Secrecy, Interagency Security Classifi-cation Appeals Panel (ISCAP), the NationalSecurity Council, the non-governmentalNational Security Archive, NARA, CIA, andthe Information Security Oversight Off i c e(ISOO), as well as representatives from Con-gress and from the media.

The panelists discussed various issuesincluding the simplification of the referralprocess throughout the intelligence commu-nity, and the need for declassification entitiessuch as the Review Board to be independentin nature. They also discussed different poli-cies for review, such as the declassification ofrecords for special cases like the assassina-tion of President Kennedy vs. agency-widedeclassification. Overall, the day long confer-ence was an informative session wherein thepanelists talked about the guidelines for therelease of information and how it could real-istically be done.

E. OUTREACH

Given that one of the pri-mary objectives of theC o n g ress in passing theJFK Act was to re s t o republic confidence in gov-ernment, the ReviewB o a rd recognized that itwould need to maintain regular contact withmembers of the public who expressed ani n t e rest in the Board’s work. As part of itse fforts to communicate with the public, theReview Board maintained both a regular mail-ing list and an e-mail mailing list consisting ofa p p roximately 1,000 con-tacts. These mailingsincluded press re l e a s e s ,periodic updates on theReview Board’s activities,updates on the results ofReview Board meetings,information about docu-ments transferred to theJFK Collection, and infor-mation about the ReviewB o a rd’s Federal Register notices.

F rom time to time, Review Board membersand staff spoke to groups of students, publicg roups, the media, and re s e a rchers re g a rd i n gthe Board’s work. In addition, Board membersand staff described their work to civic gro u p s .

1. Outreach to Academics

In 1996, the members of the Review Boardmade presentations at meetings of the A m e r i-can Historical Association, the Org a n i z a t i o nof American Historians, and the Society ofAmerican A rchivists. The Review Board ’ s

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The real question about theimpact of the [Review] Board—how much impact has theBoard had on the way agenciesb e h a v e ?—Professor David Garrow,April 14, 1998

In this era of cynicism aboutgovernment, your mission is ofcritical importance.—Lindy Boggs, June 28, 1995

e fforts allowed approximately 200 historiansto become familiar with the work of the Board .

2. Outreach to Students

During its tenure, the Review Board hostedsix groups of high school students fro m

Noblesville, Indiana. Thestudents, along with theirhistory teacher, Mr. Bru c eHitchcock, came to theReview Board offices toserve as interns. The stu-dents provided theReview Board staff withinvaluable assistance inc reating databases andp rocessing newly declas-sified documents forrelease to the A m e r i c a npublic. Mr. Hitchcock alsoplayed an important ro l ein the Review Board ’ sextension of one year, as

he provided testimony to the National Secu-r i t y, International A ffairs, and Criminal JusticeSubcommittee in support of the ReviewB o a rd’s request for a one-year extension.

All Board members took the time to speakperiodically to groups of students about thework of the Review Board.

3. Outreach to Assassination Researchers

In 1994 and again in 1995, Review BoardChairman John Tunheim spoke to the fallc o n f e rence of the Coalition on PoliticalAssassinations, updating the group on theBoard’s progress. Former Executive DirectorDavid Marwell spoke to the conference in1996. The following day, the Review Boardinvited researchers to an open house at theReview Board’s office.

Chairman Tunheim also submitted ReviewBoard updates to journals and newslettersthat serve the research community, includingarticles about the Review Board to the AARCQ u a r t e r l y, Open Secre t s, and P ro b e, all ofwhich cater to researchers and are circulatedworldwide.

4. Media

Board members and staff devoted significant

time to answering questions from the newsmedia throughout the Board’s existence. TheBoard believed its responsibility was to be asopen as possible in discussing the effort toopen the assassination records.

The Review Board took both a proactive andreactive approach to its media relations pro-gram. The Review Board disseminateda p p roximately 100 press releases andupdates to members of the media thro u g h-out its short lifetime. The Board alsoresponded to many requests for interviewsand requests for information from membersof the media about its declassificatione fforts. Contrary to prior commissions andcommittees, the Review Board was willingto talk to members of the media to keepthem informed of the Board’s latest activi-ties. The Review Board was about openness,and one way to keep as many members ofthe public as possible informed about Boardactivities was through the media.

Although the Review Board as an agencywas not necessarily a household namea round the world, the Board membersunderstood and appreciated the high publici n t e rest in the assassination itself and there-f o re made themselves available to themedia. The Review Board and staff partici-pated in countless newspaper, radio, andtelevision interviews at both the local,national, and international level. For exam-ple, stories about the work of the ReviewB o a rd were covered by all the major net-works, CNN, Associated Press, the nationalradio networks, and most major newspa-pers throughout the country, including TheWashington Post, The Los Angeles Ti m e s ,and the Dallas Morning News. Internation-a l l y, television networks in Germany andJapan conducted interviews with Board ands t a ff members, and an interview with a staffmember appeared in a newspaper inPoland. Whether it was a local radio stationin Arkansas or the national CBS EveningNews with Dan Rather, in the spirit ofopenness the Review Board went to gre a tlengths to accommodate all requests forinterviews.

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The only option for rightfullyrestoring and renewing thepublic trust in its governmentis by countermanding a historyof political constraints and pastprejudices in assassinationinquiries through an active andmassive declassification of allrecords relating directly andindirectly to the President’sassassination, and the time andopportunity is obviously now.—Richard Trask,March 24, 1995

F. CONCLUSION

As we move toward the hopeful goal offull disclosure, I hope that all of you willcontinue to have an interest in the workof the Review Board, in the work thatwe are trying to do, and hope that youall realize that you are our partners inthis very important effort as we moveforward.3

In the spirit of the JFK Act, the Review Boarddevoted a significant amount of time andresources talking to and corresponding with

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its constituency. From time to time the fre-quent and sustained contact with the publicdiverted the staff from its primary responsi-bilities—identifying and releasing re c o rd s .However, the benefits far outweighed thecosts. The Review Board received valuableinput from the public about the existence of“assassination records,” and most important,received donations of records and artifactsf rom private citizens that have gre a t l yenhanced the JFK Collection at NARA. Thereis no doubt that the interaction with the pub-lic allowed the Review Board to more com-pletely satisfy the objectives of the JFK Act.

CHAPTER 3ENDNOTES

1 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3006, The President John F.Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rept. 102–328,17.

2 JFK Act at § 7(j)(1)(E) and (F).

3 Chairman Tunheim at the Review Board’s hearing in Dallas, TX, November 1994.

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A. INTRODUCTION

When the Assassination Records ReviewBoard (Review Board) and its staff began toprocess assassination records in late 1994,they realized they would need a streamlinedprocess to track thousands of documents. Ittook two years, but with the help of a com-puter specialist, the staff transformed anunwieldy, paper-driven, labor-intensive sys-tem into a document-based, computerizedsystem that automatically tracked each docu-ment through the review process.

Developing a tracking system, however, wasjust one logistical problem. Each federal exec-utive agency and government office had itsown particular problems complying with theJohn F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collec -tion Act of 1992 (JFK Act.) This reality forcedthe Review Board to develop a re v i e wprocess that was broad enough to addresseach agency’s specific needs. This chapterexplains how that review process worked.

B. JFK ACT REQUIREMENTS FORPROCESSING DOCUMENTS

Section 3(2) of the JFK Act defines assassina-tion records to include any records “createdor made available for use by, obtained by, orotherwise came into possession of” the fed-eral government (or state or local lawenforcement offices that assisted in an inves-tigation of President Kennedy’s assassina-tion). To ensure “expeditious public trans-mission to the archivist and public disclosureof such records,” Section 5 of the JFK Actrequired each government agency to identifyand organize all records it had pertaining tothe Kennedy assassination and send them tothe National Archives and Records Adminis-tration (NARA) along with an electro n i cfinding aid to ensure easier public access.The entire process, including each agency’s

review of its records, was to take no morethan 300 days.

Generally, federal government agencies andoffices held one or more of the followingtypes of records:

(1) records relating to an agency’s assas-sination investigation;(2) records relating to an individual or toa subject that is relevant to the assassi-nation;(3) records that one of the official inves-tigative entities used in an official assas-sination investigation, or (4) records relating to an agency’s assis-tance of another agency in an officialassassination investigation.

The JFK Act placed the largest burden onsuch agencies as the Federal Bureau of Inves-tigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency(CIA), Secret Service, and the Department ofDefense because those agencies were deeplyinvolved in the investigation of the assassi-nation.1 The JFK Act required the FBI, forexample, to re v i e w, process, and transfermore than 795,000 pages to NARA, withidentification aids, within 300 days.

After the agencies hadidentified and re v i e w e devery assassination re c o rd ,the JFK Act re q u i re dthem to create an elec-t ronic identification aidfor each assassinationre c o rd. Congress believedthat this identificationsystem would allowNARA to build a centraldirectory of identification aids, making it eas-ier for the public to access every assassina-tion record in the JFK Collection.2 Unfortu-nately, it also slowed down the process.3

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CHAPTER 4DE V E L O P I N G T H E RE V I E W PR O C E S S

That’s what we hoped wouldhappen, and its literally hap-pening, as people are able tolook at the database and pro-vide us with precise informationon documents that they’re inter-ested in.—Steven D. Tilley,August 6, 1996

NARA provided each agency with the com-puter software to create its identificationaids. NARA wanted each assassinationrecord to bear a unique identification number(as well as other document-specific informa-tion, such as the date, number of pages, orig-inator, recipient, subjects, etc.). This uniquenumber consists of 13 digits divided intothree parts. The first 3 digits identify theagency (for example all CIA records beginwith “104”), the middle five digits identifythe floppy disk number on which the agencycreated the identification aid, and the lastfive digits identify the particular record onthe agency’s floppy disk. (See illustration ofrecord identification aid.)

Generally, NARA describes textual recordsby box or series of boxes. An archivist pre-pares a finding aid for a group of recordswhich consists of a general summary of therecords, and a list of folder titles. In the JFKAct, however, Congress required that everydocument in the collection be assigned a

record identification number. Tracking a col-lection of records such as the JFK Collectionon a document-by-document basis is there-fore alien to conventional archival practice.But Congress’ intent to account for everyassassination record made it necessary to gobeyond conventional practice.

C. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE REVIEW PROCESS

The JFK Act was a novel approach to govern-ment declassification, and the Review Boardwanted the process to reflect the fact that fiveAmerican citizens would judge whether gov-ernment secrets should continue to remain hid-den. The Review Board decided at its earliestmeetings that it would meet often and makedecisions on a document-by-document basis,rather than on an issue-by-issue basis.4 In otherwords, rather than immediately making“Review Board policy” on postponementsrelating to protecting the privacy of individu-als, the Review Board chose to review everyprivacy postponement claimed by an agency.The Review Board believed that its cautiousa p p roach would fulfill the JFK Act’s objec-tive—to instill public confidence that all infor-mation that could be released would bereleased. The detailed review also allowed theB o a rd to educate itself about the information inthe re c o rd, something that could not be doneexcept on a document-by-document basis.

As part of its document-by-document re v i e w,the Review Board re q u i red agencies to pro-vide specific evidence supporting their post-ponement claims—as the JFK Act re q u i re d .5

(The JFK Act re q u i red release of all informa-tion in assassination re c o rds in the year 2017,25 years after the passage of the act, so theReview Board employs the term “postponed”to mean “redacted until the year 2017.”) Byreviewing and evaluating every postpone-ment at its earliest meetings, the ReviewB o a rd developed a full understanding of theissues and of the types of evidence the agen-cies would provide. Once the Review Boardbecame comfortable with the issues and withthe quality of agency evidence, it could dele-gate more authority to the staff to present re c-ommendations for full Board action.

The Review Board staff realized its reviewsystem would need the following elements:

First, the federal agency would review itsrecords and tell the Review Board the loca-tion of its proposed postponements.

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Second, the Board staff would then reviewthe record and recommend that the ReviewBoard either sustain or overrule the agency’srequest for postponement.

Third, after making its recommendation, thestaff would schedule the document for theReview Board’s next meeting. To issue itsFederal Register notices in a timely way—asthe JFK Act required—the staff tracked thedocument number, the agency’s request forpostponements within the document, andthe staff’s recommendation before theReview Board voted on the record.

Once the Review Board voted on the record,the Review Board staff could notify theagency of its determination, publish theReview Board vote in the Federal Register, andtransmit the record to NARA, unless theagency requested the Review Board to recon-sider its decision.

In the summer and fall of 1995, the ReviewBoard staff developed database systems forreviewing assassination records and trackingReview Board votes. The system allowed thes t a ff to review any assassination re c o rd ,regardless of its originating agency. The staff,with the help of a computer specialist,designed its primary tracking system, called“Review Track,” to resemble NARA’s elec-tronic identification aid database.

Given that the JFK Act required the ReviewBoard to publish all Board votes in the FederalRegister, the staff designed the Review Trackdatabase to be able to generate Federal Regis -ter notices.

D. ELECTRONIC IDENTIFICATION AIDS

NARA’s electronic identification aid data-base system has its flaws, although these donot lie in faulty computer pro g r a m m i n g .Instead, the JFK Act’s well-intentionedrequirements that the Review Board trackdocuments on a postponement-by-postpone-ment basis was, at times, the “tail thatwagged the dog.” Further, it is not clear thatthe best way to create an accessible, easy-to-use JFK Collection was to require agencies toattach a separate piece of paper to eachrecord they processed. Because of these andother problems, the Review Board urg e sCongress to think twice before including the

type of “electronic identification aid” lan-guage that exists in the JFK Act in futurerecords management legislation.

In compliance with sections 5(d)(1)(A) and(B) of the JFK Act, NARA c reated its databasesystem and loaded it onto 5 and 1/4 inchfloppy disks. NARA assumed that any gov-ernment office could load data from the diskonto a computer, produce electronic identifi-cation aids to accompany its assassinationre c o rds, and then send the same disks back toNARA. NARA then would integrate the disksinto the main database for the JFK Collection.

Despite the predictable problems, such asagencies’ lack of appropriate computerequipment, or, more often, agencies’ lack ofemployees to enter the data, most govern-ment agencies managed to create electronicidentification aids.

The Review Board secured copies of all avail-able disks from NARA and installed agency-specific databases on its computer network.Every Review Board staff member had accessto these databases, and the database struc-ture disks served as a foundation for theReview Board’s computer specialist to buildthe Review Track database.

The Review Board and the federal agenciesquickly learned that creating electronic iden-tification aids and keeping databasesupdated was a time-consuming, confusing,and cumbersome process. Usually the origi-nating agency would create its electro n i cidentification forms on NARA’s floppy disks.But in some cases the originating agencies—primarily within the Department ofDefense—had accessioned to NARA classi-fied records, and were unwilling to createidentification aids for assassination records.For example, the Review Board staff agreedto create identification aids for thousands ofrecords from the Army’s Califano papers andfor the records of the Office of the Secretaryof Defense.

The agencies typically created electro n i cidentification aids during their initial reviewof records. Ideally, the agencies would havecreated identification aids and sent them toNARA without modification. But, becausethe electronic identification aids containedinformation relating to the Review Board’s

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actions—or votes—on the records, the agen-cies and the Review Board were constantlymodifying and updating the data on thedisks.

A number of pro b l e m splagued the creation ofthe NARA e l e c t ro n i cidentification aid data-base. Generating an iden-tification aid for eachre c o rd placed a heavyburden on NARA and onevery agency thatreviewed records underthe JFK Act. Resourc e sthat the Review Boardand the agencies allo-cated to electronic identi-fication aid pro d u c t i o nwere resources that agen-cies could have appliedto review and release ofrecords. The informationincluded on the RIF wasoften sketchy, since theindexers who created theforms were not alwaysthe individuals mostknowledgeable on thesubjects. Thus, the data-bases do not always pro-vide entirely accurate orcomplete search results.

The JFK databases did, however, open infor-mation on the records in the JFK collection tothe public, especially when NARA made thedatabases available on the Internet. Thoseidentification aids furnished useful informa-tion to researchers and facilitated the page-by-page review that the Review Boardadopted.

The Review Board re c-ommends that any futuredecisions concerning theindexing of records takeinto account the pro b-lems and the benefits ofcreating separate identi-fication aids for individ-ual records. Much of theinformation that agen-cies provided on the

identification aids might have been moreuseful to researchers if it had been indexedaccording to folder, rather than to individualdocuments.

E. TRACKING THE REVIEW OF

ASSASSINATION RECORDS

1. Review Track Database

As noted above, the Review Track database isa modified NARA electronic identificationaid database that Review Board staff used toprocess assassination records. The ReviewTrack system evolved out of the ReviewBoard staff’s early handwritten review, and itcontinued to evolve as the Board and its staffstreamlined the review process to meet theincreasing volume of documents agenciescould process.

The CIA, FBI, and NARAhad identified largenumbers of assassination records. Each ofthese three agencies established JFK Act taskforces and, due to the deadlines imposed bythe JFK Act, developed units to pro c e s srecords that the JFK Act covered before theReview Board staff existed. The agencies hadinternal models for addressing large declassi-fication projects, including the Freedom ofInformation Act (FOIA) model and themodel the agencies use to implement theExecutive Order related to declassification.Congress, however, had expressly rejectedboth the FOIAand the Executive Order mod-els in its passage of the JFK Act.

Knowing that agencies had each processedtheir assassination re c o rds diff e re n t l y, theReview Track had to accommodate a numberof variations in the electronic identificationaids. Some agencies had released redactedassassination records to NARA without sub-mitting the records to the Review Board for avote. Other agencies had initially, but notcompletely, reviewed records, but had giventhe records unique identifying numbers any-way. Still other agencies had created elec-tronic identification numbers for records thatthe agency did not believe were assassina-tion-related, and which the Review Boardagreed were not related. Clearly, had theReview Board existed when the agenciesbegan to review their records, some of thetime-consuming computer glitches may havebeen avoided.

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D r. Joyce: Are these formsrelated in any way to more—tobroader descriptions of therecords in question?Mr. Tilley: No, its strictly theinformation that was createdwhen the—captured when theagencies did the database entryon each document. It is strictlythe record identification form.They can see the whole form.So,they can see all twenty-threefields, and they can get all thesubjects. And they can see themon the screen and they can printthat out. But there is no addi-tional information beyond whatwas originally captured.Dr. Joyce: And there is no text ofthe documents?Mr. Tilley: No. No, we have notdone any text entry. There hasbeen no scanning of documentsat this time.—William Joyce and Steven D. Tilley,August 6, 1996

Tracking the large number ofdocuments through the reviewprocess was a major informa-tion technology challenge. Wereinvented the process and thesystems on a month-by-monthbasis.—Charles Rhodes,July 30, 1998

Even so, the Review Board staff generallyreceived from the agencies electronic identifi-cation aids indicating that the agency hadperformed its duties under the JFK Act. TheReview Board staff then reviewed the docu-ment using Review Track. The staff copiedthe agency’s electronic identification aid

from a disk, and evaluated each claimedpostponement according to the ReviewB o a rd’s guidelines. (See illustration ofReview Track identification aid.)

The following chapter discusses the ReviewBoard’s guidelines in great detail. In generalterms, once the Board became sufficientlyfamiliar with a particular issue, it wouldgrant the staff decisionmaking authority overit. The Board called these “green” issues.

If analysts were unsure of the Board’s posi-tion on a specific postponement, they labeledthe record “yellow” and put it on the agendafor the next Board meeting. Similarly, if ana-

lysts did not know the Board’s position on atype of postponement, they would designatethe record a “red” document, and put it onthe next Board meeting agenda. The staff alsolabeled a record red if it contained a type ofinformation that the Review Board usuallyagreed to postpone but the staff believedshould be released because the information

was of higher public interest. The distinction between red andyellow records was never com-pletely clear, but over time—asthe staff and the agencies came tobetter understand what the Boardwanted—the staff identifiedfewer and fewer items for discus-sion. When the number of docu-ments the Review Boardprocessed increased dramaticallythrough 1996 and 1997, the num-ber of red documents decreasedwhile green re c o rds dominatedmeetings.

2. Fast Track Database

The Review Board’s meetings in1995 and 1996 focused on the coreassassination records, such as filesre g a rding Lee Harvey Oswald,Jack Ruby, the Warren Commis-sion investigation, and the assas-sination investigations conductedby the agencies themselves. TheReview Board applied thestrictest scrutiny to claimed post-ponements in these files, whichset the tone for the release of allremaining assassination records.

After the Review Board finished reviewingthe bulk of the core files, it turned its atten-tion to the review of the thousands of pagesof less relevant, but still important, files.Because of time constraints, the Boarddecided to pare down the review process forthese documents.6 S p e c i f i c a l l y, the Boardmodified Review Track, calling the new sys-tem “Fast Track.”

Where Review Track required analysts toenter large amounts of data into the com-puter concerning each re c o rd, Fast Tr a c krequired analysts and administrative staff toenter only the unique identifying numberand the number of claimed postponements.

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Board analysts and their agency counterpartsdocumented their review of the documentson the actual documents. For example, aReview Board analyst and an FBI analystwould sit down with an assassination record,apply the Board’s standards of whether torelease or postpone the information at issue,initial the document, and move on to the nextrecord. This significant revision in the review

process allowed analyststo spend less time enter-ing data and more timewith the assassinationrecords themselves. (Seeillustration of Fast Trackidentification aid.)

The Review Board alsodeveloped uniform sub-stitute language codes sothat the analyst could jotthe code directly ontothe re c o rd, either in them a rgin or above there d a c t i o n .7

Following the on-the-document review by aB o a rd analyst, the analyst or a Board adminis-trative staff member would enter the re c o rdidentification number and the number of post-ponements into the Fast Track database. Thenthe staff would present all of its green re c o rd sto the Review Board at its next meeting and askthe Board to accept the staff re c o m m e n d a t i o n s .

F. CONSENT RELEASES

Once the Review Board established its votingpatterns, the agencies recognized that theB o a rd would not sustain postponements ofcertain types of information. Thus, rather thansubmit documents to the Review Board thatthe agencies knew that the Board wouldrelease, the agencies began to simply re l e a s ethe documents without asking the Board topostpone information in them. Many agenciesultimately released a large number of assassi-nation re c o rds in full because they pre d i c t e dthat the Board would release the re c o rd if itw e re presented to them for a vote. Whenagencies released re c o rds before the Boardruled on them and because they knew theB o a rd would release the re c o rd anyway, theB o a rd called the release a “consent release.”

Most of the consent release documents had elec-t ronic identification aids and were in theReview Board’s tracking system. The Board cre-ated a separate database for these re c o rd s ,which allowed the Board to determine howmany agency re c o rds were released. Everyagency that possessed assassination re c o rd sreleased at least some of its re c o rds as consentreleases. In fact, most of the documents re l e a s e dunder the JFK Act were consent re l e a s e s .

G. BOARD PROCEDURES

At each of its closed meetings, the ReviewB o a rd members examined re c o rds. TheBoard met in a closed conference room andfollowed established rules of order with oneBoard member, usually Chairman John Tun-heim, mediating discussion, entertainingmotions, and calling for votes. The Boarddetermined that a quorum of three memberswas necessary before a vote could take place,and that a majority of the full Board was nec-essary to carry a vote. A staff member, usu-ally the executive secretary, took minutes,and an audiotape recorded the proceedings.Staff members presented records to the Board

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Agencies supplied the ReviewBoard with only one copy of theoriginal security classified doc-ument and did not allow forfurther copying, thereby caus-ing another logistical problem.The solution to this problemwas a Rube Goldberg arrange-ment of two television monitorsconnected to a relative of theoverhead projector called an“ E l m o .” Thus the five Boardmembers were able to examinesimultaneously each document.—Anna Kasten Nelson, 1998

members for their consideration and pro-vided analysis of each postponement alongwith information that might provide theBoard members with a context for under-standing the document at issue. Staff mem-bers or representatives of the agencies pre-sented the evidence that agencies submittedto support postponements.

The process was laborious, especially in theearly meetings when Board members weredeveloping their views on the postponementcriteria. For the most part, the Board re v i e w e dre c o rds in the conference room. But the Boardmembers did refine the manner in which theyaccomplished the physical review of re c o rd s .In the early phases of the process, the fullBoard examined and debated on each post-ponement in each record. This method waseffective and allowed the Board to establishmany of the guidelines that facilitated moreefficient review.

Once the Board established guidelines, theystreamlined their review by requesting thatthe staff present to the full Board (in the con-ference room) only those records that pre-sented new issues. The full Board stillwanted to have at least one Board memberreview each document, however. Thus, for alimited time, staff members prepared, maderecommendations, and boxed re c o rds forreview by individual Board members. Boardmembers then voted on computer to accepts t a ff recommendations or they markedrecords for discussion by the full Board in theclosed conference room. Eventually, theBoard members were confident that the staffapplied their guidelines correctly and theBoard members began to vote to approvelarge numbers of “green” issues (in whichthe staff simply applied the Board’s guidanceto records.) The Board could then reservemeeting time for unresolved issues.

H. MISCELLANEOUS BOTTLENECKS ANDPROBLEMS IN THE REVIEW PROCESS

1. Duplicates

Nearly every assassination record appears atleast twice in the JFK Collection. In somecases, the originating agency had two ormore copies of its own record. In other cases,two or more agencies possessed copies of thesame record. The Review Board’s challenge,

therefore, was to attempt to ensure that itprocessed all copies of the same document inthe same way.

W h e re possible, the Review Board and theoriginating agencies used information fro mthe electronic identification aids to identifyduplicates prior to the Board’s review of there c o rd. For example, the FBI indexed itsre c o rds so that it could keep track of all dupli-cates of a particular re c o rd. The agency alsolisted the re c o rd numbers of all duplicatecopies on the electronic identification aid.

Other agencies were not as organized as theFBI. When processing CIA records, the Boardstaff often encountered more than a dozencopies of records. Because the CIAhas decen-tralized files, neither the agency nor theReview Board could determine where dupli-cates of particular records might be.

Since CIA files do contain so many duplicaterecords, the Board and the Agency ultimatelyagreed that, once the Board had voted onpostponements in one copy of a record, theCIA would have to assume primary respon-sibility for processing duplicates to match thefirst copy. The CIA identified the duplicatesin a re-review of the JFK Collection, and theBoard staff made sure the records the agencyidentified as duplicates were in fact dupli-cates. The CIA has agreed to transfer allduplicates to NARA by September 1999.

2. Equities and Referrals

When one agency uses another agency’sinformation to create a re c o rd, the otheragency’s information is called an “equity.”Understandably, agencies try not to releaseother agencies’ equities without first consult-ing with them. The process by which theagency that possesses the record consultswith the agency whose equities are present inthe record is called the “referral” process.Agencies also sometimes refer re c o rds toother agencies when the first agency believesthat the other agency has an interest in therecord of the first agency. For example, if rep-resentatives from the Customs Service andthe CIA were at the same meeting and Cus-toms created a record to memorialize themeeting, Customs would likely “refer” themeeting report to the CIA before agreeing torelease the report.

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In processing govern-ment records for releaseunder the terms of theFOIA or under the termsof the Executive Ord e rgoverning declassifica-tion, agencies:

(1) identify otheragency’s equities in theirrecords;

(2) send to the otheragency a copy of therecord that contains thatagency’s equity; and

(3) wait patiently—sometimes for years—forthe other agency toprocess its equity in there c o rd and return therecord.

Only after the otheragency returns the re c o rdto the referring agencydoes the referring agencybegin to process there c o rd to protect its owninformation. For exam-ple, if the CIA p ro v i d e dthe FBI with informationabout Lee HarveyOswald’s activities inMexico City in 1963, theFBI would report, in itsown document, the infor-mation that CIA p ro-vided to the FBI. Whenthe FBI evaluates thisre c o rd for release, the

first thing it does is send the re c o rd to CIA,requesting the CIA to evaluate whether CIAinformation in the re c o rd can be released. CIAevaluates its information and eventuallyreturns the re c o rd to the FBI. Only then doesthe FBI begin to evaluate whether it canrelease the FBI information in the re c o rd.

The agencies are reluctant to change thisprocess and they protect information thatoriginates with another agency. Using theabove example, if the FBI does not consultwith the CIA before releasing the informa-tion, the CIA then may choose to release FBIinformation without consulting with FBI.Because the agencies guard their own infor-

mation so carefully, they have strong incen-tives not to modify the referral process.

Because the JFK Act did not consider ora d d ress the referral issue, the pro c e s simpeded the pace of review and the ReviewBoard’s ability to release records. The ReviewBoard realized that, to complete its work, itcould not allow the agencies to engage intheir traditional referral process. Instead, theBoard would have to engineer the referralprocess in one of three ways:

(1) managing the referrals itself;(2) sending “dunning letters” to agencies

that were delinquent in returning referreddocuments; or

(3) sponsoring joint declassification ses-sions at the Review Board offices.

a. Managing referrals. When the ReviewBoard controlled the referral process, as it didwith the Wa r ren Commission, the HouseSelect Committee on Assassinations, andpresidential library records, agencies tendedto return referred records much more quicklythan if the record came from another agencythrough traditional channels. Managing thereferrals, however, took an enormousamount of staff time and forced the ReviewBoard to spend much of its time managingrecords rather than reviewing them.

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Current procedures for process-ing records with multiple equi-ties are expensive and complex.An agency referring classifiedrecords to another agency for itsreview must make copies of therecords and specially pack a g eand transport them in compli-ance with security procedures( w h i ch , depending on ther e c o r d s ’ classification levels, c a nrange from sending them viaregistered mail to having thempersonally transferred to a gov-ernment courier by a staff per-son with appropriate clear-a n c e s ) . This process is repeatedfor every record that containsa g e n cy equities and can occurmultiple times if a single docu-ment needs to be referred tomore than one agency and alsowhen that record is returned tothe referring agency only partlyd e c l a s s i f i e d . At every step of thisp r o c e s s, additional costs arei n c u r r e d . Not only is the processburdensome and costly for agen-c i e s, but there are no deadlinesby which agencies must respondto such referrals. The result canbe lengthy delays before areview is completed and infor-mation released to the public.—The Commission onProtecting and ReducingGovernment Secrecy,March 3, 1997

b. Dunning letters. When agencies weredelinquent in returning referred documents,the Review Board mailed letters to the agen-cies simply stating that if the agency did notprocess and return the record by a specifieddeadline, the Review Board would automati-cally vote to release the record. The dunningletters proved to be very effective in convinc-ing agencies to return their referrals.

c. Review Board joint declassification sessions.“Joint declassification sessions” emerged asthe Review Board’s most effective tool inaddressing the problems caused by the refer-ral process. The Review Board staff invited tothese sessions re p resentatives from eachagency that had equities in a given group ofre c o rds. The re p resentatives came to theReview Board’s office to review the records.By the end of the one- or two-day session, thereferral process was complete. (See illustra-tion of Review Board joint declassificationsession form.)

The Review Board sponsored six joint declas-sification sessions. An unforeseen advantageof the sessions was that agencies were morelikely to agree to release a record when theyrealized that other agencies had alre a d yagreed to do so.

I. DOCUMENT PROCESSING AFTER REVIEWBOARD VOTES

The JFK Act stated that agencies must deliverrecords to NARAwithin 45 days of a ReviewBoard vote. The 45-day limit proved to beu n reasonable and, as such, the agenciesrarely, if ever, adhered to the deadline.

After the Review Board voted on an assas-sination re c o rd, the JFK Act re q u i red thes t a ff to attach a “final determination form”to the re c o rd. For Review Track re c o rds, thefinal determination form identified eachpostponement, its location within the docu-ment, and the substitute language for thepostponement. For Fast Track re c o rds, thefinal determination form identified thenumber of Review Board approved post-ponements in the document and listed thesubstitute language options that corre-sponded to codes noted on the document.(See illustrations of Review Track FinalDetermination Form and Fast Track FinalDetermination Form.)

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Finally, after the Review Board staff com-pleted its final determination forms andattached the forms to the records, they placedthe document’s electronic identification aidinto a database called the “Review TrackArchive.” The Review Track Archive containsall assassination re c o rds on which theReview Board voted.

J. CONCLUSION

The Review Board’s most basic task was toreview postponements claimed by federalagencies in their assassination re c o rds and tovote either to sustain or release the informa-tion at issue. The review of claimed postpone-ments consumed more Review Board staffhours than any other task and was the pri-mary focus of most of the Review Board ’ s

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interactions with the agencies. The ReviewB o a rd voted on more than 27,000 documentsin which the agencies had requested that theReview Board postpone information. Each ofthese documents re q u i red the attention of aReview Board analyst to shepherd the docu-ment through the process of: (1) evaluatingthe postponed information according to theB o a rd’s guidelines; (2) presenting the docu-ment to the Review Board for a vote; (3)re c o rding the Review Board’s vote on thepostponed information; (4) notifying theagency of the Review Board’s decision; (5)publishing the decision in the Federal Register;and (6) preparing the document for transfer tothe JFK Collection. The Review Board ’ sreview process ensured that it scru t i n i z e deach piece of withheld information so that theAmerican public could have confidence that itdid not postpone any significant information.

CHAPTER 4ENDNOTES

1 The National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”), of course, also was affectedby Congress’ passage of the JFK Act, as they were responsible for establishing the John F.Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (“JFK Collection”).

2 JFK Act at § 4(a)(2)(B).

3 JFK Act at § 4(a)(2).

4 For a group of five citizens who were otherwise fully employed, the Review Board mem-bers met as a group very often—once or twice each month. The Review Board held the major-ity of its regular meetings in Washington, D.C. Due to the Review Board’s need to discuss clas-sified and privacy protected material, the Review Board voted to close most of its meetings tothe public. During its tenure, the Review Board held 48 closed meetings and processed forrelease more than 60,000 documents. All of these documents are now a part of the JFK Collec-tion at NARA.

5 Section 6 of the JFK Act lists criteria that agencies can cite when requesting postponements.The criteria and the Review Board’s standards for sustaining claimed postponements are fullyexplained in Chapter 4 of this report.

6 The next chapter explains in detail the standards that the Review Board established for thereview of the “Segregated Collections.”

7 FBI Substitute Language Codes a re as follows: A. Informant Name; B. Informant IdentifyingInformation; C. Informant Symbol Number; D. Informant File Number; E. Operational Detail;F. Identifying Information to Protect the Privacy of an Individual; G. File Number; H. Classi-fied Case Caption. C I A Substitute Language Codes a re as follows: 01 Crypt; 02 Digraph; 03 CIAEmployee; 04 Asset; 05 Source; 06 Name of Person; 07 Pseudonym; 08 Identifying Informa-tion; 09 Date; 10 Location; 11 Country; 12 CIA Installation in Africa/Near East*; 13 CIA I n s t a l-lation in East Asia/ Pacific*; 14 CIA Installation in Northern Europe*; 15 CIA Installation inWestern Europe*; 16 CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere*; 17 Cable Prefix forAfrica/Near East*; 18 Cable Prefix for East Asia/ Pacific*; 19 Cable Prefix for NorthernE u rope*; 20 Cable Prefix for Western Europe*; 21 Cable Prefix for Western Hemisphere*; 22Dispatch Prefix; 23 File Number; 24 Operation Details; 25 None; 26 Scelso; 27 CIA Job Ti t l e ;28 CIA; 29 Name of Organization; 30 Social Security Number; 31 Alias Documentation; 32O fficial Cover (Details of Official Cover) [*a second number is included with this type of post-ponement to facilitate tracking individual locators throughout the Collection]. Military Sub -stitute Language Codes a re as follows: A. Operational Details; B. Name of Person; C.S o u rce/Asset; D. Identifying information to Protect the Privacy of an Individual; E. Location;F. Country/Nationality; G. Name of Organization; H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Off i-cer; I. No Suitable Substitute Language.

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A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Section 6 of the President John F. KennedyAssassination Records Collection Act of 1992,1

(JFK Act), established a short list of reasonsthat federal agencies could cite as a basis forrequesting postponement of public disclo-sure of records relating to the assassination ofPresident Kennedy. The JFK Act directed theReview Board to sustain postponementsunder Section 6 only in the “rarest cases.”Beyond the statute’s presumption of disclo-sure,2 the Review Board had little guidancefrom Congress concerning how to apply eachof the grounds for postponement. This chap-ter explains how the Review Board analyzedand applied each of the postponement stan-dards of the JFK Act.

1. Current Guidelines for Release ofAssassination-Related Information

Before Congress passed the JFK Act, mem-bers of the public who wished to review thegovernment’s assassination re c o rds couldeither request the records under the Freedomof Information Act (FOIA)3 or await therelease of the records under the then-currentExecutive Order on declassification.4 As of1992, some agencies had a five year backlogin responding to FOIA requests, and mem-bers of the public often waited for long peri-ods of time to receive information that mightbe heavily redacted. Moreover Pre s i d e n tReagan’s Executive Order 12356, in effect in1992, was aimed more at protecting secretsthan releasing information.

Like the JFK Act, the FOIA is a disclosurestatute that assumes that all governmentrecords, except for those that fit within one of theenumerated exemptions, may be released.5 Alsolike the JFK Act, the FOIA places upon thegovernment the burden of proving that mate-rial fits within the statutory exemptions. The

nine FOIA exemptions that allow govern-ment agencies to withhold information fromthe public include exemptions for informa-tion that relates to the national security, infor-mation that is related to law enforcementactivities, and information that would invadethe personal privacy of individuals. TheFOIA also allows agencies to protect infor-mation if its release would cause agencies tooperate in a fishbowl. For example, agenciescan withhold information that relates solelyto personnel practices or reveals the deliber-ative process in its decision making. TheFOIA further protects trade secrets, certaininformation relating to financial institutions,and certain geological and geophysical infor-mation. Finally, exemption b(3) of the FOIAworks to exempt any information from dis-closure if the Director of Central Intelligencedetermines that the material may not bereleased.

The second set of guidelines that governeddisclosure of records relating to the assassi-nation of President Kennedy before Congresspassed the JFK Act was provided by Presi-dent Reagan’s Executive Order 12356. Execu-tive Order 12356 was not as disclosure-ori-ented as Executive Order 12958, enacted byPresident Clinton in 1995. The Senate Reportfor the JFK Act notes that,

Executive Order 12356, National Secu-rity Information, has precluded therelease of [assassination] records.. . .[L]egislation is necessary. . . because E.O.12356, “National Security Information,”has eliminated the government-wideschedules for declassification anddowngrading of classified informationand has prevented the timely public dis-closure of assassination records. . . 6

President Clinton’s Executive Order 12958,currently in effect,7 is significantly more dis-

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CHAPTER 5TH E STA N D A R D S F O R RE V I E W:

RE V I E W BO A R D “ CO M M O N LAW”

c l o s u re-oriented than President Reagan’sorder. The current Executive Order applies toall Executive branch records and, unlike theJFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a sys-tematic declassification of all records morethan 25 years old. The Executive Order givesagencies five years—until April 2000—todeclassify all classified information that is (1)more than 25 years old, and (2) is of perma-nent historical value unless the “agencyhead” determines that release of the informa-tion would cause one of the nine enumeratedharms. The Executive Order provides forcontinuing protection for sources and meth-ods where disclosure would damage thenational security. It also protects, inter alia,information that involves diplomatic rela-tions, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plansthat are still in effect, and protection of thePresident.8

The JFK Act guidelinesthat governed the disclo-sure of records relating tothe assassination of Pres-ident Kennedy weredetailed in section 6 ofthe JFK Act.9 The JFK Act

allowed the Review Board to postpone therelease of assassination re c o rds only wherethe agencies provided clear and convincingevidence that one of five enumerated harmswould occur if the Review Board re l e a s e dthe re c o rd a n d that the harm outweighedthe public interest in disclosure. The statuteallowed protection of intelligence agentsand intelligence sources and methods if theagency could show that the agent, sourc e ,or method currently re q u i red pro t e c t i o n .The statute further allowed the Board top rotect the identity of living persons whop rovided confidential information to thegovernment if the agency could show thatd i s c l o s u re of the person’s identity wouldpose a substantial risk of harm to the per-son. The JFK Act allowed the Review Boardto postpone release of information if re l e a s ewould constitute an unwarranted invasionof personal privacy or if release would com-p romise the existence of an understandingof confidentiality between a governmentagent and a cooperating individual or for-eign government. Finally, the JFK A c tallowed the Review Board to protect cur-rent information concerning protection ofgovernment off i c i a l s .

2. Key Distinctions Between Standardsof Release Under the FOIA, the Execu-tive Order, and the JFK Act

In considering whether the JFK Act was nec-essary to guarantee public access to assassi-nation records, Congress evaluated the effec-tiveness of both the FOIA and thethen-current Executive Order 12356. Both theHouse and the Senate concluded that theFOIA and the Executive Order, as adminis-tered by the executive branch, had failed toguarantee adequate public disclosure ofassassination records.

At the time that the JFK Act became law, thelargest collections of records concerning theassassination were under the control of theFBI, the CIA, and the Congressional Commit-tees who investigated the assassination. TheFOIA provides special protections for each ofthese entities, and thus could not serve as themechanism for maximum disclosure ofassassination re c o rd s . First, the FOIAexempts CIA operational files from disclo-s u re .1 0 S e c o n d , the FOIA p rovides bro a d -based protection for law enforcement filesand therefore allows the FBI to protect a sub-stantial amount of its information from dis-closure.11 Third, the FOIA does not apply tounpublished Congressional records.12 Con-gress found that the FOIA did not requireadequate disclosure in those records that itdid cover. Thus, Congress believed that theFOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism forguaranteeing disclosure of assassinationrecords.13

P resident Clinton did not sign ExecutiveOrder 12958 until April 17, 1995—over twoyears after Congress passed the JFK Act.Clearly, the terms of the Executive Orderapplied to most assassination records sincethey were of permanent historical value andwere over 25 years old. Even if PresidentClinton’s Executive Order had been in effectprior to 1992, it could not have achieved themaximum disclosure accomplished by theJFK Act. The problem with the ExecutiveOrder is that it allowed “agency heads” tomake the decision to exempt records fromautomatic declassification provided that the“agency head” expected that disclosure ofthe records would result in one of the nineenumerated categories of harm. As many sec-tions of this Report explain, the Review

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We need to separate sourcesfrom methods. This could be themost lasting effect of the Board.—Steven Garfinkle,April 14, 1998

Board found that “agency heads” tended tobe quite reluctant to release their agencies’s e c rets. The Executive Ord e r, while well-intentioned, failed to provide for any inde-pendent review of “agency heads’” decisionson declassification. Thus, although the Exec-utive Order’s standards for declassificationappeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Exec-utive Order failed to hold agency headsaccountable for their decisionmaking.

The JFK Act did require agencies to accountfor their decisions. To ensure such account-ability, Congress included four essential pro-visions in the JFK Act: first, the JFK Act pre-sumed that assassination re c o rds may bereleased; second, the JFK Act stated that anagency could rebut the presumption of dis-closure only by proving, with clear and con -vincing evidence, that disclosure would resultin harm and that the expected harm wouldoutweigh any public benefit in the disclo-sure; third, the JFK Act created an independentagency—the Review Board—whose mandatewas to ensure that agencies respected thepresumption of disclosure and honestly pre-sented clear and convincing evidence of theneed to protect information; and fourth, theJFK Act required agencies to provide theReview Board with a c c e s s to governmentrecords, even when those records would notbecome part of the JFK Collection. Withoutthese accountability provisions, the JFK Actwould not have accomplished its objective ofmaximum release of assassination records tothe public. So, while the FOIA and the Exec-utive Order each expressed the goal ofobtaining maximum disclosure, the JFK Actensured that the goal would be met. The twoaccountability provisions that relate directlyto the Section 6 grounds for postponement—the presumption of release and the standardof proof—are discussed in detail below. Thet h i rd provision discussed below is theReview Board’s obligation to balance theweight of the evidence in favor of postpone-ment against the public interest in release.

a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of assassination records.

The most pertinent language of the JFK Actwas the standard for release of information.According to the statute, “all Governmentrecords concerning the assassination of Pres-ident John F. Kennedy should carry a pre -

sumption of immediate disclosure.”14 The statutefurther declared that “only in the rarest cases isthere any legitimate need for continued protectionof such records.”15

b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clearand convincing evidence.

If agencies wished to withhold informationin a document, the JFK Act required theagency to submit clear and convincing evi-dence that the informa-tion fell within one of then a r row postponementcriteria.16

C o n g ress selected theclear and convincing evi-dence standard because“less exacting standards,such as substantial evi-dence or a pre p o n d e r-ance of the evidence,were not consistent withthe legislation’s stated goal” of prompt andfull release.17 The legislative history of theJFK Act emphasized the statutory require-ment that agencies provide clear and con-vincing evidence.

There is no justification for perpetualsecrecy for any class of records. Nor canthe withholding of any individualrecord be justified on the basis of gen -eral confidentiality concerns applicableto an entire class . Every record must bejudged on its own merits, and everyrecord will ultimately be made availablefor public disclosure.18

When agencies did present to the ReviewBoard evidence of harm that would resultfrom disclosure, it had to consist of morethan speculation.

The [Review] Board cannot postponerelease because it might cause some con -ceivable or speculative harm to nationals e c u r i t y. Rather in a democracy thedemonstrable harm from disclosure mustbe weighed against the benefits ofrelease of the information to the public.19

The Review Board’s application of the clearand convincing evidence standard is coveredin more detail in Section B of this chapter.

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The bill creates a strong pre-sumption on releasing docu-m e n t s. The onus will be on thosewho would withhold documentsto prove to the Review Board andthe American people why thosedocuments must be shielded frompublic scrutiny.—Senator John Glenn,May 12, 1992

Section B includes a discussion of the “Ruleof Reason” that the Review Board ultimatelyadopted with regard to receiving evidencefrom the agencies.

c. JFK Act requires the Review Board to balance evidence for postponement againstpublic interest in release.

Assuming that agencies did provide clearand convincing evidence that informationshould be protected from disclosure, theterms of section 6 required that informationnot be postponed unless the threat of harmoutweighs the public interest in disclosure.As used in the JFK Act, “public interest”means “the compelling interest in the promptpublic disclosure of assassination records forhistorical and governmental purposes andfor the purpose of fully informing the Amer-ican people about the history surroundingthe assassination of President John F.Kennedy.”20 The Review Board interpretedthe balancing requirement to mean that agen-cies had to provide the Review Board withclear and convincing evidence of the threat ofharm that would result from disclosure .However, to the extent that the JFK Act leftroom for discretion in evaluating the histori-cal significance, or public interest, of particu-lar assassination records, it was the ReviewBoard—not the agency that originated thedocument—that was to exercise this discre-tion. The burden was on the agencies to makethe case for postponement, not to judge thelevel of public interest in a particular docu-ment. The JFK Act established the ReviewBoard as a panel of independent citizens withexpertise as historians and archivists pre-cisely in order to secure public confidence insuch determinations.21

d. Segregability and substitute language.

When the Review Board determined that therisk of harm did outweigh the public interestin disclosure, it then had to take two addi-tional steps: (1) ensure that the agencyredacted the least amount of informationpossible to avoid the stated harm, or “segre-gate” the postponed information, and (2)provide substitute language to take the placeof the redaction.

3. Federal Agency Record Groups andthe Standards Applied to Them.

The JFK Act defines “assassination records”to include records related to the assassinationof President Kennedy that were “created ormade available for use by, obtained by, orotherwise came into the possession of” thefollowing groups: the Warren Commission,the four congressional committees that inves-tigated the assassination, any office of thefederal government, and any state or locallaw enforcement office that assisted in a fed-eral investigation of the assassination.22

When it passed the JFK Act, Congre s sintended for the JFK Collection to include therecord groups that it identified in section3(2), but it also intended for the ReviewBoard to consider carefully the scope of theterm “assassination record” and to issue aninterpretive regulation defining this crucialterm.23 The Act requires government agenciesto identify, organize, and process those assas-sination records that are defined as assassi-nation records in section 3(2). Chapter 6 ofthis report explains how the Review Boardinterpreted its responsibility to define andseek out “additional records and informa-tion.” Set forth below is a description of someof the core government holdings on theassassination which were released under thestandards of the Review Board.

a. The FBI’s “core and related” files .

The FBI’s “core and related” files consist ofthose re c o rds that the FBI gathered inresponse to FOIA requests that it received inthe 1970s for records relating to the assassi-nation of President Kennedy. The “core” filesinclude the FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswaldand Jack Ruby, as well as the FBI’s WarrenCommission files and the JFK assassinationinvestigation file. The “related” files includeFBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald’s wifeMarina and mother Marguerite, Oswald’sfriend George DeMohrenschildt, and theOswalds’ Dallas friends Ruth and MichaelPaine. The FBI began its processing of thecore and related files in 1993. The ReviewBoard applied strict standards to its review ofpostponements in the core and related files.

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b. CIA’s Lee Harvey Oswald “201” file.

CIAopens a 201 file on an individual when ithas an “operational interest” in that person.The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee HarveyOswald in December 1960 when it received arequest from the Department of State ondefectors. After President Kennedy’s assassi-nation, the Oswald 201 file served as a depos-itory for records CIA gathered and createdduring CIA’s wide-ranging investigation ofthe assassination. Thus, the file provides themost complete record of the CIA’s inquiry inthe months and years immediately followingthe assassination.

c. The FBI’s “House Select Committee onAssassinations”(HSCA) Subject Files.

During the HSCA’s tenure, the Committeemade a number of requests to the FBI forrecords that the Committee believed mightbe relevant to their investigation of theKennedy assassination. In response to theHSCA’s requests, the FBI made available tothe HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pagesof FBI files. The FBI began its processing ofthe “HSCASubject” files in 1993. The ReviewBoard applied its “Segregated Collection”guidelines (explained below) to the HSCAsubject files.

d. The CIA’s “Segregated Collection” files .

HSCA investigators gained access to CIAfiles. Upon completion of the HSCA’s work,the CIA kept separate the files that it hadmade available to the HSCA and retainedthem as a segregated collection. This collec-tion is divided into two parts: paper recordsand microfilm. CIA made 63 boxes of paperre c o rds available to the HSCA s t a ff. Thepaper records consist, in many cases, of par-ticular records that CIA culled from variousfiles. The 64th box of the CIA’s segregatedcollection contains 72 reels of microfilm andrepresents the entire set of files from whichrecords were made available to the HSCA.Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed filescontain material well beyond the scope of theHSCA investigation and may, for example,cover an agent’s entire career when only asmall portion of it intersected with the assas-sination story.

e. FBI records on the congressional commit -tees that investigated the assassination.

The JFK Act defined “assassination record”to include records relating to the Kennedyassassination that were used by the congres-sional committees who investigated eventssurrounding the assassination.24

B e f o re President Clinton appointed theReview Board, the FBI collected and began toprocess its administrative files relating to itsinvolvement with each of these committees.In large part, the records contained in theBureau’s administrative files related to topicsother than the Kennedy assassination. To theextent that the Review Board found recordsin these files that concerned topics other thanthe Kennedy assassination, it designated therecords not believed relevant (or “NBR” asthat acronym is defined infra) and removedthem from further consideration.

f. Requests for Additional Information.

Congress included in the JFK Act a provisionthat allowed the Review Board to obtainadditional information and records beyondthose that were reviewed by previous inves-tigations. Chapter 6 of this report explainsthe requests that the Review Board made andthe assassination re c o rds designated as aresult of those requests.

B. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS

The Review Board’s primary purpose, as out-lined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was todetermine whether an agency’s request forpostponement of disclosure of an assassina-tion record met the criteria for postponementset forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted of anintroductory clause, which established the“clear and convincing evidence” standard,and five subsections that set forth the criteriaunder which the Review Board could agreeto postpone public disclosure of assassina-tion-related information.

1. Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence

Text of Section 6

Disclosure of assassination records or par -ticular information in assassination records

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to the public may be postponed subject to thelimitations of this Act if [agencies provide]clear and convincing evidence that [theharm from disclosure outweighs the publicinterest in release.]

a. Review Board guidelines. For each recom-mended postponement, the JFK Act requiresan agency to submit “clear and convincingevidence” that one of the specified groundsfor postponement exists. 25 The Review Boardrequired agencies to submit specific facts insupport of each postponement, according tothe Review Board’s guidelines for each post-ponement type.

b. Commentary. Although the agenciesargued that the clear and convincing evi-

dence standard could besatisfied by a generalexplanation of thoseagencies’ positions insupport of postpone-ments, the Review Boarddetermined that the clearand convincing evidencerequirement was a docu-ment-specific one. Thus,the Board required agen-cies to present evidencethat was tailored to indi-vidual postponementswithin individual docu-ments.

The JFK Act clearlyrequired agencies to pro-vide clear and convinc-ing evidence in supportof their postponements,but it did not establish amechanism for when and

how such evidence should be presented. Thelegislative history provides a clue as to Con-gress’ intent: “[T]o the extent possible, con-sultation with the government offices createsan understanding on each side as to the basisand reasons for their respective recommen-dations and determinations.”26 The ReviewBoard did consult with government offices todetermine fair, efficient, and reasonable pro-cedures for presenting evidence.

The Review Board began its review of assas-sination records by considering pre- assassi-nation records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an

attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, theBoard asked the staff to present the recordson an issue-by-issue basis. For example, withFBI records, the Review Board first sched-uled a group of FBI records for review andnotified the FBI of the meeting date at whichit intended to vote on the re c o rds. TheReview Board invited the FBI to present itsevidence. Second, the FBI requested that it beallowed to brief the members of the ReviewBoard. At the briefing, the FBI presented itsposition to the Board—both in an oral pre-sentation and in a “position paper.” The FBI’s“position papers” summarized the FBI’s gen-eral policy preferences for continued classifi-cation of certain categories of information.T h i rd, the Review Board staff re s e a rc h e dexisting law on each of the FBI’s “positions”and determined that the arguments that theFBI put forth in support of its JFK Act post-ponements were essentially the same argu-ments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIAcases. Of course, in legislating the declassifi-cation standards of the JFK Act, Congressintended for the JFK Act standards—and notthe FOIA standards—to apply. Aware of con-gressional intent, the Review Board rejectedthe FBI’s general policy preferences on thebasis that the arguments did not constitutethe clear and convincing evidence necessaryto support a request for a postponementunder section 6. The FBI did appeal theReview Board’s decisions to the President,but the Review Board’s document-specificinterpretation of the clear and convincingevidence standard ultimately pre v a i l e dwhen the vote was withdrawn.

i. “Rule of Reason.” Of course, some assassi-nation records are of greater interest thanothers. With regard to records that had aclose nexus to the assassination, the ReviewBoard strictly applied the law. For example,the Review Board voted to release in fullnearly all of the information in the FBI’s pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and thebulk of the information in the HSCA’s reporton CIA activities in Mexico City—the“Lopez” report—because of the high publicinterest in that material. With regard to theFBI files, the FBI believed that its argumentswere compelling enough to merit appeals tothe President on nearly all of the ReviewBoard’s decisions on the pre-assassinationLee Harvey Oswald records. The FBI, theReview Board, the White House Counsel’s

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I think today a great gulf existsbetween people and theirelected officials. Doubts aboutthis particular matter are asymptom of that, and so I thinkthe purpose of this hearing is toask some questions. Why doesinformation need to be with-held? At this moment in time,what compelling interests arethere for the holding back ofinformation? Are there legiti-mate needs in this respect? Whoand what is being protected?W h i ch individuals, w h i chagencies, which institutions arein the need of protection, andwhat national security interestsstill remain?—Senator William S. Cohen,May 12, 1992

O ffice, and ultimately the Department ofState spent a substantial amount of timeresolving the issues that arose in the appealprocess, and for those important records thatwere at issue, the Review Board consideredits time well-spent. The Review Board simi-larly dealt with other key records and spentas much time as was necessary to deliberateand decide upon those records.

The postponement-by-postponement reviewat each early Review Board meeting provedto be a slow and careful process. The post-ponement-by-postponement review provedto be a necessary educational process for theBoard members. The Board members were agroup of five citizens who were selected notfor their familiarity with the subject of theassassination, but for their professional com-petence in history and law. Thus, throughreviewing individual documents at its earlymeetings, the Board essentially educateditself about the assassination.

While the Review Board did need time to edu-cate itself and to develop its policies, theB o a rd’s pace eventually increased. In an eff o r tto streamline its work, the Review Board con-sulted with federal agencies such as the CIAand FBI to work out an approach for review ofre c o rds that would allow the Review Board tomake informed decisions, but not re q u i reagencies to spend hundreds of hours locatingevidence for and providing briefings on eachpostponement within an assassination re c o rd.

The first step to developing a reasonableapproach was for the Review Board to for-mulate general rules for sustaining anddenying postponements. The Review Board’s“guidance” to its staff and the agenciesbecame a body of rules—a Review Board“common law.” Once the Review Board noti-fied an agency of its approach on a particulartype of postponement, the agency learned top resent only those facts that the ReviewBoard would need to make a decision. Forexample, with regard to FBI informants, theReview Board notified the FBI of what it con-sidered to be the relevant factors in its deci-sionmaking. In other words, it defined for theBureau what it considered to be “clear andconvincing” evidence. Then, the ReviewBoard worked with the FBI to create a one-page form titled an “Informant Postpone-ment Evidence Form” that the FBI could use

to provide evidence on an informant. (Seeillustration.) The form allowed the FBI tosimply fill in the answers to a series of ques-tions about the informant in question, whichin turn allowed the Review Board to focus onthose facts that it deemed to be dispositive ina particular document. This approach hadthe added benefit of providing consistency tothe Review Board’s decisionmaking.

A large number of records that the JFK Actdefined as “assassination records” proved tobe of very low public interest. The JFK Actrequired the Review Board to process allrecords that were “made available” to theWarren Commission and the CongressionalCommittees that investigated the assassina-tion, whether or not the records were used bythe Commission or the committees. Many ofthese records, while interesting from a histo-rian’s perspective, are not closely related tothe assassination. For those documents thatwere of little or no public interest, the ReviewBoard modified its standards in the two waysdescribed below.

A. “NBR” Guidelines: Records that ReviewBoard judged were “not believed relevant” to theassassination. For those records that truly hadno apparent relevance to the assassination,the Review Board designated the records“not believed relevant” (NBR). The “NBR”Guidelines allowed the Review Board toremove irrelevant records from further con-sideration. Records that the Review Boarddesignated “NBR” were virtually the onlygroups of records that the Review Boardagreed to postpone in full. Thus, the ReviewBoard was always extremely reluctant to des-ignate records “NBR” and rarely did so.

B. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For thoserecords that were not immediately relevant,but shed at least some light on issues that thecongressional committees that investigatedthe assassination explored as potentially rele-vant to the assassination, the Review Boardcreated the “Segregated Collection Guide-lines.” The segregated collections records,although marginally relevant, were notappropriate for “NBR” designation, as the“NBR” Guidelines would have resulted inwithholding re c o rds in full. Instead, theBoard passed the “Segregated Collection”Guidelines, which ensured that the ReviewBoard staff would review every page of the

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marginally relevant records, but would notrequire agencies to present the same amountof evidence in support of postponements.The regulations that the Review Boardadopted on November 13, 1996, define “Seg-regated Collections” to include the following:(1) FBI records that were requested by theHSCA in conjunction with its investigationinto the assassination of President Kennedy,the Church Committee in conjunction withits inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedyassassination, and the Pike Committee andRockefeller Commission that investigatedissues related to the assassination; (2) CIArecords including the CIA’s segregated col-lection of 63 boxes as well as one box ofmicrofilm records (box 64) and several boxesof CIA staff “working files.” The ReviewBoard adopted revised guidelines on April23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline thereview process of postponements in the seg-regated collections, and ensure a page-by-page review of all documents in the segre-gated collections. The guidelines state,“. . . even with the assumption that our oper-ations may be extended through Fiscal Year1998, the Review Board cannot hope to com-plete review of postponements in the Segre-gated Collections under the current methodof review.” Where the Review Board’s stan-dards differed between core files and segre-gated collection files, the guidelines set forthbelow note the distinction.

Thus, throughout its tenure, the ReviewBoard sought to be vigorous in applying thelaw, but, in order to complete its work, foundit necessary to employ a “rule of reason.”

2. Intelligence Agents

Text of Section 6(1)(A)

. . . clear and convincing evidence that thethreat to the military defense, intelligenceoperations, or conduct of foreign relations ofthe United States posed by the public disclo -sure of the assassination record is of suchgravity that it outweighs the public interest,and such public disclosure would reveal—

(A) an intelligence agent whose identitycurrently requires protection. . .

a. CIA officers.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard usually protected the names of CIAofficers who are still active or who retiredunder cover and are now living in potentiallyrisky circumstances. The Review Board usu-ally released names of deceased CIA officersand the names of CIAofficers whose connec-tion to the CIA was public knowledge. Whenthe Review Board postponed names, it usu-ally substituted the phrase, “CIAEmployee.”

ii. Commentary. Names of numerous CIAofficers appeared in the CIA’s assassinationrecords. The Review Board and the CIA hadto confront the challenge presented by thestatute, which re q u i res name-specific evi-dence, but gathering such evidence proved tobe time-consuming and burdensome for theCIA and the names of CIA officers in there c o rds were not always relevant to theassassination. The statute, of course, statesthat the only way that the Review Boardcould protect names of intelligence agentswas if the CIAprovided clear and convincingevidence that the CIA officer’s identity “cur-rently” required protection.

The CIAinitially believed that the solution tothe above-referenced challenge was for theReview Board to agree with CIA that thenames of all CIA officers within the JFK Col-lection should be postponed until the year2017. The CIA supported its request for blan-ket postponements with two arguments: first,since many CIA employees are “undercover,” CIA argued that its intelligence gath-ering capability depended on employeesmaintaining cover, and, second, even thoughthe majority of CIA officer names in the Col-lection are names of retired CIA employees,CIA is bound by a confidentiality agreementto protect the relationship. Many of these for-mer employees objected to release of theirformer Agency affiliation, complaining that itviolates this agreement and suggesting thatsuch release might jeopardize business rela-tionships or threaten personal safety.

Mindful of the JFK Act’s requirement thatagencies provide name-specific evidence, theReview Board would not agree to CIA’ srequest for blanket postponements of CIAnames. Instead, the Review Board requestedCIA to provide evidence for each name.

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The CIA, however, was reluctant to producename-specific evidence and, on occasion,C I A failed to furnish evidence when itpromised to do so. CIA’s initial refusal tosupply evidence on individual names wasmet, not with the wholesale release of namesby the Board, but with a firm insistence thatthe Agency meet the requirements of the Act.The Review Board released the names of afew individuals who were of central impor-tance to the assassination story early in theprocess, but gave the Agency a number ofadditional opportunities to provide specificevidence on other names.

For example, in December 1995, the ReviewBoard designated one day of their meeting“name day,” and invited CIA to provide evi-dence for names the Review Board hadencountered in CIA records during the previ-ous six to seven months. On that day, CIAagain requested the Review Board to sustainthe postponement of all CIA names. TheReview Board did not want to jeopardize thepersonal safety of individuals and gave CIAmore time to provide evidence. The Board setother “name days” in May 1996 and May1997. As deadlines for submission of evi-dence approached, CIA a g reed to re l e a s esome names, but in most cases, continued tooffer less than satisfactory evidence on thosethey wished to protect. Gradually, the CIAdid begin to provide supporting evidence ofthe postponement of individual names.

By May 1996, the Review Board had decidedwhat evidence would meet the clear and con-vincing evidence standard. If the CIA pro-vided evidence that the individual retiredunder cover or abroad, or evidence that theindividual objected to the release of his or hername when contacted (CIAagreed to attemptto contact former employees), the ReviewBoard would protect the CIA officer’s name.Moreover, where the CIA specifically identi-fied an ongoing operation in which the indi-vidual was involved or CIA could demon-strate that the person was still active withCIA, the Review Board would protect thename. Because the JFK Act re q u i red theReview Board to balance the potential harmfrom disclosure against the public interest inrelease, there were cases in which the ReviewBoard determined that, even though the CIAhad provided the re q u i red evidence, theReview Board believed that the individual

was of sufficiently high public interest that itwould require the CIA to provide additionalevidence before it would consider protectingthe name. In these cases, the Review Boardasked CIA to provide information on theemployee’s current status, his or her location,and the nature of the work he or she did forthe CIA.

The Review Board determined that nameswere of high public interest when the CIAofficer at issue had a substantive connectionto the assassination story or where the CIAofficer’s name appeared in CIA’s Oswald 201file. By July 1997, the Review Board haddetermined that where CIAofficer names didnot fit within one of the “high public inter-est” categories, it would require CIA to pro-vide significantly less evidence in support ofits requests for postponement. Given thelarge number of CIAofficer names in the CIArecords, the Review Board determined that ithad to adopt the practical high public inter-est/low public interest approach, particu-larly since it had limited time and resourcesavailable to complete its own review of CIArecords. The Review Board would have pre-ferred to review each name at the same highlevel of scrutiny that it used to review namesof high public interest. Nevertheless, theB o a rd’s approach compelled the CIA t orelease many more names than it would havedesired.

b. “John Scelso” (pseudonym).

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard protected the true name of the individ-ual known by the pseudonym of John Scelsountil May 1, 2001 or three months after thedecease of the individual, whichever comesfirst.

ii. Commentary. The CIA employee whowas head of CIA’s division “Western Hemi-s p h e re 3” during the period immediatelyafter the assassination of President Kennedytestified before the HSCA and the Churc hCommittee under the “throw-away” aliasJohn Scelso. His true name appears on hun-d reds of documents in the JFK collection,many of which were the product of theAgency’s extensive post-assassination inves-tigation that spanned the globe. In re v i e w i n gthis particular name, the Review Board ’ sd e s i re to satisfy the public’s interest in re l e a s e

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clashed with the CIA’s strong evidence insupport of postponement. Initially, the Boardwas inclined to release Scelso’s true name, butthe Agency argued convincingly againstrelease. CIA p rovided evidence on the curre n tstatus of the individual, shared corre s p o n-dence sent by him, and even arranged aninterview between him and a Review Boards t a ff member. As an interim step, the ReviewB o a rd inserted his prior alias “Scelso” as sub-stitute language. (See illustration.) Then, at itsMay 1996 meeting, Board members deter-mined to release “Scelso’s” true name in fiveyears or upon his death.

c. Information that identifies CIA officers.

i. Review Board guidelines. For specificinformation that, if released, would revealthe identity of an individual CIA officer thatthe Board had voted to protect, the ReviewBoard protected the information.

ii. Commentary. Whenever the ReviewB o a rd voted to protect the identity of an indi-vidual throughout federal agency assassina-tion re c o rds, it had to be realistic enough torealize that some information about individu-als is so specific that release of the informationwould reveal the individual’s identity. Exam-ples of specific identifying information includehome addresses, birth dates, job titles, namesof family members, and other less obvious, butequally revealing pieces of information.

d. Names of National Security Agencyemployees.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewB o a rd protected the names of all NationalSecurity Agency employees that it encoun-t e red. The Review Board would have consid-e red releasing names of National SecurityAgency employees if it determined that a par-ticular name was extremely relevant to thea s s a s s i n a t i o n .

ii. Commentary. Due to the nature of NSAinformation, few NSA employee namesa p p e a red in NSA’s assassination re c o rd s .Even though the Review Board did not oftenencounter NSA employee names, it did haveto vote on those names that it did confro n t .N S A’s policy of not releasing the names of itsemployees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) ofthe JFK Act that presumed release of suchinformation unless NSA could prove thatindividual NSA employee names re q u i re dp rotection. NSA a rgued that the release of anynames, other than those of publicly acknowl-edged senior officials, jeopardized the poten-tial security of U.S. cryptographic systemsand those individuals. As it did with thenames of other intelligence agents and off i-cers, the Review Board considered the namesof NSA o fficers on a document-by-documentbasis. Given the nature of NSA i n f o r m a t i o n ,the Review Board members agreed that noneof the few names which appear in the docu-ments, and for which NSA requested pro t e c-tion, was of high enough public interest orcentral to an understanding of the assassina-tion story. Thus, it protected the names.

3. Intelligence Sources and Methods,and Other Matters Relating to theNational Security of the United States

Text of Section 6(1)(B) and (C)

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. . . clear and convincing evidence that thethreat to the military defense, intelligenceoperations, or conduct of foreign relations ofthe United States posed by the public disclo -sure of the assassination record is of suchgravity that it outweighs the public interest,and such public disclosure would reveal—

(B) an intelligence source or method whichis currently utilized, or reasonably expectedto be utilized, by the United States Govern -ment and which has not been officially dis -closed, the disclosure of which would inter -f e re with the conduct of intelligenceactivities; or

(C) any other matter currently relating tothe military defense, intelligence operationsor conduct of foreign relations of the UnitedStates, the disclosure of which woulddemonstrably impair the national security ofthe United States;

a. CIA sources.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard handled CIA sources, assets, infor-mants, and specific identifying informationunder standards similar to the Board’s deci-sions for CIA officers. Where the ReviewBoard believed names held a high level ofpublic interest, either because the name wascentral to the story or because assassinationresearchers expressed interest in the name,the Review Board subjected them to closescrutiny. The Board generally protected theidentity of foreign nationals unless they wereof high public interest and then the ReviewBoard required CIA to provide specific evi-dence in support of its claimed postpone-ments. The Review Board protected domesticsources, assets and informants where CIAdemonstrated that release would jeopardizeongoing operations or harm individuals. IfCIA did not provide evidence of one of thetwo above-re f e renced harms, the ReviewBoard released the name at issue. In addition,where the public already knew the names ofindividuals who were connected to the CIA,especially if the government had previouslyreleased the information, the Review Boardreleased the information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Boarda d d ressed the issue of whether to postpone orrelease source names at the same time that it

c o n s i d e red CIA employee names, ande n c o u n t e red the same problems as it had inthe review of CIA employee names. As withC I A employee names, CIA was reluctant top rovide name-specific evidence to the ReviewB o a rd, opting instead to offer general princi-ples supporting CIA’s request that the ReviewB o a rd redact all names.

The Review Board ulti-mately decided to protectthe names of sourc e s ,assets, and informants incases where the identityof the source is ofreduced public intere s tbecause CIA sources livein countries other thanthe U.S. and were morelikely to face harm if theB o a rd disclosed theirrelationship with CIA. Inthose records where thesource’s identity was ofpossible public intere s tin relation to the assassi-nation story or wasimportant to understand-ing information related tothe assassination, theReview Board re q u i red the CIA to pro v i d eadditional evidence to support the pro t e c t i o nof the source’s identity.

When the Review Board postponed release ofsource names, it did so for ten years except incases where a foreign government mightaccuse the source of committing treason forassisting the CIA. In those cases, the ReviewBoard protected the source’s name and iden-tifying information until 2017.

b. CIA pseudonyms.

i. Review Board guidelines. With only afew exceptions, the Review Board releasedthe pseudonyms of individuals. In someinstances, the Review Board used pseudo-nyms as substitute language for the individ-ual’s true name.

ii. Commentary. Very early in the reviewprocess, the Review Board determined that,since pseudonyms were a sort of “throwaway” identity for individuals who wereunder cover, the Review Board could release

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The Review Board should con-sider a variety of factors relatedto the need to postpone disclo-sure of intelligence sources andm e t h o d s, including the age ofthe record, whether the use of aparticular source or method isalready well known by the pub-lic (e.g. that the Soviet Embassyin Mexico City was buggedduring the alleged visit of LeeHarvey Oswa l d ) , and whetherthe source or method is inher-ently secret, or whether was theinformation it collected whichwas secret.—Senate Report on JFK Act,July 22, 1992

the pseudonym without harming the indi-vidual. The CIA did not object to the ReviewBoard’s policy to release pseudonyms. TheCIA did identify several pseudonyms that itbelieved to be particularly sensitive, anddemonstrated to the Review Board with clearand convincing evidence that release of thosepseudonyms would do irreparable harm.

c. CIA crypts.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewB o a rd released some CIA “ c r y p t s ” — c o d ewords for operations and individuals. TheReview Board also generally released CIA“digraphs”—the first two letters of a cryptthat link a particular crypt to a particularlocation. CIA often created crypts to refer toother U.S. government agencies; for example,the FBI was “ODENVY.” The Review Boardmade a blanket decision to release all U.S.government crypts. The Review Board nearlyalways released CIA crypts where thosecrypts denoted operations or individualsrelating to Mexico City or Cuba. (Thedigraph for Mexico City was “LI,” and forCuba, it was “AM.”) For all other crypts, theReview Board protected the digraph andreleased the remainder of the crypt. TheReview Board established a few exceptions,and where exceptions applied, the Boardrequired CIA to provide crypt-specific evi-dence of the need to protect.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board hadto determine whether it believed that releaseof CIA crypts would harm CIA operationsand individuals. Section 6(1)(B) and (C) ofthe JFK Act provided the standard for post-ponement of CIA crypts. The Review Boardrequired the CIA to provide crypt-specificclear and convincing evidence that CIA cur-rently used, or expected to use the crypt andthat CIA had not previously released thecrypt. Thus, in order to convince the ReviewBoard to sustain postponements, the Boardrequired CIA to research each crypt to deter-mine whether CIAstill used the individual orthe operation and provide that evidence tothe Review Board.

As it did with CIA agent names, CIA initiallyrequested the Review Board to sustain post-ponements of all CIA c r y p t s — e v e n“ODENVY”—the CIA’s old crypt for the FBIthat CIA had already released in other CIA

records. CIAargued that its use of crypts wasan operational method that should remainsecret, even though CIAhad replaced most ofthe crypts at issue years earlier. CIA believedthat if the Review Board released the crypts,researchers would be able to piece togetherthe records and determine the identity ofoperations and individuals. CIA f u r t h e rargued that the burden of locating evidenceon each crypt was too heavy.

The Review Board, conversely, believed thatCIA conceived crypts as a code to hide theidentity of an operation or an individual, andso the Review Board could release the cryptsand not compromise the operation or theindividual. As with CIA agent names, theReview Board allowed the CIAample time tolocate evidence on each crypt. Finally, theReview Board released a group of CIAcryptsfrom Mexico City with the “LI” digraph. CIAeventually agreed to release its crypts anddigraphs in assassination records, and theReview Board eventually agreed to protectcertain sensitive crypts.

The Review Board recognized that it couldnot conduct a crypt-by-crypt review forevery CIA record that it encountered. CIArecords contain hundreds of thousands ofcrypts. Given the need to finish its work, theReview Board decided that, for all cryptse x c e p t the “LI,” “AM,” and “OD” seriescrypts, it would agree to postpone the loca-tion-specific digraph and release the actualcrypts. Thus, the Review Board released mostcrypts in the collection and the most relevantdigraphs. The Review Board did make threeexceptions to its general rule: it protected thedigraph in non-core files when (a) the cryptappeared next to a true name that had beenreleased, (b) when the crypt appeared next tospecific identifying information, and (c)when CIA provided clear and convincingevidence that the Review Board should pro-tect the digraph.

d. CIA sluglines.

i. Review Board guidelines. “Sluglines” areCIA routing indicators, consisting of two ormore crypts, that appear above the text inCIA cables. (See illustration.) The ReviewBoard released CIAsluglines according to thesame criteria it applied to crypts anddigraphs.

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ii. Commentary. The Review Boardreleased CIA sluglines because the Agencynever offered the Review Board any evidenceto explain why the Board should not releasethem. An example of a CIA slugline is“ RY B AT GPFLOOR.” “RY B AT” is a CIAcrypt that meant “secret,” and GPFLOORwas the crypt that CIA gave Lee HarveyOswald during its post-assassination investi-gation. CIA initially asked the Review Boardto postpone the CIAslugline even where CIAhad released the individual crypts that madeup the slugline elsewhere. For example, inthe case of “RYBAT GPFLOOR,” the CIAagreed to release the crypt “RYBAT” in twoplaces elsewhere in the document at issue,and the CIA a g reed to release the cryptGPFLOOR when it appeared in the text. CIAtold the Review Board that it could not, how-e v e r, release the slugline “RY B ATGPFLOOR.” CIA o ff e red no substantivearguments to support its request for post-ponement of the slugline. Given the statute’sdemand that CIA provide clear and convinc-ing evidence in support of its requests forpostponement, the Review Board voted torelease CIA sluglines.

e. CIA surveillance methods.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard generally released CIA surveillancemethods, the details of their implementation,and the product produced by them where theReview Board believed the methods were rel-evant to the assassination. The Review Boardsustained postponements of CIAsurveillancemethods where CIA p rovided convincingevidence that the method still merited pro-tection. Where the Review Board sustainedthe CIA’s requests for postponement of sur-veillance methods, it substituted the lan-guage “surveillance method,” “operationaldetails,” or “sensitive operation.”

ii. Commentary. As with all its sourcesand methods, CIA initially requested theReview Board to postpone all of its surveil-lance methods since, CIA argued, CIA cur-rently conducts surveillance operations. TheReview Board, on the other hand, believedthat it was not a secret that CIA currentlyconducts surveillance operations. Moreover,the Review Board did not believe that itsvotes to release CIA surveillance methods inMexico City in 1963 would jeopardize cur-

rent CIA surveillance operations. Finally, theReview Board recognized that certain CIAsurveillance operations in Mexico City in1963 were already well-known to the publicbecause the U.S. government had discloseddetails about those operations. CIA surveil-lance, particularly telephone taps and photooperations, was a major element in the storyof Oswald’s 1963 trip to Mexico City. (Seeillustration.)

The Board, therefore, concluded that the pub-lic interest in disclosure far outweighed anyrisk to national security and directed releaseof the information. However, in records thatCIA proved did contain information aboutcurrent operations, the Review Board votedto postpone the information.

f. CIA installations.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard used date “windows” within which itreleased the locations of CIA installationswhere the location was relevant to the assas-sination. Specifically, the Review Boardreleased the location of CIA i n s t a l l a t i o n srelating to Mexico City during the timeperiod 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review

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Board generally released the location of allCIA installations that were relevant to theassassination during the time periodbetween the date of the assassination—November 22, 1963—and the date that theWarren Commission issued its report in Sep-tember 1964. Finally, the Review Board gen-erally released the location of all CIAinstalla-tions that appeared in Oswald’s 201 fileduring the time period January 1, 1961through October 1, 1964. The Review Boarddid grant CIA a few exceptions to its generalrule, and except for the specific time win-dows described above, the Review Boardprotected all information that identified CIAinstallation locations.

The Review Board created substitute lan-guage for its postponement of CIA installa-tions to enable researchers to track a particu-lar CIA installation through the JFKcollection without revealing the city or coun-try in which it is located. To accomplish this,

the Review Board divided the world into fiveregions: Western Hemisphere, We s t e r nEurope, Northern Europe, East Asia/ Pacific,and Africa/ Near East/ South Asia. Then theBoard added a number to refer to each differ-ent location in the region. Thus, “CIA Instal-lation in Western Hemisphere 1” serves as aplace holder for a particular installation in allCIA assassination records.

ii. Commentary. Initially, the ReviewBoard released CIA installation locations inCIA documents relevant to Oswald’s visit toMexico City. CIA did not raise significantobjections to the Review Board’s release of itsinstallations in these records.

When the Review Board began to vote torelease the location of additional CIA instal-lation locations, the CIA did object, but didnot offer evidence of the harm to nationalsecurity that it believed would result fromd i s c l o s u re of the information. The CIA

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threatened to appeal to the President to over-turn the Review Board’s votes, but theReview Board’s position was that the JFK Actrequired release of information where CIAdid not provide convincing evidence to sup-port their postponements. The Review Boardallowed the CIA ample time to gather andpresent its evidence to support its requestsfor postponements as both the CIA and theReview Board hoped to avoid a CIA appealto the President.

U l t i m a t e l y, the CIA determined that it wouldt rust Review Board members with the infor-mation that the Review Board re q u i red topostpone the release of the location of asmall number of CIA installations. In ane ffort to balance high public interest in thelocation of CIA installations and the need top rotect certain installations, the ReviewB o a rd decided to establish date “windows”within which it would release CIA i n s t a l l a-tion locations.

The CIAnever appealed a Review Board voteto the President.

g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report).

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA cable, dis-patch, and field report “prefixes” are identi-fiers that CIA uses on its communications toindicate the installation that generates a par-ticular message. Where the Review Boardhad voted to release the location of a particu-lar CIA installation, the Review Board alsovoted to release CIA cable, dispatch, andfield report prefixes that the installation gen-erated. Likewise, the Review Board protectedcable, dispatch, and field report pre f i x e swhere it voted to protect the location of theCIA installation.

The Review Board replaced the prefixes thatit protected with substitute language similarto that used for CIA installations. An exam-ple of substitute language for CIAprefixes is:“Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in WesternHemisphere 1.”

ii. Commentary. Once the Review Boardvoted to release the location of a particularC I A installation, the Review Board and CIAdid not disagree that the Board should re l e a s ecable, dispatch and field report prefixes.

h. CIA job titles.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard voted to release CIA employees’ jobtitles except when the Board’s disclosure ofthe title might reveal the identity of an indi-vidual or CIA installation requiring protec-tion.

ii. Commentary. Although the ReviewBoard did not believe that it should vote toprotect CIAjob titles, standing alone, it some-times voted to protect titles if they revealedother information that the Review Board hadvoted to protect.

i. CIA file numbers.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA organizesmany of its files by country and assigns“country identifiers” within particular filenumbers. The Review Board released nearlyall CIA file numbers that referred to MexicoCity. The Review Board protected the “coun-try identifiers” in CIA file numbers for allother countries with the exception of countryidentifiers “15” and “19.” The Review Boardgenerally released all CIA “201” or “person-ality” file numbers where the files related tothe assassination.

ii. Commentary. The CIA rarely objectedto the Review Board’s release of its file num-bers.

j. CIA domestic facilities.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard released references to domestic CIAfacilities where the CIA has previously offi-cially disclosed the existence of the facility.The Review Board did not release informa-tion that would reveal the location of domes-tic CIA facilities where the CIAprovided evi-dence that the facility was still in use.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board rarelyencountered the issue of whether to releasethe location of CIA domestic facilities inassassination re c o rds, as CIA o ff i c i a l l yacknowledges most of its domestic facilities.When the Review Board did vote to postponethe location of CIA domestic facilities, itrequired the CIA to provide extensive evi-dence as to why the CIAhad to keep the loca-tion of those facilities secret.

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k. CIA official cover.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA “officialcover” is a means by which a CIA officer canoperate overseas in the guise of an employeeof another government agency. In congres -sional documents, the Review Board releasedgeneral information about official cover butprotected specific details. With regard to exec -utive branch documents, the CIA convinced theReview Board that, while Congress mightreveal information about official cover, theexecutive branch does not generally revealinformation about official cover because todo so would damage the national security.Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA’ spostponements regarding official cover inexecutive branch documents unless the U.S.government had previously officially dis-closed the information at issue.

The Review Board inserted the phrase “offi-cial cover” as substitute language when itpostponed such information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board ini-tially considered the issue of official cover tobe an “open secret” that was well-known tothe public. Thus, they were loathe to withholdsuch obvious information. The CIA, however,supported its strong objections in briefingsand negotiations with the Board, and eventu-ally convinced the Review Board that theharm in releasing information about off i c i a lcover outweighed any additional informationthat assassination re s e a rchers might gain fro mknowing details about official cover.

l. Alias documentation.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA employ-ees and agents use aliases and the CIA cre-ates documentation to support its employ-ees’ and agents’ aliases. The Review Boardreleased information that revealed that CIAemployees and agents used aliases. TheBoard protected specific details about howCIA documents particular aliases.

ii. Commentary. The CIA argued that itcurrently uses alias documentation and thataliases are vital to CIA’s performance of itsintelligence operations. The CIA also arguedthat the Review Board’s release of specificinformation about alias documentationwould not be useful to assassination

re s e a rchers. The Review Board membersaccepted CIA’s arguments, primarily becausethey agreed that the public interest in thespecific details about alias documentationwas low. The Review Board determined thatit did not want the CIA to spend a largeamount of time gathering evidence in sup-port of postponements that were of low pub-lic interest and, thus, it did not require theCIA to provide evidence in support of everypostponement relating to alias documenta-tion.

m. Foreign intelligence cooperation.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard postponed references to foreign intelli-gence cooperation with the CIA.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board vigor-ously debated the issue of foreign intelli-gence cooperation with the CIA a n ddemanded extensive evidence and multiplebriefings from the CIA on the subject.Though in some instances Board membersjudged that the information might add to thehistorical understanding of the assassination,the Review Board, with some dissent, deter-mined that the evidence to postpone theinformation outweighed this potential value.

n. Human sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence (assets).

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard evaluated the need to postpone theidentity of human sources in foreign counter-intelligence operations on a case-by-casebasis. Where the human source was a foreignnational, the Review Board generally agreedto protect the individual’s identity unless theindividual’s connection with the FBI wasalready known to the foreign government atissue. Where the human source was a UnitedStates citizen interacting with foreign govern -ment officials, the Review Board sometimesreleased the identity of the individual if thepublic interest in the name of the asset washigh. Where the human source was a UnitedStates citizen interacting with other UnitedStates citizens, the Review Board tended toevaluate the release of the source’s namemore like other domestic informants.

ii. Commentary. In its position paper, theFBI defined “intelligence source” as “any

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individual who has provided or is currentlyproviding information pertaining to nationalsecurity matters, the disclosure of whichcould reasonably be expected to result indamage to the FBI’s intelligence and counter-intelligence-gathering capabilities.”

The FBI off e red the following arguments insupport of its request to keep intelligences o u rces’ identities secret: (1) Review Boardd i s c l o s u re of intelligence sources would harmthe FBI’s ability to develop and maintain newand existing sources, because sources wouldreasonably believe that the governmentwould reveal their identities, and (2) disclo-s u re of intelligence sources may subject thes o u rces, their friends, and their families tophysical harm, ridicule, or ostracism.

The Review Board’s interpretation of the“clear and convincing” evidence standardre q u i red it to reject the FBI’s general policya rguments, and instead re q u i red the FBI top resent asset-specific evidence that explainedthe particular harm that the FBI expected theasset to face if the Review Board voted to dis-close his or her identity. As a general rule, theReview Board usually protected the identitiesof foreign nationals who could be pro s e c u t e din their home countries for espionage. Like-wise, where the asset was a United States cit-izen interacting with foreign government off i-cials, the Review Board considered whetherthe individual was in a position of trust withthe foreign government and whether he orshe might be in danger if the Review Boarddisclosed his or her relationship with the FBI.Unlike the above-re f e renced scenarios, thes o u rce who was a United States citizen interact -ing with other United States citizens was gener-ally evaluated according to the Board ’ sdomestic informant standards.

o. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities.

i. Review Board guidelines. As a generalrule, the Review Board believed that mostaspects of the FBI’s foreign counterintelli-gence activities against Communist Bloccountries during the cold war period werewell-known, were of high public interest,and were not eligible for postponement pur-suant to § 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act.

ii. Commentary and overview of foreigncounterintelligence appeals. The FBI’s assassi-

nation re c o rds contain information thatreveal many of the FBI’s foreign counterintel-ligence activities during the cold war period.Beginning in late 1995, the Review Boardconsidered how it could release as muchinformation as possible in the records with-out jeopardizing operations that still requireprotection.

In spring 1996, theReview Board considere dand voted on a group ofFBI re c o rds relating to theFBI’s foreign counterin-telligence activities. Inresponse to the ReviewB o a rd’s requests for evi-dence on the fore i g nc o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c ere c o rds, the FBI had pro-vided its “position paper”on foreign counterintelli-gence activities. In itsp a p e r, the FBI defined“intelligence activities” as“intelligence gathering action or techniquesutilized by the FBI against a targeted individ-ual or organization that has been determinedto be of national security interest.” The FBI’sprimary argument in support of its request forcontinued secrecy of intelligence activitieswas that disclosure of specific informationdescribing intelligence activities would re v e a lto hostile entities the FBI’s targets and priori-ties, thereby allowing hostile entities todevelop countermeasure s .

Sections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act pro-vided the standard for postponement. Inaddition, the JFK Act’s legislative historyinstructed the Review Board to consider avariety of factors related to the need to post-pone disclosure of intelligence sources andmethods, including the age of the record,whether the use of a particular source ormethod is already well-known by the public,whether the source or method is inherentlysecret, or whether the information collectedwas secret.27

The Review Board considered the FBI’s evi-dence and weighed it against public interestin the records. After careful consideration,the Review Board decided to release someforeign counterintelligence information. TheBoard’s primary reason for releasing such

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In all cases where the ReviewBoard is considering postpone-ment, it should keep the with-held information to an absoluteminimum, and ensure that thepostponement is narrowlydrawn for the shortest possibled u r a t i o n . In so doing, t h eReview Board should release asm u ch information from therecords as is possible.—Senate Report on JFK Act,July 22, 1992

records was its belief that the FBI’s evidencedid not enumerate specific harms that wouldresult from disclosure.

A. The FBI’s May 1996 Appeals to thePresident. On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBIappealed to the President to overturn theBoard’s vote on 17 records relating to theFBI’s surveillance of officials and establish-ments of four Communist countries—theSoviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, andPoland—during the 1960s. The FBI’s overar-ching arguments were that disclosure of theinformation would reveal sensitive sourcesand methods that would compromise thenational security of the United States, andthat disclosure of the targets of the surveil-lance—the four Communist countries—would harm the foreign relations of theUnited States.

The FBI sought to postpone five types ofsource and method capabilities: tracing offunds, physical surveillance (lookout logs),mail cover, electronic surveillance, and type-writer and fingerprint identification. TheReview Board’s response briefs to the Presi-dent dealt with each source or method inturn. Specific details regarding the appeal ofeach issue are discussed below.

In response to the FBI’s overarching argu-ment that disclosure of the informationwould reveal sensitive sources and methodsand compromise the national security, theReview Board responded that if the nationalsecurity would be harmed by release of thisinformation, the harm would have alreadyoccurred, since the FBI had already releasedboth the identities of the target countries andthe sources and methods that the FBI used inits operations.

In response to the FBI’s arguments that dis-c l o s u re of the targets of the surveillancewould harm the foreign relations of the UnitedStates, the Review Board responded in threeparts. F i r s t, the information that the FBIsought to protect is widely available in thepublic domain, from both official govern-ment sources and secondary sources, so ifforeign relations are harmed by disclosure ofthe information, then the harm has alreadyo c c u r red. S e c o n d , the FBI simply did notprove its argument that it may have violatedinternational law or “diplomatic standards”

by employing the sources or methods at issuesince the FBI did not cite the laws or treatiesto which it referred and the Review Boardcould not locate any laws or treaties thatwere in effect at the time that the recordswere created. Third, despite the FBI’s asser-tion to the contrary, the Review Board hadevidence that other governments do acknowl-edge that, in past years, they conducted for-eign counterintelligence operations againstother countries.

The Review Board believed that the FBI hadnot provided evidence of a “significant,demonstrable harm” to current foreign re l a-tions or intelligence work. Thus, the Boardasked the President to deny the FBI’s re q u e s t sfor postponement. The White House did note x p ressly rule on the appeals. Instead, afterseveral meetings involving re p re s e n t a t i v e sf rom the Review Board, the FBI, and the WhiteHouse, the White House directed the FBI top rovide the Review Board with specific evi-dence in support of its postponements. TheWhite House requested the Review Board toreconsider the Bureau’s specific evidence. TheFBI, in turn, withdrew the first two of itspending appeals, including some re c o rds inwhich the Review Board voted to re l e a s einformation obtained from a technical source.

B. Post-appeal decisionmaking. After fur-ther negotiations, the Review Board and theFBI agreed to release most informationre g a rding its foreign counterintelligenceactivities against Communist Bloc countriesas “consent releases.” In those few caseswhere the Bureau believed that foreign coun-terintelligence activity against CommunistBloc countries still required protection, theBureau submitted for the Board’s determina-tion postponement-specific evidence.

To the extent that the information in the FBI’sp roposed redaction did not meaningfullycontribute to the understanding of the assas-sination, the Review Board allowed the FBIto postpone direct discussions of fore i g ncounterintelligence activities against n o n-Communist Bloc countries. With regard tothe FBI’s “segregated collections,” theReview Board stated in its segreated collec-tion guidelines,

It is presumed that the FBI will, at leastpartially, carry over its post-appeal stan-

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dards for disclosing foreign counterin-telligence activities targeting Commu-nist-bloc nations. To the extent that theHSCA subjects reflect foreign counterin-telligence activities against othernations that have not been addressed bythe Review Board in the “core” files, theFBI will be allowed to redact direct dis-cussion of such activities, unless theinformation in the proposed redactionmeaningfully contributes to the under-standing of the assassination.

p. Information that reveals the FBI’sinvestigative interest in a diplomatic establishment or diplomatic personnel.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard released information that revealed thatthe FBI had an investigative interest in Com-munist Bloc countries’ diplomatic establish-ments and personnel. Likewise, the ReviewBoard generally agreed to protect informa-tion that reveals that the FBI has an inves-tigative interest in a non-Communist Blocforeign diplomatic establishment or in for-eign personnel.

ii. Commentary. In the FBI’s May 1996appeals to the President, the overriding issuewas whether the FBI could, in 1996, keepsecret its 1960s investigative interest in thediplomatic establishments and personnel ofCommunist Bloc countries. (For a full discus-sion of the Review Board’s decisionmakingwith regard to the FBI’s foreign counterintel-ligence activities, see section B.3.o.2.B above.)

q. Technical sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewB o a rd usually released nearly all generalinformation and some specific information(or operational details) regarding the FBI’sn o n - c u r rent technical sources where thesource provided information on CommunistBloc targets.

“General” information is information thatthe FBI obtains from its technical sources onCommunist Bloc countries’ diplomatic estab-lishments and personnel, including tran-scripts from electronic surveillance. “ S p e-cific” information is information regardinginstallation, equipment, location, transmittal,

and routing of technical sources. The ReviewB o a rd evaluated “specific” informationabout technical sources on a case-by-casebasis, agreeing to sustain postponementsprovided that the FBI proved that the “oper-ational detail” at issue was currently utilizedand not officially disclosed.

As a general rule, the Review Board agreedto postpone until the year 2017 symbol andfile numbers for technical sources providedthat the source was still properly classifiedpursuant to the current executive order. TheReview Board released classified symbol andfile numbers for technical sources if the num-ber had been previously released in a similarcontext, or if the source was of significantinterest to the public. The Review Boarda g reed that the phrases, “source symbolnumber” and “source file number” wouldprovide adequate substitute language.

Even for that material which did not con-tribute in a meaningful way to the under-standing of the assassination, the ReviewBoard still released as much information aspossible about the FBI’s use of technicals o u rces in its foreign counterintelligenceactivities against non-Communist Bloc coun-tries. In these less relevant cases, the ReviewBoard did, however, often protect the iden-tity of the country that was the target of theFBI’s surveillance. The Review Board wasm o re willing to protect specific detailsregarding installation, equipment, location,transmittal, and routing of technical sourceswhere the FBI proved (1) that the source cur-rently required protection, and (2) that theU.S. government had not officially disclosedthe source.

ii. Commentary. The legislative historyfor the JFK Act mentions that the ReviewBoard could release information that specifi-cally identifies “listening devices on tele-phones.” The history states that these are an“intelligence source or method” that shouldnot be postponed in circumstances wherethey are “already well-known by thepublic.”28

The Review Board believed that the FBI’s useof non-human sources or methods (e.g., elec-tronic surveillance and “black bag jobs”) inf o reign counterintelligence operationsagainst Communist Bloc countries’ diplo-

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matic establishments and personnel was, inmany aspects, a matter of official publicrecord. The FBI appealed to the President anumber of Review Board decisions involvingnon-human sources or methods. The ReviewBoard staff called to the President’s attentionthose prior disclosures that were relevant todeciding the issues on appeal.

In its May 10, 1996, appeal of the ReviewBoard’s decisions on foreign counterintelli-gence records, the FBI requested that thePresident override the Review Board’s deci-sions to release information that related toelectronic intercepts of telephone and tele-type communications involving CommunistBloc officials. In its appeal briefs, the FBIargued that the identities of its electronic sur-veillance targets were secret. The ReviewBoard collected a large body of evidenceproving that, at least with regard to Commu-nist-Bloc countries, the government hasa l ready acknowledged that the FBI con-ducted extensive technical surveillance offoreign establishments during the 1960s. Infact, the official public record and secondarysources revealed information regarding wire-taps and electronic surveillance against for-eigners and foreign establishments that wasmore specific than information that the FBIsought to protect.

Although the President did not make a deci-sion, the FBI ultimately agreed to release gen-eral information acknowledging that the FBIhad technical sources against CommunistBloc targets during the Cold War period.

r. Other classified file numbers relating to FBIforeign counterintelligence.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard generally agreed to protect classifiedfile numbers in FBI foreign counterintelli-gence files, provided the FBI could prove thatthe file number corresponded to a currentand ongoing operation. However, where theFBI had released a particular classified filenumber in other contexts, the Review Boardvoted to release the number.

ii. Commentary. The Review Boardagreed that file numbers corresponding tocurrent and ongoing intelligence operationsw e re entitled to protection under section6(1)(B) and (C). The only question, then, was

whether the Review Board would allow theFBI to protect classified file numbers whenthe corresponding operation was no longercurrent. The Review Board took the positionthat non-current classified file numbers werenot entitled to protection. In its May 28, 1996,appeal on foreign counterintelligencerecords, the FBI argued that if the ReviewBoard released classified file numbers for ter-minated operations, that release wouldprompt people to file FOIA requests for theunderlying files, “resulting inevitably inmore and more information from the filebeing released.”29 In its response, the ReviewBoard stated simply that “[m]aking it moredifficult for researchers to file FOIA requestsis not among the reasons for postponementprovided by the JFK Act.”

The President did not decide the issues onappeal, but the FBI ultimately agreed to re l e a s esome non-current classified file numbers.

s. FBI mail cover in foreign counterintelli -gence investigations.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard released information that revealed thatthe FBI conducted mail cover operationsagainst the Soviet Embassy in the 1960s. TheReview Board did not encounter a gre a tnumber of additional records regarding mailcover operations. When the Review Boarddid encounter mail cover operations in otherFBI records, it released the information atissue unless the FBI could provide evidencethat the operation was still ongoing andrequired protection. The Review Board didnot relax its standard on this issue in the seg-regated collection files.

ii. Commentary. With re g a rd to the FBI’suse of mail cover, the Review Board had todecide whether and to what extent it shouldreveal the Bureau’s use of this method in con-ducting foreign counterintelligence activities.The Review Board used the same reasoning itemployed for other foreign counterintelli-gence activities—mainly that foreign counter-intelligence operations against the USSR andother Communist Bloc countries during theCold War no longer merit protection. More-o v e r, the Review Board believed that the pub-lic is already well aware that the FBI used themethodology of mail cover and, thus, suchoperations should not be pro t e c t e d .

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In its May 10, 1996, appeal to the President,the FBI asked the President to overturn theBoard’s decision to release information fromtwo documents that the FBI alleged wouldreveal that the FBI engaged in a “mail cover”operation against the Soviet Embassy inWashington, D.C. in 1963. The Bureau arguedthat the “[h]ow, when where, and [the] cir-cumstances” of its mail cover operation wereamong its most “closely guarded secrets.”

The Review Board responded that the infor-mation that the Bureau sought to redact hada l ready been released. In the 1970s, theChurch Committee disclosed the mail coveroperation at issue—the “Z-coverage” pro-gram. In addition, the Review Board pro-duced three previously released assassina-tion records in which the FBI disclosed thatthe Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. wastargeted under the “Z-coverage” program, aprogram that the document discloses existedpursuant to an agreement with the PostOffice. As with the other foreign counterin-telligence records that the FBI appealed, theFBI ultimately withdrew its appeals andbegan to treat this type of information as aconsent release.

t. FBI tracing of funds in foreigncounterintelligence investigations.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewB o a rd released information that disclosedthat the FBI was capable of tracking fundsand examining bank accounts of CommunistBloc enterprises during the Cold War era.

ii. Commentary. The issue arose re g a rd-ing the FBI’s tracing of funds as to whetherthe Review Board should release the FBI’smonitoring of financial re c o rds and bankaccounts for the purpose of investigatingespionage. The Review Board decided thatsince the U.S. government had pre v i o u s l ydisclosed this method to the public, itshould not protect the information. TheReview Board voted to release FBI re c o rd sre g a rding tracing of funds transferred toOswald in Russia and re c o rds re g a rding theFBI’s ability to track funds from diplomaticestablishments.

In its May 10, 1996, appeal to the President,the FBI and the Department of State askedthe President to overturn the Review Board’s

decision to release information from six doc-uments related to the FBI’s ability to trackfunds from diplomatic establishments. TheFBI and the Department of State argued, first,that disclosure would reveal sensitivesources and methods, and second, that disclo-sure would reveal that Soviet governmentbank accounts were the target of FBI counter-intelligence activities.

The Review Board responded that the“sources and methods” employed in trackingof funds already has been disclosed. TheBoard cited FBI documents that reveal theFBI’s ability to trace funds, as well as otherfederal government records that explainedthat the FBI engaged in covert examination offinancial records and bank accounts in orderto determine whether an individual wasengaged in espionage. In addition, theReview Board noted that the FBI cannot nowclassify that the Soviet government was theprincipal target of the Bureau’s foreign coun-terintelligence activities in the United States,again citing FBI documents as well as alengthy list of publicly available federal gov-ernment publications that disclosed the FBI’sinterest in Soviet financial activities in theUnited States. In late 1996, the National Secu-rity Agency and the CIA removed whateverfig leaf remained covering the FBI’s tracing offunds. In the NSA/CIA joint publication,Venona: Soviet Espionage and the AmericanResponse 1939-1957 (Robert Louis Benson &Michael Wa r n e r, eds., 1996), the agenciesreleased records that explicitly stated that theFBI monitored Soviet bank accounts in theUnited States. The Venona releases also showthat the Soviets knew about the FBI’s moni-toring of their finances in the 1940s.

The Review Board concluded that previousofficial disclosures of the FBI’s ability to tracefunds in foreign counterintelligence investi-gations prevented the FBI from making aconvincing argument that the methodremained a secret. The White House did notmake a decision on the appealed records.Ultimately, the Bureau agreed to release thedocuments at issue.

u. FBI physical surveillance .

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard released information that disclosedthat physical surveillance is a method that

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the FBI employs in conducting investiga-tions. Moreover, the Review Board specifi-cally released information that the FBI con-ducted physical surveillance in its foreigncounterintelligence investigations againstCommunist Bloc countries.

ii. Commentary. In the course of manyFBI investigations, physical surveillance isnot a classified operation and thus wouldnot be protectable under section 6(1). How-e v e r, as part of its May 10, 1996, appeal toP resident Clinton, the FBI requested that theP resident overturn the Review Board’s deci-sion to release one document because itrevealed that the FBI conducted physicalsurveillance on the Soviet Embassy and thatit kept a “lookout log” that re c o rded visitorsto the Embassy.

The Review Board voted to release the recordbecause the FBI had not offered adequate evi-dence in support of its redactions andbecause it was important to the story.

The Review Board again stressed the statu-tory requirement that the FBI provide docu-ment-specific, clear and convincing evidencein support of its proposed redactions. In itsresponse brief, the Review Board noted thatthe FBI had previously officially acknowl-edged the particular physical surveillanceoperation that the document at issuerevealed, and that former Director Websterhad publicly acknowledged that the FBI con-ducts physical surveillance and used thephysical surveillance of the Russian Embassyas an example.

The Review Board concluded that previouso fficial disclosures of the FBI’s physicalsurveillance of the Soviet Embassy preventedthe FBI from making any plausible or con-vincing argument that the method was onethat should remain secret. The FBI ultimatelywithdrew its appeal of the Board’s decisionon “lookout logs.”30

The Review Board also took the position that,even in documents where the Board mightagree to protect the identity of a particularlysensitive target of the FBI’s physical surveil-lance, the fact that the FBI uses the method ofphysical surveillance in conducting investi-gations is not secret and is not eligible forpostponement.

v. Operational details concerning Departmentof Defense operations.

i. Review Board guidelines. In many mili-tary records, particularly Joint Chiefs of Staffrecords and Army records, the Review Boardoften upheld agency requests for postpone-ments under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.The Review Board protected details of forcedeployments (i.e., numbers of ships, aircraft,troops, warheads, etc.), details concerningprecise targeting information, details of pro-posed operational activities or OPLANs, andinformation that revealed real-world exercisesituations or real-world threat environments.The Department of Defense had to provideevidence that disclosure of the informationtoday, because the similarity of some cur-rently proposed combat operations orOPLANs, was so close to those used in thedocuments in question that it would demon-strably impair the national security of theUnited States.

The Review Board substituted the phrase“operational details” wherever it agreed tothe above-referenced postponements.

ii. Commentary. The Review Boarde n c o u n t e red operational details when itreviewed the first large groups of militaryrecords on Cuba and Vietnam policy.

w. National Security Agency sources and methods.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard generally protected National SecurityAgency sources and methods such as target-ing, intercept, and transmission indicators,internal production indicators, and routingand dissemination information unless theReview Board determined that the specificsource or method was important to an under-standing of the assassination or events sur-rounding the assassination

ii. Commentary. With re g a rd to signalsintelligence (SIGINT), NSA informed theReview Board that specific informationrevealed in raw intercept traffic or interceptreporting can provide a great deal of infor-mation to foreign entities on U.S. govern-ment targeting, intercept, and cryptographiccapabilities which could harm current SIG-INT capabilities. Revealing to a foreign gov-

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ernment or entity that the U.S. governmentwas capable of targeting and reading some orall of their communications, even in 1963,could provide information to that govern-ment or entity as to whether NSAhas the tar-geting, intercept, and cryptographic capabili-ties to read similar communications today.NSA’s position was that it is often not thebasic information contained in the interceptbut rather the fact of the intercept or the spe-cific technical details of how and from wherethe intercept was acquired that requires pro-tection. The Review Board protected NSAinformation such as specific details liketransmission times, transmission methods,geographic locations, and government build-ings or military unit numbers where theBoard determined that such information wasnot important to an understanding of theevents surrounding the assassination.

x. National Security Agency intercept traffic.

i. Review Board guidelines. The ReviewBoard generally protected National SecurityAgency intercept traffic unless the ReviewBoard determined that the specific source ormethod was important to an understandingof the assassination or events surroundingthe assassination

ii. Commentary. NSA’s position is thatthe nature of intercept traffic is such that itpicks up a wide variety of information and asignificant amount of non-relevant informa-tion. NSA summaries of intercept traffic usu-ally examine a wide variety of intercepts onmany different subjects worldwide. Thus, theReview Board protected blocks of informa-tion where it believed the information didnot appear to be relevant to an understand-ing of the Kennedy assassination story. TheReview Board developed substitute languagethat described NSA information that it votedto postpone.

4. Personal Privacy

Text of Section 6(3)

. . . clear and convincing evidence that thepublic disclosure of the assassination recordcould reasonably be expected to constitutean unwarranted invasion of personal pri -vacy, and that invasion of privacy is so sub -stantial that it outweighs the public interest

a. Personal privacy generally.

i. Review Board guidelines. During thecourse of the Review Board’s work, theB o a rd almost never agreed to sustainagency’s requests for postponements on per-sonal privacy grounds. The two exceptions tothe Review Board’s policy to release recordswith privacy postponements were socialsecurity numbers and information aboutprisoners of war. The Review Board deter-mined that the public interest in disclosure ofsocial security numbers was so small that anyrisk of harm would outweigh it. Accordingly,the Board routinely protected social securitynumbers throughout assassination records.Likewise, the Board protected significantamounts of information in files of prisonersof war, as explained below.

In the segregated collections, the FBI rarelyrequested that the Review Board sustain pri-vacy postponements, and so the FBI unilater-ally released the information that would fallinto the category of “personal privacy” infor-mation. In some segregated collectionrecords, the Review Board agreed to post-pone personal privacy information whereagencies provided the Review Board withevidence that the person in question is alive,living in the same area, the public interest inthe information is extremely low, and theindividual would truly suffer a substantialintrusion of privacy if the Board releases theinformation. For example, the Review Boardagreed to sustain the postponement of theidentity of a 13-year-old girl who was a rapevictim. The name in question appeared in thefile of an organized crime figure who washimself only of marginal relevance to theassassination story.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board beganits document review work in its closed meetingon January 25, 1995. At that meeting, theReview Board discussed personal privacyinformation in four Warren Commissionre c o rds, but did not vote on the four re c o rds atthat meeting, opting instead to defer final deci-sion on the re c o rds. On March 6 and 7, 1995, theReview Board staff presented to the ReviewB o a rd a briefing book on personal privacypostponements. The Board’s General Counselp rovided the Board with a memorandum thatidentified several types of information thatwould potentially implicate privacy concerns.

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The Review Board discussed the scope andintent of section 6(3) and how the personal pri-vacy provisions of the JFK Act might apply to18 sample documents. At the end of the meet-ing, the Review Board again decided that itwould defer a vote on the re c o rds and on thepersonal privacy postponements in general.Later in 1995, the Review Board made its firstdecisions on privacy issues.

Although the Review Board expected that itwould encounter a number of personal pri-vacy postponments, the FBI and CIA d i dnot request many postponments citing sec-tion 6(3).

In one case, the FBI appealed to the Presidentthe Review Board’s vote to release informa-tion about a prominent Warren Commissioncritic that the FBI requested be postponed onpersonal privacy grounds. The Review Boardc a refully considered the privacy concernsinvolved and requested that the Presidentuphold the Board’s decision to release theimportant information in the record. As ofthis writing, the White House had notresolved the issues on appeal.

b. Prisoner of War issues

i . Review Board guidelines. Military re c o rd sthat contained information re g a rding Kore a nWar prisoners contained issues of personalprivacy that the Review Board resolved in thefollowing manner. The Review Board deter-mined that it would release the name of thePOW subject of interest, dates and basic factsof his imprisonment, any documents describ-ing or quoting written or oral statementsmade by the POW subject of interest for theimprisoning authority during his confine-ment, and debriefing statements the POWsubject of interest made about himself, or anystatements others made about him. TheReview Board agreed to postpone until theyear 2008 personal identifiers of both the sub-ject of interest and all other individuals men-tioned in the subject’s debriefing file (e . g ., dateand place of birth and military service num-ber), the names of those who made statementsabout the subject of interest during debriefings,and all statements made during debriefingsabout POWs other than the subject of intere s t .

ii. Commentary. The Review Board waseventually confronted with the challenge of

deciding whether, and how, privacy post-ponements requested under Section 6 (3) ofthe JFK Act would be applied to Korean WarPOW records in general, and specifically, toPOW debriefing records, in cases where theReview Board deemed the individual at issueto be relevant to the assassination. Initially,the Army and the Defense Prisoner ofWar/Missing Personnel Management Office(DPMO) requested that the Review Boardsustain postponements of all prisoner of wardebriefing records on privacy grounds. Ulti-mately, the Review Board and the Armycame to agreement that the Review Boardcould release the most relevant informationin POW records without causing an unwar-ranted infringement on personal privacy.

The Army requested that the Review Boardpostpone information for 10 years, until2008, on the basis of its belief that most sur-viving POWs from the Korean conflictwould be deceased by that time. The subjectof POW re c o rds from the Vietnam war orother conflicts did not come before theReview Board .

c. Names of individuals in Secret Service“threat sheets.”

i. Review Board guidelines. Because of highpublic interest in the information, the ReviewB o a rd voted to release the identities of indi-viduals who threatened President Kennedyeven where the Secret Service maintainedmental health re c o rds and other personalinformation concerning such individuals.

ii. Commentary. The Secret Service keptre c o rds on individuals whom the Secret Ser-vice’s Protective Research Section consid-e red to be potential threats to Pre s i d e n tK e n n e d y, Vice President Johnson, and theirfamilies, between March and December1963. HSCA s t a ff member Eileen Dinneenreviewed the Secret Service files and keptdetailed notes on the material that shereviewed. Dinneen’s documents identifiedthe names of the individuals, and containedcondensed information about their personalb a c k g round and affiliations. In some cases,the documents contained brief informationabout an individual’s mental health history.Although the Secret Service did not opposethe release of the text of these documents, ita rgued that many of the names should be

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postponed pursuant to Section 6(3) of theJFK Act as an “unwarranted invasion of per-sonal privacy.”

The Review Board afforded the Secret Servicethe opportunity to present clear and convinc-ing evidence as to why the names in the doc-uments should be postponed. Through writ-ten submissions and oral presentations, theSecret Service primarily offered policy rea-sons in support of its arguments for post-ponement of the names. After carefully con-sidering the Secret Service’s arguments, theReview Board determined that the Secret Ser-vice had not met its statutory burden of proofby “clear and convincing evidence,” andvoted to release four re c o rds, includingnames, in April 1998.

The Secret Service appealed the ReviewB o a rd’s decision to the President, andincluded with their appeal numerous lettersf rom mental health professionals. The Secre tService enlisted the assistance of the mentalhealth community in defending its ability tocooperate with that community in perform-ing its duty of protecting government off i-cials. The Secret Service had not pro v i d e dthe Review Board with such letters when itrequested that the Board protect the namesthat it provided to the President. In its re p l yto the Secret Service’s appeal, the ReviewB o a rd argued that the Secret Service failed tomeet its statutory burden of proof withrespect to the postponement of these names,and urged the President to release these his-torically significant documents in full.3 1 As ofthis writing, the White House had not madea decision as to whether to uphold or over-turn the Review Board’s votes. The ReviewB o a rd believes that the re c o rds, includingthe names, should be opened and stro n g l yu rged the President to uphold the ReviewB o a rd’s decisions.

5. Informant Postponements

Text of Sections 6(2) and 6(4)

section (2). . . clear and convincing evidencethat the public disclosure of the assassina -tion record would reveal the name or iden -tity of a living person who provided confi -dential information to the United States andwould pose a substantial risk of harm to thatperson

section (4). . . clear and convincing evidencethat the public disclosure of the assassina -tion record would compromise the existenceof an understanding of confidentiality cur -rently requiring protection between a Gov -ernment agent and a cooperating individualor a foreign government, and public disclo -sure would be so harmful that it outweighsthe public interest;

a. Informant postponements generally.

i. Review Board guidelines. As a generalrule, the Review Board did not postponeinformation that would reveal the identity ofan informant unless the FBI could pro v i d e ,at least, evidence that the informant wasalive and still living in the same area. TheReview Board recognized two significantexceptions to the general rule. First, evenw h e re the FBI provided such evidence, theReview Board released informant identitiesif it found that the informant’s identity wasof high public interest. Second, the ReviewB o a rd did, in some cases, allow postpone-ment of informant identities even though theFBI could not provide evidence that theinformant was alive and living in the samea rea if the FBI could prove that disclosurewould subject the informant to a significantt h reat of harm.

Where a person’s relationship with the FBIhad already been made public, the ReviewBoard did not agree to protect the fact of therelationship between the government andthe individual.

ii. Commentary.

A. A note on the statutory framework forreview of FBI informant postponements. TheFBI initially cited sections 6(2) and 6(4) insupport of informant postponements. Sec-tion 6(2) clearly re q u i red that the Bure a up rove that the informant was living and thatthe informant faced a substantial risk ofharm if the Review Board released the infor-mation. Because section 6(2) re q u i red infor-mant-specific evidence, the FBI decided torely exclusively on Section 6(4) for infor-mant postponements, and not Section 6(2)—even though most of the re c o rds, as origi-nally processed by the FBI, re f e r red to bothsubsections in support of informant post-ponements.

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B. History of Review Board’s decision-making oninformant postponements. The Review Boardfirst considered informant postponements inits meeting on May 2 and 3, 1995. The FBI’sinitial evidence in support of informantpostponements consisted of a briefing thatFBI officials gave to the Review Board, fol-lowed by the FBI’s “position papers” on con-fidential informant postponements. In theposition paper, the FBI distinguished amonginformants, explaining that informants diff e rdepending on the type of information theyp rovided to the FBI and the level of confi-dentiality that existed between the FBI andthe informant at the time that the informantp rovided the information. The FBI furtherexplained that, whether or not the FBIe x p ressly promised to keep informantnames confidential, they had a “moral con-tract” with people who provided the FBIwith information.

After hearing the FBI’s general policy argu-ments, the Review Board informed the FBIthat it interpreted the “clear and convincing”evidence standard to require the agencies toprovide very specific evidence tailored toindividual postponements.

In the summer of 1995, the Review Boardconsidered four documents containing infor-mant postponements. Three of the docu-ments concerned symbol number infor-mants. The fourth document disclosed thename of a deceased informant. Because theFBI did not present document-specific evi-dence in support of its postponements, theB o a rd voted to release the re c o rds. OnAugust 11, 1995, the FBI appealed to the Pres-ident the Review Board’s decisions on thosefour records. The FBI argued that disclosureof informant information would result in thefollowing harms: first, harm to existing infor-mants; second, harm to the FBI’s ability tore c ruit new informants and its ability toobtain cooperation from existing informants,and third, harm to the government’s “word”since disclosure results in a breach of apromise of confidentiality.

In its response briefs to the President, theReview Board emphasized the JFK Act’s clearand convincing evidence standard andexplained that speculative harm does not pro-vide sufficient grounds for withholding ofinformation. In addition, the Review Board

o ff e red examples of prior releases that had notresulted in expected harm. The FBI did agre eto provide particularized evidence on three ofthe four documents. The FBI’s evidence was tointerview the informants to determinewhether they would object to having theiridentities disclosed. Of course, all of the infor-mants or their relatives objected to disclosureof their identities. Upon receipt of the FBI’sevidence, the Review Board re c o n s i d e red theinformant postponements and determinedthat it would release all information except forthe numeric portion of the symbol numbers.

The Review Board’s September 28, 1995, let-ter to the FBI informing the FBI of its deci-sions on the documents provided useful andspecific guidance as to what type of evidencethe Review Board was looking for—inter-viewing informants would not be necessary,nor would the Review Board find it useful.Instead, the Review Board needed to knowwhether informants were still alive andwhether the informant file contained corrob-orating evidence of harm that would befallthe informant if his identity were disclosed.Ultimately, the FBI was able to satisfy theReview Board’s requests for evidence oninformant issues by providing informationthat was available at FBI headquarters.

After the FBI appealed the Review Board ’ sdecisions on four informant re c o rds, the FBIeventually eliminated general policy arg u-ments from its evidence submissions andp rovided evidence in support of informantpostponements on standard forms titled“Informant Postponement Evidence Form.”Once the Review Board received the FBI’sspecific evidence, it developed a group ofguidelines for the review of informant post-p o n e m e n t s .

C. Effect of prior disclosure s. If the nameof an informant in a particular re c o rd hada l ready been released in a context that d i s c l o s e dthe informant relationship with the FBI, then theReview Board released the name. If an infor-mant symbol number in a particular re c o rd hada l ready been released in a context where thesame informant symbol number provided thesame information as in the re c o rd at issue, theReview Board released the symbol number.

As a practical matter, both the FBI and theReview Board made an effort to track the

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names and symbol numbers of FBI infor-mants whose relationships with the FBI hadalready been made public. When ReviewBoard staff members encountered informantnames or symbol numbers that were eligiblefor postponement, staff members researchedwhether the name or symbol number hada l ready been released. Similarly, the FBImaintained and checked an informant cardfile that tracked those informant names andsymbol numbers that had been publicly dis-closed and in what contexts.

b. Individuals who provided information tothe FBI, but who did not have an ongoingconfidential relationship with the FBI.

i. Review Board guidelines. Where an indi-vidual provided information to the FBI andrequested that the FBI protect his or her iden-tity, but the FBI provided no evidence of an ongo -ing confidential relationship with the individual,the Review Board voted to disclose all identi-fying information about that individual.

ii. Commentary. When the FBI first beganto present evidence to the Review Board indefense of its attempts to protect its infor-mants, it asked that the Review Board protectthe identity of any individual who eitherexpressly or implicitly requested confiden-tiality when providing information to theBureau. Persons who provide information inexchange for express promises of confiden-tiality may include neighbors or otheracquaintances of a subject of investigation, aswell as employees of state and local govern-ments, financial institutions, airlines, orhotels. According to the FBI,

Where such a promise is given, docu-ments containing such information willcontain the name of the person provid-ing the information as well as languagespecifically setting forth the fact thatconfidentiality was requested. No file isopened on such persons and no symbolnumbers are assigned to protect theiridentities.32

I n i t i a l l y, the FBI’s policy was to protect “theidentities of persons who gave the FBI infor-mation to which they had access by virtue oftheir employment,” re g a rdless of whether“their providing the information). .. i n v o l v e [ d ]a breach of trust,” provided that the person in

question requested confidentiality. More o v e r,the FBI implied that, even where a request forconfidentiality is not explicit on the face of thedocument, the identities of such persons willbe withheld in cases where their providing theinformation to the FBI involved a “breach oft rust” (e . g ., a phone company employee whogives out an unlisted number.)

The Review Board rejected the FBI’s argu-ment and voted to release the names pur-suant to Section 6(4) of the JFK Act. Section6(4) required that the FBI provide clear andconvincing evidence that disclosure wouldcompromise the existence of an understand-ing of confidentiality currently requiring pro-tection between a government agent and acooperating individual. That the individuallacked one of the Bureau’s many informantdesignations (e.g., potential security infor-mant (“PSI”), potential criminal informant(“PCI”), panel source, established sourc e ,informant symbol number) suggested to theReview Board that the individual did nothave an ongoing relationship with the FBI. Tothe extent that the FBI believes that a particu-lar “protect identity” source did have anongoing relationship with the FBI, it pro-vided evidence to the Review Board of therelationship. Without the benefit of such evi-dence, the Review Board assumed that “pro-tect identity” sources were not sources withan “understanding of confidentiality cur-rently requiring protection.” The ReviewBoard learned that FBI agents often offeredconfidentiality as a matter of course to inter-viewees, whether or not the individualrequested or required confidentiality. Even-tually, the Review Board and the FBI agreedthat the FBI would release the names of theseindividuals unilaterally.

c. Individuals who gave the FBI informationto which they had access by virtue of theiremployment.

i. Review Board guidelines. The FBI unilat-erally released the identities of individualswho gave the FBI information to which theyhad access by virtue of their employment,such as telephone company employees andutility employees.

ii. Commentary. Until the summer of 1995,the FBI protected the identities of all personswho gave the FBI information to which they

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had access by virtue of their employment pro-vided one of the two following circ u m s t a n c e sexisted: (1) the employee requested confiden-t i a l i t y, or (2) the employee’s providing theinformation involved a breach of trust (e . g . , aphone company employee who gave out anunlisted number.) The Review Board believedthat disclosure of the identities of such indi-viduals would not subject the individuals tothe type of harm that the JFK Act re q u i red tosustain informant postponements. Once theReview Board voted to release the identities ofpersons who gave the FBI information towhich they had access by virtue of theiremployment, the FBI acquiesced and pro-ceeded to release unilaterally the identities ofsuch individuals.

d. Deceased informants.

i. Review Board guidelines. With very fewexceptions, the Review Board released theidentities of deceased informants in the coreand related files.

In the segregated collection files, the ReviewBoard did not require that the FBI provideevidence that an informant was alive to sus-tain a postponement unless the Review Boardstaff member had some reason to believe thatthe informant was deceased. Thus, unless theinformant was of relatively high public inter-est, the Review Board voted to protect theinformant’s identity. In the cases where astaff member had a reason to believe that aninformant was deceased, the staff did requestthe FBI to provide evidence concerning theinformant and released the informant’s iden-tity if the informant was deceased.

ii. Commentary. A “named informant” isan individual whose name appeared inassassination re c o rds and who had sometype of ongoing confidential re l a t i o n s h i pwith the FBI. The FBI records often refer tosuch informants as “PSIs” (potential securityinformants) or “PCIs” (potential criminalinformants), but “established sourc e s , ”“panel sources,” and others also fell into thecategory of “named informants.” The ReviewBoard attempted to categorize informantsaccording to the level of confidentiality thatexisted between the FBI and the informant.While the Review Board was often willing tosustain postponements of named informantswhen the FBI could demonstrate that the

informant was still living, it believed thatdeceased informants were generally not enti-tled to protection.

However, in its response to the FBI’s infor-mant appeals, the Review Board did statethat, in some rare cases, the FBI might be ableto prove clearly and convincingly that a“confidential relationship” with a deceasedinformant currently required protection. Forexample, the FBI could have shown that therelatives of a high-level organized crimeinformant could still be at risk of retaliation.

The Review Board debated extensively theissue of what constituted adequate evidencethat an informant was currently living.Specifically, the Board had to determine whatevidence was necessary to prove that some-one who, according to a search of the FBI’scomputer databases, is now living, is in factthe same individual named as an FBI infor-mant.

U l t i m a t e l y, the Review Board determinedthat the FBI must verify that the informantwas still alive by matching the informant’sname plus date of birth or Social Securitynumber. The Review Board did not considername alone or name plus general location tobe adequate evidence that an informant wasstill living.

e. “Negative Contacts”: Informants who provided no assassination-related information to the FBI.

i. Review Board guidelines. When an FBIagent asked an informant for information ona particular topic and the informant reportedthat he or she had no information to provide,the FBI called the contact a “negative con-tact.” Where the FBI adequately identifiedthe “negative contact” informant as still liv-ing, the Review Board agreed to postpone forten years “negative contact” named infor-mants and all specific identifying informa-tion, such as street addresses, telephonenumbers, and informant-specific portions ofFBI case numbers and file numbers. A ninformant was “adequately identified as stillliving” if the FBI identified him or herthrough current information with a livingperson with the same name and other specif-ically identifying information (e.g., name anddate of birth or Social Security number.)

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Where the FBI did not adequately identifythe informant as still living, the ReviewBoard voted to release the name and anyaccompanying identifying information.

The FBI unilaterally released all unclassified“negative contact” symbol number infor-mants.

ii. Commentary. In the FBI’s early investi-gations into the assassination of PresidentKennedy, Director Hoover ordered specialagents to ask all informants for re l e v a n tinformation. Even when informants reportedthat they knew nothing that would assist theFBI in its investigation, FBI agents filedreports in the assassination investigation filedocumenting the “negative contact.”

As a result of Director Hoover’s broad direc-tive to agents to question all informants con-cerning the assassination, the assassinationinvestigation file provides a reasonably com-prehensive picture of the state of the FBI’sinformant network in late 1963 and early1964. The FBI, of course, preferred that thisoverview of its informant operations not bedisclosed to the public. The Review Boardacknowledged that the public had little or nointerest in knowing the identities of each“negative contact” informant. At the sametime, the Review Board believed that thepublic did have an interest in having accu-rate information concerning the FBI’s activi-ties in the days and weeks following theassassination. As a compromise, the FBIagreed that it would unilaterally release allunclassified negative contact symbol numberinformants (on the theory that, with no addi-tional information from or about the infor-mant, no researcher could ever determine theidentity of the informant) and the ReviewBoard agreed that it would protect those“negative contact” named informants thatwere still alive (on the theory that, since theyprovided no information about the assassina-tion, there was little value to be gained fromdisclosing the identities of hundreds of livingFBI informants.)

f. “Positive Contacts”: Informants who pro -vided at least some assassination-relatedinformation to the FBI .

i. Review Board guidelines. “Positive con-tact” informants provided at least s o m e

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related information. Where theFBI adequately identified the informant asstill living, the Review Board adopted a case-by-case approach, considering the factorslisted in the commentary below. When theReview Board voted to postpone the identityof a “positive contact” informant, it voted topostpone it for ten years, and adopteda p p ropriate substitute language. TheReview Board released informant names ifthe informant was of particular relevance tothe assassination.

Where the FBI did not adequately identifythe informant as still living, the ReviewBoard released the informant’s name and anyaccompanying information. See 4. (DeceasedInformants) above.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board ’ sdecision making with regard to “positivecontact” informant postponements involvedan evaluation of some combination of the fol-lowing factors:

(A) the significance of the information thatthe informant provided to understandingof the assassination;

(B) the importance of the identity of theinformant to assessing the accuracy of thereported information; and

(C) the significance of the threat of harm tothe informant from disclosure, consideringthe following:

(1) whether the informant is still living,and if so, whether the informant still livesin the same area;

(2) the amount of time that has passedsince the informant last provided informa-tion;

(3) the type of information the infor-mant provided;

(4) the level of confidentiality thatexisted between the FBI and the informantat the time that the informant provided theinformation; and

(5) any specific evidence of possibleharm or retaliation that might come to theinformant or his or her relatives.

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Although no one factor was dispositive inevery case, the Board considered certain fac-tors to be more important than others inmaking decisions to release re c o rds. Forexample, if public interest in a particular doc-ument was high, the Board released infor-mant names in the document even thoughthe Bureau was able to provide evidence thatwould have otherwise justified postpone-ment of the informant’s identity.

In those cases where the Review Board agre e dto protect an informant’s name and specificidentifying information, substitute languagesuch as “informant name,” “ s t reet addre s s , ”“informant file number,” or “informant symbolnumber” replaced the redacted information.

g. FBI informant symbol numbers and filenumbers.

i. Review Board guidelines. As a generalrule, the Review Board routinely agreed topostpone for ten years the “numeric” portionof informant symbol numbers and the “casenumber” portion of informant file numbers,provided that the informant’s symbol numberhad not already been made public. TheReview Board used the phrases “informantsymbol number” and “informant file num-ber” as substitute language.

Routine exceptions to this rule occurred intwo types of documents. First, in documentsthat refer to an informant by both name andsymbol (and/or file) number, the ReviewB o a rd considered the symbol number to bespecific information that might identify ani n f o r m a n t. Second, the FBI agreed to unilater-ally release the entire symbol number for“unclassified negative contacts”—those FBIinformants who were asked about a particu-lar subject, but had no “positive” information.(S e e c. FBI Informants: Negative Contacts.)

The non-routine exception to the general ru l ea rose in documents in which the unre d a c t e dinformation in the document u n a m b i g u o u s l yidentified the informant. Such documents werenot routine because the Board did not agree top rotect the numeric portions of the informant’ssymbol and file number in a document thatotherwise revealed the informant’s identity.

ii. Commentary. When the FBI had an infor-mant who provides “valuable and sensitive

information to the FBI on a regular basis”(quoting FBI position paper), the FBI mayhave assigned a “symbol number” to theinformant. The informant did not know hisor her symbol number. Rather, the symbolnumber was an internal number that allowedan FBI agent to write reports about the infor-mant and information that the informantp rovided to the FBI without writing theinformant’s name. Most informant symbolnumbers consisted of three parts—the prefixindicated the field office to which the infor-mant reported (e.g. “NY” for New Yo r k ,“DL” for Dallas, “TP” for Tampa), thenumeric portion corresponded directly to aparticular informant, and the suffix indicatedwhether the informant usually provided theFBI with information about criminal (C) orsecurity (S) cases. In longer, formal FBIreports from field offices to headquarters,where many informants were used, the FBIadded yet another layer of security to theinformant’s identity by assigning temporarysymbol numbers (T-1, T-2, etc.. . . ).

The Review Board came to believe that, in themajority of the FBI’s assassination re c o rd s ,d i s c l o s u re of the numeric portions of the sym-bol number (and the numeric portions of thec o r responding informant file) were of littlepublic interest. Rather than re q u i re the FBI tore s e a rch the status of every symbol numberinformant, the Review Board determined thatit would allow the FBI to protect the numericportions of informant symbol numbers andfile numbers, reserving the right to re q u e s tevidence on any informant the Review Boardc o n s i d e red to be of significant public intere s t .

In support of its argument to keep the symboland file numbers for informants secret, theFBI argued that the “mosaic theory” justifiedpostponement of any portion of an infor-mant’s symbol number. The Review Boardrejected the mosaic theory as the sole basis forpostponement of symbol numbers, or for anyother particular postponement issue, simplybecause the mosaic theory itself contains nolimiting principle. However, the JFK A c tre q u i red the Review Board to balance anyi n c rementally greater risk that the release offurther information would lead to disclosureof (and harm to) the informant against thepublic interest in releasing the information. Instriking this balance, the Review Board gaveg reat weight to the public interest in the infor-

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mation provided. In the “core and re l a t e d ”files, the Review Board did not postpone theinformation provided by symbol numberinformants even though it would postponethe numeric portion of the symbol number.

The Review Board has consistently releasedthe prefixes and suffixes of informant symbolnumbers, even in cases where it sustained the“numeric” part of the symbol number. Thus,for the hypothetical symbol number “NY1234-C,” “NY” and “-C” would be released,even if the Review Board sustained post-ponement of the “1234.” After the ReviewBoard’s action, researchers would know thatthe informant was run by the New York Cityfield office and reported on criminal (ratherthan “security”) cases, but may not know theinformant-specific numeric portion of thesymbol number.

In the “core and related” files, the ReviewB o a rd did not postpone any part of a “T-symbol” number. Rather, the FBI began tounilaterally release these “temporary sym-

bols” under the JFK Act after the ReviewB o a rd’s first few discussions about infor-mant postponements.

6. Confidential Relationships BetweenGovernment Agents and CooperatingForeign Governments.


. . .clear and convincing evidence that thepublic disclosure of the assassination re c o r dwould compromise the existence of anunderstanding of confidentiality curre n t l yrequiring protection between a Governmentagent and a cooperating individual or a for -eign government, and public disclosurewould be so harmful that it outweighs thepublic intere s t ;

a. Foreign liaison postponements in the FBIfiles.

i. Review Board guidelines. Informationthat the FBI receives from cooperating for-

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eign governments appears throughout theFBI’s files. The official position of the FBI isthat any foreign government information inFBI files is the property of the foreign gov-ernment, and as such, the FBI cannot releasethe information without first obtaining theconsent of the foreign government that pro-vided the information. When the ReviewB o a rd believed that information in FBIre c o rds truly was “foreign government”information, it worked with the FBI toa p p roach the foreign government andattempt to persuade the foreign governmentthat it is in our countries’ mutual interests torelease liaison information in assassinationrecords. When necessary, the Review Boardrequested the assistance of the Department ofState in approaching foreign governments.

In the segregated collection files, the ReviewBoard recognized that the cost of releasingf o reign government information far out-weighed the benefits of releasing informationof marginal relevance, as most of the segre-gated collection files are. Thus, the Board sus-tained postponements of foreign governmentinformation in the segregated collection files,provided the information was not assassina-tion-related.

ii. Commentary. Given that the FBI has ag reat deal of foreign government information inits files, the FBI asked the Review Board to post-pone release of all such information because ita d h e res to the position that it does not haveauthority to release another government’s infor-mation. The Review Board did not necessarilya g ree with the FBI’s position that the UnitedStates cannot unilaterally release informationreceived from another government.

On August 8, 1995, the FBI appealed to thePresident the Review Board’s decisions torelease five documents that contained for-eign relations postponements. The FBI madethree arguments in support of its postpone-ments: first, the fact of the liaison relationshipbetween the FBI and the foreign governmentin question was a classified secret; second, theFBI had never officially released documentsdemonstrating the nature of the relationshipbetween the FBI and foreign government;and third, release of information about therelationship would cause dramatic harm tothe United States’ foreign relations with theforeign government in question.

On August 11, 1995, the Review Boardresponded to the President that its research

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in publicly available sources supported theReview Board’s decisions to release the fiverecords at issue. In response to the FBI’s firsttwo arguments, the Review Board explainedthat the FBI had publicly announced its liai-son relationship with the foreign governmentat issue more than thirty years ago, and thatthe FBI h a d a l re a d y released assassinationrecords that described the FBI’s liaison rela-tionship with the foreign government. TheReview Board offered a three-part responseto the FBI’s third argument that harm wouldresult from release of information about theliaison relationship: first, the FBI had not metthe “clear and convincing evidence” stan-dard because it had not identified a particu-lar harm that would result; second, if foreignrelations would be harmed as a result ofrelease of information about the liaison rela-tionship, the harm would have alre a d yoccurred when the relationship was previ-ously disclosed by the FBI; and third, harm toforeign relations was unlikely because theinformation in the documents is the type ofinformation that we would expect govern-ments to share in law enforcement activities.

The FBI then consulted representatives of theforeign government to ask whether the for-eign government would object to an officialdisclosure of the liaison relationship. The for-eign government asked the FBI not to revealthe relationship, and the FBI argued to theP resident that the United States shouldrespect the request of the foreign govern-ment. The Review Board noted that, had theFBI released the records without consultingthe foreign government, foreign re l a t i o n swould not have been harmed, but since theFBI did consult the foreign government, theFBI itself had created a foreign re l a t i o n sproblem. Despite the paradox that resultedfrom the FBI’s consultation with the foreigngovernment, the Review Board took the posi-tion that the foreign government’s desire thatthe FBI not release the information was a rel-evant factor in the balancing test but that, inthis case, the public interest in disclosure out-weighed the foreign government’s unex-plained desire to protect the information.

After the FBI and the Review Board briefedthe issues to the President, representatives ofthe Review Board and the FBI met with theWhite House Counsel’s Office. The WhiteHouse asked the Review Board to reconsider

its decisions on the documents on appeal, butalso instructed the FBI to provide the ReviewBoard with postponement-specific evidencein support of its claimed postponements. TheReview Board and the FBI agreed to theWhite House request and entered into a Stip-ulation on August 30, 1995.

The Review Board then met with re p re s e n t a-tives of the Department of State and the UnitedStates Ambassador for the foreign governmentto discuss the documents at issue. As a result ofthe meeting, the foreign government agreed torelease of the overwhelming majority of infor-mation in the documents. The Review Boarda g reed to sustain the one postponement thatthe foreign government requested, which wasthe name of an employee of the foreign gov-ernment, recognizing that the identity of theindividual was of little or no interest to thepublic. (See illustration.)

After the appeals process had ended, the FBImaintained its position that it could not re l e a s ef o reign government information without theconsent of the foreign government. TheReview Board recognized that it simply didnot have the time or the re s o u rces to pursuerelease of each postponement in the same waythat it pursued release of the five appealeddocuments. Initially, the Review Board hadhoped to approach each foreign governmentseparately in an attempt to convince the gov-ernments that release of liaison information inassassination re c o rds would benefit both theUnited States and the foreign governments. Inthe end, the Review Board recognized that theeasiest way to release the foreign informationin the FBI re c o rds would be for the FBI,t h rough its “Legats” (Legal Attaches), torequest the foreign government at issue torelease the information. The Review Boardsaw three advantages to this approach: f i r s t , i nthose cases where the FBI was successful inobtaining release of the information, the re c o rdat issue would be available to the public withno further action by the Review Board; s e c o n d ,allowing the FBI to request release of fore i g ninformation using the same channels thro u g hwhich they obtain foreign information makesit possible for the FBI to maintain positive re l a-tions with their foreign contacts; and t h i r d , t h eReview Board relinquished no rights to makeits own approach to the foreign government,either before or after the FBI Legat hada p p roached its foreign contacts.

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Practically, the FBI sent the records at issue toits Legats with a letter from Director Freehexplaining to the foreign government howimportant release of the information was tothe FBI and to the American people. In addi-tion to materials from the FBI, the ReviewBoard enclosed a letter to the foreign govern-ment explaining our statute and our missionand requesting release of the records.

When the Legats were unsuccessful in obtain-ing the consent of the foreign government torelease the information, either because theLegat’s contacts did not approve the release orbecause the Legat’s local contacts no longerexisted, the Review Board requested theDepartment of State to approach the fore i g ngovernment dire c t l y. Diplomatic channelsp roved to be a time-consuming way to re l e a s ere c o rds. The Department of State was stillawaiting responses from some foreign govern-ment officials as to whether the governmentcould release their information in FBI re c o rd s .The Department of State assured the ReviewB o a rd that it would continue to pursue re l e a s eof this information even after the ReviewB o a rd terminated its operations on September30, 1998, and provide the information to theJFK Collection when it received decisions fro mthe foreign governments at issue.

If the Review Board adopted the same policyon marginally relevant foreign governmentinformation in the segregated collections thatit followed for records more closely related tothe assassination, the Review Board and itsstaff would have spent the majority of thelast year of the Review Board’s operationsapproaching foreign governments to try toobtain the release of information that was oflittle public interest. The Review Board cameto believe that the cost of release of the infor-mation outweighed the benefits of releasingthis marginally relevant information in thesegregated collection files. Thus, in its April1998 meeting, it agreed to designate the irrel-evant information as “NBR” and applied its“NBR” guidelines.

7. Presidential Protection


. . . clear and convincing evidence that thepublic disclosure of the assassination recordwould reveal a security or protective proce -

d u re currently utilized, or re a s o n a b l yexpected to be utilized, by the Secret Serviceor another Government agency responsiblefor protecting Government officials, andpublic disclosure would be so harmful that itoutweighs the public interest.

To date, the Secret Service has not relied onSection 6(5) of the JFK Act to support anyrequests for postponement of records.

C. JFK ACT EXEMPTIONS

In addition to deciding postponements, theReview Board also had to address certain cat-egories of information exempted from theJFK Act.

1. Tax Return Information

The Review Board encountered a wide vari-ety of tax return information in its review ofassassination records. Although current fed-eral law prohibits the IRS and other federalagencies from disseminating tax return infor-mation, in the 1960s, the IRS often shared itsinformation with law enforcement agenciesincluding the FBI and investigative bodiessuch as the Warren Commission. The WarrenCommission, in particular, collected tax dataon many of the individuals that it studied,including Lee Harvey Oswald.

When Congress was considering the JFK Act,the IRS requested that the JFK Act trump cur-rent federal law protecting tax return infor-mation and allow the IRS to release tax returnrecords relating to the assassination of thePresident. Congress refused to allow the IRS,or any other federal agency, to disclose taxreturn information. Thus, section 11(a) of theJFK Act reads, in relevant part,

When this Act requires transmission of arecord to the Archivist or public disclo-sure, it shall take precedence over anyother law (except section 6103 of the Inter -nal Revenue Code) . . .that would other-wise prohibit such transmission or dis-closure. . . .

Section 6103 is the section of the Internal Rev-enue Code that prohibits federal governmentagencies that possess tax return informationfrom disclosing that information.

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While the Review Board understands con-gressional reluctance to recklessly release thetax return information of American citizens,it is truly unfortunate that the Review Boardcould not make available to the public the taxreturn records of Lee Harvey Oswald for theyears prior to the assassination. The ReviewBoard received many inquiries from the pub-lic requesting that the Board release theOswald tax returns so that the public couldresolve inconsistencies in the data concern-ing Oswald’s earnings. Although the IRSdetermined that the Review Board necessar-ily had to review tax return information inorder to complete its work, it could not allowthe Review Board to disclose tax return infor-mation unless Congress granted a specificexemption to the strictures of section 6103.

Thus, the Review Board recommends thatC o n g ress enact legislation exempting LeeHarvey Oswald’s tax return information,Oswald employment information obtainedby the Social Security Administration, andother tax or IRS related information in thefiles of the Wa r ren Commission and theHSCA from the protection afforded it by sec-tion 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, andthat such legislation direct that these recordsbe released to the public in the JFK Collec-tion.

2. Records Under Seal

Section 10 of the JFK Act allows the ReviewBoard to identify records under seal of courtand request the Attorney General’s assis-tance in petitioning a court to lift its seal onthe records. The Review Board only identi-fied one instance where it believed thatimportant assassination re c o rds re m a i n e dunder seal of court and it requested andobtained the assistance of the Department ofJustice in lifting the seal on the records.

D. APPEALS TO THE PRESIDENT PENDING AS OF

SEPTEMBER 30, 1998

As of this writing (September 1998), the FBIand Secret Service appeals to the President—both relating to the Review Board’s votes torelease information the agencies believed toinvade privacy—were pending.

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E. CONCLUSION

When it first assembled, the Review Boardfaced the daunting task of setting the stan-dard for the declassification of hundreds ofthousands of federal records. These recordsincluded those under the purview of theCIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO), whichtraditionally has been exempt from declassi-fication review. In addition to the raw intelli-gence material included in the DO’s files,CIA records also included sensitive recordsfrom the Counterintelligence Staff, the Officeof Personnel, and Security. The Board alsoc o n f ronted the task of reviewing re c o rd sfrom the National Security Agency, most ofwhich were classified at the “Sensitive Com-partmented Information” (SCI) level and pre-viously never had been subject to any reviewoutside of NSA. The Review Board ulti-mately reviewed for declassification some ofthe most secret records from many otheragencies and offices, including FBI sourcefiles and Protective Research Section files ofthe Secret Service.

The Review Board received little guidanceeither from past governmental experience orf rom Congress in the legislative historybehind the JFK Act. The words of Section 6proved, however, to be of significant impor-tance to the Review Board and for the accom-plishment of its work. As interpreted andapplied by the Review Board over ane x t remely wide range of documents, thewords of Section 6 established an entirelynew standard for the release of governmentalinformation. The “common law” developedby the Review Board and largely accepted bythe agencies stands as an important part ofthe Review Board’s legacy of public releaseof government records.

CHAPTER 5

ENDNOTES

1 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) (hereinafter “JFK Act”).

2 “[A]ll Government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy should carrya presumption of immediate disclosure.” JFK Act, § 2(a)(2).

3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (hereinafter “FOIA”).

4 President Reagan’s Executive Order was in effect at the time that the JFK Act was passed.See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982-1995) (hereinafter “Executive Order 12356”). Thecurrent Executive Order is Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995-present) (hereinafter“Executive Order 12958”).

5 The Freedom of Information Act Exemptions.

(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—

(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be keptsecret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and

(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order;

(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title),provided that such statute

(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave nodiscretion on the issue, or

(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of mat-ters to be withheld;

(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and priv-ileged and confidential;

(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available bylaw to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute aclearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extentthat the production of such law enforcement records or information

(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,

(B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,

(C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-vacy,

(D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, includ-ing a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnishedinformation on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiledby a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by anagency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information fur-nished by a confidential source,

(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or pros-ecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutionsif such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or

(F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

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(8) contained in or related to examination operating, or condition reports prepared by, onbehalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of finan-cial institutions; or

(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.6 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination RecordsCollection Act of 1992 , 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 17, 20.

7 Because the audience for this report presumably will encounter the current Executive Ord e rm o re often, the standards for release of information under Executive Order 12958 are quoted.We have not quoted the standards for release of information under Executive Order 12356.

8 Executive Order 12958, Section 3.4(a)–(b): Automatic Declassification (April 17, 1995).

(a) Subject to paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of this order, all classifiedinformation contained in records that (1) are more than 25 years old, and (2) have beendetermined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, shall beautomatically declassified whether or not the records have been reviewed. Subsequently, allclassified information in such records shall be automatically declassified no longer than 25years from the date of its original classification, except as provided in paragraph (b), below.

(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a),above, specific information, the release of which should be expected to:

(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about theapplication of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelli-gence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demon-strably damage the national security interests of the United States;(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of massdestruction;(3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;(4) reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technologywithin a U.S. weapon system;(5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;(6) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations betweenthe United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermineongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;(7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability ofUnited States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other offi-cials for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized;(8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current nationalsecurity emergency preparedness plans; or(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.

9 JFK Act Section 6: Grounds for postponement of public disclosure of records.

Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to thepublic may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is clear and convincingevidence that—

(1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relationsof the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such grav-ity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal—

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected tobe utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed,the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

(C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations orconduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstra-bly impair the national security of the United States;

(2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity of aliving person who provided confidential information to the United States and would pose asubstantial risk of harm to that person;

(3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to con-stitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is so sub-stantial that it outweighs the public interest;

(4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence of anunderstanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agentand a cooperating individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be soharmful that it outweighs the public interest;

(5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protectiveprocedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret Service oranother Government agency responsible for protecting Government officials, and public dis-closure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest.

10 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).

11 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).

12 The Senate believed that the “legislation is necessary” in part “because congressionalrecords related to the assassination would not otherwise be subject to public disclosure untilat least the year 2029.” S. Rep. at 20. The “FOIAdoes not provide public access to unpublishedcongressional records.” CRS Report for Congress: President John F. Kennedy AssassinationRecords Disclosure: An overview (March 3, 1993).

13 See House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, pt. 1, at 18.

14 Section 2(a)(2) (emphasis added).

15 Section 2(A)(7) (emphasis added).

16 See Sections 6, 9(c)(1).

17 House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, pt. 1, at 25.

18 House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, at 16 (emphasis added).

19 House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, at 26 (emphasis added).

20 JFK Act, Section 3(10). 21 See, e.g., Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy AssassinationRecords Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 30.

22 JFK Act, Section 3(2).

23 The JFK Act, section 7(n), allows the Review Board to issue interpretive regulations. In itsreport on the JFK Act, the Senate noted,

Government offices are required to begin the review and disclosure of records uponenactment to expedite public access to the many records which do not require additionalreview or postponement. However, the ultimate work of the Review Board will involvenot only the review of records recommended for postponement, but requiring govern-ment offices to provide additional information and records, where appropriate.

24 JFK Act, section 3(2).

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25 JFK Act, sections 6, 9(c)(1).

26 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination RecordsCollection Act of 1992 , 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 31.

27 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination RecordsCollection Act of 1992 , 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 2977.

28 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination RecordsCollection Act of 1992 , 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328 (emphasis added).

29 FBI’s May 28, 1998, Appeal at 8.

30 Review Board’s Reply Memorandum to the President, May 22, 1998, and Surreply Memo-randum, June 19, 1998.

31 Review Board’s Reply Memorandum to the President, May 22, 1998, and Surreply Memo-randum, June 15, 1998.

32 FBI Memorandum, FBI Informant/Confidentiality Postponements, p. 3.

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A major focus of the Assassination RecordsReview Board’s work has been to attempt toanswer questions and locate additional infor-mation not previously explored related to theassassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board’s “Requests for A d d i t i o n a lInformation and Records” to governmentagencies served two purposes. First, the addi-tional requests allowed Review Board staffmembers to locate new categories of assassi-nation re c o rds in federal government files. Insome files, the Review Board located newassassination re c o rds. In other files, it discov-e red that the file contained no re l e v a n tre c o rds. In both cases, the Review Board staffmemorialized their findings in written mem-oranda, with the hope that the public wouldbe able to easily determine what files the staffreviewed. Second, the additional re q u e s t sallowed Review Board staff to request back-g round information that could assist in thereview of re c o rds that it had identified as re l-evant to the assassination. For example,Review Board staff members might encounterparticular cryptonyms, abbreviations, infor-mant symbol numbers, file numbers, or off i c edesignations in assassination re c o rds, butcould only determine the meaning of thosea b b reviations, numbers, and codewords byrequesting and reviewing additional files.

While the Review Board made most of itsadditional requests to the FBI and the CIA, italso made requests to other agencies, such asthe Secret Service, the Department of State,and the National Security Agency (NSA). Thegovernment offices answered each of theReview Board’s requests for additional infor-mation and re c o rds, as the P resident John F.Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of1 9 9 2 (JFK Act) re q u i re d .1 This chapter servesas an overview of the Review Board’s re q u e s t srather than as a complete detailed explanationof each request. The only way for the public to

fully evaluate the success of the ReviewB o a rd’s approach is to examine the ReviewB o a rd’s re c o rds as well as the assassinationre c o rds that are now at the National A rc h i v e sand Records Administration (NARA) as ad i rect result of the Review Board’s re q u e s t s .

M o re o v e r, because the Review Board’s re q u e s t sw e re not always consistent in theme, the chap-ter is necessarily miscellaneous in nature .

Scope of Chapter

Section 3(2) of the JFK Act defined the term“assassination record” to include all recordsthat were “created or made available for useby, obtained by, or otherwise came into thepossession of” any official entity that investi-gated the assassination.

This chapter does not discuss those recordsthat government offices identified for inclu-sion in the JFK Collection.

Section 7(j)(1)(C)(ii) of the JFK Act empow-e red the Board to direct government off i c e sto make available “addi-tional information andre c o rds” that the ReviewB o a rd believed it neededto fulfill its re s p o n s i b i l i-ties under the Act. A sthe JFK Act specificallyi n s t ructed the ReviewB o a rd to go beyond the scope of pre v i o u sinquiries, the ReviewB o a rd tailored its addi-tional requests to encom-pass those materials thatno previous investiga-tive body had identifiedas assassination-related. This chapter cov-ers o n l y those re c o rds that the ReviewB o a rd sought, pursuant to its authority, torequest additional information andre c o rd s .

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CHAPTER 6PA RT I: TH E QU E S T F O R AD D I T I O N A L IN F O R M AT I O N

A N D RE C O R D S I N FE D E R A L GO V E R N M E N T OF F I C E S

We cannot prevent the specula-tion that someone did cover up,but the arguments that a cover-up continues and will continue,can somewhat at least, be less-ened.What has been lost cannotbe replaced. But what we dohave can be made public. Weshould have access and our stu-dents should have access towhat still exists .—Bruce Hitchcock, May 1997

It is widely known that the Wa r ren Com-mission and the House Select Committeeon Assassinations conducted extensiveinvestigations of Jack Ruby, and, as a re s u l tgovernment offices processed voluminousRuby re c o rds. The Review Board madeonly two additional requests for informa-tion and re c o rds concerning Ruby. There-f o re, this chapter does not have a separatesection on Ruby. Similarly, the JFK Collec-tion contains a considerable number ofre c o rds concerning Lee Harvey Oswald’sactivities in New Orleans, but the ReviewB o a rd made only a few requests for addi-tional information and re c o rds re g a rd i n gOswald in New Orleans.

A. RECORDS RELATED TO LEE HARVEY

OSWALD

The Review Board’s additional re q u e s t sfocused upon locating all records concerningLee Harvey Oswald held by the U.S. govern-ment. The Review Board requested each

agency to check theirarchives, files, and data-bases for informationdirectly related to eitherLee Harvey Oswald orhis wife Marina Oswald.Given that many con-spiracy theories allegeU.S. government involve-

ment with Lee Harvey Oswald prior to theassassination, the Review Board was particu-larly interested in locating re c o rds that agen-

cies had created or main-tained prior to theassassination. In somecases, the Review Boardsimply released moreinformation from filesthat the public has longknown about, such asthe CIA 201 file on LeeHarvey and MarinaOswald or the FBI files

on Lee Harvey Oswald. In other cases, theReview Board’s additional requests led tothe release of new re c o rds, such as the CIA’ ssecurity file on Lee Harvey Oswald, orresulted in the release of previously deniedre c o rds, such as the original files on theOswalds from the Immigration and Natural-ization Service (INS).

1. Pre-Assassination Records

The question of what U.S. governmentrecords existed on Lee Harvey Oswald onNovember 22, 1963, has never been answeredto the satisfaction of the public. Thus, a pri-mary goal of the Review Board was to clarifythe pre-assassination re c o rds held by theagencies which were most involved in thepost-assassination investigation.

a. CIA.

At the time of the assassination, the CIA heldfour types of records which contained infor-mation on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 or per-sonality file which was released to the publicin 1992; an Office of Security file whichnearly duplicated the pre-assassination 201file; HTLINGUAL re c o rds; and re c o rd swithin a general file on U.S. citizens who haddefected to another country.

i. Security file. CIA’s search of its Officeof Personnel Security database produced theoriginal Office of Security’s subject file onLee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) establishedcirca 1960. The first volume of the Securityfile contains 19 documents, similar but notabsolutely identical to the pre-assassinationvolume of Oswald’s 201 file. The ReviewB o a rd identified an additional six docu-ments, which appear to pre-date the assassi-nation, in later volumes of the Security file.Although the HSCA reviewed the Office ofSecurity file in 1978, Congress did notinclude this file with the other materialviewed by the HSCA that it sequestered.Consequently, this file did not end up in theCIAsequestered collection.2 As a result of theReview Board’s request, CIA transmitted itsOffice of Security file to the John F. KennedyAssassination Records Collection (JFK Col-lection) at NARA.

ii. Records in the defector file. CIA estab-lished its 12-volume Office of Security Defec-tor file (#0341008) circa 1950 for the purposeof re c o rding information on U.S. citizenswho defected to other countries and informa-tion on foreign citizens who were consider-ing defecting to the United States. TheReview Board staff reviewed the entire defec-tor file for records related to Lee HarveyOswald. The staff located records on LeeHarvey Oswald, including research notes,

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One if the problems of secrets isthat Americans are incapable ofkeeping secrets very long. Any-thing like this would haveleaked out by now.—Richard Helms,February 7, 1996

We did not understand howintelligence agencies worked.The CIA “gave [us] nothingmore than what was asked for.Every time we asked for a file,we had to write a letter. Therewere no fishing expeditions.—Ed Lopez and Dan Hardway

press clippings, and duplicates of recordsfound in the Security file, and identified therecords as appropriate for inclusion in theJFK Collection.

iii. HTLINGUAL re c o r d s . H T L I N G U A L i sthe crypt for CIA’s mail opening and mailcover program for 1952 to 1973. The CIAreported to the Review Board that itd e s t royed most of its formal HTLINGUALre c o rds in 1990 at the direction of CIA’s Off i c eof General Counsel. The CIA s e q u e s t e red col-lection, however, does contain several “soft”or working files on Lee Harvey Oswald andthe HTLINGUAL p roject, including the “soft”file held by the Special Investigations Gro u pof the Counterintelligence Staff (CI/SIG). Inresponse to the Review Board’s request foradditional information, the CIA located addi-tional re f e rences to HTLINGUAL re c o rds ina rchival files of the CIA’s Deputy Director ofPlans (now the Deputy Director of Opera-tions). CIA p rocessed the relevant re c o rds forrelease to NARA.

b. FBI.

The FBI opened its file on Lee HarveyOswald in 1959 when press reports fromMoscow announced that Oswald, a twentyyear old former Marine had renounced hisU.S. citizenship and had applied for Sovietcitizenship. Between 1959 and November 22,1963, the FBI filed approximately 50 recordsf rom several government agencies in itsHeadquarters file on Oswald (105–82555).Although the FBI processed all of the pre-assassination documents in Oswald’s fileunder the JFK Act, the Review Board madeseveral additional requests to the FBI todetermine whether it had other pre -assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswaldin its files.

For example, the Review Board staff founddocuments cross-referenced from files cap-tioned “Funds Transmitted to Residents ofRussia” and “Russian Funds.” The ReviewBoard requested access to files with thesecase captions from FBI Headquarters and theDallas and New York Field offices for theyears 1959 through 1964. The Review Boardstaff located assassination records concern-ing attempts by Marguerite Oswald, LeeHarvey Oswald’s mother, to send money toher son while he was in the Soviet Union,

and recommended to the FBI that theserecords be included in the JFK Collection.

The Review Board also sought to determinewhether the FBI maintained a file in MexicoCity on a “Harvey Lee Oswald” under thefile number 105–2137. The Mexico City LegalAttache (Legat) opened a file on Lee HarveyOswald (105–3702) in October 1963 followingOswald’s visit to Mexico City. Some of thedocuments in the Legat’s file contain nota-tions for routing records to a file numbered105–2137, and were captioned “Harvey LeeOswald.” One researcher conjectured thatthis file would predate the Lee HarveyOswald file, 105–3702, and might lead theReview Board to other FBI documents on LeeHarvey Oswald. In response to the ReviewBoard’s request, the FBI searched its Legat’sfiles for a file numbered 105–2137 and cap-tioned “Harvey Lee Oswald,” but it did notfind such a file.

c. Secret Service.

The Review Board reviewed the Secret Ser-vice’s Protective Research Files and deter-mined that the Secret Service did not open ap rotective re s e a rch file (CO–2) file on LeeHarvey Oswald prior to the assassination.S e c ret Service re c o rds extant indicate thatthe Secret Service also did not have anyinformation on Lee Harvey Oswald fro mother government agencies prior to thea s s a s s i n a t i o n .

d. IRS/Social Security Administration.

To shed light on questions regarding LeeHarvey Oswald’s employment history andsources of income, the Review Board soughtto inspect and publicly release Internal Rev-enue Service (IRS) and Social SecurityAdministration (SSA) re c o rds on Oswald.Although the Review Board staff did reviewIRS and SSA records, Section 6103 of theInternal Revenue Code prohibits the disclo-sure of tax return information, and section11(a) of the JFK Act explicitly preserves theconfidentiality of tax return information.Thus, the Review Board unfortunately couldnot open Lee Harvey Oswald’s tax returns.The next chapter of this report explains, inthe IRS compliance section, the mechanics ofthe Review Board’s and the IRS’s efforts torelease this information.

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e. INS records on Lee and Marina Oswald.

Many researchers have asked how Lee Har-vey Oswald, a defector to the Soviet Union,could have been allowed to re-enter theUnited States in 1962 with his wife, a Sovietnational, and how Marina Oswald wouldhave been permitted to leave the SovietUnion when emigration was, at best,extremely difficult. In an attempt to shedlight on these questions, the Review Boardrequested and released original files on Leeand Marina Oswald from the U.S. Immigra-tion and Naturalization Service (INS). Subse-quently, in late 1997, INS discovered in itsinvestigative section, that it had an extensiveworking file on Marina Oswald that con-tained 1963–64 records directly relating to theassassination.

f. House Un-American Activities Committee.

As of this writing the Review Board hadobtained authorization of the House Judi-ciary Committee to release its HUAC files onLee Harvey Oswald. The records predomi-nantly postdated the assassination. However,HUAC held a few pre-assassination recordson Oswald, including articles on his defec-tion to the U.S.S.R. and his return to the U.S.

2. Military records

The question of whether the Marine Corpsconducted a post-assassination investigationand produced a written report on formerMarine Private Lee Harvey Oswald, circa late1963 and early 1964, has never been re s o l v e d

to the satisfaction of thepublic. Similarly, manyhave wondered whetherthe Office of Naval Intelli-gence (ONI) conducted apost-defection “net dam-age assessment” investi-gation of Lee HarveyOswald circa 1959 or 1960.Various former Oswaldassociates and militaryinvestigators have re c a l l e dseparate investigations.3

R e s e a rchers have alsoquestioned whetherOswald was an “authen-tic” defector, a “falsedefector” in a pro g r a m

run by an agency of the U.S. government, or afalse defector sent on a mission to the U.S.S.R.for a particular purpose and then used for dif-f e rent purposes by some members of the intel-ligence community following his return to theUnited States.

a. U.S. Marine Corps records.

The Review Board asked the Marine Corps tosearch for any records relating to post-assas-sination investigations that the U.S. MarineCorps might have completed, as someresearchers believe. The U.S. Marine Corpssearched files at both U.S. Marine Corps HQin Quantico, and at the Federal Records Cen-ter in Suitland, Maryland, but the MarineCorps did not locate evidence of any internalinvestigations of Lee Harvey Oswald, otherthan correspondence already published inthe Warren Report.

i. U.S. Marine Headquarters copy ofenlisted personnel file and medical file. In 1997,the Review Board transferred to the JFK Col-lection at NARA the original (paper) copiesof Lee Harvey Oswald’s U.S. Marine CorpsEnlisted Personnel File, and Medical Treat-ment File. Previously, these files had beenmaintained at U.S. Marine Corps Headquar-ters in Quantico, Virginia and had only beenavailable in microfiche format in response toFreedom of Information Act (FOIA) requeststhat people made to the Marine Corps.

ii. Additional relevant U.S. Marine Corpsunit diaries. The Review Board obtained fromU.S. Marine Corps Headquarters at Quan-tico, Virginia, additional official U.S. MarineCorps unit diaries from the units in whichOswald served. These additional diariescomplement the partial collection of unitdiaries gathered by the HSCA. Together, theReview Board and HSCA unit diary recordsappear to constitute a complete unit diaryrecord for Oswald. Researchers can comparethe in and out transfer dates in Oswald’s per-sonnel file with the original entries in the per-tinent diaries to which they correspond.

b. Military identification card .

To resolve questions about whether Oswald’sD D – 1173 Military Identification card pro-vided some indication that Oswald had aconnection to CIA, the Review Board

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[T]he enduring controversy ofwho Oswald really wa s, w h a the wa s, is an inherent part of thehistorical truth of this case. . .O s wa l d , as you know, is themost complex alleged or realpolitical assassin in Americanh i s t o ry. . . the idea that, for thefirst time, citizens will be thejudge of the balance betweengovernment secrecy and whatwe know, rather than the agen-cies themselves or the courts, Ithink is extraordinary. . .—Philip Melanson,March 24, 1995

requested and received additional informa-tion from the Federal Records Center in St.Louis, Missouri, from the personnel files ofother Marines who had served with Oswald(for comparison purposes), and from the U.S.Marine Corps and the U.S. Army’s MilitaryHistory Institute.

c. Possible ONI post-defection investigation.

The Review Board became aware of an indi-vidual named Fred Reeves of California, whowas reputed to have been in charge of a post-defection “net damage assessment” of Oswaldby the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)shortly after Oswald’s defection to the U.S.S.R.The Review Board contacted Reeves, inter-viewed him twice by telephone, then flew himto Washington, D.C., where the Review Boards t a ff interviewed him in person.4

In 1959, Reeves was a civilian Naval Intelli-gence Operations Specialist.5 Reeves told theReview Board that a week or so after Oswalddefected to the U.S.S.R., two officers fromONI in Washington, D.C.,6 called him andasked him to conduct a background investi-gation at the Marine Corps Air Station in ElToro, California—Oswald’s last duty stationbefore his discharge from the Marine Corps.Reeves said that he went to El Toro, copiedOswald’s enlisted personnel file, obtainedthe names of many of his associates, andmailed this information to ONI in Washing-ton, D.C. He said that ONI in Washington ranthe post-defection investigation of Oswald,and that the Washington officers thendirected various agents in the field. AlthoughReeves did not interview anyone himself, hesaid that later (circa late 1959 or early 1960),approximately 12 to 15 “119” reports con-cerning Oswald (OPNAV Forms 5520–119 areONI’s equivalent of an FBI FD–302 investiga-tive report), crossed his desk. Reeves said hewas aware of “119” reports from Japan andTexas, and that the primary concern of thereports he read on Oswald was to ascertainwhat damage had been done to nationalsecurity by Oswald’s defection. Reevesreported that he also saw eight to ten “119”reports on Oswald after the assassination,and that he was confident he was not confus-ing the two events in his mind.

In the spring of 1998, Review Board staffmembers met with two Naval Criminal

Investigative Service (NCIS) records manage-ment officials, one of whom personally veri-fied that he had searched for District Intelli-gence Office records (with negative results)from the San Diego, Dallas, and New OrleansDistrict Intelligence Offices in 1996 with neg-ative results. This search included “11 9 ”reports from the time period 1959–1964, dur-ing an extensive search of NCIS record group181. The search included any records thatwould have been related to Oswald’s defec-tion. Thus, the Review Board ultimatelylocated no documentary evidence to substan-tiate Reeves’ claims.

3. In the U.S.S.R.

Various authors interested in Lee HarveyOswald have suggested that Oswald was aC I A s o u rce, asset, or operative at the time ofhis defection to the U.S.S.R. in October 1959.R e s e a rchers further suggest that Oswald eitherperformed some sort of mission for the CIA,met with CIA personnel in the Soviet Union, orwas debriefed by CIA personnel upon hisreturn. The Review Board staff re q u e s t e dinformation and re c o rds from CIA and otheragencies in an effort to pursue re c o rds thatmight shed light on such allegations.

a. CIA operations in Moscow.

The Review Board staff examined extensiveCIA records concerning the history and oper-ations of the CIA in or against the SovietUnion in the late 1950s and early to mid1960s. The Review Board found no recordsthat suggested that Oswald had ever workedfor the CIA in any capacity, nor did anyrecords suggest that Oswald’s trip and defec-tion to the Soviet Union served any intelli-gence purpose. The Review Board staff alsointerviewed the senior CIAofficer in Moscowat the time of Oswald’s arrival and the CIAChief of Station present when Oswalddeparted the Soviet Union. Both individualsstated that they had no knowledge of Oswaldprior to the assassination, and they did notbelieve that Oswald’s trip and defection tothe Soviet Union was orchestrated for anyintelligence purpose.

b. American Embassy personnel.

R e v i e w B o a rd staff interviewed, or informallyspoke with, numerous individuals assigned

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to the American Embassy in Moscow duringthe time period 1959–1963. The clarity of indi-vidual memories of Oswald and/or theMoscow Embassy varied widely and few sto-ries were consistent. One of the most intere s t-ing was the interview of Joan Hallett, thereceptionist at the American Embassy and thefirst embassy person to meet Oswald. Hallettwas the wife of Assistant Naval Attache Com-mander Oliver Hallett and a temporaryreceptionist during the summer A m e r i c a nExhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow. Hal-lett’s recollections of Oswald’s visit place himat the embassy before the end of the Exhibi-tion on September 5, 1959. Available re c o rd sshow Oswald in the USSR no earlier thanOctober 15, 1959. While Hallett’s Departmentof State employment re c o rds document herrecollection that she was not employed as areceptionist as late as October 31, 1959, theReview Board found no documentary evi-dence to explain the variation in dates.

c. Search for American Embassy records.

In an effort to account for the widely varyingstories from the interviews of personnelassigned to the American Embassy inMoscow, the Review Board staff reviewedthe Department of State post files forMoscow for the period 1959–1963, which areavailable to the public at NARA. The Depart-ment of State was not able to locate the visi-tors book for Moscow circa 1959 nor any listof visitors and tourists for late 1959.

d. DCD/OO alleged debriefing of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Part of the mystery surrounding Oswald’sdefection and return to the U.S. is the ques-tion of whether the CIA’s Office of Opera-tions (later the Domestic Contacts Division)interviewed Oswald upon his return from

the Soviet Union. Theavailable evidence is con-t r a d i c t o r y. The ReviewB o a rd requested addi-tional information andrecords in an attempt tocoroborate a November25, 1963, memorandumwhich discusses the rec-ollections of a CIA staffo fficer that the A g e n c yc o n s i d e red interviewing

Oswald. The CIA, however, did not locateany corroborating information or records inits files.

In an effort to better understand this mys-t e r y, the Review Board searched for re c o rd swhich might confirm or deny whether therewas any contact between Oswald and theC I A b e f o re or after his time in the SovietUnion. The Office of Operations (OO), whichin 1963 was a part of the Directorate of Intel-ligence, interviewed American citizens whomight have come into contact with informa-tion or individuals of intelligence intere s twhile overseas.7 The Review Board staffexamined OO re c o rds and operational histo-ries to gain an understanding of OO prac-tices in the early 1960s. The Review Boards t a ff found no evidence of contact betweenOswald and OO either before or after histime in the Soviet Union. While the re c o rd sshowed that OO was interested in interview-ing tourists to the Soviet Union for generalinformation in the 1950s, by 1962 only trav-elers with special access, knowledge, orskills were of intelligence interest. OO hadno specific policy covering contacts withreturning defectors; however, a local fieldo ffice could initiate a contact if justified by aparticular situation. CIA could not locateany re c o rds or reporting showing any OOcontact with Oswald.

While a DCD “A” file does exist in the CIA’ss e q u e s t e red collection, most of the docu-ments in the file are from the mid-1970s; nonepredate the assassination. Furthermore, thefile appears to have been created as DCD per-sonnel attempted to locate any evidence ofcontacts with Oswald in response to variousc o n g ressional investigative bodies. CIAprocessed this file for release to NARA.

4. In Mexico City

Lee Harvey Oswald’s visit to Mexico City inS e p t e m b e r-October 1963, remains one of them o re vexing subplots to the assassinations t o r y. Oswald’s fascination with the SovietUnion and Cuba is well-known, yet thereexists no consensus of opinion as to why hespent time at both the Soviet and CubanEmbassies during his brief stay in MexicoCity in late September and early October1963. Why did Lee Harvey Oswald makethis mysterious trip to Mexico just six weeks

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[T]he CIA, with thorough photo-graphic surveillance of both theCuban and Soviet Embassies,had at least ten opportunities tophotograph Oswa l d , yet CIArecords at the time of the assassi-nation allegedly did not containa single photograph match i n gthe man arrested in Dallas.—Peter Dale Scott

prior to the assassination? Was the purposeof this trip merely to apply for a transit visaat the Cuban Embassy in a desperateattempt to return to Moscow after the Sovi-ets had re b u ffed his direct approach? Sincethe Mexico City chapter is so puzzling, andp rovides fertile ground for speculation, theReview Board sought to ensure that all gov-ernment re c o rds on this subject werereleased and took action to pursue addi-tional re c o rds. The Review Board facilitatedthe release of thousands of previously sani-tized and closed documents on the subject ofOswald’s trip to Mexico, including but notlimited to re c o rds from CIA, FBI, Depart-ment of State, the Wa r ren Commission andthe HSCA. The Review Board also pursuedleads suggested by re s e a rchers and submit-ted requests to agencies for additionalre c o rds and/or evidence.

a. Technical surveillance.

At the time of Oswald’s trip to Mexico, withthe Cold War well underway and theKennedy Administration preoccupied withCuba, the CIA’s Mexico City Station housedone of the Agency’s major foreign clandes-tine operations in the Western Hemisphere.The station maintained a multifaceted sur-veillance coverage of the Soviet and Cubandiplomatic installations. CIA electronic sur-veillance confirmed that Lee Harvey Oswaldvisited and communicated with both theCuban Consulate and the Soviet Embassybetween September 27 and October 1 or 2,1963. Despite requests from several congres-sional investigative bodies and the ReviewBoard, the CIA never located photographicevidence of Oswald’s visit to either embassy.Although CIA has transcripts of the callsbelieved to have been made by Oswald, theCIA has consistently maintained that it didnot retain tapes from the period of Oswald’svisit as the Station continually recycled thetapes after it transcribed any useful informa-tion. According to the transcripts, only one ofthe calls, made to the Soviet Consulate, actu-ally identifies a Lee Oswald as the caller.Since CIA had already erased the tapes, inaccordance with the Station’s standard pro-cedures, it could not perform post-assassina-tion voice comparisons.

Given the importance of the Mexico City Sta-tion, the Review Board worked to ensure that

the re c o rds on the Station and Oswald’s Mex-ico City visit in the JFK Collection at NARAre p resent the full universe of re c o rds. Recog-nizing the existence of gaps in the JFK Collec-tion, the Review Board staff worked to verifywhether any additional extant re c o rds couldp rovide further information on or more tangi-ble evidence of Oswald’s trip to Mexico Cityand alleged contacts with the Soviet andCuban Embassies. The Review Board staffexamined the CIA s e q u e s t e red collection, theOswald 201 file, and the then unpro c e s s e dfiles maintained by longtime CIA o fficer RussHolmes in an effort to locate any leads towardunique information on Oswald’s visit and theC I A Station in Mexico City.

i. Audio and photographic. C I A h a sacknowledged that in 1963, at the time ofOswald’s visit, the Mexico City Station hadin place two telephone intercept opera-tions—covering both the Soviet and CubanEmbassies; three photographic surveillanceoperations targeting the Soviet compound;and one photographic surveillance opera-tion, which employed at least two cameras,targeting the Cuban compound. Painstakingnegotiations between the Review Board andCIA on the protection or release of technicaland operational details resulted in CIA’s dis-closure of a great deal of previously withheldinformation concerning audio and photo-graphic surveillance. This process thenpaved the way for the Review Board to askfor specific types of records pertaining toCIA’s surveillance activities.

The Review Board submitted formal andinformal requests to CIA relating to elec-tronic surveillance operations. Several mem-bers of the Review Board staff reviewed thesequestered collection microfilm, which con-tained a broad universe of records on CIAtechnical operations and covered a periodthat extended beyond the assassination.Because the release of the Warren Commis-sion Report in 1964 had a bearing on certainsurveillance operations in Mexico City, theReview Board sought to ensure that itmarked for inclusion in the JFK Collection allrecords reflecting any changes in or suspen-sion of surveillance activity around the timethat the Wa r ren Commission released itsreport. In addition, the Review Boardexplored any newly identified operations orsurveillance activity.

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During its review of all project files andoperational reports, the Review Board founddirect references to electronic bugs and hid-den microphones at the Cuban Embassy andrequested CIA to provide additional infor-mation. The Review Board attempted todetermine whether CIA had any other elec-tronic intelligence that may have recordedOswald’s visits inside the Cuban consulate ordiscussions about his visits. In response tothis request, CIA provided evidence from aMexico City history stating that its buggingoperation was not in place at the time ofOswald’s visit. CIA p rovided no furtherinformation on hidden microphones.

Although CIAhad photographic surveillancetargeting the front gates of both the Sovietand Cuban Consulates, CIA reports that itdid not locate photographic evidence ofOswald’s visits. In an effort to obtain addi-tional records on this subject, the ReviewB o a rd submitted additional requests forinformation pertaining to technical surveil-lance. The Review Board staff also reviewedproject files concerning all known telephonicand photographic operations. The ReviewBoard designated as assassination records alltechnical operational reports pertaining tothe 1963–64 time frame that CIA had notalready placed in the JFK Collection. Thesenew re c o rds included periodic pro g re s sreports, contact sheets, project re n e w a lreports and related documentation on tele-phone and photographic surveillance, logsthat corresponded to photographic surveil-lance, contact sheets from photographic sur-veillance, and transcripts of telephonic sur-veillance.

ii. Tapes, transcripts, and photographs ine x i s t e n c e . C I A reported that it ro u t i n e l yerased tapes from telephone operations aftertwo weeks, unless CIA identified a conversa-tion on a tape that was of particular intelli-gence value. CIA stated that it destroyedtape[s] containing Oswald’s voice and otherrelated calls as a matter of routine procedure,even though the Mexico City Station’s inter-est in the Oswald conversations at the timethat CIA intercepted them was such that theStation transcribed them and reported themto CIA Headquarters in an October 8, 1963,cable. CIA reported that its interest at thetime was in an American talking to the Sovietand Cuban Embassies, not in Oswald in par-

ticular, and thus, the tape recordings them-selves were not of intelligence value.

On the day of the assassination when Oswaldwas named as the alleged assassin, CIAHeadquarters instructed its Mexico City Sta-tion not to erase any tapes until it providedfurther notification. Although CIA did notlocate tapes from the September- O c t o b e rtime frame, the Review Board’s additionalrequests resulted in CIA’s identifyingapproximately 185 additional tapes from theStation’s telephone operation from the daysimmediately following the assassination andthe next few weeks. The Review Board desig-nated all of the tapes as assassination recordsand the CIA is currently processing the tapesfor release to NARA.

The Review Board’s efforts to locate newphotographic evidence of Oswald in MexicoCity were unsuccessful. The Review Boardexplored the possibility that CIA had addi-tional re c o rds pertaining to CIA p h o t o-graphic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy.Although the Mexico City Station ran threeoperations during the relevant time period,the HSCA investigators found photographicevidence and log sheets from only one ofthese CIA operations.8 The HSCA material—including the photographs of the man whowas initially misidentified as Oswald—isavailable to the public at NARA.

Beyond the photographic evidence from thetime period of Oswald’s visit, the CIAs e q u e s t e red collection microfilm containedadditional log sheets and copies of film fro mthe Cuban and Soviet surveillance opera-tions. The Review Board believed thesere c o rds may be useful to re s e a rchers for thepurpose of establishing a frame of re f e re n c eor modus operandi, and for understandingthe scope of CIA coverage in 1963. In light ofthe historical value of this material, theReview Board declared all photographiccoverage for 1963 that it found in the CIAs e q u e s t e red collection microfilm as assassi-nation re c o rd s .

b. Cable traffic.

The Review Board determined that, whilemuch of the Mexico City Station cable trafficexisted in the JFK Collection, the traffic con-tained numerous gaps, particularly in com-

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munications between Mexico City and theCIAStation in Miami, JMWAVE.9 The ReviewBoard deemed these gaps to be significantbecause both CIA stations played roles inU.S. operations against Cuba. The cable traf-fic that the Review Board reviewed in theCIA’s sequestered collection commences onOctober 1, 1963, and contains the earliestknown communication—an October 8, 1963,cable—between the Mexico City Station andCIA Headquarters concerning Lee HarveyOswald.

In 1995, the Review Board submitted a for-mal request for additional informationregarding the above-referenced gaps in CIAcable traffic. CIA did not locate additionaltraffic for the specified periods. CIA com-pleted its response to this request in February1998 explaining that:

In general, cable traffic and dispatchesare not available as a chronological col-lection and thus, for the period 26through 30 September 1963 it is not pos-sible to provide cables and dispatches ina chronological/package form. During

the periods in question, the Office ofCommunications (OC) only held cableslong enough to ensure that they weresuccessfully transmitted to the namedrecipient. On occasion. . . cables weresometimes held for longer periods butnot with the intention of creating a long-term reference collection.

In addition, CIA informed the Review Boardthat it did not have a repository for cablesand dispatches from stations in the 1960s.10

Although originating offices maintainedtemporary chronological files, the off i c e sgenerally destroyed the temporary records inless than ninety days. After the assassination,the Office of the Deputy Director of Plansordered relevant CIA offices to retain cablesthat they would have otherwise destroyed.The HSCAused the remaining cable traffic tocompile its Mexico City chronology. Had CIAoffices strictly applied the ninety-day rule,there might have been copies of cable trafficcommencing as early as August 22, 1963,rather than October 1, 1963, available to CIAon November 22, 1963. (See illustration.)

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c. Win Scott files.

Winston M. (Win) Scott was the CIA Chief ofStation in Mexico City at the time ofOswald’s visit. While the CIA had processedsome of Scott’s files as part of its sequesteredcollection, the Review Board followed up onseveral leads suggesting that CIAmight haveadditional Scott files from his Mexico Citydays. Scott apparently had an interest in theassassination, and was a prodigious recordkeeper. The Review Board asked the CIA tosearch for any additional extant records thatScott had maintained. According to AnneGoodpasture, who had worked with Scott inMexico City, Scott kept a collection of classi-fied documents from his tenure as Chief ofStation which he stored in a safe in his homefollowing his retirement. While the details ofthe story are unclear, the Review Boardunderstands that shortly after Scott’s deathin 1973, CIACounterintelligence Chief JamesJ. Angleton, one of Scott’s longtime friends,traveled to Mexico City to make arrange-

ments with Scott’s wifefor CIA personnel toreview Scott’s classifiedmaterial. CIA producedwhat it says are its com-plete files on Scott,including inventory lists,some documents whicha p p e a red to be fro mScott’s personnel file,and Scott’s semi-autobio-graphical novel. TheReview Board examinedthese documents forinformation relevant to

the assassination. The Review Board deter-mined a small number of the records to beassassination records.

d. Sylvia Duran.

Silvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican nationalwho worked as a receptionist at the CubanConsulate in Mexico City at the time ofOswald’s visit, assisted Oswald in his questto apply for a visa to ultimately return to theU.S.S.R., and thus became a key figure in theMexico City chapter of the assassinations t o r y. In the immediate aftermath of theassassination, the Mexican federal securityservice, Direccion Federal de Seguridad(DFS), arrested and interrogated Silvia

Tirado de Duran.

CIAhad transcribed intercepts of phone callsmade between Silvia Duran and the SovietConsulate in Mexico City that related to herdealings with Oswald. Duran’s statement tothe DFS after the assassination corroboratedthe information in CIA’s intercepts—that LeeHarvey Oswald went to the Cuban Con-sulate to request a transit visa. The DFS pro-vided Duran’s interrogation reports to U.S.authorities in Mexico City and the reportswere widely disseminated to U.S. federalagencies in the immediate aftermath of Pres-ident Kennedy’s death.

Given that the initial ten-page “confession”or interrogation appeared to be a summaryreport of Duran’s account and the statementsof several other individuals who also werea r rested and questioned with Duran, theReview Board wondered whether the CIAhad an “original” transcript from Duran’sarrest. The Review Board requested that CIAsearch for such a transcript, but CIA searchesall returned to the ten-page summary andCIA did not locate additional records.

e. Legat administrative files.

The FBI keeps administrative files on each ofits field offices and its Legal Attache, orLegat, offices. The Legat administrative filescontain communications between the Legatand FBI Headquarters concerning personnel,real estate, supplies, construction, and to alesser extent, relations between the FBI Legatand re p resentatives of other governmentagencies abroad. The Review Boardrequested and received from the FBI access toits Mexico City Legat administrative file withthe hope that the file might contain recordsconcerning the assassination itself or recordsconcerning Oswald’s pre-assassination trav-els to Mexico. The Review Board also askedthe FBI for access to its Legat administrativefiles for London, England; Bern, Switzerland;and Paris, France during the periods of1960–1965 and 1977–1979 (the period of theHSCA investigation.) The Review Board didnot locate assassination re c o rds in the Legatfiles for London, Bern, or Paris files, or in the1977–1979 Mexico City Legat file. The ReviewB o a rd did designate approximately thirty doc-uments from the Mexico City Legat file for1960-1965 that discussed FBI staffing of the

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The Committee has found. . . theFBI investigation, as well as theCIA inquiry [into the Kennedyassassination], was deficient onthe specific question of the sig-nificance of Oswald’s contactswith pro-Castro and anti-Cas-tro groups for the many monthsbefore the assassination.—Senate Report on JFK Act,July 22, 1992

Mexico City Legat both before and after thea s s a s s i n a t i o n .

f. Anne Goodpasture deposition.

Anne Goodpasture worked for Mexico CityChief of Station Win Scott for many years andpossessed a thorough understanding of theoperations of the Mexico City Station. TheReview Board deposed Goodpasture atlength and she provided information con-cerning the daily routine of the Mexico CityStation, the types of operations performed bythe station, the management of operationsperformed by the station, and the workingstyle of Win Scott. The Review Board believesthat researchers will be particularly inter-ested in information she provided on thehandling of audio surveillance tapes in thestation which may have recorded Lee HarveyOswald’s voice.

B. RECORDS ON CUBA

In the mid-1970s, the Church Committee pub-licly revealed what journalists had been alleg-ing since 1967—that the U.S. government hads p o n s o red assassination attempts at varioustimes against Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Cas-t ro presumably knew about these attemptslong before the U.S. public, and some histori-ans and re s e a rchers have questioned whetherhe retaliated by assassinating Pre s i d e n tK e n n e d y. The Review Board sought to findre c o rds that would illuminate a slightly dif-f e rent but related area of interest: the degre eto which the U.S. government sponsore dpotential uprisings and military coups withinCuba, and the extent of possible U.S. plans toinvade Cuba by overt military force. TheB o a rd believed that such re c o rds would be ofi n t e rest not only to mainstream historians,but also to many who believe there was aconspiracy to kill President Kennedy. Forexample, evidence of serious, or imminent,contingency plans to invade Cuba with U.S.military forces during the Kennedy A d m i n i s-tration, if found, could provide either amotive for retaliation by Castro or a motivefor domestic malcontents who might havebeen displeased that such plans were notimmediately implemented by the administra-tion. The Review Board believed that therewould be strong public interest in any re c o rd swhich would illuminate U.S. governmentpolicy deliberations on Cuba.

F u r t h e r, Lee HarveyOswald’s connection withthe Fair Play for CubaCommittee made theReview Board’s search forany re c o rds on U.S.-Cubapolicy all the more re l e-vant. The degree to whichU.S. policy toward Cuba following Pre s i d e n tKennedy’s assassination did or did not changep rovides a final reason to search for re c o rds toenhance the historical understanding, or con-text, of the assassination.

1. CIA Records

Most of the relevant CIA records on Cubathat the Review Board staff identified asa s s a s s i n a t i o n - related existed in the CIAs e q u e s t e red collection before the ReviewBoard began making requests for additionalrecords and information. The Review Boardidentified additional records pertaining tothe period 1960–1964 from some contempo-rary working files of a CIA office concernedwith Latin American issues. Most of theserecords concerned the existence or activitiesof the JMWAVE Station in Miami. Smallnumbers of records pertaining to Cuba orU.S.-anti-Cuban activities were identified inthe records of the Directorate of Plans (nowthe Directorate of Operations) and in the filesof several senior officers of the CIA duringthe 1960–65 period. CIA processed for inclu-sion in the JFK Collection those records thatthe Review Board marked as assassinationrecords.

2. Military Records

The Review Board staff located militaryrecords on Cuba in four different collectionsof records.

a. Joint Staff Secre t a r i a t .

The staff of the Joint Staff Secretariat searc h e dfor re c o rds related to both Cuba and Vi e t n a mpolicy and flagged selected re c o rds fro m1961–1964 from the files of Joint Chiefs ofS t a ff Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, MaxwellTa y l o r, and Earle Wheeler, and selectedre c o rds from 1961–1964 from the Central Filesof the Joint Staff for examination and consid-eration by the Review Board staff. TheReview Board staff flagged all but one of the

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The Oswald visit was not, cer-tainly to my knowledge,ever anoperation, so it was just a flashin the pan, a product of some-thing that happened. . .—Anne Goodpasture, 1995

147 re c o rds selected as appropriate for inclu-sion in the JFK Collection. A p p ro x i m a t e l yt w o - t h i rds of the 147 re c o rds related to Cubapolicy from 1961–196411—the re m a i n d e rrelated to Vietnam policy.

b. Army.

In 1963, Joseph Califano served as both Gen-eral Counsel to Secretary of the Army Cyru sVance and as Special Assistant to the A r m yS e c re t a r y. NARA identified six FederalR e c o rds Center boxes containing the Cubapolicy papers of Joseph Califano from 1963.The Review Board designated the six boxes of“Califano Papers,” in their entire t y, as appro-priate for inclusion in the JFK Collection.

During 1963, Secretary Vance was the “DODExecutive Agent” for all meetings of the gov-ernmental task force, the “InterdepartmentalCoordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs,”(ICCCA). As Vance’s special assistant, Cali-fano often represented him at meetings of theICCCA, and was part of all ICCCA policydeliberations. The collection of CalifanoPapers represents a unique find and reflectsmuch of the interagency planning activitiesrelated to Cuba during 1963.

c. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

A small number ofre c o rds (appro x i m a t e l yforty) from the papers ofS e c retary of Defense RobertMcNamara at NARA con-tain some material onCuba policy. The ReviewB o a rd processed theserecords for inclusion inthe JFK Collection.

d. Joint Chiefs of Staffhistory.

The Review Board staffreviewed and identifiedas assassination recordstwo volumes of The His -tory of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, written by Walter S.Poole (Volume VIII:1961–1964, Part II— T h eSuccession of Crises; andVolume VIII: 1961–1964,

Part III—The Global Challenge). Poole ispresently updating and rewriting the twovolumes to improve their scholarship. Whenhe has finished, Poole will submit the vol-umes for a security review and the Joint StaffS e c retariat will forward the volumes toNARA.

3. Presidential Library Collections

In response to public interest in, and specula-tion about, the possible connection betweenCuba or U.S. policy toward Cuba and theassassination of President Kennedy, theReview Board requested the John F. Kennedyand Lyndon Baines Johnson Pre s i d e n t i a lLibraries to search their holdings of Cubarecords for assassination-related information.The Presidential Libraries identified addi-tional assassination re c o rds in the CubaCountry files, the National Security files, var-ious office files, personal papers of WhiteHouse officials, and certain unpro c e s s e dcollections of presidential aides and policyadvisors.

a. John F. Kennedy Presidential Libraryrecords.

Augmenting the JFK Library’s initial searchand identification of assassination records, ajoint team of Review Board staff and repre-sentatives from other agencies, visited theJFK Library in June 1996 to conduct a com-prehensive review of JFK Library closed col-lections. The Review Board staff reviewed allof the Library’s National Security Files con-taining records on Cuba from the KennedyAdministration. As a result of this effort, theJFK Library released thirty boxes of Cubafiles to the JFK Collection. The Library alsoopened its Presidential recordings on theCuban Missile Crisis and sent copies of theseto the JFK Collection.

Subsequent to this visit, the Library identifiedadditional assassination re c o rds on Cuba. Ofparticular value were those re c o rds whichdiscussed the Kennedy Administration’s pol-icy toward Cuba, proposed anti-Castro activ-ities, and Operation Mongoose planning.Most of these re c o rds were generated by theStanding Group Committee of the NationalSecurity Council with additional CIA a n dOSD memoranda discussing sensitive Cubanoperations. The Review Board staff also iden-

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The Kennedy Library verym u ch appreciates that it hasbeen able to open in excess of30,000 pages of previously clas-sified material, primarily onCuba, through the efforts of theAssassination Records ReviewBoard.—Stephanie Fawcett,September 1998

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believethat the Cuban problem must besolved in the near future.—Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,Robert McNamara from theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, L.L. Lemnitzer,April 10, 1962.

tified Cuban re c o rds in the JFK Library’sclosed papers of Attorney General Robert F.K e n n e d y, Richard Goodwin, and Ralph Dun-gan and in the Department of Justice Crimi-nal Division microfilm collection.

The Review Board discovered a wealth ofCuba material within the Robert F. Kennedy(RFK) papers, though it did not declare allof the re c o rds as assassination re c o rds. Toe n s u re that the JFK Library opened the RFKpapers, however, the Review Board desig-nated those re c o rds which it believed to berelevant. This group of re c o rds was subjectto a Deposit A g reement requiring thee x p ress permission of the RFK donor com-mittee, then headed by Michael Kennedy, toauthorize their re l e a s e .1 2 The Review Boardhas not yet secured the final release of all ofthe RFK papers, but the JFK Library fore i g npolicy staff is working with the ReviewB o a rd to attempt to obtain the release of theRFK papers.1 3 Upon approval by the com-mittee, the JFK Library will send theseimportant re c o rds to the JFK Collection atN A R A .

b. Lyndon Baines Johnson PresidentialLibrary records.

To ensure a more complete review of the LBJLibrary’s holdings for assassination records,two members of the Review Board staff and aNARA representative visited the Library inMarch 1997. The Review Board conducted acomprehensive review of the closed NationalSecurity files, including a targeted review ofCuban records. As expected, the LBJ Librarywas not as rich as the JFK Library in materialpertaining to Cuba. In addition to identifyingrecords that had direct reference to the assas-sination, the Review Board was also inter-ested in those records that could reveal conti-nuity or shifts in policy between the Kennedyand Johnson Administrations. The ReviewB o a rd designated additional assassinationrecords pertaining to Cuba found in John-son’s Vice Presidential Security files, CubaCountry Files, and various Office Files ofWhite House aides.

4. Church Committee Records

The JFK Collection contains extensiverecords relating to the Church Committee’sinvestigation of alleged assassination plots

against Fidel Castro, and includes materialsrelating to the Church Committee’s examina-tion of Operation Mongoose and AMLASH.In addition, the JFK Collection includes testi-mony from key government officials knowl-edgeable on U.S. policy toward Cuba in the1960s, such as Robert McNamara, McGeorgeBundy, Roswell Gilpatric, Richard Helms,and John McCone.

C. RECORDS ON VIETNAM

The debate among historians continues overwhether President Kennedy would have esca-lated U.S. involvement in the Vietnam Wa rhad he lived, or whether he would have less-ened involvement and even withdrawn fro mVietnam. The Review Board, there f o re ,sought to locate any re c o rds that would illu-minate this debate or illuminate any diff e r-ences between the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ smid- and-late 1963 Vietnam policy and theJohnson Administration’s 1964 Vietnam pol-i c y. Much of the Review Board’s interest inVietnam re c o rds, as in the case of the ReviewB o a rd’s search for Cuba re c o rds, is in enhanc-ing the historical understanding or context ofthe assassination.

1. CIA Records

The Review Board’s additional re q u e s t sadded few CIA re c o rds on Vietnam to theJFK Collection. The Review Board identifieda small number of re c o rds pertaining to Vi e t-nam in the files of the Directorate of Plans(now the Directorate of Operations) and inthe files of several senior CIA o fficials fro m1963–65. Some re c o rds designated as assassi-nation re c o rds concern CIA reporting on theassassination of South Vietnamese Pre s i d e n tNgo Dinh Diem and his brother in Novem-ber 1963. Many of the Vietnam re c o rd sexamined by the Review Board staff dealtwholly with CIA and military liaison andoperations after 1965. CIA p rocessed for theJFK Collection the few Vietnam re c o rd sReview Board staff members identified asassassination re c o rd s .

2. Military Records

The Review Board staff located militaryrecords on Vietnam in three different collec-tions of records.

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a. Joint Staff Secretariat.

The staff of the Joint Staff Secre t a r i a tsearched for records related to Vietnam pol-icy and flagged selected re c o rds fro m1961–1964 from the files of Joint Chiefs ofStaff Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, MaxwellTa y l o r, and Earle Wheeler, and selectedre c o rds from 1961–1964 from the CentralFiles of the Joint Staff, for examination andconsideration by the Review Board staff. TheReview Board selected approximately fiftyrecords for inclusion in the JFK Collection.

b. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Review Board identified for inclusion inthe JFK Collection a small number of records( a p p roximately forty) from the personalpapers of Secretary of Defense Robert McNa-mara at NARA that contain some materialson Vietnam policy.

c. Joint Chiefs of Staff history.

The Review Board iden-tified a three-part JointChiefs of Staff off i c i a lhistory titled The JointChiefs of Staff and the Warin Vietnam, 1960-1968, asappropriate for inclusionin the JFK Collection.

3. Presidential LibraryC o l l e c t i o n s

During most of PresidentKennedy’s time in office,the Vietnam War was not

the pressing issue for the White House that itbecame, a problem which had begun to heatup shortly before Kennedy’s death. Vietnam,as a foreign policy priority, then went on toconsume the Johnson presidency. The per-ceived change in Vietnam policy betweenthese two presidential administrations hasprovided another source of fodder for con-spiracies. In response to concerns expressedby the assassination research community thatthe Vietnam question had not been ade-quately addressed by past investigations, theReview Board extended its search of both theKennedy and Johnson Presidential Librarymaterials to include records on Vietnam. TheReview Board was primarily interested in

obtaining records that could indicate anychanges in President Kennedy’s plansregarding military involvement in Vietnamand any shift or continuity of policy at thebeginning of President Johnson’s administra-tion.

a. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.

The JFK Library identified a small number ofVietnam-related documents in its NationalSecurity files. Most of the Vietnam recordsdate from August 1963 through the assassi-nation, as the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o nbegan to pay attention to events in Vietnam.The Library also released copies of Presiden-tial recordings to the JFK Collection for thesame period, which contained additionalinformation pertaining to Vietnam.

b. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library.

In response to the public’s desire to knowmore about any shift in policy between theKennedy and Johnson Administrations, theReview Board extended its search at the LBJLibrary to include Vietnam materials fromthe transitional period. Two members of theReview Board staff visited the LBJ Library in1997 and reviewed a vast collection ofNational Security Files and White HouseOffice Files. Not surprisingly, the search forrelevant Vietnam-related material at the LBJLibrary proved to yield more records thanthe search for Cuba-related records. Most ofthe additional assassination records identi-fied at the LBJ Library from this transitionalperiod concerned Vietnam. Some of theserecords indicate that Vietnam, rather thanCuba, was quickly becoming a priority forPresident Johnson’s White House.

4. Church Committee Testimony

Among the major issues involving Vietnamwas the assassination of President Diem andhis brother in November 1963 shortly beforeP resident Kennedy’s assassination. TheReview Board released classified Churc hCommittee testimony on this issue by CIAofficers William Colby and Lucien Conein.The Church Committee’s report on the Diemassassination relied heavily on their testi-m o n y, which had remained classified forover twenty years.

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Several colleagues have calledmy attention to the role of theAssassination Records ReviewBoard in potentially effectingthe public release of documentsrelated to Vietnam policy andperhaps other issues of foreignpolicy in late 1963. . . I writenow to add my voice directly tothose calling for the completerelease of such materials .—Professor James K. Galbraith

D. RECORDS OF SENIOR AGENCY OFFICIALS

To the extent that agencies such as the CIA,FBI, or Secret Service maintained the work-ing files of those individuals who served assenior agency officials during the time of theKennedy assassination, the Review Boardrequested agencies to search those files forassassination records.

1. CIA

The CIA maintains few working files ofsenior CIA officers from the 1950s and 1960s.To the extent that CIA p reserves suchrecords, the records exist in the general filingsystem under the office that the individualheld at the time, e.g. the Director of CentralIntelligence (DCI) or their Deputy Directors(DDCI). Based on the Review Board ’ sobservations, the contents of the DCI andDDCI working files primarily tend to be cor-respondence files, briefing papers, and work-ing files on general subjects rather than in-depth collections of detailed material.

The Review Board staff requested andreviewed files of DCIs Allen Dulles and JohnMcCone, DDCIs Charles Cabell and MarshallCarter, and the office files of the DeputyDirector of Plans (DDP) (now the Directorateof Operations) for the time period 1958–1968.Because records such as the briefing papersthat CIA officers prepared for the DCI aresensitive and worldwide in nature, theReview Board designated only the relevantportions of the re c o rds as assassinationrecords.

a. Allen Dulles.

CIA reviewed most of the files of DCI AllenDulles under its Executive Order 12958declassification program. The Review Boardstaff reviewed some of Dulles’ papers and hisoffice calendars for the relevant time period.The Review Board marked some pages of thecalendars, which re c o rded Dulles’ off i c i a land social activities, as assassination records.

b. John McCone.

The Review Board staff examined CIA’s indexto DCI John McCone’s files, reviewed files ofpossible relevance, and marked relevant doc-uments as assassination re c o rds. A c c o rding to

the box and folder indexlistings of McCone’s files,McCone did not maintainfiles on the assassinationof President Kennedy, theassassination investiga-tion, Lee Harvey Oswald,or the Wa r ren Commis-sion. McCone re c o rds doinclude memoranda, brief-ing reports, and transcriptswhich discuss Oswald, the assassination, andthe assassination investigation.

Within the McCone papers, the Review Boardnoticed several file folders with notations orsheets indicating documents on a wide vari-ety of subjects which are either missing orw e re destroyed. Of the missing or destro y e ddocuments, two refer to the Kennedy assassi-nation. One document from a 1963 listing isdescribed as “Date of Meeting—26 Nov; Par-ticipants—DCI & Bundy; Subjects Covere d —Msg concerning Pres. Kennedy’s assassina-tion.” The second document is described as“Date of Meeting—19 May ‘64; Participants—DCI, J.J. McCloy; Dinner at Residence—Re:Oswald.” This document is annotated“ D e s t royed 1–28–72.” CIA historians notedthat both documents were missing when theyreviewed the files in 1986. The Review Boarddesignated as assassination re c o rds all re l e-vant documents from the McCone filesincluding the notations on the destroyed andmissing re c o rd s .

c. Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter.

Review Board staff located only a small num-ber of assassination records in the records ofDDCIs Charles Cabell for 1959–1962 andMarshall Carter for 1962–1965. The DDCIs’records consist primarily of personal corre-spondence, official correspondence, andbriefing papers.

d. Richard Bissell, William Colby, andRichard Helms.

C I A p rovided the Review Board with a mas-sive index to the files of the Office of theDeputy Director of Plans (later the DeputyD i rector of Operations) covering the periodf rom the late 1940s to the present. ReviewB o a rd staff carefully reviewed the index andidentified potentially relevant material.

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The Board has an obligation toexamine the records of formerpublic officials who partici-pated in any aspect or phase ofinvestigation concerning theassassination, or of former pub-lic officials closely allied withKennedy.—Anna Kasten Nelson

A c c o rding to CIA, it incorporated into theseo ffice files all of the still existing re c o rds ofR i c h a rd Bissell, William Colby, and RichardHelms as DDPs. Again, due to the sensitiveand worldwide nature of many of theDDP/DDO files, the Review Board designatedonly certain portions of the re c o rds for re l e a s eto the JFK Collection.

e. James J. Angleton.

Knowledge of the re c o rds that James J. A n g l e-ton, Chief of Counterintelligence for thirtyyears, allegedly created, and the pro b a b l e

d e s t ruction of thoserecords after his retire-ment, has generatedextensive public intere s t .In an attempt to satisfy thepublic’s curiosity aboutAngleton’s files, theReview Board asked theC I A (1) to search for anyextant re c o rds that A n g l e-ton maintained, and (2) toaccount for the destru c-

tion of his files or the incorporation of his filesinto other filing systems. In response, the Dire c-torate of Operations provided three memo-randa that document CIA’s multi-year re v i e wof Angleton’s counterintelligence files.1 4 T h e s ememoranda state that CIA reviewed A n g l e-ton’s re c o rds and incorporated a small perc e n t-age into the files of the Directorate of Opera-tions. CIA d e s t royed other re c o rds, eitherbecause the re c o rds were duplicates or becauseC I Adecided not to retain them. The Dire c t o r a t eof Operations did not provide destru c t i o nre c o rds to account for the Angleton files.

f. Lawrence Houston.

L a w rence Houston was the CIA G e n e r a lCounsel for much of the agency’s early years.Few of his working papers, however, stillexist today. The Review Board staff revieweda small number of papers identified asbelonging either to the files of LawrenceHouston or the Office of the General Counselfor the time period 1959–1964. The staff didnot detect any additional assassinationre c o rds in this collection of Houston’spapers. However, the Office of the GeneralCounsel had retained a file on CIA recordsthat were held by the Warren Commission.The Review Board determined that this file

was an assassination record and marked itfor inclusion in the JFK Collection at NARA.

g. William Harvey.

William Harvey was intricately involved in theplanning for the Bay of Pigs invasion and thevarious assassination plots against Fidel Cas-t ro. The Review Board received a query from are s e a rcher concerning the possible existence of“operational diaries” that Harvey may havec reated. CIA s e a rched its Directorate of Opera-tions re c o rds and did not locate any re c o rd sbelonging to Harvey. The introduction to the1967 CIA Inspector General’s (IG) report onplots to assassinate Castro notes that RichardHelms directed that, once the IG’s office pro-duced the report, CIA should destroy all notesand source material that it used to draft thereport. CIA may have destroyed Harvey’salleged diaries in response to Helms’ dire c t i v e .F i n a l l y, Review Board staff also asked variousC I A reviewers who worked on re c o rds re l a t i n gto the Bay of Pigs whether they had locatedany operational diaries belonging to Harvey.Despite its efforts, the Review Board did notlocate any diaries.

2. FBI

The Review Board attempted to determinewhether the FBI retained any sets of workingfiles of its top officials during the years sur-rounding the assassination. Public specula-tion regarding the alleged secret files of FBIDirector J. Edgar Hoover is widespread. Ofcourse, following Hoover’s death, hispersonal secretary, Helen Gandy, destroyedmany of his “Personal and Confidential”files, so that the full extent of Hoover’s Per-sonal files will never be known. Although theFBI has processed over 15,000 pages ofHoover’s “Official and Confidential” filesunder the FOIA, the public speculates thatsome of Hoover’s secret files are still extant.

In an effort to locate any working or secret filesof FBI officials, the Review Board re q u e s t e dand received from the FBI access to re c o rd sthat might shed light on the question of what,if any, files are still in the FBI’s custody.

a. Hoover and Tolson records, including“Official and Confidential” files, chronolog -ical files, and phone logs.

The Review Board requested that the FBI

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Because the files that were onceknown as Angleton’s have beendispersed within the DO records,they are no longer identifiable asa collection.—From CIA Response toReview Board informal requestCIA-IR-4 for information onJames Angleton files ,August 24, 1998

s e a rch for Hoover and Tolson “working”re c o rds relevant to President Kennedy’sassassination. The FBI made Dire c t o rH o o v e r’s “Official and Confidential” (O&C)files available to the Review Board and theReview Board designated as assassinationre c o rds the two O&C files on John Kennedy,the O&C file relating to Secret Service-FBIa g reements on Presidential protection, amemorandum re g a rding Hoover’s conversa-tion with Lyndon Johnson about the assassi-nation (from the Johnson O&C file), and sev-eral other documents from the O&C files. TheReview Board also reviewed Dire c t o rH o o v e r’s telephone logs. Recognizing thatthe FBI has already made the logs public in itsF O I A reading room, the Review Boardrelieved the FBI from the burden of furtherp rocessing the logs under the JFK Act. Finally,Hoover maintained various subject files(apart from the O&C files), including materi-als on the assassination. The Review Boardasked the FBI to locate these materials, but theFBI has not been able to locate the materials.

The Review Board also requested andreceived from the FBI access to the files ofClyde Tolson, which consisted solely of orig-inal memoranda from Director Hoover.Unfortunately, the chronological file startedwith January 1965, and the FBI could notaccount for any 1963–64 files that Tolson mayhave maintained. The Review Board identi-fied several documents as assassinationrecords.

b. Miscellaneous administrative files from the Director’s Office.

The Review Board requested access to a vari-ety of FBI Director’s Office administrativefiles. The Review Board examined files forthe relevant time period with the followingcase captions: Assistant Dire c t o r’s Off i c eAdministrative File, the Attorney General,Attorney General’s Briefing, Criminal Divi-sion of the Department of Justice, Director’sOffice Administrative File, Executive Confer-ence, National Security Council, Office Mem-oranda, Protection of the Attorney General,Threats Against the Attorney General, andWhite House. The Review Board staff desig-nated a small number of documents fromthese files—primarily on organized crime—as assassination records.

c. John P. Mohr records.

When Director Hoover died in 1972, ClydeTolson inherited the bulk of Hoover’s estate.When Tolson died, John P. Mohr, formerAssistant Director for Administration of theFBI, served as the executor of Tolson’s estate.Some authors allege that Mohr purged J.Edgar Hoover’s personal files after Hoover’sdeath in 1972. When Mohr died in February1997, the Review Board issued a subpoena tohis estate to determine whether Mohrretained any re c o rds related to Pre s i d e n tKennedy’s assassination or to the FBI’s inves-tigation of the assassination. Mohr’s estatep roduced, and the Review Board staffinspected, Mohr’s records. Mohr’s recordsincluded three files of Mohr’s personal corre-spondence, a set of Warren Commission vol-umes, and the FBI’s initial reports on Presi-dent Kennedy’s assassination. The ReviewB o a rd staff found no new assassinationrecords, and, as such, released Mohr’s estatefrom any obligation to turn records over tothe JFK Collection.

3. Secret Service

In response to the Review Board’s request forfiles of Secret Service officials, Secret Servicereported that it did not maintain office filesfor senior officials such as Chief James J.Rowley, Chief of the Protective Research Sec-tion Robert Bouck, or Chief InspectorThomas Kelly.

The Secret Service located various Rowleycorrespondence and memoranda, but did notprovide any information as to the dispositionof any working files maintained by ChiefRowley. The Review Board also sought infor-mation as to the identity and disposition ofany working files maintained by Bouckbecause Bouck was responsible for the collec-tion of information relating to potentialthreats to the President and Vice-President.Mr. Bouck testified before the Warren Com-mission re g a rding protective intelligenceinformation gathered in connection withPresident Kennedy’s trip to Dallas. As withChief Rowley, the Secret Service identifiedvarious Bouck documents, but did not (orcould not) account for whether there wereany personal working files maintained byMr. Bouck.15

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4. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

In 1997, the Review Board staff met with offi-cials from OSD and emphasized the impor-tance of identifying and reviewing recordsfor Secretary of Defense McNamara, whohad executed an affidavit for the WarrenCommission stating that Oswald was not aninformant or intelligence agent for the U.S.military. McNamara was also an importantfigure because of his direct and daily involve-ment in creating U.S. policy on Cuba andVietnam.

The Review Board also asked OSD to locateand review files of the OSD General Counselwho had “serve[d] as the liaison with the[Warren] Commission for the Department ofDefense.”

The OSD advised the Review Board that“[a]ll official files of Secretary McNamara[had] been searched” and that “[n]o itemsrelating to the Wa r ren Commission werefound.” Inventories of Secretary McNa-mara’s re c o rds were forwarded to theReview Board. In addition, a detailed inven-tory of additional records of Secretary McNa-mara at NARAwas also provided. Within theMcNamara records at NARA, the Review

Board identified a file relating to OperationMongoose, which was subsequently opened.The Review Board identified as assassinationre c o rds approximately forty re c o rds fro mMcNamara’s files that are relevant to U.S.policy in Cuba or Vietnam. A d d i t i o n a lrecords relating to the Warren Commissionwere located among the General Counsel’sfiles and additional records relating to theH S C A w e re located among Secretary ofDefense Harold Brown’s files.

5. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

The Review Board requested that the Navyand ONI search for the re c o rds of Director ofNaval Intelligence Rear Admiral Rufus Ta y l o r.The Review Board acquired a copy of anunsigned September 21, 1964, affidavit re g a rd-ing Oswald that Taylor appears to have exe-cuted and forwarded to Secretary of DefenseMcNamara. The affidavit states that that ONInever utilized Lee Harvey Oswald as an agentor an informant. (See illustration.) ONI did notlocate any files belonging to Ta y l o r.

6. Army

The Review Board staff requested that theArmy identify for review under the JFK Act

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certain additional, discrete record groups.S p e c i f i c a l l y, the staff asked the Army tolocate the 1963–64 files for top Army officials,including the Secretary of the A r m y, theChief of Staff for the Army, the AssistantChief of Staff for Intelligence, the AssistantChief of Staff for Operations and Plans, andtop officials of the U.S. Army Intelligence andSecurity Command. The Army located noassassination re c o rds in response to theReview Board’s requests.

7. National Security Agency

The Review Board requested that NSA locatethe original files of top NSA officials duringthe period of the Warren Commission (NSADirector Lt. Gen. Gordon Blake and NSADeputy Director Dr. Louis Tordella). NSAlocated materials on the Warren Commissionfrom files of Deputy Director Tordella.

8. Department of State

The Review Board ensured that the Depart-ment of State inventoried all files of its topo fficials who would have had some off i c i a linvolvement with the investigation of theassassination, including Secretary of StateDean Rusk, Undersecretary George Ball,Deputy Undersecretary Alexis Johnson,Ambassador Thompson, Ambassador ThomasMann, and other State Department off i c i a l s .The Department of State was very cooperativein making available to the Review Board man-ifests for these archive re c o rds.

9. Department of Justice

a. Office of Information and Privacy (OIP)

The Review Board raised with the Depart-ment of Justice’s OIP the issue of whetherthere were any separately maintained filesfor Attorneys General Robert F. Kennedy,Nicholas Katzenbach, and Ramsey Clark inview of their positions and re s p e c t i v einvolvement with investigations of the assas-sination. OIP reported that records of theAttorney General and Deputy Attorney Gen-eral were not maintained as a separate filesystem until 1975 under Attorney GeneralEdward Levi.16 Two archivists for the Depart-ment of Justice also confirmed that distinctfiles for the Office of Attorney General werenot archived prior to 1975 and that there

w e re no separately maintained files forMessrs. Kennedy, Katzenbach, and Clark.The archivists believed that such files mostlikely would have been stored at a presiden-tial library.

With respect to Attorney General files post-dating 1975, the Review Board sought toinspect the files of Attorney Generals EdwardLevi and Griffin Bell for any materials relat-ing to the Kennedy assassination investiga-tions of the Church Committee and theHSCA. The Office of Information and Pri-vacy made available for inspection certainoriginal files for Attorneys General Levi andBell, which yielded additional assassinationrecords. The Review Board designated asassassination re c o rds files that primarilyrelated to DOJ’s work with the HSCAand theChurch Committee.

b. Criminal Division

The Review Board requested that the Crimi-nal Division make available all files sepa-rately maintained by Herbert J. Miller, Jr.,Assistant Attorney General for the CriminalDivision at the time of the assassination. Mr.Miller had been designated as DOJ’s “liai-son” to the Warren Commission. The ReviewBoard also sought the files of J. Walter Yea-gley, Assistant Attorney General for the Inter-nal Security Division, to determine whetherhe (or his office) had any pre-assassinationrecords relating to Oswald. The CriminalDivision reported that it maintained no dis-crete files for Miller17 and Yeagley.18

10. Department of the Treasury

The Review Board requested that Main Trea-sury review its holdings to identify records ofC. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasuryat the time of the assassination and WarrenCommission investigation. Review Boardstaff independently reviewed archive trans-mittal forms for Treasury records and identi-fied certain Treasury re c o rds for re v i e w,which Treasury provided to Board staff. As aresult of its review, the Review Board staffidentified files of J. Robert McBrien relatingto his work as Treasury’s liaison to the HSCAand Church Committee.19

The Review Board also requested a completeaccounting for the files of high-level Treasury

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officials who would have had involvement inthe assassination investigation, especiallyimportant because Secret Service was part ofthe Department of the Treasury and ulti-mately reported to Secretary Dillon. Accord-i n g l y, the Review Board asked for anaccounting of the files of Secretary Dillon,Special Assistant to the Secretary Robert Car-swell, Treasury Secretary John Connally, andGeneral Counsel at the time of the WarrenCommission investigation G. D’AndelotBelin. Treasury officials reviewed its invento-ries and reported that its “review disclosedno additional JFK-related records.”20 Treasuryalso reported that it did “not have custody ofany Dillon files,”21 which presumably residewith a presidential library.

11. IRS

Although the IRS reported that it searchedfor records of top IRS officials who assisted inthe Wa r ren Commission investigation, itstated that it did not locate any such records.

E. PRO- AND ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN MATTERS

Both the Warren Commission and the HSCAconsidered the possibility that pro-Castro oranti-Castro activists had some involvementin the assassination of President Kennedy, asboth pro- and anti-Castro groups in the U.S.had contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. TheWarren Commission investigated Oswald’sCommunist and pro - C a s t ro sympathies,including his involvement with the Fair Playfor Cuba Committee, and his September 1963trip to Mexico City. In addition, the ChurchCommittee, an internal CIA Task Force, andthe HSCA all re-examined the extent towhich the Cuban government or pro-Castroactivists in the U.S. might have beeninvolved in the assassination.

Given the amount of time that prior inves-tigative bodies spent considering the possi-bility that either pro- or anti-Castro Cubanforces may have played a role in PresidentKennedy’s assassination, the Review Boardsought to collect and process all relevant fed-eral records relating to such groups. To theextent that both pro- and anti-Castro Cubangroups coordinated their activities within theUnited States, the FBI would be the agencymost likely to have investigative records ontheir activities. Thus, the Review Board ’ s

e fforts to uncover re c o rds beyond thoseexamined by prior investigative bodiesfocused primarily on FBI records.

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC)was a pro-Castro organization with head-quarters in New York. The FPCC had chap-ters in many cities, but Lee Harvey Oswaldwas its founding and, it seems, only memberin New Orleans. In the summer of 1963,Oswald distributed handbills that he hadprinted that advocated “Hands Off Cuba!”and invited members of the public to join theNew Orleans chapter of the FPCC. The War-ren Commission and the congressional com-mittees that investigated the assassinationdiscuss Oswald’s connection to the FPCC intheir respective reports. As such, the ReviewBoard’s routine processing of federal agencyrecords from Warren Commission files andfiles concerning other congressional commit-tees encompassed records on the FPCC. Notall FPCC records, however, found their wayinto the existing collections. Where ReviewBoard staff noticed gaps in the documenta-tion regarding the FPCC, it requested thatfederal agencies provide access to additionalrecords and information.

a. FBI field office files.

When the FBI processed its “core andrelated” files and “HSCA Subject” files, itprocessed the FBI Headquarters file on theFPCC, but it did not process any recordsfrom the FBI’s New York and Dallas fieldoffice files on the FPCC. Thus, the ReviewBoard staff requested access to these twofield office files.

The only records that the Review Board stafflocated in the Dallas field office file wereduplicates of Headquarters records that theFBI had already processed as part of its “coreand related” files or HSCA files. The FBIa g reed to include the Dallas field off i c ecopies in the JFK Collection.

The New York field office file proved to bemuch more voluminous than the Dallas fileand yielded more assassination records. Anumber of the records that the Review Boards t a ff designated as assassination re c o rd sfrom the New York file involved June Cobb,

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a woman who was an intelligence asset dur-ing the 1960–64 period, primarily for the CIAbut also for the FBI, regarding Castro, Cuba,and the FPCC. In addition, Cobb was theasset who first informed the CIA of ElenaG a r ro De Paz’s allegation that Oswaldattended a “twist” party in Mexico City withSylvia Duran. For the above reasons, theReview Board staff recommended to the FBIthat it process as assassination records anyFPCC documents that referenced June Cobb.The Review Board also found assassination-related records in the New York field officefile concerning the FBI’s efforts to infiltrateand disrupt the FPCC.

The bulk of the remaining records that theReview Board staff designated as assassina-tion records from the New York FPCC fileinvolve the FBI’s investigation of the FPCC.Many researchers view Oswald’s role in theFPCC as an indication that he may have beenan asset of one or more U.S. intelligenceagencies. That is, they theorize that he was a“plant,” an intelligence asset sent on a coun-terintelligence mission against the FPCC.Thus, Review Board staff designated asassassination records those documents whichaddress the urgency with which the Bureauviewed the FPCC, the priority the Bureauplaced on infiltrating the group, and Bureauintentions/plans to initiate counterintelli-gence activities against the group. TheReview Board staff employed similar reason-ing in designating records as assassination-related in the FBI’s Cuban Counterintelli-gence Program (COINTELPRO) filereferenced below.

b. CIA records on Richard Gibson .

In 1960–63, Richard Thomas Gibson was theDirector of the New York chapter of theFPCC. CIA opened a 201, or personality, fileon Gibson because of his support of bothFidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba. The1960–1964 records include the Warren Com-mission’s investigation of Gibson, and CIAincluded those records in the JFK Collection.

c. Department of Justice Criminal Divisionfiles on FPCC.

The Review Board staff requested that theDepartment of Justice Criminal Divisionsearch for records relating to the FPCC. The

Review Board located some assassinationrecords regarding the FPCC and Vincent T.Lee within the Criminal Division’s files.

2. Cuban COINTELPRO

Early in its tenure, the Review Board exam-ined the FBI’s FOIA “reading room” recordson the FBI’s COINTELPRO against pro-Cas-tro Cubans—primarily the FPCC and theJuly 26th Movement—during the early 1960s.The Review Board’s examination of the read-ing room materials led the Review Board tomake a request to the FBI for a Headquartersfile entitled, “Cuban Matters—Counterintel-ligence Program—Internal Security—Cuba”and for any other Headquarters files docu-menting efforts by the FBI or other agenciesof the U.S. government to disrupt, discredit,or bring into disrepute the FPCC or its mem-bers or activities. The FBI made its recordsavailable to the Review Board and, but forsome very recent, unrelated documents, theReview Board designated all records in theCuban COINTELPRO file as assassinationrecords.

Records that the Review Board designated asassassination records from the COINTEL-PRO file include FPCC and July 26th Move-ment membership and mailing lists. The filefurther details the FBI’s basis for initiating itscounterintelligence program against the twop ro - C a s t ro organizations. Finally, the fileprovides details concerning the methods thatthe Bureau used to disrupt the activities ofthe FPCC and the July 26th Movement.

3. Anti-Castro Activities; IS (Internal Security)-Cuba

In the spring of 1996, the Review Boardreceived a letter from a member of there s e a rch community noting that one of the“Hands Off Cuba” pamphlets that appeare din the New Orleans FPCC file contained ac ro s s - re f e rence to a file entitled “Anti-CastroActivities; IS–Cuba” and numbered NO (NewOrleans) 105–1095. The Review Board staffestablished that the FBI had not processed thisparticular file under the JFK Act, and thenrequested that the FBI provide access to allfiles bearing the above-re f e renced captionf rom Headquarters and from the NewOrleans, Miami, Tampa, New York, and Dallasfield offices during the relevant time period.

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After reviewing New Orleans file 105–1095,the Review Board staff designated two vol-umes of the file as assassination records.

4. Cuban Intelligence Activities in theU.S.; Cuban Situation

During its review of the FBI’s assassinationrecords, the Review Board staff saw file refer-ences to cases captioned “Cuban IntelligenceActivities in the U.S.” and “Cuban Situa-tion.” The Review Board requested access toHeadquarters files and files from the Miami,Tampa, New York, Washington, D.C., andDallas field offices with the above-referencedcaptions, and designated forty records fromthose files as assassination records. Most ofthe relevant records concern activity in theanti-Castro community following the Bay ofPigs invasion and following Pre s i d e n tKennedy’s assassination.

5. Anti-Castro Cuban Groups, IncludingDRE, Alpha 66, SFNE, JURE, FRD,CRC, and Commandos-L

In an effort to gather andreview re c o rds re l a t i n gto the activities of promi-nent anti-Castro Cubangroups who might havehad some involvement inthe assassination of Pres-ident Kennedy, the ReviewBoard requested the FBIto provide access to fileson the above-referenceda n t i - C a s t ro Cuban gro u p sfor Headquarters and theNew Orleans, Miami,Tampa, New York, andDallas field offices. The

FBI kept voluminous files on each anti-Cas-tro Cuban group. Review Board staff mem-bers reviewed hundreds of volumes ofre c o rds in search of assassination-re l a t e dmaterial. The files did yield approximatelyseventy assassination records.

The Review Board also requested the CIA toprovide files on the above-referenced groups,to the extent that the CIA had not alreadyprocessed such records under the JFK Act.The Review Board identified additionalre c o rds from 1960–1964 in contemporaryworking files of a CIA office concerned with

Latin American issues. Most of the relevantC I A re c o rds concerned the existence andactivities of the CIA’s JMWAVE station inMiami. The Review Board also identified asmall number of records pertaining to U.S.anti-Cuban activities in the Directorate ofPlans files and in the files of DCI JohnMcCone. The Review Board marked relevantrecords and requested that CIA process therecords for inclusion in the JFK Collection atNARA.

6. Threats Against the Life of Fidel Castro

As widely reported, the U.S. governmentattempted, at various times, to assassinateCuban leader Fidel Castro. Due to the highlevel of public interest in this topic, theReview Board requested that agencies locateany relevant records and provide them to theReview Board staff.

a. CIA DS&T records.

At the request of the Review Board, the CIAs e a rched its Directorate of Science and Te c h-nology (DS&T) databases and re c o rds for fileson possible assassination attempts againstFidel Castro .2 2 C I A’s search produced onlyone re c o rd—a handwriting analysis. TheReview Board staff reviewed the re c o rd anddetermined that it was not relevant to theassassination of President John F. Kennedy.

b. FBI file captioned “Threats Against the Life of Fidel Castro.”

An HSCA Outside Contact Report datedF e b ruary 18, 1978, indicates that the HSCArequested access to an FBI file captioned“ T h reats Against the Life of Fidel Castro” orsome similar caption. The HSCA never madea formal request for such a file, and the FBIdid not provide to the HSCA a file with sucha caption. The Review Board re q u e s t e daccess to any FBI Headquarters files withthis or a similar caption. The FBI located andp rovided two re c o rds that re f e re n c e d“ T h reats Against the Life of Fidel Castro , ”which summarized Walter Winchell’s radiob roadcasts, and compared the bro a d c a s t swith information that the FBI had concern-ing threats against Castro. The Review Boarddesignated both of these re c o rds for inclu-sion in the JFK Collection.

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I was completely convincedduring this entire period, thatthis operation had the fullauthority of every pertinentechelon of CIA and had fullauthority of the White House,either from the President orfrom someone authorized andknown to be authorized to speakfor the President.—William Harvey’s testimonybefore the Church CommitteeJune 25, 1975

7. American Gambling Interests in Cuba

As part of its efforts to gather records relatingto a Cuban connection to the assassination,the Review Board staff requested that the FBIprovide access to all Headquarters, Miami,Tampa, and Havana files captioned, “Ameri-can Gambling Interests in Cuba.”

The FBI’s Miami field office (into which all ofthe Havana Legal Attaché’s, or Legat’s, fileswere forwarded when the Legat closed) andTampa field office reported to FBI Headquar-ters that they did not have any files with theabove-referenced caption. The Review Boardstaff did not locate any material in the FBIHeadquarters files related to the assassina-tion of President Kennedy. Most of the filesthat the FBI located consisted of pre-1959records monitoring the activities of Floridaracketeers who were trying to establish gam-bling and hotel facilities in Cuba.

8. Sergio Arcacha-Smith, AntonioVeciana, and Bernardo de Torres

S e rgio A rcacha-Smith, Antonio Veciana, andB e r n a rdo de To r res were anti-Castro Cubanactivists in the early 1960s. A rc a c h a - S m i t hwas the New Orleans re p resentative to theCuban Revolutionary Council until 1962, andin that capacity, he used an office in the build-ing at 544 Camp Street. The 544 Camp Stre e ta d d ress was printed on FPCC literature thatLee Harvey Oswald distributed in NewOrleans in August of 1963. Veciana ledAlpha–66, a violent anti-Castro org a n i z a t i o nthat engaged in paramilitary operationsagainst Castro’s Cuba as well as assassinationattempts against Castro. Veciana testified tothe HSCA that he acted as an agent of the U.S.government, and that he met Lee HarveyOswald in Dallas in 1963 in the presence ofhis American “handler.” To r res was a Cubanexile living in Miami who later worked withNew Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrisonin his investigation of Clay Shaw.

The HSCA reviewed FBI Headquarters fileson Arcacha-Smith, Veciana, and de Torres, sothe FBI processed some records on thesethree men with its “HSCA Subject” files. TheReview Board requested that the FBI conductan additional search at Headquarters, and inthe New Orleans, Houston, and Dallas fieldoffices to determine whether the FBI had

other assassination-related information onthese three individuals.The Review Board desig-nated thirty-three docu-ments for processing asassassination re c o rd sfrom the many files theFBI produced inresponse to the ReviewB o a rd’s request. The relevant documentsconcern the Cuban exile community’s reac-tion to President Kennedy’s assassination.

F. RECORDS ON ORGANIZED CRIME

The question as towhether organized crimeplayed a role in a possi-ble conspiracy to assassi-nate President Kennedyis one that nearly everygovernment investiga-tion into the assassina-tion has addressed. Thus,the Review Board processed a large numberof files on organized crime figures and orga-nized crime activities simply because federalagencies made their organized crime filesavailable to previous government investiga-tions. For example, the FBI’s “HSCA subjectfiles” contain large portions of the FBI’s fileson organized crime figures such as SantosTrafficante, Carlos Marcello, Angelo Bruno,Frank Ragano, the Lansky brothers, JohnnyRoselli, Nick Civella, and Joe Campisi. Themajority of records that Review Board ana-lysts processed in these files were not directlya s s a s s i n a t i o n - related, but because priorinvestigative bodies considered these men tobe relevant, the records have been includedin the JFK Collection. In several instances,however, the Review Board pursued addi-tional records that had not been reviewed byprior investigative bodies.

1. Sam Giancana

From the time he was a young man, SamGiancana rose within the Chicago organizedcrime syndicate until he became syndicateleader in 1957. After an eight-year stint inMexico, Giancana was deported back toChicago where he was murdered in 1975,shortly before he was scheduled to testifybefore the Church Committee. The Review

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We had begun to see a generaloutline of the truth in 1979, asthe House Select Committee onAssassinations finished itsinvestigation: leaders of orga-nized crime were behind thePresident’s murder.—Robert Blakey, Fatal Hour

The most durable conspiracytheory is that the Mafia killedthe president.—Anthony and Robbyn Summers, in “The Ghosts ofNovember,”Vanity Fair,December 1994

Board considered Giancana to be of historicalinterest with respect to the Kennedy assassi-nation for a number of reasons: (1) Giancanawas involved in the CIA plots to assassinateFidel Castro; (2) Giancana expressed hostilityt o w a rd the Kennedys because of theKennedys’ war against organized crime; (3)Giancana had associates in common withPresident Kennedy (namely, Frank Sinatraand Judith Campbell Exner); (4) Giancanaallegedly contributed to Kennedy’s 1960presidential campaign; and (5) Giancana wasallegedly linked to Joseph P. Kennedythrough the illicit liquor trade.

The FBI Headquarters file on Sam Giancanaconsists of 37 volumes of records dating from1954 to 1975. When the Review Board staffbegan to review the FBI’s “main” file on SamGiancana in early 1995, it realized that theFBI had not designated for processing anyre c o rds that predated January 1, 1963.2 3

Apparently, the HSCA had requested accessto the entire FBI file on Giancana, but the FBIp rovided only portions of its file to theHSCA. The Review Board staff requestedand received access to sections spanning theyears 1958–1962. After reviewing the addi-tional volumes, the Review Board designatedthe earlier-dated material as assassinationrecords in the summer of 1995, and the FBIprocessed the records under the JFK Act.

2. FBI Electronic Surveillance of CarlosMarcello: BriLab

Many of the books on theassassination of Pre s i-dent Kennedy discussthe possibility that Car-los Marcello, allegedo rganized crime boss ofNew Orleans, wasinvolved in the assassi-

nation. In the late 1970s, the FBI investigatedM a rcello on an unrelated matter—thebribery of organized labor. As part of the“BriLab” investigation, the FBI conducteda p p roximately eight months of electro n i csurveillance on Marcello’s home and on hiso ffice at the Town and Country Motel.A c c o rding to several sources, the “BriLab”tapes contained conversations in which Car-los Marcello or his brother Joseph admittedthat they were involved in the Kennedya s s a s s i n a t i o n .2 4

The FBI maintains its tapes and transcriptsfrom the “BriLab” surveillance, but becausethe FBI’s source of authority for the surveil-lance was 18 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. (Title III), the“take” from the surveillance remained undercourt seal.25 Thus, the assassination researchcommunity was not able to confirm or rejectallegations that the tapes or transcripts con-tain information relevant to the assassina-tion. Once the Review Board obtained a courtorder allowing it access to the materials, thestaff reviewed all of the transcripts from theFBI’s surveillance on Marcello in NewOrleans. Although the staff did not locate thespecific conversations that the researchersmentioned, it did locate thirteen conversa-tions that it believed to be assassinationrecords. Most of the conversations took placein the summer of 1979 during the period thatthe HSCA released its report. The conversa-tions primarily focused on Marcello’s reac-tion to the HSCA’s allegations that he mayhave been involved in the assassination. Withthe help of the U. S. Attorney’s Office in theEastern District of New Orleans, the ReviewBoard obtained a court order to release tran-scripts of the 13 conversations to the public.

3. Department of Justice CriminalDivision Records

The Review Board sought to inspect theCriminal Division’s extensive org a n i z e dcrime files on individuals who were allegedto have had involvement in the assassination,who were associated in some manner withJack Ruby, or who had made claims of orga-nized crime involvement in the assassina-tion. The Review Board staff reviewed thesefiles and designated specific materials asassassination records. As noted by the Crim-inal Division, the Division had, “[i]n anunprecedented approach,. . . ully opened itsfiles and indices to the Review Board . ”“Hundreds of organized crime case files andother files of a general nature were madeavailable for Review Board staff scrutiny. . . ”

G. WARREN COMMISSION STAFF AND CRITICS

Given that the Warren Commission consti-tuted the first official investigation into theevents surrounding the assassination of Pres-ident Kennedy, the Review Board clearly hadan interest in ensuring that all federal agency

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The most telling evidence in ourinvestigation of organized crimewas electronic surveillance ofmajor underworld figures bythe FBI.—Robert Blakey, in Fatal Hour

records on the Warren Commission and itsactivities became part of the JFK Collection.Although the agencies processed a larg enumber of Warren Commission era docu-ments as part of their core files, the ReviewBoard staff questioned whether federal agen-cies such as the FBI and the CIA opened andmaintained files on the Warren Commissionstaff members because they were working forthe Wa r ren Commission. Likewise, theReview Board staff questioned whether fed-eral agencies such as the FBI and CIAopenedand maintained files on critics of the WarrenCommission because they were criticizingthe Warren Commission’s conclusions.

1. FBI Files on Warren Commission Staff

In an effort to determine whether the FBIopened or maintained files on Warren Com-mission staff, the Review Board requestedFBI Headquarters file references on WarrenCommission Assistant Counsel NormanRedlich. While reviewing the files providedin response to the Review Board’s request forNorman Redlich’s files, the Review Boardstaff observed a reference to General CounselJ. Lee Rankin’s request that the FBI conduct ab a c k g round investigation on Redlich andalso on Assistant Counsel Joseph A. Ball. Thestaff then asked for FBI Headquarters file ref-erences on Rankin and Ball, as it seemed thatthe FBI may have maintained a file on Ball’sinvestigation. Redlich’s file also showed thatthe Civil Service Commission (CSC) had con-ducted a background investigation onRedlich before Rankin asked the FBI to do aninvestigation. Consequently, the ReviewBoard questioned whether the CSC had car-ried out background checks on other WarrenCommission staff members. In an effort todetermine whether similar files existed at theFBI for other Warren Commission staffers,the Review Board ultimately extended therequest to include Assistant Counsel Leon D.Hubert, Jr. (whose file the Review Boardthought may also contain re f e rences toHubert’s career in New Orleans politics). Inaddition, the Review Board asked the FBI toprovide a statement on whether it openedany files, individually or collectively, onother individuals who worked as WarrenCommission Assistant Counsels or staffmembers, because of their employment withthe Warren Commission.

In response to the ReviewB o a rd’s request, the FBIp rovided all of its head-quarters file re f e rences onall of the Wa r ren Com-mission staff members.F rom the Redlich re q u e s t ,the Review Board desig-nated as assassination-related a group of re c o rd son Redlich within theFBI’s file on the Emer-gency Civil LibertiesCommittee. Otherwise,although Review Board staff did locate somea s s a s s i n a t i o n - related re c o rds, the FBI hada l ready processed most of the re c o rds as partof its core files. The Review Board did n o tlocate any information to indicate that the FBIsystematically kept re c o rds on Wa r ren Com-mission staff members simply because theyw e re employed by the Wa r ren Commission.

2. CIA and FBI Files on WarrenCommission Critics

In an effort to determine whether the FBIopened or maintained files on Warren Com-mission critics because they criticized theWarren Commission’s work and findings,the Review Board requested access to allrecords on prominent Warren Commissioncritic Mark Lane and to all pre-1973 Head-quarters file references to the other WarrenCommission critics listed below.

a. Mark Lane.

When the Review Board began to examine theFBI’s “core and related” files, it noticed that anumber of re c o rds that mentioned the nameMark Lane cro s s - re f e renced the FBI’s main fileon Lane. Because the FBI had not slated theLane main file for JFK Act processing, theReview Board requested access to all file re f e r-ences to Mark Lane or to Lane’s Citizens’Committee of Inquiry in the files of FBI Head-quarters and the New York field office. TheReview Board staff’s examination of the Lanemain file revealed that approximately eightvolumes of the file contained a significant per-centage of documents relating to the Kennedyassassination. The Review Board re c o m-mended that those eight volumes be includedin the JFK Collection. In addition to the Lanemain file, the Review Board designated as

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In the case of the Kennedya s s a s s i n a t i o n , u n p r e c e d e n t e dbelief in all kinds of nonsense,coupled with extraordinarydisrespect for the Wa r r e nC o m m i s s i o n , has waxed ingood times and bad times andflourishes among remarkablenumbers of otherwise sober-minded people.—Max Holland,November 1995

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related the entire file on the Cit-izens’ Committee of Inquiry, as well as re c o rd sin the FBI’s Communist Party COINTELPROfile, and a select few re c o rds about Lane thata p p e a red in the files of other individuals. TheReview Board’s inquiry revealed that the FBImaintained substantial files on Lane’sp rofessional and personal activities, and keptdetailed files on Lane’s political activism.

The CIA did not open a 201 file on Lane. TheAgency’s records on Lane consist of: a dis-patch dated January 23, 1970, an Office ofGeneral Counsel letter dated March 29, 1977,six FOIA requests, and one public affairsrequest. Review Board staff reviewed theserecords but did not designate them as assas-sination records. Review Board staff foundone additional reference to Lane in a foreigngovernment document and designated theinformation as assassination related.

b. Harold Weisberg.

FBI records on Warren Commission criticHarold Weisberg related to Weisberg’s previ-ous employment with the Department ofState, We i s b e rg’s public participation inpolitical issues, and We i s b e rg’s publishedwork as a journalist. The only assassination-related file on Weisberg the FBI produced inresponse to the Review Board’s request wasits file concerning a FOIA lawsuit that Weis-berg brought against the Department of Jus-tice. The Review Board recommended thatthe FBI process the FOIA litigation file as anassassination record under the JFK Act.

The Review Board determined that the CIAp rocessed most of its files on We i s b e rg as partof the CIA s e q u e s t e red collection. The ReviewB o a rd examined a CIA O ffice of Security fileon We i s b e rg and identified a small number ofdocuments as assassination re c o rds.

c. Josiah Thompson.

In FBI files containing the name of JosiahThompson, the Review Board staff locatedone assassination-related document that theFBI had processed as part of its “core” fileson the JFK Assassination. The document wasabout Thompson’s book Six Seconds in Dallas.The Review Board instructed the FBI toprocess the document as a duplicate of therecord that appeared in the “core” files.

The CIA has a small 201 file on Thompsonwhich indicates that he was considered to beof possible operational interest to the Agencyin the early 1960s while he was living over-seas. CIA lost interest however, and the CIArecords that the Review Board examined donot appear to reflect that Thompson workedfor the CIA in any capacity. The ReviewBoard staff did not locate any assassinationrecords in the 201 file.

d. Edward J. Epstein .

FBI records containing the name Edward JayEpstein concern Epstein’s general journalisticactivities. The few assassination-re l a t e drecords in Epstein’s file were processed bythe FBI as part of their “core” files. Thus, theReview Board staff did not designate anyadditional records as assassination records.

CIA located an Office of Security file and aPublications Review Board file on Epstein aswell as three CIA records documenting theCIA’s destruction of records under a stan-d a rd re c o rds destruction schedule. Thed e s t royed re c o rds related to three FOIArequests. None of the FOIA requests askedfor information on Epstein. The ReviewBoard staff did not designate any additionalrecords as assassination records.

e. Paul Hoch.

Aside from the few assassination-re l a t e drecords in FBI files containing the name PaulHoch that were processed by the FBI as partof their “core” files, the Review Board did notlocate any additional assassination records.

f. David S. Lifton .

The name David S. Lifton appeared only in theFBI’s “core” files. The FBI did not produce anyadditional files that contained Lifton’s name.

g. Sylvia Meagher.

FBI files relating to Sylvia Meagher con-tained five documents that the ReviewB o a rd believed to be assassination-re l a t e d .The FBI processed these five documents aspart of the “core” files. The Review Boardi n s t ructed the FBI to process these five docu-ments as duplicates of re c o rds that appeare din the “core” files.

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The CIA reported that it no longer had anyre c o rds on Meagher. At one time, the Office ofSecurity had a file on Meagher and a 1968Ramparts magazine article. The Review Boardalso located a re f e rence to a Privacy A c trequest made by Meagher. CIA d e s t royed thePrivacy Act request and the Office of Securityfolder under normal re c o rd control schedules.

H. NAME SEARCHES

The Review Board requested searches of fed-eral records for new or additional informa-tion and records on individuals who provedto be of interest to investigative bodies suchas the Warren Commission and the HSCA.

In addition, the Review Board received hun-d reds of letters, telephone calls, and tele-faxes from members of the public re q u e s t i n gthe Board to locate government re c o rds onindividuals who the public believed werelinked in some way to the assassination.O b v i o u s l y, the Review Board staff could notrequest and review re c o rds on every namethat came to its attention. The Review Boardrequested additional information andre c o rds on some individuals, and this sec-tion attempts to summarize the bulk of theReview Board’s requests for information onnames that are not mentioned in other placeswithin this Report.

1. John Abt

Following his arrest on November 22, 1963,Lee Harvey Oswald stated to representativesof the media that he wanted to be repre-sented by John Abt. Abt was an attorney whohad re p resented the Communist Party,USA.26 Abt’s primary residence was in NewYork City, but he was spending the weekendof November 22, 1963 at his cabin in Con-necticut. Thus, the Review Board requestedaccess to the FBI’s files on John Abt from FBIHeadquarters and from the New York andNew Haven field offices. Although the NewHaven office reported that it had no file ref-e rences to Abt, the FBI made availablere c o rds from Headquarters and from theNew York field office. The Review Board des-ignated 24 records (all dated after November22, 1963) for processing under the JFK Act.Some of the designated re c o rds relate towhether Abt and Oswald knew each otherprior to President Kennedy’s assassination.

The remainder of the records involve Com-munist Party meetings at which attendeesdiscussed the Kennedy assassination.

2. Edward Becker

E d w a rd Becker claims that, in September 1962,he met with Carlos Marcello and three othermen, and heard Marcello threaten to haveP resident Kennedy killed. The HSCAreviewed the FBI’s headquarters file onE d w a rd Becker and, as such, the FBI pro c e s s e dit under the JFK Act. The Review Boardrequested access to the Los Angeles field off i c efile on Edward Becker, as well as access to thec o n t rol file on the Los Angeles informant whod i s c redited Becker’s allegation. The ReviewB o a rd designated two documents from the LosAngeles field office file on Becker and one doc-ument from the Los Angeles informant’s con-t rol file. All three of the designated re c o rd sconcerned Becker’s allegation that Marc e l l ot h reatened President Kennedy.

3. Carlos Bringuier

Carlos Bringuier was an anti-Castro Cubanactivist in New Orleans who had re p e a t e dcontact with Lee Harvey Oswald in thesummer of 1963. Bringuier managed a cloth-ing store in New Orleans, and he was alsothe New Orleans re p resentative of the anti-C a s t ro organization Directorio Revolu-c i o n a ro Estudiantil (the DRE). Oswald vis-ited Bringuier’s store in early August 1963w h e re the two engaged in a discussion onthe Cuban political situation. A c c o rding toB r i n g u i e r, Oswald portrayed himself asbeing anti-Castro and anti-communist. Sev-eral days later, someone told Bringuier thatan American was passing out pro - C a s t roleaflets in New Orleans. Bringuier and twoothers went to counter-demonstrate, andBringuier was surprised to see that Oswaldwas the pro - C a s t ro leafleter. Bringuier andOswald argued and both were arrested fordisturbing the peace. The publicity from thea l t e rcation and trial (Oswald pleaded guiltyand was fined $10 and Bringuier and hisfriends pleaded not guilty and the charg e sw e re dismissed) resulted in a debate onWDSU radio between Bringuier andOswald on August 21, 1963. The ReviewB o a rd designated six serials from the NewOrleans file on Bringuier.

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4. George Bush

A November 29, 1963, memorandum fromFBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the Directorof the Bureau of Intelligence and Research atthe Department of State refers to the fact thatinformation on the assassination of PresidentKennedy was “orally furnished to Mr.G e o rge Bush of the Central IntelligenceAgency.” At the request of the Review Board,the CIA made a thorough search of itsrecords in an attempt to determine if the“George Bush” referred to in the memoran-dum might be identical to President and for-mer Director of Central Intelligence GeorgeHerbert Walker Bush. That search deter-mined that the CIA had no association withGeorge Herbert Walker Bush during the timeframe referenced in the document.

The records that the Review Board examinedshowed that the only other “George Bush”serving in the CIA in 1963 was a junior ana-lyst who has repeatedly denied being the“George Bush” referenced in the memoran-dum. The Review Board staff found one ref-erence to an Army Major General GeorgeBush in the calendars of Director of CentralIntelligence Allen Dulles. There was no indi-cation if this General Bush could be the refer-enced George Bush. The Review Boardmarked the calendar page as an assassinationrecord.

5. Ed Butler and Information Council ofthe Americas (INCA)

E d w a rd Scannell Butler debated Lee HarveyOswald in New Orleans in the summer of 1963on the radio station WDSU. The radio debateo c c u r red shortly after Oswald was arrested fordisturbing the peace in August 1963. Follow-ing the assassination, but before Pre s i d e n tJohnson formed the Wa r ren Commission, But-ler testified before a Senate Internal SecuritySubcommittee re g a rding his contact withOswald. Butler had long been associated withthe Information Council of the A m e r i c a s(INCA), a New Orleans-based clearinghousefor anti-Communist information, and particu-larly for anti-Castro Cuban information.

The Review Board requested access to all FBIheadquarters and New Orleans field officefiles on Edward Scannell Butler and theInformation Council of the Americas. The

Review Board designated five records to beprocessed under the JFK Act. All of the des-ignated records concern Butler’s contact withOswald in August 1963.

Chapter 7 of this Report discusses theReview Board’s attempts to obtain recordsdirectly from Mr. Butler and INCA.

CIA processed all of its records on Butler aspart of its sequestered collection.

6. Claude Barnes Capehart

One re s e a rcher inquired whether a ClaudeBarnes Capehart was ever an employee,d i rectly or indire c t l y, under any name,whether on salary or contract, of the CIA, or ac o m p a n y, business, agency, or other entityoperated by the CIA. The HSCA was inter-ested in Capehart, who claimed to have beenin Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963, as aC I A employee. The CIAgranted Review Boards t a ff full access to its re c o rds on Capehart.

C I A re c o rds state that Capehart worked fortwo diff e rent private business contractors onU.S. government classified projects, but there c o rds the Review Board examined do notshow that CIA ever employed him as an off i-c e r, staff e r, asset, or source. The re c o rds indi-cate that at least one of the private contractorsfor whom Capehart worked, Global Marine,Inc., did have CIA contracts. The re c o rds fur-ther indicate that a background investigationwas run on Capehart in August and Septem-ber 1973, so that he could work on those con-tracts as a crane operator/driller from October30, 1973 to July 9, 1975. As part of his workwith Global Marine Inc., Capehart signeds e c recy agreements with CIA in October 1973and January 1975.

The CIA holds two files on Capehart—anOffice of Security File and a medical file. TheCIA processed its Office of Security file aspart of the segregated collection. The medicalfile, not part of CIA’s segregated collection,concerns an accident which occurred on oneof the construction sites, and the ReviewBoard did not believe it was relevant. Themedical file does not contain any informationon or evidence of any possible psychologicalproblems. The CIA reported that it has neverhad an Office of Personnel file or a 201 file onCapehart.

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T h e re is no evidence in either the Office ofSecurity file or the medical file to suggest thatCapehart worked for the CIA on any addi-tional contracts nor in any capacity, direct ori n d i rect, other than as the employee of a pri-vate contractor, Global Marine, Inc., workingon CIA contracts. There is no evidence in thefiles that the Review Board saw to suggestthat CIA ever assigned him a pseudonym orthat he used another name. Finally, there is noinformation in the re c o rds to support Cape-hart’s allegations concerning the Kennedyassassination nor to confirm his where a b o u t sduring the relevant time period.

7. Lawrence Cusack

The late Lawrence Cusack was a prominentNew York attorney in the 1950s and 1960swho represented, among other clients, theArchdiocese of New York. The Review Boardreceived information that Cusack performedsome legal work for Joseph P. Kennedy andthat Cusack’s son was engaged in an attemptto sell a group of allegedly salacious docu-ments regarding Cusack’s professional (butsecret) relationship with President Kennedy.The documents at issue allegedly containedinformation regarding President Kennedy’srelationship with Marilyn Monroe and withvarious mafia figures. Questions were raisedconcerning the authenticity of the docu-ments, and Cusak’s son subsequently wasindicted on fraud charges.

In an effort to determine whether the FBI hadany information on Lawrence Cusack’s rela-tionship with the Kennedy family, theReview Board requested access to all FBIHeadquarters and New York field office fileson Lawrence X. Cusack. The Review Boarddid not find any assassination records in thematerials provided by the FBI.

8. Adele Edisen, Winston de Monsabert ,Jose Rivera

Dr. Adele Edisen has written several letters tothe Review Board and has also providedpublic testimony to the Review Board. In herletters and testimony, Dr. Edisen stated that,in New Orleans on November 24, 1963, sherecounted to an FBI agent and a Secret Ser-vice agent her knowledge of apparent deal-ings between Dr. Jose Rivera, Mr. Winston deMonsabert, and Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963.

The Review Board requested FBI records onthese individuals from FBI Headquarters andfield offices in Baltimore, Dallas, Denver,New Orleans and Washington, D.C. The FBIretrieved only a few records relating to theindividuals referenced above, all of whichthe Review Board designated as assassina-tion records.

9. Billie Sol Estes

In the 1980s, Billy Sol Estes alleged that Lyn-don Johnson was involved in the assassina-tion of President Kennedy. Estes was report-edly a con artist who claims to have had afinancial relationship with Lyndon Johnson.The Review Board requested access to all FBIHeadquarters files on Billie Sol Estes. TheReview Board designated eight serials forprocessing as assassination records under theJFK Act. All of the designated records con-cern Estes’ alleged knowledge of personsconnected to the assassination of PresidentKennedy.

10. Judith Campbell Exner

Judith Campbell Exner claims to have been alink between President Kennedy and Mafiamembers Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli.Introduced to John Kennedy by Frank Sina-tra during Kennedy’s 1960 presidential pri-mary campaign, she claimed to have had arelationship with John Kennedy that lastedfrom the winter of 1960 until March of 1962.In 1975, Ms. Exner gained national mediaattention when she testified before theChurch Committee in its investigation of theC I A plots to assassinate Fidel Castro .Between 1976 and 1997, Ms. Exner filednumerous lawsuits against the FBI seekingaccess to all information the FBI held on her.The Review Board requested access to all FBIHeadquarters and field office main files onJudith Campbell Exner. The FBI producedseveral small field office files containingp ress clippings the FBI collected on Ms.Exner, as well as several files which reflectMs. Exner’s efforts to gain access to her infor-mation in the FBI’s files. The FBI also pro-duced several files with references to womenwith names similar to Judith CampbellE x n e r. The Review Board designated asassassination records all main files on Ms.Exner, as well as all records that made refer-ence to Ms. Exner. The Review Board also

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designated the entire FBI file on the murderof Johnny Roselli which the FBI produced inresponse to this request.

11. H.L. Hunt and Family and ClintMurchison and Family

Some researchers allege that the assassina-tion of President Kennedy was master-minded by wealthy Dallas oilmen H.L. Huntand Clint Murchison. The Review Boardrequested access to all FBI headquarters andDallas field office files on the following indi-viduals during the period 1960 through 1969:H.L. Hunt, Nelson Bunker Hunt, LamarHunt, Clint Murchison, Sr., Clint Murchison,Jr., and Paul M. Rothermel. FBI files con-tained many references to the Hunts, theMurchisons, and Rothermel, but the docu-ments were primarily concerned with theirbusiness dealings or their political activities.The Review Board designated for the JFKCollection ten documents from the files theFBI produced in response to the ReviewBoard’s request.

12. Joseph P. Kennedy

In light of allegations that Joseph P.Kennedy’s organized crime connectionshelped to fund John Kennedy’s 1960 cam-paign for the Democratic nomination, theReview Board requested FBI files on JosephP. Kennedy. Given that Joseph P. Kennedywas a prominent American who served inmany high-level government positions, theReview Board limited its request for FBI fileson Joseph P. Kennedy to: (1) a list of file num-bers and case captions of files where Mr.Kennedy was the main subject of the file; and(2) field office files for the 1956 FBI investiga-tions of Kennedy in connection with hisappointment to the Presidential Board ofConsultants on Foreign Intelligence Activi-ties of the U.S. government. The ReviewB o a rd singled out Kennedy’s 1956 back-ground investigation because of its proximityto the 1960 presidential election, and the alle-gations of organized crime influence duringthat election. The Review Board alsorequested that the FBI provide a list of filenumbers and case captions that containeddocuments mentioning Joseph P. Kennedy.The vast majority of records that the FBI pro-duced concerning Joseph P. Kennedy werenot related to the assassination of President

K e n n e d y. The Review Board found onlythree records that it believed to be assassina-tion-related, all relating to threats that weremade by private citizens to Joseph P.Kennedy and his sons.

13. Oswald LeWinter

In 1997, the Review Board received a queryf rom a re s e a rcher as to whether a mannamed Oswald LeWinter had any ties, cur-rent or past, with the CIA. A c c o rding to there s e a rc h e r, LeWinter claimed to be the cur-rent Deputy Director of Countere s p i o n a g efor the CIA with information on the assas-sination of President Kennedy. The ReviewB o a rd staff examined CIA and FBI re c o rd son LeWi n t e r. FBI and CIA files indicate thatL e Winter is a well-known fabricator withan interest in intelligence and law enforc e-ment activities who frequently makesclaims related to sensational or unusualnews events. The re c o rds that the ReviewB o a rd examined did not show that OswaldL e Winter was ever employed by or workedfor the CIA in any capacity. Further, CIAreported that it has never employed any-one with a title or position equivalent to“Assistant or Deputy Director of Coun-t e re s p i o n a g e . ”

14. Marita Lorenz

Marita Lorenz allegedly was involved in theearly plots to assassinate Fidel Castro; asso-ciated with some of the more colorful gun-running characters in the assassinationstory; and has worked as an informant forgovernment agencies, including the Dru gE n f o rcement A g e n c y. A c c o rding to formerH S C A s t a ffers, Lorenz claimed to have wit-nessed a meeting between Frank Sturg i s ,a.k.a. Frank Fiorini, and E. Howard Hunt,both of whom had denied knowing eachother in testimonies to the Rockefeller Com-mission. Although there are extensive FBIfiles on Lorenz, the Review Board located noadditional files in the CIA collections underher name. Upon the suggestion of formerH S C A s t a ffers to look further into MaritaL o renz, the Review Board requested DEAand INS to search their respective agencyfiles for re c o rds on Lorenz. While INS had nore c o rds, DEA p roduced two files, none ofwhich contained information of relevance tothe assassination.

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15. John Thomas Masen

John Thomas Masen was a Dallas area gundealer who was arrested on gun smugglingc h a rges two days before the assassination ofP resident Kennedy. During the fall of 1963,Masen supplied arms to the Directorio Rev-olucianario Estudiantial (DRE), an anti-Castrog roup based in Miami. The FBI interviewedMasen during the assassination investigationre g a rding allegations that he may have sold6.5 mm Mannlicher- C a rcano ammunition toLee Harvey Oswald. Some re s e a rchers havealleged that Masen had connections toOswald. The Review Board requested accessto FBI files on John Thomas Masen from thefollowing locations: Headquarters, San A n t o-nio, Dallas, and Miami. The FBI reported thatthe Miami field office file had been destro y e d ,but the Review Board designated as assassina-tion re c o rds the Headquarters, San A n t o n i o ,and Dallas field office files in their entire t y.These files describe the FBI’s investigation ofMasen in 1963 and 1964, and his associationwith the DRE.

16. John Anthony McVickar

John Anthony McVickar was a consular offi-cer in Moscow from 1959 to 1961 where hedealt with Lee Harvey Oswald and MarinaOswald. McVickar shared an office with con-sular officer Richard Snyder in 1959 and sowas present to hear Snyder’s October 31interview with Oswald. McVickar was inter-viewed by members of the Review Boardstaff and provided affidavits to the ReviewBoard. McVickar said he had no connectionsto the CIA. The “John A. McVickar” file thatexists in the CIAsequestered collection is thatof an individual with a diff e rent middlename and no connection to the assassination.

17. Elizabeth Catlett Mora

Elizabeth Catlett Mora was a pro m i n e n tAmerican communist who lived in MexicoCity in the early 1960s. Mora was an associateof Vincent T. Lee, head of the FPCC, and trav-eled to Cuba with him in December 1962. TheReview Board requested access to FBI Head-quarters and Mexico City file references toMora to determine if the Communist com-munity in Mexico City had any contact withOswald during his trip to Mexico City in thefall of 1963. The Review Board designated 12

serials from the Headquarters file on Morawhich concerned the Oswald investigation inMexico City.

18. Gordon Duane Novel

Gordon Novel came tothe attention of NewOrleans District AttorneyJim Garrison after mak-ing claims that he was anemployee of the CIA inNew Orleans in 1963 andknew both Lee HarveyOswald and Jack Ruby.The CIA has a 201 and anOffice of Security file onGordon Novel. The 201file includes a DomesticContacts Division “A” file which CIA incor-porated into the 201 file. The Review Boardreviewed both files and designated as assas-sination records the entire Office of Securityfile, and relevant documents from the 201 filewhich did not duplicate re c o rds alre a d yfound within the CIA sequestered collection.

19. Orest Pena

Orest Pena was a New Orleans bar ownerand an anti-Castro activist. Pena and Oswaldobtained passports on the same day in thesummer of 1963. Pena testified before inves-tigative committees, and claimed he was anFBI informant. In an effort to verify his claimsthat he was an informant, the Review Boardrequested access to any Headquarters or fieldoffice files under the “134” or “137” classifi-cation (the FBI file classification for its infor-mant source files). The FBI found no filesresponsive to this request.

20. Carlos Quiroga

Carlos Quiroga was an anti-Castro Cubanactivist in New Orleans who had contactwith Lee Harvey Oswald in the summer of1963. Quiroga received Oswald’s flyer on theFPCC, contacted Oswald, and feigned inter-est in the FPCC. In addition, Quiroga spenttime with Oswald in an effort to determinewhether the FPCC was a serious pro-Castrogroup in New Orleans. The Review Boardrequested access to all Headquarters andNew Orleans field office files regarding Car-los Quiroga. The Review Board designated

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At the time it seemed to me thatLHO was reciting propagandaf o r m u l a s, as well as phrasesused in connection with hisdemand for citizenship renunci-ation, that he perhaps did notfully understand himself, andthat he may have been coachedby persons unknown.—From Affidavit of John A.McVickar, June 23, 1997

six serials from the New Orleans file as assas-sination records.

21. Charles Small

Charles Small was a prominent AmericanCommunist who lived in Mexico City in theearly 1960s. The Review Board requestedaccess to FBI Headquarters and Mexico Cityfile references to Small to determine if theCommunist community in Mexico City hadany contact with Oswald during his trip toMexico City in the fall of 1963. The ReviewBoard designated as assassination records 18serials from the files produced in response tothis request. These documents primarilyrelate to the Mexico City Communist com-munity’s reaction to the assassination and tothe fact that Oswald had visited Mexico Cityshortly before the assassination.

22. Clarence Daniel Smelley

C l a rence Daniel Smelley was a member of theInternational Bro t h e rhood of Teamsters inBirmingham, Alabama, who alleged in 1964that he had information in his possession thatTeamster President Jimmy Hoffa had con-s p i red to and carried out the assassination ofP resident Kennedy. The Review Boardrequested access to the FBI Headquarters filetitled “James Riddle Hoffa; Clarence DanielSmelley; Unknown Subjects,” as well as thec o r responding Memphis and Birminghamfield office files. The Review Board desig-nated the entire Headquarters file for pro c e s s-ing under the JFK Act. This file documentedthe Bureau’s investigation of Smelley and hisallegations. The FBI reports that it destro y e dc o r responding Memphis and Birminghamfield office files in the 1970s.

23. Richard Snyder

R i c h a rd Snyder was the Department of Stateconsular officer on duty at the A m e r i c a nEmbassy in Moscow when Lee HarveyOswald appeared at the embassy to announcehis defection on October 31, 1959. ThoughSnyder had briefly worked for the CIA in 1949and 1950, the Review Board staff could locateno evidence in CIA files that he still had anyconnection to the CIA at the time of Oswald’sdefection. CIA p rocessed its 201 re c o rd onSnyder as part of the sequestered collection.The Review Board staff examined Snyder’ s

O ffice of Personnel file, but did not designateany re c o rds as assassination re c o rd s .

24. Marty Underwood

Marty Underwood was an advance man whoworked for both President Kennedy and Pre s-ident Johnson. He was part of the team thataccompanied President Kennedy to Texas inNovember 1963. Certain re s e a rchers contendthat when Judith Campbell Exner in April 1960allegedly delivered a satchel of cash to Mafiaboss Sam Giancana as a favor to then pre s i-dential candidate Senator John F. Kennedy,Underwood was on the same train from Wa s h-ington, D.C. to Chicago, with instructions to“keep an eye” on her. The Review Board wasalso interested in learning more about Under-wood’s relationship with Winston Scott, theC I A Chief of Station in Mexico City, whom hemet during the Johnson administration. TheReview Board requested access to all file re f e r-ences on Marty Underwood. The FBI pro-duced two documents responsive to thisrequest, and neither re c o rd contained anya s s a s s i n a t i o n - related information. A l t h o u g hUnderwood’s oral history is at the LBJ Library,he has refused to sign a deed to open the his-t o r y. While the Review Board considered theoral history to be an assassination re c o rd ,Underwood gave permission to open onlythose sections which pertain directly to theassassination. The LBJ Library will send thosesections to the JFK Collection.

25. General Edwin Walker and theMinutemen

General Edwin Walker, a retired Army MajorGeneral, was an extreme right-wing politicalactivist living in Dallas in 1963. He wasforced into retirement from the U.S. Army in1961 for distributing right-wing literature tosoldiers under his command. General Walkerwas involved in organizing the protests ofJames Meredith’s matriculation to the Uni-versity of Mississippi in the fall of 1962, aswell as protests of Adlai Stevenson’s visit toDallas in October 1963. After the events ofNovember 22–24, 1963, Marina Oswald con-fided to authorities that she believed it wasLee Harvey Oswald who shot at GeneralWalker’s home in April 1963.

The Review Board was interested in whetherthe FBI had any information which indicated

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that Walker or his followers: (1) hadexpressed any desire to assassinate PresidentKennedy; (2) had any contact with Lee Har-vey Oswald; or (3) had any informationregarding the Walker shooting. The ReviewBoard requested access to Headquarters andDallas field office files on General Walker, theMinutemen, the Headquarters file number100–439412, and the Dallas field office filenumber 105–1475. The FBI produced numer-ous files in response to this request, and theReview Board recommended 191 documentsfrom the various files be processed as assas-sination re c o rds. These documents con-cerned threats against President Kennedyand members of the Kennedy Administra-tion and reactions within the right-wingpolitical community to the assassination ofPresident Kennedy.

The Review Board also requested the Crimi-nal Division of the Department of Justice tosearch for files on Walker. The Review Boardstaff located a small number of assassinationrecords in the Criminal Division’s files.

I. MISCELLANEOUS

This section, organized by agency, sets forthsome of the searches for additional informa-tion and records which did not easily fitwithin other sections or chapters.

1. CIA

At the request of the Review Board, the CIAundertook a search for and located the originalearly re c o rds re g a rding the development of theU–2 plane. The CIA also located one of the fewextant, unredacted, and still closely held copiesof the so called “Family Jewels” document.

a. The U–2 connection and the “fake” manuals.

Many researchers have wondered whetherLee Harvey Oswald learned enough aboutthe U–2 airplane during his U.S. MarineCorps service in Japan to provide usefulinformation to the Soviets as to its airspeedand altitude or whether he might haveplayed a diff e rent role re g a rding Sovietknowledge of the airplane. In his 1994 per-sonal memoir, Ben Rich, the former directorof Lockheed’s research and design “SkunkWorks,” states that Lockheed flight engineersproduced four false test flight manuals at

Richard Bissell’s request. The false test flightmanuals contained incorrect information onthe plane’s weight, speed, altitude, and loadfactor limits. Rich claims that Lockheed pro-duced the four manuals but only Bissellknew how or if the CIA got them to the Sovi-ets. Did Oswald, or others like him, carrythese fake manuals into Soviet hands?

In an effort to locate re c o rds to confirmRich’s story, the Review Board staff con-tacted several individuals who wereinvolved with the U–2 program at CIA. Inaddition, the Review Board staff examinedn u m e rous files from the earliest days of theU–2 including some of the original test flightmanuals. The Directorate of Science andTechnology found no mention of any fakeU–2 manuals in its archives or database. Inaddition, Lockheed, when queried, re p o r t e dthat re c o rds of that age, if they still existed,w e re neither indexed nor archived. In short,the Review Board staff was unable to findany individual who had ever heard of anyfake U–2 manuals or any re c o rd which evenhinted at the existence of any manuals. Wi t hRich and Bissell both deceased, the existenceor plans for four fake U–2 manuals re m a i n sa mystery.2 7

b. The “Family Jewels.”

The 693-paged “Family Jewels” is not a sin-gle written document or report, but rather acollection of separate memoranda or lettersf rom individuals, branches, divisions, ando ffices within the CIA. It grew out of arequest by James Schlesinger, then Dire c t o rof Central Intelligence, instructing individ-ual Agency components to detail acts orp rograms being conducted by the A g e n c ywhich might possibly violate the charter ofthe CIA. Although Schlesinger did not placea time limit on responses, the majority of thematerial detailed in the “Family Jewels” isf rom the late 1960s and early 1970s. The“Family Jewels” contains multiple copies ofmemoranda as diff e rent authors attachedp revious branch, office, or division materi-als to individual treatises, retorts, elabora-tions, or addenda. The collection does nothave a table of contents, sequence, or org a-nizational rationale. CIA stamped the pagesc o n s e c u t i v e l y, and they appear roughly tobe numbered in the order in which theyw e re collected.

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In response to the Review Board’s informalrequest CIA–IR–08, the CIA agreed to meetwith a member of the Review Board staff toreview the “Jewels” and identify assassina-tion-related material. Portions of 27 pageswere marked as assassination records to beprocessed for inclusion in the JFK Collectionat the National Archives.

2. FBI

a. “Research Matters” file on John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board requested access to filenumber 94–37374 in the summer of 1995.The file was one of the 164 files that com-prised J. Edgar Hoover’s “Official and Con-fidential (O&C)” files, which were re m o v e df rom Hoover’s office after his death and arec u r rently maintained by the FBI as a gro u pto maintain their integrity. The file consistsof five volumes, and three “EBFs,” or enclo-s u res behind file. The FBI processed thee n t i re file under the JFK Act. The file consistsof a mix of material relating to JohnK e n n e d y. Volumes 1, 2, 3, and the first half ofVolume 4 all predate the assassination. Thesecond half of Volume 4 and all of Volume 5contain documents that are dated after theassassination and consist of condolence let-ters and other material relating to Pre s i d e n tK e n n e d y. The earliest documents in the filedate back to the late 1940s, when JohnKennedy ran for and was elected to Con-g ress. The pre-assassination file containssocial and professional corre s p o n d e n c ebetween Kennedy and Director Hoover. Italso contains a significant number of news-paper articles and information aboutKennedy’s election races. Once Kennedybecame President, the file captured informa-tion about Presidential protection and liai-son with the Secret Service. The file also con-tains letters and call reports from membersof the public to the FBI generally and toD i rector Hoover specifically relating to Pre s-ident Kennedy.

b. Liaison with other federal agencies.

In his Warren Commission testimony, SecretService agent Rowley commented that, hadfederal agencies shared their informationrelating to Lee Harvey Oswald, the govern-ment could have compiled a list of at least 18items that would have alerted the Secret Ser-

vice that Oswald was a threat to the Presi-dent. In light of allegations that federal agen-cies neglected to adequately share lawenforcement information, the Review Boardstaff believed that information of the 1960sera, which related to liaison between federalgovernment agencies on law enforc e m e n tmatters generally and matters affecting Pres-idential protection specifically, would be rel-evant for purposes of the JFK Collection.

i. Secret Service/Protection of the President.The Review Board requested access to theFBI’s files captioned “Liaison with the SecretService” and “Presidential Protection.” Bothof these files had previously been available inthe FBI’s FOIA reading room in a heavilyredacted form. The FBI’s file on PresidentialProtection does not begin until 1964, and theReview Board designated all documentsfrom 1964, and 27 documents from post-1964,as assassination records. The Review Boardalso designated the FBI’s entire file on theDillon Commission as assassination-related.

ii. CIA. Although the HSCA re v i e w e dportions of the FBI’s liaison file with theCIA, the Review Board requested access toadditional sections of the FBI/CIA l i a i s o nfile covering the period 1957 through 1969 inan effort to locate new assassination re c o rd s .The Review Board designated all documentsf rom the CIA liaison file for the years 1963and 1964 as well as 67 documents from theperiod before and after 1963 and 1964 forp rocessing as assassination re c o rds. Thesedocuments cover a wide variety of topicsrelated to the assassination including infor-mation about how the FBI and the CIAs h a red information when their intere s t soverlapped.

iii. NSA. The Review Board staff’ sreview of the FBI liaison file with NSAfor theyears 1959–1964 produced no additionalassassination records.

iv. Customs. The Review Board staff’sreview of the FBI’s liaison file with the Cus-toms Service produced no additional assassi-nation records.

v. ATF. The Review Board staff’s reviewof the FBI’s liaison file with the Bureau ofAlcohol Tobacco and Firearms produced noadditional assassination records.

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3. Secret Service

a. Protective survey reports.

Whenever the President traveled outside ofWashington, D.C., the Secret Service wouldgenerate a Protective Survey Report, or a“trip report.” Trip reports, composed byS e c ret Service agents who conductedadvance work for the President’s trips, con-tained information ranging from logisticaldetails about seating arrangements to detailsabout individuals in the area known to havemade threats against the President’s life.Some of the survey reports document infor-mation Secret Service received from otheragencies such as the FBI or the CIA.

The survey reports detail Pre s i d e n tKennedy’s travel, whereabouts, associations,and activities for his entire administration.They also provide a complete picture of theS e c ret Service’s protection of Pre s i d e n tKennedy.

b. Shift reports.

The White House Detail consisted of SecretService agents whose duties were to person-ally protect the life of the President, the VicePresident, and their respective families. TheWhite House Detail kept “shift reports,” usu-ally authored by the Special Agent in chargeof the shift, that detailed the activity of eachsection during their assigned working hours.

c. Eileen Dinneen memoranda.

Eileen Dinneen, a staff researcher for theHSCA, obtained access to protective intelli-gence files and Protective Survey Reports.Dinneen documented her review of thesefiles in memoranda and reports. The ReviewBoard staff found useful Dinneen’s docu-mentation of information contained in theSecret Service protective intelligence files ofindividuals whom the Secret Service consid-ered to be dangerous to the lives of the Pres-ident, the Vice President, and their familiesfrom March to December 1963. For each pro-tective intelligence file she reviewed, Din-neen created a one-page report documentingthe name of the individual and various bio-graphical and background information theSecret Service maintained on the individual.The Board’s vote to release in full these

“threat sheets” was the subject of the SecretService’s May 1998 appeal to the President.


Robert Edward Webster was a technicianworking on the American Exhibition inMoscow in the summer of 1959 when hedecided to renounce his citizenship and defectto the Soviet Union. Webster appeared at theU.S. Embassy to announce his defection twoweeks prior to Oswald’s visit. Researc h e r shave suggested that accounts of Oswald’sappearance at the embassy differ becauseembassy personnel have confused the arrivalsof Webster and Oswald. In an effort to exploreany physical similarities between the twomen, the Review Board asked the Departmentof State to locate a circa 1959 passport photo-graph of We b s t e r. The Department of Statep roduced its passport file on We b s t e r, andt r a n s f e r red the file to the JFK Collection. Thepassport file includes new, detailed informa-tion on We b s t e r’s defection.

5. Army

The Review Board’s two primary concernswith Army records were: first, to open thecounterintelligence files located at the Inves-tigative Records Repository (IRR) at FortMeade; and second, to determine whetherArmy intelligence units had any re g u l a rresponsibilities for protection of the Presi-dent as part of their normal duties circa 1963.

a. U.S. Army’s Investigative Records Repository.

This facility at Fort Meade in Maryland, apart of the Army’s Intelligence and SecurityCommand (INSCOM), contains investigativefiles on individuals of counterintelligenceinterest to the Army. The HSCA studied 34IRR “case files,” and thus, the A r m yprocessed those records for inclusion in theJFK Collection. The Review Board requestedthree additional files and designated themassassination records. The three additionalcase files declared as assassination records bythe Review Board pertain to Alfredo MirabalDiaz, Jordan James Pfuntner, and ClemardJoseph Charles. The Review Board staff alsodesignated one additional file consisting ofan assortment of extracts from various ArmyIntelligence Regulations.

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b. Army Security Agency records and files.

The Review Board did not locate any addi-tional assassination records from the ArmySecurity Agency’s files. Review Board staffsearched for information and records con-cerning ASA electronic surveillance from the1960s, but was unsuccessful in its efforts tolocate any such material. Army personnelprovided to the Review Board staff a unit his-tory which gave a generic description of ASAsurveillance activities in Mexico City in 1963.The one paragraph that addressed this activ-ity was short, not very detailed, anddescribed the ASA surveillance effort of theCuban and Soviet Embassies as larg e l yunsuccessful, due to technical diff i c u l t i e s .This paragraph did not provide any rawintelligence or surveillance data.

c. Army Inspector General 1973 report ondomestic surveillance abuses in the U.S.

In 1997, the Review Board requested that theArmy’s Inspector General’s Office locate andprovide a copy of its own 1973 report ondomestic surveillance abuses in the UnitedStates, in the hope that this document mightmention domestic surveillance activity in theearly 1960s and provide leads to the ReviewBoard. (The Church Committee cited thisreport in detail.) The Army IG off i c eresponded to the Review Board staff that itcould not locate its own report.

6. White House Communications Agency

WHCAwas, and is, responsible for maintain-ing both secure (encrypted) and unsecured(open) telephone, radio, and telex communi-cation between the President and the govern-ment of the United States. Most of the per-sonnel that constitute this elite agency areU.S. military communications specialists;many, in 1963, were from the Army SignalCorps. On November 22, 1963, WHCA wasresponsible for communications betweenand among Air Force One and Two, theWhite House Situation Room, the mobileWhite House, and with the Secret Service inthe motorcade.

The Review Board sought to locate any audiorecordings of voice communications to orfrom Air Force One on the day of the assassi-nation, including communications between

Air Force One and Andrews Air Force Baseduring the return flight from Dallas to Wash-ington, D.C. As many people are now aware,in the 1970s, the LBJ Presidential Libraryreleased edited audio cassettes of unsecured,or open voice conversations with Air ForceOne, Andrews Air Force Base, the WhiteHouse Situation Room, and the Cabinet Air-craft carrying the Secretary of State and othero fficials on November 22, 1963. The LBJLibrary version of these tapes consists ofabout 110 minutes of voice transmissions, butthe tapes are edited and condensed, so theReview Board staff sought access tounedited, uncondensed versions. Since theedited version of the tapes contains consider-able talk about both the forthcoming autopsyon the President, as well as the reaction of agovernment in crisis, the tapes are of consid-erable interest to assassination researchersand historians.

Given that the LBJ Library released the tapesin the 1970s, the paper trail is now sketchy andquite cold. The LBJ Library staff is fairly confi-dent that the tapes originated with the WhiteHouse Communications Agency (WHCA).The LBJ Library staff told the Review Boards t a ff that it received the tapes from the WhiteHouse as part of the original shipment of Pre s-ident Johnson’s papers in 1968 or 1969.A c c o rding to the LBJ Library’s documenta-tion, the accession card reads: “WHCA?” andis dated 1975. The Review Board staff couldnot locate any re c o rds indicating who per-formed the editing, or when, or where .

The Review Board’s repeated written and oralinquiries of the White House Communica-tions Agency did not bear fruit. The WHCAcould not produce any re c o rds that illumi-nated the provenance of the edited tapes.

7. Presidential Library Materials

The JFK Act obliged both the John F. Kennedyand Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Librariesto grant the Review Board access to donor-restricted material and to re c o rds stored undera deposit agreement to determine whether thematerial contains assassination information.I n i t i a l l y, both presidential libraries were re l u c-tant to release their most closely guard e dre c o rds involving Jacqueline Kennedy, RobertK e n n e d y, and William Manchester. In the caseof both libraries, privacy concerns, as well as

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political motivations, delayed the decision-making process. The Review Board was able tos e c u re the LBJ Library’s agreement to re l e a s ethe Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes and tran-s c r i p t s ;2 8 obtain William Manchester’s permis-sion to allow a member of the Review Boards t a ff to review his papers on The Death of aP re s i d e n t; and secure the cooperation of the JFKLibrary in approaching the Kennedy familyre g a rding the release of the sealed tapes andtranscripts of Manchester’s interviews withJacqueline B. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy.

a. William Manchester interviews.

Most of William Manchester’s work papersrelating to his work on The Death of a Pre s i d e n ta re stored at the JFK Library under a 1967Deposit A g reement. Of particular historicalvalue are the extensive personal interviews heconducted in the early aftermath of the Pre s i-dent’s death. In contrast to other re c o rds in theCollection that shed light on the assassinationinvestigations, the Manchester interviewsc h ronicle the human side of the story. Man-chester envisioned that The Death of a Pre s i d e n tw o u l d p rovide “one complete, accurateaccount about the assassination,. . . that wouldbe based on material gathered while the mem-ories were still fre s h . ”2 9 The interviews cap-t u red and re c o rded the early recollections andreactions of people closest to Pre s i d e n tKennedy and provide a lens through whichthe tragedy of the event can be seen andunderstood in the context of the times.

Beginning in early 1995, the Review Boardmade repeated attempts to gain access toM a n c h e s t e r’s papers at the JFK Library. InJune 1998, Manchester agreed to allow aReview Board staff member to review hismaterial at the Library. This review re v e a l e dthat, while much of the information Man-chester obtained from the interviews isincorporated into his book, his raw noteswould be of great value and interest tore s e a rchers.

Although Manchester recorded some of hisinterviews on tape, the recordings were notavailable at the Library. Only the writtennotes and/or transcripts of his interviews arein this collection. Furthermore, not all of theinterviews that Manchester referenced in TheDeath of a President are accounted for in thenotebooks and transcripts he deposited in

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the JFK Library. Becauseof their unique historicalvalue, the Review Boardregards these interviewsas highly relevant to theassassination. This out-standing collection ofmaterials should bemade available to thepublic as soon as possi-ble. At this point, how-e v e r, Manchester hasrefused to cooperate andit is unfortunately impos-sible to open the recordswithout his consent.

The tapes and transcripts of William Man-c h e s t e r’s interviews of Robert F. Kennedy andJacqueline B. Kennedy are subject to a 1967legal agreement which states that they werenot to be made public for 100 years “except. . .on the express written consent of plaintiff[Jacqueline B. Kennedy].” With Mrs. Onas-sis’s death, her daughter Caroline Kennedybecame her re p resentative and is the onlyperson with authority to give consent to openthis material.

The Review Board recog-nizes that the interviewshave extraordinary his-torical value and so itpursued this matter withthe JFK Library and withWilliam Manchester. A f t e revaluating whether thethe court order could belifted, the Review Boarddecided to approach Car-oline Kennedy to discussthe possibility of havingthe tapes and transcriptsopened at the KennedyL i b r a r y. Caroline Kennedy wrote to theReview Board in late August 1998, informingthe Board of her decision n o t to release thematerial at this time, nor would she agree toallow one of the Review Board members toreview the material to determine whetherthe tapes contained assassination-re l a t e dm a t e r i a l .

The Review Board was very disappointedthat Caroline Kennedy declined to even allowthe Review Board access to the material. The

The public was curious, a n dthat curiosity could not be sat-isfied without revealing whatwe had decided to omit. At thesame time, some political fig-ures described in the manu-script demanded that they bepresented in glowing terms. Ibalked and refused to makechanges that would falsify his-t o r y .—William Manchester, inDeath of a President

In my view, the Manch e s t e rinterviews have an extraordi-narily unique historical valueand are the most importantrecords not yet released. . . I amhopeful that you might agree torelease the material before theReview Board completes itswork in September so we canhelp manage the release in anappropriate manner.—Hon. John R. Tunheim’s letterto Caroline B. Kennedy

B o a rd hopes that she will agree to publicrelease at a later time.

b. Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes at the LBJ Library.

T h e re are six re c o rded telephone conversa-tions between Jacqueline B. Kennedy andP resident Johnson within the collection ofp residential re c o rdings at the LBJ Library.The Review Board has worked consistentlywith the LBJ Library to secure their re l e a s e .The LBJ Library was concerned about donorrestrictions associated with the release ofthese tapes. Finally , in March 1998 the LBJLibrary decided to release the six conversa-tions provided that they be opened alongwith the next scheduled release of Pre s i d e n tJohnson’s re c o rdings. The Review Boardunderstands that these tapes will bereleased on September 18, 1998, along withthe release of the August to November 1963re c o rd i n g s .

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J. CONCLUSION

The Review Board examined a large number ofrecords in its efforts to identify additional fed-eral records and information related to theassassination, many of which are not detailedin this report. For every assassination recordthat the Review Board located and included inthe JFK Collection, the staff literally reviewedhundreds of documents. The need to reviewevery file on a document-by-document basismeant that the Review Board simply did nothave time to request additional informationand records on every research lead that itreceived. For those requests that the ReviewBoard staff did make, the Review Board staffteam leaders kept notebooks that documentedthe Review Board staff’s efforts to locate addi-tional records at the FBI, CIA, and Departmentof Defense. To the extent that the public isi n t e rested in finding information on theReview Board’s additional requests, the note-books document which records Review Boardstaff reviewed and which records the ReviewBoard has designated as assassination-related.

CHAPTER 6

PART I: ENDNOTES

1 JFK Act, § 5(c)(2)(H).

2 Chapter 5 of this Report defines the CIA’s Sequestered Collection.

3 In Volume 11 of its report, the HSCA attempted to deal with allegations of a possible mili-tary investigation of Oswald by the Marine Corps following the assassination. Also, some for-mer USMC associates of Oswald have told researchers that they recall civilian investigatorsasking questions about Oswald following his defection in late 1959 or early 1960.

4 The in-person, unsworn interview was tape-recorded, and the three written interviewreports are dated August 5, August 13, and September 16, 1997, respectively.

5 Reeves served in the District Intelligence Office of the San Diego, California 11th NavalDistrict.

6 One of the officers who called Mr. Reeves was Rufus Taylor, who was Director of NavalIntelligence in 1964.

7 The Office of Operations later became the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD) of the Direc-torate of Operations.

8 See the HSCA’s report on Oswald in Mexico City, The Lopez Report, where the subject ofCIA photographic surveillance operations is discussed at length.

9 The Review Board was not able to locate cables or dispatches from the following periods:Mexico City Station to Headquarters (September 26–30, 1963); Headquarters to Mexico CityStation (September 26–30, 1963); JMWAVE to Headquarters (September 26–November 21,1963); Headquarters to JMWAVE (September 26–November 21, 1963); and all traffic betweenthe Mexico City Station and JMWAVE for the periods September 26–October 20, 1963 andNovember 22–December 30, 1963.

10 According to CIA, in the 1960s, offices of record for cable traffic and dispatches did not cre-ate cable and dispatch files for reference collection purposes.

11 Approximately half of the records on Cuba were from 1962 and the other half were from1963. Very few records from 1961 or 1964 were present.

12 The RFK donor committee was established in the 1970s for the purpose of overseeing theprocessing of RFK papers which were held on a deposit agreement at the JFK Library. It tradi-tionally has been comprised of Kennedy family members and scholars and is now headed byMax Kennedy, one of Robert F. Kennedy’s sons.

13 When the Review Board decided in 1996 that it would not object to the JFK Library keep-ing custody of the RFK Cuba-related records, provided that the JFK Library agree to releasethe records, the JFK Library moved to process the records as part of the executive ordermandatory review declassification. Consequently, the Library included the RFK records in thepilot scanning project conducted by CIA, with the stipulation that they be reviewed under JFKAct guidelines. The process was delayed due to a combination of technical problems with thescanning project and a change in leadership of the donor committee following the death ofMichael Kennedy.

14 The CIAmemoranda bear the dates November 23, 1976; August 5, 1977; and November 29,1979.

15 Secret Service Final Declaration of Compliance.

16 OIP Final Declaration of Compliance.

17 Mr. Miller was later subpoenaed by the Review Board, and he had retained numerousrecords from his tenure as Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division.

18 Criminal Division Initial Statement of Compliance (dated January 29, 1997).

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19 Dec. 19, 1996, Review Board Letter to Main Treasury.

20 Main Treasury Final Declaration ¶ 10.

21 Id. ¶ 19.

22 In the early 1960s, the Technical Services Division (TSD), was a part of the Directorate ofPlans (now the Directorate of Operations). Later administrative shifts moved TSD (renamedthe Office of Technical Service) to the DS&T and the files of the relocated office were incorpo-rated into the DS&T system.

23 The FBI had only designated for processing under the JFK Act sections 17–18 and 20–37 ofthe Giancana file. Section 17 of the file began with the year 1963, and so the FBI had not des-ignated for processing any volumes of records that predated January 1, 1963.

24 Robert Blakey and Richard Billings, Fatal Hour (1981); Anthony Summers, Conspiracy503–504 (1980); Gerald Posner, Case Closed 459–460 (1993); John H. Davis, Mafia Kingfish,519–524 (1989); Ronald Goldfarb, Did the Mob Kill JFK?, Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1995 at C3:1.

2 5 When the FBI determines that electronic surveillance is a necessary component of a partic-ular investigation, the FBI goes to a federal court and obtains authorization pursuant to Title IIIto establish the surveillance. Title III operates to automatically place a l l materials obtained fro mthe overhear under court seal. Then, if the U.S. Attorney wants to use the tapes in a pro s e c u-tion, they have to petition the federal court to have the seal lifted only for the portions of thetapes that will be played at trial. The practical effect of this pro c e d u re is that everything that isn o t played at trial remains under seal. Thus, in order for the Review Board staff to obtain accessto the BriLab surveillance, it had to move to unseal the materials for the purpose of its re v i e w.Then, when the Review Board staff located assassination re c o rds within the BriLab materials, itrequested the Title III court to unseal the re c o rds for the purpose of public disclosure.

26 The Worker newspaper, to which Oswald subscribed, often mentioned Abt.

27 Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years At Lockheed. NewYork: Little Brown, and Company. 1994.

28 Scheduled to be released on September 18, 1998.

29 William Manchester, Foreward to The Death of a President, Harper & Row, Publishers, NewYork, p. ix–x.

A. INTRODUCTION

Many students of the assassination believethat the medical evidence on the assassina-tion of President Kennedy, in concert withthe ballistics evidence and film recordings ofthe events in Dealey Plaza, is the most impor-tant documentation in the case, as indeed itwould be in any homicide investigation. TheReview Board believed that, in order to trulyaddress the public’s concerns relating to pos-sible conspiracies and cover-ups relating tothe assassination, it would need to gathersome additional information on all three ofthese topics. The pages that follow detail theReview Board’s efforts to develop additionalinformation on these highly relevant andinteresting topics.

B. MEDICAL EVIDENCE1

The President John F. Kennedy AssassinationRecords Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) did nottask the Assassination Records Review Boardwith the mission of investigating the assassi-nation or of attempting to resolve any of thesubstantive issues surrounding it. But theJFK Act did authorize the Review Board topursue issues related to the documentaryrecord, including the completeness of recordsand the destruction of records. In an informaldiscussion with the Review Board, Congress-man Louis Stokes, former Chairman of theHouse Select Committee on Assassinations(HSCA), strongly encouraged the ReviewBoard to do what it could to help resolveissues surrounding the documentary recordof the autopsy. He advised the Board that themedical evidence is of particular importanceand that he hoped that it would do all itcould to complete the record. Despite beinghampered by a 33-year-old paper trail, theReview Board vigorously pursued additionalrecords related to the medical evidence andthe autopsy, commencing in 1996.

1. Medical Issues

One of the many tragedies related to theassassination of President Kennedy has beenthe incompleteness of the autopsy record andthe suspicion caused by the shroud of secrecythat has surrounded the records that do exist.Although the professionals who participatedin the creation and the handling of the med-ical evidence may well have had the best ofintentions in not publicly disclosing informa-tion—protecting the privacy and the sensibil-ities of the President’s family—the legacy ofsuch secrecy ultimately has caused distrustand suspicion. There have been serious andlegitimate reasons for questioning not onlythe completeness of the autopsy records ofPresident Kennedy, but the lack of a promptand complete analysis of the records by theWarren Commission.

Among the several shortcomings regardingthe disposition of the autopsy records, thefollowing points illustrate the problem. First,there has been confusion and uncertainty asto whether the principal autopsy prosector,Dr. James J. Humes, destroyed the originaldraft of the autopsy report, or if he destroyednotes taken at the time of the autopsy. Sec-ond, the autopsy measurements were fre-quently imprecise and sometimes inexplica-bly absent. Third, the prosectors were notshown the original autopsy photographs bythe Wa r ren Commission, nor were theyasked enough detailed questions about theautopsy or the photographs. Fourth, the per-sons handling the autopsy records did notc reate a complete and contemporaneousaccounting of the number of photographsnor was a proper chain of custody estab-lished for all of the autopsy materials. Fifth,when Dr. Humes was shown some copies ofautopsy photographs during his testimonybefore the HSCA, he made statements thatwere interpreted as suggesting that he had

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CHAPTER 6PA RT II:

CL A R I F I N G T H E FE D E R A L RE C O R D O N T H E ZA P R U D E R F I L M A N D T H E

ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E

revised his original opinion significantly onthe location of the entrance wound. Theseshortcomings should have been remediedshortly after the assassination while memo-ries were fresh and records were more read-ily recoverable.

The first step taken by the Review Board inre g a rd to the medical evidence was toarrange for the earliest possible release of allrelevant information in the Warren Commis-sion and HSCA files. Prior to the passage ofthe JFK Act, the files from the HSCA con-tained numerous medical records that hadnever been released to the public. After theJFK Act came into effect, but before theReview Board was created, the NationalA rchives and Records A d m i n i s t r a t i o n(NARA) released many of these re c o rd s .Once the Review Board staff was in place infall of 1994, it attempted to identify allremaining records that appeared to be con-nected to the medical evidence and arrangedfor their prompt release. All of these recordswere sent to NARA by early 1995 withoutredactions and without postponements.

The Review Board queried several govern-ment entities about possible files related tothe autopsy, including the Bethesda NationalNaval Medical Center, the Armed Forc e sInstitute of Pathology, the Naval Photo-graphic Center, the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence (for Church CommitteeRecords), and the President John F. KennedyLibrary. The Review Board also attempted tocontact all former staff members of the HouseSelect Committee on Assassinations. Withthe exception of the autopsy photographsand x-rays, which are exempt from publicdisclosure under the JFK Act, the ReviewBoard arranged for the release of all govern-mental records related to the autopsy. Thereare no other restricted records related to theautopsy of which the Review Board is aware.

The Review Board’s search for re c o rds there-upon extended to conducting informal inter-views of numerous witnesses, taking deposi-tions under oath of the principal persons whoc reated autopsy re c o rds, and arranging forthe digitizing of the autopsy photographs.

There were many notable successes resultingfrom the Board’s work, a few of which maybriefly be mentioned here. With the generous

and public-spirited cooperation of the East-man Kodak Company, NARA, the FBI, and arepresentative of the Kennedy family, theReview Board was able to provide securetransportation to ship the autopsy pho-tographs to Rochester, New York, to be digi-tized on the most advanced digital scanner inthe world. The digitized images will be capa-ble of further enhancement as technologyand science advance. The digitizing shouldalso provide assistance for those who wish topursue the question of whether the autopsyphotographs were altere d .2 The ReviewBoard also was able to identify additionallatent autopsy photographs on a roll of filmthat had (inaccurately) been described as“exposed to light and processed, but show-ing no recognizable image.” Again with thegenerous cooperation of Kodak, the latentphotographs were digitized and enhancedfor further evaluation. These digitizedrecords have already been transferred to theJohn F. Kennedy Assassination Records Col-lection (JFK Collection) at NARA. Access tothese materials is controlled by a representa-tive of the Kennedy family.

On another front, through staff efforts, theReview Board was able to locate a new wit-ness, Ms. Saundra Spencer, who worked atthe Naval Photographic Center in 1963. Shewas interviewed by phone and then bro u g h tto Washington where her deposition wastaken under oath in the presence of theautopsy photographs. Ms. Spencer testifiedthat she developed post-mortem pho-tographs of President Kennedy in November1963, and that these photographs were dif-f e rent from those in the National A rc h i v e ssince 1966. In another deposition under oath,D r. Humes, one of the three autopsy pro s e c-tors, acknowledged under questioning—intestimony that appears to differ from whathe told the Wa r ren Commission—that hehad destroyed both his notes taken at theautopsy and the first draft of the autopsyreport. Autopsy prosector Dr. “J” ThorntonBoswell, in an effort to clarify the impre c i-sion in the autopsy materials, marked on ananatomically correct plastic skull his bestrecollection of the nature of the wounds onthe President’s cranium. The autopsy pho-t o g r a p h e r, Mr. John Stringer, in detailed tes-t i m o n y, explained the photographic pro c e-d u res he followed at the autopsy and heraised some questions about whether the

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supplemental brain photographs that hetook are those that are now in NARA. Hisformer assistant, Mr. Floyd Riebe, who hadearlier told several re s e a rchers that theautopsy photographs had been altered basedupon his examination of photographs thathave been circulating in the public domain,re-evaluated his earlier opinion when shownthe actual photographs at NARA.

P e rhaps the most challenging aspect of theReview Board’s work on the medical evi-dence was the preparation and taking of thedepositions of the principal persons withknowledge about the autopsy and autopsyre c o rds. Although conducting such workwas not re q u i red by the JFK Act, the ReviewB o a rd sought to obtain as much informationas possible re g a rding the documentaryre c o rd. A c c o rd i n g l y, it identified all of thestill-living persons who were involved inthe creation of autopsy re c o rds and bro u g h tvirtually all of them to NARA. For the firsttime, in the presence of the original colort r a n s p a rencies and sometimes first-genera-tion black-and-white prints, the witnessesw e re asked questions about the authenticityof the photographs, the completeness of theautopsy re c o rds, the apparent gaps in there c o rds, and any additional information intheir possession re g a rding the medical evi-dence. The witnesses came from as far awayas Switzerland (Dr. Pierre Finck) and asclose as Maryland (Dr. “J” ThorntonBoswell). In conducting the depositions, theReview Board staff sought to approach thequestioning in a professional manner andwithout prejudging the evidence or the wit-n e s s e s .

Near the end of its tenure, the Review Boardalso took the joint deposition of five of theDallas physicians who treated the President’swounds at Parkland Memorial Hospital onNovember 22, 1963.

There were three closely related problemsthat seriously impeded the Review Board’sefforts to complete the documentary recordsurrounding the autopsy: a cold paper trail,faded memories, and the unreliability of eye-witness testimony. An example of the coldpaper trail comes from Admiral Georg eBurkley, who was President Kennedy’s mili-tary physician and the only medical doctorwho was present both during emergency

t reatment at Parkland Memorial Hospitaland at the autopsy at Bethesda Naval Hospi-tal. In the late 1970s, at the time of theHSCA’s investigation, Dr. Burkley, throughhis attorney, suggested to the HSCA that hemight have some additional informationabout the autopsy. Because Dr. Burkley isnow deceased, the Review Board soughtadditional information both from his formerlawyer’s firm, and from Dr. Burkley’s family.The Burkley family said it did not possessany papers or documents related to the assas-sination, and declined to sign a waiver ofattorney-client privilege that would havepermitted the Review Board access to thefiles of Mr. Illig (also now deceased),Burkley’s former attorney.

Memories fade over time. A very importantf i g u re in the chain-of-custody on the autopsymaterials, and the living person who perh a p sm o re than any other would have been able toresolve some of the lingering questions re l a t e dto the disposition of the original autopsymaterials, is Robert Bouck of the Secret Ser-vice. At the time he was interviewed he wasquite elderly and little able to remember theimportant details. Similarly, the re c o rds showthat Carl Belcher, formerly of the Departmentof Justice, played an important role in pre p a r-ing the inventory of autopsy re c o rds. He was,h o w e v e r, unable to identify or illuminate there c o rds that, on their face, appear to have beenwritten by him.

Finally, a significant problem that is wellknown to trial lawyers, judges, and psychol-ogists, is the unreliability of eyewitness testi-mony. Witnesses frequently, and inaccurately,believe that they have a vivid recollection ofevents. Psychologists and scholars have long-since demonstrated the serious unreliabilityof peoples’ recollections of what they hearand see. One illustration of this was an inter-view statement made by one of the treatingphysicians at Parkland. He explained that hewas in Trauma Room Number 1 with thePresident. He recounted how he observedthe First Lady wearing a white dress. Ofcourse, she was wearing a pink suit, a factknown to most Americans. The inaccuracy ofhis recollection probably says little about thequality of the doctor’s memory, but it isrevealing of how the memory works andhow cautious one must be when attemptingto evaluate eyewitness testimony.

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A N D T H E ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E

The deposition transcripts and other medicalevidence that were released by the ReviewBoard should be evaluated cautiously by thepublic. Often the witnesses contradict notonly each other, but sometimes themselves.For events that transpired almost 35 yearsago, all persons are likely to have failures ofmemory. It would be more prudent to weighall of the evidence, with due concern forhuman error, rather than take single state-ments as “proof” for one theory or another.

C. ZAPRUDER FILM

In the spring of 1996, the Review Boardbegan to consider how it might answer ques-tions about chain-of-custody, or provenance,of selected film records, or enhance or betterpreserve selected film records.

1. Ownership of the Zapruder Film

At the time that Congre s spassed the JFK A c t ,Abraham Zapru d e r’ sfamous 8mm film depict-ing the death of Pre s i d e n tKennedy was in the pos-session of NARA. TheZ a p ruder film, whichre c o rds the momentswhen President Kennedywas assassinated, is per-haps the single mostimportant assassinationre c o rd. In 1978, A b r a h a mZ a p ru d e r’s son, Henry G.Z a p ru d e r, deposited theoriginal Zapruder filmwith the NationalA rchives for safekeeping.Legal ownership of thefilm, however, was stillretained by the Zapru d e rf a m i l y. As the Zapru d e rfamily stated upon trans-mission of the film to the

National A rchives, “the Film will be held bythe A rchives solely for storage purposesa nd. . . the A rchives has acquired no rightswhatsoever to the Film.”3

In March 1993, shortly after passage of theJFK Act, Henry Zapruder sought unsuccess-fully to remove the original film from theNational A rchives. In October 1994, the

Zapruder family, through its attorney, againsought return of the original film. NARAdeclined to return the original film, knowingthat the JFK Act may have affected the legalownership status of the film.

Thereafter, NARA, the Review Board, andthe Department of Justice sought to clarifythe status of the original film under the JFKAct, including whether the U.S. governmentcould legally acquire the original film andwhat the value of compensation to theZapruder family would be under the takingsclause of the Fifth Amendment. In addition,the U.S. government had numerous discus-sions with legal counsel for the Zapruderfamily regarding a legal “taking” of the film,the compensation to be accorded to the fam-ily, and copyright issues regarding the film.

In 1997, the Review Board deliberated, andultimately asserted, its authority under theJFK Act to acquire legal ownership of theoriginal Zapruder film. On April 2, 1997, theReview Board held a public hearing “to seekpublic comment and advice on what shouldbe done with the camera-original motion pic-ture film of the assassination that was takenby Abraham Zapruder on November 22,1963.” The issue facing the Board waswhether the Zapruder film was an “assassi-nation record” that “should be in the JFKCollection at the Archives” and whether it“should. . . be Federal Government propertyrather than the property of private citizens.” 5

The Review Board also had to consider howto acquire the film for the American people,whether through the exercise of a takingspower or through negotiation with theZapruder family.

At its April 1997 hearing, the Review Boardh e a rd testimony from six experts whoa d d ressed a variety of issues, including theconstitutional and legal issues involved ine ffecting a “taking” of the film and the bene-fits in having U.S. government ownership ofthe original film. Following the Zapruder filmhearing, the Review Board held an open meet-ing on April 24, 1997, and resolved to securelegal ownership of the original Zapruder filmfor the American people. The Board’s “State-ment of Policy and Intent with Regard to theZ a p ruder Film,” adopted unanimously by theB o a rd, resolved: (1) that the Zapruder filmwas an assassination re c o rd within the mean-

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W hy is this [Zapruder] film soimportant? It is enormouslyi m p o r t a n t , if you want to knowwhat happened in Dealey Plaza,this film shows you, as much asany film can. All queries andchallenges to. . . [ i t s ]. . . a u t h e n-t i c i t y , if this film is in govern-ment hands, can be satisfa c t o-rily overcome. When that isd o n e , this film then becomes abaseline for all additional stud-ies for what happened in DealeyP l a z a. . . there should be a proto-col established as for how a dig-itized copy is made with thestate of the art equipment. . . t h a tdigitized copy, w h i ch is thenfully authenticated, should thenbe the basis of all research inthe future.—Josiah Thompson,April 2, 1997

ing of the JFK Act; (2) that the Board wouldattempt to ensure that the best available copyof the film be made available to the public atthe lowest reasonable price; (3) that the Boardwould work cooperatively with the Zapru d e rfamily to produce the best possible copy forscholarly and re s e a rch purposes, establish abase re f e rence for the film through digitiza-tion, and to conduct all appropriate tests toevaluate authenticity and to elicit historicaland evidentiary evidence; and (4) that theoriginal film be transferred to the JFK Collec-tion on August 1, 1998 and that the ReviewB o a rd would work with Congress to re s o l v ethis issue.

In June 1998, Congressman Dan Burton,Chairman of the House Committee on Gov-ernment Reform and Oversight, which over-sees the work of the Review Board, wrote tothe Department of Justice expressing Con-gressional support for the efforts of DOJ tocarry out the “Board’s commitment to ensur-ing that the original Zapruder film remainsin the custody of the American people as themost important ‘assassination record.’”6 Atthe time of this Report, the Department ofJustice was engaged in negotiations with theZapruder family to resolve all outstandingissues relating to the legal transfer of the filmf rom the family to the U.S. government,including the issue of compensation to bepaid to the family for the film. The transfer ofthe original Zapruder film to the JFK Collec-tion was effective August 1, 1998.

2. S t a ff Examinations of Films Designated as “In-Camera” Original,and First Generation Copies, by NARA

The Review Board determined that thereshould be an examination of the Zapruderfilms at NARAdesignated as the original andthe two Secret Service copies (believed to befirst generation copies) for the purpose ofrecording characteristics of the three films.(See illustration.) (The Review Board subse-quently determined that the LMH Com-pany—the Zapruder family’s company—possessed a third first generation copy of theZapruder film.) The Review Board hopedthat the recorded observations would serveto provide information to a public that wouldnot be able to obtain physical access to thesefilms, and second, would determine whetherthe film should be examined by photo-

graphic experts. Ultimately, the staff recom-mended, and the Review Board agreed, thatit would approach Eastman Kodak to requestthat Kodak examine the Zapruder film.

3. Eastman Kodak’s Pro Bono Work for theReview Board Related to the ZapruderFilm (and Autopsy Photographs)

The Review Board first met with the EastmanKodak Company in June 1996 in Washingtonto discuss a wide variety of possible researchtopics related to a host of potential filmissues. At that time, Kodak stated that itwould provide a limited amount of pro bonowork for the Review Board. The ReviewBoard continued discussions with Kodak lab-oratory officials based in Rochester, NewYork, and subsequently met with Kodaktechnical experts James Milch and RolandZavada in Washington, D.C. At that meeting,the Review Board identified three majorareas of interest, only one of which related tothe Zapruder film: (1) the possible digitiza-tion and enhancement of the Zapruder film,as well as edge print analysis of the originaland first generation copies, and study of theoptical characteristics of the Zapruder cam-

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era in relation to perceived “anomalies” inthe original film; (2) the possible enhance-ment and, if necessary, optical (i.e., film, notmedical) analysis of autopsy images; and (3)a study of the provenance of film materialssubpoenaed by the Review Board fro mRobert J. Groden for examination. Kodak lab-oratory experts Milch and Zavada viewedthe original Zapruder film, a Secret Servicefirst generation copy, and some of the Gro-den materials for the first time at NARA dur-ing their September 1996 visit to Washington.

Kodak subsequentlyoffered to contribute upto $20,000 of labor andmaterials to the ReviewBoard in pro bono work—the equivalent of roughly35 days of effort. Kodakconfirmed, at a meetingwith the Review Board inAugust of 1997, thatZavada, a retired Kodak

film chemist who was formerly Kodak’s pre-eminent 8 mm film expert, was the consul-tant that Kodak had hired to: (1) attempt towrite a “primer” explaining the optical andmechanical operating characteristics of Abra-ham Zapruder’s 8 mm Bell and Howell homemovie camera; (2) explain the relationship, ifany, between the camera’s operating charac-teristics and perceived “anomalies” in theoriginal film; and (3) answer questions aboutthe provenance of the original film and thefirst generation copies. (“Provenance” issuesthat Mr. Zavada took on included studyingthe chain-of-custody documents executed inNovember 1963 by Abraham Zapruder; con-ducting interviews of surviving personnelinvolved in the development of the originalfilm, and the exposure and developing of thethree first generation copies; and studyingmanufacturer’s edge print, processing labedge print, and the physical characteristics ofthe optical printer believed to have been usedto create the three first generation copies onNovember 22, 1963.)

In addition, in August 1997 James K. Toner,the Laboratory Head of Kodak’s Imaging Sci-ence Resources Lab in Rochester, presented amethodology for making the best possibledirect digitization of the original Zapruderfilm. Kodak also began to make arrange-ments with NARA and the Review Board for

the digital preservation and enhancement ofthe autopsy images of President Kennedy,under the direct guidance of Toner.

In September 1997, Toner and Zavada visitedWashington and, in addition to studyingselected autopsy film and x-ray images atNARA, they also studied perceived anom-alies in the inter-sprocket areas of the originalZapruder film, and the emulsion characteris-tics and edge print characteristics of whatNARA presumed to be the camera-originalZapruder film and the two Secret Service firstgeneration copies. (See the 3 illustrations onpage 121.) Following this visit, Zavada beganwriting his extensive report on Zapruder filmissues, which expanded in scope as hisresearch into camera optics and printer char-acteristics continued. This report was sched-uled for completion by Kodak no later thanSeptember 30, 1998; six copies were sched-uled for deposit at NARA in the JFK Collec-tion.

Kodak ultimately spent appro x i m a t e l y$53,000 on work related to the digitizationand enhancement of the President’s autopsyimages, and approximately $11,000 on workrelated to Zapruder film issues, significantlyexceeding its original estimate of donatedlabor and materials. The Review Board grate-fully acknowledges the public service pro-vided to the American people by the East-man Kodak Company.

4. The Review Board Staff’s Study andClarification of Paul Hoch’s FOIALead “CIA Document 450”

The Review Board staff located and inter-viewed two former employees of the CIA’ sNational Photographic Interpretation Cen-ter (NPIC) and questioned them about“ C I A Document 450,” a 1970s Freedom OfInformation Act release—original docu-ment undated—that indicates NPIC had aversion of the Zapruder film, made“internegatives” and “copies,” conducted a“print test,” and performed a shot-and-tim-ing analysis based on interpretation of thefilm’s content.

Both individuals indicated that the interneg-atives made were of single frames only, andthe prints made (from these same internega-tives) were of single frames only—for brief-

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To call Zapruder’s film remark-able is an exaggerated under-s t a t e m e n t . It is, due to the sub-ject matter and the clear angle ofview undoubtedly one of themost historically important, i fnot the most important, m o v i efilms ever made.—Richard Trask, April 2, 1997

ing boards—and that they never reproduced(or altered) the film as a motion picture. Theyidentified portions of the document relatedto this activity—magnification and reproduc-tion of small motion picture frames as prints.To this extent, the document has been demys-tified. However, other questions, such as whoconducted the shot-and-timing analysis, andwho assembled the briefing boards, remainunanswered.

D. Ballistics

In April 1995, a member of the public wroteto Attorney General Janet Reno to advise herthat Warren Commission Exhibit 567 (CE567)—a bullet fragment—may have embed-ded in it tiny strands of fiber that the writerbelieved came from President Kennedy’s

shirt collar. [See illustration.] In January 1996,John Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-eral, wrote to FBI Director Louis Fre e hrequesting that the FBI “initiate an inquiryinto specific aspects of the assassination the-ory related to collected bullet fragments andresidues now in the possession of the federalgovernment.”

The Review Board determined that theFirearms Examination Panel of the HSCArecommended analysis of CE 567 more than19 years ago. For unknown reasons, thePanel’s recommendation did not appear inthe HSCA’s March 1979 final report. TheReview Board contacted former HSCA staffmembers to determine why this recommen-dation was deleted from the draft when thefinal HSCA report was published, but the

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former HSCA staff members and FirearmsPanel members contacted were not able toprovide a reason for the omission of the rec-ommendation.

In March 1996, the Review Board, the FBI, theDepartment of Justice, and NARA began aseries of meetings to discuss re-examinationof the ballistics evidence. In June 1996, theFBI provided its report to the Review Boardand stated that “a complete fiber analysiscould be conducted on the fibrous debrisadhering to CE 567 and the materials com-posing the shirt and the tie [of PresidentKennedy].”

In August 1998, after lengthy considerationabout whether the testing would be appro-priate, NARA finally agreed to allow limitedtesting of CE 567 to complete the earlier rec-ommendation of the HSCA’s Firearms Panel.NARA also determined that the bullet frag-ment should be tested for “suspected biolog-ical tissue and/or organic material,” the pres-ence of which was noted by the HSCA in1978 and the FBI in 1996.

In September 1998, testing began on CE 567and, at the time of this writing (September1998), was ongoing. NARA will issue its re p o r ton the results of the testing in October 1998.

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CHAPTER 6PART II: ENDNOTES

1 Most of the section of this Report relating to medical evidence and medical issues wasprinted and distributed to the public in a Staff Report dated July 31, 1998 when the ReviewBoard released its deposition transcripts and written reports of unsworn interviews relating tomedical issues.

2 Although the Review Board does not offer opinions on the substantive issues related to theassassination, it believes that trained medical personnel will possibly be able to provide addi-tional illuminating explanations regarding the autopsy after examining the enhanced images.It should be noted, however, that although the digitizing significantly enhanced the clarity ofthe images, many questions are likely to remain unanswered.

3 July 10, 1978 Letter from Henry G. Zapruder to James Moore, National Archives.

4 Transcript of Review Board Proceedings, Hearing on the Status and Disposition of the“Zapruder Film,” April 2, 1997, at 5 (statements of Chairman Tunheim).

5 Id., at 11 (statements of General Counsel Gunn).

6 June 5, 1998 Letter from Chairman Burton to Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney Generalfor the Civil Division.

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A. PURSUIT OF RECORDS AND PAPERS FROM

PRIVATE CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS

The Review Board actively encouraged pri-vate citizens and organizations who pos-sessed assassination records to donate themto the JFK Collection to make the collectionas historically rich as possible. Fortunately,private citizens were willing to donate mate-rials, often in the form of a deed of gift, to thecollection. The Review Board also receivedcountless essays, interview transcripts andbooks, usually not accompanied by a deed ofgift. These, too, will become part of the JFKCollection. Below is an overview of materialsdonated by private citizens.

1. Gary Aguilar: Interviews with Drs. Humes and Boswell

Dr. Gary Aguilar of San Francisco providedthe Review Board with an audiotape of his1994 telephone interviews with Dr. James J.Humes and Dr. “J” Thornton Boswell, thetwo Navy prosectors at President Kennedy’sautopsy.

2. Richard Barnes: AP Wire Copy

Richard Barnes, a former Associated Pressreporter, donated to the JFK Collection APwire copy for November 22 through Novem-ber 26, 1963. The material chronicles the first

A P news reports of President Kennedy’sassassination, Lee Harvey Oswald’s arrest,Jack Ruby’s shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald,and President Kennedy’s funeral. Barnes, aSan Francisco-based A P reporter in 1963,obtained permission from his editor to keepthe wire copy, which would otherwise havebeen thrown away.

3. Dr. George Burkley

The Review Board contacted the children ofdeceased Vice Admiral George G. Burkley,former military White House physician toP residents Kennedy and Johnson, to find outif their father had deposited his papers atany institution, or if they possessed anyassassination re c o rds. The staff came upe m p t y - h a n d e d .

According to House Select Committee onAssassinations re c o rds, Burkley’s personalattorney apparently told the HSCA that hisclient believed there was a conspiracy to killPresident Kennedy. Mr. Illig, Burkley’s attor-ney, however, is now deceased. The ReviewBoard staff asked Burkley’s daughter, theexecutor of his estate, to sign a waiver allow-ing the Review Board access to papers atIllig’s law firm, but she declined to sign andreturn the waiver.

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CHAPTER 7PU R S U I T O F RE C O R D S A N D IN F O R M AT I O N

F R O M NO N- FE D E R A L SO U R C E S

I firmly believe that the Board has an obligation to seek out assassinationrecords from all sources; public and private. The goal of Congress in passing S.3006 was to ensure broadest possible disclosure of the records relating to theassassination. The fact that a document exists only in private hands should notdeter the Board in any way from seeking to compel its transmission to theNational Archives.—Judge Tunheim at the Review Board nomination hearings.

Through fair and impartial application of the criteria developed by the ReviewBoard and keeping in mind always the express purposes of the enabling legis-lation, I believe that the Review Board should be as aggressive as it needs to beto achieve disclosure of relevant records. That also applies to records held byprivate citizens...—William Joyce at the Review Board nomination hearings.

4. Edward Scannell Butler: Materialsfrom the Information Council of theAmericas

Chapter 6 of this report discusses the ReviewB o a rd’s attempts to locate governmentrecords on Edward Scannell Butler and hisorganization, the Information Council of theAmericas. INCA is a New Orleans-basedclearinghouse for anti-communist informa-tion, and particularly for anti-Castro Cubaninformation.

Although Butler allowed Review Board staffto view INCA files, he said he could not pro-vide copies of them to the JFK Collectionuntil he catalogued the material. He alsodeclined the Board’s offer to send its staffmembers to New Orleans to determine whatINCA records would be of value to the JFKCollection.

5. Mrs. Marion Ebersole: Records of Dr.John J. Ebersole

The Review Board staff contacted the widowof Dr. John J. Ebersole, the Navy radiologistwho was on duty the night of PresidentKennedy’s autopsy at Bethesda NationalNaval Medical Center. Although he was notyet board-certified, he served as the consult-ing radiologist during the procedure. Eber-sole said she did not have any of her hus-band’s personal papers or any assassinationrecords.

6. President Gerald Ford: Desk Diaries

P resident Gerald Ford donated to the JFK Col-lection selected entries from his desk diaries(calendars) from 1963 and 1964 during theperiod that he served as a member of the Wa r-ren Commission. The Review Board staffreviewed the calendars for relevance andselected excerpts for donation to the JFK Col-lection with the cooperation of President Ford .

7. Justice Abe Fortas

Former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas,who was an adviser to President Johnson,kept papers that include drafts of PresidentJohnson’s and Lady Bird Johnson’s writtenstatements to the Warren Commission anddocuments rebutting passages from WilliamManchester’s book, The Death of a President.

Fortas donated his papers to Yale University,but the Review Board secured copies of thea s s a s s i n a t i o n - related material for the JFKCollection. NARA will open Fortas’ assassi-nation-related papers in January 2001, whichis the same date that Yale will open theremainder of his papers.

8. Captain J.W. “Will” Fritz

Dallas Police Department Captain J.W. “Will”Fritz served as Lee Harvey Oswald’s primaryinterrogator when Oswald was in police cus-tody from the afternoon of November 22until the morning of November 24, 1963.Fritz was the chief of the Dallas PoliceDepartment’s Homicide and RobberyB u reau. In November 1997, the ReviewB o a rd acquired and released handwrittennotes that Fritz apparently made followinghis interviews with Oswald.

9. Jim Garrison

The late Jim Garrison was the New OrleansDistrict Attorney who investigated and pros-ecuted Clay Shaw for conspiracy to assassi-nate President Kennedy and swho was por-trayed in Oliver Stone’s film, JFK.

Garrison’s family donated 15,000 pages of hisassassination papers, which include recordsfrom his investigation and prosecution ofShaw, as well as other files on individuals orsubjects that Garrison believed to be con-nected to the assassination.

10. James P. Hosty Jr.

In November 1996, the Review Board inter-viewed James P. Hosty, Jr., the FBI agentresponsible for handling the Lee HarveyOswald and Marina Oswald cases when theylived in Dallas. Hosty was present during theinitial Dallas police interrogation of Oswaldand took contemporaneous handwrittennotes. Although the notes were believed tohave been destroyed, Hosty donated thenotes, and other materials relating to theassassination and the FBI’s investigation, tothe JFK Collection.

11. Wesley Liebeler

Wesley Liebeler, former Assistant Counsel tothe Warren Commission, testified before the

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Review Board at its Los Angeles public hear-ing in September 1996. At the time of his tes-t i m o n y, Liebeler provided to the ReviewBoard copies of six chapters from his unfin-ished book on the assassination. In addition,Liebeler provided the Review Board with areport on the Zapruder film written byUCLAPhysics professor Brian Jones. Liebelerhad apparently requested that Jones examinethe Zapruder film and prepare the report.

12. David Lifton: Medical Evidence

David Lifton, author of Best Evidence: Dis-guise and Deception in the Assassination of JohnF. Kennedy, testified before the Review Boardat its public hearing in Los Angeles in Sep-tember 1996. During his testimony, Liftonannounced that he would donate to the JFKCollection his 35mm “interpositive” of theZapruder film. Interpositives are valuablebecause they are made directly fro minternegatives, which in turn are made fromthe original film. They there f o re pro v i d edenser colors and better resolution than pro-jection prints.

Lifton also donated compact disk copies ofinterviews he conducted with medical wit-nesses from both Parkland Hospital in Dallasand Bethesda National Naval Medical Cen-ter. Some of Lifton’s medical interviews datefrom as early as 1966.

In addition, Lifton provided the ReviewB o a rd staff with audiotapes, videotapes,and transcripts of selected witness inter-views. Lifton’s donations are now in the JFKC o l l e c t i o n .

13. Holland McCombs

Holland McCombs, now deceased, was a L i f emagazine correspondent in Dallas at thetime of the assassination. A private citizentold the Review Board that there were assas-sination re c o rds in Mr. McComb’s papers,which are housed at the Paul Meek Libraryof the University of Tennessee at Martin. InJuly 1996, a Review Board staff memberreviewed hundreds of boxes of McComb’spapers and located seven boxes relating tohis interest in the assassination. The Boards t a ff marked approximately 600 re c o rds andt r a n s f e r red photocopies of those re c o rds tothe JFK Collection.

14. Richard Case Nagell

In his book The Man Who Knew Too Much,author Dick Russell wrote about RichardCase Nagell, a former Army Counterintelli-gence Officer who told Russell he: (1) hadconducted surveillance on Lee HarveyOswald for both the CIA and the KGB; (2) hadbeen re c ruited by a KGB agent (masquerad-ing as a CIA operative) to persuade Oswaldn o t to participate in a plot against Pre s i d e n tKennedy; (3) had been instructed by the KGBto kill Oswald if he could not dissuade himf rom participating in the plot; (4) was in pos-session of a Polaroid photograph that hadbeen taken of himself with Lee HarveyOswald in New Orleans; (5) had audio tapere c o rdings of Oswald and others discussing aforthcoming assassination attempt on Pre s i-dent Kennedy; and (6)had sent a letter, via re g-i s t e red mail, to FBI Dire c-tor J. Edgar Hoover inSeptember 1963, warningof a conspiracy to killP resident Kennedy in lateSeptember 1963 in Wa s h-ington, D.C. (and haddocumentary proof of themailing of said letter).

The Review Board sent aletter to Nagell datedOctober 31, 1995, requesting that Nagell con-tact the Review Board’s Executive Director todiscuss any assassination records he mighthave in his possession. Subsequently, theReview Board was informed that Nagell hadbeen found dead in his Los Angeles apart-ment the day after the ARRB’s letter wasmailed. (The coroner ruled that he died as aresult of natural causes.)

A member of the Review Board staff traveledtwice to California to inspect the effects ofNagell in an attempt to find assassinationrecords. During the first trip, the ReviewBoard staff member, along with Nagell’s sonand niece, inspected Nagell’s apartment inLos Angeles. During the second trip, theReview Board staff member inspected, againwith the assistance of the son and niece,material contained in some footlockers foundin storage in Phoenix, Arizona. The ReviewBoard staff did not locate any of the itemsthat Dick Russell references above.

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. . . the intent of the conspirators,according to Nagell, was to pinthe blame [for the assassinationof the President] on Castro’sCuba and spark an invasion ofthe island. . . he has indicated tome in the past that, if he wasever subpoenaed by a govern-ment agency, he would be will-ing to testify.— D i ck Russell, M a r ch 24, 1 9 9 5

A considerable amount of documentarymaterial on Nagell from the U.S. Secret Ser-vice and the U.S. Army’s InvestigativeRecords Repository (IRR) was placed in theJFK Collection as a result of the JFK Act andthe efforts of the Review Board staff.

The CIA processed as part of its sequesteredcollection a 201 and Domestic Contacts Divi-sion file on Nagell. The Review Board staffalso reviewed a CIA Office of Security file onNagell. The entire file was designated anassassination record.

15. New Orleans Metropolitan CrimeCommission

The Metropolitan Crime Commission is aprivate, anti-crime organization that, sincethe 1950s, has investigated public corruptionand organized crime in the New Orleansarea. HSCA staff members reviewed MCCrecords on organized crime figures, such asCarlos Marcello, and on the Garrison investi-gation. The MCC also granted the ReviewB o a rd permission to review its re c o rd s .Board staff members initially identified 12boxes that they believed would enhance theJFK Collection.

About half of the MCC records copied byBoard staff concern New Orleans DistrictAttorney Garrison’s investigation of theassassination. The remaining half of therecords are files that had belonged to GuyBanister. Most of the Banister material datesfrom the early 1950s when he worked for theNew Orleans Police Department. A l a rg enumber of those documents—NOPD “Inter-nal A ffairs” investigative files detailingsmall-time police corru p t i o n — w e re irre l e-vant to the Kennedy assassination.

Review Board staff members designated asassassination re c o rds only the MCC documentsthat were not exclusively related to NOPD’sinternal affairs. It still was a sizable number.U l t i m a t e l y, the Board added some 3,000 pagesof MCC re c o rds to the JFK Collection.

16. Gerald Posner

Gerald Posner, author of the book C a s eC l o s e d , testified before Congress duringdebate over the JFK Act that he had inter-viewed both Navy autopsy prosectors, Drs.

Humes and Boswell. When asked if he woulddonate his notes of those interviews to theJFK Collection and if he had any audiotapesof those interviews, Posner responded, “Iwould be happy, Mr. Chairman, to ask Drs.Humes and Boswell if they would agree fortheir notes to be released to the NationalArchives.” The Review Board’s initial contactwith Posner produced no results. The ReviewBoard never received a response to a secondletter of request for the notes.

17. Frank Ragano

Frank Ragano, who died in 1998, was anattorney for reputed organized crime figures.Ragano reperesented both Jimmy Hoffa andSanto Trafficante. In Ragano’s 1994 book,Mob Lawyer, Ragano claimed that JimmyHoffa used him as a messenger to ask Traffi-cante and Carlos Marcello to arrange for themurder of President Kennedy. Ragano fur-ther wrote that in 1987 Trafficante confessedto him that he, Trafficante, had been involvedin the assassination.

Ragano also stated in his book that he pos-sessed original, contemporaneous notes ofmeetings with organized crime figures. Todetermine whether Ragano’s notes were rele-vant to the assassination, the Review Boardsubpoenaed the notes and deposed Ragano.He produced several handwritten notesregarding the assassination, but he could notdefinitively state whether he took them dur-ing the meetings in the 1960s or later when hewas working on his book in the 1990s.

The Review Board submitted the originalnotes to the Secret Service to see if it coulddetermine when Ragano created the notes,but the Secret Service was unable to providea conclusive answer. Ragano’s testimony tothe Review Board is now available to thepublic in the JFK Collection as a transcriptand an audio recording. Ragano’s notes areattached to his deposition transcript.

18. J. Lee Rankin: Warren Commission Papers

James Rankin Jr., the son of the late J. LeeRankin, the General Counsel of the WarrenCommission, testified at the Review Board’spublic hearing in Los Angeles and subse-quently agreed to donate his father’s papers

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to the JFK Collection. J. Lee Rankin’s WarrenCommission files include memos and hand-written changes to draft chapters of the Com-mission report that Commission membersGerald Ford, John McCloy and Allen Dulles,among others, recommended.

19. Clay Shaw: Personal Papers and Diary

Clay Shaw, the New Orleans businessmanwhom District Attorney Jim Garrison pro s e-cuted for conspiracy to murder Pre s i d e n tK e n n e d y, left personal papers with one of hisfriends. The Review Board acquired thepapers for inclusion in the JFK Collection. Thepapers, which fill seven boxes, include Shaw’sdiary from the time of the trial; re c o rds fro mShaw’s criminal case; and Shaw’s corre s p o n-dence, business re c o rds, passports, personalre c o rds, and photographs.

20. Walter Sheridan

In its effort to comply with the JFK Act, theJohn F. Kennedy Library reviewed its hold-ings for groups of re c o rds that could containassassination re c o rds. Among others, itfound the re c o rds of Walter Sheridan, aninvestigator who worked for Robert F.Kennedy and later for NBC. The libraryidentified folders of materials, primarilynotes, related to Sheridan’s work as aninvestigative reporter for NBC covering thep rosecution of Clay Shaw. In 1967, Sheridanp roduced an hour-long television special onthe assassination.

In 1994, the library informed Sheridan that itwas processing his records and sending themto the JFK Collection at NARA. Sheridanrequested that the library return the identi-fied assassination records to him, and thelibrary honored his request. Sheridan, how-ever, died in January 1995. NBC then claimedit owns the rights to the Sheridan papers. Thedispute is now pending.

21. Dallas Sixth Floor Museum Records

The Sixth Floor Museum in Dallas, Texas, isdedicated to providing information to thepublic about President Kennedy’s assassina-tion, and it contains an archives section thatholds original films and documents. Themuseum is on the sixth floor of the formerTexas School Book Depository, the exact loca-

tion from which Lee Harvey Oswaldallegedly shot President Kennedy.

The Review Board sosught to identifymuseum records that should be part of theJFK Collection. After deposing Sixth FloorMuseum officials and negotiating with themuseum, the Review Board secured copies ofParkland Hospital records on the medicalt reatment of President Kennedy; autopsyrecords for Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby,and Dallas police officer J.D. Tippit; courtpapers from Jack Ruby’s criminal trial; Park-land physician Dr. Charles J. Carrico’spapers; and several home movies depictingthe Presidential motorcade in Dallas.

22. Martin Underwood

Martin Underwood, aformer advance man forP residents Kennedy andJohnson, was a memberof President Kennedy’sadvance team in Texas in November 1963. Are s e a rcher who workedwith Seymour Hersh onhis book, The Dark Side ofC a m e l o t , told the Review Board that Under-wood claimed that President Johnson sentUnderwood to Mexico City in 1966 or 1967 tosee what he could learn about the Kennedyassassination. Underwood allegedly metwith Win Scott, former CIA Chief of Stationin Mexico City.

The researcher provided the Review Boardwith copies of handwritten notes, on WhiteHouse stationery, ostensibly pre p a red byUnderwood and documenting his meetingwith Scott. The notes state that Scott toldUnderwood that the CIA “blew it” in Dallasin November 1963. On the morning ofNovember 22, the agency knew that a planehad arrived in Mexico City from Havana,and that one passenger got off the plane andb o a rded another one headed for Dallas.Underwood’s notes state that Scott said thatC I A identified the passenger as FabianEscalante.

The re s e a rcher also stated that someonei n s t ructed Underwood to follow JudithCampbell Exner on her 1960 train trip fromWashington, D.C., to Chicago, during which

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My family and I would like tocontribute all of my fa t h e r ’spapers that relate to his Wa r r e nCommission service to the Amer-ican people, to be included in theNational Arch i v e s.—James Rankin, September 17,1996

she was alleged to have carried moneybetween Senator Kennedy (the DemocraticParty nominee) and organized crime bossSam Giancana.

The Review Board staff informally inter-viewed Underwood. Underwood confirmedthat he traveled to Mexico City in 1966, butsaid that he went to advance President John-son’s trip and not to look into circumstancessurrounding President Kennedy’s assassina-tion. While in Mexico City, Underwood metwith Scott concerning the details of PresidentJohnson’s trip. During Underwood’s meetingwith Scott, he said they did discuss PresidentKennedy’s assassination and that Scott toldhim the story that the researcher relayed tothe Review Board.

When Review Board staff asked Underwoodabout any notes he may have taken, he ini-tially claimed to have no memory of anynotes. Upon viewing copies of the notes thatthe researcher provided to the Review Board,Underwood said that he had written thenotes in 1992 or 1993 for a researcher to usefor Hersh’s book. Underwood explained thatthe notes are on White House stationerybecause he has a lot of extra White Housestationery left over from his work with Pres-ident Johnson.

Underwood could not remember whether hehad contemporaneous notes from his meet-ing with Scott. He also denied that he fol-lowed Judith Campbell Exner on a train andthat he had no knowledge about her allegedrole as a courier.

After the informal interview, Underwoodforwarded to the Review Board a set of typednotes from his 1966 trip to Mexico City andhis meeting with Scott. The typed notes doc-umented Underwood’s activities in MexicoCity and briefly mentioned his meeting withScott. The notes do not mention Under-wood’s conversation with Scott about theKennedy assassination. Instead, the notesstate that Underwood sought Scott’s assis-tance in staging a big welcome for PresidentJohnson. The Review Board subsequentlyrequested Underwood to testify under oath,but due to health problems, he was not avail-able. Underwood’s notes now are part of theJFK Collection.

23. Edward Wegmann

Cynthia Wegmann, the daughter of the lateEdward Wegmann, a New Orleans lawyerwho assisted in defending Clay Shaw duringhis conspiracy trial, testified before theReview Board at its New Orleans hearingand donated his assassination-related papersto the JFK Collection.

Wegmann’s collection includes some docu-ments from Garrison’s office files that Weg-mann and his colleagues obtained from for-mer Garrison investigator William Gurvich.While working for Garrison, Gurvich becamedisenchanted and decided to quit. Beforeleaving, he made copies of Garrison’s memo-randa and witness interviews. He later gavehis copies to Shaw’s attorneys.

The Wegmann papers contain some 6,000pages and are now in the JFK collection.

24. Thomas W. Wilson

On September 11, 1998, Mr. Thomas W. Wil-son of Pennsylvania made a presentation toReview Board staff summarizing his eightyears of research into the authenticity andsignificance of the JFK autopsy images andthe Zapruder film, and additional study ofthe Mary Moorman Polaroid photograph,using “photonics” as a technological tool.

Mr. Wilson donated the following materialsto the JFK Collection: (1) a 20-page “execu-tive summary” of his work; (2) a graphic pre-sentation of Mr. Wilson’s research conclu-sions about President Kennedy’s headwounds, using “A.D.A.M.” software to dis-play his conclusions; (3) a 20-minute audio-tape of a discussion between Mr. Wilson andformer Navy x-ray technician Jerrol Custer,dated 3/28/98; and (4) a commercially soldvideotape summarizing his work.

Mr. Wilson believes he possesses a consider-able amount of scientific and physical evi-dence, accumulated over eight years (from1988-1996), proving his contention that Presi-dent Kennedy was shot from the front, notfrom behind. He is willing to donate all ofthis material to the JFK Collection if FBI orDepartment of Justice officials will first allowhim to make his full two-day presentation onthe evidence he has collected regarding the

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Moorman photograph, the Zapruder film,and the autopsy photographs of PresidentKennedy.

B. PURSUIT OF AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIALFROM PRIVATE CITIZENS ANDORGANIZATIONS

Below is a list of the audio-visual materialfrom private citizens and organizations thatthe Board was able to obtain.

1. Tom Alyea: Film from Inside the TexasSchool Book Depository

Tom Alyea, a cameraman for Dallas televi-sion station WFAA, shot film while he wastrapped in the Texas School Book Depository,which was sealed by the Dallas PoliceDepartment after the assassination. Alyea’sfootage includes shots of the sixth floorsniper’s nest.

In May 1996, Review Board staff met withAlyea, who agreed, in writing, to donate hisoriginal 16mm film to the JFK Collection.Alyea gave the film to the JFK Collection atthat time, and as agreed, the Review Boardsent Alyea a 16mm positive copy and a16mm negative copy.

Alyea later decided that he wanted the Boardto return the film to him. The Review Board,however, could not do so because the filmwas then at the National Archives, a federalagency, and therefore came under Section 5of the JFK Act. Section 5 requires agencies toplace all assassination records in their pos-session in the JFK Collection.

2. Charles Bronson: Film of Dealey Plaza

The Review Board approached the family ofthe late Charles Bronson, a private citizenwho filmed the scenes in Dealey Plazashortly before and after President Kennedy’sassassination, and requested that they con-sider donating Bronson’s film. The familydeclined.

3. CBS Outtakes

The Review Board approached executives atCBS, the network holding the largest volumeof television coverage and subsequent spe-cials about the assassination, to request that

they consider donating their outtakes to theJFK Collection. CBS owns rare interview out-takes with individuals such as MarinaOswald Porter.

CBS agreed to donate its outtakes from itstelevision specials to the JFK Collection. TheReview Board anticipates that the CBSrecords eventually will become part of theJFK Collection.

4. Robert Groden

Robert Groden, a photo-optics technician,was the first to publicly screen the famousZapruder film as a motion picture. Subse-quently he served as an unpaid photographicconsultant for the HSCA.

G roden’s collection of assassination photosand films is renowned throughout the assas-sination re s e a rch community, and manysuspect that Groden made unauthorizedcopies of the HSCA’s photos and films whenhe worked with the Committee. A f e wre s e a rchers believe that Groden kept origi-nal photos and films and returned copies tothe Committee.

One researcher believes that Groden mayhave a photograph from the Pre s i d e n t ’ sautopsy that is not at NARA. The researcherrecalled that he had seen an autopsy photo-graph at Groden’s home in 1980 that was notin NARA’s official collection. The researcherurged the Review Board to find this “extra”photograph.

The Review Board subpoenaed all originaland first-generation assassination films inGroden’s possession, and deposed Groden.Under oath, Groden claimed he did not pos-sess any original or first-generation assassi-nation films or images of any kind. With thehelp of NARA, the Board collected Groden’smaterials, studied their provenance, andreturned them in July 1998. Groden did notturn over to the Review Board any autopsyphotographs that are not already part ofNARA’s official collection.

5. Lt. Everett Kay: Audio Surveillance Tape

Lt. Everett Kay (Ret.), formerly with theMiami Police Department Intelligence Unit,donated to the JFK Collection an audio sur-

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veillance tape of a November 9, 1963, meet-ing between Miami police informant WilliamSomersett and Joseph Milteer, who allegedthat President Kennedy would be killed by arifle shot from an office window.

6. Vincent Palamara: Interviews withSecret Service Personnel

Vincent Palamara conducted extensive inter-views with former Secret Service personnel.Palamara donated three audio cassettes ofthese interviews to the JFK Collection.

7. David Powers: Film of Motorcade

David Powers, a close aide to Pre s i d e n tKennedy, was riding in the Secret Service fol-low-up car directly behind the President’slimousine on November 22, 1963. Close byPresident Kennedy’s side, he filmed many ofthe President’s activities that day with hishome movie camera. His film ends minutesbefore the motorcade entered Dealey Plaza.The Kennedy Presidential Library holds theoriginal film, but Powers, now deceased, gra-ciously agreed to make a copy of his filmavailable in the JFK Collection.

8. David Taplin: November 24, 1963,Coverage of Dallas Police Department

Gerald Nathan Taplin Sr. filmed the exteriorof the Dallas Police Department building onthe morning that the DPD scheduled itstransfer of Lee Harvey Oswald to the countyjail. On that morning, Jack Ruby shot Oswaldinside the DPD building. The Taplin film con-tains images of the arrival of the armored carthat the DPD intended to use as a decoy dur-ing the Oswald transfer, footage of other filmcrews covering the event, and scenes on thes t reet. David Taplin, Gerald Taplin Sr. ’ sgrandson, donated a videotape copy of hisgrandfather’s film to the JFK Collection.

9. Stephen Tyler

In 1992, Stephen Tyler produced “He MustHave Something,” a 90-minute televisiondocumentary about Jim Garrison’s investiga-tion of President Kennedy’s assassination.Tyler testified at the Review Board’s publichearing in New Orleans, and announced thathe would donate to the JFK Collection a copyof his documentary along with the outtakes

of approximately 30 interviews that he con-ducted for the documentary. Among thoseinterviewed are former District Attorney JimGarrison, New Orleans witness Perry Russo,and Warren Commission critic Mark Lane.

10. Janet Veazey: KTVT Outtakes

In November 1995, the Review Boardlaunched a special initiative in Dallas,appealing to residents to consider donatingany film or photographs they may have relat-ing to the assassination. As a result, theReview Board acquired important KTVT out-takes from Janet Veazey.

Veazey had the film because her father’sfriend, Roy Cooper Jr., was a photographer atKTVT in Dallas. Cooper retrieved the out-takes from the KTVT trash and spliced themtogether, creating a 45-minute, 16mm silentfilm. The original film, already in the JFKCollection, contains footage of Pre s i d e n tKennedy and Mrs. Kennedy in Dallas, andthe aftermath of the assassination. A firstgeneration copy of these outtakes are nowalso part of the JFK Collection.

11. Moses Weitzman

Moses Weitzman is a special effects filmexpert who employed Robert Groden as atrainee and junior level staffer in the late1960s. Weitzman worked for his client, Time-Life, on the original Zapruder film in the late1960s and was the first to enlarge the 8mmZapruder footage to 35mm format.

Although Weitzman gave his best Zapruderfootage to Time-Life, he retained someimperfect 35mm internegatives (exhibitingtrack and framing error) he had maded i rectly from the original Zapruder film.Weitzman used these internegatives todemonstrate his technical ability to enlarge8mm film directly to a 35mm format.

Weitzman made these imperfect internega-tives available to Groden during the late1960s. Most likely Groden used prints madefrom these internegatives when he publiclyscreened the Zapruder film in the mid-1970s.Weitzman testified about the historicalimportance of the Zapruder film at theReview Board’s April 1997 public hearing,and he donated a 16mm copy to the JFK Col-

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lection. Weitzman informed the ReviewB o a rd that he no longer possesses anyZapruder film materials.

12. Robert White: Evelyn Lincoln Materials

In January 1997, the Review Board contactedthe beneficiaries of Evelyn and Harold Lin-coln’s wills to determine whether Evelyn,President Kennedy’s personal secretary, hadaccumulated assassination-related items.

One of the beneficiaries, Robert White, whocollected Kennedy memorabilia and hadbeen friends with the Lincolns for more than20 years, apparently had more than 100,000items in his collection. Many of them wereEvelyn Lincoln’s, including an entire file cab-inet and Kennedy memorabilia such as brief-case, signing table, rocker, and stereo.

After the Review Board sent a letter to White,he contacted an attorney. In a February 1997letter to the Board, his attorney stated thatWhite “did not receive nor was he is in pos-session of any assassination-related artifactsand/or memorabilia originating from theLincolns or from any source.”

White agreed to speak with Review Boards t a ff on April 10, 1997. At this meeting,White provided a brief, handwritten list ofthe items Evelyn Lincoln had left him inher will. White also briefly described hisinvolvement with cataloguing and apprais-ing the items in the two Lincoln estates.White reiterated that his inventory of theestate did not reveal any items related tothe assassination, other than the diariesand appointment books that had beenbequeathed to the Kennedy Library.

After meeting with White, the Review Boardcontinued to receive information that Whitepossessed assassination-related items andlater learned that White planned to auctionitems from his collection at Guernsey’s auc-tion house in New York City on March 18and 19, 1998. The Board, with the help of theDepartment of Justice, subpoenaed White,requiring him to produce all objects andrecords relating to the Kennedy assassina-tion, and all re c o rds pertaining to theKennedy and Johnson administrations onCuba, the FBI, the CIA, organized crime, and

other topics. The subpoena also soughtinventories of White’s collection and a list ofitems that White had received as a benefi-ciary of the Lincolns’ wills.

The Review Board staff deposed White inMarch 1998. During the deposition, Whitedescribed his friendship with Evelyn Lincolnand discussed the various Kennedy-relatedobjects that she had given him. In certaincases, White relayed Lincoln’s comments ordocumentation about the provenance of var-ious objects. Among the records that Whiteproduced were Texas trip advance sheets, aSecret Service White House Detail photo-graph book, memoranda authored by Presi-dent Kennedy, and 23 White House Dictabelttapes. The Board found that four of the mem-oranda written by President Kennedy con-tained classified, national security informa-tion, and forwarded them to the InformationSecurity Oversight Office.

On the last day of his deposition, White toldthe Review Board that he had just donatedthe Dictabelts to the Kennedy PresidentialL i b r a r y. The Dictabelts contain telephoneconversations, dictations and discussionsbetween President Kennedy and other indi-viduals. Specific topics on the Dictabeltsinclude President Kennedy’s dictation dur-ing the week of November 4, 1963, discus-sions of the Berlin Crisis, conversationsre g a rding the Cuban Missile Crisis, andthoughts dictated by President Kennedy onNovember 12, 1963.

C. PURSUIT OF STATE AND LOCALGOVERNMENT RECORDS

An assassination re c o rd. . . i n c l u d e s ,without limitation: All records collectedby or segregated by all federal, state andlocal government agencies in conjunc-tion with any investigation or analysisof or inquiry into the assassination ofPresident Kennedy. . . 1

1. New Orleans District AttorneyFiles

Harry F. Connick, Sr., District Attorney ofNew Orleans, testified at the Review Board’sNew Orleans public hearing in June 1995.Connick stated that he was in possession of

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former District Attorney Garrison’s inves-tigative files. He said he intended to donate

the files to the JFK Col-lection.

Several days later, a pack-age from New Orleansarrived in the R e v i e wB o a rd’s offices. It con-tained what appeared tobe original transcriptsfrom the grand jury Gar-

rison convened for his investigation of ClayShaw.

The man who mailed the records, a formerConnick investigator, said that Connick hadgiven them to him to throw out when Con-nick was cleaning out the District Attorney’so ffice. Instead, the investigator took thematerials home and stored them in his base-ment. When he heard about the ReviewBoard’s effort, he said he felt compelled tosend the transcripts to the Board.

Connick responded by demanding that theBoard return the records to the District Attor-ney’s office. He said the records were theproperty of the state of Louisiana and weresubject to the seal of the Louisiana statecourts. Connick further warned that unlessthe Review Board returned the grand juryrecords, he would not donate the Garrisoninvestigative records.

The Review Board refused. Since the recordsw e re in the possession of a governmentoffice, namely the Review Board, the Boardbelieved it was compelled by the JFK Act toreview, organize, and process them for inclu-sion in the JFK Collection.

A flurry of subpoenas followed. Connicksubpoenaed the Review Board for the returnof grand jury records; the Review Board sub-poenaed Connick for the investigativerecords. With the Department of Justice’shelp, the Review Board successfully arguedthat Louisiana could not subpoena a federalagency for the records. Connick, however,was unable to fend off the Review Board’ssubpoena for the Garrison files. Connicksued unsuccessfully. Both the investigativerecords and the grand jury transcripts arenow in the JFK Collection.

2. Dallas City and County Records

On November 22, 1963, immediately afterPresident Kennedy was shot, David Burros, aDallas motorcycle policeman, found a pieceof bone on Elm Street in Dealey Plaza. Thepoliceman gave the bone fragment to DeputyConstable Seymour Weitzman, who presum-ably gave it to the Secret Service. The SecretService then sent the fragment to the WhiteHouse physician, then Rear Admiral GeorgeBurkley. The Secret Service placed medicalmaterials from the autopsy in the safe ofRobert Bouck, the Chief of the Secret Ser-vice’s Protective Research Section. However,the April 26, 1965, inventory of Bouck’s safedid not list this bone fragment (or any othersin Burkley’s possession in November 1963)as part of its contents.

The Review Board staff wrote to the DallasCounty records management officer and theDallas city archivist to find out if they hadany photographs x-rays, or other records intheir files regarding this bone fragment. Nei-ther archive had any record of it.

D. PURSUIT OF RECORDS FROM FOREIGNGOVERNMENTS

Assassination re c o rds and additionalrecords and information may be locatedat, or under the control of. . . Foreigngovernments.2

In an effort to compile a more completerecord of the assassination, the Review Boardfocused considerable attention on an effort toobtain copies of records contained in the filesof foreign governments. The JFK Act statesthat it is the “sense of Congress” that theDepartment of State should take steps toobtain such records which have been theobject of much interest since the assassina-tion. In particular, the Board focused much ofits efforts on the KGB records thought to bemaintained both in Russia and in Belarus,and on Cuban and Mexican governmentrecords. Congress anticipated, and indeedspecifically provided in the JFK Act, that theDepartment of State “should contact” theRussian government and “seek the disclo-s u re of all re c o rds of the former SovietUnion” relating to the assassination.3 Fur-t h e r m o re, the Department of State wasre q u i red to “cooperate in full with the

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But we think that what you aredoing is important and we thinkthat what we can hopefully addto what you’re doing. . .—District Attorney Harry F. Connick, Sr.,June 28, 1995

Review Board” in seeking disclosure of rele-vant records.4 While the Department of Stateoccasionally helped facilitate contacts withf o reign counterparts and individual StateDepartment employees provided helpfulassistance and advice, overall the Depart-ment of State was more of a hindrance than ahelp to the Review Board. The Board cer-tainly expected much more help than itreceived from a Department that obviouslydid not consider pursuit of foreign recordsabout the Kennedy assassination to be a pri-ority. Letters of request to the Departmentfrom the Board went unanswered for longperiods of time, cables that contained com-munications from foreign sources or fromUnited States Embassy personnel to theBoard sat for months on the desks of StateDepartment employees without being trans-mitted to the Board, and important opportu-nities were missed because the Departmentdid not believe the issue was importantenough to raise. The Review Board has iden-tified significant records, but does not believethat these collections will be obtained in fulluntil the Department of State determines thatsuch an effort is an important priority.

1. Russia

The Review Board believes that the re c o rds ofthe former KGB exist in Moscow that (1)reflect surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswaldand Marina Oswald during 1959–1962, andthat (2) reflect the Soviet investigation into thec i rcumstances of the Kennedy assassination.The United States Embassy made requests forthese re c o rds and a Review Board delegationlater visited Moscow and met with re p re s e n-tatives of three diff e rent archives where it wasbelieved that re c o rds existed. The Boardreceived a number of individual re c o rd swhich have been released in the JFK Collec-tion but was unsuccessful in obtaining per-mission to review or copy the larger sets offiles which exist in Moscow. The Boardreceived a significant boost to its efforts whenVice President Gore asked Russian PrimeMinister Chernomyrdin in March 1998 torelease the files. Unfortunately, the NationalSecurity Council declined to raise the re q u e s tin September 1998 during the Clinton-Ye l t s i nsummit meeting. Additional approaches tothe Russians continue, but the Review Boards t rongly recommends that the United Statesgovernment in general, and the State Depart-

ment in particular, continue to pursue therelease of these important KGB re c o rd s .

2. Belarus

With the assistance of the United StatesEmbassy in Minsk, Chairman Tunheim, BoardMember Hall and Executive Director Marwellin November 1996 reviewed the extensiveKGB surveillance file kept in Minsk by theB e l a rusian KGB. The file details over twoyears of extensive surveillance and analysis bythe KGB of Lee Harvey Oswald during thetime that he resided in the Belarusian capital.Some of these re c o rds were utilized by Nor-man Mailer in his book O s w a l d ’s Ta l e. TheB o a rd was unable to obtain a copy of the file,in part due to the deteriorating re l a t i o n s h i pbetween the United States and Belarus in1997–98. Mailer’s collaborator in O s w a l d ’s Ta l e,L a w rence Schiller, agreed, in response to theB o a rd’s request, to donate copies of docu-ments from the Minsk files, but the re c o rd swill not be released in the JFK Collection untila later date. Additional efforts are still under-way to obtain the files which are unquestion-ably of strong historical interest. Again, theB o a rd strongly recommends that all possiblee fforts be made to obtain for the A m e r i c a npeople this important re c o rd of the activitiesof accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald dur-ing the years prior to the assassination.

3. Cuba

The Review Board initiated a dialogue withCubans stationed in the Cuban Interest Sec-tion in the Swiss Embassy to try to find out ifthe Castro government has any records rele-vant to the assassination. The Chief of theCuban Interest Section, who agreed that therelease of Cuban records would be beneficialto Cuba and the United States, launched aneffort to locate records. However, he notedthat record keeping in Cuba was spotty in theyears immediately following Castro’s rise topower, but agreed to work with the Board inan effort to promote a better understandingof these issues. The Review Board appreci-ated the excellent cooperation it re c e i v e dfrom Cuban officials.

The Review Board continued to activelywork with officials in the Cuban Interest Sec-tion to determine what, if any, informationexists in Cuba relating to the assassination.

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4. Mexico

Since the Mexican government conducted aninvestigation into the activities in MexicoCity of Lee Harvey Oswald, and the Direc-cion Federal de Seguridad (DFS), the Mexi-can federal security service, conducted inter-rogations of Silvia Duran, who met withOswald in Mexico City, the Review Boardsought Mexico’s cooperation in its search foradditional re c o rds. At the behest of theReview Board, the Department of Staterequested the Mexican government to searchits files for possible records relevant to theassassination. To date, the only records theMexican government has made available tothe JFK Collection were copies of the samediplomatic correspondence between theMexican Foreign Ministry and the Depart-ment of State that it submitted to the WarrenCommission. Copies of these communica-tions already were in the JFK Collection.

5. Other Governments

The Review Board also requested recordsthat were relevant to the assassination fromother foreign governments. The Boardreceived records from the archives of GreatBritain and Canada. These records are nowavailable in the JFK Collection.

E. CONCLUSION

The JFK Act paved the way for a single gov-ernment entity, for the first time, to be able tosearch for, identify, and assemble donationsfrom citizens and local governments, andthen place them in a central location, open tothe public.

Although not all of the Board’s efforts weresuccessful, the Review Board hopes that thefact that it strenuously upheld its mandate tosearch for, obtain, and disclose assassination-related material in an open and documentedfashion will help restore trust in the govern-ment’s desire and ability to be responsive tocitizens’ concerns.

Public hearings held in several cities by theReview Board, independent researcher“expert’s conferences,” and working luncheonsheld with Review Board staff and Board mem-bers, were instrumental in providing leads thatp roved most useful to the search for re c o rd s .

The Review Board is grateful for the contri-butions made by citizens who participated inthese meetings, made important re s e a rch sug-gestions to the Review Board, and donatedassassination re c o rds so that all citizens canenjoy access to these important materials.

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CHAPTER 7ENDNOTES

1 44 C.F.R. § 1400.1.

2 44 C.F.R. § 1400.3(i).

3 President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107, sec-tion 10(b)(2) (Supp. V 1994).

4 JFK Act, § 10(b)(3).

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A. INTRODUCTION

Are federal agencies cooperating fully,or is there resistance that fosters publicdistrust of the government?1

The John F. Kennedy Assassination RecordsCollection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) directed fed-eral agencies to search for re c o rds re l a t i n gto the assassination of President Kennedyand to transfer those re c o rds to the John F.Kennedy Assassination Records Collection(JFK Collection) at the National A rc h i v e sand Records Administration (NARA) forpublic disclosure. As explained earlier inthis report, agencies began their complianceactivities even before the Senate confirmedthe nomination of the A s s a s s i n a t i o nR e c o rds Review Board members in 1994.Once the Review Board convened, itassessed the efforts of federal agencies tocomply with the terms of the JFK Act.

In late 1996, the Review Board initiated a for-mal program to ensure that all re l e v a n tagencies were complying with the JFK A c t .The Review Board used its compliance pro-gram to ensure that government offices ful-filled their JFK Act obligations. The pro g r a mre q u i red agencies to certify that:

(1) the agency conducted a thoro u g hs e a rch for assassination re c o rds as thatterm is defined by the JFK Act and theReview Board’s regulation further definingthe term;

(2) the agency identified, organized, andreviewed its assassination records;

(3) the agency prepared its assassinationrecords for public release at NARA;

(4) the agency responded to each of theReview Board’s requests for additional infor-mation and records; and

(5) the agency transmitted its assassinationrecords to NARA.

Chapter 6 of this Report describes both theReview Board’s requests for additional infor-mation and records to federal agencies andfederal agencies’ responses to those requests.

The Review Board’s compliance pro g r a mstressed agency obligations to search for andpublicly release records relating to PresidentKennedy’s assassination. As part of its com-pliance program, the Review Board askedeach agency to submit a declaration, underpenalty of perjury, describing the re c o rdsearches that it completed, the assassinationrecords that it located, and any other actionsit took to release assassination records. TheReview Board established the complianceprogram in furtherance of the JFK Act’s man-date that there be “an enforceable, indepen-dent and accountable process for the publicdisclosure” of records on the Kennedy assas-sination.2

The Review Board worked extensively withagency personnel to resolve outstandingcompliance issues prior to submission ofFinal Declarations of Compliance.

B. FEDERAL AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THEJFK ACT

Each section of this chapter describes workthat a particular agency completed, bothbefore and during the Review Board’s exis-tence.3

1. Central Intelligence Agency

The Review Board considered the CIA’s com-pliance with the JFK Act, including completedisclosure of all CIA records relating to LeeHarvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassina-tion, to be one of its highest priorities.

The CIA complied with the JFK Act throughthe auspices of the Agency’s Historical

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CHAPTER 8CO M P L I A N C E W I T H T H E JFK AC T

B Y GO V E R N M E N T OF F I C E S

Review Program (previously the HistoricalReview Group or HRG). HRP reviewed doc-uments, re f e r red documents within CIA,answered questions, negotiated issues withthe Review Board staff, and, after Board vot-ing, processed documents for release toNARA. The HRP reviewers were all CIAannuitants, with twenty years or more expe-rience, working as independent contractors.Beginning with a 14-member staff in 1992,the staff grew steadily to 29 reviewers andnine administrative personnel by the sum-mer of 1998. HRP also drew on the resourcesof numerous other offices at CIA for recordsearches, answers to Review Board ques-tions, and the provision of records for inspec-

tion by the Board. From1992 until December 1997,HRG functioned as part ofthe Center for Studies inIntelligence and its Chiefwas the Director of Cen-tral Intelligence’s per-sonal re p resentative to theReview Board. In January1998, the CIA’s re o rg a n i-zation renamed HRG theHistorical Review Pro-gram and moved it to joinother CIA d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o ne fforts in the Office ofInformation Managem e n t .

In 1992 and 1993, the CIA’s Historical ReviewGroup proceeded to assemble CIA recordsrelating to the assassination. In early 1992,prior to enactment of the JFK Act, the Chiefof the History Staff located and inventoriedthe CIA records on the assassination that CIAheld pursuant to an agreement between theC I A and the HSCA (the CIA–HSCAsequestered collection). This material com-prised 64 boxes. In addition, the History Staffsecured the 16 boxes of the original Lee Har-vey Oswald 201 file. Following passage ofthe JFK Act, the CIA reviewed and declassi-fied with numerous redaction the Oswald201 file and files within the CIA–HSCAsequestered collection, and in 1993 the CIAtransmitted those records to the JFK Collec-tion at NARA.

In October 1993, the CIA’s HRG requested thevarious CIA d i rectorates to search for addi-tional re c o rds on Lee Harvey Oswald and onthe JFK assassination. (The directorates were

the Directorate of Operations, the Dire c t o r a t eof Intelligence, the Directorate of A d m i n i s t r a-tion, and the Directorate of Science & Te c h-n o l o g y.) As a result of this search dire c t i v e ,the CIA identified 31 boxes of potentiallyresponsive re c o rds, and these were for-w a rded to the HRG for review under the JFKAct. Included were 19 boxes of working fileson the Kennedy assassination by CIA o ff i c e rRuss Holmes (for many years he was theAgency’s focal point officer with re s p o n s i b i l i t yfor responding to questions related to CIA’ sKennedy assassination-related re c o rds); twoboxes on KGB defector Yuri Nosenko; sevenboxes of Latin American Division re c o rd s ;and three boxes related to the Bay of Pigs. TheReview Board identified 22 boxes as re s p o n-sive under the JFK Act, although many of there c o rds were duplicates of re c o rds containedin the Oswald 201 file or the CIA–HSCAs e q u e s t e red collection files.

The Review Board requested numerous cate-gories of additional CIA records in an effortto ensure the most complete disclosure ofinformation relating to the Kennedy assassi-nation. The Review Board made 16 formalrequests in writing, and 37 informal requests,for additional information and records fromthe CIA.

In anticipation of the Review Board ’ srequests for additional information andrecords, the CIA, in April 1995, requestedeach directorate and the DCI administrativeofficer “to appoint a focal point officer” forthe JFK Act. Review Board inquiries werereferred by the HRG to the appropriate CIAoffice. A number of CIA officers facilitatedthe difficult processes of securing access toCIA files, as well as negotiating issues relat-ing to the release of records. The Board foundthat, whenever it and its staff were able todeal directly with knowledgeable expertsthroughout the Agency on substantive issuesor records, more often than not the result wasa mutually acceptable release or postpone-ment. These compromises reasonably bal-anced the public interest in disclosure withlegitimate needs for continued secrecy onlimited issues. The Review Board encoun-tered early CIA resistance to making recordsavailable to the Review Board, as well asresistance to the ultimate disclosure ofrecords. A small number of CIA staff officers,almost exclusively from the Directorate of

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[T]he only thing more horrify-ing to me than the assassinationitself is the insidious, perversenotion that elements of theAmerican Government, that myown Agency, had some part init. I am determined personallyto make public or to expose todisinterested eyes every relevantscrap of paper in CIA’s posses-sion, in the hope of helping todispel this corrosive suspicion.—CIA Director Robert Gates,May 12, 1992

Operations, unnecessarily impeded theprocess and damaged the Agency’s interestsby resisting compromise with all-or-nothingpositions.

In response to the Review Board requests, theBoard staff was granted access to revieworiginal, unsanitized CIA f i l e s — i n c l u d i n goriginal files of the highest officials at CIAduring the time of the assassination—to con-firm the existence (or non-existence) of mate-rials relating to the assassination. Since theCIAfiles covered other matters in addition tothe assassination, the CIA was initially reluc-tant to provide whole files for Review Boardinspection. In order to obtain access to certainsets of files, and thus examine them in theiroriginal form, the Review Board agreed tolimit access to one or two Board staff mem-bers. The Board believed that agreeing to thislimitation was of practical benefit because itsecured access to entire original sets of files.

As a result of the Review Board’s requestsand inspection of various CIA files, theReview Board staff identified additionalmaterials relating to the assassination inaddition to those initially identified in 1992and 1993.

In 1997, the CIA provided the Review Boardstaff with several briefings by representativesof each directorate with respect to their filesand re c o rd keeping systems and theirsearches for assassination-related records. Inits searches for records on the assassination,the CIA conducted both manual and elec-tronic database searches. In 1998, the ReviewBoard expressed to the CIA concern regard-ing the thoroughness of CIA’s initial 1992–93record searches. The Review Board’s concernarose out of the CIA’s belated discovery ofseveral files relating directly to Lee HarveyOswald, including (a) a multi-volume Officeof Security file on Oswald; (b) a previouslyundisclosed continuation of the Oswald 201file containing a small number of documentspost-dating the 1977–78 HSCA investigation;(c) another, small file on Oswald designatedby the CIA as an “A” file; and (d) additionalrecords relating to a KGB source with infor-mation relating to Lee and Marina Oswald.None of these files had been identified by theCIA in 1992–93, when the CIA first assem-bled its files on the Kennedy assassination.These files were located through Review

Board inquiries regarding specific records.The Review Board was disturbed by thebelated discovery of these records, particu-larly given its mandate to assure the publicthat all relevant materials on the Kennedyassassination were being released by the U.S.government.

In an effort to ensure that the CIA had con-ducted thorough and adequate searc h e sunder the JFK Act, the Review Board specifi-cally requested that CIA D i rector Georg eTenet issue a directive to all components ofCIA requesting that they identify any recordsrelating to the assassination. Director Tenetissued the directive. Other measures weresuggested by the Review Board, and thesew e re undertaken by CIA. In particular,offices most likely to contain assassinationrecords (e.g., Counter- Intelligence and LatinAmerican Division) were asked to conducttargeted searches following Review Boardguidelines.

The Executive Dire c t o r, the third highestlevel official of the CIA, certified under oaththat the CIAhad fully complied with the JFKAct. In its Final Declaration of Compliance,the CIA stated that each of its directorates, aswell as the official responsible for the DCIa rea, had certified that “their re s p e c t i v eoffices or directorates [had] properly andfully responded to requests from the Board.”CIA further represented, under oath, that ithad “made diligent searches to locate anddisclose. . . all records in its possession relat-ing to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassina-tion of President Kennedy” and that it was“ a w a re of no other assassination-re l a t e drecords in its possession being withheld.. . . ”The Central Intelligence Agency submittedits Final Declaration of Compliance datedSeptember 24, 1998.

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation identi-fied its primary files on the Kennedy assassi-nation in the 1970s in response to publicrequests for disclosure under the Freedom ofInformation Act. These re c o rds, re f e r red to bythe FBI as the “core and related” files, consistof headquarters and field office files on thefollowing subjects: Lee Harvey Oswald, JackR u b y, the JFK assassination investigation, theFBI administrative file on the Wa r ren Com-

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mission, Marina Oswald, Ruth Paine, Georg ede Mohrenshildt, Clay Shaw, David Ferrie,the FBI administrative file on the Churc hCommittee, and the FBI administrative file onthe House Select Committee on A s s a s s i n a-tions. The FBI established its JFK Task Forc e(which consisted of five document re v i e w-

e r s )4 in 1992 as Congre s sdebated legislation toaccelerate disclosure ofall re c o rds related to theassassination of Pre s i d e n tK e n n e d y. The FBI con-ducted re c o rds searc h e sof the core and re l a t e d

subjects in its Central Records System and itsautomated electronic surveillance index(ELSUR Index) to determine that they hadg a t h e red all core and related files in FBI head-quarters and field offices.

The FBI identified a second major category ofrecords to be processed under the JFK Actwhich the FBI refers to as the “HSCA Sub-jects.” In its investigation of the Kennedyassassination, the House Select Committeeon Assassinations (HSCA) requested accessto records responsive to FBI searches on morethan 600 different subjects. The HSCA cast awide net in its investigation, and the HSCAsubjects range from individuals who haddirect contact with Lee Harvey Oswald tomajor figures in organized crime and anti-Castro Cuban political activity. The HSCAsecured an agreement from the FBI in 1978that the Bureau would retain the HSCA sub-jects as a “sequestered collection” whichwould be filed as a set of records apart fromthe FBI’s central records system.

All of these records (the core and related filesand the HSCA subjects) were identified, andthe FBI had begun its JFK Act processingprior to the appointment of the ReviewBoard. The FBI delivered its first shipment ofassassination records to the JFK Collection inDecember 1993. As of September 30, 1998, theFBI has made 22 shipments of assassinationrecords to the JFK Collection.

As described in Chapters 4 and 5 of thisreport, the Review Board streamlined itsreview processes in 1997 to ensure that allassassination records would be reviewed bythe close of the Review Board’s term. In thespring and summer of 1997, the FBI assured

the Review Board that it would attempt tofinish its processing of assassination recordsas a result of the streamlined processes. InMarch 1998, the FBI wrote a letter to theReview Board stating that it did not expect tofinish its assassination re c o rds pro c e s s i n guntil February 2000. After a series of meet-ings between the Review Board and the FBI,the FBI again committed to finishing its JFKAct processing before the end of September1998.

The Review Board formally submitted to theFBI more than 50 requests for additionalre c o rds. In response to the Board’s re q u e s t s ,the FBI made its original files available. In alimited number of instances, the Bureau pro-vided documentation on those files that wered e s t royed according to the FBI’s re c o rds re t e n-tion schedule. The Review Board designatedthousands of documents for assassinationre c o rds processing as a result of these re q u e s t s .

In January 1997 and again in April 1998, thestaff of the Review Board met with the FBI toa d d ress any outstanding matters withrespect to the Bureau’s compliance with theJFK Act. The compliance program with theFBI focused primarily on the scope of theFBI’s searches under the JFK Act. The ReviewBoard staff raised additional records issues,including the identification of any workingfiles of top FBI officials with responsibilityfor overseeing the investigation of theKennedy assassination and accounting for allrelevant electronic surveillance that relatedto the assassination. Acting on the ReviewBoard’s concerns, the FBI requested all FBIHeadquarters Divisions to conduct searchesfor any materials not retrievable through theFBI central records system and for recordsthat may have been maintained by top FBIofficials. While the FBI has discovered somenew assassination records as a result of thissearch, they have not found any workingfiles maintained by top FBI officials from theearly 1960s.

On the issue of electronic surveillance, the FBIrequested all 56 of its field offices to identifyany electronic surveillance in which assassina-t i o n - related figures were either speaking, orre f e r red to, in conversations monitored by theFBI. The FBI searched its ELSUR indices underthe core file subjects. The FBI certified that itidentified only one instance where a core sub-

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The FBI is absolutely committedto achieving the maximum dis-closure of JFK material.—FBI Director Louis J. Freeh,November 24, 1993

ject was a target of FBI electronic surveillance,and that was the electronic surveillance ofMarina Oswald in Dallas following the assas-sination. All other responsive electronic sur-veillance identified by the FBI consisted of so-called “overhears,” where a person ismentioned in a conversation. Nonetheless, theFBI certified that these would be re v i e w e dand processed under the JFK Act.

The FBI has a well-indexed, centralized filingsystem, and the FBI’s official main files onthe Kennedy assassination were readily iden-tified and processed under the JFK Act. Thebulk of FBI records relating to the assassina-tion have been placed in the JFK Collection.However, at the time of this Report, the FBIwas still processing some additional materi-als for inclusion in the JFK Collection.

The FBI submitted its Final Declaration ofCompliance on August 20, 1998.

3. Secret Service

The Secret Service transferred its official casefile on the Kennedy assassination to NARAin 1979.

In December 1992, after the JFK Act waspassed, the Assistant Director for the SecretService Office of Administration directed theSecret Service to inventory its records in anattempt to locate records relating to the assas-sination. In response, the Chief of the PolicyAnalysis & Records Systems Branch withinthe Office of Administration reviewed theinventories of Secret Service records in stor-age. Secret Service made these inventories, aswell as archive re c o rds, available to theReview Board staff for inspection. In 1995,the Assistant Director for the Office ofAdministration instructed each A s s i s t a n tDirector and the Chief Counsel to search forassassination-related records. In December1996, the same Assistant Director issuedanother search directive to each employee.

In addition to the Secret Service’s search of itsa rchival re c o rds, the Review Board submittedto the Secret Service more than twenty sepa-rate requests for re c o rds. The Secret Servicewas generally cooperative in making therequested re c o rds available to the ReviewB o a rd. As a result of the Service’s owns e a rches, as well as Review Board requests for

re c o rds, the Secret Service identified, as assas-sination re c o rds under the JFK Act, additionalmaterials beyond those contained in the off i-cial case file for the Kennedy assassination.

C o n g ress passed the JFK Act of 1992. Onemonth later, the Secret Service began its com-pliance efforts. However, in January 1995, theS e c ret Service destroyed presidential pro t e c-tion survey reports for some of Pre s i d e n tKennedy’s trips in the fall of 1963. The ReviewB o a rd learned of the destruction appro x i-mately one week after the Secret Serviced e s t royed them, when the Board was draftingits request for additional information. TheB o a rd believed that the Secret Service files onthe President’s travel in the weeks pre c e d i n ghis murder would be re l e v a n t .

The Review Board requested the Secret Serviceto explain the circumstances surrounding thed e s t ruction, after passage of the JFK Act. TheS e c ret Service formally explained the circ u m-stances of this destruction in corre s p o n d e n c eand an oral briefing to the Review Board.

The Review Board also sought to account forcertain additional re c o rd categories thatmight relate to the Kennedy assassination.For example, the Review Board sought infor-mation regarding a protective intelligencefile on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee(FPCC) and regarding protective intelligencefiles relating to threats to President Kennedyin the Dallas area (the Dallas-related fileswere disclosed to the Warren Commission).The FPCC and Dallas-related files apparentlyw e re destroyed, and the Review Boardsought any information re g a rding thedestruction. As of this writing, the Servicewas unable to provide any specific informa-tion regarding the disposition of these files.

The Secret Service submitted its Final Decla-ration of Compliance dated September 18,1998, but did not execute it under oath. TheReview Board asked the Service to re-submitits Final Declaration.

4. National Security Agency

Despite the highly classified nature of its oper-ations, the National Security Agency (NSA)conducted searches for assassination re c o rd s .In March 1993, NSA’s Deputy Director ofPlans, Policy, and Programs (DDP) dire c t e d

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that an NSA-wide search be conducted forre c o rds responsive to the JFK Act. Wi t h i nNSA, the Office of Policy coordinated re v i e wof NSA’s assassination-related re c o rd s .A c c o rding to NSA, “[a] search of all files anddatabases believed to hold such [assassina-t i o n - related] re c o rds was conducted by eachof the Directorates within NSA....” In additionto database searches, NSA assigned ten indi-viduals to hand-search approximately 200boxes of archived material from the 1963–64time frame. The Directorate of Operations andthe NSA A rchives also conducted searches inresponse to specific requests of the ReviewB o a rd in 1995. As a result of NSA’s 1993 and1995 searches, NSA identified a total of 269re c o rds to be processed under the JFK Act. In1998, an additional 109 assassination re c o rd sw e re identified by NSA to be processed underthe JFK A c t .

NSA located the bulk of its assassinationrecords in the NSA Legislative Affairs Officeand General Counsel’s Office. These recordsrelated to NSA responses to prior investiga-tional inquiries regarding the assassination.In March 1995, the NSA briefed the ReviewBoard members as to how it conducted itssearches for assassination records and, inaddition, submitted answers to specific ques-tions of the Review Board concerning assas-sination records in the possession of NSA.The Review Board subsequently submittedadditional questions to NSA, particularlyregarding NSA intelligence records relatingto Cuba or the Soviet Union. NSA answeredthe Board’s questions, submitting a detailedset of responses to Review Board inquiriesregarding intelligence holdings on Cuba andthe Soviet Union that might lead to relevantinformation relating to the assassination.NSA stated that “both Cuba and the USSRwere targets of high interest [to NSA] duringthe time of the assassination,” and that NSAsearched its files relating to those countries.NSA concluded that “[t]hese searches pro-duced records that primarily reflected reac-tions to the assassination.”

With respect to NSA’s review of its intelli-gence holdings, NSA “certifie[d] that it hasneither located, nor is it withholding, anyintelligence records containing informationof investigatory significance to the Kennedyassassination.” NSA advised the ReviewBoard that its relevant intelligence records

had “report[ed] on reactions to the assassina-tion” and that they did not contain “uniqueinformation” on the “planning , execution, orinvestigation” of the assassination.The National Security Agency submitted itsFinal Declaration of Compliance datedAugust 18, 1998.


The Department of State transferred its mainrecord holdings regarding the assassinationto NARA in 1989. These were “lot files” con-sisting mostly of re c o rds re g a rding theDepartment of State’s work relating to theWarren Commission investigation. The filesoriginated in the Department of State LegalAdvisor’s Office and the Office of Securityand Consular Affairs. After Congress passedthe JFK Act, the Department of State openedthese files to the public in August 1993.

The Department of State designated its Officeof Freedom of Information, Privacy & Classi-fication Review (within the Bureau ofAdministration) as the entity responsible foridentifying and processing assassinationrecords under the JFK Act. The office in turnappointed a retired Department of State his-torian to coordinate the Department’s JFKAct compliance.

The Department of State staff conductednumerous searches of its records to ensurecompliance with the JFK Act. For example, in1993, the Department searched its CentralForeign Policy records. The search included areview of manifests of retired files of Depart-mental offices and foreign posts, as well ascomputerized searches of its automated doc-ument systems. Also in 1993, the AssistantS e c retary of State for Administration for-mally requested various offices within theDepartment to search for records relating tothe assassination.

Among the records located by the Depart-ment were 25,000 pages of material relatingto condolences, funeral attendance arrange-ments, and memorial activities. Also, “virtu-ally every diplomatic conversation held dur-ing the month or so after the assassinationcontained oral condolences or references tothe recent American tragedy.” After process-ing approximately 3,000 such records for theJFK Collection, the Department discontinued

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p rocessing these kinds of re c o rds and“restricted its search to documents relevantto the murder investigation.” The ReviewBoard did not object to this approach.

Former Foreign Service Officers, working asre-employed annuitants, reviewed Depart-ment of State-originated documents anddocuments re f e r red by other agencies toState. Other entities within the Departmentof State also participated in review anddeclassification, including the Bureau ofDiplomatic Security, the Office of PassportP o l i c y, and the Bureau of Intelligence &R e s e a rch. Department of State re v i e w e r sw e re sent to NARA, the CIA, the House andSenate Intelligence Committees, and the JFKLibrary to review and declassify Departmentof State re c o rds. More than 10,000 suchre c o rds were processed under the JFK Act. Inaddition, Department of State re v i e w e r sp rocessed approximately 4,500 documentsre f e r red to State from other agencies.

Since 1997, a team of Department of Statereviewers also has been declassifyingDepartment records pursuant to ExecutiveO rder 12958. These reviewers werei n s t ructed to identify any assassination-related materials in the course of theirre v i e w. Many of the re c o rds that weres e a rched under the JFK Act have beenprocessed under Executive Order 12958 andsent to NARA. In view of the Department ofState’s representations regarding its declassi-fication efforts under the Executive Order,the Review Board determined that a furtherdetailed review of these records for assassi-nation-related materials was not necessary.

Among the re c o rds identified under the JFKAct and transferred to NARA w e re: diplo-matic cables re g a rding foreign reaction to theassassination; re c o rds from the Mexico CityPost File; documents from the re c o rds ofLlewellyn E. Thompson, former A m b a s s a d o rto the Soviet Union; re c o rds of Secretary DeanRusk, including memoranda summarizingtelephone conversations he had re g a rding theassassination; and working files on the assas-sination maintained by U. Alexis Johnson,then Deputy Undersecretary of State.

The Department of State submitted its FinalDeclaration of Compliance dated March 18,1998.

6. Department of Justice

The Review Board worked separately witheach of the relevant divisions of the Depart-ment of Justice to identify and release recordsunder the JFK Act. Accordingly, the ReviewBoard worked with the Office of Information& Privacy (OIP), responsible for “leadershipo ffices,” the Criminal Division, the CivilDivision, the Civil Rights Division, and theOffice of Legal Counsel. The work of eachDivision is summarized below.

a. Office of Information and Privacy.

This office is responsible for re c o rds of the“leadership offices” of the Department of Jus-tice, including re c o rds of the Attorney Gen-eral, Deputy Attorney General, and A s s o c i a t eAttorney General. In addition, OIP is re s p o n-sible for handling FOIA requests and appealsd i rected against all entities within the Depart-ment of Justice. OIP assigned staff to carry outits obligations under the JFK Act, including asenior counsel, a Department of Justicea rchivist, and two FOIA/declassification spe-cialists. The senior counsel was appointed asthe OIP re p resentative to coordinate OIP’se fforts under the JFK A c t .

After passage of the JFK Act, OIP had identi-fied materials relating to FOIAlitigation overrecords relating to the JFK assassination, andthese materials were placed in the JFK Col-lection. OIP also located and designated asassassination records the following: (1) cer-tain files of Robert Keuch, who was DOJ’sliaison to the HSCA; (2) a file of AttorneyGeneral Edward Levi (entitled, “FBI/JFKAssassination Investigation”); (3) a file ofAttorney General William Barr; (4) files fromDOJ’s Office of Public Affairs; (5) documentsfrom DOJ’s Departmental Review Commit-tee involving administrative appeals of FOIArequests; and (6) a historical file containingassassination-related documents from “lead-ership offices” and those that have been thesubject of past FOIA litigation.

The Office of Information and Privacy sub-mitted its Final Declaration of Compliancedated August 6, 1998.

b. Criminal Division.

After passage of the JFK Act, the Acting A s s i s-tant Attorney General for the Criminal Divi-

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sion instructed high-level officials within theDivision to forward any assassination re c o rd sto the Freedom of Information/Privacy A c t( F O I / PA)Unit within the Division. In addi-tion, re c o rd searches were conducted by theF O I A / PA Unit and the Criminal DivisionR e c o rds Unit. Files relating to the assassina-tion were identified and placed into the JFKCollection in 1993. Among the Criminal Divi-sion files in the JFK Collection are the Divi-sion’s main file on the assassination and a fileon FBI handling of the assassination investi-gation. In the course of complying with theJFK Act, the Criminal Division utilized fourattorneys and support personnel.

In complying with Review Board requests, theCriminal Divison made available for ReviewB o a rd inspection numerous original files re l a t-ing to organized crime and internal securitymatters. As of September 1998, major cate-gories of assassination re c o rds in the custodyof the Criminal Division had not yet beent r a n s f e r red to the JFK Collection at NARA.These consisted of the re c o rds identified bythe Board from its review of the org a n i z e dcrime and internal security files. The ReviewB o a rd is disappointed that these re c o rds havenot been processed and transferred to the JFKCollection, but the Criminal Division has com-mitted to completing the process of re l e a s i n gthese re c o rds to the JFK Collection.

The Criminal Division has also generatedadditional records regarding recent ballisticstesting of one of the bullet fragments and hascommitted to placing those records in the JFKCollection.

The Criminal Division submitted its FinalDeclaration of Compliance dated September2, 1998.

c. Civil Division.

In March 1993, the Acting Assistant A t t o r n e yGeneral for the Civil Division directed all Divi-sion offices to identify any assassination-related re c o rds that might be in their custody.In addition, the Civil Division appointed theDivision’s attorney in charge of its FOI/PAUnit to coordinate release of assassinationre c o rds under the JFK A c t .

As a result of the search directive, the CivilDivision identified four categories of records

as potentially responsive to the JFK Act: (1)case files relating to FOIA litigation in whichplaintiffs sought access to U.S. governmentrecords on the Kennedy assassination; (2) acase file relating to compensation for the U.S.government’s taking of the Oswald rifle(Marina Oswald Porter v. United States) (thisfile, however, had been destroyed in 1991according to the Department’s records reten-tion/destruction schedule); (3) a CriminalDivision file relating to the Kennedy family’sagreement to donate certain personal itemsof President Kennedy to NARA; and (4) mis-cellaneous materials relating to the assassina-tion located with the Director of the FederalPrograms Branch.

In 1993, the Civil Division transferred toNARAthe small collection of documents thathad been discovered among the secured filesof the Director for the Federal Pro g r a m sBranch. This collection of materials includedpictures of the President’s clothing after theassassination, documents relating to thea u t o p s y, and memoranda relating to theavailability of Warren Commission materials.Aside from these materials, no other assassi-nation-related records had been placed in theJFK Collection at that time.

The Civil Division defends federal agencies insuits arising under the FOIA, and the Divisionhad numerous FOIA litigation cases bro u g h tagainst the government for denying access toKennedy assassination re c o rds. The ReviewB o a rd requested that the Civil Divisionp rocess its FOIA litigation case files relating toassassination re c o rds under the JFK Act. TheCivil Division took the position that FOIA l i t i-gation files on JFK assassination re c o rds neednot be reviewed or released under the JFK A c t .H o w e v e r, the Review Board prevailed uponthe Civil Division to release these FOIA f i l e sunder the JFK Act. The various JFK-re l a t e dF O I A cases were identified to the Civil Divi-sion by the Review Board, and they weretransmitted to the JFK Collection.

The Civil Division submitted its Final Decla-ration of Compliance dated July 29, 1998.

d. Civil Rights Division .

The Civil Rights Division located one fileresponsive to the JFK Act. This file consistedof a civil rights complaint made against New

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Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, andit is in the JFK Collection.

The Civil Rights Division submitted its FinalDeclaration of Compliance dated July 2, 1997.

e. Office of Legal Counsel.

The Office of Legal Counsel collected docu-ments spanning from the date of the assassi-nation through the Congressional inquiriesof the 1970s pertaining to legal aspects of theassassination, the start-up of the Wa r re nCommission, access to Warren Commissionevidence, legislation making Pre s i d e n t i a lassassination a federal crime, and publicinquiries about the assassination. Theserecords have been transmitted to the JFK Col-lection.

The Review Board did not request a declara-tion of compliance from the Office of LegalCounsel.

7. Department of the Treasury

The Review Board worked with various com-ponents of the Department of Tre a s u r y,including Main Treasury (i.e., the Office ofthe Secretary), Secret Service (discussedabove), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),the Customs Service, and the Bureau of Alco-hol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF).

a. Main Treasury.

In December 1992, the Assistant Director forPolicy, Plans and Paperwork Managementrequested the Departmental Offices RecordsOfficer to identify any assassination-relatedrecords under the JFK Act. No assassinationrecords were identified at that time. In 1995,the Review Board began to make specificadditional requests for information andre c o rds, and Treasury searched for therecords that the Board requested. In addition,Treasury made available original records forReview Board inspection.

In late 1996, Main Treasury designated theDepartmental Offices Records Officer to coor-dinate Treasury’s work under the JFK Act. Inaddition, a senior attorney from the Office ofGeneral Counsel was tasked to handle JFK A c tmatters. These officials assisted in the pro c e s s-ing of identified assassination re c o rds and in

making available to the Review Board addi-tional re c o rds for inspection.Treasury has con-firmed that all of its identified assassinationrecords have been transferred to the JFK Col-lection at NARA.

The Department of the Treasury submittedits Final Declaration of Compliance datedAugust 12, 1998.

b. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms(ATF).

In 1992, ATF’s AssistantD i rector (Administra-tion) directed each of theheads of offices withinATF to locate any recordsrelating to the assassina-tion. No assassinationrecords were identified atthat time. In addition, in1995, ATF re v i e w e dinventories of re c o rd sheld in storage, and noassassination re c o rd swere identified throughthat review. In particular,ATF reported that theFort Worth Records Cen-ter held no ATF recordsfrom the 1960s. ATF alsomade search

The Review Board sought to have ATF locateany 1963–64 re c o rds relating to ATF’s assis-tance in the investigation of the JFK assassina-tion, as well as re c o rds from the late 1970srelating to ATF’s work for the HSCA. TheReview Board specifically requested that AT Fcheck for re c o rds from the ATF Field Office inDallas, as well as re c o rds for the ATF Dire c t o rand ATF Chief Counsel, and this was done.

ATF was fully cooperative and documentedits search efforts in detail and under oath.ATF located only a handful of records, all ofwhich related to its work with the HSCA.

One factor that may explain the inability ofATF to locate any relevant records from the1960s was the fact that ATF was not createdas an independent entity until 1972. ATF’spredecessor agency was the Alcohol TobaccoTax Unit of the Internal Revenue Service. TheReview Board therefore requested that IRS

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[T]he Department of the Trea-sury supports the purposeunderlying this Joint Resolutionand agrees with its intention ofmaking the greatest number ofgovernment documents avail-able to the public. Perhaps theseadditional disclosures, and theunfettered review by the publicof the documents, will helprelieve the lingering concernsand anxieties surrounding thistragedy, and restore the confi-dence of the American peoplethat there are no more mysteriesassociated with the tragedy.—Department of Treasury,Senate Hearings on JFK Act

determine whether it had any pre-1972 ATFrecords relating to the assassination. IRS wasunable to locate any ATF assassinationrecords within its files.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearmssubmitted its Final Declaration of Compli-ance dated November 11, 1997.

c. Customs Service.

After passage of the JFK Act, Customs con-ducted a search of its Washington, D.C. head-quarters files through computerizedsearches, as well as extensive review of itsarchival files with the assistance of ReviewBoard staff. In addition, Customs instructedits field offices to search for assassinationrecords. Customs identified a modest num-ber of assassination records.

The Review Board staff requested additionalsearches of Customs headquarters records,but no additional records were identified. Inan effort to determine whether field officeskept records that headquarters might havedestroyed, the Review Board asked that Cus-toms have its Dallas field office re-check forany relevant files.

Customs Service submitted its Final Declara-tion of Compliance dated June 30, 1997.

d. Internal Revenue Service.

The identification andrelease of assassination-related re c o rds in IRS’scustody has been diff i c u l tbecause Section 11(a) ofthe JFK Act explicitly pro-vides that tax-relatedrecords continue to beexempt from public dis-c l o s u re under Section 6103of the IRS Code. The

Review Board believes that significant assassi-n a t i o n - related re c o rds of the IRS were pre-cluded from release under the JFK Act. Mosts i g n i f i c a n t l y, the JFK Act failed to secure IRS’spublic release of the original Lee HarveyOswald tax returns and significant tax-re l a t e dmaterial in the files of the Wa r ren Commission.5

Notwithstanding Section 6103, the ReviewB o a rd requested that the IRS collect and

identify all records it had relating to theassassination. In 1994, IRS reported that ithad identified, pursuant to the JFK A c t ,approximately fifty documents. These docu-ments apparently related to a tax proceedinginvolving Jack Ruby’s estate. At the time, nofurther work was undertaken by IRS torelease these documents or to identify anyother records under the JFK Act.

In late 1996, the Review Board sought toclarify what IRS did to locate additionalre c o rds relating to the assassination andwhat it intended to release in light of Sec-tion 6103. In addition, the Review Boardsought to inspect assassination re c o rds thatw e re, or would be, collected by IRS, includ-ing original tax returns of Lee HarveyOswald, and re c o rds relating to IRS workwith the Wa r ren Commission. The ReviewB o a rd also sought to ascertain the statusand anticipated treatment of such re c o rd sby IRS under the JFK Act. While IRS con-s i d e red such re c o rds under Section 6103exempt from release, the Review Boardasserted its legal authority, under the JFKAct, to confidentially inspect IRS assassina-tion re c o rds. However, the assassinationre c o rds collected by the IRS were not madeavailable for the Review Board’s inspection.Only a year later did IRS affirm the ReviewB o a rd’s legal authority to inspect IRS assas-sination re c o rd s .

In 1998, the Review Board requested that IRSformally document its actions and compli-ance under the JFK Act. The Review Boardrequested that the IRS search for records thatmight relate to the assassination and that theIRS specifically identify any such records thatit believed could not be released under Sec-tion 6103. The Review Board also requestedthat IRS review the tax-related records in theWarren Commission and HSCA holdings todetermine which records could be releasedconsistent with Section 6103.

At the request of the Review Board, the IRSintends to forward to the JFK Collection alltax-related assassination records identifiedby IRS, including those records to remainconfidential pursuant to Section 6103. Therecords covered by Section 6103, althoughtransmitted to the JFK Collection, will not bereleased pending any later determination asto their status under the IRS code.

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[T]he department and the IRShave no objection to lifting thebar to public disclosure of thetax information previously pro-vided to the Warren Commis-sion and the House and SenateCommittees.—Department of Treasury,Senate Hearings on JFK Act

The Review Board has received draft compli-ance statements from the Internal RevenueService but has not received the IRS’s FinalDeclaration of Compliance.

8. National Security Council

The National Security Council did not ini-tially do any work in response to the JFK Actfollowing its passage. In 1997, the ReviewB o a rd contacted the NSC to ascertainwhether it might have any re c o rds thatwould be relevant under the JFK Act. TheNSC was fully cooperative in identifying andmaking available the records within its cus-tody and control. NSC provided the ReviewBoard with various inventories to recordsheld off-site and certain re c o rds from itsvault in the Old Executive Office Building.Review Board staff worked with senior NSCrecords officials to designate assassination-related records under the JFK Act. Amongthe early 1960s records designated were min-utes of NSC and Special Group meetings.The materials covered issues regarding Cubaand Vietnam.

The National Security Council submitted itsFinal Declaration of Compliance dated April30, 1998.

9. The President’s Foreign IntelligenceAdvisory Board

In early 1997, the Review Board re q u e s t e dthat the President’s Foreign IntelligenceAdvisory Board (PFIAB) make available any1962–64 re c o rds that might relate to theKennedy assassination. The PFIAB agreed tomake available certain re c o rds for theReview Board’s inspection. Over severalmonths, the Review Board staff inspectedthese re c o rds and identified certain excerptsas assassination re c o rds. When the ReviewB o a rd sought to have the re c o rds pro c e s s e dfor public release, The PFIAB took the posi-tion that these re c o rds were, in fact, notreleasable under the JFK Act. Senator Wa r re nRudman, Chairman of The PFIAB, appeare db e f o re members of the Review Board inAugust 1998 to present The PFIAB’s viewthat its re c o rds were not covered by the JFKAct and, furthermore, that particular re c o rd sidentified by the Review Board were nota s s a s s i n a t i o n - related within the meaning ofthe statute.

The Review Board proceeded to formally des-ignate the identified The PFIAB re c o rd s(many of which dealt with U.S. policy toward sCuba) as assassination re c o rds under the JFKAct. Challenging the Review Board’s author-ity to designate pertinent re c o rds as assassina-tion re c o rds under the Act, The PFIABrequested a document-by-document justifica-tion re g a rding the relevance of the re c o rds, thepublic interest in their release, and whetherThe PFIAB documents contained uniqueinformation. The Board had previously articu-lated the relevance of the materials to ThePFIAB and considered the requested analysisto be unnecessary, burdensome, and ulti-mately an obstacle to release. At the time ofthis Report, The PFIAB reserved its right toappeal to the President any Board decision torelease The PFIAB re c o rd s .

10. Immigration & Naturalization Service

In 1993, the Immigration & NaturalizationService (INS) conducted a re c o rds search inresponse to passage of the JFK Act. Specifi-c a l l y, INS’s Assistant Commissioner for theR e c o rds System Division directed all INScomponents to search for re c o rds that met thestatutory definition of an assassinationre c o rd. INS designated a Management A n a-lyst for the Headquarters Records Manage-ment Branch to receive and process INSassassination re c o rds under the JFK Act. Mostof the files identified by INS were files on var-ious individuals who had some connection tothe assassination story, and there f o re had pre-viously been made available to Congre s s i o n a lcommittees, including the HSCA. After con-sultation with other agencies, INS identifiedadditional files as being pertinent under theJFK Act. (A list of the INS files pro c e s s e dunder the JFK Act is set forth in the INS FinalDeclaration of Compliance.) While INS hadidentified over 65 files to be processed underthe JFK Act, none had been transferred toN A R A until late 1996. INS ultimately devotedsubstantial re s o u rces to processing these filesfor release under the JFK A c t .

INS had not, at the time of this Report, com-pleted the transmission of its identifiedassassination records to the JFK Collection.Although INS had forwarded numerous filesto the JFK Collection, including files on Leeand Marina Oswald, INS had yet to forward

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files on certain lesser-known figures, somemiscellaneous documents from its subjectfiles, and a work file on Carlos Marcello. INSattributes the delay, in part, to the time-con-suming processing of referring documents toother agencies for review and awaiting agen-cies’ release of their equities. INS has com-mitted to completing the transmission of allremaining assassination-related files to theJFK Collection.

The Immigration and Naturalization Servicesubmitted its Final Declaration of Compli-ance dated September 11, 1998.

11. Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)had not identified any assassination recordsby August 1993, the first deadline imposedby the JFK Act. In October 1995, ReviewBoard staff met with various Department ofDefense officials and identified topics andrecord categories to be searched for under theJFK Act. As a result, components of thearmed forces under the Secretary of Defensewere instructed to search for assassinationrecords and, in addition, OSD’s own archivalre c o rds were searched. Miscellaneousrecords were thereafter identified from theSecretary of Defense official correspondencefiles, including records on Cuba and corre-spondence with the HSCA.

The OSD’s Directorate for Correspondence &D i rectives was diligent in attempting toaddress the record-related issues raised bythe Review Board. The OSD’s Records Sec-tion ran computerized record searches andinventoried its archive re c o rds and ulti-mately responded to all Review Boardsearches.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense sub-mitted its Final Declaration of Compliancedated May 21, 1998.

12. Defense Intelligence Agency

In 1993, DIA forwarded to NARA approxi-mately one box of materials for the JFK Col-lection consisting mostly of correspondencewith the HSCA. The Review Board staff metwith DIA in early 1997 and determined thatDIA had not reviewed all of its relevantarchive holdings. The Review Board then

began to make specific requests for addi-tional information from DIA. All requestswere ultimately answered.

In an effort to locate records responsive to theReview Board’s additional requests, a specialDIA task force worked at the WashingtonNational Records Center in Suitland, Mary-land, conducting a page-by-page review ofall pertinent pre-1965 Agency file series.After this review of its archive records, DIAidentified additional assassination-re l a t e ddocuments. These records have been placedin the JFK Collection.

The Defense Intelligence Agency submittedits Final Declaration of Compliance datedApril 10, 1998.

13. Department of the Army

In response to the JFK Act, the Army con-ducted in 1993 an “Army-wide canvassingfor relevant records.” Another canvassing ofrecords was done in 1997. The Army reportedthat it conducted “a complete review of the70,000 line item listing of the Army’s hold-ings in the Federal Records Centers... . ” TheArmy identified various assassinationrecords, including: (a) material relating toballistics research performed by the Army inconnection with the assassination; (b) the1965 typewritten notes of Pierre Finck, theArmy pathologist who participated in theKennedy autopsy; (c) records of the ArmyCorps of Engineers relating to the design andconstruction of the Kennedy gravesite; (d)materials relating to the polygraph examina-tion of Jack Ruby from the Defense Poly-graph Institute at Fort McClellan, Alabama;(e) records on Cuba from the files of JosephCalifano, created while he was a SpecialAssistant to the Secretary of the Army in theKennedy administration; and (f) Army intel-ligence files on various individuals con-nected with the Kennedy assassination story.In addition, the Army made available micro-film records of the Pentagon Telecommunica-tions Agency, and the Review Board desig-nated certain documents from the 1963–64period as assassination records.

The Department of the Army submitted itsFinal Declaration of Compliance dated Sep-tember 11, 1998.

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a. Investigative Records Repository .

The Review Board staff also worked sepa-rately with the IRR at Fort Meade, theArmy’s storage facility for counter-intelli-gence files. The IRR has released severalintelligence files under the JFK Act, includingfiles on Gerald P. Hemming and anti-Castroactivists. The IRR was cooperative in deter-mining whether it had any files on other indi-viduals related to the assassination. In manycases, they found no records for the namessubmitted. The Review Board requested theIRR to determine whether it had any office orwork files for certain Army intelligence offi-cials located in the Dallas area in 1963–64.The IRR stated that it had no such files. Inaddition, the Review Board requested thatthe IRR provide any additional informationor documentation with respect to an Armyintelligence dossier maintained on Oswald.The Army destroyed this file in 1973 as partof a program to purge domestic surveillancefiles. The Review Board developed no newinformation on the file or its destructionbeyond that developed by the HSCA.

The Review Board received the Final Decla-ration of Compliance of the InvestigativeRecords Repository on January 23, 1998.

14. Department of the Navy

The Review Board considered records of theDepartment of the Navy essential in view ofLee Harvey Oswald’s tenure with theMarines, which is administratively a part ofNavy. Under the JFK Act, the Navy identifiedand placed into the JFK Collection at NARAcertain core files relating to Lee HarveyOswald—(1) the personnel and medicalMarine Corps files for Oswald and (2) Officeof Naval Intelligence records on Oswald.

After passage of the JFK Act, the Navy’sCriminal Investigative Service transferred, in1994, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)records that had been maintained on LeeHarvey Oswald.6 In 1995, the General Coun-sel of the Navy directed that a further reviewof the Navy’s files be undertaken pursuant tothe JFK Act. This directive went to the Chiefof Naval Operations, the Commandant of theMarine Corps, the Naval Criminal Investiga-tive Service, and the Naval Historical Center.The Navy identified no additional assassina-

tion records. In 1996, the Marine Corps trans-mitted to the Review Board the original per-sonnel and medical Marine Corps files onOswald. The Review Board transmitted theserecords to the JFK Collection.

Notwithstanding the Navy’s identification ofthese core materials, the Review Boardrequested the Navy to search additionalre c o rd categories to ensure that all re l e v a n tmaterials had been identified. In December1996, the Navy designated two officials withinthe Office of General Counsel to coord i n a t ethe Navy’s further search and processing ofa s s a s s i n a t i o n - related re c o rds under the JFKAct. In early 1997, after the Navy consultedwith Review Board staff re g a rding categoriesof potentially relevant re c o rds, the GeneralCounsel’s office issued another search dire c-tive to the Chief of Naval Operations, theCommandant of the Marine Corps, the JudgeAdvocate General of the Navy, the NavalCriminal Investigative Service, the Secre t a r yof the Navy’s Administrative Division, andother components within the Navy. TheReview Board asked the Navy to search forfiles of high-level officials of the MarineCorps, the Office of Naval Intelligence, andthe Navy during the years 1959 through 1964.The Navy conducted an extensive review offiles, including a review of files from the Sec-retary of the Navy’s Administrative Office, theChief of Naval Operations, and the MarineCorps. The Navy located miscellaneous docu-ments relating to the Wa r ren Commission andH S C A f rom files of the Administrative Off i c efor the Secretary of the Navy as a result of thiss e a rch. Among the re c o rds found was anunsigned copy of an affidavit by the Dire c t o rof ONI, pre p a red at the time of the Wa r re nCommission, stating that Lee Harvey Oswaldwas not used as an agent or informant byONI. The Navy confirmed that it had not,h o w e v e r, located the 1959–1964 files for theD i rector of ONI.

The Department of the Navy submitted itsFinal Declaration of Compliance datedDecember 3, 1997.

a. Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Review Board pursued the matter of ONIre c o rds separately. A c c o rd i n g l y, the Boardrequested that ONI submit its own certifica-tion of its compliance with the JFK A c t . In its

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Final Declaration of Compliance, ONI statedthat it conducted an extensive review of ONIre c o rds held at Federal Records Centerst h roughout the country. ONI did not identifyany additional assassination re c o rds. ONI wasunable to find any relevant files for the Dire c-tor of ONI from 1959 to 1964. ONI alsoacknowledged that there were additional ONIre c o rds that were not reviewed for assassina-tion re c o rds, but that these re c o rds would bereviewed under Executive Order 12958 re q u i r-ing declassification of government re c o rd s .

The Office of Naval Intelligence submitted itsFinal Declaration of Compliance dated May18, 1998.

b. National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda.

The Review Board also pursued assassinationre c o rds with the National Naval Medical Cen-ter at Bethesda, Maryland (NNMC). TheNNMC was cooperative and conductedextensive searches. An unsigned original ofthe JFK autopsy report was located in a safe atthe NNMC’s Anatomic Pathology Division.The NNMC located miscellaneous FOIArequests relating to autopsy re c o rds. TheReview Board asked the NNMC to re - c h e c kwhether it had any 1963–64 files for the topo fficials of the NNMC, including Comman-ders Humes and Boswell. Humes and Boswellw e re the Navy pathologists who conductedthe autopsy of President Kennedy. TheNNMC re-certified that it had no such files.

The National Naval Medical Center submit-ted its Final Declaration of Compliance datedJune 27, 1997, and its Supplemental Declara-tion of Compliance on December 23, 1997.

15. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

The Review Board worked directly with theArmed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP).A F I P designated its A rchivist for the NationalMuseum of Health and Medicine to serve asthe official responsible for conducting A F I P ’ ss e a rches under the JFK Act. As with theNational Naval Medical Center in Bethesda,Maryland, the Review Board sought to identifyany re c o rds from A F I P that might relate to theautopsy of President Kennedy (Lt. Col. PierreFinck, one of the autopsy pathologists, wasChief of the Wound Ballistics Branch of A F I Pa tthe time). A F I P located some materials of Dr.

Finck, including two 1965 reports he pre p a re dfor General Blumberg re g a rding the Kennedyautopsy and his 1969 memorandum re g a rd i n gtestimony he gave at the Clay Shaw trial. TheReview Board also asked A F I P for any 1963–64files of top A F I P o fficials who might have hadinformation re g a rding the autopsy of Pre s i d e n tKennedy. AFIP did locate one additionalre c o rd, an oral history interview with Dr.Robert F. Karnei, Jr., in which he briefly dis-cusses his role at the JFK autopsy.

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology sub-mitted its Final Declaration of Compliancedated June 12, 1997.

16. Department of the Air Force

In 1995, the Air Force directed certain A i rF o rce commands to undertake searches forassassination re c o rds. The only assassinationre c o rd found was an operations logbookf rom A n d rews Air Force Base that hadre c o rded events at the base on the day of theassassination. The Review Board asked theAir Force to conduct further searches forassassination re c o rds. The Review Boardasked the Air Force to: (1) identify andreview the 1963–64 files for the highest off i-cials in the Air Force, including the Secre t a r yof the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for theAir Force; (2) more thoroughly review thefiles of the Office of Special Investigationsfor any re c o rds related to Oswald; and (3)determine whether there were any re c o rd srelating to Air Force One on November 22,1963, including specifically searching for anyaudiotapes of transmissions to or from A i rF o rce One on the day of the assassination.

As the Review Board requested, the A i rF o rce conducted a targeted search. The A i rF o rce did not, however, forward additionalre c o rds to the JFK Collection. After the A i rF o rce submitted its Final Declaration, theB o a rd requested that the Air Force furtheraccount for specific Air Force re c o rds, partic-ularly re c o rds for the Air Force’s Office ofP residential Pilot and the HistoricalR e s e a rch Agency at Maxwell Air Force Basein Alabama. The Air Force, at the time of thisReport, had not followed up on the ReviewB o a rd’s re q u e s t .

The Air Force submitted its Final Declarationof Compliance dated November 21, 1997.

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17. Joint Staff

The Chief of the Information ManagementDivision, Joint Secretariat, Joint Staff, coordi-nated the Joint Staff’s compliance with theJFK Act. The Joint Staff searched its archivedfiles for records of the Joint Chiefs of Stafffrom the early 1960s, including files of JointChiefs Chairmen Lyman L. Lemnitzer,Maxwell Taylor, and Earle G. Wheeler. TheJoint Staff estimated that it spent 210 hourssearching for assassination records in suchfiles. The Joint Staff allowed the ReviewBoard access to these records.

The Joint Staff responded to the ReviewBoard’s requests for additional informationrelating to Cuba and Vietnam.

In the course of identifying relevant records,the Review Board learned that the Joint Staffhad destroyed minutes and/or transcripts ofmeetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1947to 1978. Since the re c o rds would haveincluded minutes of meetings in 1963 and1964 which might have been relevant to theassassination, the Review Board requestedthat the Joint Staff account for the destruc-tion. The Joint Staff explained that, in 1974,the Secretary for the Joint Chiefs of Staffordered these materials destroyed and, atthat time, also established a dispositionschedule for such records. In 1978, accordingto the Joint Staff, the “practice of recordingmeeting minutes was discontinued.. . . ”

The Joint Staff submitted its Final Declarationof Compliance dated November 13, 1997.

18. White House CommunicationsAgency

The White House Communications Agency(WHCA) did not identify any assassinationre c o rds before its first meeting with theReview Board in early 1997. The ReviewB o a rd contacted WHCA to determinewhether it retained any archived re c o rd sfrom 1963–64 relating to the assassination.

The Review Board formally requested thatWHCA search for any 1963–64 records thatmight have pertained to the assassination.WHCA located and placed into the JFK Col-lection an historical file that contained state-ments of WHCA personnel regarding events

on the day of the assassination and, in addi-tion, a WHCA memorandum providing a“list of telephone calls recorded by the WhiteHouse switchboard on 22 November 1963.”

The Review Board further re q u e s t e dW H C A to undertake a broad search for anyre c o rds reflecting White House communi-cations re g a rding the assassination, includ-ing any communications to or from A i rF o rce One on the day of the assassination.The Commander of WHCA i n s t ructed hiso ffices to conduct a search for assassina-t i o n - related re c o rds. WHCA located noadditional assassination re c o rds. TheReview Board then requested that WHCAc e r t i f y, under penalty of perjury, that it hadno other re c o rds from the 1963–64 periodthat might relate to the assassination.W H C A certified that it had no re c o rds fro mthe 1963–64 time period nor any re c o rd srelating to their disposition.

The White House Communications Agencysubmitted its Final Declaration of Compli-ance dated April 22, 1998.

19. U.S. Postal Service

In 1993, the Postal Service located its originalfile on the Kennedy assassination investiga-tion composed of Postal Service investiga-tive reports re g a rding the assassination. Thefile had been located among the arc h i v e dre c o rds for the Chief Postal Inspector, andthe file was subsequently transferred to theJFK Collection. The Review Board suggestedadditional searches. The Postal Service wasdiligent in following those suggestions, butno additional assassination re c o rds wereu n c o v e re d .

20. Social Security Administration

In response to a directive in 1993 by theDepartment of Health & Human Services(HHS) regarding compliance with the JFKAct, the Social Security Administration (SSA)inventoried its holdings relating to Lee Har-vey Oswald and Jack Ruby. SSA sequesteredthe records at the Review Board’s request.These same SSA records were later acquiredby IRS and IRS deposited them in the JFKCollection, but Section 6103 of the InternalRevenue Code prevents disclosure of taxreturn records.

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In early 1997, the Review Board staff metwith SSA to verify what assassination-related re c o rds SSA might have and todetermine if any such re c o rds could be pub-licly released. The Review Board re q u e s t e dthat SSA assemble all earnings-re l a t e dre c o rds for Lee Harvey Oswald and JackR u b y, quarterly reports filed by Oswald’semployers (to verify Oswald’s employmenthistory and income), and the original fileopened for Marina Oswald’s claim for sur-vivor benefits following Lee HarveyOswald’s death.

The SSA was extremely diligent in collectingand assembling these re c o rds. The SSA p ro-tected some of these re c o rds under Section6103, but the balance were transmitted tothe JFK Collection. SSA placed its assassina-tion re c o rds that contain information pro-tected by Section 6103 in the JFK collectionw h e re they will be kept confidential byNARA. The SSA confirmed that thesere c o rds are being pre s e r v e d .

As with Oswald’s tax returns, the ReviewBoard regrets that Oswald’s earnings infor-mation and employment history, as con-tained in employer reports on file with SSA,have not been released to the public as of thedate of this Report.

21. Drug Enforcement Administration

The Drug Enforcement A d m i n i s t r a t i o n(DEA) was cooperative with the ReviewBoard in making files available for review. InMay 1998, the Review Board asked DEA toformally process certain records as assassina-tion records under the JFK Act. In addition,the Review Board asked for a formal state-ment of DEA’s compliance. However, DEAhas taken no steps to formally designateassassination records, nor has it submitted acompliance report as requested.

22. NARA and the Presidential Libraries

The Review Board worked separately withN A R A in Washington, D.C., the FederalRecords Center in Fort Worth, Texas, the FordP residential Library, the JFK Pre s i d e n t i a lLibrary, and the LBJ Presidential Library. Thecompliance status for each of these entities isset forth below.

a. NARA, Washington, D.C.

NARA has legal and physical custody ofnumerous federal government records thata re transferred to it by federal agencies.Accordingly, the JFK Act required NARA toidentify any assassination records that mayhave been in its legal custody at the time theJFK Act was passed.

After the JFK Act was passed, NARA identi-fied three major record categories in its cus-tody: (1) records of the Warren Commission;(2) the main Department of Justice CriminalDivision file on the Kennedy assassination;and (3) the main Secret Service file on theassassination. Many of the records withinthese files were already open to the publicwhen the JFK Act was passed. NARA alsoidentified administrative re c o rds for theUnited States Archivist and Deputy Archivistrelating to the handling of assassination-related materials maintained by NARA,including administrative records regardingWarren Commission holdings. In addition,NARA staff identified various federal agen-cies that had cooperated with the WarrenCommission and searched those records forassassination records.

In December 1992, the Assistant Archivistissued a directive to the staff of NARArequesting that any other assassination-related records be identified. Some miscella-neous records were included in the JFK Col-lection as a result of this search. In addition,NARA—through its Center for LegislativeArchives—processed hundreds of boxes ofCongressional records relating to the assassi-nation, including most importantly therecords of the House Select Committee onAssassinations (HSCA).

In April 1998, staffs of the Review Board andNARA met to review the status of NARA’sidentification and release of assassinationrecords. The Review Board asked NARA toconfirm that there were no other closedre c o rds relating to the assassination thatmight be among classified or closed files ofofficials of the Kennedy and Johnson Admin-istrations, including certain cabinet secre-taries. In addition, the Review Board hadasked NARA to coordinate with the Admin-istrative Office of U.S. Courts to identify andsecure for the JFK Collection court case files

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for various FOIA suits involving the public’srequest to open up CIA, FBI, and otheragency files on the Kennedy assassination.NARA has been working with the Adminis-trative Office to obtain these court files.

N A R A submitted its Final Declaration ofCompliance on September 14, 1998.

b. NARA, Southwest Region.

NARA had its Southwest regional facilityundertake searches pursuant to the JFK Act.That facility is a repository for federal agencyrecords in the Dallas, Texas area. Among therecords identified under the JFK Act by theSouthwest Region were: (1) court files fromthe federal district court in Dallas, Texas withrespect to litigation over the rifle used toassassinate President Kennedy (United Statesv. 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano Rifle and MarinaOswald Porter v. United States); (2) court filesfor the litigation brought by Claw Shawagainst Jim Garrison in federal district courtin New Orleans (Clay Shaw v. Jim Garrison);(3) files from the U.S Attorney in Dallas relat-ing to the litigation over the Oswald rifle;and (4) records of the criminal proceedingsagainst Jack Ruby, also obtained from theU.S. Attorney in Dallas.

The Southwest Region also identified withinits custody various medical equipment fromTrauma Room No. 1 at Dallas Parkland Hos-pital. This equipment was purchased fromDallas County in 1973 when Parkland Hospi-tal was being remodeled, and the equipmentwas placed in storage by NARA at its South-west Region facility. The Review Boarddeferred to NARA’s decision to retain theequipment in storage.7

In April 1998, Review Board staff met with off i-cials of the Southwest Region at its facility inFort Worth, Texas. The Review Board sought toascertain whether the Southwest Region hadlegal custody of any 1963–64 re c o rds for vari-ous law enforcement, intelligence, or militaryagencies with offices in the Dallas re g i o n ,including Secret Service, AT F, FBI, and ONI.The staff of the Southwest Region confirmedthat it had no such relevant re c o rds.

The Southwest Region of NARA submitted itsFinal Declaration of Compliance dated July10, 1998.

c. The Gerald R. Ford Library.

The Ford Library had substantial holdingsthat were relevant under the JFK Act, includ-ing files of the President’s Commission onCIA Activities within the United States (theRockefeller Commission) and papers of for-mer President Gerald R. Ford relating to hiswork on the Warren Commission. The FordLibrary first identified assassination recordsf rom among materials that were alre a d yopen to researchers, including records fromGerald Ford’s Congressional and Vice-Presi-dential papers and records of Ford Adminis-tration officials.8 As a result of these searches,the Ford Library transmitted approximatelysix cubic feet of records to the JFK Collectionin August 1993. The Ford Library alsosearched its unprocessed or closed “nationalsecurity collections.” This encompassed areview of the Rockefeller Commission files,as well as files of President Ford’s NationalSecurity Advisor and the Presidential Coun-sel to the extent the files related to intelli-gence investigations of the mid-1970s (i.e.,the Rockefeller Commission and Churc hCommittee investigations). The Ford Libraryreviewed approximately 240,000 pages frommore than 20 different closed or unprocessedcollections, and the Library selected approxi-mately 1,400 documents (11,500 pages) forp rocessing under the JFK Act. The FordLibrary worked with the Review Board tohave relevant agencies release these assassi-nation records.

The Ford Library submitted its Final Declara-tion of Compliance dated August 12, 1998.

d. The John F. Kennedy Library.

The identification ofassassination re c o rd swithin the holdings of theJFK Library presented achallenge to both theLibrary and the ReviewB o a rd in view of theextensive material re l a t-ing to, and originated by,o fficials within theKennedy administration.

After passage of the JFK Act, the JFK Librarys t a ff undertook an extensive review ofKennedy administration re c o rds, personal

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The National Archives andRecords Administration (NA R A )fully supports the acceleratedr e v i e w , d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , a n drelease of records related tothe assassination of PresidentK e n n e d y .—National Archives andRecords Administration, SenateHearings on JFK Act

papers, and oral histories in its possession. Inp a r t i c u l a r, the JFK Library reviewed itsclosed or “unprocessed” holdings to identifyassassination re c o rds. Among the re c o rd sreviewed by the JFK Library staff were Presi-dent Kennedy’s National Security files andoffice files. The Library staff also reviewedmaterial made available to investigative bod-ies in the 1970s such as the Church Commit-tee. In addition, the Review Board staff, withthe Library, reviewed the classified AttorneyGeneral file series of Robert F. Kennedy. TheJFK Library staff reviewed numerous collec-tions of records from Kennedy administra-tion officials, as well as numerous oral his-tory interviews of such officials. The Libraryprocessed many of these records as assassi-nation records.

As of March 1995, the JFK Library had trans-mitted to the JFK Collection 33,000 pages ofdocuments identified under the JFK A c t .These included papers of President Kennedy,Robert F. Kennedy, C. Douglas Dillon,T h e o d o re Sorenson, Burke Marshall, DavidB ro d e r, Chet Huntley, and Arthur Schlesinger.In addition, re c o rds from the Kennedy WhiteHouse were also transmitted. These includedre c o rds from the National Security files, theWhite House Central Subject files, and theP resident’s Office files. The Library also sentall or parts of numerous oral history inter-views to the extent that these interviewstouched upon the Kennedy assassination.Additional materials were sent later, includ-ing Teddy White’s “Camelot papers,” whichcontained notes of his interview with Jacque-line Kennedy for Life magazine, and EvelynLincoln’s re c o rds consisting of log books,daily diaries, and appointment books forP resident Kennedy. Finally, the JFK Libraryhas stated that all remaining closed Dictabeltsof President Kennedy’s telephone conversa-tions, as well as 25 hours of audio re c o rd i n g sof President Kennedy’s meetings, will bereleased this fall. The JFK Library committedto releasing all remaining audio re c o rdings ofKennedy meetings by 1999 under ExecutiveO rder 12958.

The Review Board attempted to ensure thatthe Library had reviewed and identified allrelevant records in its custody, particularlyrecords that were closed and unavailable toresearchers. The Review Board submitted tothe JFK Library, in July 1998, a detailed set of

questions re g a rding the Library’s re c o rdsearches and its work under the JFK Act. Thequestions were to be answered by Libraryofficials, under penalty of perjury, in theLibrary’s Final Declaration of Compliance.The Library submitted its Final Declarationof Compliance shortly thereafter. The JFKLibrary certified that “[a]ll records of Presi-dent Kennedy, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis,Evelyn Lincoln, and Robert F. Kennedy in thecustody of the Library have been reviewedunder the JFK Act.” The Library also statedthat further review of Robert F. Kennedy’spapers had resulted in the identification ofadditional assassination records that wouldbe processed for release. In addition, approx-imately 150 RFK documents previously iden-tified for release were still in the process ofdeclassification or review by the RFK DonorCommittee at the time of this Report.9 Whilerecognizing the extensive work of the JFKLibrary and its significant contribution to theJFK Collection, the Review Board was disap-pointed in the delay in identification andrelease of RFK papers.

The JFK Library, at its suggestion, briefed themembers of the Review Board in August1998 with respect to the work of the Libraryunder the JFK Act. At that presentation, theReview Board was given assurances by theLibrary, in the strongest terms, that it wascommitted to completing release of all assas-sination-related records, including the RFKrecords.10

The JFK Library submitted its Final Declara-tion of Compliance dated August 18, 1998.

e. The Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

The LBJ Library has extensive re c o rds thatw e re reviewed pursuant to the JFK Act. TheLibrary holds 505 collections of personalpapers, 59 bodies of federal re c o rds, and 1,227p rocessed and deeded oral history inter-views. Even before the JFK Act was passed in1992, the Library, beginning in 1980, identi-fied and made available materials that it hadrelating to the assassination of Pre s i d e n tK e n n e d y.11 In 1993, the LBJ Library transmit-ted to the JFK Collection material on theassassination from the LBJ White House Cen-tral files, White House Confidential files, andthe National Security files; the Library’s “Spe-cial File on the Assassination of Pre s i d e n t

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K e n n e d y,” which was assembled by theWhite House in late 1966 as a re f e rence file torespond to William Manchester’s book, T h eDeath of a Pre s i d e n t ; P resident Johnson’s dailydiary re c o rds listing his appointments andphone calls made during the period followingthe assassination; office files of various WhiteHouse aides; White House telephone off i c ere c o rds; personal papers of Under Secre t a r yof State George Ball, Attorney General Ram-sey Clark, and John Connally; and numero u soral history interviews. The LBJ Library alsoreleased tapes of President Johnson’s conver-sations relating to the assassination (datingmostly from 1963, 1964, and 1967—the time ofthe Garrison investigation and publication ofthe Manchester book).

In the Spring of 1997, the Review Board staffconducted a comprehensive review of LBJLibrary National Security Files (NSF), closedoral histories thought to be related to theassassination, and various manuscripts,archives and office files of key officials. Thes t a ff identified more than 300 additionalassassination re c o rds. The Review Boardcoordinated with various agencies in declas-sifying these records.

Finally, the LBJ Library committed to releas-ing tapes of all of President Johnson’sre c o rded telephone conversations thro u g hOctober 1964 by September 1998. This releasewill include six previously closed recordingsof President Johnson’s telephone conversa-tions with Jacqueline Kennedy in December1963 and January 1964. The LBJ Library willalso release additional telephone conversa-tions identified as assassination-re l a t e d ,including two involving McGeorge Bundy.The Library plans to continue release of theLBJ tapes (post-October, 1964) in chronologi-cal order, and has represented that additionalconversations relating to the assassinationwill be forwarded to the JFK Collection.

The LBJ Library submitted its Final Declara-tion of Compliance dated August 27, 1998.

23. General Services Administration

The General Services Administration (GSA)conducted no records searches under the JFKAct. The Review Board asked GSA in 1997 todetermine whether it might have recordsrelating to the assassination. This approach

was made because NARA, until 1984, wasunder the auspices of GSA. Therefore, theReview Board wanted to ensure that GSAdidnot have records relating to NARA’s han-dling of Warren Commission materials or thehandling of the JFK autopsy photos and x-rays. GSA did identify files for the top offi-cials of GSA from the 1960s but these werealready at NARA and fully available to thepublic. GSA did not transfer any records tothe JFK Collection.

GSA submitted its Final Declaration of Com-pliance dated January 26, 1998.

C. CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS

In addition to executive branch records, theReview Board worked with various congres-sional committees, and NARA, to ensure dis-c l o s u re of various congressional re c o rd srelating to the assassination. The most impor-tant record groups in this regard were therecords of the two congressional committeesthat conducted independent investigations ofP resident Kennedy’s assassination—theChurch Committee in 1975–76 and the HouseSelect Committee on Assassinations in1977–79. In addition, the Review Boardsought to ascertain whether there were rele-vant records among certain other Congres-sional Committees.

1. The House Select Committee onAssassinations (the HSCA)

The files of the HSCA embody the collec-tive work of that Committee in investigatingthe assassinations of President Kennedy andthe Reverend Martin Luther King. A f t e rissuance of the HSCA’s report in 1979, thevoluminous files of the HSCA w e re placedin storage and were to be kept under sealuntil 2029 (i . e ., fifty years from 1979).Because these were Congressional re c o rd s ,they were not subject to disclosure underthe FOIA. Oliver Stone’s film, J F K, under-s c o red the existence of these closed files andthe fact that they would not be re l e a s e duntil 2029. After passage of the JFK A c t ,N A R A made the opening of the HSCA f i l e sthe highest priorities. NARA opened the JFKassassination portion of the HSCA re c o rd safter consulating with the agencies that hadequities in the re c o rd s .

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2. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations withRespect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee)

Records of the Church Committee, like theHSCA records, were of high public interest.The Review Board made extensive efforts toe n s u re the fullest disclosure of re l e v a n trecords. The Church Committee, in 1975–76,investigated a range of issues involving theoperations of the intelligence agencies. Manyof these issues fell outside the scope of theJFK Act, but the Church Committee investi-gated the Kennedy assassination and theissue of assassination of foreign leaders.

After passage of the JFK Act, the SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)inventoried the original re c o rds of theChurch Committee (some 450 boxes) andtransmitted approximately 40 boxes of assas-sination-related records to the JFK Collection.This represented a significant effort by theCommittee, as well as by the agencies thatreviewed and declassified the re c o rd s .NARA, however, surveyed the re c o rd splaced in the Collection and concluded thattestimony directly relevant to the Kennedyassassination (and cited in the Kennedyassassination report of the Church Commit-tee) was not included in the released materi-als. For approximately two years, the SSCIdid not explain or rectify this crucial gap inthe records provided to NARA.

In 1997, the Review Board wrote to the SSCIand, again, raised the issue of identifying andprocessing testimony directly relevant to theC h u rch Committee’s investigation of theKennedy assassination, as well as testimonyre g a rding alleged CIA assassination plotsagainst foreign leaders. The SSCI was coop-erative and diligent in attempting to locateand forward the specific transcripts that hadbeen identified by the Review Board andNARA. Throughout 1997–98, the SSCI identi-fied and produced scores of micro f i l m e dcopies of the requested transcripts. This testi-mony was processed and placed into the JFKCollection. The transcripts include testimonyof FBI and CIA officials who worked on theJFK assassination investigation, as well asofficials who testified regarding the allegedassassination plots against Fidel Castro .Among the officials whose testimony was

released under the JFK Act were Secretary ofDefense Robert McNamara; Deputy Secre-tary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric; SpecialAssistant for National Security McGeorgeBundy; former Directors of Central Intelli-gence John McCone, Richard Helms, andWilliam Colby; Deputy Director of CentralIntelligence Marshall Carter; CIAofficer JohnScelso (alias); Secret Service Chief JamesRowley; Assistant FBI Director Alex Rosen;FBI Special Agent in Charge for the DallasField Office Gordon Shanklin; and FBI AgentJames Hosty.

While the SSCI had been successful in obtain-ing the microfilmed transcripts requested bythe Board, the Review Board remained con-cerned that the original hardcopy transcriptsfor this testimony, and any accompanyingmaterials, had not been located by the SSCIor otherwise accounted for. The ReviewBoard asked for access to all 450 boxes oforiginal Church Committee files. Again, SSCIwas cooperative and arranged to have theoriginal Church Committee files available forthe Board’s inspection (the originals had notpreviously been reviewed by the staffs ofNARA or the Review Board). The ReviewBoard staff inspected all the original files,and additional materials were designated asassassination re c o rds. However, the hardcopy of testimony cited in the JFK Assassina-tion Report was not among the materials.Although microfilm copies of this testimonywere available, the Review Board specificallyasked the SSCI to explain the absence of thehard copy files, particularly since they were adiscrete and significant body of records relat-ing to the Kennedy assassination. At the timeof this Report, the SSCI could not explain theabsence of these original transcripts (and per-haps accompanying materials) relating to theKennedy assassination.

3. House Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee)

In 1975, the Pike Committee investigated var-ious issues regarding the intelligence com-munity. The Pike Committee also looked intocertain discrete, limited issues regarding theassassination of President Kennedy. The PikeCommittee records have been under the cus-tody of the House Permanent Select Commit-tee on Intelligence (HPSCI). HPSCI identifiedapproximately three boxes of assassination-

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related records of the Pike Committee andhas placed them into the JFK Collection.

4. House Judiciary Subcommittee onCivil & Constitutional Rights, Chaired by Congressman DonEdwards (the Edwards Subcommittee)

In 1975 and 1976, the Edwards Subcommitteeinvestigated the FBI’s destruction of a notethat Lee Harvey Oswald delivered to the Dal-las Field Office prior to the assassination ofP resident Kennedy. The Review Board raisedwith NARA’s Center for Legislative A rc h i v e sthe issue of whether they had any originalfiles for this subcommittee. The LegislativeA rchives staff could not identify any such fileswithin its Judiciary Committee re c o rds. TheReview Board also asked the Clerk’s Office ofthe House of Representatives for assistance inlocating these re c o rds. Unfortunately, no orig-inal re c o rds for this subcommittee have beenlocated, although copies of some of thesere c o rds can be found in the HSCA Collection.

5. House Government Operation’sSubcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights,Chaired by Congresswoman BellaAbzug (the Abzug Subcommittee)

In 1975 and 1976, the Abzug Subcommitteelooked into issues relating to access to War-ren Commission records and the destructionof FBI records. It was the Review Board’sunderstanding that these records remainedclosed pursuant to House Rules. In 1996, andagain in 1997, the Review Board sought Con-gressional authorization to have any assassi-nation-related records within the Abzug Sub-committee files reviewed and released underthe JFK Act. After receiving the appropriateC o n g ressional authorization, the ReviewBoard staff inspected the original files of theAbzug Subcommittee and designated vari-ous materials for release under the JFK Act.

6. House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)

During the 1950s and 1960s, this Committeeinvestigated “un-American” activities of vari-ous individuals and groups. In the summer of1996, the staff of NARA’s Center for Legisla-tive A rchives did an initial survey of theHUAC files and identified files on Lee Harvey

Oswald, Marina Oswald, the Fair Play forCuba Committee (FPCC), and Mark Lane (aWa r ren Commission critic). Under HouseRules, investigative re c o rds of a House com-mittee may be closed for fifty years after thecommittee finishes their investigation andshuts down.

In November 1996, the Review Boardrequested that Congress make these recordsavailable for inspection by the Review Boardto confirm whether the records initially iden-tified by NARA s t a ff were assassinationrecords and should be released to the public.The Review Board received no responses andraised the matter again in 1997. In January1998, the Clerk’s Office sought permissionfrom the Judiciary Committee to open up theHUAC files for Review Board inspection. TheJudiciary Committee initially denied theBoard’s request, but upon reconsiderationultimately agreed to release substantialHUAC files relating to the JFK assassination.

7. Library of Congress

The Library of Congress did not transmit anyassassination re c o rds to the JFK Collectionafter passage of the Act. In June 1994, theLibrary of Congress responded to an inquiryby the Review Board and reported that it hadlocated no assassination-related re c o rd swithin the classified holdings in its Manu-script Division. In 1996, the Review Boardasked the Library of Congress, including theC o n g ressional Research Service, to ensure thatit had searched for any non-public re c o rds inits custody that might relate to the assassina-tion. The Library of Congress took no actionon the Review Board’s request, and the Boardmade another formal request in October 1997.The Congressional Research Service deferre dcompliance with the JFK Act pending explicitC o n g ressional authorization. Aside from CRS,h o w e v e r, the Library of Congress undertookto survey its non-public holdings to identifyre c o rds relating to the assassination. Thisentailed review of the Library’s closed re c o rd sin its Manuscript Division.

The Library of Congress filed a formal state-ment of compliance with the Review Boardand identified three sets of closed recordscontaining assassination-related materials:(1) a “duplicate and partial” set of Rocke-feller Commission records donated by Vice-

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President Rockefeller and closed until March25, 2002; (2) papers of Senator Daniel Moyni-han from his tenure as Assistant Secretary ofLabor in the Kennedy Administration; and(3) papers of Howard Liebengood, an aide toSenator Howard Baker, who did work relat-ing to the assassination for the Senate Intelli-gence Committee. The Library also identifiedrelevant collections that were pre v i o u s l yopen to the public, including papers of EarlWa r ren, David Atlee Phillips, and ElmerGertz (attorney for Jack Ruby). In addition,the Library had one piece of correspondencewritten by Lee Harvey Oswald while he wasin the Soviet Union.

Once the relevant closed materials were iden-tified, the Review Board sought the donors’permission to open the records. The ReviewBoard obtained Senator Moynihan’s agree-ment to open his papers relating to the assas-sination, and the Board has been in theprocess of obtaining Mr. Liebengood’s con-sent. The Library of Congress stated that itsRockefeller Commission records were dupli-cates of the Rockefeller Commission files atthe Ford Library. The Ford Library reviewedand processed assassination records from theRockefeller Commission under the JFK Act.The Review Board has requested the Libraryof Congress to ascertain whether its set of theRockefeller Commission papers contains anyassassination-related materials that have notbeen released by the Ford Library.

In the Summer of 1998, the Congre s s i o n a lR e s e a rch Service (CRS) identified one box ofmemoranda relating to the assassination thatw e re pre p a red by CRS for the HSCA and otherentities. Having received appropriate Congre s-sional authorization, CRS has agreed to for-w a rd these materials to the JFK Collection.

8. Other Congressional Records

The NARA and Review Board staffs alsoexamined certain other Congre s s i o n a lrecords to identify any materials that mightbe considered “assassination-related” underthe JFK Act.

The Review Board was given appropriateCongressional authorization to inspect filesof the Senate Select Committee on ImproperActivities in the Labor or Management Field(the Mclellan Committee). This committee

investigated labor practices in the late 1950s;then Senator John Kennedy was a member ofthe committee and Robert F. Kennedy wasChief Counsel. The records of the committeeinclude information on organized crime fig-ures. It was determined that the records ofthe committee did not qualify as assassina-tion records under the JFK Act.

The Review Board surveyed the indices to1949–51 records of the Senate Special Com-mittee to investigate Organized Crime inInterstate Commerce (the Kefauver Commit-tee). Given the remoteness in time from theevents of the assassination, no records of theKefauver Committee were designated asassassination re c o rds. More o v e r, Congre s shas authorized NARA to open these recordsin 2001.

The Review Board and NARA i d e n t i f i e dcertain re c o rds of the Senate Judiciary’s Sen-ate Internal Security Subcommittee (theEastland Committee) for review under theJFK Act. Thirteen transcripts of executivesession testimony were subsequently identi-fied for release under the JFK Act. Thesew e re processed by the Center for LegislativeA rchives and transmitted to the JFK Collec-tion. The re c o rds included 1961 testimony ofEdwin Walker and December 1963 testi-mony of Ruth Paine. In addition, the Centerfor Legislative A rchives transmitted to theJFK Collection three boxes of press clippingsre g a rding Lee Harvey Oswald and thea s s a s s i n a t i o n .

D. CONCLUSION

Generally, government offices attempted tos e a rch for and release their assassinationrecords in compliance with the JFK Act. Mostimportantly, this was the case with the majoragencies, such as the FBI, CIA, Department ofState, Department of Justice, Secret Service,NARA, and the Presidential Libraries, thatwould be expected to have core materialsrelating to the assassination. In some cases,particular agencies conducted searches afterthe Review Board notified them of theirobligations.

By initiating a compliance program, theBoard decided to require the relevant agen-cies to affirmatively document their workunder the JFK Act, including certification

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that they had conducted diligent searches forassassination records. The individual offi-cials who represented the agencies were pro-fessional and cooperative in meeting the sub-stantive and procedural requirements of theBoard’s compliance program.

With some limited exceptions, almost all ofthe federal entities this chapter discusseshave explained and certified, under penaltyof perjury, their efforts to locate and releaseall relevant records on the assassination ofP resident Kennedy. The Board anticipatesthat these statements, under oath, willenhance the public’s confidence that theUnited States government, in good faith,attempted to release all re c o rds on theKennedy assassination.

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CHAPTER 8ENDNOTES

1 House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law,Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearings on H.J. 454, 102 Cong., 2d sess., 1992.(Opening statement by Committee Chairman John Conyers, Jr.

2 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2)(a)(3).

3 Many of the descriptions of agency’s efforts to comply with the JFK Act were obtainedfrom the initial or final certifications that the agencies submitted to the Review Board.

4 At its peak in 1994, the FBI’s JFK Task Force had more than 90 employees working onassassination records processing.

5 In the spring of 1997, Marina Oswald provided limited consent to the IRS to release LeeHarvey Oswald’s tax returns to researchers Ray and Mary La Fontaine. Marina Oswalddeclared her intent to have the La Fontaines release these returns to the public, but to ourknowledge they have not done so. Absent Marina Oswald’s consent, the IRS is legally oblig-ated under Section 6103 to withhold the Oswald tax returns from public disclosure.

6 Copies of these ONI re c o rds were also located in the files of the HSCA, and they werereleased along with the other HSCA f i l e s .

7 In addition to records identified by the Southwest Region of NARA, the SoutheastRegion had identified some papers of Senator Richard Russell relating to his work on theWarren Commission. (NARA had been providing courtesy storage for these papers on behalfof the University of Georgia.)

8 Among the Ford papers transmitted to the JFK Collection were excerpts of interviewswith President Ford conducted by Trevor Armbrister in connection with the writing of Ford’smemoirs, A Time to Heal.

9 The Robert F. Kennedy Donor Committee controls access to all RFK papers under a Deedof Gift agreement with the JFK Library.

10 In addition, the JFK Library is releasing the RFK and other papers pursuant to the declas-sification requirements of Executive Order 12958.

11 These materials were identified in a detailed index entitled, “Guide to Materials from theJohnson Library Pertaining to the Assassination of John F. Kennedy.”

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The Final Report of the A s s a s s i n a t i o nRecords Review Board provides not only anopportunity to detail the extraord i n a r ybreadth and depth of the Board’s work toidentify and release the records of the tragicdeath of President John F. Kennedy, but alsoto reflect on the Board’s shared experience incarrying out this mission and the meaning ofits efforts for the much larger challenge ofsecrecy and accountability in the federal gov-ernment. It is true that the Board’s role was toa large extent disciplined and tightly focusedon the assassination, its aftermath and theb roader Cold War context in which theevents occurred.

Any evaluation, however, of the uniqueexperience of the Review Board–five privatecitizens granted unprecedented powers torequire public release of long-secret federalrecords–inevitably presents the larger ques-tion of how the Board’s work can be appliedto federal records policy. There is no doubtthat for decades the pendulum had swungsharply toward secrecy and away from open-ness. Changes wrought by the end of theCold War and the public’s desire to knowhave begun to shift the balance. The ReviewBoard’s mandate represented a new frontierin this changing balance—an entirely newdeclassification process applied to the most-sought after government secrets. In thischapter, the Board steps back and reflects onits experiences, raises issues that will helpframe the declassification debate, and makesrecommendations on the lessons to belearned from the path taken to release of theKennedy assassination collection. The dia-logue about how best to balance nationalsecurity and privacy with openness andaccountability will continue both within gov-ernment and beyond. The Review Board willnecessarily be part of that important debate.The Review Board was created out of thebroad public frustration that the federal gov-

ernment was hiding important informationabout the Kennedy assassination by placingits records beyond the reach of its citizens.Broad disagreement with the Warren Com-mission findings, explosive claims in thepopular movie JFK, and continued deteriora-tion of public confidence in government ledto consensus that it was time to open thefiles. Thus the debate in Congress largelybecame a debate over what mechanismscould constitutionally compel the opening ofthe assassination files.

The Review Board’s mandate was not toinvestigate once again the assassination, butto release as many of these heavily restricteddocuments as possible. Lawmakers com-mented that the efforts of the Review Board“will stand as a symbol and barometer ofpublic confidence in the review and releaseof the government records related to theassassination of President Kennedy....Severalprovisions of [the JFK Act] are intended toprovide as much independence and account-ability as is possible within our Constitu-tional framework.” Restoring public confi-dence in government is a difficult task underany circumstances. The Review Board tookthis responsibility seriously, however, and setout in April 1994 to create the most completerecord possible of the documentary evidenceof the assassination so that in the end theAmerican public could draw its own conclu-sions as to what happened and why on thatfateful day in Dallas in November 1963.

F rom the start, the Review Board did as muchof its work in public as it could possibly do,given the classified material with which itworked. The Board’s major policy decisionsw e re all made after carefully consulting withthe public through public hearings and F e d -eral Register notices. Many of the Board ’ srequests to agencies for additional informa-tion were suggested by the Board’s continu-

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RE V I E W BO A R D RE C O M M E N D AT I O N S

ing dialogue with re s e a rchers, authors, andexperts. Frequent public hearings outside ofWashington, experts conferences, ongoingpublic releases of the re c o rds, witness inter-views, and media availability were amongthe many tools the Board used to reach outand communicate with a public stro n g l yi n t e rested in the results of the Board’s work.The result was that the Board was helpedimmeasurably not only by the advice andsuggestions that resulted from this public dia-logue, but by the re c o rds that were discov-e red and opened through the communica-tions. The broad definition of “assassinationre c o rd” and the foundation for the taking ofthe original Zapruder film were developedt h rough public hearings. Furthermore, someof the Board’s most significant acquisitions ofdonated collections—for example, the Rankinpapers, the Wegmann papers, and the Garri-son grand jury transcripts—were the result ofthe public hearings.

Public involvement in the Review Board ’ swork was critical to the success of the Board ,both because public participation was impor-tant for public confidence and because publicinvolvement produced results. The assassina-tion re s e a rch community, in particular, pro-vided many useful suggestions to the Board ,but more importantly perhaps, monitored theB o a rd’s work closely and did not permit theB o a rd to back off in its search for re c o rd s .

The Review Board began its work at a slowpace, which was necessary for a group of fiveprivate citizens with no prior involvementwith the issue. Preparation to weigh theimportant competing interests of nationalsecurity and privacy with the public interesttook time. Education of the Board and theequally important development of tru s tamong the Board, its staff, and agencyreviewers takes time, and future declassifica-tion efforts need to take that into account.What developed from the early extensive dis-cussions between the Board, its staff and theagency reviewers were thoughtful and well-reasoned decisions that reflected the Board’scommitment to the legislation as well as theBoard’s collective interest in developing thefullest possible historical record surroundingthis tragic event.

The precedents that developed from theBoard’s early deliberations guided the staff

in its review of the re c o rds and guidedagency reviewers in the positions they tooktoward postponement requests. The devel-opment of this unique and valuable set ofdecisions, which came to be known as theBoard’s “common law,” eventually resultedin thousands of “consent releases,” in whichdocuments moved directly from the agencieswithout redactions to NARA.

There were, of course, many substantive dis-agreements between the Board and the agen-cies, but the course of the relationships werecharacterized chiefly by growing mutualunderstanding and markedly impro v e dcommunications. The Board was gratified tosee agency reviewers and decisionmakersgrow increasingly aware that the responsiblerelease of information can provide an oppor-tunity to create a more complete record of theextensive work that many agencies did onthe issues raised by the assassination. Manyappeared also to gain a greater appreciationof the tremendous costs of secrecy, both interms of public confidence and maintenanceof records.

There were critics of the Review Board, thosewho believed that the “targeted declassifica-tion” of assassination records not only inter-fered with the goal of systematic declassifica-tion directed by Executive Order 12958, butwas also much too expensive. It is difficult, ofcourse, to compare one method of declassifi-cation with another, harder still to place aprice tag on the nature of the informationthat is now released and available to theAmerican public. It is worth noting that theKennedy assassination records were largelysegregated due to the use of the records dur-ing the many prior government investiga-tions of the assassination. But, the ReviewBoard does recognize that any meaningfulapproach to declassification will of necessitybe multi-faceted, with diff e rent methodsadopted for different circumstances. The par-ticular circumstances of the assassination ofPresident Kennedy and the highly secretivegovernmental response have had an enor-mous impact on public confidence and madethe Review Board approach singularlyappropriate. When viewed in that light thecost of this four-year project seems entirelya p p ropriate, particularly when compare dwith the significant costs, both financial andotherwise, of keeping the record secret. The

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Board is confident that, in this setting, theapproach chosen by the Congress to open theKennedy assassination records was a highlyeffective one.

The Review Board is certainly aware thatt h e re are a great many unresolved issues re l a t-ing to the assassination of President Kennedythat will be addressed in the years to come.The massive public collection of documentsthat awaits the re s e a rchers will undoubtedlyshed light not only on the assassination, buton its broader context as an episode of theCold Wa r. The community of professional his-torians, who initially exhibited comparativelyslight interest in the Board’s work, has begunpaying attention with the new accessibility ofre c o rds that reflect the Cold War context inwhich the assassination was enmeshed. Ulti-m a t e l y, it will be years before the JFK Collec-tion at NARA can be judged pro p e r l y. The testwill be in the scholarship that is generated byhistorians and other re s e a rchers who studythe extensive documentation of the event andits aftermath. Does the historical re c o rdformed by the Board inspire confidence thatthe re c o rd is now reasonably complete? Wi l lthe documents released under the JFK A c tlead to still other materials? Will the mass ofdocumentary evidence answer the questionsposed by historians and others? Will theB o a rd’s compliance program inspire confi-dence that the agencies have produced all therelevant documentation that exists today inagency files? What do the re c o rds tell us aboutthe 1960s and the Cold War context of thea s s a s s i n a t i o n ?

The Review Board approach, the pre c e d e n tc reated, the tools identified, and the lessonslearned will assist future re s e a rchers immea-s u r a b l y. Agency reviewers will note that theRepublic has not collapsed under the weightof threats to national security because ofReview Board actions and, perhaps, they willalso note that openness is itself a good thingand that careful scrutiny of governmentactions can strengthen agencies and thep rocess of government, not weaken it. Therelikely will be problems in the future that bestlend themselves to the extraordinary attentionthat a similarly empowered Review Board canfocus. Formation of a historical re c o rd that canaugment understanding of important eventsis central not only to openness and account-a b i l i t y, but to democracy itself.

At an early stage in the Review Board’se fforts, one of the Board members com-mented that the Board should strive toaccomplish as much as it could, to be remem-bered for what it attempted. Or, to para-phrase Robert Kennedy, the Board shouldwork hard to ensure that its reach continuallyexceeded its grasp. The Board did not alwaysachieve that standard, but the sheer scopeand accessibility of the JFK Collection speakseloquently about the effort. The Board hasleft to posterity a historical bequest that isinvaluable and unprecedented.

Recommendations

The Review Board presents recommenda-tions that reflect the Board’s experience andprovides guidance for those who wish tocapitalize on that experience to furtherreform the process of classification anddeclassification of federal documents. TheBoard recognizes that the JFK Act representsbut one approach to declassification, onewhose activity was designed to review sensi-tive records concerning a controversial event.

1. The Review Board recommends that futuredeclassification boards be genuinely independent,both in the structure of the organization and inthe qualifications of the appointments.

The Review Board’s independence wasg rounded in the concept that the Board wasin fact an independent agency in the execu-tive branch with powers granted through itsenabling legislation. This independence wasconsequently as political as it was legal, facil-itating the Board’s relations with the agencies.

Although appointed by the President, mem-bers of the Review Board could not be termi-nated except for just cause. By not submittingthe Review Board to the supervisory authorityof the executive branch, providing an inde-pendent staff who answered only to theB o a rd, and establishing strong statutory stan-d a rds governing the review of re c o rds, the JFKAct provided political and legal balance forthe conflict with agencies. This balance wasabsolutely necessary for the Board to stand upto experts and their national security claims.

Furthermore, the independent qualificationsof Board members is likewise important. Agroup of five outsiders, uninvolved in previ-

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ous investigations or research concerning theassassination, but trained in historical,archival, and legal issues that are central tothe records of the assassination, the Boardcollectively brought a perspective framed byp rofessional training and experience. Theabsence of any connection or allegiance to theagencies freed the Board to make truly inde-pendent decisions. The Review Boardabsolutely needed its independence in orderto accomplish its statutory mandate. For anyg roup charged with declassifying secre tre c o rds, independence is an essentialattribute.

2. The Review Board recommends that anyserious, sustained effort to declassify re c o r d srequires congressional legislation with (a) a pre -sumption of openness, (2) clear standards ofaccess, (3) an enforceable review and appealsprocess, and (4) a budget appropriate to the scopeof the task.

The JFK Act established admirable and effec-tive standards through its standards of “pre-sumption of disclosure” for releasing recordsand “clear and convincing evidence of harm”in restricting them. Both standards helpfullyguided the Board in its decisionmaking, wereunderstandable and simple in application.The Board strongly urges that these stan-dards be applied to other efforts to declassifyfederal records. The discerning enumerationin the Act of criteria for sustaining restrictedaccess created an obligation both for theReview Board and the agencies to applythese criteria to the many issues presented inthe documents. These criteria for sustainingrestrictions, especially that of “clear and con-vincing evidence of harm,” provide a veryimportant focus and disciplined way ofthinking about federal records and the infor-mation they often contain.

The central fact that the access standards wereembodied in Congressional legislation was ofimmeasurable assistance to the Review Board .Although Congress’ inclusion of such stan-d a rds in the JFK Act nearly sparked a constitu-tional battle over the Act’s legality, the powerof independence by Congressional mandates u rely muted a fair number of agency dis-putes. Standards set through agency re c o m-mendations and presidential inclusion in anexecutive order would have limited theB o a rd’s ability to compel disclosure .

Other powers conferred on the Board by theJFK Act were similarly central to the exerciseof the Board’s duties. The agencies couldchallenge Board decisions only by appealingdecisions to the President, who has the “non-delegable” responsibility to decide them.This stringent provision raised our declassifi-cation activity to a threshold level thatprompted the agencies to weigh the ramifica-tions of any appeal that expended valuablepolitical capital.

The access standards have been a central con-sideration in guiding the work of the Board,never far from any discussion or decision.Their importance cannot be overlooked, andthe pervading influence of the standards wasconsistently reflected in our deliberations. Inbalancing the public interest and harm of dis-closure, the Board determined that the pre-cept of a “presumption of disclosure” pre-vailed in every case where there was salientinformation relative to the assassination.

The Board’s relationship with the agenciesoften faltered over the “clear and convincingevidence of harm” standard. This exactingstandard, borrowed from the criminal law,was not only a new declassification criterion,but it placed the burden on the agency toexplain why information should re m a i nshrouded in secrecy. This occasioned conflictand misunderstanding, especially as theagencies complained that satisfying the testrequired unwarranted expenditure of scarcefunds. The Board, however, insisted onadherence to the legislative provisions, andthe agencies ultimately learned, for the mostpart, how to satisfy the Board’s expectations.As interpreted by the Review Board, “clearand convincing evidence of harm” requiredspecific reasons for protection. General con-cepts of “national security” and “individualprivacy” were insufficient. If harm were to becaused by release, the Board insisted onunderstanding the harm. Thus, the specificstandard resulted in greater fidelity to thelaw and more accurate decisionmaking bythe Review Board.

Moreover, the Congress provided adequateand sufficient funds for the Board to hire staffto undertake its work. The Board was fortu-nate to recruit talented and dedicated col-leagues who worked closely with the Boardto fulfill its important mission. The Review

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Board’s accomplishment is, in a direct way,that of the staff, and the Board is indebted tothem. Other federal declassification efforts,especially at NARA, need substantially moreresources if they are successfully to accom-plish their mandates. The work of the ReviewBoard staff shows what adequate fundingcan achieve.

3. The Review Board recommends that its“common law” of decision, formed in the contextof a “presumption of disclosure” and the “clearand convincing evidence of harm” criteria, be uti -lized for similar information in future declassifi -cation efforts as a way to simplify and speed upreleases.

The Review Board’s understanding of theimportant standards of a “presumption ofdisclosure” in the release of documents and“clear and convincing evidence of harm” insustaining restricted access and its applica-tion of the more specific section 6 standardsdeveloped slowly as the Board applied thelaw to the many postponement issues raisedin the documents.

In time, the body of decisionmaking began tog ro w, and with it what was termed theBoard’s “common law,” a collection of deci-sions that greatly informed staff and agencyreviewers how to apply the JFK Act andsaved an enormous amount of time by han-dling similar information in similar ways.

Many documents share common characteris-tics. The names of agents and informants,crypts, digraphs, the location of CIA installa-tions abroad, and other numerical data usedto identify documents, recurred constantly inthe documents examined by the ReviewBoard and helped form the Review Board“common law” about how to treat redactedinformation in federal documents.

As the effort to declassify federal documentspresses forward on other fronts, the ReviewBoard believes that there are common waysof handling these categories of information,so that similar substitute language may beprovided, and there might also be consensusconcerning how long the information needsto be restricted. Handling restricted docu-ments by adopting common substitute lan-guage as appropriate will also enhance theefficiency of the review, lowering unit costs

for processing documents.

Codification of these rules of applicationwould permit restricted access to some ofthis information, and yet still indicate toresearchers and other citizens what kind ofidentifying information had been withheldand for how long. The idea of substitute lan-guage for critical pieces of redacted informa-tion, together with less sweeping and morediscerning application of what is to be with-held, offers a promising way of limiting thevolume of restricted information in federaldocuments, either through more uniformand limited classification rules or throughearlier and more declassification.

4. The Review Board recommends that futuredeclassification efforts avoid the major shortcom -ings of the JFK Act: (a) unreasonable time limits,(b) employee restrictions, (c) application of thelaw after the Board terminates, and (d) problemsinherent with rapid sunset provisions.

If the JFK Act represented a milestone inarticulating important new principles bywhich to review classified records, there werealso shortcomings in the law that should beavoided in future declassification eff o r t s .They include:

• the timetable laid out for the Review Boardto accomplish its work was unrealistic andre q u i red the Board to play “catch up” from thebeginning and re q u i red agencies to duplicatetheir work after the Board began its work;

• the provision that the Board could not hirestaff who were currently working anywherein the government seemed unduly restric-tive, and obliged the Board to undertakecostly and time-consuming security checksfor most employees, for whom security clear-ances were central to their work with classi-fied documents;

• the Review Board sunsets but the JFK Actdoes not and, as a result, there is uncertaintyabout the status of openings that will occurafter September 1998, and whether any fur-ther appeals by agencies might be permitted,and, if so, who would represent the interestof openness;

• the sunset provision in the JFK Act, whileembodying the important concept that this

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e ffort was not to be permanent, nonethelessundermined the careful review and disposi-tion of the re c o rds. The Board inevitably lostcritical staff in the final stages because theyhad to seek job security for themselves andtheir families. More o v e r, the sunset enabledgovernment agencies that were not inclinedto cooperate to simply try to outlast theB o a rd. A m o re open-ended provision wouldbe preferable, in which the Board, supervisedby its congressional oversight committee andthe Office of Management and Budget, wouldd e c l a re its pro g ress, but not set a terminationdate until there was agreement concerningthe successful completion of the mandate.

5. The Review Board recommends that thecumbersome, time-consuming, and expensiveproblem of referrals for “third party equities”(classified information of one agency appearing ina document of another) be streamlined by (A)requiring re p resentatives of all agencies withinterests in selected groups of records to meet forjoint declassification sessions, or (B) devisinguniform substitute language to deal with certaincategories of recurring sensitive equities.

The practice of extensive classification ofgovernment documents has created a jungleof secrecy in which agencies are protective ofone another ’s pre rogatives, meticulouslyreferring records to the originating agency inall cases. The frequency of this occurrencehas had a substantial impact on the rate andpace of release of such information. It is notsurprising that sensitive information iss h a red extensively, especially among lawenforcement and intelligence agencies. Oneconsequence of this sharing is that oneagency’s restricted information is oftenfound in another’s files. When this occurs,the agency creating the information mustagree to its release by another agency. Suchequities are expensive to search and release.

The Review Board developed an effectivemeans of mitigating these cumbersome refer-rals by convening on occasion representa-tives of agencies with interests in the docu-ments so that a group of documents could becollectively declassified at once, with repre-sentatives there to sign off on the specificinterests associated with each agency. A sec-ond means of easing this problem is todevelop a uniform means of dealing withcertain recurring categories of sensitive infor-

mation. One such way would be to useagreed-upon substitute language to avoidthe originating agency referral.

6. The Review Board recommends that a com -pliance program be used in future declassificationefforts as an effective means of eliciting full coop -eration in the search for records.

The Review Board compliance program wasestablished to ensure that all federal agenciesholding assassination records would warrantunder oath that every reasonable effort hadbeen made to identify assassination recordsand that such records had been made fullyavailable for review by the Board. The Boardhas remained concerned that critical recordsmay have been withheld from the Board’sscrutiny and that the Board did not secure allthat was “out there.” It is all too easy to imag-ine that agencies and agency personnel notinclined to cooperate might simply havewaited, using the JFK Act’s sunset provisionby waiting for it to take effect and ending theneed to cooperate.

The Review Board’s solution to this concernwas to develop a compliance program inwhich each agency designated a “compli-ance officer” to warrant, under oath andpenalty of perjury, that re c o rds had beendiligently searched for and turned over tothe Board for review and/or release toNARA. This program entails a detailedreview (overseen by Review Board staff) ofthe effort undertaken by each agency in pur-suit of such re c o rds and constitutes a re c o rdto guide future re s e a rchers in examiningwhat assassination re c o rds were actuallyu n c o v e red. The program is also intended tobe forward-looking, so that the agencies willcontinue to follow the provisions of the JFKAct after the Board terminates its role. Thep rogram has worked well.

7. The Review Board recommends the followingto ensure that NARA can exercise the provisions ofthe JFK Act after the Review Board terminates:

a. that NARA has the authority and meansto continue to implement Board decisions,

b. that an appeals procedure be developedthat places the burden for preventing access onthe agencies, and

c. that a joint oversight group composed ofre p resentatives of the four organizations that origi -

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nally nominated individuals to serve on the ReviewBoard be created to facilitate the continuing execu -tion of the access provisions of the JFK Act.

The creation of the JFK Collection at NARAestablished a large records collection under-going intense use by researchers. Having cre-ated this national research resource, Con-gress should ensure that NARA receives theadditional re s o u rces necessary to managethis collection responsibly, and that it is alsobe given the authority to administer theremaining provisions of the JFK Act.

The Board recommends negotiation of amemorandum of understanding amongNARA, the FBI, and the CIA that wouldestablish a common agreement on how toresolve the inevitable issues concerning theextensive assassination records of these twoagencies. This is particularly necessary sinceadditional records will be sent to NARA andadditional releases of documents are sched-uled to take place after the termination of theReview Board.

The formation of a liaison group composedof individuals from professional organiza-tions that originally nominated members forthe Review Board to oversee implementationof the provisions of the JFK Act would ensurethe continuing representation of the publicinterest by those trained to understand con-tinuing historical, archival, and legal issues.

8. The Review Board recommends that theReview Board model be adopted and appliedwhenever there are extraordinary circumstancesin which continuing controversy concerning gov -ernment actions has been most acute and wherean aggressive effort to release all “reasonablyrelated” federal records would serve usefully toenhance historical understanding of the event.

The public stake is clear in creating a mecha-nism such as the Review Board to informAmerican citizens of the details of some ofthe most controversial events in Americanhistory. Moreover, the release of documentsenables citizens to form their own views ofevents, to evaluate the actions of elected andappointed officials, and to hold them toaccount. There will not be a large number ofsuch events, but there must be proceduresgrounded in experience that might be used touncover the truth when these events, tragic

as most of them are, occur. The provisions ofthe JFK Act have fostered the release of suchdocuments, and the Board’s experiencedemonstrates that similar legislation wouldbe successful in the future.

9. The Review Board recommends that both theFreedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Execu -tive Order 12958 be strengthened, the former tonarrow the categories of information automati -cally excluded from disclosure, the latter to add“independent oversight” to the process of“review” when agency heads decide that recordsin their units should be excluded from release.

Despite the sound public policy goalsencompassed in both the FOIA and Execu-tive Order 12958, both of these measures fallshort of their goal of access, as evidenced bythe inability of re s e a rchers to use these mea-s u res to obtain access to assassinationre c o rds. The categories of exclusion are fartoo broad in the FOIA to constitute a mean-ingful program of opening restricted federalre c o rds, and the succession of executiveo rders issued since the FOIA was enactedreflects the same problem. The most re c e n t ,Executive Order 12958, also fails by not cre-ating for federal agencies an “oversight”p ro c e d u re to ensure that the decisions con-cerning access to agency re c o rds made bythat agency’s head will be independentlyreviewed. The mandate to release should beinternalized in the agencies and penalties fors e c recy must rival in consequence those forunauthorized re l e a s e .

The mandate of the Review Board, under-s c o red by powers conferred in the JFK A c tand further aided by an adequate appro p r i a-tion, far exceeds what the FOIA and executiveo rders can accomplish because the ReviewB o a rd has the authority and re s o u rces to bothreview and release. Proponents of the FOIAand executive order declassification wouldbenefit from consulting the JFK Act to iden-tify how best to augment the re s o u rces andauthority of those measure s .

10. The Review Board recommends the adoptionof a federal classification policy that substantially:

a. limits the number of those in governmentwho can actually classify federal documents,

b. re s t r i c t s the number of categories bywhich documents might be classified,

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c. reduces the time period for which the doc -ument(s) might be classified,

d. encourages the use of substitute languageto immediately open material which might other -wise be classified, and

e. increases the resources available to theagencies and NARA for declassifying federalrecords.

The Review Board’s experience leaves littledoubt that the federal government need-lessly and wastefully classified and thenwithheld from public access countlessimportant re c o rds that did not re q u i re sucht reatment. Consequently, there is little doubtthat an aggressive policy is necessary toa d d ress the significant problems of lack ofaccountability and an uninformed citizenrythat are created by the current practice ofexcessive classification and obstacles toreleasing such information. This need is notsomething recently identified, although theMoynihan Commission on Secrecy in Gov-

ernment is a recent expression of this long-standing concern. Change is long overd u eand the Review Board’s experience amplydemonstrates the value of sharing importantinformation with the American public. It is amatter of tru s t .

The Review Board’s recommendations aredesigned to help ensure that the comprehen-sive documentary record of the Kennedyassassination is both actively developed afterthe Board terminates, and that the experienceof the Review Board be turned to the largerpurpose of addressing the negative conse-quences of the excessive classification of fed-eral records. The Review Board’s effort toaccomplish the purposes of the JFK Act hasbeen focused and aggressive. It will be forothers, of course, to judge the Board’s successin achieving these goals, but there can be nodoubt about our commitment to making theJFK Act and an independent Review Board amodel for the future.

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“The President, by and with the advice and con-sent of the Senate, shall appoint, without re g a rdto political affiliation, five citizens to serve asmembers of the Review Board to ensure andfacilitate the re v i e w, transmission to theA rchivist, and public disclosure of Governmentre c o rds related to the assassination of Pre s i d e n tJohn F. Kennedy.” JFK Act at § 7 (b)(1).

Although the Review Board members werePresidential appointees, the JFK Act recom-mended that the President select the Boardmembers from lists of names submitted tothe President by four professional associa-tions—the American Historical Association,the Organization of American Historians, theSociety of American A rchivists, and theAmerican Bar Association. The ReviewBoard’s biographies follow.

The Honorable John R. Tu n-h e i m . The American BarAssociation re c o m m e n d e dJohn R. Tunheim to theP resident. Judge Tu n h e i mis currently a United StatesDistrict Court Judge in theDistrict of Minnesota, and,at the time of his nomina-tion, was Chief Deputy

Attorney General of the state of Minnesota.Judge Tunheim worked in the Office of theAttorney General for 11 years as the SolicitorGeneral before his appointment as ChiefD e p u t y. Earlier, he practiced law privately andserved as Staff Assistant to U.S. Senator HubertH. Humphre y. He received his J.D. from theUniversity of Minnesota Law School, and hisB.A. from Concordia College in Moorh e a d ,Minnesota. The Review Board members electedJudge Tunheim to Chair the Review Board .

Henry F. Graff. Henry F.Graff was recommendedto President Clinton bythe White House staff. Heis Professor Emeritus ofHistory at Columbia Uni-v e r s i t y, where he heldrank as Instructor to FullProfessor from 1946-1991.He served as the Chair-

man of the History Department fro m1961–1964. In the 1960s he served on theNational Historical Publications Commis-sion, having been appointed by Pre s i d e n tLyndon B. Johnson. Dr. Graff was also aSenior Fellow of the Freedom Forum MediaStudies Center from 1991-1992. He re c e i v e dhis M.A. and his Ph.D. from Columbia Uni-v e r s i t y, and his B.S.S. from City College,New York.

Kermit L. Hall. The Orga-nization of American His-torians nominated KermitL. Hall, Executive Dean ofthe Colleges of the Artsand Sciences, Dean of theCollege of Humanities,and Professor of Historyand Law at The OhioState University. D e a n

Hall was appointed by Chief JusticeWilliam Rehnquist to the Historical A d v i-sory Board of the Federal Judicial Centerand is a director of the American Society forLegal History. Dean Hall received his Ph.D.f rom the University of Minnesota, a Masterof Study of Law from Yale University LawSchool, received his M.A. from SyracuseU n i v e r s i t y, and his B.A. from The Univer-sity of A k ro n .

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APPENDIX ATH E ME M B E R S O F T H E


William L. Jo y c e . The Soci-ety of American A rc h i v i s t srecommended William L.Joyce to the President. Dr.Joyce is currently the A s s o-c i a t e University Librarianfor Rare Books and SpecialCollections at PrincetonUniversity. Joyce previ-ously served as A s s i s t a n t

D i rector for Rare Books and Manuscripts at theNew York Public Library. Dr. Joyce has alsoheld positions at the American A n t i q u a r i a nS o c i e t y, initially as the Curator of Manuscripts,and later as the Education Off i c e r. He re c e i v e dhis Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, hisM.A. from St. John’s University, and his B.A.f rom Providence College.

Anna Kasten Nelson. T h eAmerican Historical A s s o-ciation recommended tothe President Anna K.Nelson, the DistinguishedAdjunct Historian in Resi-dence at the A m e r i c a nU n i v e r s i t y. Dr. Nelson hasbeen a professor of fore i g nrelations at the A m e r i c a n

University since 1986. In 1975, she served onthe staff of the Public Documents Commis-sion. Dr. Nelson previously served as theD i rector of the Committee on the Records ofGovernment and a member of the HistoricalAdvisory Committee of the State Department.She was a Distinguished Visiting Professor atArizona State University in 1992. She re c e i v e dher Ph.D. from George Washington Univer-s i t y, and both her M.A. and B.A. from the Uni-versity of Oklahoma.

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“ A person appointed to the staff shall be a pri-vate citizen of integrity and impartiality whois not a present employee of any branch of theGovernment and who has had no pre v i o u sinvolvement with any official investigation orinquiry relating to the assassination of Pre s i-dent John F. Kennedy” JFK Act, § 8 (b)(2).

Executive Directors. The JFK Act charged theReview Board’s Executive Director with theduties of overseeing all of the work of theReview Board, including overseeing thereview and declassification process, andserving as a liaison between the ReviewBoard and federal agencies.

David G. Marwell. David G. Marwell servedas Executive Director from August 1994 toOctober 1997, the Review Board’s originallyscheduled sunset date. Dr. Marwell previ-ously served as Director of the Berlin Docu-ment Center. He has also served as the Chiefof Investigative Research in the Office of Spe-cial Investigations at the Department of Jus-tice. Dr. Marwell received his Ph.D. from theState University of New York at Binghamtonand his B.A. from Brandeis University.

T. Jeremy Gunn. In October 1997, the ReviewBoard members appointed T. Jeremy Gunn asExecutive Director. Dr. Gunn also served theReview Board as its Associate Director forResearch and Analysis from November 1994until October 1997, and as General Counselfrom January 1996 until July 1998.1 Dr. Gunncame to the Review Board from the Washing-ton, D.C. law firm of Covington and Burling.He received his J.D. from Boston Universityand his Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Laura A.Denk. In July 1998, the Review Boardmembers asked Laura Denk, the ReviewBoard’s Chief Analyst for FBI Records, toserve as Executive Director during the finalmonths of the Board’s work. Ms. Denkreceived her J.D. from the University ofKansas and her B.A. from The College ofWilliam and Mary.

Senior Staff. The Review Board’s Senior Staffconsisted of the Deputy Director, the GeneralCounsel, and the Associate Directors. Asidefrom performing their specific job duties, theReview Board’s Senior Staff acted as a teamto recommend Review Board policy andassist the Executive Director in carrying outhis or her duties.

Thomas E. S a m o l u k p reviously served as theReview Board’s Deputy Dire c t o r. Mr.Samoluk, who was an Assistant A t t o r n e yGeneral and Director of Communications inthe Massachusetts Attorney General’s off i c ealso served as the Review Board’s A s s o c i a t eD i rector for Communications. He re c e i v e dhis J.D. from Suffolk University Law Schooland his B.A. from the University of Massa-chusetts at A m h e r s t .

Tracy J. Shycoff. Tracy J. Shycoff served theReview Board as Associate Director forAdministration from October 1994 until July1998, when the Review Board asked her toserve as Deputy Director during the finalmonths of the Board’s work. Ms. Shycoff pre-viously served as the Associate Director forAdministration at the National Commissionon AIDS. She attended Southern MethodistUniversity.

Ronald G. Haron. Ronald Haron served as theReview Board’s General Counsel during July,August, and September of 1998. Mr. Haronhad previously served the Review Board as

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APPENDIX BTH E STA F F O F T H E


1 Sheryl L. Wa l t e r, formerly General Counsel of the pri-vate National Security A rchive, served as the ReviewB o a rd’s General Counsel from November 1994 to May1995, and departed the Review Board to become theGeneral Counsel on the Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni-han Committee on Government Secre c y.

Associate General Counsel and as SeniorAttorney. Mr. Haron came to the ReviewBoard from the Washington, D.C. law firm ofHowrey and Simon. He received both his J.D.and his B.A. from the University of Virginia.

K .M i chelle Combs. Michelle Combs served asthe Review Board’s Associate Director forR e s e a rch and Review from March 1998 untilthe Review Board’s closure. Dr. Combs pre-viously served the Review Board as a SeniorAnalyst. Dr. Combs received her Ph.D. inCommunication Studies from NorthwesternUniversity and her B.A. from Va n d e r b i l tU n i v e r s i t y.

P ress and Public Affairs Off i c e r. Given thatone of the JFK Act’s primary objectives wasto re s t o re public confidence in government,the Review Board realized that it wouldhave to maintain fairly extensive publica ffairs and communications programs, asdescribed in Chapter 2 of this report. Thus,its Press and Public A ffairs Officer was a crit-ical individual in evaluating the ReviewB o a rd’s success or failure.

Eileen A. S u l l i v a n . Eileen Sullivan served as theReview Board’s Press and Public A ffairs Off i-cer from May 1997 until the Review Board ’ sc l o s u re in September 1998. Ms. Sullivan pre v i-ously served as the Assistant Press and PublicA ffairs Off i c e r. Ms. Sullivan received her B.A.f rom The American University.

Computer Specialist. As Chapter 4 of thisreport describes in detail, computer pro-grams that could track the Review Board’sp rocessing of thousands of re c o rds wereessential components to the fulfillment of theReview Board’s mandate.

Charles C. Rhodes. Chet Rhodes served as theReview Board’s Computer Specialist fromDecember 1994 until the Review Board’s clo-sure in September 1998. Mr. Rhodes receivedhis B.S. from the University of Maryland.

R e s e a rch and Analysis Staff . Review Boardanalysts identified and reviewed re c o rds andmade recommendations to the Review Board .O rganized into three teams, FBI, CIA, andM i l i t a r y, analysts developed working re l a-tionships with re p resentatives from the fed-eral agencies within the analyst’s purview.Analysts developed expertise into particular

subject matters—essential to providing theReview Board members with information re l-evant to the Board’s decision making. More-o v e r, analysts carried out the importantassignment of determining whether torequest additional re c o rds from agencies.

Douglas P. H o r n e . Douglas Horne served asthe Review Board’s Chief Analyst for Mili-tary Records from March 1997 to September1998. Mr. Horne previously served theReview Board as a Senior Analyst. Prior tohis work at the Review Board, Mr. Horneserved in the U.S. Navy and also worked asa civilian for the U.S. Navy. Mr. Hornereceived his B.A. from The Ohio State Uni-v e r s i t y.

Robert J. S k w i r o t . Robert J. Skwirot served asthe Review Board’s Chief Analyst for CIAR e c o rds from September 1997 to September1 9 9 8 .2 M r. Skwirot previously served theReview Board as a Senior Analyst. Mr. Skwiro treceived his M.A. from Villanova Universityand his B.A. from La Salle University.

Kevin G. Ti e r n a n. Kevin G. Tiernan served asthe Review Board’s Chief Analyst for FBIR e c o rds from July 1998-September 1998.3 M r.Tiernan previously served as a Senior A n a-lyst for the Review Board. Mr. Ti e r n a nreceived his B.A. from Mary Wa s h i n g t o nC o l l e g e .

Joseph P. Freeman. Joe Freeman served as aSenior Analyst for the Review Board. Mr.Freeman had a Rotary International Founda-tion Fellowship at the School of Peace at theUniversity of Bradford, England, and hereceived his B.A. from Harvard University.

Irene F. Marr. Irene Marr served as a SeniorAnalyst for the Review Board. Ms. Marrreceived her M.A. from The Fletcher School

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2 Mary S. McAuliffe served as the Review Board’s firstChief Analyst for CIA R e c o rds from April 1995 toOctober 1996. Dr. McAuliffe received her Ph.D. fro mthe University of Maryland, and her B.A. from Prin-cipia College.

3 Philip D. G o l r i ck served as the Review Board’s firstChief Analyst for FBI Records, and also as Counsel to theReview Board, from November 1994 until March 1997.M r. Golrick previously worked for the Washington lawfirm of Covington and Burling. He received both his J.D.and his B.A. from the University of Vi rg i n i a .

of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts Universityand her B.A. from Smith College.

Sarah Ahmed. Sarah Ahmed served as ananalyst for the Review Board. Ms. A h m e dreceived her B.A. from The George Wa s h-ington University.

Marie B. Fa g n a n t . Marie Fagnant served as ananalyst for the Review Board . Ms. Fagnantreceived her B.A., from Arizona State Uni-v e r s i t y.

James C. Goslee, II. Jim Goslee served as ananalyst for the Review Board. Mr. Goslee isan M.A. candidate at Georgetown University,and he received his B.A. from the Universityof Connecticut. Benjamin A. Rockwell. BenRockwell served as an analyst for the ReviewBoard. Mr. Rockwell received his B.A. fromThe George Washington University.

Peter H. Voth. Peter Voth served as an analystas well as the Assistant Computer Specialistfor the Review Board. Mr. Voth received hisM.A. from The American University and hisB.A. from Penn State University.

Administrative Staff . The Review Board ’ sadministrative staff, though skeletal in num-b e r, performed a wide variety of tasks. Underideal conditions, the Review Board hoped tohave four to five administrative staff members.H o w e v e r, the Review Board’s administratives t a ff often consisted of only three individuals.

Jerrie Olson. Jerrie Olson served as the Execu-tive Secretary from June 1995 until the clo-sure of the Review Board in September 1998.Ms. Olson provided support to the ExecutiveDirector, the General Counsel, staff investiga-tors, and the Review Board members.

Catherine M. R o d r i g u e z . Cathy Rodriguezserved as the Technical Assistant forResearch and Analysis and provided supportto the General Counsel from August 1996until the closure of the Review Board in Sep-tember 1998. Ms. Rodriguez attended theUniversity of Maryland European Division atBerlin, Germany.

Janice Spells. Janice Spells served as thereceptionist/administrative assistant for theReview Board.

I n v e s t i g a t o r s .4 The Review Board hired twofull-time staff investigators to locate a vari-ety of re c o rds from non-federal sources. Theinvestigators were successful in identifyingand locating significant private collectionsof re c o rds and in arranging for donation ofthose collections to the government. More-o v e r, investigators played a critical role inlocating former government employees whow e re subsequently interviewed re g a rd i n gthe possible existence and location of addi-tional assassination re c o rd s .

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4 Anne E. B u t t i m e r and David R. Montague served theReview Board as investigators.

Section 1: Short Title

This Act may be cited as the “President JohnF. Kennedy Assassination Records CollectionAct of 1992”.

Section 2: Findings, Declarations, and Purposes

(a) Findings and Declarations- The Congressfinds and declares that—

(1) all Government records related to theassassination of President John F. Kennedyshould be preserved for historical and gov-ernmental purposes;

(2) all Government records concerning theassassination of President John F. Kennedyshould carry a presumption of immediatedisclosure, and all records should be eventu-ally disclosed to enable the public to becomefully informed about the history surroundingthe assassination;

(3) legislation is necessary to create anenforceable, independent, and accountablep rocess for the public disclosure of suchrecords;

(4) legislation is necessary because con-gressional records related to the assassina-tion of President John F. Kennedy would nototherwise be subject to public disclosureuntil at least the year 2029;

(5) legislation is necessary because theFreedom of Information Act, as implementedby the executive branch, has prevented thetimely public disclosure of records relating tothe assassination of President John F.Kennedy;

(6) legislation is necessary because Execu-tive Order No. 12356, entitled “NationalSecurity Information” has eliminated thedeclassification and downgrading schedulesrelating to classified information across gov-ernment and has prevented the timely publicdisclosure of records relating to the assassi-

nation of President John F. Kennedy; and(7) most of the records related to the assas-

sination of President John F. Kennedy arealmost 30 years old, and only in the rarestcases is there any legitimate need for contin-ued protection of such records.(b) Purposes- The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to provide for the creation of the Presi-dent John F. Kennedy Assassination RecordsCollection at the National A rchives andRecords Administration; and

(2) to require the expeditious public trans-mission to the Archivist and public disclo-sure of such records.

Section 3: Definitions

In this Act:(1) “Archivist” means the Archivist of the

United States.(2) “Assassination record” means a record

that is related to the assassination of Presi-dent John F. Kennedy, that was created ormade available for use by, obtained by, orotherwise came into the possession of—

(A) the Commission to Investigate theAssassination of President John F. Kennedy(the “Warren Commission”);

(B) the Commission on Central Intelli-gence Agency Activities Within the UnitedStates (the “Rockefeller Commission”);

(C) the Senate Select Committee toStudy Governmental Operations withRespect to Intelligence Activities (the“Church Committee”);

(D) the Select Committee on Intelligence(the “Pike Committee”) of the House of Rep-resentatives;

(E) the Select Committee on Assassina-tions (the “House Assassinations Commit-tee”) of the House of Representatives;

(F) the Library of Congress;(G) the National Archives and Records

Administration;

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APPENDIX CTH E PR E S I D E N T JO H N F. KE N N E D Y AS S A S S I N AT I O N

RE C O R D S CO L L E C T I O N AC T O F 1992 (JFK AC T)

(H) any Presidential library;(I) any Executive agency;(J) any independent agency;(K) any other office of the Federal Gov-

ernment; and(L) any State or local law enforcement

office that provided support or assistance orperformed work in connection with a Federalinquiry into the assassination of PresidentJohn F. Kennedy, but does not include theautopsy records donated by the Kennedyfamily to the National Archives pursuant to adeed of gift regulating access to thoserecords, or copies and reproductions madefrom such records.

(3) “Collection” means the President JohnF. Kennedy Assassination Records Collectionestablished under section 4.

(4) “Executive agency” means an Execu-tive agency as defined in subsection 552(f)of title 5, United States Code, and includesany Executive department, military depart-ment, Government corporation, Govern-ment controlled corporation, or other estab-lishment in the executive branch of theGovernment, including the Executive Off i c eof the President, or any independent re g u-latory agency.

(5) “Government office” means any officeof the Federal Government that has posses-sion or control of assassination re c o rd s ,including—

(A) the House Committee on Adminis-tration with regard to the Select Committeeon Assassinations of the records of the Houseof Representatives;

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligenceof the Senate with regard to records of theSenate Select Committee to Study Govern-mental Operations with Respect to Intelli-gence Activities and other assassinationrecords;

(C) the Library of Congress;(D) the National Archives as custodian

of assassination records that it has obtainedor possesses, including the Commission toInvestigate the Assassination of Pre s i d e n tJohn F. Kennedy and the Commission onCentral Intelligence Agency Activities in theUnited States; and

(E) any other executive branch office oragency, and any independent agency.

(6) “Identification aid” means the writtendescription pre p a red for each re c o rd asrequired in section 4.

(7) “National A rchives” means the

National Archives and Records Administra-tion and all components thereof, includingPresidential archival depositories establishedunder section 2112 of title 44, United StatesCode.

(8) “Official investigation” means thereviews of the assassination of President John F.Kennedy conducted by any Presidential com-mission, any authorized congressional commit-tee, and any Government agency either inde-p e n d e n t l y, at the request of any Pre s i d e n t i a lcommission or congressional committee, or atthe request of any Government off i c i a l .

(9) “Originating body” means the Execu-tive agency, government commission, con-gressional committee, or other governmentalentity that created a re c o rd or particularinformation within a record.

(10) “Public interest” means the com-pelling interest in the prompt public disclo-sure of assassination records for historicaland governmental purposes and for the pur-pose of fully informing the American peopleabout the history surrounding the assassina-tion of President John F. Kennedy.

(11) “Record” includes a book, paper, map,photograph, sound or video re c o rd i n g ,machine readable material, computerized,digitized, or electronic information, regard-less of the medium on which it is stored, orother documentary material, regardless of itsphysical form or characteristics.

(12) “Review Board” means the Assassina-tion Records Review Board established bysection 7.

(13) “Third agency” means a Governmentagency that originated an assassinationrecord that is in the possession of anotheragency.

Section 4: President John F. Kennedy AssassinationRecords Collection at the NationalArchives and Records Administration

(a) In General-(1) Not later than 60 days after the date

of enactment of this Act, the NationalA rchives and Records Administration shallcommence establishment of a collection ofre c o rds to be known as the President JohnF. Kennedy Assassination Records Collec-tion. In so doing, the A rchivist shall ensurethe physical integrity and original pro v e-nance of all re c o rds. The Collection shallconsist of re c o rd copies of all Government

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re c o rds relating to the assassination ofP resident John F. Kennedy, which shall betransmitted to the National A rchives ina c c o rdance with section 2107 of title 44,United States Code. The A rchivist shallp re p a re and publish a subject guidebookand index to the collection.

(2) The Collection shall include—(A) all assassination records—

(i) that have been transmitted to theNational Archives or disclosed to the publicin an unredacted form prior to the date ofenactment of this Act;

(ii) that are required to be transmittedto the National Archives; or

(iii) the disclosure of which is post-poned under this Act;

(B) a central directory comprised ofidentification aids created for each recordtransmitted to the Archivist under section 5;and

(C) all Review Board records as requiredby this Act.(b) D i s c l o s u re of Records- All assassinationre c o rds transmitted to the NationalA rchives for disclosure to the public shallbe included in the Collection and shall beavailable to the public for inspection andcopying at the National A rchives within 30days after their transmission to theNational A rc h i v e s .(c) Fees for Copying- The Archivist shall—

(1) charge fees for copying assassinationrecords; and

(2) grant waivers of such fees pursuant tothe standards established by section 552(a)(4)of title 5, United States Code.(d) Additional Requirements-

(1) The Collection shall be preserved, pro-tected, archived, and made available to thepublic at the National Archives using appro-priations authorized, specified, andrestricted for use under the terms of this Act.

(2) The National Archives, in consultationwith the Information Security OversightOffice, shall ensure the security of the post-poned assassination records in the Collec-tion.(e) Oversight- The Committee on Govern-ment Operations of the House of Representa-tives and the Committee on GovernmentalAffairs of the Senate shall have continuingoversight jurisdiction with respect to the Col-lection.

Section 5: Review, Identification, Transmission to theNational Archives, and Public Disclosureof Assassination Records by GovernmentOffices

(a) In General-(1) As soon as practicable after the date of

enactment of this Act, each Government off i c eshall identify and organize its re c o rds re l a t i n gto the assassination of President John F.Kennedy and pre p a re them for transmissionto the A rchivist for inclusion in the Collection.

(2) No assassination re c o rd shall bedestroyed, altered, or mutilated in any way.

(3) No assassination record made availableor disclosed to the public prior to the date ofenactment of this Act may be withheld,redacted, postponed for public disclosure, orreclassified.

(4) No assassination record created by aperson or entity outside government (exclud-ing names or identities consistent with therequirements of section 6) shall be withheld,redacted, postponed for public disclosure, orreclassified.(b) Custody of Assassination Records PendingReview- During the review by Governmentoffices and pending review activity by theReview Board, each Government office shallretain custody of its assassination records forpurposes of preservation, security, and effi-ciency, unless—

(1) the Review Board requires the physicaltransfer of records for purposes of conduct-ing an independent and impartial review;

(2) transfer is necessary for an administrativehearing or other Review Board function; or

(3) it is a third agency record described insubsection (c)(2)(C).(c) Review-

(1) Not later than 300 days after the date ofenactment of this Act, each Governmento ffice shall re v i e w, identify and org a n i z eeach assassination record in its custody orpossession for disclosure to the public,review by the Review Board, and transmis-sion to the Archivist.

(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), a Gov-ernment office shall—

(A) determine which of its records areassassination records;

(B) determine which of its assassinationrecords have been officially disclosed or pub-licly available in a complete and unredactedform;

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(C)(i) determine which of its assassina-

tion records, or particular information con-tained in such a record, was created by at h i rd agency or by another Governmentoffice; and

(ii) transmit to a third agency or otherGovernment office those records, or particu-lar information contained in those records, orcomplete and accurate copies thereof;

(D)(i) determine whether its assassina-

tion re c o rds or particular information inassassination records are covered by the stan-dards for postponement of public disclosureunder this Act; and

(ii) specify on the identification aidre q u i red by subsection (d) the applicable post-ponement provision contained in section 6;

(E) organize and make available to theReview Board all assassination records iden-tified under subparagraph (D) the public dis-closure of which in whole or in part may bepostponed under this Act;

(F) organize and make available to theReview Board any record concerning whichthe office has any uncertainty as to whetherthe record is an assassination record gov-erned by this Act;

(G) give priority to—(i) the identification, re v i e w, and

transmission of all assassination records pub-licly available or disclosed as of the date ofenactment of this Act in a redacted or editedform; and

(ii) the identification, re v i e w, andtransmission, under the standards for post-ponement set forth in this Act, of assassina-tion records that on the date of enactment ofthis Act are the subject of litigation under sec-tion 552 of title 5, United States Code; and

(H) make available to the Review Boardany additional information and records thatthe Review Board has reason to believe itrequires for conducting a review under thisAct.

(3) The Director of each archival deposi-tory established under section 2112 of title 44,United States Code, shall have as a prioritythe expedited review for public disclosure ofassassination records in the possession andcustody of the depository, and shall makesuch records available to the Review Board asrequired by this Act.(d) Identification Aids-

(1)

(A) Not later than 45 days after the dateof enactment of this Act, the Archivist, inconsultation with the appropriate Govern-ment offices, shall prepare and make avail-able to all Government offices a standardform of identification or finding aid for usewith each assassination re c o rd subject toreview under this Act.

(B) The Archivist shall ensure that theidentification aid program is established insuch a manner as to result in the creation of auniform system of electronic records by Gov-ernment offices that are compatible with eachother.

(2) Upon completion of an identificationaid, a Government office shall—

(A) attach a printed copy to the record itdescribes;

(B) transmit to the Review Board aprinted copy; and

(C) attach a printed copy to each assas-sination record it describes when it is trans-mitted to the Archivist.

(3) Assassination records which are in thepossession of the National Archives on thedate of enactment of this Act, and which havebeen publicly available in their entirety with-out redaction, shall be made available in theCollection without any additional review bythe Review Board or another authorizedo ffice under this Act, and shall not berequired to have such an identification aidunless required by the Archivist.(e) Transmission to the National Archives- EachGovernment office shall—

(1) transmit to the Archivist, and makeimmediately available to the public, all assas-sination records that can be publicly dis-closed, including those that are publiclyavailable on the date of enactment of this Act,without any redaction, adjustment, or with-holding under the standards of this Act; and

(2) transmit to the Archivist upon approvalfor postponement by the Review Board orupon completion of other action authorizedby this Act, all assassination records the pub-lic disclosure of which has been postponed,in whole or in part, under the standards ofthis Act, to become part of the protected Col-lection.(f) Custody of Postponed Assassination Records-An assassination record the public disclosureof which has been postponed shall, pendingtransmission to the Archivist, be held for rea-sons of security and preservation by the orig-inating body until such time as the informa-

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tion security program has been established atthe National Archives as required in section4(e)(2).(g) Periodic Review of Postponed AssassinationRecords-

(1) All postponed or redacted records shallbe reviewed periodically by the originatingagency and the Archivist consistent with therecommendations of the Review Board undersection 9(c)(3)(B).

(2)(A) A periodic review shall address the

public disclosure of additional assassinationrecords in the Collection under the standardsof this Act.

(B) All postponed assassination recordsdetermined to require continued postpone-ment shall require an unclassified writtendescription of the reason for such continuedpostponement. Such description shall be pro-vided to the Archivist and published in theFederal Register upon determination.

(C) The periodic review of postponedassassination records shall serve to down-grade and declassify security classified infor-mation.

(D) Each assassination record shall bepublicly disclosed in full, and available in theCollection no later than the date that is 25years after the date of enactment of this Act,unless the President certifies, as required bythis Act, that—

(i) continued postponement is madenecessary by an identifiable harm to the mil-itary defense, intelligence operations, lawenforcement, or conduct of foreign relations;and

(ii) the identifiable harm is of suchgravity that it outweighs the public interestin disclosure.(h) Fees for Copying- Executive branch agen-cies shall—

(1) charge fees for copying assassinationrecords; and

(2) grant waivers of such fees pursuant tothe standards established by section 552(a)(4)of title 5, United States Code.

Section 6: Grounds for Postponement of Public Disclosure of Records

Disclosure of assassination records or partic-ular information in assassination records tothe public may be postponed subject to thelimitations of this Act if there is clear and

convincing evidence that—(1) the threat to the military defense, intel-

ligence operations, or conduct of foreign rela-tions of the United States posed by the publicdisclosure of the assassination is of suchgravity that it outweighs the public interest,and such public disclosure would reveal—

(A) an intelligence agent whose identitycurrently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or methodwhich is currently utilized, or reasonablyexpected to be utilized, by the United StatesGovernment and which has not been offi-cially disclosed, the disclosure of whichwould interfere with the conduct of intelli-gence activities; or

(C) any other matter currently relatingto the military defense, intelligence opera-tions or conduct of foreign relations of theUnited States, the disclosure of which woulddemonstrably impair the national security ofthe United States;

(2) the public disclosure of the assassina-tion record would reveal the name or identityof a living person who provided confidentialinformation to the United States and wouldpose a substantial risk of harm to that person;

(3) the public disclosure of the assassina-tion record could reasonably be expected toconstitute an unwarranted invasion of per-sonal privacy, and that invasion of privacy isso substantial that it outweighs the publicinterest;

(4) the public disclosure of the assassina-tion record would compromise the existenceof an understanding of confidentiality cur-rently requiring protection between a Gov-ernment agent and a cooperating individualor a foreign government, and public disclo-sure would be so harmful that it outweighsthe public interest; or

(5) the public disclosure of the assassina-tion record would reveal a security or protec-tive procedure currently utilized, or reason-ably expected to be utilized, by the SecretService or another Government agencyresponsible for protecting Government offi-cials, and public disclosure would be soharmful that it outweighs the public interest.

Section 7: Establishment and Powers of the Assassination Records Review Board

(a) Establishment- There is established as anindependent agency a board to be known as

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the Assassinations Records Review Board.(b) Appointment-

(1) The President, by and with the adviceand consent of the Senate, shall appoint,without regard to political affiliation, 5 citi-zens to serve as members of the ReviewBoard to ensure and facilitate the review,transmission to the Archivist, and public dis-closure of Government records related to theassassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(2) The President shall make nominations tothe Review Board not later than 90 calendardays after the date of enactment of this A c t .

(3) If the Senate votes not to confirm anomination to the Review Board, the Presi-dent shall make an additional nominationnot later than 30 days thereafter.

(4)(A) The President shall make nomina-

tions to the Review Board after consideringpersons recommended by the American His-torical Association, the Organization ofAmerican Historians, the Society of Ameri-can Archivists, and the American Bar Associ-ation.

(B) If an organization described in sub-paragraph (A) does not recommend at least 2nominees meeting the qualifications stated inparagraph (5) by the date that is 45 days afterthe date of enactment of this Act, the Presi-dent shall consider for nomination the per-sons recommended by the other organiza-tions described in subparagraph (A).

(C) The President may request an orga-nization described in subparagraph (A) tosubmit additional nominations.

(5) Persons nominated to the ReviewBoard—

(A) shall be impartial private citizens,none of whom is presently employed by anybranch of the Government, and none ofwhom shall have had any previous involve-ment with any official investigation orinquiry conducted by a Federal, State, orlocal government, relating to the assassina-tion of President John F. Kennedy;

(B) shall be distinguished persons ofhigh national professional reputation in theirrespective fields who are capable of exercis-ing the independent and objective judgmentnecessary to the fulfillment of their role inensuring and facilitating the review, trans-mission to the public, and public disclosureof records related to the assassination of Pres-ident John F. Kennedy and who possess anappreciation of the value of such material to

the public, scholars, and government; and(C) shall include at least 1 professional

historian and 1 attorney.(c) Security Clearances-

(1) All Review Board nominees shall begranted the necessary security clearances inan accelerated manner subject to the stan-d a rd pro c e d u res for granting such clear-a n c e s .

(2) All nominees shall qualify for the nec-essary security clearance prior to being con-sidered for confirmation by the Committeeon Governmental Affairs of the Senate.(d) Confirmation Hearings-

(1) The Committee on GovernmentalAffairs of the Senate shall hold confirmationhearings within 30 days in which the Senateis in session after the nomination of 3 ReviewBoard members.

(2) The Committee on GovernmentalAffairs shall vote on the nominations within14 days in which the Senate is in session afterthe confirmation hearings, and shall reportits results to the full Senate immediately.

(3) The Senate shall vote on each nomineeto confirm or reject within 14 days in whichthe Senate is in session after reported by theCommittee on Governmental Affairs.(e) Vacancy- A vacancy on the Review Boardshall be filled in the same manner as speci-fied for original appointment within 30 daysof the occurrence of the vacancy.(f) Chairperson- The Members of the ReviewBoard shall elect one of its members as chair-person at its initial meeting.(g) Removal of Review Board Member-

(1) No member of the Review Board shallbe removed from office, other than—

(A) by impeachment and conviction; or(B) by the action of the President for

inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance inoffice, physical disability, mental incapacity,or any other condition that substantiallyimpairs the performance of the member’sduties.

(2)(A) If a member of the Review Board is

removed from office, and that removal is bythe President, not later than 10 days after theremoval the President shall submit to theCommittee on Government Operations of theHouse of Representatives and the Committeeon Governmental Affairs of the Senate areport specifying the facts found and thegrounds for the removal.

(B) The President shall publish in the

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Federal Register a report submitted underparagraph (2)(A), except that the Presidentmay, if necessary to protect the rights of aperson named in the report or to preventundue interference with any pending prose-cution, postpone or refrain from publishingany or all of the report until the completion ofsuch pending cases or pursuant to privacyprotection requirements in law.

(3)(A) A member of the Review Board

removed from office may obtain judicialreview of the removal in a civil action com-menced in the United States District Courtfor the District of Columbia.

(B) The member may be reinstated orgranted other appropriate relief by order ofthe court.(h) Compensation of Members-

(1) A member of the Review Board shall becompensated at a rate equal to the dailyequivalent of the annual rate of basic payp rescribed for level IV of the ExecutiveSchedule under section 5315 of title 5, UnitedStates Code, for each day (including traveltime) during which the member is engagedin the performance of the duties of theReview Board.

(2) A member of the Review Board shall beallowed reasonable travel expenses, includ-ing per diem in lieu of subsistence, at ratesfor employees of agencies under subchapter Iof chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code,while away from the member’s home or reg-ular place of business in the performance ofservices for the Review Board.(i) Duties of the Review Board-

(1) The Review Board shall consider andrender decisions on a determination by aGovernment office to seek to postpone thedisclosure of assassination records.

(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the ReviewB o a rd shall consider and render decisions—

(A) whether a re c o rd constitutes anassassination record; and

(B) whether an assassination record orparticular information in a record qualifiesfor postponement of disclosure under thisAct.(j) Powers-

(1) The Review Board shall have theauthority to act in a manner prescribed underthis Act including authority to—

(A) direct Government offices to com-plete identification aids and organize assassi-nation records;

(B) direct Government offices to trans-mit to the A rchivist assassination re c o rds asre q u i red under this Act, including segre-gable portions of assassination re c o rds, andsubstitutes and summaries of assassinationre c o rds that can be publicly disclosed to thefullest extent;

(C)(i) obtain access to assassination

records that have been identified and orga-nized by a Government office;

(ii) direct a Government office tomake available to the Review Board, and ifnecessary investigate the facts surrounding,additional information, records, or testimonyfrom individuals, which the Review Boardhas reason to believe is required to fulfill itsfunctions and responsibilities under this Act;and

(iii) request the Attorney General tosubpoena private persons to compel testi-mony, records, and other information rele-vant to its responsibilities under this Act;

(D) require any Government office toaccount in writing for the destruction of anyrecords relating to the assassination of Presi-dent John F. Kennedy;

(E) receive information from the publicregarding the identification and public dis-closure of assassination records; and

(F) hold hearings, administer oaths, andsubpoena witnesses and documents.

(2) A subpoena issued under paragraph(1)(C)(iii) may be enforced by any appropri-ate Federal court acting pursuant to a lawfulrequest of the Review Board.(k) Witness Immunity- The Review Boardshall be considered to be an agency of theUnited States for purposes of section 6001 oftitle 18, United States Code.(l) Oversight-

(1) The Committee on Government Opera-tions of the House of Representatives and theCommittee on Governmental Affairs of theSenate shall have continuing oversight juris-diction with respect to the official conduct ofthe Review Board and the disposition ofpostponed records after termination of theReview Board, and shall have access to anyrecords held or created by the Review Board.

(2) The Review Board shall have the dutyto cooperate with the exercise of such over-sight jurisdiction.(m) Support Services- The Administrator ofthe General Services Administration shallp rovide administrative services for the

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Review Board on a reimbursable basis.(n) Interpretive Regulations- The Review Boardmay issue interpretive regulations.(o) Termination and Winding up-

(1) The Review Board and the terms of itsmembers shall terminate not later than 2years after the date of enactment of this Act,except that the Review Board may, by major-ity vote, extend its term for an additional 1-year period if it has not completed its workwithin that 2-year period.

(2) Upon its termination, the Review Boardshall submit reports to the President and theCongress including a complete and accurateaccounting of expenditures during its exis-tence, and shall complete all other reportingrequirements under this Act.

(3) Upon termination and winding up, theReview Board shall transfer all of its recordsto the Archivist for inclusion in the Collec-tion, and no record of the Review Board shallbe destroyed.

Section 8: Assassination Records Review Board Personnel

(a) Executive Director-(1) Not later than 45 days after the initial

meeting of the Review Board, the ReviewB o a rd shall appoint one citizen, withoutregard to political affiliation, to the positionof Executive Director.

(2) The person appointed as ExecutiveDirector shall be a private citizen of integrityand impartiality who is a distinguished pro-fessional and who is not a present employeeof any branch of the Government and hashad no previous involvement with any offi-cial investigation or inquiry relating to theassassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(3)(A) A candidate for Executive Director

shall be granted the necessary security clear-ances in an accelerated manner subject to thestandard procedures for granting such clear-ances.

(B) A candidate shall qualify for the nec-essary security clearance prior to beingapproved by the Review Board.

(4) The Executive Director shall—(A) serve as principal liaison to Govern-

ment offices;(B) be responsible for the administration

and coordination of the Review Board ’ sreview of records;

(C) be responsible for the administrationof all official activities conducted by theReview Board; and

(D) have no authority to decide or deter-mine whether any record should be disclosedto the public or postponed for disclosure.

(5) The Executive Director shall not beremoved for reasons other than by a majorityvote of the Review Board for cause on theg rounds of ineff i c i e n c y, neglect of duty,malfeasance in office, physical disability,mental incapacity, or any other condition thatsubstantially impairs the performance of theresponsibilities of the Executive Director orthe staff of the Review Board.(b) Staff-

(1) The Review Board may, in accordancewith the civil service laws but without regardto civil service law and regulation for com-petitive service as defined in subchapter 1,chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code,appoint and terminate additional personnelas are necessary to enable the Review Boardand its Executive Director to perform itsduties.

(2) A person appointed to the staff of theReview Board shall be a private citizen ofintegrity and impartiality who is not a pre-sent employee of any branch of the Govern-ment and who has had no previous involve-ment with any official investigation orinquiry relating to the assassination of Presi-dent John F. Kennedy.

(3)(A) A candidate for staff shall be granted

the necessary security clearances in an accel-erated manner subject to the standard proce-dures for granting such clearances.

(B) A candidate for the staff shall qualifyfor the necessary security clearance prior tobeing approved by the Review Board.(c) Compensation- The Review Board shall fixthe compensation of the Executive Directorand other personnel in accordance with title5, United States Code, except that the rate ofpay for the Executive Director and other per-sonnel may not exceed the rate payable forlevel V of the Executive Schedule under sec-tion 5316 of that title.(d) Advisory Committees-

(1) The Review Board shall have theauthority to create advisory committees toassist in fulfilling the responsibilities of theReview Board under this Act.

(2) Any advisory committee created by theReview Board shall be subject to the Federal

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Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

Section 9: Review of Records by the AssassinationRecords Review Board

(a) Custody of Records Reviewed by Board-Pending the outcome of the Review Board’sreview activity, a Government office shallretain custody of its assassination records forpurposes of preservation, security, and effi-ciency, unless—

(1) the Review Board requires the physicaltransfer of records for reasons of conductingan independent and impartial review; or

(2) such transfer is necessary for an admin-istrative hearing or other official ReviewBoard function.(b) Startup Requirements- The Review Boardshall—

(1) not later than 90 days after the date ofits appointment, publish a schedule forreview of all assassination records in the Fed-eral Register; and

(2) not later than 180 days after the date ofenactment of this Act, begin its review ofassassination records under this Act.(c) Determinations of the Review Board-

(1) The Review Board shall direct that allassassination records be transmitted to theArchivist and disclosed to the public in theCollection in the absence of clear and con-vincing evidence that—

(A) a Government record is not an assas-sination record; or

(B) a Government record or particularinformation within an assassination recordqualifies for postponement of public disclo-sure under this Act.

(2) In approving postponement of publicd i s c l o s u re of an assassination re c o rd, theReview Board shall seek to—

(A) provide for the disclosure of segre-gable parts, substitutes, or summaries ofsuch a record; and

(B) determine, in consultation with theoriginating body and consistent with the stan-d a rds for postponement under this Act, whichof the following alternative forms of disclo-s u re shall be made by the originating body:

(i) Any reasonably segregable partic-ular information in an assassination record.

(ii) A substitute record for that infor-mation which is postponed.

(iii) A summary of an assassinationrecord.

(3) With respect to each assassinationrecord or particular information in assassina-tion records the public disclosure of which ispostponed pursuant to section 6, or for whichonly substitutions or summaries have beendisclosed to the public, the Review Boardshall create and transmit to the Archivist areport containing—

(A) a description of actions by theReview Board, the originating body, the Pres-ident, or any Government office (including ajustification of any such action to postponed i s c l o s u re of any re c o rd or part of anyrecord) and of any official proceedings con-ducted by the Review Board with regard tospecific assassination records; and

(B) a statement, based on a review of theproceedings and in conformity with the deci-sions reflected therein, designating a recom-mended specified time at which or a speci-fied occurrence following which the materialmay be appropriately disclosed to the publicunder this Act.

(4)(A) Following its review and a determi-

nation that an assassination record shall bepublicly disclosed in the Collection or post-poned for disclosure and held in the pro-tected Collection, the Review Board shallnotify the head of the originating body of itsdetermination and publish a copy of thedetermination in the Federal Register within14 days after the determination is made.

(B) Contemporaneous notice shall bemade to the President for Review Boarddeterminations regarding executive branchassassination records, and to the oversightcommittees designated in this Act in the caseof legislative branch re c o rds. Such noticeshall contain a written unclassified justifica-tion for public disclosure or postponement ofdisclosure, including an explanation of theapplication of any standards contained insection 6.(d) Presidential Authority over Review BoardDetermination-

(1) Public Disclosure or Postponement of Dis -closure- After the Review Board has made aformal determination concerning the publicdisclosure or postponement of disclosure ofan executive branch assassination record orinformation within such a record, or of anyinformation contained in an assassinationrecord, obtained or developed solely withinthe executive branch, the President shallhave the sole and nondelegable authority to

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require the disclosure or postponement ofsuch record or information under the stan-dards set forth in section 6, and the Presidentshall provide the Review Board with anunclassified written certification specifyingthe President’s decision within 30 days afterthe Review Board’s determination and noticeto the executive branch agency as requiredunder this Act, stating the justification for thePresident’s decision, including the applicablegrounds for postponement under section 6,accompanied by a copy of the identificationaid required under section 4.

(2) Periodic Review- Any executive branchassassination re c o rd postponed by the Pre s i-dent shall be subject to the re q u i rements ofperiodic re v i e w, downgrading and declassifi-cation of classified information, and public dis-c l o s u re in the collection set forth in section 4.

(3) Record of Presidential Postponement- TheReview Board shall, upon its receipt, publishin the Federal Register a copy of any unclas-sified written certification, statement, andother materials transmitted by or on behalf ofthe President with regard to postponement ofassassination records.(e) Notice to Public- Every 30 calendar days,beginning on the date that is 60 calendardays after the date on which the ReviewB o a rd first approves the postponement ofd i s c l o s u re of an assassination re c o rd, theReview Board shall publish in the FederalRegister a notice that summarizes the post-ponements approved by the Review Boardor initiated by the President, the House ofR e p resentatives, or the Senate, including adescription of the subject, originatinga g e n c y, length or other physical description,and each ground for postponement that isrelied upon.(f) Reports by the Review Board-

(1) The Review Board shall report its activ-ities to the leadership of the Congress, theCommittee on Government Operations of theHouse of Representatives, the Committee onGovernmental Affairs of the Senate, the Pres-ident, the Archivist, and the head of any Gov-ernment office whose records have been thesubject of Review Board activity.

(2) The first report shall be issued on thedate that is 1 year after the date of enactmentof this Act, and subsequent reports every 12months thereafter until termination of theReview Board.

(3) A report under paragraph (1) shallinclude the following information:

(A) A financial report of the expenses forall official activities and requirements of theReview Board and its personnel.

(B) The progress made on review, trans-mission to the Archivist, and public disclo-sure of assassination records.

(C) The estimated time and volume ofassassination records involved in the comple-tion of the Review Board’s performanceunder this Act.

(D) Any special problems, includingrequests and the level of cooperation of Gov-ernment offices, with regard to the ability ofthe Review Board to operate as required bythis Act.

(E) A record of review activities, includ-ing a record of postponement decisions bythe Review Board or other related actionsauthorized by this Act, and a record of thevolume of records reviewed and postponed.

(F) Suggestions and requests to Congre s sfor additional legislative authority needs.

(G) An appendix containing copies ofreports of postponed records to the Archivistrequired under section 9(c)(3) made since thedate of the preceding report under this sub-section.

(4) At least 90 calendar days before com-pleting its work, the Review Board shall pro-vide written notice to the President and Con-g ress of its intention to terminate itsoperations at a specified date.

Section 10: Disclosure of Other Materials and Additional Study

(a) Materials under Seal of Court-(1) The Review Board may request the

Attorney General to petition any court in theUnited States or abroad to release any infor-mation relevant to the assassination of Presi-dent John F. Kennedy that is held under sealof the court.

(2)(A) The Review Board may request the

Attorney General to petition any court in theUnited States to release any information rele-vant to the assassination of President John F.Kennedy that is held under the injunction ofsecrecy of a grand jury.

(B) A request for disclosure of assassina-tion materials under this Act shall be deemedto constitute a showing of particularizedneed under Rule 6 of the Federal Rules ofCriminal Procedure.

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(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of theCongress that—

(1) the Attorney General should assist theReview Board in good faith to unseal anyre c o rds that the Review Board determines tobe relevant and held under seal by a court orunder the injunction of secrecy of a grand jury;

(2) the Secretary of State should contact theGovernment of the Republic of Russia andseek the disclosure of all records of the gov-ernment of the former Soviet Union, includ-ing the records of the Komitet Gosudarstven-noy Bezopasnosti (KGB) and the GlaynoyeRazvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye (GRU), rele-vant to the assassination of Pre s i d e n tKennedy, and contact any other foreign gov-ernment that may hold information relevantto the assassination of President Kennedyand seek disclosure of such information; and

(3) all Executive agencies should cooperatein full with the Review Board to seek the dis-closure of all information relevant to theassassination of President John F. Kennedyconsistent with the public interest.

Section 11: Rules of Construction

(a) Precedence over Other Law- When this Actre q u i res transmission of a re c o rd to theArchivist or public disclosure, it shall takeprecedence over any other law (except sec-tion 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judi-cial decision construing such law, or commonlaw doctrine that would otherwise prohibitsuch transmission or disclosure, with theexception of deeds governing access to ortransfer or release of gifts and donations ofrecords to the United States Government.(b) Freedom of Information Act- Nothing in thisAct shall be construed to eliminate or limitany right to file requests with any executiveagency or seek judicial review of the deci-sions pursuant to section 552 of title 5, UnitedStates Code.(c) Judicial Review- Nothing in this Act shallbe construed to preclude judicial re v i e w,under chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code,of final actions taken or required to be takenunder this Act.(d) Existing Authority- Nothing in this Actrevokes or limits the existing authority of thePresident, any executive agency, the Senate,or the House of Representatives, or any otherentity of the Government to publicly discloserecords in its possession.

(e) Rules of the Senate and House of Representa -tives- To the extent that any provision of thisAct establishes a procedure to be followed inthe Senate or the House of Representatives,such provision is adopted—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking powerof the Senate and House of Representatives,respectively, and is deemed to be part of therules of each House, respectively, but applic-able only with respect to the procedure to befollowed in that House, and it supersedesother rules only to the extent that it is incon-sistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitu-tional right of either House to change therules (so far as they relate to the procedure ofthat House) at any time, in the same manner,and to the same extent as in the case of anyother rule of that House.

Section 12: Termination of Effect of Act

(a) Provisions Pertaining to the Review Board-The provisions of this Act that pertain to theappointment and operation of the ReviewBoard shall cease to be effective when theReview Board and the terms of its membershave terminated pursuant to section 7(o).(b) Other Provisions- The remaining provi-sions of this Act shall continue in effect untilsuch time as the Archivist certifies to thePresident and the Congress that all assassina-tion records have been made available to thepublic in accordance with this Act.

Section 13: Authorization of Appropriations

(a) In General- There are authorized to be appro-priated such sums as are necessary to carry outthis Act, to remain available until expended.(b) Interim Funding- Until such time as fundsa re appropriated pursuant to subsection (a),the President may use such sums as are avail-able for discretionary use to carry out this A c t .

Section 14: Severability

If any provision of this Act or the applicationt h e reof to any person or circumstance is heldinvalid, the remainder of this Act and theapplication of that provision to other personsnot similarly situated or to other circ u m s t a n c e sshall not be affected by the invalidation.

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The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Extension Act of 1994

Section 1: Short Title

This Act may be cited as the “President JohnF. Kennedy Assassination Records CollectionExtension Act of 1994”.

Section 2: Extension of Act

Section 7(o)(1) of the President John F.Kennedy Assassination Records CollectionAct of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) isamended—

(1) by striking “2 years after the date ofenactment of this Act” and inserting “Sep-tember 30, 1996”; and

(2) by striking “2-year”.

Section 3: Amendments Relating to Review BoardPowers

Section 7(j)(1) of the President John F.Kennedy Assassination Records CollectionAct of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) isamended—

(1) in subparagraph (E) by striking “and”after the semicolon;

(2) in subparagraph (F) by striking theperiod and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:“(G) use the Federal Supply Service in

the same manner and under the same condi-tions as other departments and agencies ofthe United States; and

“(H) use the United States mails in thesame manner and under the same conditionsas other departments and agencies of theUnited States.”.

Section 4: Amendments Relating to Review BoardPersonnel

(a) Security Clearance for Review Board Person -n e l- Section 8 of the President John F.Kennedy Assassination Records CollectionAct of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amendedby adding at the end the following:“(e) Security Clearance Required- An individ-ual employed in any position by the Review

Board (including an individual appointed asExecutive Director) shall be required to qual-ify for any necessary security clearance priorto taking office in that position, but may beemployed conditionally in accordance withsubsection (b)(3)(B) before qualifying for thatclearance.”.(b) Appointment and Termination of Staff, Gen -erally- Section 8(b) of the President John F.Kennedy Assassination Records CollectionAct of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amendedby striking “(b) Staff- ” and all that followsthrough the end of paragraph (1) and insert-ing the following:“(b) Staff- (1) The Review Board, withoutregard to the civil service laws, may appointand terminate additional personnel as arenecessary to enable the Review Board and itsExecutive Director to perform the duties ofthe Review Board.”.(c) Review Board Administrative Staff- Section8(b)(2) of the President John F. KennedyAssassination Records Collection Act of 1992(44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended—

(1) by striking “A person” and inserting“(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B),a person”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:“(B) An individual who is an employee

of the Government may be appointed to thestaff of the Review Board if in that positionthe individual will perform only administra-tive functions.”.(d) Conditional Employment of Staff- Section8(b)(3)(B) of the President John F. KennedyAssassination Records Collection Act of 1992(44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended to read asfollows:“(B)

(i) The Review Board may offer condi-tional employment to a candidate for a staffposition pending the completion of securityclearance background investigations. Duringthe pendency of such investigations, theReview Board shall ensure that any suchemployee does not have access to, or respon-sibility involving, classified or otherwiserestricted assassination record materials.

(ii) If a person hired on a conditional basisunder clause (i) is denied or otherwise doesnot qualify for all security clearances neces-sary to carry out the responsibilities of theposition for which conditional employmenthas been offered, the Review Board shallimmediately terminate the person’s employ-ment.”.

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(e) Compensation of Staff- Section 8(c) of theP resident John F. Kennedy A s s a s s i n a t i o nRecords Collection Act of 1992 (21 U.S.C.2107 note) is amended to read as follows:“(c) Compensation- Subject to such rules asmay be adopted by the Review Board, thechairperson, without regard to the provisionsof title 5, United States Code, governingappointments in the competitive service andwithout regard to the provisions of chapter51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of thattitle relating to classification and GeneralSchedule pay rates, may—

(1) appoint an Executive Dire c t o r, who shall

be paid at a rate not to exceed the rate of basicpay for level V of the Executive Schedule; and

(2) appoint and fix compensation of suchother personnel as may be necessary to carryout this Act.”.

Section 5: Technical Correction

Section 6(1) of the President John F. KennedyAssassination Records Collection Act of 1992(44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended in the mat-ter preceding subparagraph (A) by inserting“record” after “the assassination”.

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Sections1400.1 Scope of assassination record. 1400.2 Scope of additional records and infor-mation. 1400.3 Sources of assassination records andadditional records and information. 1400.4 Types of materials included in scopeof assassination re c o rd and additionalrecords and information. 1400.5 Requirement that assassinationrecords be released in their entirety.1400.6 Originals and copies. 1400.7 Additional guidance. 1400.8 Implementing the JFK Act—Notice ofAssassination Record Designation.

Section 1400.1: Scope of assassination record

(a) An assassination record includes, but isnot limited to, all records, public and private,regardless of how labeled or identified, thatdocument, describe, report on, analyze orinterpret activities, persons, or events reason-ably related to the assassination of PresidentJohn F. Kennedy and investigations of orinquiries into the assassination.(b) An assassination record further includes,without limitation:

(1) All records as defined in Section 3(2) ofthe JFK Act;

(2) All records collected by or segregatedby all Federal, state, and local governmentagencies in conjunction with any investiga-tion or analysis of or inquiry into the assassi-nation of President Kennedy (for example,any intra-agency investigation or analysis ofor inquiry into the assassination; any intera-gency communication regarding the assassi-nation; any request by the House Select Com-mittee on Assassinations to collectdocuments and other materials; or any inter-or intra-agency collection or segregation ofdocuments and other materials);

(3) Other records or groups of records

listed in the Notice of Assassination RecordDesignation, as described in Sec. 1400.8 ofthis chapter.

Section 1400.2: Scope of additional records and information

The term additional records and informationincludes:(a) All documents used by governmentoffices and agencies during their declassifica-tion review of assassination records as wellas all other documents, indices, and othermaterial (including but not limited to thosethat disclose cryptonyms, code names, orother identifiers that appear in assassinationre c o rds) that the Assassination Record sReview Board (Review Board) has a reason-able basis to believe may constitute an assas-sination record or would assist in the identi-fication, evaluation or interpretation of anassassination record. The Review Board willidentify in writing those records and othermaterials it intends to seek under this sec-tion.(b) All training manuals, instructional mate-rials, and guidelines created or used by theagencies in furtherance of their review ofassassination records.(c) All records, lists, and documents describ-ing the procedure by which the agenciesidentified or selected assassination recordsfor review.(d) Organizational charts of governmentagencies.(e) Records necessary and sufficient todescribe the agency’s:

(1) Records policies and schedules;(2) Filing systems and organization;(3) Storage facilities and locations;(4) Indexing symbols, marks, codes,

instructions, guidelines, methods, and proce-dures;

(5) Search methods and procedures used in

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APPENDIX D36 CFR 1400—GUIDANCE FOR INTERPRETATION AND

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDYASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992

the performance of the agencies’ dutiesunder the JFK Act; and

(6) Reclassification to a higher level, trans-fer, destruction, or other information (e.g.,theft) regarding the status of assassinationrecords.(f) Any other record that does not fall withinthe scope of assassination record as describedin Sec. 1400.1, but which has the potential toenhance, enrich, and broaden the historicalrecord of the assassination.

Section 1400.3: Sources of assassination records and additional records and information

Assassination records and additional recordsand information may be located at, or underthe control of, without limitation:(a) Agencies, offices, and entities of the exe-cuting, legislative, and judicial branches ofthe Federal Government;(b) Agencies, offices, and entities of the exec-utive, legislative, and judicial branches ofstate and local governments;(c) Record repositories and archives of Fed-eral, state, and local governments, includingpresidential libraries;(d) Record repositories and archives of uni-versities, libraries, historical societies, andother similar organizations;(e) Individuals who possess such records byvirtue of service with a government agency,office, or entity;(f) Persons, including individuals and corpo-rations, who have obtained such re c o rd sfrom sources identified in paragraphs (a)through (e) of this section;(g) Persons, including individuals and corpo-rations, who have themselves created or haveobtained such records from sources otherthan those identified in paragraphs (a)through (e) of this section;(h) Federal, state, and local courts where suchrecords are being held under seal; or(i) Foreign governments.

Section 1400.4: Types of materials included in scope ofassassination record and additional recordsand information

The term record in assassination record andadditional records and information includes,for purposes of interpreting and implement-ing the JFK Act:

(a) papers, maps, and other documentarymaterial;(b) photographs;(c) motion pictures;(d) sound and video recordings;(e) machine readable information in anyform; and(f) artifacts.

Section 1400.5: Requirement that assassination records bereleased in their entirety

An assassination record shall be released inits entirety except for portions specificallypostponed pursuant to the grounds for post-ponement of public disclosure of re c o rd sestablished in Sec. 2107.6 of the JFK Act, andno portion of any assassination record shallbe withheld from public disclosure solely ong rounds of non-relevance unless, in theReview Board’s sole discretion, release ofpart of a record is sufficient to comply withthe intent and purposes of the JFK Act.

Section 1400.6: Originals and copies

(a) For purposes of determining whetheroriginals or copies of assassination recordswill be made part of the President John F.Kennedy Assassination Records Collection(JFK Assassination Records Collection) estab-lished under the JFK Act, the following shallapply:

(1) In the case of papers, maps, and otherdocumentary materials, the Review Boardmay determine that record copies of govern-ment records, either the signed original, orig-inal production or a reproduction that hasbeen treated as the official record maintainedto chronicle government functions or activi-ties, may be placed in the JFK AssassinationRecords Collection;

(2) In the case of other papers, maps, andother documentary material, the ReviewBoard may determine that a true and accu-rate copy of a record in lieu of the originalmay be placed in the JFK A s s a s s i n a t i o nRecords Collection;

(3) In the case of photographs, the originalnegative, whenever available (otherwise, theearliest generation print that is a true andaccurate copy), may be placed in the JFKAssassination Records Collection;

(4) In the case of motion pictures, the cam-

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era original, whenever available (otherwise,the earliest generation print that is a true andaccurate copy), may be placed in the JFKAssassination Records Collection;

(5) In the case of sound and video record-ings, the original recording, whenever avail-able (otherwise, the earliest generation copythat is a true and accurate copy), may beplaced in the JFK Assassination Records Col-lection;

(6) In the case of machine-readable infor-mation, a true and accurate copy of the orig-inal (duplicating all information contained inthe original and in a format that permitsretrieval of the information), may be placedin the JFK Assassination Records Collection;and

(7) In the case of artifacts, the originalobjects themselves may be placed in the JFKAssassination Records Collection.(b) To the extent records from foreign gov-ernments are included in the JFK Assassina-tion Records Collection, copies of the originalrecords shall be sufficient for inclusion in thecollection.(c) In cases where a copy, as defined in para-graph (a) of this section, is authorized by theReview Board to be included in the JFKAssassination Records Collection, theReview Board may require that a copy be cer-tified if, in its discretion, it determines a cer-tification to be necessary to ensure theintegrity of the JFK Assassination RecordsCollection. In cases where an original, asdefined in paragraph (a) of this section, isrequired for inclusion in the JFK Assassina-tion Records Collection, the Review Boardmay, at its discretion, accept the best avail-able copy. In such cases that records includedin the JFK Assassination Records Collection,whether originals or copies, contain illegibleportions, such records shall have attachedthereto a certified transcription of the illegi-ble language to the extent practicable.(d) For purposes of implementing the JFKAct, the term copy means a true and accuratephotocopy duplication by a means appropri-ate to the medium of the original record thatpreserves and displays the integrity of therecord and the information contained in it.(e) Nothing in this section shall be inter-preted to suggest that additional copies ofany assassination records contained in theJFK Assassination Records Collection are notalso assassination records that, at the ReviewBoard’s discretion, may also be placed in the

JFK Assassination Records Collection.(f) Nothing in this section shall be interpretedto prevent or to preclude copies of any elec-tronic assassination records from being refor-matted electronically in order to conform todifferent hardward and/or software require-ments of audiovisual or machine readableformats if such is the professional judgmentof the National A rchives and Record sAdministration.

Section 1400.7: Additional guidance

(a) A government agency, office, or entityincludes, for purposes of interpreting andimplementing the JFK Act, all current, past,and former departments, agencies, off i c e s ,divisions, foreign offices, bureaus, and deliber-ative bodies of any Federal, state, or local gov-ernment and includes all inter- or intra-agencyworking groups, committees, and meetingsthat possess or created re c o rds relating to theassassination of President John F. Kennedy.(b) The inclusion of artifacts in the scope ofthe term assassination re c o rd is understood toapply solely to the JFK Assassination Record sCollection and to implement fully the termsof the JFK Act and has no direct or indire c tbearing on the interpretation or implementa-tion of any other statute or re g u l a t i o n .(c) Whenever artifacts are included in the JFKAssassination Records Collection, it shall besufficient to comply with the JFK Act if thepublic is provided access to photographs,drawings, or similar materials depicting theartifacts. Additional display of or examina-tion by the public of artifacts in the JFKAssassination Records Collection shall occurunder the terms and conditions establishedby the National A rchives and Record sAdministration to ensure their preservationand protection for posterity.(d) The terms and, or, any, all, and the pluraland singular forms of nouns shall be under-stood in their broadest and most inclusivesense and shall not be understood to be termsof limitation.(e) Unless the Review Board in its sole dis-cretion directs otherwise, records that areidentified with respect to a particular personshall include all records ralating to that per-son that use or reflect the true name or anyother name, pseudonym, codeword, symbolnumber, cryptonym, or alias used to identifythat person.

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(f) Unless the Review Board in its sole discre-tion directs otherwise, records that are identi-fied by the Review Board with respect to aparticular operation or program shall includeall records, pertaining to that program by anyother name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol,number, or cryptonym.

Section 1400.8: Implementing the JFK Act—Notice ofAssassination Record Designation

(a) A Notice of Assassination Record Desig-nation (NARD) shall be the mechanism for

the Review Board to announce publicly itsdetermination that a re c o rd or group ofrecords meets the definition of assassinationrecords.(b) Notice of all NARDs will be published inthe Federal Register within 30 days of thedecision to designate such records as assassi-nation records.(c) In determining to designate such recordsas assassination records, the Review Boardmust determine that the record or group ofrecord will more likely than not enhance,enrich, and broaden the historical record ofthe assassination.

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April 12, 1994Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

July 12, 1994Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

October 11, 1994Public Hearing, Washington, D.C.

November 18, 1994Public Hearing, Dallas, Texas

December 13 – 14, 1994Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

January 25, 1995Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

March 6 – 7, 1995Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

March 24, 1995Public Hearing, Boston, Massachusetts

May 2 – 3, 1995Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

May 18, 1995Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

June 7, 1995Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

June 27 – 28, 1995Open and Closed Meetings, New Orleans,Louisiana

July 17 - 18, 1995Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

August 2 – 3, 1995Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

August 28 – 29, 1995Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

August 30, 1995Special Meeting (Open), Washington, D.C.

September 20 – 21, 1995Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

October 23 – 24, 1995Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

November 13 – 14, 1995Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

December 12 – 13, 1995Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.


January 30 – 31, 1996Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

February 29 – March 1, 1996Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

March 18 – 19, 1996Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

April 16 – 17, 1996Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

May 13 – 14, 1996Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

June 4 – 5, 1996Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

July 9 – 10, 1996Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.


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APPENDIX EME E T I N G S O F T H E RE V I E W BO A R D

September 17, 1996Public Hearing and Open Meeting, LosAngeles, California

September 27, 1996Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

October 15 – 16, 1996Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

November 13 – 14, 1996Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

December 16 – 17, 1996Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.



February 13, 1997Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

March 13 – 14, 1997Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

April 2, 1997Public Hearing and Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

April 23 – 24, 1997Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

May 12 – 13, 1997Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

June 9 – 10, 1997Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

July 9, 1997Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

August 5, 1997Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.


October 14, 1997Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

November 17, 1997Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

December 15 – 16, 1997Closed Meeting, College Park, Maryland


February 17, 1998Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

March 10, 1998Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

April 13, 1998Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

May 12 – 13, 1998Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

June 4, 1998Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

June 17, 1998Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

July 7 – 8, 1998Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

July 20 – 21, 1998Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

August 6, 1998Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.


September 8 – 9, 1998Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.




September 29, 1998Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

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Documents Voted on by the Board—

By Agency

Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77Army Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,854Carter Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Church Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,079Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20DIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5DOJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63DOJ Civil Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Eisenhower Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,013Ford Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133HSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,421JCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Johnson Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Kennedy Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31NARA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

203

APPENDIX FSUMMARY OF REVIEW BOARD VOTES ON RECORDS

NSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246NSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Office of the Secretary of Defense . . 3PFIAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Pike Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Warren Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70Total Documents* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29,420

Sub TotalsMilitary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,015Libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267Other Gov. Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,079FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,013HSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,421

*Accurate as of 9–12–1998. Some documentsmay be counted more than once due to mul-tiple consideration by the Review Board.

Documents Processed by the Board—Consent Releases

By Agency

Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929Army Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,075Carter Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Church Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,172Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64DIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30DOJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1DOJ Civil Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Eisenhower Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,509Ford Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280HSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,480JCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261Johnson Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

Kennedy Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89NARA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11NSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84NSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227Office of the Secretary of Defense . . 22Pike Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Warren Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393Total* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,176

Sub Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,317Libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569Other Gov. Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,172FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,509HSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,480

*Accurate as of 9–12–1998.

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FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to acknowledge the following indi-viduals who contributed to the success of this project:

Former Staff Members of Assassination Records Review Board

David G. Marwell, Executive DirectorT. Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director and General CounselThomas E. Samoluk, Deputy Director and Associate Director for Communications Sheryl L. Walter, General CounselPhilip D. Golrick, Chief Analyst for FBI Records/CounselMary S. McAuliffe, Chief Analyst for CIA RecordsThomas L. Wilborn, Press and Public Affairs OfficerTimothy A. Wray, Chief Analyst for Military RecordsChristopher M. Barger, AnalystMosemarie D. Boyd, AnalystEugene A. Burpoe, Senior AnalystAnne E. Buttimer, Chief InvestigatorJessica L. DiFrisco, AnalystCarrie J. Fletcher, AnalystAndrew J. Funk, AnalystNoelle C. Gray, Technical Assistant for Research and AnalysisKim A. Herd, Senior Attorney/AnalystManuel E. Legaspi, AnalystTammi S. Long, Attorney/AnalystJoseph R. Masih, AnalystChristina P. Mays, Administrative AssistantDavid R. Montague, Senior InvestigatorDennis J. Quinn, Attorney/Senior AnalystD. Sydney Reddy, AnalystBrian E. Rosen, Attorney/Senior AnalystValerie M. Sails, Special Assistant to the Executive DirectorEric N. Scheinkopf, AnalystMichelle M. Seguin, AnalystJoan G. Zimmerman, Senior Analyst

Interns

Robert R. ArreolaTracy L. BrandtChristopher J. BurtonNabeena ChatterjeeDelaney M. DiStefanoRochelle JuelichFarand KanKrista B. LaBelleFrank P. MennaDaniel D. Wedemeyer

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Agency Personnel

Steven D. Tilley, Chief, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARAMartha Murphy, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARASteven Hamilton, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARARamona Branch Oliver, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARARoland Bordley, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARAMatt Fulgham, Center for Legislative Archives, NARAKris Wilhelm, Center for Legislative Archives, NARADave Brown, Initial Processing/Declassification Division, NARALes Waffen, Motion Picture and Audiovisual Branch, NARAAlan Lewis, Motion Picture and Audiovisual Branch, NARAMargaret Ann Kelly, Document Conservation Laboratory, NARAJohn Constance, Director, Congressional Affairs, NARAWilliam Grover, Special Access and FOIA Staff, NARAMiriam Nisbet, Office of General Counsel, NARAJohn Collingwood, Assistant Director for Press and Congressional Affairs, FBICarol Keeley, Chief, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBILuAnn Wilkins, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBIDebbie Beatty, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBICarl Valentine, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBITerry O’Connor, Former Inspector in Charge, JFK Task Force, FBIP. Grant Harmon, Supervisory Special Agent, JFK Task Force, FBIJ. Barry Harrelson, Chief, JFK Project, Historical Review Program, CIAJohn Pereira, Former Chief, Historical Review Group, CIAJames Oliver, Chief, Historical Review Program, CIANina Noring, Department of StateHugh Woodward, Department of StateBruce Miller, Department of the Treasury, United States Customs ServiceAnthony Radosti, Metropolitan Crime Commission of New OrleansEdmund McBride, Joint Staff SecretariatWill Kammer, Joint Staff SecretariatPaul Jacobsmeyer, Joint Staff SecretariatToni Bowie, United States ArmyClay Ferris, United States ArmyElaine Rogic, IRR, United States ArmyPhyllis Birckhead, IRR, United States ArmyClaudia Collins, Chief, Information Security Policy, National Security AgencyLee Schroyer, JFK Act Project Officer, National Security AgencyLisa Salvetti, Deputy Director of Access Management, National Security CouncilJohn D. Podesta, The White HouseKimberly Newman, Office of Management and BudgetMaya Bernstein, Office of PolicyCalvin Snowden, Former Director, Agency Liaison Division, General Services AdministrationCassandra Browner, Agency Liaison Division, General Services AdministrationNicholas M. Freda, Typography and Design Division, U.S. Government Printing OfficeCarlotta Wells, Civil Division, Department of JusticeArt Goldberg, Civil Division, Department of JusticeTina Houston, Lydon Baines Johnson Presidential LibraryStephanie Fawcett, John F. Kennedy Presidential LibraryMegan Desoyners, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library

The Assassination Records Review Board would also like to thank the numerous federal offi-cials who were formally designated to ensure agency compliance with the JFK Act.

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Cogressional Staff

Donald GoldbergDaniel MollJeff SchaffnerBrian DettelbachKevin Sabo

The Eastman Kodak Company

James MilchFred WilliamsonJim TonerRoland Zavada

Participants in Additional Ballistics Testing

Armed Forces Institute of PathologyDr. Mitchell Holland, Chief, Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL)Edwin Huffine, Chief DNAAnalyst, AFDILDr. Jerry Spencer, The Armed Forces Medical Examiner

FBI LaboratoryDr. Chris Allen, Hairs and Fibers UnitSteven Burmeister, Chief, Chemistry UnitDouglas Deedrick, Chief, Trace Evidence UnitDr. Joseph DiZinno, Chief, DNA-II UnitRobert Fram, Trace Evidence UnitDonald Havekost, Materials Analysis UnitRonald Menold, Chemistry UnitCharles Peters, Materials Analysis UnitDr. Jenifer Lindsey Smith, Chief, DNA-I UnitRobert Sibert, Deputy Chief, Scientific Analysis Section

Independent ConsultantsDr. Mary Baker, Smithsonian Center for Materials Research (SCMRE)Dr. Michael Zimmerman, Maimonides Medical Center

Experts at Review Board Experts’ Conferences

May 1995The Quest for Additional Records and InformationG. Robert BlakeyDavid GarrowPaul HochJames LesarDavid LiftonJohn NewmanDavid Slawson

April 1998The Problem of SecrecySteven AftergoodSteven GarfinkelDavid GarrowMorton HalperinWilliam LearyMike LostumboKate MartinRoslyn MazerPage Putnam MillerMary RonanBritt SnyderEvan Thomas

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Leslie AtkinsonJoyce LarkinSteve KatzRichard HertlingMichelle Mrdeza

Washington, D.C., October 11, 1994Daniel AlcornMartin BarkleyMax HollandJohn JudgeWilliam KellyJames LesarHarrison LivingstonePage Putnam MillerJohn NewmanCharles SandersPeter Dale ScottDaryll WeatherlyMark Zaid

Dallas, Texas, November 18, 1994Gary AguilarAdele E.U. EdisenGary MackJim MarrsBeverly Oliver MassegeeJohn McLaughlinWallace MilamDavid MurrahSteve OsbornRoy SchaefferMartin ShackelfordKenneth SmithPhilip TenbrinkRobert VernonThomas Wilson

Boston, Massachusetts, March 24, 1995George Michael EvicaPriscilla Johnson McMillanPhilip Melanson

Dick RussellEdgar TatroSteve TilleyRichard Trask

New Orleans, Louisiana, June 28, 1995The Honorable Lindy BoggsThe Honorable Harry F. Connick, Sr.Wayne EverardMichael KurtzSteve TilleyStephen TylerCynthia Anne Wegmann

Washington, D.C., August 6, 1996Barry HarrelsonJohn PereiraSteve Tilley

Los Angeles, California, September 17, 1996David BelinJames DiEugenioEric HamburgWesley LiebelerDavid LiftonJames RankinRobert TanenbaumSteve Tilley

Washington D.C., Wednesday, April 2, 1997Robert BrauneisDebra ConwayJames LesarArt SimonJosiah ThompsonRichard TraskMoses Weitzman

Witnesses at Public Hearings of the Assassination Records Review Board

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The Review Board would also like to thank the many private citizens with whom it maintainedcontact throughout its tenure. We thank you for your interest, your suggestions, and your support.