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World History 9

Ethan Fisher

THE 1938 MUNICH AGREEMENT:BRITAIN SETTLED FOR HOPE OVER CONFRONTATION

DESPITE CREDIBLE OPTIONS TO OPPOSE HITLER

8 May 2012

Mr. Adkison

Word Count: 5085


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I. Events Leading to Hitlers Exploitation of Britishs Foreign Policy

In the words of Sun Tzu, a prominent Chinese military general: If ignorantboth of your enemy and yourself, you are certain to be in peril.1 During the month ofSeptember 1938, leaders of Western Europe were in desperate need of some SunTzu guidance. After several months of diplomacy, Neville Chamberlain, BritainsPrime Minister, decided to negotiate with Hitler directly on his belief that war woulderupt by October if an agreement with Hitler was not reached. As a result,Chamberlains decision to do so was a surprise to the British Parliament, the rest ofWestern Europe and even Hitler himself. Fundamentally, Chamberlain wasdetermined, at all cost, to avoid a confrontation with Hitler believing Hitler could bereasoned with.2 Furthermore, Chamberlain was willing to sacrifice others sovereignland and ultimately did so through the signing of the Munich Agreement which forcedCzechoslovakia to give up a part of its country, the Sudetenland.

Instead of taking a stand against Hitler, Britain and her appeasement policysettled for hope over other credible options. With that said, there were a series ofsignificant events during this September period that questioned whether the Munich Agreement should have been signed. In the first place, the Czechoslovakian armymay have had the ability to defend itself from Germany on its own without the need ofimmediate support from France or Britain. Moreover, there were inconsistent reportsas to the size and strength of Germanys military force. Lastly and most importantly,Britain was aware that various German generals were not supportive of Hitler andwere willing to stage a coup if Czechoslovakia was invaded. Accordingly, thismindset may have also signaled a broader lack of support from the German peopleas a whole. 3 To illustrate, a British official wrote to Chamberlains office in September

11 about the German peoples lack of interest of war by stating:

Public opinion is much alarmed at Germany military measures which as theyincreases in scope, are becoming more widely known. There is a general fearthat an attack of Czechoslovakia may lead to a European war, which Germanywould be likely to lose.4

1 Sun, Tzu. The Art of War. (Middlesex: Echo Library, 2006).2 Hughes, Michael. British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919-1939 . (London: Routledge, 2006).3 Ibid.4 Ibid.


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but no longer within its borders.11 In his policy of expansion, Hitler first targeted Austria. In 1938, he successfully reached agreement with Austrias government. Ineffect, this agreement allowed Hitler to annex Austria without a single gunshot. WithGermany showing off its military strength on the border with Austria, Hitler was ableto convince Austria to vote for the annexation by Germany. In March 1938, Hitler ledthe march into Austria without any bloodshed.12 Choosing to ignore this, Britaincontinued to support Hitlers actions;Chamberlain continued to express willingnessto improve relations with Berlin in order to secure the kind of European pacificationthat had been dreamt of by British governments goal since 1919.13

Shortly after Austria was annexed, Hitler next turned his efforts to reclaimparts of Czechoslovakia. In May 1938, Hitler put in place a plan to invadeCzechoslovakia. According to a letter from General Keitel, the Chief of the German Armed Forces, a detailed plan stated the preparations for war and clarified that itsexecution must be assured by October 1, 1938, at the latest. 14 WithinCzechoslovakia there was a Sudeten German Party that represented the borderinglands with Germany that were still populated by mostly German decent. Under theadvice of Hitler, the leader of the Sudeten German Party negotiated with theCzechoslovakian Government on disputes it had and further discussed the possibilityof breaking away to join with Germany. Hitler advised the Sudeten German Party tokeep demanding for more, even though the Czechoslovakian Government gave in onnearly all of the original issues.15 By July 1938, the negotiations were breaking downand Germany made it clear that it would not back down. As a precaution, NevilleHenderson, British ambassador to Germany, advised Chamberlain not to take anaggressive position against Hitler because a blow to Hitlers prestige might well havecontrary effect and drive him over the edge.16 During this period of negotiations,

Britain informed Germany that she was asking Czechoslovakia to be generous andconciliatory 17 towards Germanys growing demands. While the British governmentwanted to maintain peace, they had little interest in Czechoslovakia. In fact, they did

11 May, Ernest R., Richard N. Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner. History and Neorealism . (Cambridge: CambridgeUP, 2010).12 Hughes, Michael. British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919-1939 . (London: Routledge, 2006).13 Ibid.14 Schmitt, B.Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Vol. II. Series D (London: 1950).15 Wiegrefe, Klaus. "The Road to World War II: How Appeasement Failed to Stop Hitler."Spiegel Online . 2 Aug.2009.16 Woodward, E. L. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Vol. 2. (London: H.M. Stationery Off. 1946).17 Ibid.


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not view her of any strategic importance.18 Likewise, France also did not favormilitary action regarding Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, France was prepared tohonor their treaty to come to Czechoslovakias aid if invaded, as they did not trustHitler. As communicated to Britain, France had no illusion to Hitlers real objective inCzechoslovakia. He wanted to destroy her and this would be merely the first stepin Hitlers policy of expansion.19

Throughout the crisis over the Sudetenland, Britain had not indicated toGermany if they would defend Czechoslovakia, preferring to keep Germanyguessing. 20 With that said however, Chamberlain still wanted to appease Hitler. In aneffort to assist in the negotiations between Czechoslovakia and the Germany-supported Sudeten Party, Chamberlain sent an official, Lord Runciman, to helpmediate the discussions in July 1938. 21 With this intention, it was made clear to allthat Runciman was not to make decisions on the disputes, only to provide anotheropinion to discussions.22 However, this effort failed and by September 1938, thecrisis over Sudetenland had escalated to a point where military conflict was likely.Not to mention, the language used between governments grew more direct, and inSeptember 1938, Hitler stated with regards to the Sudetenland , I am determined tosettle it. I do not care whether there is a world war or not.23 At the same time,Neville Henderson, British foreign minister, communicated about Germany toChamberlain on September 3, 1938 that a German official said there was a

lack of enthusiasm in the country for war and went so far as to observe thatthis lack of enthusiasm in the back areas would be a serious handicap after thefirst few months of war, if it occurred. Nor were the generals themselvesenthusiastic. Their instructions were to be 100 percent ready for alleventualities as from a certain date, but, so far as he could discover, they hadno other instructions and no information as to the Chancellors [Hitler] real

intentions.24

In spite of this, German troops were moving to the border and Czechoslovakiantroops were actively preparing. Chamberlain, nevertheless, still remained confident

18 Aulach, H. "Britain and the Sudeten Issue, 1938: The Evolution of a Policy." Journal of Contemporary History18.2 (1983).19 Ibid.20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 Woodward, E. L. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Vol. 2. (London: H.M. Stationery Off. 1946).23 May, Ernest R., Richard N. Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner. History and Neorealism . (Cambridge: CambridgeUP, 2010).24 Woodward, E. L. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Vol. 2. (London: H.M. Stationery Off. 1946).


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Hitler did order an invasion of Czechoslovakia, Britain would support Czechoslovakia.However, each of these requests was counter to Chamberlains policy of appeasingHitler in the hope of obtaining peace. In the same meeting, the German officialindicated that the views of the German generals were consistent with the views of thepeople who were terribly alarmed at the prospect of war.30

Additional contacts were made in September to Lord Halifax in which Britishassistance was asked for again in the form of a public statement declaring that theBritish government was not supportive of Germany attacking Czechoslovakia.Moreover, Lord Halifax was also told that the German army was ready to take actionagainst Hitler if necessary but only if the Britain opposed Hitler.31 Chamberlain,however, remained very skeptical on the German approach of overthrowing Hitler,and in reference to the August 11 meeting Chamberlain said that he viewed theGerman official as:

very anti-Hitler and is extremely anxious to stir up his friends in Germany tomake an attempt at its overthrown. He reminds me of the Jacobites at theCourt of France in King Williams time and I think we must discount a gooddeal of what he says.32

While it is logical to be skeptical, it does not appear that the British governmenttested the integrity of the German conspirators.

Without doubt, General Beck was very outspoken against any military actionupon a sovereign country and did not support the idea of attacking ethnic Germans toacquire land, like in the case of Austria and now Czechoslovakia.33 Becks oppositionto Hitlers tactics were documented in his letter dated July 16 to the GermanCommander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch, criticizing Hitler for not caringabout the whole of the people. As a sign of taking steps against Hitler, Beck added,Extraordinary times call for extraordinary actions.34 Although Beck did resign fromhis position in protest to Hitlers strategy, Hitler kept Beck involved until lateSeptember most likely because Hitler did not want to show any signs of weakness

30 Ibid.31 Rothfels, Hans, Adolf Hitler, and Lawrence Wilson.The German Opposition to Hitler; an Assessment . (London:Wolff, 1973).32 Woodward, E. L. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Vol. 2. (London: H.M. Stationery Off. 1946).33 "The Valkyrie Conspiracy."German Generals 1938 Conspiracy to Oust Hitler Regime , http://www.valkyrie-plot.com/1938/html.34 Rothfels, Hans, Adolf Hitler, and Lawrence Wilson.The German Opposition to Hitler; an Assessment . (London:Wolff, 1973).


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within his military while negotiating with the British. Supported by several generals,the plan to remove Hitler remained in place up until late September when it was clearBritain was not going to consider the conspirators plan as an option. Clearly, theoption to completely drive out Hitlers Regime should have been put into moreconsideration as it may have prevented the signing of the Munich Agreement and thebeginning of World War II.

III. The Relative Military Strengths of Germany

In addition to the lack of support from Hitlers own army, an important pointthat was overlooked was the actual the strength of the German army. In the decadesfollowing the war, the facts were clear: the German army was not nearly as strong aspublicly advertised; thus, a battle against Czechoslovakia would not have endedquickly. In the years before and during the Czechoslovakian crisis, the size of theGerman military was greatly exaggerated. In particular, General Maurin, the FrenchMinister of War, reported in 1936 that Hitler had close to 300,000 men in uniform,the equivalent of 21-22 divisions 35 in the Rhineland and another 900,000 inreserves. Yet it was well known that Hitler had only 30,000 troops in the Rhineland atthe time.36 By the same token, the British government also overestimated the abilityof Hitlers army. Unsatisfied with the amount of money Britain was spending onrebuilding its military, Churchill talked up the size of the Germany forces as early as1934. Hence, Churchill wrote:

a disaster of the first magnitude had fallen upon us. Hitler had alreadyobtained parity with Great Britain. Henceforward he had merely to drive hisfactories and training-schools at full speed, not only to keep his lead in the air

but steadily to improve it!

quantity was henceforth beyond us.37

As well, British General Edmund Ironside naively commented in August 1938: TheGerman Army is really big. They have 48 divisions! They then have 20 reservedivisions and 36 Landwehr divisions38 for a grand total of 104 divisions.Suspiciously, a month later the British military attach gave a report that stated35 Ben-Arie, K. "Czechoslovakia at the Time of 'Munich': The Military Situation."Journal of Contemporary History 25.4 (1990).36 Ibid.37 Baldwin, Hanson W. "Hitler's Power in 1939."The New York Times 9 May 1948.38 Ben-Arie, K. "Czechoslovakia at the Time of 'Munich': The Military Situation."Journal of Contemporary History 25.4 (1990).


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Germany had only 31 divisions on the Czechoslovakian border.39 Additionally,Charles Lindbergh, a famous American living in Germany, also made various publicstatements in Paris and London that Germany had 8,000 military planes and couldbuild 1,500 a month.40 However, Dr. Carroll Quigley, a renowned professor atGeorgetowns School of Foreign Service, conducted extensive research of theGermany military strength, which included access to confidential documents. In hisstudy, Quigley concluded that Germany only had approximately 1,500 planes, fewhundred of 38-ton-tanks armed with 75mm cannons, and only produced 50 of thesetanks a month -- a vast difference from what General Edmund Ironside advertised.41 Clearly, Germanys motive was to inflate the size of its military in order to scareWestern Europe. On the contrary, we now know Germanys military was stillrelatively weak in 1938.

Equally important, despite what was advertised about Germans militarystrength, the actual views within the British government were mixed. Evidently, theseviews should have directly impacted Britains strategy during the Czechoslovakiancrisis. For example, in July 1938, British military attach Mason-MacFarlane wasquite unconvinced that the [German] military evidence now at our disposal definitelyindicates a clear intention to march this autumn.42 Halifax spoke of Germanysmisinformation to Henderson in August citing the recurrence of reports of troopmovements in this or that place, which when investigated turn out baseless.43 Despite the inconclusive views of German military strength, Chamberlain rushed tomake a deal with Hitler, almost as if Germany had the ability to take over the world. As indicated, the inconsistent reports of the German army should have triggeredsome hesitation to the signing of the Munich Agreement.

IV. The Relative Military Strengths of Czechoslovakia

Notwithstanding the contradictions of the size of the German army, what reallymattered in this analysis is how the German army compared to the strength of theCzechoslovakian military. In 1938, the Czechoslovak army comprised 17 infantry

39 Ibid.40 Dr. Quigley Explains How Germany in 1938 Conquered a Then More Powerful Czechoslovakia - An Exchangeof Correspondence between Mr. Jay Burke and Dr. Carroll Quigley." Professor Carroll Quigley .41 Ibid.42 Woodward, E. L. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Vol. 2. (London: H.M. Stationery Off. 1946).43 Ibid.


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and 4 mobile divisions. Full mobilizations yielded a further 17 reserve divisions,giving a field army of 38 divisions.44 In addition, there were approximately another15 divisions along its borders. While Czechoslovakia had a much larger infantry,Germany was more superior in the air. However, in September, the weather waspoor and it was not likely that there was good visibility,45 giving the Czechs theadvantage. Even within the British military, the view was that the Czechoslovakianmilitary was not only prepared to fight but that they also wanted to fight. InSeptember 1938, Lieutenant Colonel Stronge, British Military Attache, provided abriefing of the Czechoslovakian military readiness:

The Czech General Staff undoubtedly have a capacity for organization, and I

do not expect any serious hitch in the process of rapid mobilization!

For anarmy which is not absolutely of the front rank the equipment, especially asregards arms, is surprisingly good. The country has the advantage ofpossessing an arms industry which can vie with any other in the world! Mypersonal opinion is that the morale of the Czech army and nation is high! Tosum it up, there are no shortcomings in the Czech army.46

Despite the overwhelming evidence of Czechoslovakias ability to defend itselfif the dispute came to war, Britains diplomat in Berlin, Neville Henderson himself

asserted that he thought the Czechs would collapse much quicker than people think,after the first week or two.47 With that said, Chamberlain maintained his agenda and,within two weeks of Strongs report, Chamberlain launched his direct negotiationswith Hitler, against the wishes of his Parliament. In comparing the two forces, what isclear is that neither would have found an easy victory nor would one force dominateover the other. This view also assumes that no other country would have come to theaid of Czechoslovakia.

V. Historians and Scholars Perspectives

As indicated, the analysis of whether the Munich Agreement should have beensigned has been based on the following principles: i) information that Britain had atthe time in terms of a possible coup against Hitler; ii) the relative strength of the

44 Ben-Arie, K. "Czechoslovakia at the Time of 'Munich': The Military Situation." Journal of Contemporary History 25.4 (1990).45 Ibid.46 Woodward, E. L. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Vol. 2. (London: H.M. Stationery Off. 1946).47 Ibid.


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German army; iii) the relative strength of the Czech military. With regards to this, it isclear that there is room for doubt. The signing of the Munich Agreement has beenanalyzed by several historians as one of the most critical moments leading up toWorld War II. Decades after the event, the Munich Agreement has become one ofthe most controversial treaties signed in the twentieth century raising debates amonghistorians and scholars. Christopher Lane, in his paper Debunking the 1930s

Analogy , believed that it was unfair to blame Chamberlain for failing to see Hitlersreal intentions. If Chamberlain had recognized that fact, the Munich Agreement wouldnot have happened. As Lane concluded, Hitlers ultimate intentions were far fromclear ! [And] until the aftermath of the Munich crisis, Hitlers stated goals werescarcely different from 1926 Noble Peace Prize co-laureate German Foreign MinisterGustav Stresemann who was perceived as a champion of Germanys reconciliationwith Britain and France.48 In like manner, other scholars believed that Chamberlainwas a strong leader who was caught in a difficult and impossible situation; hence,they argued that appeasement was the only political solution and that Chamberlainacted in Britains best interest. In particular, R.A.C Parker viewed that appeasementwas the only option as Britain did not have the economic strength to fight Germanynor did she have the military capability to go to war due to decline in militaryspending. With that said, these scholars stand as a minority in believing that theleaders of the European super powers could not have foreseen Hitlers trueintentions and his abilities as a world aggressor.

Yet, the facts were quite compelling for Britain to counter Hitler. Instead,Chamberlain repeatedly gave into Hitlers demands. Not only did Hitler violate theTreaty of Versailles by entering the Rhineland, but he also annexed Austria and thendemanded the Sudetenland. In light of all this, Chamberlain still believed he could

appease Hitler. Given that the German army was not as strong during this time, thecoalition of Europe could have easily defeated Hitler and remove him from power.Niall Ferguson in his research of the invasion of Czechoslovakia stated that Hitlerhimself admitted that he was greatly disturbed when he was informed of theCzechoslovakia preparedness. 49 Adding to this, Germanys economics were not inthe best shape to go to war. Katriel Ben-Arie believed that Germans financial

48 Layne, Christopher. "Debunking the 1930's Analogy: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Re-Examined."Note De Recherche Working Paper 21 (2006): 1-61. Print.49 May, Ernest R., Richard N. Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner. History and Neorealism . Cambridge: Cambridge UP,2010. Print.


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countries other than pro-German attitudes by influencing the arms budgets ofboth Britain and her principal ally at crucial points during the 1930s.52 But one canthelp but wonder if the policies that led to the Munich Agreement were driven moresimply on the personal attitudes of Chamberlain towards Hitler. As summarized inRobert Becks Munichs Lessons Reconsidered , Chamberlain thought that Hitlermeant what he said and that he had come to believe that Hitler was telling thetruth and that he had formed the opinion that Hitlers objectives were strictlylimited.53 As history dictates, Chamberlain was wrong.

VI. Concluding Remarks

All things considered, the question remains: Should the Munich Agreementhave ever been signed? Compelling evidence suggests there was no reason toconcede to all of Hitlers demands. In doing so, Hitlers was able to strengthen andexpand his power; it led Hitler to believe that he was unstoppable. With hisappeasement policy, Chamberlain absolutely believed he could preserve peace bygiving in to all of Hitlers demands. In fact, Chamberlain left Munich believing that byappeasing Hitler he had assured 'peace for our time'. Chamberlain returned home toa cheering crowd. In contrast, Winston Churchill, a member of the British Parliament,strongly disagreed with Chamberlains policy by declaring: You were given thechoice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war. In aspeech before the House of Commons on October 5, 1938, Churchill warned:

We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude. . . . we havesustained a defeat without a war. . . . And do not suppose that this is theend! I fear we shall find that we have deeply compromised, and perhaps

fatally endangered, the safety and even the independence of Great Britain andFrance.54

As Churchill dreadfully predicted, reality quickly set in. Six months later, Hitler brokethe Munich Agreement and seized the rest of Czechoslovakia. And in September1939, he invaded Poland, formally setting the stage for World War II a war

52 Walker, Stephen G. "Solving the Appeasement Puzzle: Contending Historical Interpretations of BritishDiplomacy during the 1930."British Journal International Studies 6 (1980): 219-46. Print.53 Beck, Robert J. "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered." The MIT Press 2nd ser. 14: 161-91. Print.54 Churchill, Winston. The Munich Agreement. WinstonChurchill.org. June 2011. Web. 6 May 2012.


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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aulach, H. "Britain and the Sudeten Issue, 1938: The Evolution of a Policy." Journalof Contemporary History 18.2 (1983): 233-59. Print.

Aulach is associated with the World University Service (Canada) and waspreviously a member of the Indian Foreign Service and served in embassies atBonn and Prague. The article takes the view that Frances relationship withCzechoslovakia caused a diplomatic problem for England who did not want toget involved from the start. The book also provides an interesting insight into thethinking of British government during this period.

Baldwin, Hanson W. "Hitler's Power in 1939."The New York Times 9 May 1948.Print.

Hanson Weightman Baldwin (March 22, 1903 - November 13, 1991) was thelong-time military editor of the New York Times. He won a Pulitzer Prize for hiscoverage of the early days of World War II. He authored and edited numerousbooks on military topics. I am using this article for the German and Czech armyinformation and what the British government knew at the time of the crisis.

Beck, Robert J. "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered." The MIT Press 2nd ser. 14: 161-91. Print.

An Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin

Milwaukee, Beck also teaches in the Global Studies degree program. Beckspaper outlines certain defenses to Chamberlains decision making leading up tothe Munich Agreement.

Ben-Arie, K. "Czechoslovakia at the Time of 'Munich': The Military Situation."Journalof Contemporary History 25.4 (1990): 431-46. Print.

Ben-Arie teaches contemporary history and military history at the Technion(Technological University) in Haifa. Bene-Arie examines the military strength of


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Czechoslovakia during the crisis, the morale of the military leaders and what wascommunicated to Britain during this period.

Churchill, Winston. "The Munich Agreement." June 2011. www.winstonchurchill.org.6 May 2012. Web.

Winston Churchill was political leader of the opposing party to Chamberlain during1938 and ultimately succeeded Chamberlain. This is Churchills speech to theCommons on October 5, 1938, detailing his views of why the Munich Agreementwas a bad decision.

Dr. Quigley Explains How Germany in 1938 Conquered a Then More PowerfulCzechoslovakia - An Exchange of Correspondence between Mr. Jay Burkeand Dr. Carroll Quigley."Professor Carroll Quigley . Web. 25 Jan. 2012..

Dr. Quigley is a professor at Georgetown University on Foreign affairs. This is aletter to a student. He wrote this letter with classified documents as proof. CarrollQuigley (November 9, 1910 January 3, 1977) was an American historian andtheorist of the evolution of civilizations. He is noted for his teaching work as aprofessor at Georgetown University, for his academic publications, and for hisresearch on secret societies. The letter is a communication between Quigleyand a student who was questioning certain conclusions. Quigley made it publiclyknown what Britain knew during the period of the crisis with respect to German

military strength.

Hoffmann, Peter. "Peace through Coup D'tat: The Foreign Contacts of the GermanResistance 19331944." Central European History 19.01 (1986): 3. Print.

Provides detailed quotes and insights to German resistance in 1933. PeterHoffmann is a William Kingsford Professor at McGill University and has

published several books on the German resistance. His books are written in bothEnglish and German. http://webpages.mcgill.ca/staff/group3/phoffm/web/


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Hughes, Michael. British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919-1939 .London: Routledge, 2006. Print.

The Foreign Office has been a symbol of British imperialism and diplomacy sinceVictorian times. The end of World War I and the rising storm that followedchanged the nature of the office and its relationship with the rest of thegovernment. This book examines the careers of the men who served as BritishForeign Secretary between 1919 and 1939, focusing in particular on the ways inwhich they sought to mold foreign policy during their time in office. Interestinganalysis of the British government published bookDocuments of British ForeignPolicy from 1919-1939 ; provides first person communications and discussions.

Layne, Christopher. "Debunking the 1930's Analogy: Neville Chamberlain's GrandStrategy Re-Examined." Note De Recherche Working Paper 21 (2006): 1-61.Print.

At the time of writing this article, Christopher Layne was an associate professor atthe Busch School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.Layne provides an analysis defending Chamberlains decisions during the Munichcrisis. This analysis is helpful in providing some balance to the research.

May, Ernest R., Richard N. Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner. History and Neorealism .Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print.

Niall Ferguson's chapter Realism and risk in 1938: German foreign policy andthe Munich Crisis. Ferguson is a renowned historian. Ferguson provides ananalysis of the period just prior to the signing of the Munich Agreement. He iscritical of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlains decision during this period.

Milton, Richard.Best of Enemies: Britain and Germany : 100 Years of Truth and Lies .Thriplow, UK: Icon, 2007. Print.


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Richard Milton (born 1943) is a British journalist and writer who deals with oftenhighly controversial subjects. Milton, an engineer by training, has published onthe topics of popular history, business, scientific controversies and alternativescience and has published a novel.

Parker, R.A.C. Struggles for Survival: The History of the Second World War . OxfordUniversity Press, 1989. Print.

Parker was a British historian specializing in British appeasement policy. Thearticle offers a detailed assessment of Chamberlains appeasement policy.

Ripley, Tim. The Wehrmacht: The German Army of World War II, 1939-1945 . NewYork: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2003. Print.

Tim Ripley is a freelance journalist specializing in modern military affairs, and aresearch associate at Lancaster University's Centre for Defense andInternational Security Studies. Previously he studied the collapse of the WarsawPact while a research fellow at the University of Oxford. He has written a numberof books on military affairs, including Osprey's Desert Storm Special, LandPower, The Coalition and Iraqi Armies. Some good information on the size ofthe German military during 1938. Used it to cross check certain facts from othersources.

Rothfels, Hans, Adolf Hitler, and Lawrence Wilson.The German Opposition to Hitler;an Assessment . London: Wolff, 1973. Print.

Rothfels translated from German Lawrence Wilson's book with the support of theFoundation for Foreign Affairs, which is a non-profit corporation, devoted to thepromotion of a wider understanding of international relations - political, economicand cultural. This book provides a detailed analysis of the communicationbetween certain German generals and the British government during 1938.

Schmitt, B. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Vol. II. Series DLondon: 1950. Print.


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This volume covers the documentary record of German policy with regard to theCzechoslovak crisis. Having the exact records of dialogue between Germangovernment officials provides direct insight thinking at the time.

Sun, Tzu. The Art of War . Middlesex: Echo Library, 2006. Print.

Used a quote from book on military strategy. I was looking for a quote and Ithought this was very relevant and representative of the situation Chamberlainwas faced with during this period of time.

True Stories: Peace in Our Time . Dir. Jan Nemec and Otto Olejr. Perf. NicolWilliamson. Channel 4 Television Corporation, 1988. Internet Re-broadcast.

Documentary account of the events leading up to the Munich Agreement of 1938using newsreel footage (mostly Movietone); contains interviews with witnessesand historians. The "leading players" are referred to by nicknames (Hitler is thegodfather, Mussolini the fixer, Chamberlain the dealer, Joseph Kennedy thebusinessman, etc.). The interviews with former Czech military and Britishgovernment officials or their relatives provide good direct analysis on what washappening at the time.

"The Valkyrie Conspiracy." German Generals 1938 Conspiracy to Oust HitlerRegime . Web. 20 Jan 2012. .

This site lists a summary of events that occurred in 1938 specific to the first coupattempt.

Walker, Stephen G. "Solving the Appeasement Puzzle: Contending HistoricalInterpretations of British Diplomacy during the 1930."British JournalInternational Studies 6 (1980): 219-46. Print.

Stephen G. Walker is Professor Emeritus in the School of Politics and GlobalStudies at Arizona State University. Walker analyzes the decision making of the


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British government as they chose between negotiation and military action duringthe Munich crisis.

Wiegrefe, Klaus. "The Road to World War II: How Appeasement Failed to StopHitler."Spiegel Online . 2 Aug. 2009. Web. .

An informative article about the years leading up to World War II andChamberlains policy of appeasement. He is in charge of the contemporaryhistory section for Germanys Der Spiegel, a German weekly news article witha weekly citation of over one million.

Woodward, E. L. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Vol. 2. London:H.M. Stationery Off. 1946. Print. Third Series.

This book is a very valuable resource as this volume covers the documentaryrecord of British policy with regard to the Czechoslovak crisis. Having the exactrecords of dialogue between British government officials provides direct insightthinking at the time.