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Explaining post-Soviet ethnicconflicts: Using regimetype to discern the impactand relative importance ofobjective antecedentsShale HorowitzPublished online: 19 Aug 2010.

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Nationalities Papers, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2001

ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/01/040633-28 © 2001 Association for the Study of NationalitiesDOI: 10.1080/0090599012010212 9

The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed a number of violent, usually secessionistethnic conflicts. These conflicts were typically intensified (or “escalated”) by foreignintervention. Although there is a great deal of consensus about the fundamentalforces driving these conflicts and their escalation, there remain considerable theo-retical differences about how to understand these factors and assess their relativeimportance. These differences mirror debates in the broader literature on nationalidentity and its consequences. This article seeks to clarify these debates byelucidating some theoretical distinctions among the factors taken to contribute to theoutbreak and escalation of violent ethnic conflicts. These distinctions are thenapplied to post-Soviet conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. Thecase studies bear out the relevance of the theoretical distinctions, but also reveal thedifficulty of applying them unambiguously in any given case. These examples formthe basis for some concluding suggestions. These suggestions aim to maximize theclarity with which theoretically distinct causal factors are empirically distinguishedfor purposes of testing hypotheses.

There are two influential ethnic conflict literatures that rarely interact. One focuseson objective sources of ethnic conflict and its escalation, and the other on the nature,formation, and political uses of ethno-national identities. The “objective sources”literature seeks to identify initial conditions that increase the likelihood of ethnicconflict and escalation. Objective factors contributing to violent ethnic conflictinclude historical and contemporary factors making political self-rule seem a moredesirable alternative to the status quo;1 the balance of power between the restiveminor ity and its host s tate , including the expec ted impact of any foreignintervention;2 and the nature of the ethnic minority’s pre-conflict demands, inparticular whether they include increased rights, greater autonomy, or secession.3

Objective factors contributing to foreign intervention in ethnic conflicts includeethnic kinship,4 geopolitical interests,5 and the expected balance of power.6

The second type of literature originates in the primordialist–instrumentalist debate

EXPLAINING POST-SOVIET ETHNIC CONFLICTS:USING REGIME TYPE TO DISCERN THE IMPACT

AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVEANTECEDENTS

Shale Horowitz

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about national identity. This literature focuses on the extent to which nationalidentities are either relatively stable ends in themselves, or relatively malleablemeans to achieve political power and economic wealth.7 This debate is commonlyapplied to explain ethnic conflict and its escalation in the following ways: primor-dialists tend to argue that secessionist conflicts reflect ethnic minorities’ pursuit ofwidely held collective interests in cultural integrity and political self-rule withinhistoric areas of settlement. Instrumentalists tend to argue that secessionist conflictsare used by political elites to compete for power and wealth. Similar arguments canbe made about the reasons for foreign intervention.

In this article, it will be argued that these literatures would benefit from inter-action, and indeed that each is incomplete without the other. Variation in objectivefactors is certainly critical, but these objective factors often have different implica-tions for policymaking, depending on whose interests are being pursued. Forexample, mass opinion may view past oppression by state authorities associated withanother ethnic group as reason for mobilizing to seek political autonomy. On theother hand, eli tes of the previously oppressed ethnic group may resist suchtendencies as threats to their own power and economic wealth. Before the relativeimportance of various objective factors can be assessed, it is necessary to analyzehow different political actors influence policymaking and how their policies comparewith their proclaimed objectives.

It is also true that the primordialist–instrumentalist debate can hardly be settled ona purely theoretical level. Indeed, it is quite possible that either view may be closer tothe truth in any particular case. Hence, it becomes necessary to examine how themost relevant objective conditions are influencing policymaking. This providesinformation about how much political elites have internalized mass conceptions ofnational identity and its path of “true” or “right” development, or how much they arepolitically constrained to pursue such mass conceptions. It can also help reveal howmuch political elites are able to pay lip service to such conceptions while ignoringthem or downgrading them as practical priorities.

The analysis and evidence considered below support the following conclusions.The influence of objective antecedents of ethnic conflict and its escalation cannot beaccurately assessed without establishing whether political decision makers areprioritizing elite or collective interests. Democratic institutions are more likely toimpose collective objectives on political decision makers, regardless of how muchthese decision makers have internalized collective objectives. On the other hand,authoritarian regimes provide opportunities for decision makers to emphasize elite orcollective interests, depending upon which are more important to them. Hence,democratic institutions can be used as a reasonably reliable indicator of pursuit ofcollective interests. In contrast, authoritarian institutions per se are a less reliableindicator that elite interests are being emphasized. The relative importance of eliteand collective interests for authoritarian leaders must be deduced from their policychoices. In particular, it is worth examining whether restrictions on civil liberties and

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government economic policies appear designed above all to monopolize power andprivilege—even at the cost of setbacks to collective interests. Overall, these con-clusions synthesize the strongest elements of the literature focusing on objectiveantecedents and national identities. They do so by emphasizing how variation in thepreferences of state actors causes corresponding differences in responses to importantobjective conditions.

The next section reviews and analyzes commonly used theories of the origins andescalation of ethnic conflict. This is followed by brief discussions of violent post-Soviet ethnic conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. In each case,the commonly hypothesized objective causes of ethnic conflict and its escalation aresummarized. This will make it possible to discuss whether objective factors weremore influential at the level of forming and constraining the pursuit of collectiveinterests in ethno-national development; or whether they mattered more asconstraints on elite interests in maximizing power and wealth.8 The conclusiondiscusses implications for formulating hypotheses about the origins and escalation ofethnic conflict, and for testing such explanations empirically.

Origins and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict

The ethnic conflicts to be examined involve disputes between dominant ethnicgroups, which typically control central state institutions, and ethnic minorities thatpredominate in one or more regions. In particular, we are interested in explainingwhy some conflicts of this type erupt into large-scale violence. Three types ofobjective factors are most commonly discussed as causes of violent ethnic conflicts:(1) the historical and contemporary achievements, political treatment, and oppor-tunities of the ethnic minority in its areas of concentrated settlement; (2) the balanceof power between the predominant (or “titular”) ethnic group and the ethnicminority, including the effects of any institutional resources controlled by the ethnicminority, and the impact of expected or actual intervention on either side by thirdparties; and (3) the nature of the ethnic minority’s political demands.

“Achievements” include historical memories of political independence, politicalinfluence, economic development, and distinctive cultural institutions. These areparticularly potent where they occurred partially or wholly in the current area ofsettlement of the ethnic minority. “Political treatment” refers to past and presentpolicies of titular and other rulers towards the ethnic minority, whether of per-secution and discrimination, or of tolerance and equal status. “Opportunities” includethe presence of significant numbers of ethnic kin in neighboring states. Such apresence offers models and options for greater autonomy or independence.

Ethnic minority control of regional or local institutions is usually viewed as acause for increasing the minority’s desire and capacity to pursue autonomist orseparatist goals. Anticipated or actual intervention by other states, or by subnationalethnic formations in other states, also affects calculations about whether autonomist

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or separatist demands are desirable and feasible. The balance of power between theethnic minority and the titular ethnic group influences expectations about whetherobjectives can, if necessary, be achieved through the use of force.

Finally, the historical and contemporary achievements of ethnic minorities as wellas the treatment they have received, along with the balance of power vis-à-vis thepredominant ethnic group, influence whether ethnic minorities demand greatercultural or political autonomy, or outright separation of ethnic minority regions.Whether separation involves creating a newly independent ethnic minority state, orintegrating into a neighboring state, it represents a more fundamental challenge to thesovereignty of the titular state. Separatist demands, although often deriving fromother sources of conflict, make conflicts more difficult to resolve in a peacefulmanner.

To summarize, the three objective factors involve (1) historical and contemporaryexperiences affecting the appeal of greater autonomy or separation relative to thepolitical status quo; (2) the capacity of the ethnic minority to pursue such goalsunilaterally; and (3) the extent to which such goals threaten the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the titular state. However, it is important to note that thesefactors are ambiguous from the perspective of strategic policy choice. This is truewhether the policy choices at issue are those of the titular authorities, or those ofethnic minority representatives. In particular, analysts often assume that the threefactors are primarily operative at either an elite or a mass level—meaning that it iseither elite or mass objectives or interests that are primary. Where the factors arepresumed to be operative at the elite level, the assumption is often that the elites areprimarily concerned with their own power and economic interests, and onlysecondarily with representing mass preferences. Where the factors are taken tofunction at the mass level, they are assumed to reflect widely held national identitiesand national development goals, which are more or less accurately represented inpolicies made by elites.

Logically speaking, either or both of these levels of analysis may be relevant. Bothare presumably always relevant to some extent, so the real issue is to determine theirrelative importance in specific examples. Even when analyzing particular historicalexamples in detail, it is often difficult to distinguish elite pursuit of power andeconomic interests from elite representation of mass self-determination aspirations.The difference is the most evident when the two types of objectives conflict, that is,when mass self-determination aspirations (“collective interests”) are best served bypolicies that pose a risk to the political survival and economic interests of elites(“elite interests”). In instances of conflicts between collective and elite interests,outcomes tend to be dependent upon regime type. Authoritarian regimes are morelikely to be constructed and maintained by elites more concerned to protect their ownpower and economic interests. Similarly, elites that abide by democratic proceduresare institutionally accountable to mass preferences, and are also more likely to beideologically loyal to such preferences. However, this correlation is far from perfect.

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It is possible for authoritarian leaders to pursue widely held visions of nationaldevelopment at the expense of their own power and economic interests. And it ispossible for elites to use democratic institutions as means to pursue their own powerand economic interests. In the latter case, however, elites risk losing power if they donot pay homage rhetorically and practically to widely held conceptions of collectiveinterests.

“Escalation” refers to third-party intervention in ethnic conflicts. Intervention maybe limited to offering rhetorical encouragement to one side, or it may extend toproviding economic and military aid and even to direct military intervention.Intervention is usually conducted by sovereign states, but may also come fromrelated ethnic communities residing in other states. Escalation is most commonlyexplained using three objective factors: (1) ethnic kinship of external actors witheither the titular ethnic group or the aggrieved ethnic minority; (2) geopoliticalinterests of external actors, typically states, in preserving their territorial integrity andestablishing spheres of influence in strategic regions; and (3) the expected balance ofpower that would follow from more aggressive intervention in a conflict. Ethnickinship and geopolitical interests refer to objectives to be achieved through inter-vention, and the expected balance of power refers to the likelihood of success.

As with the factors influencing the origins of violent ethnic conflict, the factorsinfluencing escalation can be operative at the level of elite or collective interests (orsome combination of the two). Again, it can be difficult to detect a difference unlesspursuit of mass national development goals poses a threat to the political survival andeconomic interests of elites. And once more, pursuit of elite goals at the expense ofmass goals is more likely to occur under authoritarian regimes, and sacrifice of eliteinterests for mass goals is more likely to occur in democracies—although thesecorrelations would not be expected to be perfect.

Ethnic Conflict in Azerbaijan

Historical Sources of Karabakh Armenian Self-Determination Aspirations

During the long centuries when most of the ethnic Armenian population lived underTurkish or other foreign rule, isolated Nagorno-Karabakh (“Mountainous Karabakh”)maintained local autonomy. Karabakh was brought under direct foreign administra-tion only when the Russians conquered the area. The path of conquest, throughAzerbaijan, led Russia to incorporate Karabakh into the administrative region thatincluded Azerbaijan. Against the background of severe Turkish persecution ofArmenians in 1895–1896, anti-Armenian pogroms and Armenian–Azeri fightingbroke out in Baku and other regions in 1905. Following the mass deportation andslaughter of the eastern Anatolian Armenians in 1915, fighting broke out in Russia’sCaucasus region towards the end of World War I, which led to the breakdown ofstate authority. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia declared independence. In a series

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of bitter engagements, Turkish forces joined by Azeri contingents invaded RussianArmenia. Azerbaijani forces were once more placing Karabakh under siege when theRed Army occupied Azerbaijan and then Armenia.

Stalin awarded Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Karabakh was given autonomous statuswithin Azerbaijan, but denied direct borders with Armenia. This decision was neveraccepted by Armenians, whether within Karabakh or Armenia proper. Moreover, theproximity of Armenia, as well as the existence of autonomous Nagorno-Karabakhinstitutions within Azerbaijan, made a revision of borders a more realistic option forthe future. During the Soviet period, despite Karabakh’s nominal autonomy, it wasadministered from Baku and subjected to assimilationist pressures. At the end of theSoviet period, Armenians constituted approximately 75% of Karabakh’s population,and Azeris accounted for almost all of the remainder.9

Balance of Power between Armenians and Azerbaijanis

The Karabakh Armenian movement for integration with Armenia developed in late1987, and was immediately supported by Armenia proper. In both Karabakh andArmenia, the goal was shared by both the nationalist opposition and the localcommunist parties (C.P.s)—although the latter accommodated rather than initiatedthe movement. In any conflict with Azerbaijan, the Soviet center could be expectedto support whichever side would remain loyal to the Soviet Union and its existingprinciples of political organization. Given the relative weakness of Azerbaijan’sreform nationalist movement and the conservatism of the C.P. of Azerbaijan, as wellas the broader implications of altering internal Soviet borders to satisfy Armeniandemands, this meant that the Soviet center would predictably defend the territorialintegrity of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (S.S.R.). After some indecision,during which Karabakh was placed under direct rule of the Soviet center, this isprecisely what happened. Karabakh was returned to Azerbaijani administration.From April 1991, in “Operation Ring,” Soviet troops joined with Azerbaijani policeand interior ministry forces in a campaign of terror against Armenian villages in andaround Karabakh. Although Armenia supported Karabakh’s separatist aspirations,the balance of power was naturally unfavorable to the Karabakh Armenians for aslong as the U.S.S.R. remained intact.

With the Soviet collapse in late 1991, full-scale war broke out in Karabakh. Afteran early period of confusion during which Russia withdrew from involvementbeyond its borders, a Russian sphere of influence was reasserted in what came to becalled the “Near Abroad”—the non-Russian areas of the former U.S.S.R. (except theBaltic states). Subjected to a blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia washighly dependent on Russian support. In Azerbaijan, conservative C.P. elites led byAyaz Mutalibov initially remained in power, and looked to Moscow to control theviolence in Karabakh. Russia initially played a neutral, mediating role. In the mean-time, however, the Karabakh Armenian forces, supported materially and militarily

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from Armenia, were able to seize most of Karabakh. Under the impact of thesedefeats, Mutalibov was deposed by the reform nationalist opposition, the AzerbaijaniPopular Front (A.P.F.). The A.P.F. was strongly pro-Turkish and Western-oriented,which predictably alienated Russia and Iran. At this point, Russia threw its supportbehind Armenia and helped to engineer the overthrow of A.P.F. leader AbulfazElcibey. With Russia firmly committed to Armenia, there was no possibility of inter-vention by Turkey in favor of Azerbaijan. Iran, fearing an Azeri irredentist move-ment among its own huge Azeri population, predictably backed Armenia and lookedfavorably upon Russian intervention. Once Elcibey came to power, Russian inter-vention tipped the balance of power even more strongly in favor of the KarabakhArmenian fighters.10

Karabakh Armenian Demands

From the beginning, the Karabakh Armenians demanded integration with Armenia.The Armenian President, Levon Ter-Petrossian, later decided not to claimsovereignty over Karabakh for diplomatic reasons. This would allow Armenia to castthe conflict as one of Karabakh Armenian self-determination rather than Armenianannexation of foreign territory. Somewhat naively, Ter-Petrossian believed that thiswould make it easier to reach a diplomatic settlement and end the blockade; however,all that this led to was the declaration of an independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic(N.K.R.), that is, Karabakh Armenian goals remained separatist rather than autono-mist in character. Ter-Petrossian wanted the Karabakh Armenians to reduce theirdemands to greater autonomy in exchange for ending the blockade. But they refused,and were supported by at least half of the Armenian public and by the Armeniansecurity forces. This led to an internal struggle for power within Armenia, andultimately to a bloodless coup displacing Ter-Petrossian. He was replaced by hisformer Prime Minister, Robert Kocharian, who had previously been President of theN.K.R.11

Summary of Factors Related to the Origins of the Conflict

The Karabakh Armenians, backed by their ethnic kin in neighboring Armenia, hadextremely strong aspirations for self-determination. This was rooted in the longhistory of struggle against alien rule, attempted ethnocide, war with Turks andAzeris, and in Karabakh, unforgiving Soviet-era rule from Baku. Despite the lateSoviet-era balance of power that was unfavorable to Armenian aspirations, both theKarabakh Armenians and those of Armenia proper broadly supported separatist goalsand were prepared to fight for them. Given the risk of defeat and the quickly evidentcosts of economic blockade, this is a case where elite power and economic interestswere often subordinated to collective self-determination objectives.

Moreover, this was not merely a case of elites deferring to masses in order to stay

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in power, however temporarily. The Armenian C.P. was deeply sympathetic to thereform nationalist cause, and allowed itself to be replaced in power as a result ofArmenia’s May 1990 Supreme Soviet elections. The reform nationalist elites wereobviously taking great personal risks as well. Many of them were imprisoned by theSoviet authorities. In the event of a hard conservative tilt in Moscow, they faced longprison terms at best. Karabakh Armenians were under direct military threat, par-ticularly after the launching of Operation Ring. Later, Levon Ter-Petrossiansupported broadly unpopular concessions to Azerbaijan, risking his position to allowa settlement he believed necessary to secure Armenia’s long-term economic andmilitary security prospects. Under Ter-Petrossian, Armenia’s democracy wasincreasingly marred by vote fraud and harassment of the opposition. But theseviolations appear to have been mostly driven by disagreements over how to pursuecollective interests, and have been largely eliminated under his successor Kocharian.Finally, both Ter-Petrossian and Kocharian emphasized market reform, thussacrificing significant opportunities for patronage. Karabakh elites have struggled forpower and economic privileges, and have harassed political opposition and mediafigures. But compared with conditions in other militarized post-Soviet statelets suchas Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, they have allowed relatively free andfair elections and greater political and economic pluralism.12 To summarize, stronghistorical sources of self-determination objectives played a more important role thanthe predictably adverse balance of power, fueling strong separatist demands thatmade the conflict difficult to settle. Moreover, Armenian elites from Karabakh andArmenia proper appear to have been more strongly influenced by ideologicallyrooted collective interests than by individual interests in power and wealth.

In Azerbaijan, the relative importance of collective and elite interests has followeda more uneven, zigzag-like pattern. The Azerbaijani C.P. leadership subordinatedAzerbaijani collective interests to its own power and economic interests. Thesubordination of collective to elite interests was at least somewhat debatable duringthe Soviet period. Thus, it could be argued that loyalty to Moscow was more likely toallow Azerbaijan to retain possession of Karabakh. Of course, the nationalistopposition did not accept this argument, because this still left Azerbaijan a Sovietcolony. The case became clearer after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. Azerbaijani C.P.leader Mutalibov blocked efforts to construct an Azerbaijani national armed forces,at the cost of larger than necessary military reverses in Karabakh. Instead, he soughtbacking from the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.).But Russia would not do Azerbaijan’s fighting. The Azerbaijani opposition arguedall along that this was clear, and that Mutalibov’s true motive was fear that a large,conscription-based armed forces would become a threat to his power. It is difficult tofigure out an alternative explanation of Mutalibov’s behavior, which left the localArmenians in full control of Karabakh and eventually led to his own downfall.

By contrast, Mutalibov’s successor, A.P.F. leader Elcibey, appeared to prioritizecollective interests over his party’s power and economic interests. He prioritized the

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war in Karabakh over efforts to consolidate control over the armed forces. Althoughthe war interfered with the A.P.F.’s plans for market reform and led to some restric-tions on civil liberties and political freedoms, the record of the A.P.F. government inthese areas was relatively strong. Finally, Elcibey pursued a pro-Turkish foreignpolicy that predictably alienated Russia.13 These decisions facilitated the Russian-backed military coup that toppled Elcibey and the A.P.F. from power. This in turnled to further military reverses at the hands of the Karabakh Armenians. The oppositepriorities are evident in the case of Mutalibov’s successor, the old Azerbaijani C.P.leader and Soviet Politburo member Heidar Aliev. Aliev focused on consolidatingcontrol over the Azerbaijani security forces and crushing the political opposition, andagreed to a ceasefire with the Armenians as soon as his internal opposition waseliminated. His main condition was not any return of Azerbaijani territory, but ratherthat Russian forces would not be based in Azerbaijan. Aliev feared that Russianforces would support further coup attempts in the future. Aliev has since spent muchtime and effort preparing to have his son succeed him in power. Finally, Aliev hasallowed only limited economic reforms, even after the war. He evidently prefers touse government economic policies to enlarge his patronage network. Economicreforms have been truly prevalent only in the energy sector, which promises totransfer large sums directly into state coffers.14

Escalation by Armenia

Armenian support for Karabakh began in the Soviet period, and accelerated after theSoviet collapse. Although Karabakh retained autonomous administrative institutions,the N.K.R. remained military and economically dependent on Armenia. Again, thebalance of power was unfavorable to Armenia during the Soviet period. After theSoviet collapse, the cost of supporting the Karabakh Armenians was a catastrophiceconomic blockade. Although some people got rich smuggling goods across borders,this was not the case for Ter-Petrossian and most of his supporters. In fact, Ter-Petrossian made the decision to risk his own power by trying to force the N.K.R. tocompromise independence so that the blockade could be lifted. As a result, Ter-Petrossian was driven from power—a prospect that he had repeatedly prophesiedwould happen. Again, the only continuously operative motives among the Armenianpolitical elites appear to be collective interests. At various times, both elite powerinterests and elite economic interests were subordinated to collective interests.15

Escalation by Russia

Boris Yeltsin was able to defeat the August 1991 coup because he held the loyalty ofcrucial elements of the Soviet armed forces. These elements were placed in control ofRussia’s armed forces. Although Yeltsin initially pursued a pro-Western, non-interventionist foreign policy, this quickly changed under the pressure of internal

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political events. Yeltsin was confronted by an increasingly hostile Soviet-eraparliament, which played the nationalist card in demanding that Yeltsin defendregional Russian interests. Much of the Russian population as well as the Russianarmed forces were sympathetic to this more aggressive foreign policy. Yeltsin hadlittle choice but to accommodate these demands. As a result, the Russian armedforces, encouraged by the hardliners in parliament, were allowed to conduct a largelyautonomous set of policies in the Near Abroad. These policies often grew spon-taneously out of the local initiatives of Russian troops based abroad in the non-Russian former Soviet republics. Although there were no large populations ofRussians in Armenia or Azerbaijan, the Russian armed forces were interested inlimiting Turkish, Western, and Iranian influence in the region. For a while, thismeant only keeping other outsiders from actively intervening. But once the pro-Turkish and pro-Western Elcibey came to power, intervention in favor of Armenia, ahighly vulnerable and hence reliable ally, became the obvious option. Given thewidespread popular support for these policies among the Russian public, it is difficultto determine the relative importance of Russian collective interests and elite powerand patronage interests in motivating Russian intervention. Both appear to haveplayed a significant role.16

Ethnic Conflicts in Georgia

Historical Sources of Abkhaz and South Ossetian Aspirations for Self-Determination

The Abkhaz language is similar to those of some peoples in the Russian NorthCaucasus region. Historically, there have been a number of self-ruling Abkhaz states.On the other hand, the Abkhaz have been an integrated part of past Georgian states,with Abkhaz elites assimilating into Georgian literary culture. In the 1870s, theRussian conquest forced over half of the Abkhaz population into Turkish exile, andthe most of the remainder were converted to Christianity. As part of the Bolshevikreconquest, Abkhazia was briefly given the status of a full Union Republic in 1921,and was joined in an equal union with Georgia between 1921 and 1931. In 1931,however, Abkhazia was downgraded to an autonomous region within Georgia. In the1940s and early 1950s, large numbers of ethnic Georgians were moved into Abkhaziaand education policy sought to impose the Georgian language. Thus, the Abkhazbecame a small minority in their homeland, threatened with demographic and culturalextinction. By 1990, Abkhaz were a mere 17% of Abkhazia’s population, alongsideGeorgians (44%), Russians (16%), Armenians (15%), and others. The Abkhaz viewedthe setbacks since 1931 as a Georgian threat, since they were instituted under theethnic Georgians Stalin and Lavrenti Beria. Thus, an Abkhaz culture that previouslyhad a strong affinity with Georgia increasingly adopted a more exclusively NorthCaucasian identity, and came to view Russia and the Soviet Union as their mainprotection against a Georgian threat to their existence. Open protests against inte-

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gration with Georgia and the associated demographic and cultural tendencies eruptedrepeatedly after Stalin’s death, in 1957, 1964, 1967, 1978, and finally in 1989.

In contrast, Ossetians are relatively recent migrants to Georgia; however, theyconstitute a majority within South Ossetia. Christianized during the nineteenthcentury as part of a longstanding and ongoing political and cultural alliance withRussia, many Ossetians migrated from the Russian-held North Caucasus to theadjacent region that became South Ossetia during the nineteenth and early twentiethcentury. Later, Ossetians fought bloody engagements against Georgians in support ofthe Bolshevik reconquest of Georgia. In 1922, the Ossetian regions were dividedbetween the South Ossetian autonomous region in Georgia, and a parallel, NorthOssetian autonomous region just across the border in the Russian Federal Republic(R.S.F.S.R.). The 1991 Soviet collapse therefore divided the Ossetians betweenGeorgia and Russia. South Ossetians traditionally view Russia as their protector froma relatively hostile Georgian host, and demands for unification of the Ossetian landswithin the R.S.F.S.R. go back to 1925. On the other hand, Georgians view Ossetiansas late-coming colonists lacking the historical roots of the Abkhaz.17

In October 1990, Georgia’s Supreme Soviet elections were won by ZviadGamsakhurdia’s reform nationalist Round Table/Free Georgia bloc, which duly tookcontrol of the Georgian government. Gamsakhurdia was elected President in May1991. Since well before Gamsakhurdia came to power, his rhetoric exacerbated thefears of the Abkhaz and South Ossetians. Language laws passed in 1989 aimed atincreasing the use of the Georgian language were especially threatening to the SouthOssetians, few of whom speak Georgian. Gamsakhurdia and the Georgian C.P.authorities were particularly hostile to the South Ossetian movement, which theyviewed as inherently illegitimate given the “late arrival” of the South Ossetians inGeorgia. Thus, Gamsakhurdia threatened to abolish South Ossetia’s autonomousstatus within Georgia. Ethnic minority parties were legally excluded from theOctober 1990 elections, provoking declarations of sovereignty by the Abkhaz andSouth Ossetian Supreme Soviets. Upon taking power, Gamsakhurdia made someconciliatory gestures. In particular, Georgian citizenship and legal rights wereextended to all residents of Georgia. Nevertheless, Gamsakhurdia responded to theDecember 1990 elections in South Ossetia by abolishing South Ossetia’s autonomousstatus and mounting an economic blockade. Fighting between Georgian and SouthOssetian paramilitary formations intensified, resulting in large numbers of refugees.A similar development occurred in response to Abkhazia’s March 1991 vote topreserve the U.S.S.R. Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba arranged for a strongerpresence of Soviet troops. In a belated attempt to placate the Abkhaz, Gamsakhurdiaagreed to give the Abkhaz a consociational-style veto in the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet.By th is time, however, neither the South Ossetians nor the Abkhaz trustedGamsakhurdia. They proceeded with their consolidation of control over institutionsin their autonomous regions, and waited for an opportunity to assert greater inde-pendence.18 They did not have to wait long.

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Balance of Power vis-à-vis Georgia

Like in the Karabakh Armenian case, support among the Abkhaz and SouthOssetians for separation from Georgia was broad, extending from outsider elites tolocal C.P. cadres and leaders, and with an overwhelming mass following. The move-ment for separation appears to have been particularly strong among the Abkhaz. InMarch 1989, over a quarter of the Abkhaz population attended a single demonstra-tion in favor of restoring the 1921 Union Republic status. Georgia’s reformnationalist movement also formed rapidly with broad popular support, includingconsiderable sympathy within the Georgian C.P. After the bloody crackdown onnationalist demonstrators in Tbilisi in April 1989, the Georgian C.P. more openlysympathized with the independence movement. As a result, Moscow increasinglybacked the Abkhaz and South Ossetian movements as a means of bridling Georgianseparatism. Gamsakhurdia further enraged Moscow by openly supporting DzhokarDudayev’s efforts to lead Chechnya out of the R.S.F.S.R. to independence. Asclashes spread between ethnic Georgians on the one hand and Abkhaz and SouthOssetians on the other, locally based Soviet troops tended to favor and aid theAbkhaz and South Ossetians—presumably with the encouragement of the Societcenter. This emboldened the Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities in the initialtakeover of local institutions in their autonomous regions. Of course, the positions ofthe Abkhaz and South Ossetians were also strengthened by the fact that they startedout already in possession of autonomous regions and institutions.

The unexpected collapse of the U.S.S.R. provided new opportunities for secession.Gamsakhurdia’s rhetoric and methods had also alienated a considerable proportion ofthe ethnic Georgian political elite, and his cautious response to the August 1991Moscow coup attempt was made the occasion for an attempt against Gamsakhurdia.This was led by his own National Guard commander, and joined by Georgian para-militaries, opposition nationalist parties, and dissident leaders of the Round Table. Ata minimum, the coup received encouragement f rom the Russian milit ary .Gamsakhurdia was finally toppled during fighting in December 1991 to January1992.

This internal disarray obviously strengthened the positions of the Abkhaz andSouth Ossetians. The South Ossetians were the first to take advantage of the oppor-tunity, voting in favor of a referendum in January 1992 to integrate with Russia. TheGeorgian National Guard and paramilitary forces that had unseated Gamsakhurdiamoved into South Ossetia in May and June. With locally based Russian troops againperiodically aiding the South Ossetians, and Russian hardliners threatening tointervene on a large scale, Boris Yeltsin brokered a ceasefire. Georgian forces wereforced to withdraw from South Ossetia, and Russia deployed “peacekeepers” tomonitor the settlement—leaving the South Ossetians with a de facto independentstate.

The Abkhaz took advantage of the fighting in South Ossetia to consolidate control

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over local security forces. They also proclaimed a return to the 1925 constitution,which had been in place prior to Abkhazia’s integration into the Georgian S.S.R.Georgian National Guard forces pursuing pro-Gamsakhurdia rebels in westernGeorgia duly launched an offensive into Abkhazia—seizing the Abkhaz capital,Sukhumi. Informal support from local Russian units and volunteers and suppliesfrom Russia—ironically including an important contingent led by Chechen leaderShamil Basayev—were crucial in allowing Abkhaz forces to win a total victory aftermonths of bitter fighting. Again, Georgian troops agreed to stay out, Russian peace-keepers were deployed, and Abkhazia emerged as a de facto independent state.Military victory was especially important to the Abkhaz, who were able to rectifytheir perilous demographic position by ejecting Abkhazia’s large ethnic Georgianpopulation. 19

Abkhaz and South Ossetian Demands

Both Abkhaz and South Ossetian demands immediately took the form of separationand direct affiliation with either the U.S.S.R. or the R.S.F.S.R. The proximity ofsimilar or identical ethnic formations in the R.S.F.S.R. played a role in theseaspirations, as did the tendency of both groups to see affiliation with the Sovietcenter or Russia as a defense against what they viewed as Georgian assimilationistobjectives. However, compared with the case of the Karabakh Armenians, there is agreater likelihood that conciliatory Georgian offers of strong regional political andcultural autonomy might have satisfied the Abkhaz and South Ossetian populationsand elites—particularly if these concessions were guaranteed by agreements with theSoviet center and (later) Russia. This is because the Abkhaz and South Ossetianefforts to affiliate with the U.S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. were mainly driven by fearsof discrimination and assimilation within an ideologically and politically “national-ized” Georgia.

Summary of Factors Related to the Origins of the Conflicts

The historical sources of aspirations for Abkhaz self-determination were con-siderably stronger than those of the South Ossetians, particularly when combinedwith the demographic situation of the Abkhaz. Furthermore, due to the Soviet desireto maintain its sway in the region, the initial balance of power favored the Abkhazand South Ossetians. The balance of power improved further when Georgia implodedinto internal divisions and fighting. There is reason to believe that Abkhaz and SouthOssetian fears might have been placated by early autonomy concessions combinedwith conciliatory rhetoric. However, such concessions are difficult to imagine in theearly days of the Georgian nationalist movement, when there was a need to mobilizepopular and elite support by emphasizing Georgian national revival and develop-ment. This was almost bound to include a political backlash against ethnic minorities

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perceived to be complicit in Moscow’s “divide and rule” strategy. Not surprisingly,both the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians took advantage of the favorable balance ofpower to achieve their maximum goals. Here it is difficult to assess the relativeimportance of collective interests and of elite power and economic interests. On theone hand, mass and elite support for collective self-determination interests can hardlybe doubted. On the other, the non-transparent, authoritarian character of the controlexerted by South Ossetian and Abkhaz elites shows that elite power and economicinterests have also been important.20

By contrast, both the Georgian C.P. leadership during the late Gorbachev era andGamsakhurdia were risking their power and control of economic interests byfacilitating or leading political movements that alienated the Soviet center. This isparticularly obvious in Gamsakhurdia’s case. In a more subtle way, the same hasbeen true for Gamsakhurdia’s successor, Eduard Shevardnadze. In order to prevent amilitary collapse after the Abkhaz victory, Shevardnadze was forced to bring Georgiainto the C.I.S. and to concede Russian bases in Georgia. But Shevardnadze has bothpreserved democracy and sought to erode Russia’s control of the region. Shevard-nadze was in a position to impose an authoritarian regime in the manner of HeidarAliev, but he chose instead to play by democratic rules and pursue nationalistobjectives in a manner that heightened internal and Russian threats to his power. Thisis most obvious in the multiple assassination attempts he has survived. Shevardnadzehas also championed market reform. Hence, for both Gamsakhurdia and Shevard-nadze, there were often conflicts between collective national interests and elite powerand economic interests. In both cases, although in ways that revealed importantdifferences in temperament, judgement, and specific objectives, the two leadersopted to uphold collective national interests.21

Escalation by Russia

Russia’s geopolitical interests were more important than specifically Russian ethnicties. To be sure, there were many Russian officers with vacation homes in Abkhazia.Historically, however, Russia had close ties with the North Ossetians, and would beexpected to want to preserve them by aiding the North Ossetians’ brethren across theGeorgian border. Similarly, the Abkhaz are ethnically related to some Caucasianpeoples in the Russian Federation, and aiding the Abkhaz would be expected tosolidify the loyalty of these peoples. The alternative in both cases was independentlocal agitation to provide aid and volunteers to ethnic kin in Georgia. The relevantpolitical movements and organizations would then have the potential to be turnedagainst Russia’s territorial integrity in the future. Another geopolitical motive was thatleverage vis-à-vis Georgia was important to maintain influence in Armenia andAzerbaijan, and to minimize any regional influence of Turkey, the Western powers,and Iran. Finally, the balance of power was quite favorable to Russia, making it likelythat the geopolitical gains would be pursued once the political impetus developed.

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As with Russian intervention in favor of Armenia, it is difficult to determine therelative importance of mass support for collective interests and of elite pursuit ofpower and economic interests. Many in the Yeltsin regime were not convinced thatRussia’s national interests were best served by such heavy-handed intervention. Butthe “red–brown” (communist and populist-nationalist) political opposition and theRussian military were convinced, and were able to find ample popular support fortheir views. Of course, the power and resources of the Russian military were alsothereby enhanced.22

As long as Georgia remained neutral in the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict, neitherside had an interest in mobilizing their ethnic brethren in Georgia against theGeorgian state. Any intensification of the conflict in Georgia would disrupt transportlinks to international markets that were vital to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.Furthermore, Russian intervention in Georgia made Armenian intervention un-necessary, and Azerbaijani intervention more dangerous.

Ethnic Conflicts in Moldova

Historical Sources of Russian and Gagauz Aspirations for Self-Determination

The Moldovan S.S.R. corresponded to those heavily Romanian regions that had beenunder Tsarist rule before being integrated into Romania after World War I. The smallregion east of the Dniester river (“Transnistria”) had remained within the SovietUnion, and been kept as an embryo S.S.R. in order to maintain the Tsarist-era claimto the larger West Bank region. The regions gained from Romania after World WarII were partitioned between the Moldovan and the Ukrainian S.S.R.s. Although therehad long been sizeable Ukrainian populations in some regions of the enlargedpostwar Moldovan S.S.R., the large Russian population is of relatively recent origin.They had a particularly large presence in Transnistria, because the region hadremained within the Soviet Union and attracted Russian and Ukrainian migrants asindustrialization accelerated. After World War II, this Russian and Ukrainianmigration continued, enlarging the presence in Transnistria and creating a large newpresence in the West Bank cities. There was therefore little historical basis inTransnistria for a Russian, or more accurately, Russified Slavic entity. On the otherhand, the Gagauz Turk population has inhabited some southern regions of Moldovasince the early nineteenth century, and its roots in the Balkans go back to theeleventh century.

There was no specifically Moldovan history of oppressing ethnic minorities.However, a strong record of oppression and discrimination had developed in interwarand in Ceausescu-era Romania. This was important, because the dominant radicalwing of the Gorbachev-era Moldovan Popular Front (M.P.F.) favored unificationwith Romania. As a result of the February–March 1990 Supreme Soviet elections,the M.P.F. ruled in coalition with ethnic Moldovan reform communists. Even before

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the elections, ethnic Moldovan reform communists had been able to pass a languagelaw requiring competence in Moldovan (i.e. Romanian) for employees in governmentand state enterprises. Russians, Ukrainians, and Gagauz did not generally speakRomanian, since Russian was the language of inter-ethnic and public communicationin the Soviet period. The M.P.F. and the reform communists all along pledged toprovide equal rights and local cultural autonomy for all ethnic minorities. Moreover,the reform communists and most ethnic Moldovans opposed the idea of integrationinto a poverty-stricken, still neo-communist Romania. But the language law and theidea of integration with Romania were enough to frighten the majority of theRussian, Russified Ukrainian, and Gagauz populations into supporting separatistcounter -mobilization . These movements had demographic crit ical mass inTransnistria and the Gagauz regions, where they were also led by local nomenklaturaconcerned to protect Soviet-era positions threatened by the reform nationalistagenda.23

Balance of Power vis-à-vis Moldova

The Soviet center supported Transnistrian Russian and Gagauz separatist movementsas a means of retaining control over the Moldovan S.S.R. Because ethnic Russianswere involved, local Soviet forces were even more sympathetic than usual,developing significant informal links with the separatist leaderships and theirbudding police and militia formations. The balance of power thus strongly favoredthe Transnistrian Russians and Gagauz. The corresponding threat of civil war, whichwould probably at least end with territorial dismemberment, further weakenedpopular support for the M.P.F. “Romanianists.” As a result, the ethnic Moldovanreform communists were able to eject the M.P.F. from the government even beforethe collapse of the U.S.S.R.

A local seizure of power in Transnistria, timed to correspond with the August 1991Moscow coup attempt, succeeded despite the coup’s failure at the Soviet center. TheMoldovan reform communists, correctly realizing the slim chances of a militaryvictory, and fearing the spread of fighting into the Moldovan heartland, offered littleresistance. When Transnistrian forces crossed the Dniester to seize some strategicpoints, Moldovan resistance was quickly crushed by Russian Fourteenth Army inter-vention. A July 1992 ceasefire left the Transnistrian Russians in control of a de factoindependent state. The Moldovan government also understood the need to avoidprovoking the Gagauz, which is why they did not resist the local Gagauz takeover.Through timely, generous, and constitutionally guaranteed autonomy concessions,the Moldovan government was able to reach a negotiated agreement with theGagauz. This was finalized in July 1994, but Gagauz autonomy was respected fromthe time of the Soviet collapse. The agreement preserved at least formal Moldovansovereignty, and forestalled any intensified military clashes that would probablyresult in a Gagauz victory.24

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Transnistrian Russian and Gagauz Demands, and Summary of Factors Related to theOrigins of the Conflict

Although the Transnistrian Russians and the Gagauz did not have strong historicalgrievances against Moldovan rule, they did have strong contemporary fears ofdiscrimination in a “Romanianizing” Moldova. Moreover, Soviet and later Russianbacking made the balance of power very favorable to separatist solutions. Thecaution and timely concessions of the Moldovan reform communists, which werelargely due to the initial separatist mobilization in Transnistria and the Gagauzregions, made it possible to achieve a negotiated settlement and avoid large-scaleconflict in the Gagauz regions. However, such concessions were not sufficient toprevent or to reverse Transnistrian separatism.

Here the attraction of affiliating with the Soviet Union or Russia appears to haveplayed an important role. Moldovan concessions would allow the Russian elite inTransnistria to maintain their local predominance in much the same way as they didfor the Gagauz elite. However, the added attraction of affiliating with the “mothercountry” appeared to offer a much more certain future to both masses and elites, andit was readily available at low risk. On the other hand, as long as their autonomyrights were expected to remain politically secure, the Gagauz masses and elitesgained little more by insisting on a forcefully maintained effort to formally affiliatewith Russia.

Again, it is difficult to determine the relative importance of collective and eliteinterests among the Transnistrian Russians and the Gagauz, since pursuit of bothcollective and elite interests is evident. On the other hand, the more authoritarian andeconomically exclusive character of rule in Transnistria, as compared with that in theGagauz regions, appears to reveal a greater emphasis on elite interests.25

Among ethnic Moldovans, the M.P.F. radical wing’s persistent emphasis onintegration with Romania is a clear example of sacrificing power and patronage forstrongly held conceptions of collective interests. Some argue that the ethnicMoldovan reform communists sacrificed collective interests for the sake of obtainingpower and patronage. But it must be recalled that these elements embraced the causeof Moldovan national development while the Soviet Union still existed, and that theycould certainly have maintained personal power by allying with the Moldova’s largeSlavic minority to create a neo-communist authoritarian regime. Indeed, based uponthe results of elections—most notably those of February 2001—it seems that ethnicMoldovan reform communist elites have at least as strong a commitment to inde-pendent Moldovan national development as do the ethnic Moldovan masses.26

Escalation by Russia

Any Russian geopolitical interests in Moldova were relatively unimportant comparedwith the factor of ethnic kinship. Intervention in Moldova, where ethnic Russians

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were involved as a principal party, resonated much more strongly in Russiandomestic politics than did interventions elsewhere in the Near Abroad. This can beseen, for example, in the meteoric political career launched by Fourteenth Armycommander Aleksandr Lebed. Lebed was able to pose credibly as the first post-Soviet leader that made Russia stand up. Apart from the issue of maintaining theloyalty of the armed forces, Yeltsin’s electoral base might have been seriouslyeroded if he had outright opposed Russian intervention in Moldova.27 Yeltsin himselfwas probably primarily motivated by a desire to retain power, particularly sinceDniester officers were quite prominent among the August 1991 coup plotters. TheRussian military also gained power from the intervention. However, the Russianmilitary and much of the Russian population genuinely believed that DniesterRussians had legitimate self-determination rights, and that Russia was fully justifiedin intervening on their behalf. Neither Ukraine nor Romania had much to gain fromintervening, given their own propensities to internal ethnic disputes. In addition,Russia’s involvement made the potential costs of intervention much too high.

Regional and Ethnic Conflicts in Tajikistan

Historical Sources of Internal Regional and Ethnic Cleavages in Tajikistan

The Tajik civil war was not an orthodox conflict over ethnic minority self-determina-tion, but a struggle for power in which the opposing coalitions formed along regionaland ethnic lines. For centuries, Persian and Turkish speakers intermingled within asuccession of empires in Central Asia. Although the rulers were typically Turks, theliterary culture was Persian. The Soviet rulers were the first to carve out politicalboundaries that roughly corresponded to linguistically distinct peoples. Nevertheless,the boundaries between Turkish Uzbekistan and Persian Tajikistan d id notcorrespond at all precisely with linguistic areas of settlement. A large Uzbekminority was concentrated in Tajikistan’s northern Khojand region and in the south-western parts of Tajikistan. Similarly, Uzbekistan contained large Tajik-speakingareas, including the historic cultural and administrative centers of Bukhara andSamarkand. During the Soviet period this was not a problem, since the Tajik C.P. hadclose links to its “elder brothers” in Uzbekistan, and ethnic Uzbeks enjoyed aninformally protected status in Tajikistan. The political leadership of the Tajik C.P.were invariably drawn from the relatively wealthy Khojand region, and the republic’ssecurity force cadres were heavily drawn from the poor southern region of Kulob.

Given that Tajikistan was the poorest and most rural of all the Soviet republics,it is not surprising that Tajik national identity was relatively weak. Apart fromintellectuals and professionals concentrated in the capital, Dushanbe, the support ofthe reform nationalist opposition was strongest among politically peripheral groups.Most prominently, these came from the south-central Gharm region, from thelinguistically and religiously distinct Gorno-Badakhshon autonomous region, and

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from among Gharmi and Badakhshoni migrants in southwestern Qurgon-Teppaprovince. The ruling Khojandis and Kulobis, on the other hand, could count onsupport from ethnic Uzbeks.28

Balance of Power between the Tajik C.P. and the Reform Nationalist OppositionGroups

The Tajik C.P. was in a strong position as long as the Soviet Union existed. Oppositiongroups were generally prevented from organizing, although the secular and Islamicreform nationalist movements did succeed in capitalizing on spontaneous unrest overhousing shortages. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the Tajik C.P. promptly moved tocreate a neo-communist authoritarian regime. But its efforts to remove unreliable,reform-oriented cadres soon led to large-scale opposition demonstrations. For a shortperiod of time, opposition forces were strong enough to force the government ofRakhmon Nabiev to share power. However, this deal was rejected by the Khojandi andKulobi elites. Kulobi forces moved out from their home region in an effort to takepower, and the country descended into civil war. The opposition groups were in a weakposition all along, because they did not control the Soviet-era administrative andsecurity structures, and because their principal regions of support contained only asmall minority of the population. Moreover, to the extent that it could be predicted,external intervention would not have a positive effect on the situation. Uzbekistan andRussia could be expected to sympathize with the conservative status quo, and little helpcould reasonably have been expected from Afghanistan or Iran.29

Reform Nationalist Demands

The principal reform nationalist groups were the secular nationalist groups Rastokhez(Revival) and the Tajik Democratic Party, strongest in Dushanbe; the IslamicRenaissance Party (I.R.P.), strongest among Gharmis; and the regional-autonomy-oriented Lali Badakhshon. The groups were quite heterogeneous. Most importantly,they agreed on free elections, protection of civil liberties, and a revival of traditionalcultural traditions. Although there were elements within the I.R.P. that favoredimposing an Islamic state by force, moderates believing in a consensual revival ofIslam were initially more prominent.30

Summary of Factors Related to the Origins of the Conflict

The neo-communist government had long made clear its willingness to use force toretain power. The opposition does not appear to have contemplated the possibility ofcivil war in advance. Rather, they hoped that ongoing demonstrations would forcethe government to make concessions, above all to allow free and fair elections.Although Nabiev and others in the capital were willing to make tactical concessions,

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Kulobi elites went to war rather than accept these concessions. Strengthened byethnic Uzbek contingents and support from Russia and especially Uzbekistan, Kulobiforces were able to seize control over most of the south outside of isolated Gorno-Badakhshon within a few months. The opposition continued guerrilla actions fromthe mountains and from across the Afghan border. In retrospect, the outcome appearsto have been a foregone conclusion: the insider elites, especially the Kulobis, weredetermined not to relinquish power, they had control of the security forces, and theyreceived external support. It is more surprising that the opposition was able tomaintain such strong initial pressure on Nabiev’s government. The conservativeelit es w ere above all concerned wi th maintain ing pow er , and their b roadpatron–client networks felt little sympathy for the reform nationalist cause. Marketreform has been correspondingly limited. On the other hand, the reform nationalistopposition leaders and their supporters were clearly taking strong personal risks inmobilizing under such adverse conditions.31

Escalation by Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s post-Soviet authoritarian leader, Islam Karimov, appears to have beenmotivated above all by a desire to preserve his power. It is true that a reform-nationalist-ruled Tajikistan might be expected to pose an irredentist threat toUzbekistan’s important Tajik regions. However, it appears that Karimov was moreafraid of the example of free elections and the influence of Islamist movements. Thisinference is supported both by Karimov’s repressive internal policies, and by areversal of events in Tajikistan following the civil war. After their victory in theTajik civil war, Kulobi elites led by Imomali Rakhmonov began to purge the stateand security forces of Khojandi cadres. They also began to disarm the ethnic Uzbekparamilitaries that had supported them in the war. Karimov initially tried to preserveinfluence in Tajikistan by supporting a coalition of ethnic Uzbek field commandersand Khojandi elites against Rakhmonov. The resulting fighting among factions of theold regime allowed the old reform nationalist opposition—now forming the UnitedTajik Opposition (U.T.O.)—to make military gains. Rakhmonov duly made con-cessions in order end the fighting, signing a peace agreement with the U.T.O. in June1997. This allowed Rakhmonov to concentrate his efforts on his Khojandi and Uzbekopponents. Rakhmonov received support from Russia, which wanted to keepKarimov in his place. With radical Islamists more recently making incursions intoUzbekistan, Karimov has at least temporarily retreated from continuing conflict withRakhmonov’s Tajikis tan. A long w ith an in tensified internal crackdown inUzbekistan, this appears to show that Karimov is more concerned about heading offinternal threats to his power than with pursuing ethnic Uzbek interests per se. Thisepisode also showed the importance of balance-of-power considerations. Thesurvival-oriented Karimov withdrew from intervention once it threatened to create atoo large and threatening array of enemies.32

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Escalation by Russia

In Tajikistan, Russia’s geopolitical interests are more important than the small andrapidly declining ethnic Russian population. Russia is interested in maintaining abuffer against regional inroads by both Islamism and reform nationalism. Both ofthese are a threat to Russian influence in the region. Indirectly, Russian influence inthe region is important in keeping out other powers, in limiting separatist movementsamong Muslim peoples of the Russian Federation, in protecting the interests of thelarge ethnic Russian population in Kazakhstan, and in maximizing Russia’s stake inthe region’s energy resources. For the same reasons, Russia is interested in protectingthe political au tonomy of the Rakhmonov government vis-à-vis Karimov’sUzbekistan. The balance of power within Tajikistan was such that limited Russiansupport was sufficient to achieve these results. As with the other cases of Russianintervention, elite interests in intervention have been complemented by popularsupport.

Until the recent near-total v ictory of the Taliban, the various factions inAfghanistan were too weak to intervene on a significant scale in Tajikistan or else-where in Central Asia. Iran has shown restraint for a variety of reasons. But the mostimportant reason, again, is to preserve the tactical alliance with Russia in limitingTurkish and Western influence in the broader region—above all in Azerbaijan.33

Conclusions

The most commonly cited objective sources of ethnic conflict and its escalation haveambiguous policy implications. In particular, these objective factors have policyimplications on both the level of collective or national interests and the elite level ofpower and economic interests. Although these interests are often harmonized or atleast relatively consistent, it is also true that they often conflict. It is in these cases ofconflict that the different implications of filtering objective factors through differenttypes of political regimes and actors become most clear. Democracies are more likelyto prioritize collective interests, and authoritarian regimes are more likely toemphasize elite interests.

These points are strongly supported by the four case studies of post-communistethnic conflict. More democratic movements or regimes almost invariably appearedto prioritize collective over elite interests, whereas authoritarian regimes and move-ments tended to privilege elite interests. Among the restive ethnic minorities, thispattern holds for the relatively democratic movements of Karabakh Armenians,Gagauz Turks, and Tajik reform nationalists. The evidence is more ambiguous forthe Abkhaz, South Ossetians, and Transnistrian Russians, for which collective andelite interests largely coincided. However, the Abkhaz, South Ossetian, andTransnistrian regimes have been relatively more attentive to elite interests in theircivil liberties restrictions and patronage-oriented economic policies. Among the

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titular governments, the pattern holds for the authoritarian Mutalibov and Alievregimes, the more democratic Elcibey regime, all three relatively democraticGeorgian regimes, the democratic M.P.F.-led and reform-communist-led Moldovangovernments, and the authoritarian Nabiev and Rakhmonov regimes. Finally, amongthe intervening foreign states, the pattern holds for relatively democratic Armeniaand authoritarian Uzbekistan. For relatively democratic Russia, collective and eliteinterests again coincided, making the evidence more ambiguous.

These results, although based on a small number of case studies, have suggestiveimplications for specifying and testing hypotheses about the causes and escalation ofethnic conflict. As is true in other explanatory contexts, objective factors must have aclear interpretation in terms of agent preferences. For explanations of ethnic conflict,this means (1) that collective and elite interests should be distinguished in theory, and(2) that institutional settings should be distinguished insofar as they seem likely toprovide evidence concerning the relative importance of collective and elite interests.Institutional settings are important in creating objective constraints and opportunitiesthat affect policy choices, and sometimes in helping to reveal elite preferencesconcerning the relative importance of collective and elite interests.

This can be seen in Table 1, which employs a rough distinction between demo-cratic and authoritarian regimes. The democratically imposed need to win re-electionis more likely to force elites to embrace collective preferences, regardless of theextent to which elites themselves would prefer to prioritize elite interests overcollective interests. In this sense, democratic institutions do not tend to reveal elitepreferences. On the other hand, collective preference constraints are not binding inauthoritarian regimes, so policy should tend to reveal elite preferences.

This simple picture is actually somewhat more complicated. Democratic regimescan under certain circumstances be preference revealing, i.e. they may present eliteswith opportunities to show whether or not they are prioritizing elite power andeconomic interests over collective objectives. First, in some situations ruling elites indemocracies have opportunities to impose an authoritarian regime that will more

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TABLE 1Effect of Regime Type on Elite Policy Choice

Authoritarian Regime Democratic Regime

Collective Interests More Policy Expected to Policy Expected to Prioritize

Important to Elites Prioritize Collective Collective InterestsInterests

Elite Interests More Policy Expected to Policy Expected to Prioritize

Important to Elites Prioritize Elite Interests Collective Interests

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certainly protect elite interests. Where such elites respect democratic rules, there issome evidence that they are giving considerable weight to collective interests. Oneexample of this discussed above is the policy of the ethnic Moldovan reformcommunists, who had ample opportunity to seize power in coalition with the Slavicleft. There is another way in which democracy can be preference revealing. Wherethe balance of power is adverse to pursuit of collective interests, elite policy choiceunder democracy can be more revealing of elite preferences. In such circumstances,pursuing collective interests can often pose considerable personal danger to elites.This would appear to show a high regard for collective interests relative to elitepower and economic interests. Examples occurred repeatedly in which oppositionintellectuals and professionals led reform nationalist movements in the early days, incases where such activity predictably earned the hostility of the Soviet center. Theyalso occurred, for example, where assassination posed a credible threat, as withShevardnadze in Georgia. Shevardnadze’s courageous behavior in other contexts,Soviet and post-Soviet, provides reinforcing evidence that he was not interested inkeeping power at all costs.

With this discussion in mind, consider now the design of statistical tests ofpredictors of ethnic conflict or its escalation. Suppose that either dependentvariable—outbreak of violent ethnic conflict, or decisions of particular countries tointervene in such conflicts—is coded as a dichotomous variable. It is clear thatcoding independent variables directly in terms of the objective predictors wouldoften lead to biased estimates of their effects. This is because they might be expectedeither to increase or to decrease the likelihood of either of the two outcomes,depending on whether elites prioritize collective or elite interests. Take first theobjective antecedents of violent ethnic conflict. Stronger historical and contemporaryexperiences establishing the desirability of greater autonomy or secession would beexpected to make violent conflict more likely under democratic institutions ascompared with authoritarian ones. This is because violent conflict can pose a con-siderable risk to regime stability and hence to elite interests. For the same reasons,democracy is more likely to result in violent conflict where the balance of power isadverse to the aspirations of autonomist or separatist minorities; and strong seces-sionist as opposed to merely autonomist mass sentiments are more likely to beunleashed by democratic institutions. Similarly, democratic institutions are morelikely to facilitate escalation where the motive is ethnic kinship, and under adversebalance-of-power conditions.34

Some improvement of these potential bias problems would be expected from inter-acting dummy variables for democratic regime type. This would give the interactionterms, of democracy with the various objective variables, clear interpretationsin terms of hypotheses about the policy choices of elites constrained to respectcollective interests. However, the same cannot be said for the non-interactedobjective variables, now corresponding to the authoritarian cases. Recalling Table 1,this is because authoritarian elites could be prioritizing either collective or elite

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interests in responding to objective factors. In this sense, parameter estimates of theeffect of non-interacted objective variables would again be biased. This bias could becorrected by including another dummy variable for authoritarian regimes that appearto give greater priority to collective interests. This dichotomous term for bias in favorof collective or elite interests could be coded using regime policies in other areas—for example in economic policy and in the character of violations of civil liberties.

Of course, these refinements still leave significant remaining problems of measure-ment error. For example, the proposed dummy variables for democracy and forvarieties of authoritarianism are quite blunt. Subject to information and timeconstraints, it would be desirable to have more than two increments along thesedimensions. But these problems can only be minimized and then kept in mind wheninterpreting statistical results. Such problems are important reasons why morecausally detailed case studies are invariably a valuable complement to large-samplestatistical tests.

In explaining ethnic conflict and its escalation, it has been argued that the“objective factors” and “primordialism–instrumentalism” literatures are individuallyincomplete yet complementary. Both theory and some preliminary evidence supportthe possibility of using variation in regime type as a means to help reconcile the twoliteratures.

NOTES

1. For example, Ted Robert Gurr and Will H. Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessment for the 1990s,” American Journalof Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 4, 1997; Charles Ingrao, “Understanding Ethnic Conflictin Central Europe: An Historical Perspective,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1999;Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset, “Racial and Ethnic Conflicts : A GlobalPerspective,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 4, 1992–1993; Gail Lapidus,“Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No.4, 1984; Robin M. Williams, Jr, “The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: ComparativeInternational Perspectives,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 20, 1994; MargaretWyszomirski, “Communal Violence: The Armenians and the Copts as Case Studies,”World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1975.

2. For example, James D. Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of EthnicConflict,” in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds, The International Spread ofEthnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1998); Gurr and Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion;” Stephen M. Saideman, “Is Pandora’sBox Half Empty or Half Full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the DomesticSources of Disintegration,” in Lake and Rothchild, eds, The International Spread ofEthnic Conflict; Williams, “Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts.”

3. For example, Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict;” PhilipG. Roeder, “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2,1991; Williams, “Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts.”

4. For example, David R. Davis, Keith Jaggers and Will H. Moore, “Ethnicity, Minorities,

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and International Conflict Patterns,” in David W. Carment and Patrick James, eds, TheInternational Politics of Ethnic Conflict (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,1997); Alexis Heraclides, “Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement,”International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1990; Will H. Moore and David R. Davis,“Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy,” in Lake and Rothchild, eds, TheInternational Spread of Ethnic Conflict; Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spreadof Ethnic Conflict;” Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, “Determining theCauses of Irredentism: Logit Analysis of Minorities at Risk Data from the 1980s and1990s,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 4, 2000.

5. For example, David Carment and Patrick James, “Internal Constraints and InterstateEthnic Conflict: Towards a Crisis-Based Assessment of Irredentism,” Journal of ConflictResolution, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1995; Samuel Clark, “International Competition and theTreatment of Minorities: Seventeenth Century Cases and General Propositions,”American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103, No. 5, 1998; Alexis Heraclides, “SecessionistMinorities and External Involvement.”

6. For example, Samuel Clark, “International Competition and the Treatment of Minorities;”Williams, “Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts.”

7. For examples of positions along this spectrum, see Benedict Anderson, ImaginedCommunities (London: Verso, 1991); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest forUnderstanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Ernest Gellner, Nations andNationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Michael Hechter, “The Political Economy ofEthnic Change,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 79, No. 5, 1974; Anthony Smith,The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

8. Due to space constraints, it is not possible to give self-contained narratives of the ethnicconflicts. The focus will be on discussing the variables hypothesized to be particularlyimportant in explaining the origins and escalation of the conflicts.

9. Audrey Alstadt, “Azerbaijan’s Struggle toward Democracy,” in Karen Dawisha andBruce Parrott, eds, Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 111–114, 141–144; MichaelCroissant, The Armenian–Azerbaijani Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport, CT:Praeger, 1998), pp. 1–20; Nora Dudwick, “Armenia: Paradise Regained or Lost?” in IanBremmer and Ray Taras, eds, New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 472–482; Ronald Grigor Suny,Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1993).

10. Alstadt, “Azerbaijan’s Struggle toward Democracy,” pp. 116–36; Croissant, Armenian–Azerbaijani Conflict, pp. 25–47, 77–91; Elizabeth Fuller, “Gorbachev’s Dilemma inAzerbaijan,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 5, 1990; Elizabeth Fuller, “What Liesbehind the Current Armenian–Azerbaijani Tensions?” Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No.21, 1991; Elizabeth Fuller, “Nagorno-Karbakh: Internal Conflict Becomes International,”RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 11, 1992; Elizabeth Fuller, “Azerbaijan: GeidarAliev’s Political Comeback,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 5, 1993; ShireenHunter, The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict (Washington:Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), pp. 65–88; Brenda Shaffer,“The Formation of Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28,No. 3, 2000.

11. Croissant, Armenian–Azerbaijani Conflict, pp. 26–47, 69–71, 107–125; Emil Danielyan,“A Crisis of Legitimacy in Armenia,” Transition, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1997, pp. 84–85; EmilDanielyan, “Back to Political Standstill,” in Peter Rutland, ed., Annual Survey of Eastern

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Europe and the Former Soviet Union 1997: The Challenge of Integration (Armonk, NY:M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Joseph R . Masih and Robert O. Krikorian, Armenia at theCrossroads (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. vii–xvi, 48–60,86–91, 122–128.

12. “Armenia Passes Point of No Return on Road to Reforms,” Financial Times, 14 May2001, p. 8; “Armenian Leader Act ive ly Seeks Lasting Peace with Azerbai jan,”International Herald Tribune, 7 September 2000, p. 2; Freedom House, Armenia/Azerbaijan: Nagorno-Karabakh (Washington: Freedom House, 2001), www.freedom-house.org/research/freeworld/2001/countryratings/zznagorno.htm; Adrian Karatnycky,Alexander Motyl and Aili Piano, eds, Nations in Transit 1999–2000: Civil Society,Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (NewBrunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), pp. 69–87; Gerard J. Libaridian, The Challenge ofStatehood: Armenian Political Thinking since Independence (Watertown, MA: BlueCrane Books, 1999), pp. 19–45, 69–96; Masih and Krikorian, Armenia at the Crossroads,pp. xiii–xvi, 23–24, 34–36, 40–42, 52–53.

13. Elizabeth Fuller, “The Ongoing Political Power Struggle in Azerbaijan,” RFE/RLResearch Report, Vol. 1, No. 18, 1992; Elizabeth Fuller, “Azerbaijan after thePresidential Elections,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 26, 1992; Thomas Goltz,Azerbaijan Diary (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 46–73, 131–141, 186–200,242–268, 355–366.

14. “Azerbaijan: Aliev and Son,” The Economist, 6 March 1999, p. 51; Fuller, “Azerbaijan:Geidar Aliev’s Political Comeback;” Elizabeth Fuller, “Between Neo-Stalinism andDemocratization,” Transition, Vol. 2, No. 18, 1996; Karatnycky et al., Nations in Transit1999–2000 , pp. 93–109.

15. See note 12.16. Kate Litvak, “The Role of Political Competition and Bargaining in Russian Foreign

Policy,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 29, June 1996; Neil Malcolm andAlex Pravda, “Democratization and Russian Foreign Policy,” International Affairs, Vol.72, July 1996; Michael McFaul, “A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making ofRussian Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1997–1998.

17. Elizabeth Fuller, “The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification,” Report on the USSR,Vol. 1, No. 49, 1989; Elizabeth Fuller, “Abkhazia on the Brink of Civil War?” RFE/RLResearch Report, Vol. 1, No. 35, 1992; Stephen F. Jones, “Georgia: The Trauma ofStatehood,” in Bremmer and Taras, New States, New Politics, pp. 506–511; StanislavLak’oba, “History: 1917–1989,” in George Hewitt, ed., The Abkhazians: A Handbook(London: Curzon, 1999); Ghia Nodia, “The Conflict in Abkhazia: National Projects andPolitical Circumstances,” in Bruno Coppetiers, Ghia Nodia and Yuri Anchabadze, eds,Georgians and Abkhazians: The Search for a Peace Settlement (Brussels: VrijeUniversiteit, 1998), pubs.carnegie.ru/CRS/publi/Georgians/index.htm, pp. 3–14.

18. Fuller, “The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification;” Elizabeth Fuller, “GeorgianPresident Flees after Opposition Seizes Power,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 3,1992; Fuller, “Abkhazia on the Brink of Civil War?” Jones, “Georgia,” pp. 511–22; GhiaNodia, “Dynamics of State-Building in Georgia,” Caucasus and the Caspian Transcripts(Cambridge, MA: BCSIA Publications, 1996), ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA, pp. 1–4;Nodia, “The Conflict in Abkhazia,” pp. 1–25; Darrell Slider, “Democratization inGeorgia,” in Dawisha and Parrott, eds, Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asiaand the Caucasus, pp. 156–198.

19. “Abkhaz Take Sukhumi, Advance to Georgian Border,” Current Digest of the Post-SovietPress, Vol. 45, No. 39, 1993, pp. 17–20; Dodge Billingsley, “The Georgian Security

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Dilemma and Military Failure in Abkhazia,” Harriman Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1998;Julian Birch, “Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm,” Central Asian Survey, Vol.14, No. 1, 1995; Ghia Nodia, “Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies ofZviad Gamsakhurdia,” in Bruno Coppieters, ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus(Brussels: VUBPRESS, 1996), poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/info.htm; Nodia,“The Conflict in Abkhazia,” pp. 26–47; Alexei Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus,1988–1994,” in Coppieters, ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus, pp. 26–45.

20. “Abkhazia: Russia’s New ‘Black Hole,’” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.49, No. 27, 1997, pp. 16–17; Birch, “Ossetia;” Freedom House, Georgia: Abkhazia(Washington: Freedom House, 2001), www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/countryratings/zzabkhazia.htm; “Georgian, Ossetian Chiefs Split,” Current Digest of thePost–Soviet Press, Vol. 44, No. 25, 1992, p. 5.

21. “A Defiant Shevardnadze Says He’ll Stay in Sukhimi ‘As Long as Necessary,’” CurrentDigest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 45, No. 27, 1993, p. 28; Fuller, “Georgian PresidentFlees after Opposition Seizes Power;” Elizabeth Fuller, “Eduard Shevardnadze’s ViaDolorosa,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 43, 1993; Karatnycky et al., Nations inTransit 1999–2000, pp. 277–98; Nodia, “Dynamics of State-Building in Georgia;” Slider,“Democratization in Georgia,” pp. 165–168.

22. See note 16.23. William Crowther, “Moldova: Caught between Nation and Empire,” in Bremmer and Taras,

New States, New Politics, pp. 316–319; William Crowther, “The Politics of Democratizationin Postcommunist Moldova,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds, DemocraticChanges and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 284–288; Charles King, Post-SovietMoldova: A Borderland in Transition (Iasi, Romania: Center for Romanian Studies, 1997),pp. 16–30; Vladimir Socor, “Moldavian Lands between Romania and Ukraine,” Report onthe USSR, Vol. 2, No. 46, 1990; Vladimir Socor, “Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: APrecedent for Eastern Europe?” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 33, 1994.

24. Crowther, “The Politics of Democratization in Postcommunist Moldova,” pp. 288–320;Vladimir Socor, “Moldavia Builds a New State,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 1,1992; Vladimir Socor, “Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova,” RFE/RL Research Report,Vol. 1, No. 3, 1992; Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s Fourteenth Army and the Insurgency inEastern Moldova,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 36, 1992; Vladimir Socor,“Moldova’s ‘Dniester’ Ulcer,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1993; VladimirSocor, “Moldova: Another Major Setback for Pro-Romanian Forces,” RFE/RL ResearchReport, Vol. 2, No. 9, 1993; Socor, “Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: A Precedent forEastern Europe?”

25. Jeff Chin and Steven D. Roper, “Territorial Autonomy in Gagauzia,” NationalitiesPapers, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1998; Freedom House, Moldova: Transnistria (Washington:Freedom House, 2001), www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/countryratings/zztransdniester.htm; Pal Kolsto and Andrei Malgin, “The Transnistrian Republic: A Caseof Politicized Regionalism,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1998.

26. Dan Ionescu and Igor Munteanu, “Likely Presidential Rivals Gear up for Elections,”Transition, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1996; Karatnycky et al., Nations in Transit 1999–2000,pp. 447–461; “New Communist Moldovan President Sets New Courses,” DeutschePresse-Agentur, 4 April 2001 (Lexis-Nexis); Vladimir Socor, “Moldova: DemocracyAdvances, Independence at Risk,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1994.

27. In May 1992, Yeltsin explained that “this is not intervention by Russia, it is the defense ofthe people living there, on the personal initiative of the officers living there … if the

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people of the Dniester region want to live autonomously, that is the business of the peoplethemselves” (Socor, Russia’s Fourteenth Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova,pp. 45–46). Needless to say, military commanders-in-chief do not commonly admit todeferring to the initiative of their officers. See also Stuart J. Kaufman and Stephen R.Bowers, “Transnational Dimensions of the Transnistrian Conflict,” Nationalities Papers,Vol. 26, No. 1, 1998.

28. Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Why Did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?” Europe–Asia Studies,Vo l . 48 , N o. 7, 1996 , pp . 1105–1108 , 1116–1119 ; M ur ie l A tkin , “ThwartedDemocratization in Tajikistan,” in Dawisha and Parrott, eds, Conflict, Cleavage, andChange in Central Asia and the Caucasus, pp. 279–282; Aziz Niyazi, “Tajikistan,” inMohiaddin Mesbahi, ed., Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domesticand Internat ional Dynamics (Ga inesv il le: Universi ty o f F lor ida Press , 1994) ,pp. 165–168, 171–172; Habibollah Abolhassan Shirazi, “Political Forces and TheirStructures in Tajikistan,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1997, pp. 612–614;Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Pos t-SovietTajikistan,” Harriman Institute Forum, Vol. 6, No. 11, 1993, pp. 4–5.

29. Akbarzadeh, “Why Did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?” pp. 1111–1117; Atkin,“Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan,” pp. 293–303; Bess Brown, “Tajikistan: TheFal l of Nabiev,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 38, 1992; Bess Brown,“Tajikistan: The Conservatives Triumph,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 7, 1993;Allen Hetmanek, “Islamic Revolution and Jihad Come to the Former Soviet Central Asia:The Case of Tajikistan,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1993; Niyazi, “Tajikistan,”pp. 173–184; Tadjbaksh, “Bloody Path of Change,” pp. 2–7.

30. See note 28. Within the I.R.P., the radicals progressively gained influence once the civilwar got underway.

31. Atkin, “Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan;” Brown, “Tajikistan: The ConservativesTriumph;” Karatnycky et al., Nations in Transit 1999–2000, pp. 617–636.

32. Bess Brown, “Central Asian States Seek Russian Help,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2,No. 25, 1993; Stuart Horsman, “Uzbekistan’s Involvement in the Tajik Civil War,1992–1997: Domestic Considerations,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1999;Bruce Pannier, “A Year of Violence in Tajikistan,” Transition, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1997; BrucePannier, “Exercising Peace,” in Peter Rutland, ed., Annual Survey of Eastern Europe andthe Former Soviet Union 1997 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Bruce Pannier,“Peace Does Not Bring an End to the Fighting,” in Peter Rutland, ed., Annual Survey ofEastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 1998 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999);Ahmed Rashid, “Central Asia Summary: Recent Events in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,”Eurasia Insight, 17 January 2001, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav011701.shtml; R. Grant Smith, “Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace,” Central AsianSurvey, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1999, pp. 243–247.

33. See notes 16 and 32.34. Where geopolitical interests are the motive for escalation, it seems more difficult to settle

on a strong expectation about the differences between democratic and authoritarianregimes. For democracies, the usual argument is that, unless strong national security ornational economic interests are at stake, intervention carrying a high risk of casualties isunlikely. For authoritarian regimes, it is not casualties but threats to the regime that arethe most relevant deterrent, and leaders would be expected to care less about threats tonational security and national economic interests. In general, it is hard to say which typeof calculation is more likely to favor escalating intervention.

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