experimental economics and finance - xiamen...

2010201020102010 InternationalInternationalInternationalInternational WorkshopWorkshopWorkshopWorkshop onononon

ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics andandandand FinanceFinanceFinanceFinance

2010201020102010 DecemberDecemberDecemberDecember 15-16,15-16,15-16,15-16, XiamenXiamenXiamenXiamen

WangWangWangWang YananYananYananYanan InstituteInstituteInstituteInstitute forforforfor StudiesStudiesStudiesStudies inininin EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics (WISE)(WISE)(WISE)(WISE)

XiamenXiamenXiamenXiamen University,University,University,University, ChinaChinaChinaChina

2010201020102010 InternationalInternationalInternationalInternationalWorkshopWorkshopWorkshopWorkshop onononon ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics andandandand FinanceFinanceFinanceFinance ProgramProgramProgramProgram

---- 2222 ––––

CONTENTSCONTENTSCONTENTSCONTENTS

目录

Academic Program Overview....................................................................... 3

Conference Guide.......................................................................................... 4

Detailed Program........................................................................................... 7

Program with Abstract................................................................................. 13

List of Participants.......................................................................................33


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AcademicAcademicAcademicAcademic ProgramProgramProgramProgram OverviewOverviewOverviewOverview

DecemberDecemberDecemberDecember 15151515

8:308:308:308:30amamamam –––– 8:458:458:458:45amamamam Welcome and Opening Remarks (Economics Building D-110)8:458:458:458:45amamamam ---- 9:359:359:359:35amamamam Plenary I (Economics Building D-110）9:359:359:359:35amamamam ---- 10:0010:0010:0010:00amamamam Coffee Break (Lobby of D110)

Group Photo (Front Gate of Economics Building)10:0010:0010:0010:00amamamam ---- 12:0012:0012:0012:00amamamam Invited Sessions I.A (Economics Building D110)

Invited Sessions I.B (Economics Building D310)12:0012:0012:0012:00amamamam ---- 1:301:301:301:30pmpmpmpm Lunch (Fu De lin Restaurant, Vegetarian Food)

1:301:301:301:30pmpmpmpm ---- 3:003:003:003:00pmpmpmpm Invited Sessions II.A (Economics Building D110)Invited Sessions II.B (Economics Building D310)

3:003:003:003:00pmpmpmpm ---- 3:203:203:203:20pmpmpmpm Coffee Break (Lobby of D110)3:203:203:203:20pmpmpmpm ---- 5:005:005:005:00pmpmpmpm Plenary II and III (Economics Building D110)5:155:155:155:15pmpmpmpm ---- 6:456:456:456:45pmpmpmpm Invited Sessions III.A (Economics Building D110)

Invited Sessions III.B (Economics Building D310)6:456:456:456:45pmpmpmpm ---- 8:45pm8:45pm8:45pm8:45pm Dinner (Yifu Building)

DecemberDecemberDecemberDecember 16161616

9:009:009:009:00amamamam ---- 10:4010:4010:4010:40amamamam Plenary IV and V (Economics Building D110)10:4010:4010:4010:40amamamam ---- 11:0011:0011:0011:00amamamam Coffee Break (Lobby of D110)11:0011:0011:0011:00amamamam ---- 12:0012:0012:0012:00amamamam Invited Sessions IV.A (Economics Building D110)

Invited Sessions IV.B (Economics Building D310)12:0012:0012:0012:00amamamam ---- 1:451:451:451:45 Lunch (Yifu Building)1:451:451:451:45pmpmpmpm ---- 3:153:153:153:15pmpmpmpm Invited Sessions V.A (Economics Building D110)

Invited Sessions V.B (Economics Building D310)3:153:153:153:15pmpmpmpm ---- 3:353:353:353:35pmpmpmpm Coffee Break (Lobby of D110)3:353:353:353:35pmpmpmpm ---- 4:254:254:254:25pmpmpmpm Plenary VI (Economics Building D110)4:404:404:404:40pmpmpmpm ---- 6:106:106:106:10pmpmpmpm Invited Sessions VI.A (Economics Building D110)

Invited Sessions VI.B (Economics Building D310)6:10pm6:10pm6:10pm6:10pm –––– 8:10pm8:10pm8:10pm8:10pm Dinner (Seafood Restaurant)


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2010201020102010 InternationalInternationalInternationalInternational WorkshopWorkshopWorkshopWorkshop onononon

ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics andandandand FinanceFinanceFinanceFinance ProgramProgramProgramProgram

ConferenceConferenceConferenceConference GuideGuideGuideGuide

Please refer to the Conference Guide for a more detailed timetable of presentations. This

guide primarily concerns with Transportation, Accommodation, Registration, Meals and

Ticket-booking arrangements during the conference.

1.1.1.1. TransportationTransportationTransportationTransportation

Please make your own way toYi Fu Building (逸夫楼 ) on the main campus of

Xiamen University（厦门大学）. The taxi fee is about 45RMB from the airport to

Yifu Building.

2.2.2.2. AccommodationAccommodationAccommodationAccommodation andandandand RegistrationRegistrationRegistrationRegistration

For all participants, accommodationaccommodationaccommodationaccommodation is provided by Yifu Hotel and Jianwen Hotel on XMU

campus.

TheTheTheThe registrationregistrationregistrationregistration timetimetimetime is on Dec 14 from 10:00am10:00am10:00am10:00am totototo 9:30pm9:30pm9:30pm9:30pm at the lobby of Yifu Building on

XMU campus.

IfIfIfIf youyouyouyou missedmissedmissedmissed thethethethe registrationregistrationregistrationregistration timetimetimetime,,,, plsplsplspls askaskaskask forforforfor youryouryouryour materialmaterialmaterialmaterial whenwhenwhenwhen youyouyouyou checkcheckcheckcheck in.in.in.in.

3.3.3.3. MealsMealsMealsMeals

1) Dec 14 Supper 6:00pm-9:00pm Yi Fu Building

2) Dec 15 Breakfast 7:00am Yi Fu Building

Lunch 12:00pm Fu Delin Restaurant

(Vegetarian Food)

Dinner 6:45pm Yi Fu Building


Lunch 12:00pm Yi Fu Building

Supper 6:10pm Seafood Restaurant


(Locations are subject to change, please refer to the announcement made by the Conference

Reception.)


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4.4.4.4. BookingBookingBookingBooking TicketsTicketsTicketsTickets

You may contact the following agencies for booking affairs.

Ticket Office in XMU: 0592-2183083 (For aviation and bus ticket, please book in advance)

Xiamen Airlines Hotline: 0592-2226666 (Free delivery of tickets within the Island)

Consulting Agency at the Xiamen Airport: 0592-6020033/ 6028940

Ticket Office at the Airport: 0592-5738816

AirAirAirAir ticketticketticketticket confirmationconfirmationconfirmationconfirmation numbersnumbersnumbersnumbers forforforfor majormajormajormajor airlinesairlinesairlinesairlines：

MF: 2226666 CZ: 5117777, 6022936-7558

FM: 2210600 MU: 5732401

CA: 5084383, 5084375 SC: 5555555, 5562377

KA: 5117702 CX: 00852-27471888

MH: 2106088, 2106188 PR: 2394729, 2394730

MI: 2053275, 2037127 KA: 2680140, 2680141

SQ: 2053275 NH: 2052317, 5732888

5.5.5.5. ChiefChiefChiefChief OrganizersOrganizersOrganizersOrganizers’’’’ contactcontactcontactcontact informationinformationinformationinformation inininin thethethethe ConferenceConferenceConferenceConference CommitteeCommitteeCommitteeCommittee

a) Academic affairs: Jason Shachat 13906041967

b) Publicity: Jingjing Deng 2182387

c) Reception: Katherine Zhang 2180198

Youshu Xu 2181003

AileenYu 2188827

Jeoly Bao 2181269

d) Conference-related affairs: Zhihuang Chen 2182991

e) Treasury: Iris Hong Zhang 2187878

6.6.6.6. A half-day trip around Xiamen will be specially offered on 17th Dec by the committee which

will guide our guests around Gu Langyu Island (the Island of Architectures and Piano) and the

Ring Road. For those guests who are interested in this trip, please confirmconfirmconfirmconfirm itititit duringduringduringduring youryouryouryour

registrationregistrationregistrationregistration. For those who sighed up then, please gathergathergathergather atatatat 8:00am,8:00am,8:00am,8:00am, 11117777thththth DecDecDecDec atatatat LobbyLobbyLobbyLobby atatatat

JianJianJianJianWenWenWenWen BuildingBuildingBuildingBuilding; the trip will lastlastlastlast fromfromfromfrom 8:00am8:00am8:00am8:00am totototo 1:001:001:001:00pmpmpmpm,,,, lunchlunchlunchlunch isisisis includedincludedincludedincluded....

7.7.7.7. A whole-day trip to Hakka Valley will be specially offered on 17th Dec by the committee

which will guide our guests around the earth building. For those guests who are interested in


6

this trip, please confirmconfirmconfirmconfirm itititit duringduringduringduring youryouryouryour registrationregistrationregistrationregistration. For those who sighed up then, please

gathergathergathergather atatatat 8888::::00000am,0am,0am,0am, 11117777thththth DecDecDecDec atatatat LobbyLobbyLobbyLobby atatatat JianJianJianJian WenWenWenWen BuildingBuildingBuildingBuilding; the trip will lastlastlastlast fromfromfromfrom 8:00am8:00am8:00am8:00am totototo

6666:00:00:00:00pmpmpmpm,,,, lunchlunchlunchlunch isisisis includedincludedincludedincluded....

8. Please present your conference ID card when you have lunch and supper at the appointed

restaurants.

9. Please turn your cell phone into silence or vibration mode when the conference is in progress.

10. Photography can be downloaded in the homepage of the Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in

Economics (WISE) at www.wise.xmu.edu.cn .

11. For clubbing and pubs, please go to

Haiwan Park (海湾公园，10 minutes drive from XMU) or

Bin Lang Xiao Qu (Bin Lang Community，槟榔小区) at Hu Bin Dong Lu (湖滨东路，20

minutes drive from XMU)

12. For safety cautions: Although Xiamen is one of the most comfortable and safest cities in

China, we suggest you take good care of yourself and your belongings. A company is better

than alone when you are going out at night.

Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics

December, 2010

http://www.wise.xmu.edu.cn


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2010 International Workshop on Experimental Economics and Finance

December 15-16 (Weds.-Thurs.), 2010

Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE)

Xiamen University, China

AcademicAcademicAcademicAcademic ProgramProgramProgramProgram DetailedDetailedDetailedDetailed

DecemberDecemberDecemberDecember 15151515 (Wednesday)(Wednesday)(Wednesday)(Wednesday)

8:308:308:308:30 –––– 8:458:458:458:45WelcomeWelcomeWelcomeWelcome andandandand OpeningOpeningOpeningOpening RemarksRemarksRemarksRemarks8:458:458:458:45 –––– 9:359:359:359:35 PlenaryPlenaryPlenaryPlenary IIIIVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Shyam Sunder (Yale School of Management)Title: Default penalty as a disciplinary and selection mechanism in presence of multipleequilibriaChair: Jason Shachat (WISE, Xiamen University)

9:359:359:359:35 –––– 10:0010:0010:0010:00 CoffeeCoffeeCoffeeCoffee BreakBreakBreakBreak andandandand GroupGroupGroupGroup PhotoPhotoPhotoPhoto

10:0010:0010:0010:00 –––– 12:0012:0012:0012:00 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions I.AI.AI.AI.A andandandand I.BI.BI.BI.B

SessionSessionSessionSession I.AI.AI.AI.ACoordinationCoordinationCoordinationCoordinationVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: Joseph Tao-yi Wang* (National Taiwan University)

1)1)1)1) GroupGroupGroupGroup MergerMergerMergerMerger asasasas aaaaWayWayWayWay totototoAchieveAchieveAchieveAchieve EfficientEfficientEfficientEfficient CoordinationCoordinationCoordinationCoordination ininininWeak-linkWeak-linkWeak-linkWeak-link GamesGamesGamesGamesIrina Kirysheva (European University Institute)

2)2)2)2)AuthorityAuthorityAuthorityAuthority andandandand CommunicationCommunicationCommunicationCommunication inininin thethethethe Laboratory*Laboratory*Laboratory*Laboratory*Ernest K. Lai (Lehigh University) and Wooyoung Lim* (HKUST)

3)3)3)3) UsingUsingUsingUsing BrainBrainBrainBrain DrainDrainDrainDrain MigrationMigrationMigrationMigration totototo InduceInduceInduceInduce EducationEducationEducationEducation Investment:Investment:Investment:Investment: AnAnAnAn LaboratoryLaboratoryLaboratoryLaboratoryExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental InvestigationInvestigationInvestigationInvestigationYi-Ping Bai, Tzu-Hao Wang and Joseph Tao-yi Wang* (National Taiwan University)

SessionSessionSessionSession I.BI.BI.BI.B FieldFieldFieldField andandandand RealRealRealReal EffortEffortEffortEffort ExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Zemin Zhong (PKU-HSBC)


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1)1)1)1) SurpriseSurpriseSurpriseSurprise andandandand Reciprocity:Reciprocity:Reciprocity:Reciprocity: AAAA RealRealRealReal EffortEffortEffortEffort ExperimentExperimentExperimentExperimentZhiquan Weng (SWUFE)

2)2)2)2) FramingFramingFramingFraming ManipulationsManipulationsManipulationsManipulations inininin Contests:Contests:Contests:Contests: AAAANaturalNaturalNaturalNatural FieldFieldFieldField ExperimentExperimentExperimentExperimentFuhai Hong* (HKUST), Tanjim Hossain (University of Toronto), John A. List (Universityof Chicago)

3)3)3)3) ClinicalClinicalClinicalClinical Information,Information,Information,Information, MoralMoralMoralMoral Hazard,Hazard,Hazard,Hazard, andandandand PatientPatientPatientPatient Involvement:Involvement:Involvement:Involvement: FieldFieldFieldField EvidenceEvidenceEvidenceEvidence ininininChinaChinaChinaChinaSiyu YU (Guanghua School of Management, Peking University)

4)4)4)4) LemonyLemonyLemonyLemony prices:prices:prices:prices: anananan onlineonlineonlineonline fieldfieldfieldfield experimentexperimentexperimentexperiment onononon pricepricepriceprice dispersiondispersiondispersiondispersionZemin (Zachary) Zhong* and David Ong (PKU-HSBC)

12:0012:0012:0012:00 –––– 1:301:301:301:30 LunchLunchLunchLunch1:301:301:301:30 -3:00-3:00-3:00-3:00 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions II.AII.AII.AII.A andandandand II.BII.BII.BII.B

SessionSessionSessionSession II.AII.AII.AII.ANewNewNewNewMethodologiesMethodologiesMethodologiesMethodologiesVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: David Ong (PKU-HSBC)

1)1)1)1) DataDataDataData PrecisionPrecisionPrecisionPrecision andandandand thethethethe ReliabilityReliabilityReliabilityReliability ofofofof StatisticStatisticStatisticStatistic Inference:Inference:Inference:Inference:AAAACaseCaseCaseCase StudyStudyStudyStudyQiqi Cheng*, Bin Xu, Zhijian Wang (Zhejiang University)

2)2)2)2) TheTheTheThe EffectsEffectsEffectsEffects ofofofof StakeStakeStakeStake SizeSizeSizeSize andandandand GenderGenderGenderGender onononon RiskRiskRiskRisk PreferencePreferencePreferencePreference underunderunderunderHypotheticalHypotheticalHypotheticalHypothetical ConditionsConditionsConditionsConditionsYue Gao (Dongbei University of Finance and Economics)

3)3)3)3) AAAAMechanismMechanismMechanismMechanism totototo DetectDetectDetectDetect andandandand DecreaseDecreaseDecreaseDecrease InsiderInsiderInsiderInsider TradingTradingTradingTradingDavid Ong (PKU-HSBC)

SessionSessionSessionSession II.BII.BII.BII.BAssetAssetAssetAsset MarketsMarketsMarketsMarketsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310

Chair: Stephen L. Cheung* (University of Sydney)

1)1)1)1) InformationalInformationalInformationalInformational pricepricepriceprice cascadescascadescascadescascades andandandand thethethethe non-aggregationnon-aggregationnon-aggregationnon-aggregation ofofofof asymmetricasymmetricasymmetricasymmetric informationinformationinformationinformationinininin anananan experimentalexperimentalexperimentalexperimental assetassetassetasset market.market.market.market.Jason Shachat* (WISE, Xiamen University) and Anand Srivinasan (NUS)

2)2)2)2) TheTheTheThe EffectEffectEffectEffect ofofofof CircuitCircuitCircuitCircuit BreakersBreakersBreakersBreakers onononon inininin ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalAssetAssetAssetAsset MarketsMarketsMarketsMarketsXiaolan Yang* and Tao Hong (Zhejiang University)

3)3)3)3) League-TableLeague-TableLeague-TableLeague-Table IncentivesIncentivesIncentivesIncentives andandandand PricePricePricePrice BubblesBubblesBubblesBubbles inininin ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental AssetAssetAssetAsset MarketsMarketsMarketsMarkets ****

Stephen L. Cheung* (University of Sydney), and Andrew Coleman (Credit Suisse)


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3:003:003:003:00 -3:20-3:20-3:20-3:20 CoffeeCoffeeCoffeeCoffee BreakBreakBreakBreak3:203:203:203:20 ---- 5:005:005:005:00 PlenaryPlenaryPlenaryPlenary IIIIIIII andandandand IIIIIIIIIIIIVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Plenary II:::: Peter BossaertsMarketMarketMarketMarket BubblesBubblesBubblesBubbles andandandand CrashesCrashesCrashesCrashes asasasas anananan ExpressionExpressionExpressionExpression ofofofof TensionTensionTensionTension betweenbetweenbetweenbetween SocialSocialSocialSocial andandandandIndividualIndividualIndividualIndividual Rationality:Rationality:Rationality:Rationality: AnAnAnAn ExperimentExperimentExperimentExperimentChair: Shyam Sunder (Yale School of Management)

Plenary III: John Duffy (University of Pittsburgh)AAAADynamicDynamicDynamicDynamic GeneralGeneralGeneralGeneral EquilibriumEquilibriumEquilibriumEquilibriumApproachApproachApproachApproach totototoAssetAssetAssetAsset PricingPricingPricingPricing ExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsChair: Shyam Sunder (Yale School of Management)

5:155:155:155:15 –––– 6:456:456:456:45 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions III.AIII.AIII.AIII.A andandandand III.BIII.BIII.BIII.B

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession III.AIII.AIII.AIII.A SequentialSequentialSequentialSequential ChoiceChoiceChoiceChoice ExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: Masaru Sasaki (Osaka University)

1)1)1)1) HerdingHerdingHerdingHerding withwithwithwith thethethethe StarsStarsStarsStarsFangfang Tang, Kai Yan and David Ong* (PKU-HSBC)

2)2)2)2)AnAnAnAn ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental TestTestTestTest ofofofof aaaa CollectiveCollectiveCollectiveCollective SearchSearchSearchSearch Model*Model*Model*Model*Yoichi Hizen (Hokkaido University), Keisuke Kawata*, Masaru Sasaki (OsakaUniversity)

3)3)3)3)AnAnAnAn ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental TestTestTestTest ofofofof aaaa SearchSearchSearchSearch ModelModelModelModel underunderunderunder KnightianKnightianKnightianKnightian Uncertainty*Uncertainty*Uncertainty*Uncertainty*Takao Asano, Hiroko Okudaira (Okayama University), Masaru Sasaki* (OsakaUniversity)

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession III.BIII.BIII.BIII.B IndividualIndividualIndividualIndividual PortfolioPortfolioPortfolioPortfolio andandandand InvestmentInvestmentInvestmentInvestment DecisionsDecisionsDecisionsDecisionsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Cheng-Chung Wu* (National Kaohsiung First University of Science and Technology)

1)1)1)1) TheTheTheThe EffectsEffectsEffectsEffects ofofofof OverconfidenceOverconfidenceOverconfidenceOverconfidence onononon thethethethe IndexIndexIndexIndex ofofofof DiscriminationDiscriminationDiscriminationDiscrimination AbilityAbilityAbilityAbility andandandand thethethetheJudgmentJudgmentJudgmentJudgment CriterionCriterionCriterionCriterion inininin InvestmentInvestmentInvestmentInvestment DecisionDecisionDecisionDecision:::: AnAnAnAn ExperimentExperimentExperimentExperiment BasedBasedBasedBased onononon SignalSignalSignalSignalDetectionDetectionDetectionDetection TheoryTheoryTheoryTheoryWU Ru-xin*, Huang Jian-bai (School of Business, Central South University)

2)2)2)2) TheTheTheThe StockStockStockStock InvestmentInvestmentInvestmentInvestment DecisionsDecisionsDecisionsDecisions andandandand FinancialFinancialFinancialFinancial Behaviors:Behaviors:Behaviors:Behaviors: TheTheTheThe PerspectivePerspectivePerspectivePerspective ofofofofPsychologicalPsychologicalPsychologicalPsychological BiasesBiasesBiasesBiasesCheng-Chung Wu*( National Kaohsiung First University of Science and Technology),Chung-Wen Yang, Chiu-Hua Tang, andYing-Shih Mai (Cheng Shiu University)


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DecemberDecemberDecemberDecember 16161616 (Thusday)(Thusday)(Thusday)(Thusday)

9:009:009:009:00 –––– 10:4010:4010:4010:40 PlenaryPlenaryPlenaryPlenary IVIVIVIV andandandand VVVVVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Plenary IV: Ananish Chaudhuri (University of Auckland)SustainingSustainingSustainingSustaining cooperationcooperationcooperationcooperation inininin laboratorylaboratorylaboratorylaboratory publicpublicpublicpublic goodsgoodsgoodsgoods experiments:experiments:experiments:experiments: aaaa selectiveselectiveselectiveselective surveysurveysurveysurvey ofofofofthethethethe literatureliteratureliteratureliteratureChair: Joerg Oechssler (University of Heidelberg)

Plenary V: Eyal Winter (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)MentalMentalMentalMental EquilibriumEquilibriumEquilibriumEquilibrium andandandand RationalRationalRationalRational EmotionsEmotionsEmotionsEmotionsJoerg Oechssler (University of Heidelberg)

10:4010:4010:4010:40 ---- 11:0011:0011:0011:00 CoffeeCoffeeCoffeeCoffee BreakBreakBreakBreak11:0011:0011:0011:00 –––– 12:0012:0012:0012:00 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions IV.AIV.AIV.AIV.A andandandand IV.BIV.BIV.BIV.B

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession IV.AIV.AIV.AIV.A PublicPublicPublicPublic GoodsGoodsGoodsGoodsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: Liangcong Fan (Zhejiang University)

1)1)1)1) Cross-EffectsCross-EffectsCross-EffectsCross-Effects ofofofof Leadership,Leadership,Leadership,Leadership, PunishmentPunishmentPunishmentPunishment andandandand ExogenousExogenousExogenousExogenous RegulationRegulationRegulationRegulation inininin thethethethe publicpublicpublicpublicgoodgoodgoodgood provision:provision:provision:provision:AnAnAnAn ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental StudyStudyStudyStudyBo Li (Nankai University)

2)2)2)2) GroupGroupGroupGroup SizeSizeSizeSize andandandand thethethethe EffectivenessEffectivenessEffectivenessEffectiveness ofofofof thethethethe PunishmentPunishmentPunishmentPunishment MechanismMechanismMechanismMechanism inininin thethethethe VCM:VCM:VCM:VCM: AnAnAnAnExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental InvestigationInvestigationInvestigationInvestigationBin Xu (Zhejiang Gongshang University), Bram Cadsby (University of Guelph),Liangcong Fan* (Zhejiang University) Fei Song (Ryerson University)

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession IV.BIV.BIV.BIV.B DynamicDynamicDynamicDynamic MarketsMarketsMarketsMarketsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Damjan Pfajfar (Tilburg University)

1)1)1)1) IndividualIndividualIndividualIndividual Expectations,Expectations,Expectations,Expectations, LimitedLimitedLimitedLimited RationalityRationalityRationalityRationality andandandandAggregateAggregateAggregateAggregate Outcomes*Outcomes*Outcomes*Outcomes*Te Bao*, Cars Hommes, Joep Sonnemans, and Jan Tuinstra (University of Amsterdam)

2)2)2)2) Frictions,Frictions,Frictions,Frictions, persistence,persistence,persistence,persistence, andandandand centralcentralcentralcentral bankbankbankbank policypolicypolicypolicy inininin anananan experimentalexperimentalexperimentalexperimental dynamicdynamicdynamicdynamicstochasticstochasticstochasticstochastic generalgeneralgeneralgeneral equilibriumequilibriumequilibriumequilibrium economyeconomyeconomyeconomyCharles N. Noussair, Damjan Pfajfar*, and Janos Zsiros (Tilburg University)

12:0012:0012:0012:00 –––– 1:451:451:451:45 LunchLunchLunchLunch1:451:451:451:45 –––– 3:153:153:153:15 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions V.AV.AV.AV.A andandandand V.BV.BV.BV.B

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions V.AV.AV.AV.A IndividualIndividualIndividualIndividual PreferencesPreferencesPreferencesPreferences underunderunderunder RiskRiskRiskRisk

*


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Venue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Chair: Zhong Songfa (NUS)

1)1)1)1) WillingnessWillingnessWillingnessWillingness totototo Pay,Pay,Pay,Pay, WillingnessWillingnessWillingnessWillingness totototo AcceptAcceptAcceptAccept andandandand ““““SmoothSmoothSmoothSmooth vs.vs.vs.vs. KinkedKinkedKinkedKinked”””” UtilityUtilityUtilityUtility ofofofofWealthWealthWealthWealth Functions:Functions:Functions:Functions: AnAnAnAn EmpiricalEmpiricalEmpiricalEmpirical TestTestTestTest ofofofof aaaa TheoreticalTheoreticalTheoreticalTheoretical DebateDebateDebateDebateSusan Chilton, Michael Jones-Lee, Rebecca McDonald, Hugh Metcalf* (NewcastleUniversity Business School)

2)2)2)2) ReiningReiningReiningReining inininin ExcessiveExcessiveExcessiveExcessive RiskRiskRiskRisk TakingTakingTakingTaking bybybyby Executives:Executives:Executives:Executives: ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental EvidenceEvidenceEvidenceEvidenceMathieu Lefebvre, and Ferdinand M. Vieider* (Ludwig-Maximilians-University)

3)3)3)3) ModelingModelingModelingModeling DecisionDecisionDecisionDecision MakingMakingMakingMaking underunderunderunder RiskRiskRiskRisk usingusingusingusing NeurochemistryNeurochemistryNeurochemistryNeurochemistryChew Soo Hong, Richard P Ebstein, and Zhong Songfa* (NUS)

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions V.BV.BV.BV.B AuctionsAuctionsAuctionsAuctions andandandandAffiliatedAffiliatedAffiliatedAffiliated ValuesValuesValuesValuesVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Youxin Hu (SWUFE)

1)1)1)1) TheTheTheThe effecteffecteffecteffect ofofofof biddingbiddingbiddingbidding informationinformationinformationinformation inininin ascendingascendingascendingascending auctionsauctionsauctionsauctionsAuthors: Mun Chui* (SJTU), David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith

2)2)2)2) SimilaritySimilaritySimilaritySimilarity EffectsEffectsEffectsEffects inininin TakeoverTakeoverTakeoverTakeover ContestsContestsContestsContestsYun Dai* (Erasmus University Rotterdam), Sebastian Gryglewicz Han, and T.J. Smit

3)3)3)3) TheoreticalTheoreticalTheoreticalTheoretical andandandand ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalAnalysisAnalysisAnalysisAnalysis ofofofofAuctionsAuctionsAuctionsAuctions withwithwithwith NegativeNegativeNegativeNegative ExternalitiesExternalitiesExternalitiesExternalitiesYouxin Hu* (SWUFE), John Kagel, and Lixin Ye

3:153:153:153:15 -3:35-3:35-3:35-3:35 CoffeeCoffeeCoffeeCoffee BreakBreakBreakBreak

3:353:353:353:35 –––– 4:254:254:254:25 PlenaryPlenaryPlenaryPlenary VIVIVIVIVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Plenary V1: Joerg Oechssler (University of Heidelberg)Imitation:Imitation:Imitation:Imitation: TheoryTheoryTheoryTheory andandandand ExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsChair: Ananish Chaudhuri (University of Auckland)

4:404:404:404:40 –––– 6:106:106:106:10 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions VI.AVI.AVI.AVI.A andandandand VI.BVI.BVI.BVI.B

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession VI.AVI.AVI.AVI.ATrustTrustTrustTrustVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: Jan Potters* (Tilburg University)

1)1)1)1) WillWillWillWill FormalFormalFormalFormal RiskRiskRiskRisk SharingSharingSharingSharing ArrangementsArrangementsArrangementsArrangements CrowdCrowdCrowdCrowd outoutoutout InformalInformalInformalInformalMechanisms:Mechanisms:Mechanisms:Mechanisms: AnAnAnAn ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental StudyStudyStudyStudy


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Yiming Liu*, Yu Duan, and Zhao Li (Peking University)

2)2)2)2) PromisesPromisesPromisesPromises asasasas CCCCommitmentsommitmentsommitmentsommitmentsHuseyn Ismayilov and Jan Potters* (Tilburg University)

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession VI.VI.VI.VI.BBBB GamesGamesGamesGamesVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Bin Xu (Zhejiang University)

1)1)1)1) HowHowHowHow dodododo subjectssubjectssubjectssubjects playplayplayplay againstagainstagainstagainst aaaa NashNashNashNash opponentopponentopponentopponent inininin gamesgamesgamesgames whichwhichwhichwhich havehavehavehave aaaa mixedmixedmixedmixedstrategystrategystrategystrategy equilibrium?equilibrium?equilibrium?equilibrium?Jason Shachat (WISE, Xiamen University), J. Todd Swarthout (Georgia State University)and Lijia Wei* (WISE, Xiamen University)

2)2)2)2) ChoiceChoiceChoiceChoice BracketingBracketingBracketingBracketing andandandand SocialSocialSocialSocial Preference:Preference:Preference:Preference: ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental EvidenceEvidenceEvidenceEvidence fromfromfromfrom TrustTrustTrustTrustGameGameGameGame andandandand SimultaneousSimultaneousSimultaneousSimultaneous PrisonerPrisonerPrisonerPrisoner’’’’ssss DilemmaDilemmaDilemmaDilemma GameGameGameGameLI King, and DING Jieyao* (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

3)3)3)3) Bertrand-Edgeworth-ShapleyBertrand-Edgeworth-ShapleyBertrand-Edgeworth-ShapleyBertrand-Edgeworth-Shapley CycleCycleCycleCycle inininin aaaa 2222 ×××× 2222 GameGameGameGameBin Xu and Zhijian Wang* (Experimental Social Science Laboratory, ZhejiangUniversity)


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2010 International Workshop on Experimental Economics and FinanceProgram with Abstract

DecemberDecemberDecemberDecember 151515158:308:308:308:30 –––– 8:458:458:458:45WelcomeWelcomeWelcomeWelcome andandandand OpeningOpeningOpeningOpening RemarksRemarksRemarksRemarks8:458:458:458:45 –––– 9:359:359:359:35 PlenaryPlenaryPlenaryPlenary IIIIVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Shyam Sunder (Yale School of Management)Title: Default penalty as a disciplinary and selection mechanism in presence of multipleequilibriaAbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract: Closed exchange and production-and-exchange economies may have multipleequilibria, a fact that is usually ignored in macroeconomic models. Our basic argument isthat default and bankruptcy laws are required to prevent strategic default, and these lawscan also serve to provide the conditions for uniqueness. In this paper we reportexperimental evidence on the effectiveness of this approach to resolving multiplicity:society can assign default penalties on fiat money so the economy selects one of theequilibria. Our data show that the choice of default penalty takes the economy to theneighborhood of the chosen equilibrium. The theory and evidence together reinforce theidea that accounting, bankruptcy and possibly other aspects of social mechanisms play animportant role in resolving the otherwise mathematically intractable challenges associatedwith multiplicity of equilibria in closed economies. Additionally we discuss the meaningand experimental implications of default penalties that support an activebankruptcy-modified competitive equilibrium.Chair: Jason Shachat (WISE, Xiamen University)

9:359:359:359:35 –––– 10:0010:0010:0010:00 CoffeeCoffeeCoffeeCoffee BreakBreakBreakBreak andandandand GroupGroupGroupGroup PhotoPhotoPhotoPhoto

10:0010:0010:0010:00 –––– 12:0012:0012:0012:00 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions I.AI.AI.AI.A andandandand I.BI.BI.BI.B

SessionSessionSessionSession I.AI.AI.AI.ACoordinationCoordinationCoordinationCoordinationVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: Joseph Tao-yi Wang* (National Taiwan University)

1)1)1)1) GroupGroupGroupGroup MergerMergerMergerMerger asasasas aaaaWayWayWayWay totototoAchieveAchieveAchieveAchieve EffiEffiEffiEfficientcientcientcient CoordinationCoordinationCoordinationCoordination ininininWeak-linkWeak-linkWeak-linkWeak-link GamesGamesGamesGamesIrina Kirysheva (European University Institute)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract：This paper investigates efficiency of group performance in weak-link gamesintroduced by VanHuck et al characterized by multiple Pareto-ranked Nash Equilibria.Previous evidence shows that in such games large groups almost never coordinateefficiently in the laboratory, though efficiently coordinating groups can be grown, bystarting with a small group and gradually increasing its size. In real life, the way anorganization (e.g. a company) develops is not limited to gradual growth only; another


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option is a merger of two or more existing groups of smaller Size.The purpose of this paper is to analyze if the merger of previously effectively

coordinating groups can solve coordination problem. Using controlled laboratoryexperiments we investigate a weak-link game, where two small (and, thus, usuallyeffectively coordinating) groups are merged together. We have conducted six sessions(three treatment and three control sessions) in two universities in Moscow with the totalnumber of participants equal to one hundred. In treatment sessions participants wererepeatedly playing a game in groups of size two for ten periods. Then each group wasmerged with another group and participants continued playing in groups of size four foranother ten periods. In control sessions participants were playing in groups of four fortwenty rounds of the experiment.Under both treatment and control conditions in each round participants had to make a

choice of effort level from 1 to 7, with all choosing 7 being a Pareto-dominantequilibrium, while all choosing 1 being the most inefficient one. Participants were alsoasked to predict choices of other participants in their group and a premium for accurateguesses was provided.Our experimental data suggests that in rounds 11 to 20, participants in the treatment

sessions tend to choose higher level of effort than participants in the control session. Themost significant determinant of a participant’s choice in a given period is the minimumlevel of effort in his or her group in the previous period. Our results also suggest thatpeople in treatment sessions tend to be more patient and do not react as heavily to theprevious miscoordination.Our experimental findings suggest that larger groups formed from smaller groups are

significantly more efficient in their ability to coordinate than those that were start large.Such groups start from the higher effort level and keep this efficiency through all periods,even after the merger. Another reason for merged group efficiency is reduced strategicuncertainty about decisions of other players in the group that is achieved through thehistory of previous success. Players in small groups seem to be more patient and wait tilltheir partners raise effort levels, and this effect holds after the merger too, thought itbecomes smaller in magnitude. The efficiency in the period prior to the merger playscrucial role in determining the future success of the merged group. Our findings can beinterpreted as suggesting that failure to coordinate observed in large groups is attributableto lack of the success coordination history rather than to the size of the group per se.

2)2)2)2)AuthorityAuthorityAuthorityAuthority andandandand CommunicationCommunicationCommunicationCommunication inininin thethethethe LaboratoryLaboratoryLaboratoryLaboratory****Ernest K. Lai (Lehigh University) and Wooyoung Lim* (HKUST)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: We experimentally investigate delegation and communication astwo alternative means of coordination. We implement twodelegation-communication games in which an uninformed principal decideswhether to delegate her decision-authority to an informed agent or tocommunicate with the agent via cheap talk to obtain decision-relevantinformation. We observe that the decision-authority is almost always retainedin the game in which the principal is able to communicate with the agent over


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the truth-telling equilibrium that payoff -dominates delegation. Significantlymore choices of delegation than of communication are observed in the game inwhich delegation payoff -dominates the unique babbling communicationequilibrium. Yet in this game we observe a higher incidence of o-equilibriumplay in which 1) a non-negligible fraction of principal-subjects hold on to theirdecision-authority despite the optimality of delegation, and 2) agent-subjectstransmit information in the o -equilibrium communication subgame despite theequilibrium prediction of no information transmission. The boundedrationality model of level-k reasoning provides a link between the twophenomena: a principal-subject "under-delegates" because she believes thather agent opponent is less than fully strategic and will provide information toher; such beliefs of "over-transmission of information" is in turn consistentwith the actual play.

3)3)3)3) UsingUsingUsingUsing BrainBrainBrainBrain DrainDrainDrainDrain MigrationMigrationMigrationMigration totototo InduceInduceInduceInduce EducationEducationEducationEducation Investment:Investment:Investment:Investment: AnAnAnAn LaboratoryLaboratoryLaboratoryLaboratoryExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental InvestigationInvestigationInvestigationInvestigationYi-Ping Bai, Tzu-Hao Wang and Joseph Tao-yi Wang* (National Taiwan University)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: We investigate the effects of emigration with laboratory experiments byemploying a “minimum effort” game, in which each person in a group chooses an effortlevel (investment in human capital), and payoffs are determined by one’s own effort andthe lowest effort in the group. This game has multiple equilibria, resembling multipleequilibria with various levels of human capital in macroeconomic models, and illustratesthe coordination problem created by the externalities of education level. We find thatwhen subjects have a chance to migrate to a new group of one’s own after the first fiverounds (in which one could perfectly coordinate at the highest effort level possible),groups could sustain high effort equilibria during those rounds if the probability ofmigration depends on relative effort levels (brain drain). Coordination drops in the laterrounds, but some groups still coordinate on better equilibria than the worse one. On theother hand, we see effort levels drop to the lowest level when there is no migrationpossibility or when the chances of migration is independent of effort.

SessionSessionSessionSession I.BI.BI.BI.B FieldFieldFieldField andandandand RealRealRealReal EffortEffortEffortEffort ExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Zemin Zhong (PKU-HSBC)

1)1)1)1) SurpriseSurpriseSurpriseSurprise andandandand Reciprocity:Reciprocity:Reciprocity:Reciprocity: AAAA RealRealRealReal EEEEffffffffortortortort ExperimentExperimentExperimentExperimentZhiquan Weng (SWUFE)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract:::: We present the results of a real-effort experiment which tests for the presenceof a surprise effect in a gift-exchange game. A surprise effect is hypothesized as inducingthe agent to work harder when the wage paid is greater than expected. We find thatsurprising workers with a higher wage induced them to work more meticulously, raising


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the quality but not the quantity of the work performed. The surprise effects did notdiminish but persisted over time. In contrast, workers did not respond positively toadditional wage payment when the bonus announcement was made ahead of time.

2)2)2)2) FramingFramingFramingFraming ManipulationsManipulationsManipulationsManipulations inininin Contests:Contests:Contests:Contests: AAAANaturalNaturalNaturalNatural FieldFieldFieldField ExperimentExperimentExperimentExperimentFuhai Hong* (HKUST), Tanjim Hossain (University of Toronto), John A. List (Universityof Chicago)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract：We report results from a natural field experiment that exogenously manipulateswage bonuses within a contest over an 8-week period in a Chinese high-techmanufacturing facility. Two identical teams competed against each other to win a bonusgiven to the team with the higher average hourly productivity over the week. For oneteam, the bonus was framed as a reward or gain while it was framed as a punishment orloss for the other. As one would expect, the bonus worked. On average, productivityincreased by almost 14% under the bonus schemes. We report several more results: First,worker effort increased by a greater degree in response to bonuses posed as losses than ascomparable gains. The framing effect was roughly 2.3%, but is measured imprecisely.Moreover, framing the incentive scheme as a loss made a team nearly 48% more likely toproduce at a level of productivity higher than that of a team whose incentive was posed asa gain. Finally, the workers seemingly reciprocated to the bonus by increasing the qualityof production as well as quantity the defect rate fell as the productivity increased.

3)3)3)3) ClinicalClinicalClinicalClinical Information,Information,Information,Information, MoralMoralMoralMoral Hazard,Hazard,Hazard,Hazard, andandandand PatientPatientPatientPatient Involvement:Involvement:Involvement:Involvement: FieldFieldFieldField EvidenceEvidenceEvidenceEvidence ininininChinaChinaChinaChinaSiyu YU (Guanghua School of Management, Peking University)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: With a field experiment involving 935 samples, this paper investigates theinfluence of physician-provided clinical information and physician-patient relationshipson patient involvement in outpatient treatment and detects moral hazard behaviors in thepatient demand side. Patient decisions are found to be significantly affected byphysician-provided clinical information, physician-patient relationships, and theindividual characteristics of patients such as education, income, self-professionalinformation, and illness severity. Additionally, patients who have health insurance preferto choose a combination of imported drugs, even if the therapeutic effect shows them tobe identical with domestic drugs. The results of this study have implications with respectto educating patients, building trust worthiness between physicians and patients,encouraging patient empowerment, and evaluating the insurance framework in China.Because this study controls for physician behaviors, further studies are needed on therelationships among these factors in real-life settings.

4)4)4)4) LemonyLemonyLemonyLemony prices:prices:prices:prices: anananan onlineonlineonlineonline fieldfieldfieldfield experimentexperimentexperimentexperiment onononon pricepricepriceprice dispersiondispersiondispersiondispersionZemin (Zachary) Zhong* and David Ong (PKU-HSBC)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: In an online field experiment, we test the widespread perception that Chinese


17

consumers use prices as signals of quality, and hence, will not necessarily buy the lowestpriced product, all else being equal.

We contribute to the large and growing literature in the marketing and economicsliteratures on differences in prices of identical or nearly identical goods. This pricedispersion is all the more puzzling in the age of the internet where such price dispersioncan no longer be easily attributed to search costs, especially as the dispersion is oftenlarger among online than offline stores. However, prior empirical studies likeBrynjolfsson and Smith 2000 do not firmly establish such price dispersion as they do notrule out reputation or other unobservable factors as causes. External validity is animportant issue for the few laboratory experiments which we are aware of in experimentslike Michael and Morgan 2004.

We achieve control of unobservables and external validity with an online field experimenton taobao.com, the largest B2C and C2C online market in China. We sell a pure searchgood with a highly liquid market: 100 kinds of top-up cards for mobile phone withdifferent combination of operator, face value and region from two shops with no trackrecords. We sell identical pairs of such cards but at different prices. Reputation andfeedback for the two shops are constantly balanced to maintain identicality. With ourlarge sample size we can either disconfirm the hypothesis of price dispersion for searchgoods, or confirm it, and hence credibly put in question one of the few laws in economics-- the law of the downward sloping demand curve.

12:0012:0012:0012:00 –––– 1:301:301:301:30 LunchLunchLunchLunch1:301:301:301:30 -3:00-3:00-3:00-3:00 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions II.AII.AII.AII.A andandandand II.BII.BII.BII.B

SessionSessionSessionSession II.AII.AII.AII.ANewNewNewNewMethodologiesMethodologiesMethodologiesMethodologiesVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: David Ong (PKU-HSBC)

1)1)1)1) DataDataDataData PrecisionPrecisionPrecisionPrecision andandandand thethethethe ReliabilityReliabilityReliabilityReliability ofofofof StatisticStatisticStatisticStatistic Inference:Inference:Inference:Inference:AAAACaseCaseCaseCase StudyStudyStudyStudy

Qiqi Cheng*, Bin Xu, Zhijian Wang (Zhejiang University)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: In this paper, data of Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura（2008）is employedto illustrate the necessity of controlling the Type II error in statistical inference. Generallyspeaking, given that the significant test cannot reject the null hypothesis, we alwaysaccept it. However, we may accept a false null hypothesis (the Type II error) at this time.Such error leads to a misunderstanding in the theories comparison. When other conditionsremain the same, the frequency of type II error is negatively correlated with the precisionof the data, thus the reliability of the statistics results depends on the precision of data.Especially in economics experiments, other factors being controlled, the precision of datacan only be adjusted by varying the sample size. A requirement of the precision ofexperimental data is accompanied by a minimum sample size requirement. In general, the


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minimum sample size requirement can be calculated when the difference between thesample data, the level of significance and the acceptable probability of Type II error given.We calculate the minimum sample size requirements for distinguishing the two treatmentsin each pair in Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura（2008）and re-analysis the data thatmeets the criterion. We find that IBE (Impulsive Balance Equilibrium) relativelyoutperforms in those five theories, but is still not perfect.

2)2)2)2) TheTheTheThe EffectsEffectsEffectsEffects ofofofof StakeStakeStakeStake SizeSizeSizeSize andandandand GenderGenderGenderGender onononon RiskRiskRiskRisk PreferencePreferencePreferencePreference underunderunderunder HypotheticalHypotheticalHypotheticalHypotheticalConditionsConditionsConditionsConditions

Yue Gao (Dongbei University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: Prospect Theory is important for understanding patterns of people’s attitudestowards risk and was proposed by Kahnman and Tversky (1979, KT) based on people’sresponses to different hypothetical lottery questions. However, some experimental studiesquestioned the validity of this method when the stake is large. According to the theory onthe interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic incentive, low real payments by cash werereplaced by small gifts under high hypothetical payments in this experiment, and lotterychoice problems were surveyed within two samples in China directly by the“Hypothetical Problem” method. Results suggest that stake size also matters in onesample. Besides, significant gender differences in risk attitudes were also found. Somesuggestions on applying these findings to decision making about cash dividends andbackground and gender diversity in the boardroom were proposed in the final part.

3)3)3)3) AAAAMechanismMechanismMechanismMechanism totototo DetectDetectDetectDetect andandandand DecreaseDecreaseDecreaseDecrease InsiderInsiderInsiderInsider TradingTradingTradingTrading

David Ong (PKU-HSBC)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: Every publicly traded firm has insiders (e.g., managers) who are privy toinformation relevant to future stock price, which they could exploit in trades against otherinvestors. Since trades are anonymous and uninformed traders would always lose in suchtrades, the possibility of facing a trader with inside information may deter trading byuninformed traders. Theory predicts that the fear of loss will be reflected in a greater bidask spread, which would prevent efficiency increasing trades from being realized. Thestandard method of eliminating insider trading, by administratively or legally restrictingthe trades of insiders, may actually decrease efficiency, because a) Some trades byinsiders may be liquidity motivated trades and not be based upon insider information, b)Such restrictions will not hinder the friends and family of insiders in their trades basedupon insider information.

For all these reasons, the effectiveness and welfare implications of such restrictions arealso not clear. Furthermore, current measures of insider trading cannot distinguishbetween trades on insider information and trades based upon clever interpretations ofpublic information.


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I propose a new method of measuring and decreasing insider trading that overcomes theseproblems. In regards to measurement, I rank stocks according to the correlation betweentheir price movements and publicized news events. (Trades based upon insiderinformation will move prices before public announcements.) My method can separate theeffects of such trades from those that are based upon insightful interpretations of publiclyavailable information -- on the assumption that peculiar insights occur randomly acrossstocks within a given industry. Using my analysis, different stock markets can also beranked by the amount of insider trading.

In an experimental follow up, I will test for the insider trading decreasing effect of thisindex by publicizing it for a randomly selected sample of stocks. Potential investors canthen use it to determine the probability of facing an insider in a trade. Thus, they candemand a proportionally larger premium for trades that involve stocks whose prices arerelatively less well explained by public information. If my theory is right, the bid askspread of these stocks should increase relative to those with higher correlation.Furthermore, I predict that the average bid ask spread of these stocks should be lowerthan for stocks with unpublished indices. This difference would reflect the actual shift ofinvestors to such stocks and the threat of further shifts should greater trading on insiderinformation occur. My method can be applied to any market. It also avoids thecontroversial surround regulatory measures to decrease insider trading decrease efficiency,which if they work may increase trades at the cost of decreasing informativeness oftrades.

SessionSessionSessionSession II.BII.BII.BII.BAssetAssetAssetAsset MarketsMarketsMarketsMarketsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310

Chair: Stephen L. Cheung* (University of Sydney)

1)1)1)1) InformationalInformationalInformationalInformational pricepricepriceprice cascadescascadescascadescascades andandandand thethethethe non-aggregationnon-aggregationnon-aggregationnon-aggregation ofofofof asymmetricasymmetricasymmetricasymmetric informationinformationinformationinformationinininin anananan experimentalexperimentalexperimentalexperimental assetassetassetasset market.market.market.market.Jason Shachat* (WISE, Xiamen University) and Anand Srivinasan (NUS)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:We report on experimental markets for a simple asset that lives for nine rounds,pays no dividends, and has terminal value which is a priori equally likely either one orzero. Our experimental design has three treatments. First, there is a baseline treatmentwhere no additional information regarding the terminal value arrives to the market. In theother treatments there is an informative binary signal that arrives after the first eighttrading rounds. If the true terminal value is one, the probability of a positive signal istwo-thirds; otherwise the probability is one-third. In one treatment the realization of thesignal is public information, and in the other market participants are randomly sequencedand receive the signal as private information. This latter case is the classic example ofBickchandi et al which leads to information cascades when price is exogenously fixedand market participants make sequential and observable portfolio adjustments. But inwhich cascades do not form when this setting is augmented with a market maker whooptimally adjusts prices.


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Each experimental session is conducted under one treatment and with subjectsparticipating in a sequence of three markets. In each market every subject is endowed withfive dollars of currency and five units of the asset. Rather than the sequential move marketinstitution we adopt the more commonly used in practice double auction market institutionwithout a market maker. In this institution the principle of private decentralizedinformation holds and participants can only learn by observing the public market data ofbids, asks, and contract prices - participants' portfolio adjustments are private. This recastthe performance questions as ones of how well does the market adjusts to sequentiallyarriving public information and how well does it aggregate this information if it privatelyand asymmetrically held. From the hypotheses of rational expectations and efficientmarkets we predict prices should quickly adjust to reflect fundamental values in all threetreatments. From alternative models based on market frictions or lack of commonknowledge of rationality we should expect higher incidences of bubbles, greater excessvolatility, and price to less reflect fundamental value as we respectively compare the noinformation, public signals, and private signal treatments.

Our results are strikingly different from these hypothesis and previous relatedexperiments. In a typical no information session dramatic bubbles occur in the earlyround of the first market and then prices converge strongly to the constant fundamentalvalue. Subjects learn to not bubble moving as they participate in the second and thirdmarkets. In a typical public information session, there is lower tendency for bubbles toform in the first market. Prices track the fundamental value, but in an adaptive fashion. Inthe period following the arrival of a signal price will reflect about fifty percent of theresulting change in value, and then the subsequent period prices will reflect an additionalthirty percent of the value. In the private treatments, there is a complete failure ofinformation aggregation. An informational price cascade forms in almost all sessions inwhich a homegrown price norm emerges early in a session and sustains the three marketincarnations. These prices have very low volatility and have zero correlation with thefundamental value. The norms are supported by subjects who are not the period’s insidersand are noise traders. This allows some subjects, to capitalize on their private informationwithout having to generate informative market or limit orders. These results are in starkcontrasts to previous experimental results, which strongly support the informationaggregation hypothesis, and reveal there is a hold spectrum of environments that need tobe explored before we can understand when asset markets will exhibit informationalefficiency.

2)2)2)2) TheTheTheThe EffectEffectEffectEffect ofofofof CircuitCircuitCircuitCircuit BreakersBreakersBreakersBreakers onononon inininin ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalAssetAssetAssetAsset MarketsMarketsMarketsMarkets

Xiaolan Yang* and Tao Hong (Zhejiang University)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: This paper conducts experimental asset markets with random value shocks andliquidity shocks to examine the effects of circuit breaker on market behavior. We have abaseline treatment and a circuit breaker treatment. In both treatments, the asset marketslast for 20 trading periods. An announcement of good news (positive shock) or bad news


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(negative shock) about the asset value is in public at the beginning of each period and theexpected value of each shock is negative. Besides the uncertainty of asset value, everysubject would be asked to return 4000 points experimental cash out of 12000 points initialendowment in a randomly chosen period. In the circuit breaker treatment, a breaker istriggered when the trading price overreacts to the value changing news. Our resultsindicate that circuit breakers significantly attenuate the deviation of prices fromfundamental values. Bid and offer prices are more rational after triggering circuit breaker.However, circuit breakers decrease the trading volume, since the trading time is reducedonce the breaker is triggered.

3)3)3)3) League-TableLeague-TableLeague-TableLeague-Table IncentivesIncentivesIncentivesIncentives andandandand PricePricePricePrice BubblesBubblesBubblesBubbles inininin ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental AssetAssetAssetAsset MarketsMarketsMarketsMarkets ****

Stephen L. Cheung* (University of Sydney), and Andrew Coleman (Credit Suisse)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: We study experimental markets when participants face incentives similar tothose prevailing in markets for managed funds. Each participant’s portfolio is periodicallyevaluated at market value and ranked in a league table according to short-term paperreturns. Those who rank highly attract a larger share of new fund inflows. Underconditions in which prices are relatively efficient, we find the effect of incentives to bemild. However under conditions in which markets are prone to bubble, these bubbles aregreatly exacerbated by incentives. In these markets, bubbles become larger withexperience and do not necessarily crash back to intrinsic value.

3:003:003:003:00 -3:20-3:20-3:20-3:20 CoffeeCoffeeCoffeeCoffee BreakBreakBreakBreak3:203:203:203:20 ---- 5:005:005:005:00 PlenaryPlenaryPlenaryPlenary IIIIIIII andandandand IIIIIIIIIIIIVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Plenary II:::: Peter BossaertsMarketMarketMarketMarket BubblesBubblesBubblesBubbles andandandand CrashesCrashesCrashesCrashes asasasas anananan ExpressionExpressionExpressionExpression ofofofof TensionTensionTensionTension betweenbetweenbetweenbetween SocialSocialSocialSocial andandandandIndividualIndividualIndividualIndividual Rationality:Rationality:Rationality:Rationality: AnAnAnAn ExperimentExperimentExperimentExperimentChair: Shyam Sunder (Yale School of Management)

AAAAbstract:bstract:bstract:bstract: We investigate the claim that social rationality (as opposed to individualrationality) explains the emergence of one type of bubble in competitive asset marketsthat we shall refer to as ``credit market bubble,'' and that individual rationality explainsthe subsequent crash. The bubble is defined as a situation where (i) the debt is pricedabove its commonly known intrinsic value and (ii) the debt is rolled over even thougheach creditor should cash in because everyone knows that the debtor will never be able torepay. Building on evidence from behavioral game theory, we propose that credit marketbubbles emerge whenever the debtor's payment ability, although never sufficient, growsover time. We argue that this captures the essence of many financial bubbles alleged tohave been observed in the real world. Experimental data confirm the emergence ofbubbles in this setting. The bubbles are robust -- they re-emerge upon replication with


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exactly the same parameters and the same subject cohort. Prices always remain abovelevels predicted by conventional asset pricing theory. We believe no existing theory istruly applicable to explain pricing in credit bubbles. In parallel to behavioral game theory,we expect our experiments to lead to new theory, best referred to as behavioral assetpricing theory.

Plenary III: John Duffy (University of Pittsburgh)AAAADynamicDynamicDynamicDynamic GeneralGeneralGeneralGeneral EquilibriumEquilibriumEquilibriumEquilibriumApproachApproachApproachApproach totototoAssetAssetAssetAsset PricingPricingPricingPricing ExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsChair: Shyam Sunder (Yale School of Management)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract:::: We report results from a laboratory experiment that implements aconsumption-based dynamic general equilibrium model of asset pricing. This work-horsemodel of the macrofinance literature posits that agents buy and sell assets for the purposeof intertemporally smoothing consumption, and that asset prices are determined byindividual risk and time preferences as well as the distribution of income and dividends.The experimental findings are largely supportive of the model's theoretical predictions.Notably we observe that asset price bubbles, defined as sustained departures of pricesfrom those implied by fundamentals, are infrequent and short-lived. This finding is a starkdeparture from many recent multi-period asset pricing experiments that lack aconsumption-smoothing objective. Indeed, we find that when subjects are induced toadjust shareholdings to smooth consumption, assets typically trade at a discount relativeto their expected value and market participation is broad; when theconsumption-smoothing motivation to trade assets is removed in an otherwise identicaleconomy, assets frequently trade at a premium relative to fundamentals and shareholdingsbecome highly concentrated.

5:155:155:155:15 –––– 6:456:456:456:45 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions III.AIII.AIII.AIII.A andandandand III.BIII.BIII.BIII.B

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession III.AIII.AIII.AIII.A SequentialSequentialSequentialSequential ChoiceChoiceChoiceChoice ExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: Masaru Sasaki (Osaka University)

1)1)1)1) HerdHerdHerdHerdinginginging withwithwithwith thethethethe StarsStarsStarsStarsFangfang Tang, Kai Yan and David Ong* (PKU-HSBC)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: We examined the effect of heterogeneous accuracy of information on herdingin a laboratory financial market. We first develop a Bayesian benchmark to predict thegreater influence of the better informed subjects (“stars”). In line with Cipriani andGuarino (2005), in our experiment only a fraction of those who should have herdedaccording to the rational benchmark did herd. However, this under-herding became morepronounced as stars’ information accuracy increased. We also found that the reputationeffect is larger if the star has more accurate information. However, the effect of a star’smistake on her reputation was also amplified.


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2)2)2)2)AnAnAnAn ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental TestTestTestTest ofofofof aaaa CollectiveCollectiveCollectiveCollective SearchSearchSearchSearch Model*Model*Model*Model*Yoichi Hizen (Hokkaido University), Keisuke Kawata*, Masaru Sasaki (OsakaUniversity)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: This paper’s objectives are to design laboratory experiments of finite andinfinite sequential collective search models and to test some implications obtained inAlbrecht, Anderson and Vroman (2010). We find that the average search duration islonger in collective search with the unanimity rule than in single-agent search, but isshorter in collective search in which only one vote is allowed to stop searching than insingle-agent search. These results support the implications of the AAV model. In addition,subjects are more likely to vote to stop searching in collective search than in single-agentsearch. This confirms the threshold effect in the sense that agents are less picky incollective search. Overall, the experimental outcomes are consistent with the implicationssuggested in the AAV model in terms of the relationships of the search duration and theprobability of voting for stop between collective search and single-agent search. However,the different outcomes are obtained in terms of the magnitude relationships of theprobability of voting for stop in collective search among various plurality voting rules.

3)3)3)3)AnAnAnAn ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental TestTestTestTest ofofofof aaaa SearchSearchSearchSearch ModelModelModelModel underunderunderunder KnightianKnightianKnightianKnightian UncertaintyUncertaintyUncertaintyUncertainty****

Takao Asano, Hiroko Okudaira (Okayama University), Masaru Sasaki* (OsakaUniversity)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: This paper’s objective is to design a laboratory experiment to address the effectof Knightian uncertainty on a subjectís search behavior in a finite sequential search model.Our finding is that the average search duration is shorter when there is Knightianuncertainty in the sense that the true point distribution is unknown to subjects, comparedto when the point distribution is known. The estimate of the probability of accepting anoffered point confirms that subjects are more likely to accept the offered point when thepoint distribution is unknown than when the point distribution is commonly known inadvance. We also find direct evidence that subjects reduce their own reservation pointwhen there is ambiguity of the point distribution. These results support the implication ofNishimura and Ozaki (2004). Ambiguity notably affects search behavior of risk aversesubjects, but not of either risk neutral or risk prone subjects. Finally, we test whether ornot subjects engage in search activity according to the optimal stopping rule.

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession III.BIII.BIII.BIII.B IndividualIndividualIndividualIndividual PortfolioPortfolioPortfolioPortfolio andandandand InvestmentInvestmentInvestmentInvestment DecisionsDecisionsDecisionsDecisionsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Cheng-Chung Wu* (National Kaohsiung First University of Science and Technology)

1)1)1)1) TheTheTheThe EffectsEffectsEffectsEffects ofofofof OverconfidenceOverconfidenceOverconfidenceOverconfidence onononon thethethethe IIIIndexndexndexndex ofofofof DDDDiscriminationiscriminationiscriminationiscrimination AAAAbilitybilitybilitybility andandandand thethethetheJJJJudgmentudgmentudgmentudgment CCCCriterionriterionriterionriterion inininin InvestmentInvestmentInvestmentInvestment DecisionDecisionDecisionDecision:::: AnAnAnAn ExperimentExperimentExperimentExperiment BasedBasedBasedBased onononon SignalSignalSignalSignalDetectionDetectionDetectionDetection TheoryTheoryTheoryTheoryWU Ru-xin*, Huang Jian-bai (School of Business, Central South University)


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AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract:::: The paper examines the effects of overconfidence on the index ofdiscrimination ability and the judgment criterion in the investment decision by asimulated experiment based on signal detection theory. We perform the experimentwith 55 undergraduates of business majors recruited freely, and adopt corporationinvestment decisions as experiment task to do our research. The result indicates:Overconfident is a situated compound concept, the overconfidence measured by theoverestimate of the investment outcomes has significant effect on the individual’discrimination ability and judgment criterion investment. The overconfidentparticipants have lower hits rate, the correct reject rate and the index ofdiscrimination ability, as well as higher rate of missing rate, false alarm rate and theindex of judgment criterion compared with the rational ones. Moreover, theindeterminate decision-making situation, the opportunity acceptance pattern, the lowrisk low income pattern of decision-making condition as well as the average/low riskincome pattern in decision-making may intensify the overconfident individual’sirrationality.

2)2)2)2) TheTheTheThe StockStockStockStock InvestmentInvestmentInvestmentInvestment DecisionsDecisionsDecisionsDecisions andandandand FFFFinancialinancialinancialinancial Behaviors:Behaviors:Behaviors:Behaviors: TheTheTheThe PerspectivePerspectivePerspectivePerspective ofofofofPsychologicalPsychologicalPsychologicalPsychological BiasesBiasesBiasesBiasesCheng-Chung Wu* (National Kaohsiung First University of Science and Technology),Chung-Wen Yang, Chiu-Hua Tang, andYing-Shih Mai (Cheng Shiu University)

AAAAbstract:bstract:bstract:bstract: With domestic economic growth showing signs of inertness, only throughappropriate wealth management can investors rest assured. When making an investment,investors are subject to the opinions of their counterparts or others. However, the peerinfluence is not the sole factor affecting investors’ behaviors; externalities and psychologyalso play a part. The research study emphasizes the influence of psychology on investors.The study considers psychological biases as a major factor in the stock investment, and

believes an exploration of psychological biases may lead to the enlightenment ofindividual preferences in terms of finance. Therefore, the study will firstly compilevarious psychological biases and distribute questionnaires for the sake of quantitativeresearch. The results of the questionnaires will be used to illustrate the effect ofpsychological status on investment decisions, the effect of demographics onpsychological biases, and the effect of psychological biases on investment decisions. Thestudy concludes the analysis with suggestions in response to various psychological biasesfor investors.

DecemberDecemberDecemberDecember 161616169:009:009:009:00 –––– 10:4010:4010:4010:40 PlenaryPlenaryPlenaryPlenary IVIVIVIV andandandand VVVVVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Plenary IV: Ananish Chaudhuri (University of Auckland)


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SustainingSustainingSustainingSustaining cooperationcooperationcooperationcooperation inininin laboratorylaboratorylaboratorylaboratory publicpublicpublicpublic goodsgoodsgoodsgoods experiments:experiments:experiments:experiments: aaaa selectiveselectiveselectiveselective surveysurveysurveysurvey ofofofofthethethethe literatureliteratureliteratureliteratureChair: Joerg Oechssler (University of Heidelberg)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed.by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press,（1995) on threerelated issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the roleof costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance ofcooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratorypublic goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the publicgood are positively correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution.Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high contributions to the public goodthrough costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such asexpressions of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching.

Plenary V: Eyal Winter (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)MentalMentalMentalMental EquilibriumEquilibriumEquilibriumEquilibrium andandandand RationalRationalRationalRational EmotionsEmotionsEmotionsEmotionsChair: Joerg Oechssler (University of Heidelberg)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract: We present here the concept of rational emotions: emotions may be directlycontrolled and utilized in a conscious, analytic fashion, enabling an individual to size up asituation, determine that a certain “mental state” is strategically advantageous to him andadjust accordingly. Building on the growing body of literature recognizing the vital roleof emotions in determining decisions, we explore the complementary role of rationalchoice in choosing emotional states. To that end, we employ psychophysiologicalmeasures and questionnaires to study participants’ behavior in an elementary game setting.Participants played the role of “recipient” in the Dictator Game, in which an anonymous“dictator” decides how to split an amount of money between himself and the recipient. Asubset of recipients was given a monetary incentive to be angry at low-split offers. Thatsubset demonstrated increased arousal at low offers relative to high offers, as well asmore anger than other participants. Highlighting the multi-level role of rational processes,these results provide a fresh outlook on human decision-making and constitute animportant step in the continuing effort to build more complete models of rationaldecision-making.

10:4010:4010:4010:40 ---- 11:0011:0011:0011:00 CoffeeCoffeeCoffeeCoffee BreakBreakBreakBreak11:0011:0011:0011:00 –––– 12:3012:3012:3012:30 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions IV.AIV.AIV.AIV.A andandandand IV.BIV.BIV.BIV.B

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession IV.AIV.AIV.AIV.A PublicPublicPublicPublic GoodsGoodsGoodsGoodsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: Liangcong Fan (Zhejiang University)

1)1)1)1) Cross-EffectsCross-EffectsCross-EffectsCross-Effects ofofofof Leadership,Leadership,Leadership,Leadership, PunishmentPunishmentPunishmentPunishment andandandand ExogenousExogenousExogenousExogenous RegulationRegulationRegulationRegulation inininin thethethethe publicpublicpublicpublicgoodgoodgoodgood provision:provision:provision:provision:AnAnAnAn ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental StudyStudyStudyStudyBo Li (Nankai University) *


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Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: In the years of planned economy, China’s central government plays the role ofthe “one and only” public goods supplier. Since the economic reform, the provision ofpublic goods depends more on market than on government in China. Therefore, to studythe transformation of the role and positioning of the government in the public goodsprovision has become an increasingly important issue, especially in the background thatthe under-provision problem has been more serious than ever before. In thecomputer-network lab with Chinese university students as subjects, this paper designs aset of experiments to study the important factors in the mechanism design of the publicgoods provision, including pure voluntary, leadership example, leader punishment andexogenous regulation. Moreover, this paper also explores the cross-effects of the factors.By the comparison and analysis of the experiment data, this paper finds that:(a) the pureleadership example wouldn’t necessarily lead to the increase in the contribution level ofthe public goods; whereas the cross-effect of the leader punishment and leadershipexample would significantly increase the level; (b) the effect of leader punishment is lessthan the exogenous regulation; (c) the cross-effect of the leadership example and theexogenous regulation would lead to the decrease of the effect of the exogenousregulation.

2)2)2)2) GroupGroupGroupGroup SizeSizeSizeSize andandandand thethethethe EffectivenessEffectivenessEffectivenessEffectiveness ofofofof thethethethe PunishmentPunishmentPunishmentPunishment MechanismMechanismMechanismMechanism inininin thethethethe VCM:VCM:VCM:VCM: AnAnAnAnExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental InvestigationInvestigationInvestigationInvestigationBin Xu (Zhejiang Gongshang University), Bram Cadsby (University of Guelph),Liangcong Fan* (Zhejiang University) Fei Song (Ryerson University)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract： The primary objective of our study is to examine the effectiveness of theindividual-punishment mechanism in larger groups. We compare groups of four versus 40participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robustdespite the coordination problems inherent in an institution relying on decentralizedindividual punishment decisions in the context of a larger group. As long as the MPCRstays constant, punishment is just as effective in a 40-person group as in a four-persongroup. Only if the marginal group return stays constant, resulting in an MPCR thatshrinks with group size, does punishment lose some but not all of its effectiveness atencouraging voluntary contributions to a public good.

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession IV.BIV.BIV.BIV.B DynamicDynamicDynamicDynamic MarketsMarketsMarketsMarketsVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Damjan Pfajfar (Tilburg University)

1111)))) IndividualIndividualIndividualIndividual Expectations,Expectations,Expectations,Expectations, LimitedLimitedLimitedLimited RationalityRationalityRationalityRationality andandandandAggregateAggregateAggregateAggregate Outcomes*Outcomes*Outcomes*Outcomes*Te Bao*, Cars Hommes, Joep Sonnemans, and Jan Tuinstra (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: Recent studies suggest that the type of strategic environment or expectationfeedback can have a large impact on whether the market can learn the rationalfundamental price. We present an experiment where the fundamental price experienceslarge unexpected shocks. Markets with negative expectation feedback (strategicsubstitutes) quickly converge to the new fundamental, while markets with positiveexpectation feedback (strategic complements) do not converge, but show under-reaction


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in the short run and over-reaction in the long run. A simple evolutionary selection modelof individual learning explains these differences in aggregate outcomes.

2222)))) Frictions,Frictions,Frictions,Frictions, persistence,persistence,persistence,persistence, andandandand centralcentralcentralcentral bankbankbankbank policypolicypolicypolicy inininin anananan experimentalexperimentalexperimentalexperimental dynamicdynamicdynamicdynamicstochasticstochasticstochasticstochastic generalgeneralgeneralgeneral equilibriumequilibriumequilibriumequilibrium economyeconomyeconomyeconomyCharles N. Noussair, Damjan Pfajfar*, and Janos Zsiros (Tilburg University)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are theprincipal paradigm currently employed for central bank policymaking. The popularity ofthese models lies in the rich and plausible dynamics they are able to generate, and theirability to allow policymakers to study the consequences of exogenous and policy-inducedshocks. In this paper, we construct experimental economies, populated with humansubjects, with the structure of a New Keynesian DSGE model. We give individualsmonetary incentives to maximize the objective functions in the model, but allow scope foragents' boundedly rational behavior and expectations to influence economic outcomes. Inour experiment subjects participate as consumer/workers, producers, and central bankersin an experimental macroeconomy. The economy is stochastic in that random shocksoccur to the production technology and to consumer demand. The economy is dynamic inthat consumer/workers can save unconsumed funds for future consumption. There aremonopolistically competitive output markets and a competitive input market in operation.The central bankers set the interest rate. Our objective in this research is twofold. The firstobjective is to create a new arena in which macroeconomic policy questions can bestudied, which is complementary to the methods currently employed. The secondobjective of this paper is to study especially the persistence of shock, the behavior ofhuman central bankers, and micro-pricing behavior. A first set of questions considers howthree types of frictions influence the persistence of shocks. The three frictions are (1) thepresence of monopolistic versus perfect competition, (2) the existence of menu costs inthe output market, and (3) the existence of human central bankers. We consider whether anumber of stylized facts can be replicated in our experimental economies. Empirical VARstudies show that policy innovations typically generate an inertial response in inflationand a persistent, hump-shaped response in output after a policy shock.

12:3012:3012:3012:30 –––– 1:451:451:451:45 LunchLunchLunchLunch1:451:451:451:45 -3:15-3:15-3:15-3:15 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions V.AV.AV.AV.A andandandand V.BV.BV.BV.B

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions V.AV.AV.AV.A IndividualIndividualIndividualIndividual PreferencesPreferencesPreferencesPreferences underunderunderunder RiskRiskRiskRiskVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Chair: Zhong Songfa (NUS)

1)1)1)1) WillingnessWillingnessWillingnessWillingness totototo Pay,Pay,Pay,Pay, WillingnessWillingnessWillingnessWillingness totototo AcceptAcceptAcceptAccept andandandand ““““SmoothSmoothSmoothSmooth vs.vs.vs.vs. KinkedKinkedKinkedKinked”””” UtilityUtilityUtilityUtility ofofofofWealthWealthWealthWealth Functions:Functions:Functions:Functions: AnAnAnAn EmpiricalEmpiricalEmpiricalEmpirical TestTestTestTest ofofofof aaaa TheoreticalTheoreticalTheoreticalTheoretical DebateDebateDebateDebateSusan Chilton, Michael Jones-Lee, Rebecca McDonald, Hugh Metcalf* (NewcastleUniversity Business School)


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AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract：We obtain “Willingness to Accept/Willingness to Pay” (WTA/WTP) ratios fortwo health complaints, preceded by a WTA-WTP learning experiment utilizing anincentive compatible disclosure method. We find that while, not surprisingly, there issome variation in WTA and WTP responses for more substantial health effects across thesample, it is nonetheless the case that as the severity of the health effect is reduced, so theWTP/WTP ratio converges across the sample and tends to unity, in accordance withtheory. On the basis of this evidence, we find no compelling evidence to reject theneoclassical assumption of ‘smooth’ utility of wealth functions which underlies standardValue of a Prevented (Statistical) Fatality (VPF) analysis.

2)2)2)2) ReiningReiningReiningReining inininin ExcessiveExcessiveExcessiveExcessive RiskRiskRiskRisk TakingTakingTakingTaking bybybyby Executives:Executives:Executives:Executives: ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental EvidenceEvidenceEvidenceEvidenceMathieu Lefebvre, and Ferdinand M. Vieider* (Ludwig-Maximilians-University)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract：Compensation of executives by means of equity has long been seen as a meansto tie executives' income to company performance, and thus as a solution to theprincipal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management inpublicly owned companies. The overwhelming part of such equity compensation iscurrently provided in the form of stock-options. Recent events have however revivedsuspicions that the latter may induce excessive risk taking by executives. We develop abasic model in which such risk-taking behavior is explained based on a richer array ofrisk attitudes than typically assumed in principal-agent theory. We then use this model toderive a series of hypotheses based on risk attitudes as predicted by prospect theory. In anexperiment, we find that subjects acting as executives do indeed take risks that areexcessive from the perspective of shareholders if compensated through options.Comparing compensation mechanisms based on stock-options to long-termstock-ownership plans, we find that the latter significantly reduce the uptake of excessiverisks by aligning executives' interests with those of shareholders. Introducing aninstitutionalized accountability mechanism consisting in the requirement for executives tojustify their choices in front of a shareholder reunion also reduces excessive risk taking,and appears to be even more effective than long-term stock-ownership plans. Acombination of long-term stock-ownership plans and increased accountability thus seem apromising direction for reining in excessive risk taking by executives.

3)3)3)3) ModelingModelingModelingModeling DecisionDecisionDecisionDecision MakingMakingMakingMaking underunderunderunder RiskRiskRiskRisk usingusingusingusing NeurochemistryNeurochemistryNeurochemistryNeurochemistryChew Soo Hong, Richard P Ebstein, and Zhong Songfa* (NUS)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: Challenges to the descriptive validity of the expected utility model have led tothe development of non-expected utility models of decision making under risk includingprospect theory which incorporates psychological considerations to account for theloss-gain differentiation in risk attitude and overweighting of small probabilitiesassociated with sizable outcomes. We propose a neurochemical extension of prospecttheory by linking two evolutionarily ancient neurotransmitters – dopamine and serotonin– to the valuation and saliency of outcomes over gains and losses. This model provides abiological basis for the phenomenon of loss aversion, diminishing valuation sensitivity


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towards gains and losses, and nonlinear response to probabilistic stimuli. We derive itstestable implications linking the decision maker’s genetic makeup modulating herdopamine and serotonin tones to her attitude towards the fourfold risks of moderateprospects, moderate hazards, longshot prospects, and longshot hazards. The empiricalvalidity of our model is corroborated by evidence from within-subject correlations ofattitude towards fourfold risks as well as evidence from recent published findings on themolecular genetics of risk taking.

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions V.BV.BV.BV.B AuctionsAuctionsAuctionsAuctions andandandandAffiliatedAffiliatedAffiliatedAffiliated ValuesValuesValuesValuesVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Youxin Hu (SWUFE)

1)1)1)1) TheTheTheThe effecteffecteffecteffect ofofofof biddingbiddingbiddingbidding informationinformationinformationinformation inininin ascendingascendingascendingascending auctionsauctionsauctionsauctionsAuthors: Mun Chui* (SJTU), David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: In an ascending price auction, when values are interdependent, bidders usebidding information concerning when other bidders drop out of the auction to form anestimate of their own value for the object. This suggests that this bidding informationcan be an integral part of a bidder’s decision process in such an auction. We study theeffect of this information in an environment where bidders’ values involve both privateand common value components. We find that providing bidding information does nothave a significant effect on expected revenue and expected efficiency. The effect ofinformation on winner’s expected profit depends on the range of uncertainty of thecommon value component and the level of Nash profit prediction, which the auctioneerhas no a priori knowledge. In our environment, where bidders have a private componentto their value and the auction takes place in ascending clock format, bidders do not sufferfrom the winner’s curse even when information is not provided. Information substantiallyincreases the variability of revenue and winner’s profit when the range of uncertainty ofthe common value component is large. Bidders’ response to information depends on therange of uncertainty.

2)2)2)2) SimilaritySimilaritySimilaritySimilarity EffectsEffectsEffectsEffects inininin TakeoverTakeoverTakeoverTakeover ContestsContestsContestsContestsYun Dai* (Erasmus University Rotterdam), Sebastian Gryglewicz Han, and T.J. Smit

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract：When bidders share related resources and post-acquisition strategies for atarget, their valuations are likely to be interdependent. This paper analyzes equilibriumbidding strategies in a sequential-entry takeover contest, in which similar acquirers havecorrelated private valuations. Increased similarity between bidders has two effects onbidding strategies. On the one hand, informational externalities of early bids signal highexpected value and induce participation in the contest. On the other, bidding rivalrybetween similar rivals decreases acquirer’s expected returns, which makes participationless profitable. The model predicts that expected acquisition prices and the probability ofmultiple-bidder contests are the highest for intermediately similar bidders. A laboratoryexperiment confirms the qualitative predictions especially for low and intermediate levels


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of similarity. We show that extending the theory for a joy of winning can help further inexplaining the experimental data.

3)3)3)3) TheoreticalTheoreticalTheoreticalTheoretical andandandand ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalAnalysisAnalysisAnalysisAnalysis ofofofofAuctionsAuctionsAuctionsAuctions withwithwithwith NegativeNegativeNegativeNegative ExternalitiesExternalitiesExternalitiesExternalitiesYouxin Hu* (SWUFE), John Kagel, and Lixin Ye

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:We investigate a model in which a single bidder (the “entrant”), on winning theauction, imposes a negative externality on two “regular” bidders. In an ascending priceclock auction, in equilibrium when all bidders are active a regular bidder free rides,dropping out before reaching his private value. Despite this free riding problem, in almostall cases, the item is ex post efficiently assigned. In contrast, in a first-price sealed bidauction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, leading to a lower expost efficiency. The experiment shows minimal free riding in the clock auction, but aspredicted, when a single regular bidder is left competing with the “entrant” he bids up tohis value plus the externality. In first-price auctions, as predicted regular bidders bid moreaggressively than the “entrant,” and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality.

3:153:153:153:15 -3:35-3:35-3:35-3:35 CoffeeCoffeeCoffeeCoffee BreakBreakBreakBreak3:353:353:353:35 –––– 4:254:254:254:25 PlenaryPlenaryPlenaryPlenary VIVIVIVIVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110

Plenary V1: Joerg Oechssler (University of Heidelberg)Imitation:Imitation:Imitation:Imitation: TheoryTheoryTheoryTheory andandandand ExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsExperimentsChair: Ananish Chaudhuri (University of Auckland)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: This talk provides an overview over some recent developments in theory andexperiments on imitation in strategic environments. A special focus is the relationshipbetween imitation and maximization of relative payoffs.

4:404:404:404:40 –––– 6:106:106:106:10 InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionsSessionsSessionsSessions VI.AVI.AVI.AVI.A andandandand VI.BVI.BVI.BVI.B

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession VI.AVI.AVI.AVI.ATrustTrustTrustTrustVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-110D-110D-110D-110Chair: Jan Potters* (Tilburg University)

1)1)1)1) WillWillWillWill FormalFormalFormalFormal RiskRiskRiskRisk SharingSharingSharingSharing ArrangementsArrangementsArrangementsArrangements CrowdCrowdCrowdCrowd outoutoutout InformalInformalInformalInformal Mechanisms:Mechanisms:Mechanisms:Mechanisms: AnAnAnAnExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental StudyStudyStudyStudyYiming Liu*, Yu Duan, and Zhao Li (Peking University)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: This paper presents a study into the relationship between formal and informalrisk sharing arrangements. Informal risk sharing mechanisms play an important role inrural areas of developing countries. However, a lot of literatures proved that perfect risksharing can hardly be achieved by informal arrangements，so it is necessary to promote


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formal mechanisms in these areas. Then new problems arise: will formal risk sharingarrangements crowd out informal mechanisms? If yes, how much will formal mechanismscrowd out informal mechanisms? What factors will enhance or weaken this crowding outeffect? We design a series of laboratory experiments to study these issues. In ourexperiments, participants are free to choose to transfer their incomes to their partners orpurchase a commercial insurance or do both. We reach four main conclusions: 1) Formalrisk sharing arrangements will crowd out informal mechanisms. 2) The crowding outeffect of formal risk sharing is larger among groups of lower incomes.3) Risk aversionalso strengthens the crowding out effect. 4) Trust between subjects inhibits formalmechanisms from crowding out informal arrangements.

2)2)2)2) PromisesPromisesPromisesPromises asasasas CCCCommitmentsommitmentsommitmentsommitmentsHuseyn Ismayilov and Jan Potters* (Tilburg University)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract: We present an experimental test of the commitment-based explanation ofpromise keeping. We implement a trust game in which the trustee can write a free formpre-play message for the trustor. The main twist in our design is that there is a probabilityof 50% that the message is delivered to the trustor and a probability of 50% that themessage is replaced by an empty sheet. Before the trust game is played, both the trusteeand the trustor know whether the trustee's message is actually delivered. We observe thatabout 65% of the trustees write an explicit promise in their message. In line with previousstudies, we find that trustees who make a promise are significantly more likely to acttrustworthy than those who do not make a promise. We find, however, that this effect isindependent of whether or not the trustee's message is actually delivered to the trustor.This shows that trustees who make a promise tend to keep it even if they know that theirpromise cannot have affected the trustor's belief. These results lend strong support to theinterpretation of promises as commitments.

InvitedInvitedInvitedInvited SessionSessionSessionSession VI.VI.VI.VI.BBBB GamesGamesGamesGamesVenue:Venue:Venue:Venue: EconomicsEconomicsEconomicsEconomics D-310D-310D-310D-310Chair: Bin Xu (Zhejiang University)

1)1)1)1) HowHowHowHow dodododo subjectssubjectssubjectssubjects playplayplayplay againstagainstagainstagainst aaaa NashNashNashNash opponentopponentopponentopponent inininin gamesgamesgamesgames whichwhichwhichwhich havehavehavehave aaaa mixedmixedmixedmixedstrategystrategystrategystrategy equilibrium?equilibrium?equilibrium?equilibrium?Jason Shachat (WISE, Xiamen University), J. Todd Swarthout (Georgia State University)and Lijia Wei* (WISE, Xiamen University)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract: We examine experimentally how humans behave when they, unbeknownst tothem, play against a computer which implements its part of a mixed strategy Nashequilibrium. We consider two games, one zero-sum and another unprofitable with a pureminimax strategy. A minority of subjects' play was consistent with their Nash equilibriumstrategy. But a larger percentage of subjects' play was more consistent with differentmodels of play: equal-probable play for the zero-sum game, and the minimax strategy in


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the non-profitable game. We show that there is significant discrete and dynamicheterogeneity in subject choices. We estimate a hidden Markov model, in which the statesare each of the pure strategies, the Nash equilibrium mixed strategy, and theequal-probable mixed strategy when it differs from the Nash. The estimated version of themodel captures the increasing adoption of pure strategies overtime, and the roleasymmetries in strategy adoption.

2)2)2)2) ChoiceChoiceChoiceChoice BracketingBracketingBracketingBracketing andandandand SocialSocialSocialSocial Preference:Preference:Preference:Preference: ExperimentalExperimentalExperimentalExperimental EvidenceEvidenceEvidenceEvidence fromfromfromfrom TrustTrustTrustTrustGameGameGameGame andandandand SimultaneousSimultaneousSimultaneousSimultaneous PrisonerPrisonerPrisonerPrisoner’’’’ssss DilemmaDilemmaDilemmaDilemma GameGameGameGameLI King, and DING Jieyao* (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract:Abstract:Abstract:Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates the effect of broad versus narrowbracketing in social preference tests. Players in both treatments know that they will playthe same game (Simultaneous PD or trust game) for two times, and they will be randomlymatched with a different player in each play. In the broad bracketing treatment, playerssee the two identical games on the same screen, and make the two choices at the sametime. In the narrow bracketing treatment, the two identical games are displayedsequentially-each time there is only one game showed on the screen and players maketheir choice one by one. No feedback is provided till the end of the whole experiment.Our finding is that bracketing does affect individual social preference, and the influence isstronger in trust game which involves sequential moves between players. In the trustgame, there are two main findings. First, players are less likely to trust others under broadbracketing. It implies that players are more risk averse, which is opposite to the predictionof myopic loss aversion (Thaler et al. 1997). Second, players are more likely to betray thetrust of others under narrow bracketing. While in the simultaneous PD, there is notreatment difference on the likelihood of choosing to cooperate or to defect. Furthermore,generally speaking, in both games, there are no treatment differences in belief on thechoice of others.

3)3)3)3) Bertrand-Edgeworth-ShapleyBertrand-Edgeworth-ShapleyBertrand-Edgeworth-ShapleyBertrand-Edgeworth-Shapley CycleCycleCycleCycle inininin aaaa 2222 ×××× 2222 GameGameGameGameBin Xu (Zhejiang University) and Zhijian Wang* (Experimental Social ScienceLaboratory, Zhejiang University)

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract：Taking the detailed balance condition (H. Peythan Young 2005) or/and the timereversal transformation (Baiesi, Maes and Wynants 2009) into consideration, we presentthe Bertrand-Edgeworth-Shapley cycle (Cason, Friedman and Wagener 2005) in atwo-dimensional 5 × 5 lattices space based on our data from laboratory experiments. Wehave 12 independent sessions and in each session 4 Up-Down players and 4 Right-Leftplayers play a 2 × 2 game with the payoff matrix of [(5, 0)(0, 5); (0, 5)(5, 0)] in pairs over300 periods under random matching protocol. We suggest that, a social Markov jumpingin strategy space is a velocity vector, and then it can be measured. By analyzing ourexperimental data, we find that these vectors form a significant spiral vector field in the 5× 5 lattices space. Filtering out the detailed balance (or called as traffics process byphysicist), we get a clear dynamic pattern (Fig.3(b,c,d,e)). We also find a


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ring-mountain-shaped distribution of the time anti-symmetric Markov jumping in thetwo-dimensional space (Fig.3(f)). Both algebra matrix analysis and geometricalpresentation method reach the same result. These findings, together with the method,suggest considerable connections between evolutionary game theory and experimentaleconomics.

ListListListList ofofofof ParticipantsParticipantsParticipantsParticipants

LastLastLastLast NameNameNameName FirstFirstFirstFirst NameNameNameName EmailEmailEmailEmail AffiliationAffiliationAffiliationAffiliation

Bossaerts Peter [email protected] Institute of Technology and EcolePolytechnique Federale de Lausanne

Chaudhuri Ananish [email protected] University of Auckland

Chen Fang [email protected] Central South University

Cheng Hui [email protected] Central South University

Cheng Qiqi [email protected] Zhejiang University

Cheung Stephen [email protected] The University of Sydney

Chui Mun [email protected] Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Dai Yun [email protected] University RotterdamBurg

Ding Jieyao [email protected] Planck Institute for Research onCollective Goods

Duffy John [email protected] University of Pittsburgh

Fan Liang-cong [email protected] Zhejiang University

Gao Yue [email protected] University of Finance andEconomics

Gao Ying [email protected] University BusinessAdministration College

He Qixin [email protected] Renmin University of China

Hong Fuhai [email protected] Kong University of Science andTechnology

Hu Youxin [email protected] University of Finance andEconomics

Jin Xiu [email protected] University BusinessAdministration College

mailto:[email protected]


















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Kawata [email protected]

Osaka-university


Kirysheva Irina [email protected] European University Institute

Li Bo [email protected] School of Economics, Nankai University

Li Wei [email protected] Nankai University

Lim Wooyoung [email protected] Hong Kong University of Science andTechnology

Liu Lucie [email protected] Central South University

Liu Yiming [email protected] Yuanpei College, Peking University

Mai Ying-Shih [email protected] Kaohsiung First University ofScience and Technology

Metcalf Hugh [email protected] Newcastle University

Oechssler Jorg Martin [email protected] Heidelberg University

Ong David [email protected] Peking University HSBC Business School

Ou Kai [email protected] Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Pfajfar Damjan [email protected] University of Tilburg

Potters Jan [email protected] Tilburg University

Sasaki Masaru [email protected] ISER, Osaka University

Shachat Jason [email protected] WISE, Xiamen University

She Sheng-xiang [email protected] Institute of Technology ShenzhenGraduate School

Sunder Shyam [email protected] Yale School of Management

Te Bao [email protected] University of Amsterdam

Vieider Ferdinand [email protected] Ludwig Maximilians University

Wang Joseph Tao-yi [email protected] National Taiwan University

Wang Zeke [email protected] Lingnan College in Sun Yat-sen University

Wang Xiaoyi [email protected] University of Economics andFinance









mailto:[email protected]%20%20National%20Kaohsiung%20First%20University%20of%20Science%20and%20Technology

mailto:[email protected]%20%20National%20Kaohsiung%20First%20University%20of%20Science%20and%20Technology















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Wang Zhijian [email protected] Zhejiang University


Wei Lijia [email protected] WISE, Xiamen University

Weng Zhiquan [email protected] University of Finance andEconomics

Winter Eyal [email protected] The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Wu Ruxin [email protected] School of Business, Central South University

Wu Zhiwei [email protected] Nanjing University

Wu Cheng-Chung [email protected] Kaohsiung First University ofScience and Technology

Xu Bin [email protected] Zhejiang Gongshang University

Yan Gongcui [email protected] Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Yang Xiaolan [email protected] Zhejiang University

Yao Hui [email protected] Capital Normal University

Yu Siyu [email protected] Peking University

Zhong Songfa [email protected] National University of Singapore

Zhong Zemming [email protected] HSBC Business School, Peking University















experimental economics and finance - xiamen...

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