european union sub-committee for external affairs … · shipments going through its waters, 50% of...

EUROPEAN UNION SUB-COMMITTEE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Turning the Tide on Piracy, Building Somalia’s Future: Follow-up

report on the EU’s Operation Atalanta and beyond

Oral and written evidence

Contents

Mr Jean-Paul Adam, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Seychelles – Oral evidence (Q1

– QQ18) ........................................................................................................................................................ 2

Adjoa Anyimadu – Oral evidence (QQ19 – QQ63) ........................................................................ 15

Dr Knox Chitiyo – Oral evidence (QQ19 – QQ63) ....................................................................... 46

Chamber of Shipping - Written evidence ........................................................................................... 47

Council of Somali Organisations - Written evidence ...................................................................... 51

Department for International Development – Oral evidence (QQ109 – 175) ......................... 89 Foreign and Commonwealth Office – Oral evidence (QQ109 – 175) ...................................... 119

Evidence to be found under Department for International Development ............................... 119

Foreign and Commonwealth Office – Supplementary written evidence .................................. 119

Christian Le Mière, Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security International

Institute for Strategic Studies – Written evidence ......................................................................... 123

Lloyd’s Market Association – Written evidence ............................................................................. 126

Ministry of Defence – Oral evidence (QQ64 – QQ108) ............................................................. 128

Nick Harvey MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces – Oral evidence (QQ64 – QQ108)

.................................................................................................................................................................... 154

Alexander Rondos – Oral evidence (QQ176 – QQ234) ............................................................. 155

Dr Lee Willett – Oral evidence (QQ19 – QQ63) ......................................................................... 185

Dr Lee Willett – Supplementary written evidence ........................................................................ 185

Mr Jean-Paul Adam, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Seychelles – Oral evidence (Q1 – QQ18)

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Mr Jean-Paul Adam, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of

Seychelles – Oral evidence (Q1 – QQ18)

Evidence Session No. 1. Heard in Public. Questions 1 - 18

THURSDAY 14 JUNE 2012

Members present

Lord Teverson (Chairman)

Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury

Lord Boswell of Aynho

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock

Baroness Henig

Lord Inge

Lord Jay of Ewelme

Lord Jopling

Lord Lamont of Lerwick

Lord Radice

Lord Trimble

Lord Williams of Elvel

Baroness Young of Hornsey

________________

Examination of Witness

Mr Jean-Paul Adam, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Seychelles.

Q1 The Chairman: Minister, can I welcome you very much to the House of Lords EU

External Affairs Sub-Committee? Can I just go through the housekeeping, just to make sure

everybody is aware? First of all, this is a public session and it will be transcribed and

recorded. We will give you an opportunity to see that transcription so that if there is an

error on it you are able to change that, but it is a public session and they are far more

valuable as that. This is the first of our sessions in our inquiry following up a report we

undertook some two years ago on Somali piracy and particularly EU Atalanta. We are an EU

Select Committee so we look particularly from the European point of view. As you are well


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aware, we will have to end the session by about 9.25 or 9.30 am, so I have asked Members

to keep their questions and supplementaries short, but we are keen to get into a dialogue. I

know you are keen to make a short opening statement, so perhaps, Minister, you would like

to do that and then we will move into the questions.

Jean-Paul Adam: Thank you very much, Lord Teverson and your Lordships. It really is a

great honour for me to be here, and I appreciate very much that time is of the essence so I

will be as quick and brief as possible. Perhaps I can start by saying that I do believe the

relationship between Seychelles and the United Kingdom on piracy is a strategic one, and

one that has been very positive. I am going to start with that statement because then I will

immediately say, of course, we are still not doing enough. I want to start with that statement

because I think that the United Kingdom is giving very strong leadership on the matter, but

there is still a lot to be done.

One of the key points I will make is that, in terms of the international community, we are

almost treating piracy as an acceptable symptom that we can live with, in the way that we

are set up to deal with it. A lot of the practices the pirates are involved with, if we

transposed those activities and look at them on land, we would never have accepted as being

acceptable to any form of trade and we must be much more robust and direct in dealing

with the problem. I will not bore you with too many figures, but the Indian Ocean, where

Seychelles is based, is the third-largest ocean and sees two-thirds of the world’s oil

shipments going through its waters, 50% of containerised cargo and one-third of bulk cargo.

It is also home to 40% of the world’s offshore oil production, so it really is a strategic area.

Piracy is a global problem because of that, not just for the island states or the coastal states

of the Indian Ocean.

For Seychelles we have seen revenue from fisheries reduced by almost 30%. With tourism

revenue, there is a dichotomy because in tourism overall we are growing by 15%. The


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economy as a whole is growing by 3%, but in the specific areas of tourism that depend on,

for example, catamarans, leasing of boats, cruise ships and so on, it is down to almost zero,

meaning that we have had to almost shut down that part of the tourism economy. Fuel

bunkering, which is a part of our economy—we buy fuel and we re-export it—has reduced

by 35% and that is directly due to piracy. The core problem for Seychelles is that we are a

very isolated economy. We depend on trade. We import 95% of our needs, so there is a

huge inflationary problem due to piracy. This is why we have been so active on it because we

realise that we cannot afford not to do anything, so we have been at the forefront.

In terms of solutions for piracy, I think very strongly we must start, first of all, with a very

basic principle and that is looking at the oceans as a development space comparable to that

of the land. We have to develop a view of the ocean as being as important as land and not

looking at it as a secondary space. There have been large improvements in the co-ordination

of the fight against piracy, much more robust action by the European Union Atalanta forces,

including interventions on land. That is welcomed by Seychelles, and we do feel it has been

done in the right way because the interim Somali Government has also accepted it. I would

not say they necessarily welcome it, but they have accepted it as part of the fight and as

something necessary. Also, the regional Governments, such as Somaliland and Puntland, have

also accepted it.

There is still a problem of impunity overall dealing with piracy and this is why Seychelles

particularly has come in. I will just touch on some of the things that we have done. We

passed a new law on piracy, which is very much linked to the International Law of the Sea.

We are one of the few countries that have more or less domesticated all of the aspects of

the Law of the Sea. We are prosecuting pirates. We currently have over 100 Somalis serving

sentences—well, some are awaiting trial and some are serving sentences in our prisons. We

established a high-level committee to co-ordinate all the action against piracy and we signed


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various status of forces agreements, which allow international forces to send vessels to our

waters. We have also undertaken prisoner transfers, meaning that pirates arrested by

European Union forces, by the US and by other parties including China and India can then be

transferred to Seychelles for prosecution.

The problem that we face is that we have had one prison—it was built by the United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime—which had a capacity of 60. I say it is a prison, but it is

actually a wing that was added to our prison. We already have over 100 prisoners and that

was in the space of one year, so we are already at capacity. In any case, we have always said

that as a small country we cannot afford to hold prisoners forever, so we have put a lot of

emphasis on the importance of transferring prisoners back to Somalia to serve their

sentence. In February, we had a breakthrough in that we agreed with the autonomous

Government of Somaliland that they would take a group of 20 Somali prisoners, and we have

undertaken that transfer in the month of March. So we have those 20 prisoners that are

serving 10-year sentences for piracy crimes, and they are currently serving them in a prison

in Hargeisa in Somaliland. That prison is being monitored by UN experts and everything is

proceeding correctly for the moment. We believe quite strongly that that is the way

forward, because you will not get regional states that will be prosecuting pirates if they will

be forever bearing the burden of incarceration. It is very important that we have

incarceration in the state of origin, which is also part of actually building the capacity for law

and order in Somalia.

The Chairman: Minister, we are probably going to go on to some of these areas in the

questions.

Jean-Paul Adam: Good. Then the final point I will just mention is that the UK and

Seychelles have also set up a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Intelligence Centre, which

targets the financiers of piracy, and it is starting work now. There is a grant of £500,000


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from the UK Government to set it up. Perhaps you will ask a few questions, so I will not go

into too much detail. Thank you very much.

Q2 The Chairman: Minister, thank you very much. In fact, you have really answered

most of question 1 and probably the rest as well, but rather than have tea and polite

conversation we will go through. Given the fact, as you say, that the anti-piracy military work

as such is not a long-term solution, perhaps the one thing I would like your view on is

whether the problem is being contained or is still growing. Do you feel it is coming down

and piracy is now seen as a much more risky activity than it was previously? Just a very brief

comment on that.

Jean-Paul Adam: There has been a huge improvement, first of all, in terms of the

effectiveness of the international effort. I would say when Seychelles first started to feel the

effects of piracy, which was around 2009—piracy obviously existed before that but it was

more towards the Gulf of Aden—when it came as far south as Seychelles. We are actually

over 1,200 nautical miles from the coast of Somalia. It is quite a long way, but they have

come that far and even further south now. They are in the Mozambique Channel. There has

been a big, big improvement. First of all, in Seychelles, for example, we have EU surveillance

aircraft and basing them in Seychelles has provided a better picture of the Indian Ocean.

They feed information much more effectively than before. The different forces are speaking

to each other more effectively and the fact that they are intervening on land as well, meaning

they are disrupting pirate groups before they can put to sea, has meant a real decrease in

successful attacks and that is very, very positive.

However, because of the problems on land in Somalia, there is still a very big group of

people that are interested in piracy. What has also happened is that, because there are fewer

successful attacks, in the individual attacks that are successful you see a huge increase in the

request for ransoms. We currently have two of our nationals in Somalia being held, and we


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have had two occasions before where we have had people there and they were released.

Our Government never pays ransoms, but the different companies that were involved may

have paid some money for the two previous ones. Our understanding is that these were

relatively small sums because they were not considered as high value. The two who are

currently being held are fishermen who could not really be considered high-value persons,

but the amounts that are being asked are still in the millions of dollars. There is an increasing

desperation from the pirates and that shows in the tactics that are used, which are more

violent.

Q3 Lord Inge: Again, you have answered a lot of the questions I would have liked to ask.

But can you talk about the particular capabilities that you think are not there in a military

sense? Also, is the speed of reaction of using those capabilities as good as it should be? How

good is the intelligence?

Jean-Paul Adam: Thank you very much for these very pertinent questions. First of all, the

problem with the Indian Ocean is its size. It is a massive space, so you could probably take

the whole of the world’s navies and put them there and then you would have enough. On

the question whether enough is being done, I think the answer will always be no. But things

can be very much improved by increasing the air support, which does help to give more

accurate information, and also by strategically using the forces that we do have. The

disruptions on land in Somalia have been very effective and, if you can multiply that, you stop

them going to sea. That is very, very good.

In terms of the timeliness of the response, again the size of the ocean is against us. Now, in

Seychelles we have worked very closely with our partners. We have 1.3 million square

kilometres of ocean that belongs to Seychelles. That is equivalent of three times the land

mass of South Africa. We are only 85,000 people—we are a tiny country—but our ocean

space is massive. We cannot control that on our own. We have two coastguard vessels,


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which do 24-hour patrols during what we call the piracy season. We use our own aircraft—

we have three—and we also have different European forces that have been stationing

aircraft in Seychelles. There are also three US unmanned drones based in Seychelles, but

those unmanned drones are getting intelligence from Somalia itself.

In terms of the intelligence available, it is good. It could be a lot better. I have to say that the

intelligence sharing from the United States is often not as good as we would like. The

information is often a little bit outdated. It takes some time for it to reach the forces on the

ground. But it is still useful because we have a lot of information about where the pirates are

congregating, and that helps us to also work with our partners in terms of where we

position our assets. I think I have answered most of your questions.

Q4 Lord Inge: You are saying to me that the response, between getting the intelligence

and then giving that intelligence to people that could take action on that intelligence, is too

slow. Is that what you are saying?

Jean-Paul Adam: Overall, it is too slow. What I will say is that, in terms of the co-operation

with EU Atalanta, it has been excellent—I would say as good as it can be. But overall, in

terms of what is called the Combined Maritime Forces, it can be vastly improved.

Q5 Lord Inge: Having got that intelligence and identified a target, is the reaction time

acting against that target good enough or not?

Jean-Paul Adam: Based on the assets that are there it is good, but it is still 48 hours in

terms of the size of the ocean.

Q6 The Chairman: Could I ask one thing? We have a copy of a speech you made

recently. It was very impressive. Clearly, what you liked was the fact that you had about five

different agencies or assets in Seychelles. The question that I think is really important to

us—leading on from Lord Inge—which I want to be clear on is: it is great having Ocean

Shield assets, US drones and a Luxembourg civilian charter airplane, but do those agencies


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actually co-ordinate what they all do or do they all go and search the same area? Do they

then swap that intelligence? That is what I think we need to understand.

Jean-Paul Adam: They do swap information and the improvement from 2009 to now is

massive. They are vastly improved in terms of the sharing of information and they do not

tread on each other’s toes. There is an understanding that this vessel will be in that area and

so on. But there is more that can be done. We can do more to bring the Chinese and the

Indians into this operation in a more systematic way because they are part of it in terms of

participating in the CMF in a general sense. There can be more effort to bring them in.

Q7 Lord Inge: They do not want to be?

Jean-Paul Adam: No, I think they do, but there are sensitivities on both sides. There are

sensitivities on their side in terms of working and so on, yes.

The Chairman: We need to move on to some of the EU aspects.

Q8 Baroness Young of Hornsey: Minister, thank you for your opening remarks and

your speech. You said in your opening remarks that you felt that somehow piracy was

viewed or is being treated as an acceptable symptom, which I found an interesting remark.

That suggests that somehow things have not been going in quite the right direction. I wonder

if you could tell us—and you have already touched on some of these issues—how well you

think the EU has responded, and what you think are the most important achievements of

Operation Atalanta? Then, finally, what would your view be on the EU strategy around the

Horn of Africa?

Jean-Paul Adam: Thank you. I think that the EU’s effectiveness has improved immensely. My

personal view, and the view of my Government, is that there would be more effectiveness

by giving a bit more resource to the countries of the region. The cost of Atalanta is billions

of euros. This is also a fault of the African nations in that over the years we have not built up

coastguards and we have not built up navies, so the capacity is very limited. In fact, in


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Seychelles with our two vessels we are almost a maritime power in the region because there

is a real lack of capacity. I think in the long term we can do a lot more in terms of building up

the capacity of the regional states to act. The fact that Seychelles is prosecuting pirates

shows that, first of all, we are willing and we have the capability. We have also had occasions

where our vessels have arrested pirates, where we have done the whole chain ourselves,

using and sharing information with other partners. There is a lot more investment that can

be done in the countries of the region themselves and it will actually cost the European

Union less in the long run.

The positive things from the European Union include the fact that we are actually receiving

some additional budget support from the European Union to help mitigate the cost of piracy,

but it is not enough. It is €3 million. Because of the EU rules it is actually not designated for

the fight against piracy work. It is designated as social support—meaning there is recognition

that we are spending more money because of the fight against piracy and, therefore, we

need more support. But because of the rules the EU cannot give us money to spend on the

coastguards, the military and so on. Also, regarding the sums we are talking about, we have

lost 4% of our GDP due to piracy and €3 million is very much appreciated but it does not fit

into the overall question.

The EU has done a very good job and is our first partner in fighting piracy—Atalanta

provides a fantastic effort, given the resources available—and is, I think, investing in the

countries of the region for the long term. Also, we have developed relationships with

Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, as well as the autonomous Governments of

Somaliland and Puntland. There is a lot of potential for us to look at the countries of the

region also as the interactive players to build the capacity in Somalia, to use what we have

built up in terms of expertise in Seychelles.


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In Seychelles we have now done more piracy trials than any other country. We have over

100 convicted pirates in Seychelles. There have been some cases in Kenya but, apart from

that, most of the expertise is actually in Seychelles. What we have done as well, which has

helped that, is we have had prosecutors from a number of countries—including the UK—

that have been working in Seychelles on these trials.

Q9 Baroness Young of Hornsey: Could I just quickly ask as well whether there is a

good working relationship between the African Union and the EU, in addressing this as a

holistic area?

Jean-Paul Adam: I think there is a good relationship and I salute the efforts of the EU

recently to increase the funding for AMISOM, which, if I am not mistaken, was an increase of

about €100 million. That has already had an impact, in the sense that Somalia is an anarchic

state and there is no other way to control it than having boots on the ground. Definitely the

African Union is best placed to have those boots on the ground because there will be a

sense of imperialism if you bring in other forces. So I think there is a good working

relationship between the African Union and the European Union. Of course there are areas

to be improved but I think overall it is positive.

The Chairman: Lord Radice, did you want to ask anything further?

Q10 Lord Radice: Foreign Minister, in fact I think you said that you have 100 convicted

prisoners and that you are holding a further 100. Is that right?

Jean-Paul Adam: No, not quite. We have in total convicted—I could verify the exact

figure—probably in the region of 140 to 150 and we are currently holding about 100.

Q11 Lord Radice: So those are the two facts?

Jean-Paul Adam: Yes.

Q12 Lord Radice: Do you want to have further capacity?


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Jean-Paul Adam: Not necessarily. We believe, the way we have looked at Seychelles—and

when you say “further capacity”—we have to beef up what we already have, meaning

improving our prison ability to manage holding pirates. The way in which you deal with them

is very different. First of all, Seychelles is a Catholic country. So in terms of having specific

measures in place for holding Muslim prisoners, all of these are things that we have to look

at the capacity of Seychelles to deal with. We would estimate that we would want to hold at

any one time up to 100 prisoners. The idea was that we would prosecute, we would hold

them for three to six months and then we would transfer them to prisons in Somalia. We

have discussed that with the countries of the region, such as Tanzania and Mauritius, that are

willing to prosecute—and Mauritius will be prosecuting as of September—and they agree

with this model as well, meaning that they are very willing to prosecute and hold but they

would not like to be holding these prisoners for long periods of time. The sentences are 10

to 15 years in general and it makes much more sense that they are sent back to Somalia.

This is also a way of sending a clear message to pirates in Somalia that it does not pay, if they

are actually held in prisons in Somalia.

Q13 Lord Jopling: I am very uneasy to know that, having got a prosecution, you are

sending them back to Somalia because you described it yourself as “an anarchic state”. I

would have thought it is only a matter of time before al-Shabaab mounts a raid on the

prisons and has them out. I would have thought it is the last place where you ought to be

sending convicted prisoners for incarceration.

Jean-Paul Adam: It is a very good question and it is one of the first questions we asked. The

issue is that it is an anarchic state and because of that there have been areas of stability that

have been achieved in Somalia. In fact, Somaliland, which is a former British protectorate, has

an autonomous Government and it is there that we have sent our prisoners. The prisons are

monitored by the United Nations. There are UN monitors that are actually partly running


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the prison. What we have seen with the Somaliland Government is that they respond to

carrots. They recognise that if they want to be a viable entity, a viable Government, they

have to have law and order and part of law and order is showing that they are serious on

piracy. The dialogue that the Somaliland autonomous Government has had with the United

Kingdom and with Seychelles has shown that, if they are willing to work on this issue, they

will receive support and capacity building for their own police force, for their own prisons,

and so on, and they see the benefit of that. I think the Government in place there is

committed to undertake this. If we are to look at the long term, it is actually part of building

the stability of Somalia itself.

Q14 Lord Jopling: You say the UN contingency is running the prisons. Are they armed?

Jean-Paul Adam: I would not know off the top of my head.

Q15 Lord Jopling: Could you find out and tell us?

Jean-Paul Adam: I could, yes.

Lord Jopling: Because they jolly well ought to be armed.

Jean-Paul Adam: Yes.

The Chairman: That is a really interesting area and if you were able to give us some more

information that would be good.

Q16 Baroness Henig: Very briefly, just to finish off on the theme of the prisons and the

trials, I am interested in the area of assistance that you have. You mentioned judges from the

UK, which is clearly an area of assistance. You also mentioned budget support from the EU

in terms of €3 million. I wonder whether that went towards these trials in any way.

Jean-Paul Adam: No, it does not.

Q17 Baroness Henig: What assistance then have you had in terms of holding prisoners

and helping to prosecute them?


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Jean-Paul Adam: In terms of holding prisoners and prosecution, most of it has come

through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Some of that money obviously

originates within EU member states. I am not sure if the EU itself gives money to the

UNODC but we have had a very good relationship with the European Union.

There is another project that is just starting now, which is the regional capacity-building

project and Seychelles will benefit quite significantly under that. It is only just getting under

way—that is why I have not mentioned it—but it is quite a big envelope of money. I am not

sure of the amount but it is quite a big envelope. Seychelles is supposed to benefit, in terms

of training of our police, training of the coastguard, investment in some equipment for the

police and coastguard and so on, as well as prisons and management of prisons.

There is also a regional project. The regional project will be run through the different

regional organisations. Seychelles is a member of what is called the Indian Ocean

Commission, which is a grouping of island states, and we have actually taken the lead to

implement the first phase of €26 million for regional capacity building—and that is EU

money—which will also tackle this capacity building in the region.

Q18 Baroness Henig: So things are getting under way?

Jean-Paul Adam: Things are moving but the problem is always the timeframe. It has taken

us a year just to get all of this off the ground. But yes, there is a lot going on.

The Chairman: Minister, thank you very much indeed for sparing us time with your

schedule. That has given us real insight and an excellent start to our inquiry. We notice very

much the economic impact that this has had on the Seychelles, and any EU money is a small

recompense in comparison with that. I hope this report will in some way help improve the

situation as we move forward. Thank you very much indeed.

Adjoa Anyimadu – Oral evidence (QQ19 – QQ63)

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9.40 am

Witnesses: Adjoa Anyimadu, Dr Knox Chitiyo and

Dr Lee Willett

Members present





Baroness Henig

Lord Inge

Lord Jay of Ewelme

Lord Jopling Lord Lamont of Lerwick

Lord Radice

Lord Trimble



________________

Examination of Witnesses

Adjoa Anyimadu, Head Analyst on Somalia, Chatham House; Dr Knox Chitiyo,

Associate Fellow, Chatham House, Brenthurst Foundation, formerly Africa Head, RUSI; and

Dr Lee Willett, Senior Research Fellow in Maritime Studies, RUSI.

Q19 The Chairman: I welcome you to our inquiry. As I have already mentioned, it is our

first day of looking at Somali piracy within an EU context, particularly Operation Atalanta

and the other EU initiatives in the Indian Ocean area. Can I remind you that it is a public

hearing and this session will be webcast and recorded? We will send you a copy of the

transcript, so that if there is anything there that we have made an error on you do have a


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chance to correct that. I am very keen to move this session straight into questions and

answers, so that we can have a dialogue and take evidence. Thank you for coming and, Dr

Willett, we are very keen to welcome you back after our previous inquiry. Perhaps what I

could ask, though, is just very briefly for you to introduce yourselves both for the public and

for Members of the Committee and then we will start the session. Again, I repeat that I am

not expecting all of you to answer all the questions, but please do contribute to the ones

that you feel are important. We will leave it to you to decide who answers in what order

and how. Ms Anyimadu, perhaps you would like to start and introduce yourself and then we

will work across?

Adjoa Anyimadu: Yes, thank you, Lord Chairman. Good morning. My name is Adjoa

Anyimadu. I work on the Horn of Africa at Chatham House. We have been working on the

Horn for about six years now and I have been part of that project for about three years. We

have really been looking at the piracy issue from a Somali viewpoint: the effects on land in

Somalia; the Somali community’s opinions on the piracy issue; and how that fits into the

global dialogue on piracy.

Dr Chitiyo: Thank you, Mr Chair. I am Knox Chitiyo. I am the Africa Fellow at Chatham

House. I also was the Africa Fellow and Head of Africa Programme at RUSI, so it is an

interesting mix for me. I have done work more on the African maritime security and African

maritime strategy. One of the projects we did when I was at RUSI was with the African

Union helping them to devise their maritime security strategy. We have worked on other

things as well in terms of maritime issues.

Dr Willett: Good morning, Mr Chairman. I am Dr Lee Willett and I am Senior Research

Fellow in Maritime Studies at RUSI. My particular area of focus on this subject—and

something that I think complements my two fellow witnesses—is I focus very much on the

international naval contribution, what that is and what more can be made of that. I hope that


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I will have something very complementary to add, in terms of the comprehensive approach

for dealing with this problem.

Q20 The Chairman: Good. Thank you very much. Perhaps I could start on a more

general level and ask whether the response of the international community to the problem

of piracy off the coast of Somalia, particularly by the EU, has been correctly focused and

effective. What has been the response of the Africans to the problems? How has this been

linked with the EU’s activity? What have the main achievements been so far and the

problems? It is really setting out the scene for the rest of the session. I do not know who

would like to take that first.

Dr Willett: Thank you. I will take the direction of my two colleagues and happily kick off on

that one, because I think it is a very interesting question. First of all, in terms of the response

of the international community, correctly focused and effective, I think there was a slight

degree of inevitability that the initial focus would be at sea and would be naval for two

reasons: one, because the pirate attacks were happening at sea; and, two, because the open

nature of the sea means that nations can park ships out there and try and do something

without having to get into the deeper political issue of thinking then about what to do

ashore. The very nature of the sea lent a naval response, in the first instance, as one of the

more straightforward options.

In terms of the effectiveness, I would say that, yes, it has been effective but with caveats. In

terms of how effective it has been, yes, the naval response has helped to contain the

problem. But it raises the question: for how long, because the nations have a finite amount of

naval resources to apply to this and a finite amount of political patience, so part of the

question that I would like to get into later is how to maintain that.

In terms of the focus, of course it has looked very much at the issue at sea. That is quite a

short-term approach in terms of the overall problem, so the caveat there, in terms of focus,


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is how to sustain that focus in the longer term and deal with the problem both at sea and

ashore.

Q21 The Chairman: I am very happy on this one to take people’s introductory remarks.

Dr Chitiyo.

Dr Chitiyo: If I may just add on to what Lee said. Overall, I think there has been a generally

positive evolution, particularly with regard to Operation Atalanta because it helped focus on

what was the key issue at the time, which was on anti-piracy. In that respect, there has

generally been good progress because when Operation Atalanta and the EU first came in, it

was a massive, massive problem. Now that Operation Atalanta has come in, there has been a

focus on specific anti-piracy operations and I think the operationalisation of it has helped to

curb piracy activities.

Where we are at now is a situation where, with the improved operational situation in

Somalia itself against al-Shabaab, what needs to happen now is to take the anti-piracy

operations to the next level. We are now in a situation where it has to become much more

comprehensive, where the land operations and the sea operations have to become much

more integrated, both in terms of Operation Atalanta and in terms of the wider

international or global approach. It has to be a comprehensive approach, not just in terms of

bringing more nations on board but also operationally.

Adjoa Anyimadu: I agree with what both my colleagues have said. Has the international

community been effective in countering piracy? Yes, if you are looking at the number of

successful hijackings that have happened recently. The numbers have definitely dropped in

the first quarter of 2012. But, as Lee said, it is important to see this in a wider context of

what is happening in Somalia, particularly the trajectory of piracy since the mid 2000s, which

is that pirates have proved themselves to be highly adaptable. Hijacking may have gone down

at sea this year, but there has also been evidence over the past year that pirates are acting


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more on land in terms of kidnapping aid workers and so on and tourists. It is important for

the international community to keep an eye on the fact that this trajectory is constantly

changing and that piracy may go on to evolve in a way that has not been predicted so far.

Q22 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: Could I ask just a factual question? Do you have a figure

for the total number of hostages held by pirates currently?

Adjoa Anyimadu: I hear estimates of between 150 and about 188.

Q23 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: Hostages?

Adjoa Anyimadu: Yes.

Dr Willett: There are seven ships currently held as I understand it.

Q24 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: I thought it was a higher figure, I must say.

Dr Willett: There have been some ships that have been released in recent weeks and

months following the payment of ransoms.

Dr Chitiyo: The general estimates are currently around 150 to 200.

Q25 The Chairman: Can I just ask one regional supplementary? We heard—as you

heard—from the Foreign Minister of the Seychelles about how this was affecting the region

economically. It is okay for us as trading nations to talk about the trade but it is having a real

effect on the regional economy. Is there real co-ordination of those littoral states in Africa

around this as well as all the interventions from the west? Is that actually happening or is that

a force? Are they talking together and working co-operatively?

Adjoa Anyimadu: I think it has been a lot slower than the Western approach to counter-

piracy. That is partly to do with the importance of the shipping industry to the West and the

fact that piracy was initially quite concentrated just off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of

Aden. As pirates have moved further south and into the Indian Ocean, increasingly the

eastern coastal states of Africa are being affected, in terms of both perception of risk for

investors into countries—I think that has really affected Kenya particularly—and also the


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tourism industry in Tanzania and Seychelles has been badly affected. Those aspects have

really encouraged states in the Indian Ocean, and along the east coast of Africa, to start

thinking about co-ordinating their efforts towards piracy. Around the London Conference

on Somalia I know there were talks among states, including Tanzania, South Africa and

Mozambique, to come up with an agreement to approach the counter-piracy effort in a co-

ordinated fashion.

Q26 The Chairman: Is that work in progress at the moment? It is not really happening

that strongly.

Adjoa Anyimadu: There were news reports that within the past month Tanzania, South

Africa and Mozambique have launched a successful counter-piracy operation and have

captured some pirates. That was with the support of the EU.

Q27 Lord Inge: You have partly answered the question I was going to ask. Therefore

would you say, as a result of the change in tactics by Atalanta and so on, that the piracy

problem has increased or decreased? Where do you think it has got to? Secondly—and again

you mentioned part of it—how good are the pirates at changing their tactics? What

capabilities do you think they are looking for to improve their operational capability?

Dr Willett: Taking the second question first, if I may, the pirates have proved to be

remarkably resilient, but one can argue it is because they have not had much opportunity to

do anything else. The key question here is to what extent you can consider that the piracy

model has been broken—where you cut off their sources of revenue, you cut off their ability

to operate. Over the course of time they have shown a remarkable ability to be able to

adapt: whether it is to increase the range of their operations as a result of the balloon effect,

whereby when you push down on their presence in one area it bulges up somewhere else,

which is what happened originally with the pressure in the Gulf of Aden from the naval

forces forcing the problem further out into the Somali Basin, almost as far out as the Indian


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coastline and into Indian waters; the use of mother ships, where they would use a larger

vessel from which to launch their skiffs at sea; and the use of greater levels of weaponry,

aggression and violence, which has been steadily increasing, and also, as mentioned, they

have been turning to kidnapping ashore and other things.

What we saw, in particular in 2011, was a surge in this ability to reach further out and to do

more with greater levels of violence. I would argue this is business from the pirates’ point of

view. While some may argue that in Somali terms perhaps life is cheap, and that they are not

perhaps necessarily that conscious of the fact that they may lose their lives over this, it is a

business model for them. If you cut off the source they are then going to try and find

something else to do.

In terms of your question about weapons and tactics, what has been interesting and has been

covered in a couple of press sources, following the initial attack onshore a couple of months

ago, was whether the pirates would now look again to up the ante in terms of responding to

a threat directly to them ashore. There were sources quoted in the press saying, “Well,

maybe the pirates will look into anti-air weapons?” because if they see that the threat will

come by helicopter from the sea over the beach then an air defence asset, from their point

of view, might be something that they would look at. Certainly, some press sources have

suggested that is a concern. Of course, history with Somalia and helicopters is a particularly

difficult one—not something that I am sure many nations would be interested in

entertaining.

But in terms of your first question, if I may respond, how Atalanta and the change in

mandate have worked, I think it has been a very important response from a military and a

political point of view. Militarily it is taking the fight to the pirates and it is trying to break the

model in terms of deconstructing their view that they are invulnerable ashore. It is not

targeting the pirates; it is targeting their skiffs, their fuel and their weapons dumps. The


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proportionality is very important as part of this response. The attacks take away the pirates’

ability to conduct piracy, targeting their assets on the beach where they felt they were

invulnerable ashore. It is also part of joining up the naval approach with other activities

ashore and more of a comprehensive approach to how you do this. It is very proactive and it

enables the navies to be more open in how they interpret their rules of engagement and so

on.

One of the key things though in this—and this relates to the problem of politics, and is

particularly relevant to the EU—is that when the issue of the mandate renewal was coming

up again, I think there was a desire from the navies and some of the nations to say, “We

have to be able to show that we can do more” because renewal is just going to be the same

old as we have done for the last four years. There might be a time when some nations say,

“Well, what are we achieving here?” Perhaps upping the ante was part of renewing the

effectiveness of the mandate and saying to the nations of the European Union, “We are

doing more. We can do more”. One of the risks in that, though, is conversely very strange,

in that if you show progress in breaking the piracy model and reducing the numbers of

attacks, at a time of austerity when there are other areas of interest for the European

nations, might people in the national capitals say, “Oh well, we have nipped that one in the

bud, so now we can go and worry about something else”. That is the danger because any

success achieved here is very easily reversible. One of the key challenges for all of this is

maintaining the political commitment and the political buy-in of the nations concerned.

Q28 Lord Inge: Is the political will still all right?

Dr Willett: At the moment I think so, and I think absolutely the change of the mandate was

fundamental in demonstrating that, because it showed that the navies concerned, and their

national capitals, were prepared to authorise an increased use of force and to entertain the

risks that that might bring with it, so I think so, yes.


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Q29 Lord Inge: If you covered that command in Atalanta, what capability would you like

to improve your effectiveness?

Dr Willett: One would suspect that a naval officer would always say that he could do with a

lot more of certain things. Maritime surveillance assets are particularly very, very important,

which relates to certain other debates in the UK about our capabilities, but other nations

are providing those—the Seychelles, the Italians, the Germans and others. The ability to

poise large ships offshore is a very interesting point about this. When you look at the Libya

crisis—it is slightly unrelated but it has an important link to this—there was evidence to

suggest that putting a large ship that has helicopters on deck offshore had a demonstrable

coercive effect on the regime fighters. There is an argument put forward in some of the

media coverage in the wake of the initial attack ashore in Somalia that the presence of a

French landing ship with attack helicopters could have had a similar deterrent effect on the

Somali pirates too, because you are talking about hard-end military capability that is parked

offshore that is very visible and can arrive very quickly. The question there is whether the

pirates will choose to melt into the background, as they did in that initial attack, or think

about striking back in due course to preserve their equipment.

The Chairman: I guess you cannot park it there for five years, which is a problem. Lord

Jay, you wanted to come in on this question.

Q30 Lord Jay of Ewelme: What did the pirates do before they were pirates and what

would they do if they could not be pirates anymore?

The Chairman: Stand for Parliament, I think.

Baroness Young of Hornsey: The new House of Lords.

The Chairman: A very good question.

Adjoa Anyimadu: I think there is a lot of talk, which in my own personal opinion is only

partly true now, that these pirates are former fishermen whose livelihoods have been ruined


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by illegal fishing by international fishing fleets, some of them European apparently, and also by

the alleged dumping of toxic waste off the coast of Somalia. There has never been any real

research done into whether this is true and, if it is true, what the effects are now currently. I

think as piracy has proved to be so lucrative for so many people, pirate networks have

increased and multiplied in their complexity. Thousands of people are involved in this issue

and not all of them could have been fishermen before they became pirates. Also important I

think is that a lot of the coastal communities are, we hear, not necessarily directly involved

in providing young men for the hijackings. We hear that a lot of these people are coming

inland from the larger towns, in Puntland particularly, and then heading to the coast to

conduct these attacks because it is lucrative.

Q31 The Chairman: Dr Chitiyo, I think you wanted to come back on the original

question?

Dr Chitiyo: Yes, if I can just add something on the question of the success or otherwise of

Operation Atalanta. It may be useful if we go back to the original mandate of Operation

Atalanta and to what extent that has been achieved. Part of the original mandate was

protection of World Food Programme ships from assault by pirates. That I think has been

very, very successful. There have been very few World Food Programme ships that have

been taken, so in that respect I think it has been very successful.

With the evolution of piracy and anti-piracy we are now in a situation where it is both a land

as well as a sea issue. One of the things I think for Operation Atalanta, an operational

question, will be: how do you target the pirate ships and the people on land? There is going

to be an aspect of human intelligence that I think needs to be beefed up—human intelligence

capabilities on the ground—to know who the pirates are, what they do when they are not

being pirates, where are they and so on. I think that needs to be improved. Also, there

needs to be an element of precision munitions or so on to take out their mother ships


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without inflicting civilian casualties. There is an issue there around precision weaponry

and/or special forces. I think there is a question mark there.

The Chairman: Thank you. Can I then move on to Lord Williams? I think we will come

back on to the World Food Programme.

Q32 Lord Williams of Elvel: Looking a bit at the longer run, do you think that the

international anti-piracy operations are sufficient to allow the shipping industry to continue

to use this particular route along the Gulf of Aden and so on? Secondly, do you think that

the industry itself is doing enough for its own protection? Should we have more armed

protection units on ships? Is the insurance industry doing more? We were very worried at

our last inquiry that the insurers took a very relaxed view about the whole business and

were quite prepared to insure ransoms, for instance. What is the situation there?

Dr Willett: Yes, of course the big change, at least in terms of the UK’s debate since you last

looked at this issue, is the UK Government’s decision to allow the companies that have UK-

flagged ships to authorise the use of armed security detachments on their vessels. The

problem there, of course, is that the naval forces that were present simply were not present

in sufficient numbers to enable every single ship to be covered, even if they were doing a

very good job at deterring attacks and starting to drive the number of successful attacks in a

downward direction. The problem with the naval ships is that if you think about the number

that you would actually need to provide coverage, based on being able to get a helicopter

over a ship being attacked within 20 minutes in the entire area in question, you will not ever

have enough ships. It is impossible. Given that you have to have one ship on station, one ship

prepared to relieve it and one ship having come off patrol, you are talking about hundreds of

ships that have to be in the cycle to maintain 60 or 70 on station to give you that coverage.

You would never have enough naval ships even in the most ideal naval world. There was

always going to be a feeling that there would be a need to find other means to provide a


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solution to this problem. Hence Governments are saying that perhaps armed guards are a

way forward.

Of course, the issue of armed guards has been very difficult politically. Some in the shipping

industry have been concerned that the Government is leaving the industry to its own fate.

Others have argued that, of course, the shipping industry should provide security for its

vessels in the same way it provides security for warehouses ashore. The debate has been

very mixed and very polemic, but what we do have is a situation now where it is happening

and companies are using it. They were before anyway in terms of some other nations.

Evidence suggests that it is having an effect on the pirates. It is having a deterrent effect,

simply because the chances of the pirates finding a ship now that does not have either a

naval ship nearby, or some kind of armed detachment on board, is decreasing to the point

that their window of opportunity to find a ship that is vulnerable is very small. Having said

that, there still needs to be a lot of discussion about how to work this properly. The use of

armed detachments is a very defensive measure, whereas the whole point of Atalanta’s

mandate is to be more offensive and proactive and to take the fight to the pirates.

In terms of the initial question about whether the route is still safe to use, shipping

companies have looked at rerouting round the Horn but that adds an awful lot of cost. At

the moment, most of them have opted to continue to carry on using the route and to rely

upon the protection of the naval forces and now of private security if they can.

Q33 Lord Williams of Elvel: Do you think this is a winnable campaign? Can you see into

the future and say sooner or later we are going to clean the whole thing up?

Dr Willett: There are two end states that we are talking about and they are different. There

is the end state at sea and the end state ashore. The end state at sea is to get the situation

back to what it was in 2005-06 where there was the risk or possibility of piracy as there is

anywhere in the world, but the seafarers using that particular part of the world were able to


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transit that region without feeling that their lives were inherently at risk just by doing that

job on a daily basis. If the numbers of attacks or the risk of attack can be reduced to a level

that is manageable for the industry and for the navies and manageable politically for the

Governments, then that is the sort of position that you are looking for as a solution at sea.

But that is a different question, though, from taking away the root causes of piracy ashore,

which of course is a much, much longer term question.

Dr Chitiyo: If I may just add on to what Lee is saying, the other thing that shipping

companies are doing to protect their ships is actually putting technology on the ships, such

as citadels and so on, so that even if the pirates do put their ladders up and manage to get to

the top, it is almost impossible for them to actually get into the ship. This, plus the use of

armed guards, has proved to be quite a useful deterrent. One caveat on that, though, is that

in some instances where pirates have managed to clamber on and take an armed ship, it has

led to greater attacks on the hostages. There is that unfortunate corollary.

For the international community and Africa, there are two levels in terms of the long term.

One is the aspirational, which is the eradication of piracy, which is what people talk about.

At a more pragmatic day-to-day level, as Lee said, it is to bring it down to a manageable level

and then work down from there. The long-term goal, as stated at political level, is the

eradication but everyone knows that is going to take time.

Q34 Lord Williams of Elvel: If I may very quickly, is there any shift in marine insurers’

attitude towards this whole business? We were very disappointed when we had them in

front of us when we did our last study. We thought they were insufficiently robust about

refusing to insure ships that did not obey the rules.

Adjoa Anyimadu: My point is related to your question, because I think it is important to

remember that there are always going to be irresponsible ship owners who do not really fall

under the cover of the organised and very vocal international shipping industry, and the


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prominent voices there. You see cases, such as the MV Iceberg, where insurance is

insufficient, the ship owners go bust and you end up with a vessel that is rapidly

deteriorating, being held in Somalia for over a year, and the hostages there are in a very bad

state. I believe two hostages in that situation have already died and there is no real clear plan

for how to get them out. There are always going to be gaps in the shipping industry, where it

is difficult to reach ship owners who are willing to take a risk to go along there without

proper protection in place.

In terms of the insurers, I think that the angle of the international community of looking

increasingly at ransom payments—and I think that has been really headed by the UK—has

partly made insurers more aware of their responsibilities and also of the political interest in

their activities. There was a suggestion that ransom payments could be banned, and the

effect that that would have on insurers and the shipping industry as a whole was really

strongly taken on by insurers and the shipping industry. There have been improvements, I

would say. There have been improvements.

Q35 Lord Jopling: Dr Willett, you said a few moments ago that you thought that the

existence of armed on-board protection units had been effective, but when you came before

this Committee two and a half years ago—and I am quoting question 185—you said, “One

could argue, I suppose, would that deter the pirates; well, the evidence at the moment

suggests not”. Could you tell us what might have happened in the mean time that has made

these on-board protection units effective, which you felt then were not?

Dr Willett: I think the issue at the time was the significant concern in the shipping industry,

perhaps not necessarily to do with the effectiveness, but there were two things. One, there

was a concern that at the time the pirates had shown a habit for just ratcheting up the

pressure all the time. The view was that, if you started putting weapons on board, the

weapons would just be used in defensive measures and the pirates would just continue to up


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the ante. What has happened since then is that, rather than just put forward the issue of

armed guards as a standalone solution, we have had a number of measures that have come

together, of which armed guards is one. Increasingly, the change of the mandate for Atalanta

is another one. There has been more of a comprehensive approach to looking at this, which

makes the armed guards option—I do not want to say less risky—perhaps more palatable. It

gives more utility if such things are done as part of a wider approach, where you can add

them in as an overall part of a comprehensive effort to deter the pirate threat, which does

not just rely upon the armed guards being given licence to do this but has the naval forces

and the Governments doing more as part of a comprehensive approach.

To add into your question and build on something that Dr Chitiyo raised, there was the

issue of best management practice, which means encouraging the ship owners themselves

not only to consider things like armed guards but to consider making the ships secure in the

first place. There is a well written and publicly available best management practice document

that is given to all ship owners and ship masters. They are all encouraged to take it on board.

It is very slim, it is simple to read and it is delivered in a very commonsense way. If you can

get your ship owners to encourage all of their ships to use that, that again is another key

part of this overall package that has come together, since two years ago, to create a broader

approach.

The problem about BMP, as both my fellow panellists have raised, is that there are still

some—a quarter or more—who do not do it. It is encouraging those ship owners and those

ship masters to do that as part of the approach. When you have armed guards on board, the

pirates may be deterred by that but they are similarly deterred by a ship that is driving at

speed, that is using evasive manoeuvring and that has a citadel and razor wire as part of a

package.


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Of course, the overall approach—linking a point to the original question—is that, when you

are trying to look at this holistically, best management practice is something that all ship

owners around the world need to be responsible for implementing, no matter what part of

the world they are operating in, because it is just about making shipping safer, whether the

threat is from East Africa or West Africa or in the South China Sea. Unfortunately, it is a

cost to ship owners as well to do this, particularly when you are talking about the Somali

Basin area, and when you are putting in citadels and razor wire that is a further cost. You

have to try and make the case to the ship owners that they need to think about this for their

overall fleets and not just for the ships that transit that particular area.

Q36 The Chairman: We need to move on, but can I just capture one statistic? I think

you mentioned 25% as your estimate of ship owners that effectively just do it as they have

always done it. Is that what you are saying?

Dr Willett: The generally accepted or generally discussed figure is that about a quarter of

the ships that are involved choose—either because they do not wish to or because they

cannot afford to—not to implement best management practice.

Q37 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: My written down question was: how effective is the

Transitional Federal Government in addressing the root causes of the problem? But I think

Adjoa has already talked about the fishing industry, the huge fortunes and the drive for

celebrity. Maybe it is a bit unreasonable, really, to expect the Government to be able to do

that much about these root causes. Maybe the answer is, as Lord Williams was saying, this is

just containment of the problem.

Adjoa Anyimadu: As both my colleagues have said, realistically containment is what we

should aim for at the moment. The added problem of expecting the TFG particularly to have

an effect on mitigating piracy is the fact that it does not really occur in the areas under TFG

control. The TFG basically controls Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, and not much else


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at the moment. Piracy attacks tend to happen off the coast of Puntland, so slightly further

north, and that region has a semi-autonomous Government. I feel that the one sticking point

has been the political focus on supporting the TFG, and it is understandable because it is the

internationally recognised Government of Somalia. Puntland has declared itself autonomous

but also sees itself as part of a federated Somalia in the future sense. When Somalia is fixed

they will want to be a part of that Somalia, but for the moment want to govern themselves.

The difficulty there is that it means that international Governments have to tread carefully

when engaging with Puntland, because being seen to recognise them to a greater extent or

engaging more with them than the TFG may be seen to be recognising them over the TFG.

However it is necessary, as I have said, because that is where piracy is occurring most. I

think there has been a change in attitude but it has been gradual. It needs to be a lot more

proactive and a lot quicker in order to combat piracy from where it is happening in Somalia.

Q38 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: But these problems are so profound it would be difficult

to believe anyone could make a lot of progress on the actual root causes. To what extent

have the efforts to enhance the capacity to prosecute pirates in Somalia, Somaliland and

Puntland been effective?

Adjoa Anyimadu: I think the comments you heard from the Foreign Minister of the

Seychelles this morning touched a lot on this. The Seychelles really has been at the forefront

of prosecuting pirates, as has Kenya, but Kenya has very complicated political issues with

Somalia. I think this makes the notion of keeping Somali nationals in prison for piracy - for an

offence that has not affected Kenya - is hard to justify to the Kenyan population because of

the expense. The transfer of pirates to prisons in Somalia has picked up, I think in Somaliland

particularly because of its relative stability compared to the rest of Somalia. That has been

successful. In Puntland the UNODC is putting in a lot of money and is supported by a

number of EU member states to increase the judicial capacity. But there are concerns. We


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hear from some people that the potential of links between some authorities in Puntland and

pirate networks make the idea of keeping pirates in Puntland not entirely palatable at the

moment.

Dr Chitiyo: Just a tiny note to add on to what Adjoa was saying, particularly with regard to

Puntland, the suggestion with regard to prosecution and incarceration of pirates was

probably better last year than this. I think there has been a bit of a slowdown this year,

partly because of the transition occurring in Somalia itself, partly because of issues between

Puntland and Somalia. Overall there needs to be a higher and quicker re-engagement with

Puntland on the whole question of what do we do about pirates, because I think there has

been a definite slowdown in Puntland in particular.

Dr Willett: Let me make a very small, quick point on this. In terms of the overall approach

of deterring attacks but particularly of keeping the Somali populace on side, one particular

issue that is quite interesting in terms of the judicial process and imprisonment is that some

estimate that as many as 2,000 pirates are currently awaiting trial in a number of countries.

From a Somali populace point of view that is quite an interesting message, because if we are

trying to show to the Somalis themselves that allowing piracy to happen from within their

country is not the right thing to do, to keep the population on side and to encourage them

to drive out the pirates, which is something that has happened on a number of occasions in

certain towns like Eyl, for example, getting the message across somehow to the Somali

population that, “Actually what you are talking about here is an entire generation of your

young men—and occasionally young women now—being removed and being put in prison

for a long time, with life imprisonment being the sentence in some cases”. If 2,000 young

men are suddenly taken away, that has an impact locally in terms of the ability of the Somali

population to do what it needs to do. Putting the message across that, “The imprisonment is

going to work and it is, if they keep conducting piracy, going to take away a generation of


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your young men”, is an important message that some argue would have an effect if it was put

across.

Q39 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: I think you have covered quite a lot of

what I was going to ask. That is a very good aspiration, but what about the practicalities of

it? We just heard from the Foreign Minister of the Seychelles that they do not want to keep

these pirates in prisons on the Seychelles, so where are they going to be incarcerated?

Adjoa Anyimadu: I think the UNODC has made quite sterling moves to increase the

capacity in Somaliland and Puntland. For African regional states especially, the idea of being

able to transfer pirates, once they are prosecuted, back to Somalia means that prosecutions

are more likely to happen in those states because authorities know that they are not going

to have to look after the pirates.

Q40 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: No, I see that. But you just said a

moment ago that there were problems with the connection between pirates and the prisons

in Puntland. Picking up on what Lord Jopling said in the last session, how do you ensure that

the pirates are not just sprung from the prisons once they are sent back to Somalia,

whichever bit?

Adjoa Anyimadu: It is a combination of things. It includes what Lee has said, about

increasing the awareness of the population in those regions of the impact that piracy is

having on them. Particularly around the time of the London Conference on Somalia, we

heard a lot of calls from the Somali community that piracy is not particularly a burning issue

for Somali people, because it is seen to affect the international shipping industry and

Western Governments, and there are so many other problems on the ground in Somalia,

such as food insecurity, al Shabaab and the lack of representative governance. But if Somalis

were encouraged to see that piracy does affect them, then that will have an impact on the


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pressure put on the judicial system within Somalia to ensure that incarceration really does

mean incarceration.

Q41 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: But who is actually running these

prisons?

Adjoa Anyimadu: It is a mixture. I know in Puntland the Puntland authorities are taking an

increasingly proactive role and seeking international partners to help with the judicial system

and with the prison system. As I said, the UNODC has taken a lead role and a number of EU

member states are also providing money for prisons.

Q42 The Chairman: You mentioned it on the EU side. Do you feel the EU should get

more involved in this particular area perhaps?

Adjoa Anyimadu: As far as I know, a number of EU member states are supporting these

efforts. I think that there needs to be is more of a comprehensive approach, more of a link

between the focus of breaking up the operational methods of piracy, efforts on the judicial

side and on tracking the financial flows of piracy. There needs to be a more cohesive

approach.

Q43 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: Just picking up on the EU point, is it true

that the EU Development Fund cannot be used to build prisons?

Adjoa Anyimadu: I am not entirely sure. As far as I know, the EU Development Fund is

supposed to go towards more general support.

The Chairman: We have to redefine it as housing accommodation, I suspect.

Dr Chitiyo: One key thing that needs to happen is there has to be a deeper and wider

dialogue between the EU and IGAD. That is the East African community. IGAD also is

developing a strategy and prosecution of pirates is one of the issues. Of course, IGAD is

partly with AMISOM and so on. I think that dialogue needs to be deepened as quickly as

possible.


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The Chairman: We sometimes tend to forget about IGAD, you are right.

Q44 Lord Jopling: The Foreign Minister—whom we saw an hour ago—told us that the

UN were running the prisons in Somalia and that he was not sure whether they were armed

or not. Can you confirm both those things?

Adjoa Anyimadu: I am not sure on the ground of exactly what the UN’s day-to-day capacity

is in terms of being armed. I am not sure, but that is something that I can check.

Dr Chitiyo: The EU is running prisons in Somalia. At the moment, as we speak, they are not

armed as such.

Lord Jopling: The EU you said?

Dr Chitiyo: No, the UN.

Lord Jopling: Sorry, I thought you said EU.

Dr Chitiyo: No, the UN is running the prisons.

Q45 Lord Jopling: But not armed?

Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: Running all of it?

Dr Chitiyo: Not all the prisons, but the majority of them. At the moment they are not

armed, but one of the ongoing discussions is whether and to what extent they should be

armed. The reason for lack of arms is a political issue with regard to Somalia.

Q46 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: When you say “running all the prisons”,

are these pirate prisons?

Dr Chitiyo: Yes, the pirate prisons, but they are not running all the prisons. They are

running most of them.

The Chairman: As you can see there is a lot of interest in this particular area, because one

of the things as a Committee we try to be is very practical around solutions. As Kathryn, our

clerk, mentioned to you beforehand, if you wanted to provide any further evidence for us


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around this that you think we would find useful in terms of facts or this area, I am sure we

would welcome that after today’s session.

Q47 Lord Radice: There has been talk of better co-ordination not just between EU

countries but between the EU and the United States, of course, and also China and India. I

am just interested in the Chinese. Do they have a different approach to the pirates than the

others? It is rumoured that they do and I wonder if you could help us here.

Dr Willett: It is an interesting question. When you look at the Chinese approach to dealing

with the problem, you have to look at the Chinese approach to their presence in global

affairs as a whole. For example, I raise that with regard to the Chinese offer to help to do

World Food Programme escorts at the moment. One can argue that this is the Chinese

trying to convey a message that they are doing good things for the people of the region. Of

course, as a growing global power with a blue water navy, their desire to be there in all of

the areas of major activity from a naval point of view is a key part of their overall strategy of

projecting Chinese power around the world. They have interests they seek to protect in

those parts of the world as well. As a minor aside, looking at the Chinese presence in the

Indian Ocean, you can look at their developing links in Djibouti, in Pakistan and in Sri Lanka

and Burma, which give them quite an interesting little strategic foothold over the entire

region. Of course, that raises the question of what the Indians might think about that. There

is a whole wider dynamic of power politics in the Indian Ocean area, of which the Chinese

are a major part.

In terms of the particular piracy issue and where that fits in, of course, the Chinese, seeing

themselves as a major world power and a world navy, want to play a very particular part in

that. So, understandably, they put themselves forward, and I think they are now on their

11th rotation of ships on task. They were very concerned when they first started out they

would not be able to sustain that, but they have found they need to keep going and to keep


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being involved and they have done that now. Actually, the more they have done it, the more

their contribution has been welcomed. Going back to my original point about navies do what

navies do and they co-operate at sea because you can, the Chinese found very quickly that

rather than go and just do their own thing about piracy and escort their own ships, they very

quickly recognised the need to get involved and help other ships.

For example, if there was a ship that was in distress or under attack and their ship was the

nearest ship, they went and did it even if it was not a Chinese merchant ship that was being

attacked. They very quickly realised that when their ships ran out of supplies at sea, the

easiest thing is to get on the nearest ship, even if it is an American or British ship, and just

ask for help because it is what navies do. There is the big strategic power politics issue with

China, which is creating an interesting message about their presence and what they are

trying to do, but within that there is the reality of the fact that they are there, they are doing

it and they are making a useful contribution.

Q48 Lord Radice: On tactics, are they any different?

Dr Willett: That I am not entirely sure of, to be honest. They seem to be following the rules

of engagement in the same way as others. There are other nations that perhaps are being

slightly less strict. In my view, the Chinese do not have a name that normally comes up

among those that are doing their own thing.

Lord Radice: In a sense, that is a very useful corrective to the general view.

The Chairman: I think you were going to ask on the AMISOM question—

Lord Radice: Well, no, I thought I was asking about China, actually.

The Chairman: We thought you would maybe combine the two somehow.

Lord Radice: Would you like to ask that question?

Q49 The Chairman: Do not worry, I will move it on. Yes. We talked a little bit about

AMISOM and I suppose this comes back also to Africa’s own response to the regional crisis.


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“EU support for AMISOM gives grounds for an even more pessimistic assessment, in

comparison to the EU’s support for the AU Mission in Sudan”. That was stated by Alex

Vines of Chatham House. “Despite the importance of Somalia for European security, the

assistance provided has been half-hearted.” Do you agree with his assessment? It is really

about the effectiveness of AMISOM. In Europe can we help that be more effective, or should

we just keep out of that and let Africa sort that out for itself?

Dr Chitiyo: What we have all seen has been a massive change in the last six months in the

situation on the ground in Somalia with AMISOM. A year ago it was a very difficult situation

with al-Shabaab pretty much in control of south central and pretty much half of Mogadishu.

In the past six months that situation has changed dramatically with AMISOM and the Somali

security forces. We should not forget that there are now the national forces of Somalia as

well. They have taken Mogadishu and they are moving into the former al-Shabaab area.

There has been a massive change; I think a very positive change. AMISOM in a way is on a

roll. How long that will last remains to be seen, but certainly al-Shabaab is on the back foot.

There is no doubt about it. AMISOM does need to be given support. The talk in Somalia

now is about building a nation and this is something that is pretty much unheard of.

The Chairman: That is very important—

Dr Chitiyo: The Somali people themselves are talking about building a nation, so there is a

general spirit of optimism. There are challenges also, but the Somalis themselves speak in a

general spirit of optimism together with AMISOM. The AMISOM mission should be

supported. I do not see it now as being as pessimistic as it was even six months ago.

Q50 Lord Radice: Can I just follow that up? We are talking about the Ethiopian troops

and the Kenyan troops above all. Which is the more effective of those two efforts?

Dr Chitiyo: There are the Ethiopians and Kenyans, but there are also the Ugandan Djibouti

forces. It is a mix. I think they are all generally professional forces. One of the important


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changes that has occurred, particularly with regard to the Ethiopians, is that while the

Somalians are still very wary about Ethiopians in Somalia, it is much less hostile now than it

was, say, in 2006 when the Ethiopians last went in. That level of hostility is somewhat

diminished, but overall I think these are very competent troops. There is less general

hostility towards AMISOM now than there was perhaps a year ago, when I think civilians in

Mogadishu were very unhappy about the shelling by AMISOM forces in Mogadishu and so

on. There is a gradual increasing rapport between AMISOM and the Somali people, who are

now I think a little more accepting of the AMISOM mission in Somalia.

Adjoa Anyimadu: I think it is important to note that the Ethiopian troops in Somalia are not

under the AMISOM mandate. All of the other troops, as far as I know, are. Kenya initially

went into Somalia at the end of last year independently of AMISOM and has been

incorporated into AMISOM since then.

Q51 Lord Radice: Has that been in response to the kidnappings?

Adjoa Anyimadu: In response to the kidnappings and general insecurity in the southern

border of Somalia and northern border of Kenya.

Q52 The Chairman: Thank you. I am just seeing here whether we move on. Is the

Ugandan training mission, which is one of the EU missions there that is based in Uganda,

seen as something that is significant or successful, or is it just a pinprick that is seen as being

notional?

Dr Chitiyo: It is generally regarded as being very useful because it has helped to train not

just Ugandans but also the Somali national forces. I think it has been perceived as being very

useful.

Q53 The Chairman: Has that been a part of that greater confidence and ability of the

Somali national forces? Has that been directly attributed to that?


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Dr Chitiyo: It has had a direct impact on the greater professionalisation of the Somali

forces.

Q54 Lord Jay of Ewelme: One of the documents we were given was a document from

the Brenthurst Foundation, a discussion paper, “Somalia 2012: Ending the Transition?”, which

says at one point, “It is felt that foreign training methods in the EU-led training programmes

in Uganda has not been attuned to Somali needs and are seen as incongruent with Somali

approaches”. I just wonder whether you are taking a different view. That I thought was

rather surprisingly critical of the EU approach. It would be interesting to hear your

testament on that.

Dr Chitiyo: If I may on that, I think there has been an evolution on the EU Uganda training

mission. When it first began, it started at a time when there was a great level of hostility

within Somalia to outsiders coming in and trying to talk about Somalia. I think one of the

things that has happened has been that over the past two years it has been shown that the

training mission is there to help the Somali military and the Somali military in turn has

become more professional. They have become less aggressive towards their own civilians, so

there has been a transition. At the time that the survey was done, it was a very fractious

situation between Somali civilians, the Somali military and the EU military as well. That

situation has changed quite dramatically through dialogue. In a sense, the military success has

bred greater confidence.

The Chairman: We have to start moving through fairly quickly.

Q55 Lord Jopling: Yes. We saw in May a major escalation in this whole operation with

attacks on pirate facilities on land. I wonder if you could tell us whether this caused any

tensions within the alliance. What do you think is the major long-term effect of starting to

attack land targets? Do you have any information about the three drones that are kept on

Seychelles? Do they have a capacity not just to survey but also to launch rocketry or laser-


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guided missiles or are they just for reconnaissance? Would they have a role, if they could

launch missiles, in attacking land targets?

Dr Chitiyo: If I may I will perhaps just kick off and my colleagues will chip in. The question of

the shift, or the addition of adding land-based targets, has been acceptable and co-ordinated

at a political level with the TFG, with the region and with the EU. I think that has been

generally acceptable. The problem has been in how the civilian communities perceive the

land attacks and also Puntland, because I think just fairly recently there was an attack in

Gomba in Puntland. The Minister for marines in Puntland was very vociferous about the lack

of information from the EU with regard to this attack. He said Puntland was not informed or

consulted, and the attack simply occurred—a helicopter attack on pirate operations. I think

that is one thing that perhaps needs to be examined, which we alluded to earlier. There

needs to be discussions with Puntland. Again, on the civilian aspect, there perhaps needs to

be greater clarity from the EU and Operation Atalanta in terms of these attacks on the

ground. Are we talking about combat boots on the ground or simply essentially attacks using

helicopters? Because with the people of Somalia in particular it is an issue, I think perhaps

greater clarity needs to occur with regard to that particular question. I think my colleagues

probably have more to add.

Q56 The Chairman: Could we have brief comments, particularly the one perhaps also

on the capability of the drones, if we know what those are?

Dr Willett: Off the top of my head I do not, but it is something I can check up on and come

back on. There is, of course, a significant ethical discussion about using unmanned vehicles

for combat operations, which is a very vibrant issue in its own right, not just in Somalia but

elsewhere.

There are a couple of points which should be made about the mandate change and what it

means for the longer term is that. First of all, it is part of an acceptance politically that more


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needed to be done, yet there remains a very clear limit as to what can be done. As I

mentioned before, the proportionality is still very, very much in mind and the need to inflict

no casualties in such operations, even among the pirates, is at the forefront of the thinking

to ensure that one does not risk turning the Somali populace against the idea. The recent

attacks were very carefully targeted at skiffs themselves in particular, at refuelling points, at

weapons dumps et cetera. The mandate says very clearly that it extends to the shore and

some riverine areas, but nothing further. NATO has been taking a similar approach, too.

Although not striking ashore, it has been putting further pressure on the pirates as they

leave the beach, so blockading, effectively. This is seen as a step up. Whether or not there

has been any discussion of whether there needs to be any further steps I could not say

because the mandate change is seen itself as quite a big step because the navies are now

actually operating over the shore. The interesting point about the whole EU approach and

the EU mandate is that, while there are challenges in getting 27 nations to agree, the fact

that the EU operation as a whole, from the naval point of view, constitutes a number of

different components and the attacks ashore means that the nations can choose which bits

they want to support, so there is a degree of flexibility within the construct. Of course it is

interesting that there were seven nations involved in the original strike, back in May, which

suggests that at least a core of them are prepared to conduct attacks ashore and have the

ability, within their own national rules of engagement, to be able to interpret the rules and

to do it and to—

Q57 The Chairman: Can I ask which nations were involved?

Dr Willett: The nations that were involved—excuse me, I am just checking—were the

French, the Germans, the Italians, the Spanish, the Dutch and the Portuguese. The UK did

not have a ship there at the time.

Q58 The Chairman: It is a very interesting list, particularly the German side.


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Dr Willett: To be clear, those are the ships that were involved but none of the reports

made available state which ships launched helicopters. They say the helicopters came from

unnamed ships, so we know which ships were present but we do not know which ships

launched the helicopters that conducted the attack.

The Chairman: That is an important point that we will record. We have three more

questions. Because we have another session we are going to have to start, perhaps I could

ask each of my colleagues to ask a shortened version of the question and I could ask one of

you to reply with a quick answer on those questions, if you would not mind.

Q59 Baroness Henig: My problem is about the level of co-ordination between the EU’s

different elements, the naval force Atalanta, the training mission in Somalia and EUCAP

Nestor. In particular, I want to ask how the EUCAP Nestor initiative is progressing and

whether the timetables are going to be reached in terms of making that effective.

Dr Willett: That might be something I would be more comfortable giving you a further note

on when I have had a chance to have a look at it.

The Chairman: We welcome that very much indeed.

Q60 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: What about the wider EU policy on the Horn of

Africa? Is it proving successful? Is the appointment of the special representative helpful and is

the European External Action Service causing any problems in relation to that?

Dr Chitiyo: From what I have seen—and I have been fairly frequently to the EU

headquarters in Addis—it is working pretty well. There are always certain tensions and so

on, but I think there is a general acceptance and, in fact, a welcoming of EU operations and

having the special representative there. I think it has made quite a vast difference to how the

EU is perceived. There is political acceptance of the need for co-ordination and partnership

with the EU. So I think it has been pretty successful.


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One thing that I might add, which is not specific to this question but just one of the things

occurring in the discussion in Africa itself, is that this is not simply about anti-piracy or

piracy per se, even within Somalia itself. That is something we need to take cognisance of.

Q61 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Is it going back to what Lord Jay was asking about the

root causes of this?

Dr Chitiyo: It is not simply the root causes because the regions—the African Union and so

on—are looking at the issue of maritime security in a wider context. One of the things that

they are looking at, with regard to Somalia as well, are things like port security. It is not

simply about piracy and anti-piracy. That is important, but I think further down the line we

need to think in a more holistic way in our dialogue with the EU and particularly with IGAD.

I also heartily recommend that we upscale the dialogue with IGAD.

Q62 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: The dialogue with whom?

Dr Chitiyo: IGAD is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa, which

is becoming one of the lead actors.

The Chairman: That is a prompt. Somewhere in this we need to get some evidence from

IGAD because they also appear in our Sudanese interests as well. Lastly, we have a record of

marginalising development issues to the end, I am afraid, and we have managed to do it again.

Baroness Young perhaps you would like to quickly—

Q63 Baroness Young of Hornsey: I will. Again, perhaps if you have anything further to

add on this, you can write us a note. What do you feel have been the main achievements of

the EU’s development and humanitarian aid programme in Somalia? How has EU funding for

the fishing industry helped the coastal communities in particular? How well is the EU co-

ordinating with the United Nations Development Programme rule of law and security

programme in terms of creating support for police forces, courts and prisons?


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Adjoa Anyimadu: These are all very good questions and quite big ones. What is good about

the EU’s Horn of Africa strategy is that it is explicitly supposed to be a holistic approach to

Somalia. So it is seeing piracy as one symptom of—what has been mentioned a few times

today—the root problems in Somalia, which are the political instability and the lack of

effective governance. The Horn of Africa strategy does emphasise the importance of

development, as well as governance, judicial reform and all of these aspects.

By co-ordinating better with the UN particularly, which I think is probably the only other

actor that is taking as holistic an approach as the EU, positive effects will be seen gradually

over a period of time. The actions that the EU is taking in coastal communities—actually, a

number of actors are engaged positively in coastal communities—seek to make piracy seem

unattractive, for example, through radio programmes and so on. They are engaging former

pirates and former pirate negotiators and have campaigns to show that piracy does not pay

and there is this risk of incarceration thousands of miles away from your family for an

indeterminate amount of time. I am sure they are having small effects on the ground but

those are so difficult to quantify. Overall, what is important for the EU’s strategy in the Horn

of Africa is to understand that often the positive effects of these things cannot be quantified

necessarily, but by talking to Somalis you can find out what the effects are that are happening

on the ground. I think that is important.

The Chairman: We would be very pleased to take more written evidence from you on

this particular question. I am sorry we have gone through the last part of this very quickly.

We would have been delighted to talk for at least another hour with you, I am sure. Thank

you very much indeed for the insights you have given us. We do treat this issue in this part

of the world extremely importantly. I am pleased to hear that some of the EU initiatives that

have taken place, which we scrutinise particularly, appear to be operating very positively,

although there is still a lot to learn and a lot to do. Thank you very much.

Dr Knox Chitiyo – Oral evidence (QQ19 – QQ63)

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Dr Knox Chitiyo – Oral evidence (QQ19 – QQ63)

Evidence to be found under Anyimadu

Chamber of Shipping - Written evidence

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Chamber of Shipping1 - Written evidence

What has changed since publication of the report in April 2010

1. The factors surrounding Somali piracy and what is often described as the Somali

Piracy Model constitute a unique international piracy phenomenon which, as

predicted is proving very difficult to counter. Piracy challenges the international

order and primarily must be a matter for Governments and the international

community to address.

2. In November 2011 the UK Government published Interim Guidance to UK

Flagged Shipping on the Use of Armed Guards to Defend against the Threat of

Piracy in exceptional Circumstances. The Guidance was updated in June 2012.

The shipping industry fully supports the guidance and sees the temporary use of

armed guards as an exceptional requirement at the present time. There is

concern that their use may become institutionalised, and is accepted by some in

Government as constituting the ‘new order’. The industry strongly challenges

and refutes this view.

3. UK government actions, including ministerial responses, to the Somali problem

have been positive and prompt. A clear FCO lead was established from the

start and good cross-departmental dialogue and co-ordination of policy has

been a notable feature. Close liaison with industry and effective civil/military

operational links continue to be maintained.

4. The human cost of piracy is appalling in scale and effect on individuals, 555

seafarers were attacked and taken hostage in 2011, 149 have been held for

more than a year and 35 lost their lives. Although fewer hostages were

captured in 2011 from the peak in 2010 the violence faced by seafarers has not

subsided. The worse affects of piracy on UK ships and seafarers has, by

comparison, been limited and it is notable that only 7% of hostages have been

from OECD countries.

5. Both as an island and a maritime trading nation the UK remains exposed to the

risks of piracy owing to the high levels of essential imports of all types, including

energy cargoes, which transit the High Risk Area through the Gulf of Aden and

across the Indian Ocean. In March 2011, an impact study jointly commissioned

by the Chamber and the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)

to quantify the economic impacts of Somali piracy highlighted the UK’s

particular dependence and exposure to piracy. It found that the value of EU

cargoes trading through the affected area exceeded $1,000 billion in 2009. The

UK should maintain a policy lead.

1 The Chamber of Shipping is the trade association for the UK shipping industry with 137 members; it

represents 927 ships of 28 million gross tonnes.


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6. The shipping industry believes the conduct of Operation Atalanta has been

methodical and determined – and its leadership highly effective. The shipping

industry has placed on record in different fora on several occasions its

appreciation for what has been delivered and achieved by the military.

7. The industry accepts there are no easy or short-term solutions to the threat

posed by Somali pirates. We continue to be fully engaged in many strands of

activity. The most obvious objectives are to:

Optimise vessel self-protection measures by implementation of Best

Management Practices (BMPs – Version4).

Address the concerns and confidence of seafarers and to reduce the

risks to which they are exposed.

Ensure an effective regime including third party accreditation and

international standards for Private Maritime Security Companies and

their personnel.

Support regional jurisdictional efforts and encourage UK prosecutions in

cases with sufficient UK interest.

Support international, regional and national capacity-building.

Defeat the UK’s political initiative which threatens the safety of our

employees by seeking to ban the payment of ransoms.

Establish a road map leading to a return to normality in the Indian

Ocean.

Operational Aspects of counter-piracy

8. Operationally, the industry-led Best Management Practices (BMPs) have proved

to be effective in preventing successful attacks, but non-compliance with BMPs

by a proportion, about 30%, of the (non UK) world’s fleet continues to be a

problem.

9. The introduction of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) or

Armed Guards on UK ships was initially resisted by UK shipping companies due

to the difficulties foreseen with legal, liability and safety aspects of their

employment, and the presence of weapons onboard civilian ships. Industry also

took the view in 2010 that the use of firearms by civilians in self-defence could

lead to an escalation in the use of firearms and other types of violence by

pirates. There has been no evidence of an escalation to date.

10. Detailed national guidance has now been produced with industry input and

arrangements for the third party accreditation of private security to

internationally agreed standards are expected to be introduced by the end of

2012. The industry believes this to be a pragmatic regulatory regime for UK to


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ensure private security companies and individuals working in the maritime

domain operate to the highest standards. However it is important to stress that

the use of PCASP is seen as a temporary and exceptional measure. It is not

legal or readily accepted in the jurisdictions of many third States and their use is

clearly not appropriate in response to other security threats or in other piracy

prone areas. In a global context the shipping industry remains concerned that

standards of PCASP may vary widely and a proportion of security companies

may not be complying with the established Rules for the use of Force, training

and safety requirements or the export and import and licensing requirements

for their firearms and ammunition. The shipping industry wants to remove the

need for the carriage of PCASP on civilian ships at the earliest opportunity.

11. The industry recognises the effectiveness of Armed Guards and the success of

the commercial model of PCASP which has been demonstrated in recent

months by the professionalism of those operating in the Indian Ocean and the

diligence of those shipping companies contracting them. Nevertheless, the

industry views with some disappointment the MOD’s decision not to resource

Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) consisting of military personnel; we

believe MOD has missed an opportunity to better contribute to the ‘protection

of merchant shipping’ which is still thought to be a core responsibility of

Governments and their navies. To contradict evidence given to the Committee

by MOD it is understood that a small number of highly trained UK VPDs

already exist to serve the self-protection needs of MOD cargoes being carried

on civilian ships and it is the view of the industry that their number and use

could have been extended, relatively cheaply and quickly, to serve a small

number of UK companies and their vessels. VPDs have crown immunity and so

are able to act with clear legitimacy in the counter-piracy environment; as yet

the same cannot be said for many of their privately contracted equivalents.

12. Chamber members have observed that the Royal Navy’s contribution of

warships to EUNAVFOR has been limited to a frigate or destroyer which

according to the Armed Forces Minister in his evidence to the Committee on

14 June is ‘one vessel for three months in every two years’. This is a minimal

contribution to force levels and is considerably less than is required by UK

shipping in the area and compares poorly with that made by other European

navies such as Spain, France, Germany (or Denmark, although not strictly part

of EUNAVFOR). The contribution of RFA and specialised units is acknowledged

but the UK contribution of ‘ship days’ to counter-piracy is less than many other

nations and less than that needed. The provision of the resource at EUNAVFOR

HQ should not preclude or justify the lack of warships deployed and

contributing to counter-piracy operations. The shipping industry in its evidence

in 2010 drew attention to the need for the RN to consider whether their

proposed ‘fleet profile’ provided sufficient lower cost patrol type vessels to be


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available for future global maritime security duties. Experience since 2010

indicates they may not.

Legal aspects and the payment of ransoms

13. The Chamber has strongly advocated the prosecution of captured pirates but

has recognised the legal complexities. Were sufficient ‘British interests’ present

in a piracy incident in the future, the Chamber would want to see pirates either

fast-tracked for prosecution in East Africa or regionally or brought home to be

prosecuted in UK.

14. The first meeting of the UK led International Task Force on Ransoms met 30

May 2012. Industry has a clear view supported by many in Government that

ransoms must be paid in order, however unpalatable it may be, to secure the

freedom of hostage seafarers, ships and cargoes; at the same time it

acknowledges ransom payments fuel the piracy model and allow the crime of

piracy to be seen to pay. The Chamber remains closely involved in this difficult

debate and is resisting any moves to ban ransom payments which, if

implemented, it believes would be unevenly applied, impossible to enforce and

further threaten and increase the risk to the lives of seafarers held hostage.

Conclusion

15. The EU military operation Operation Atalanta has been effective and has

reduced the number of pirate attacks from peak levels but the threat has been

diffused over a greater sea area. Many pirate attacks have been disrupted.

Strikes against pirate logistics are seen as being particularly effective. It is

recognised that the timescale of returning this vitally important but immense

sea area to normality is stretching out into the future. Existing EU force levels

must be maintained and the UK contribution increased. The Chamber

supports capacity building and continues to improve its own performance with

BMPs and the effectiveness and reliability of PCASP. Suggested areas for

Government attention are provided in the text of this submission.

28 June 2012

Council of Somali Organisations - Written evidence

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 We welcome this opportunity to submit evidence to the committee. The substance of

the Committees deliberations, are of substantial topical interest to the UKs large Somali

diaspora, who remain fully seized of the issues arising.

1.2 The Council of Somali Organisations on behalf of Somalis universally condemns maritime

piracy in the strongest possible terms. The Council of Somali Organisations calls for the

immediate and conditional release of all seafarers and other hostages held by pirate groups,

and other criminal networks.

1.3 In combating piracy, the Council of Somali Organisations urges the international

community to address the root causes of insecurity in Somali coastal regions, and to ensure

that the rule of law and universal human rights are observed in all aspects of detention,

prosecution and incarceration.

1.4 The Right to a fair trial and the particular vulnerabilities of minors prosecuted for alleged

piracy is of paramount importance in promoting the rule of law in the region.

The Committee is to be strongly commended for welcoming the present submissions.

1.5 It is in many ways unfortunate ,that that the international community has often excluded

the voices of Somalis themselves in discussions and decision making on all aspects of the

piracy conundrum, including the role of Somali authorities.

1.6 The popular view of Somalis universally is that the TFG is a creature of the

international donor community. It neither represents nor enjoys democratic legitimacy

amongst the Somali populace. Moreover the incompetence and corruption of many TFG

officials is such that, their presence and contributions in discussions on piracy, do little to

inspire confidence in international efforts.


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1.7 Accordingly, the present submissions may well constitute the very first time that the

view of Somali’s has genuinely been sought in a formal manner, by those engaged in any

degree of political oversight of international efforts to suppress piracy. To that extent the

Council of Somali Organisations extends its sincere gratitude for the leadership and foresight

of the committee in facilitating and receiving these submissions.

1.8 We would further respectfully request that the committee uses its best offices and

endeavours to promote the inclusion of the Somali diaspora in all UK and EU fora relating to

Piracy, fisheries governance and Security sector reform, including as part of its final

recommendations for the present evidence session.

1.9 Before addressing the issues of interest to the committee, it may be helpful to provide

some background information on the preparation of the present submission by the Council

of Somali Organisations.

2. The Author

2.1 This submission has been prepared by Omer Ahmed, founder and director of the

Council of Somali Organisations.

2.2 Omer is a solicitor with experience inter alia, of advising a wide range of parties in

relation to legal and policy issues pertinent to Somalia, including piracy and has advised

amongst others Medicins Sans Frontiers in Mogadisho and Brussels, Interpol, risk

management Consultants, as officials engaged in Counter piracy in the Transitional Federal

Government of Somalia, coastal regions and in Somaliland.

3. The Council of Somali Organisations

3.1 The Council of Somali Organisations is an independent organisation, representing and

advocating on behalf of the Somali diaspora in the UK, and promoting Anglo Somali comity

and mutual understanding. The organisations work benefits from generous financial support

from the Trust for London and the City Bridge Trust.


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3.2 The Council of Somali Organisations was established inter alia, to deliver capacity

building support to increase the operational effectiveness of organisations supporting Somali

communities.

3.3 The agency also works to amplify the voice of the Somali community on a wide range of

policy issues, and acts as a platform for liaison and cooperation with Whitehall departments

and international agencies and partners with an interest in issues pertinent to the Somali

diaspora in the UK, EU and the Horn of Africa.

3.4 The Council of Somali Organisations is managed by an active and dedicated board of

Trustees, recruited through an independent selection process, and is supported on an

advisory basis by a wide range of Somali and non Somali professionals.

3.5 One measure of the effectiveness of our policy and representational activities, was

reflected in a meeting chaired by Omer Ahmed in Downing Street between the Prime

Minister David Cameron, and the Somali diaspora on 20th February 2012. On 22nd February

2012 the Foreign Secretary William Hague in a pre London conference reception at

Lancaster House, identified the Council of Somali Organisations for specific praise and

commendation for influencing government thinking on key Somali matters.

“I thank Chatham House and the Council of Somali Organisations for their part in

supporting these discussions, which really have made a contribution to our thinking

and our policy”. 2

3.6 The CSO represents a broad range of Somali diaspora organisations in the UK. We also

have civil society organisations within our membership based in Somalia, including coastal

communities affected by piracy, such as Haradhere the scene of the 17 second burst of fire

of which your Lordships have heard much.

3.7 In preparing these submissions the Council of Somali Organisations has consulted with

2 http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latestnews/?view=Speech&id=733712482

http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latestnews/?view=Speech&id=733712482


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member organisations in the UK and consulted with Somalis on the ground across all

regions, dealing with security risks posed by pirate groups operating in their districts.

3.8 The purpose of the present submission therefore, is to provide the Committee with a

broad overview, of Somali civil society thinking in relation to piracy. The submissions of an

alternative narrative on counter piracy efforts, based on the perspectives of the Somali

diaspora, particularly as coastal communities in South Central Somalia, are not readily able

to proffer their views on the conduct of EUNAVFOR and other maritime security platforms

such CTF-150 & CTF151. The present submission will focus on those areas which are of

most concern to our members and to Somalis.

3.9 The evidence we proffer fall within the following broad headings:

Somali Diaspora: An untapped Resource

Normalising HMG & EU Presence In Mogadisho

Maritime Security Operation Atalanta Mandates & Eucap Nestor

Coherence of the EU Response

Somali Exclusive Economic Zone.

Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing

European Union Fisheries Policy & IUUF

Comparative Value of Illicit Flows - K&R & IUUF

Hostis Omnium Generis: Universal Human Rights: Unfair & Unsafe Piracy

Prosecutions

Somali Diaspora Solutions to Piracy 1:Ceeldaraad Ltd & Fishing For Peace

Somali Diaspora Solutions to Piracy 2: Council of Somali Organisations recommendations

4. DIASPORA AS AN UNTAPPED RESOURCE

4.1 It would be useful at the outset to say a few words about the role of the Somali

Diaspora.


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4.2 The UK has a large and vibrant Somali diaspora community which is a substantial asset to

HMG. The Somali diaspora enjoys substantial influence over transnational Somali networks

across all Somali speaking regions and across the wider region.

4.3 On the other hand, the paucity of human intelligence and in the absence of empirical

data, policy makers and national parliaments often make decisions on piracy which are not

informed by empirical evidence but often premised on desk research and open source or

operational intelligence often of low source grading3. This leads to an often myopic and one

dimensional reversion to a militaristic comfort zone.

4.4 In working with and through the Somali diaspora, many of these deficiencies can be

ameliorated. . Diaspora influence extends to the very coastal communities which are the

subject of the Committees deliberations. In addition to supplying financial and political

support, the Somali diaspora contributes many of the leading political figures in Somaliland

and Somalia, including the dynamic Mayor of Mogadisho. It is to be noted that many of the

most influential political leaders in the coastal regions are British citizens, including the

leadership of Galmuduug, and other centres of pirate activity further south in Gulhiraan and

Haradhere.

3 By way of clarification, it is to be noted that the first incidence of piracy off the Somali coast, infact took place in

1989/1990 with the hijacking of a Romanian cargo ship with a cargo of Russian goods including cigarettes destined for their

pseudo Gramician communist comrades in Mogadishu.

The vessel was hijacked by clan members of the Somali National Movement as part of Somaliland’s efforts to restrict

weapons into Mogadishu to prevent what was then descending into an orgy of violence in the aftermath the overthrow of

the genocidal Barre regime..

The ship was eventually released after the then, USSR stepped in on behalf obits Warsaw Pact ally, threatening to bomb

Somalia. The ship was returned with the crew unharmed with an unknown ransom believed to have been exchanged. The

cargo sent by the regime of Nikolai Ceausescu was however comprehensively looted and sold across Africa.

A highly topical epilogue to this incident was that this took place before the days of sophisticated ransom drops. The

ransoms were allegedly paid by wire to Barclays account in London. The hijackers did not have access to today's network

of Remittance agencies and so simply went through their pocket books and called relatives members of the UK Somali

diaspora from the bridge of the Vessel requesting bank account number of a relative.

This was picked up by Scotland Yard who arrested several people in London, though non were subsequently charged. The

ransom was recovered from a UK bank account.

This incident is interesting inasmuch is it dates piracy off the Somali coast, back to the start of the conflict in South Central.

It also underlines that the issue of tracking K&R and other illicit financial flows in relation to Somalia has a longer history.


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4.5 The Somali diaspora enjoys extensive contacts and unfettered access to all pirate

controlled areas. Far from the vastly overstated security risks (often stated as being too

dangerous even for military personnel), British Somalis frequently travel to the region and

have taken teams of journalists to meet pirate leaders..

4.6 National and International policy fora in which counter piracy is discussed, do not include

diaspora voices, instead relying on officials of the Transitional Federal Government. The

prevailing view amongst in the diaspora and indeed in Somalia and its regional

administrations, is that unfortunately for a number of reasons officials of the Transitional

Federal Government in Mogadisho, are not best placed to properly articulate Somali

concerns.

4.7 Principally, because as clients of the international donor community, it can in many

respects, be extremely difficult to challenge deficiencies by ones donors in respect of

counter piracy or wider security sector reform efforts.

4.8 The Somali diaspora in the UK, is not dependant on international donor support, and has

no political restriction or affiliations limiting its ability to articulate the views and interests of

Somalis universally, on the issue of piracy, maritime security and protection of the scarce

economic resources available to Somalis.

4.9 A principle reason often stated for failing to engage with / excluding the Somali diaspora,

is an insistence that there is no political consensus amongst the diaspora. This argument is

quintessentially, disingenuous in a number of respects, as it presupposes that a political

consensus should be any more likely amongst Somalis in the diaspora. In fact there is

consensus amongst all Somali diasporas on themes such as the need to ensure a democratic

and viable constitution is implemented, around human rights and in relation to piracy and the

Somali EEZ.

4.10 Whilst on more political matters there will continue to clan based and historic rivalries.

There is little doubt about the areas in which Somalis share almost universal consensus.


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4.11 The Council of Somali Organisations seeks to articulate and further amplify those areas

of consensus, some of which are addressed in the present submissions.

4.12 The diaspora, is able to offer land based economic and political solutions to undermine

the piracy model, inter alia, by investing in coastal communities and developing alternative

livelihoods for young people. Disaspora efforts in this regard needs to be better connected

with donor activity, which is conspicuous in its absence from the coastal regions, most

affected by piracy in South Central Somalia.

4.13 In this, and in many other important respects, the potential resource of the Somali

diaspora remains largely untapped.

4.14 Whilst this has been a source of considerable frustration, there is a fair degree of

optimism too. HMG has substantially enhanced its awareness of, and engagement with the

Somali diaspora, identifying opportunities to work with the diaspora on a number of themes.

4.15 Much of the credit for this has to go to the efforts in the particularly since mid 2011 of

HMG officials. Whilst the wider East Africa directorate, and no doubt the leadership of the

Foreign Secretary have also been central to this improvement.

4.16 The work of both Sally Axleworthy, and Tom Crofts of the FCO Somali unit, warrants

a specific mention here, in improving the quality, relevance and content of dialogue with the

Somali diaspora, to unprecedented levels. The Council of Somali Organisations has been at

the forefront of supporting those efforts, and believes that the step change in mutual

understanding can only be of significant benefit to HMGs work in the region, and serves as a

potential template for effective engagement of diaspora communities.

4.17 The Council of Somali Organisations will continue to support and where necessary to

challenge HMG and EU thinking and policy making, to secure and enhance the quality of

HMG & EU interventions in relation to the Somali polity and indeed the wider Horn of

Africa region.


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4.18 This paper sets out additional contributions of the Anglo Somali diaspora, in respect of

Somali led solutions to piracy, involving diaspora led private sector investments to

undermine the much vaunted piracy business model. Including innovative diaspora led

initiatives. Fishing for Peace, is a compelling and powerful example of Diaspora initiatives

with substantial social benefits to vulnerable coastal communities (see page Somali Diaspora

Solutions)

5. STABILISATION: NORMALISING HMG & EU PRESENCE IN MOGADISHO

5.1 The much heralded land based solutions to piracy, are very much dependent on the

timing, of pacification and stabilisation of Somalia. Operational difficulties are compounded by

the challenges of the transitional process, which adversely affects the planning processes,

generating a damaging time lag in delivery, as already stated.

5.2 The Council of Somali Organisations on behalf of the diaspora, has advised HMG, EU and

UN institutions, including UNPOS, that the process of pacification and stabilisation of South

Central beginning with Mogadisho, cannot realistically achieved without the support of

diaspora based professionals

5.3 Moreover, the requirement for this support was quite foreseeable and indicates that the

international community particularly at the EU and UN level, need to be more proactive in

adapting diaspora recruitment processes, so that the security gains in Alshaabab cleared

areas can be consolidated into rapid socio economic improvements in liberated areas.

5.4 The Council of Somali Organisations works with amongst others, the UK Stabilisation

Unit, to identify suitable mechanisms to facilitate deeper and more operationally relevant

engagement with its influential Somali diaspora. This includes proffering diaspora candidates

for deployment as part of a proposed Somali cadre of experts, deployable across the region.

5.5 This is a particularly important development, given the requirement for the international

donor community to develop an increasingly visible presence in Mogadisho and South

Central Somalia, as part of the transitional normalisation and stabilisation of South Central.


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5.6 The challenges of the political and security environment are amongst the reasons why

the planning for recruitment in this area by the international community, lags some 12-18

months behind the facts being created on the ground, and this gap in many respects is the

hallmark of the international community’s failures in Somalia.

5.7 From a diaspora perspective, the implementation of international interventions in

Somalia, suffer from ineffective political oversight and performance management, leading to

planning processes are not proactive in anticipating and addressing changes in the political

and security environment in Somalia. This leads to a substantive time lag between security

gains on the ground, and visible evidence of those gains for the local populace.

5.8 An example of the effects of this time lag, is that despite the fact that the political

transition in Somalia agreed in Kampala in June 2011, is scheduled to end on 20 August 2012,

the construction of a secure diplomatic presence in Mogadisho, has not begun. Limiting

HMG and the EU presence to Aden Cadde International Airport.

5.9 The UK presence in Somalia, and that of its EU partners will continue to suffer from a

credibility gap, in the absence of a secure embassy compound in the city. The unfavourable

local impression when compared to the Turkish stance will continue to have a deleterious

effect on perceptions of HMG and EU objectives in Somalia.

5.10 EU operational activity in Somalia continues to be conducted by remote control from

Nairobi, which will remain the de facto capital of Somalia, until the EU and HMG invests in a

permanent diplomatic presence in Mogadisho.

5.11 The lead times involved in deploying Somali civilians, are therefore vitally critical in

terms of the international community’s ability to timeously deliver stabilisation and back fill

capacity.

5.12 It is also important to bear in mind that an increased diplomatic presence in Somalia

whilst politically significant, would not have any meaningful impact on combating piracy per

se, and it is therefore incumbent on the committee to recognise that there is little piracy to

be had, in Mogadisho. It is the coastal strip between Puntland and Mogadisho in which


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policing of the maritime coastline and onshore is a critical issue yet to be comprehensively

tackled.

6. MARITIME SECURITY EUNAVFOR/ EUCAP NESTOR:MANDATES

The principle concern of Somalis with respect to Operation Atalanta, and other EU led

efforts is the extent to which the security and well being of coastal communities are is

enhanced. In broad terms Somalis believe, that the only aspect of current operations which

could be of benefit to coastal communities is the protection of the scarce marine resources

available to Somali communities along a long and vulnerable coastline.

6.1 Increased militarisation, brings few benefits and numerous risks to Somali coastal

communities. The new and more aggressive posture of naval forces, operating closer to the

shoreline, has resulted in several incidents of Somali fishermen being killed, due to

“misidentification.” Such incidents do not receive much attention beyond Somalia. There is

likely to be an increase in the number of innocent Somali fishermen killed by naval forces, on

the basis that they simply looked like pirates. This is perceived by Somalis to be one of the

direct consequences of the EU’s recent decision to adopt a more aggressive stance.4

6.2 The starting point for Somalis in assessing the impact of operation Atalanta is the content

of the missions mandate. From a Somali perspective therefore, the nature of the EU and

EUNVAFORS counter piracy engagement is entirely offshore, with no evidence of any work

to implement land based solutions as this is not reflected in either the mandate or current

activity.

6.3 The mandated purpose of Operation Atalanta is purely to protect the interest of the

international community from Somalis. By definition it does not protect Somalis from the

international community. Often far from being a benign force protecting maritime trade

from Somali pirates, both Operation Atalanta and other naval forces, including

Italian,American and Russian forces, have allegedly killed and injured (fishermen allegedly

mistaken for pirates. These incidents and the perception of impunity may be a matter of

4 http://piracy-studies.org/2012/the-eus-misguided-move-to-fight-pirates-onshore/


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perception, yet perceptions fuel narratives in which coastal communities become inured to

piracy, reinforcing the piracy business model.

6.4 It is widely believed amongst Somalis that the international community has not taken on

into consideration the need of Somalis to have exclusive use of their own coastline. Somalis

frequently allege that the EUNAVFOR mandate is not remotely concerned with the

protection of Somalis, the Somali coastline or the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone. In that

sense, operation Atalanta, is perceived as yet another hostile foreign military force.

6.5 Whilst EUNVAFOR publicly purports that its operational mandate includes to “monitor

fishing”, a cursory glance at the stated legal basis for any of the published Council decisions

on Somali piracy, discloses that infact there is little if any formal commitment to protecting

or monitoring fishing in Somali waters, in the official decisions and documents of the EU, and

there is even less practical operational commitment. In his evidence before the Committee

Nick Harvey Minister for armed forces5, to his credit stated a more accurate view of the

mandate of operation Atalanta without reference to protection of Somali fisheries and other

natural resources.

6.6 This is problematic inasmuch as EU council decisions in relation to combating piracy,

were promulgated to reflect UN Security Council Resolutions which clearly include the

requirement of protecting Somalia’s rights with respect to offshore natural resources,

including fisheries, in accordance with international law”.6

6.7 The role of operation Atalanta and how it is perceived by Somalis, needs to be

understood in this context.

5 At Question Number 70: Evidence of Nick Harvey MP and Captain Reindorp RN Evidence Session No. 3. Questions 64 -

108 Thursday 14 June 2012 Heard in Public. (Combating Somali Piracy: The EU's Naval Operation Atalanta - Follow-Up

Report)

6 Contained in Resolution 1851 (2008) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6046th meeting, on 16 December 2008


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6.8 The reality that EUNAVFOR in fact works diligently to keeping illegal trawlers away from

Somali waters, is lost in translation, amidst the cacophony of mutual condemnation and

recriminations around declaration of a Somali EEZ.

6.9 To the extent that the EUCAP NESTOR Programme will make a difference, remains to

be seen. The funds earmarked for coastal enforcement really do need to be reviewed and

supplemented with significant development assistance. It is also essential that EUCAP

NESTOR, in building regional capacity, ensures that Somali lawyers (of whom there are many

in the diaspora), are engaged in the development of the developing regional legal

architecture, in terms of both criminal, public and private law. Indeed this should be

fundamental to the mandate of this new mission.

7. COHERENCE OF THE EU RESPONSE

7.1 The absence of a Somali EEZ undermines operation Atalanta’s legal capacity to prevent

illegal fishing, and this is itself a matter of real concern. Particularly given that the EU and

other naval mission off Somalia take their authority partially from UN Security Council

Resolutions, which require states to suppress illegal fishing.

7.2 It is respectfully suggested that the Committee should as part of its recommendations

call for a declaration of a Somali Exclusive Economic Zone, taking full account of Somali’s

historic claims and sensitivities in this regard, and an amendment to the present mandate to

task EUNAVOR with actively protecting the waters they patrol from illegal fishermen and

those transporting toxic material through the Somali littoral. Making public, the monitoring

of illegal fishing since the inception of the EUNAVOR mission, and communicating the

benefits to Somali communities, is essential in undermining the currency of the piracy

business model.

7.3 The hijacking incident involving the MV Leopard, and the cargo aboard that vessel when

it was hijacked, again points to the implausibly permissive mandate of EUNAVFOR. This

vessel has along history of allegedly transporting highly toxic waste in and near Somali

waters. It is also allegedly used to transport weapons in the region. Other similar vessels

hijacked including the Ukrainian vessel MV Faina have seen Somali pirates offloading high

caliber ammunition including depleted uraniums rounds.


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7.4 The international community has yet to act on the concerns raised regarding toxic

dumping and dangerous cargoes, or in fact remained silent on why such cargoes are allowed

to sail in or near Somali waters, given the evident risks from piracy and terrorism. The

EUNavfor mandate should include observance of the Basel Convention on the Control of

Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. Of course the lack of

ratification of these instruments by an incompetent TFG means that this remains a

substantial lacunae in regional coastal protection regimes. This however, should not deprive

Somalis of the protection of such instruments.

7.5 Capacitating Somali diaspora organisations and local NGOs to sensitise the national

authorities, could accelerate TFG accession to the relevant treaties and regional instruments

7.6 Exit strategies for Operation Atalanta, are however very much dependant on the success

of land based solutions which to date have not been articulated. The committee asked

prescient questions in relation to exit strategies. Despite the talk of exit strategies, these

strategies are hostage to mismanagement of the transitional processes by the international

community and TFG politicians in particular, and the continuation of the current remote

control engagement with Somalia, will not yield the mandated results desired by the

international community.

7.7 The reason why coastal communities continue to have little option but to tacitly support

piracy in their regions, was presciently summarised in the evidence of Alexander Rondos in

support of accelerating stabilisation initiatives to all regions; as follows:

"Now, I believe that in the next year this is the strategic challenge in Somalia.But we

also have to be very imaginative and also widen the angle of the geographic lens. We

should not simply be talking about the stabilisation of areas, if you will, retrieved from

Shabaab control. It is the stabilisation of the entire country, including the coastal

areas”.


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What does stabilisation mean? Having a modicum of decent Government. You are not

shooting each other and you are part of a decent economy, or an economy that is

functioning That is why extending the notion of stabilisation and investing in

coastal areas becomes an absolute key in offering an alternative incentive to

communities for whom, in most instances, and clearly now, reluctantly feel they need

to allow or tolerate piracy to operate from near their communities areas becomes an

absolute key in offering an alternative incentive to communities for whom, in most

instances, and clearly now, reluctantly feel they need to allow or tolerate piracy to

operate from near their communities”. 7

7.8 Ultimately the main diaspora concern regarding the relationship between EUNAVOR

and the EU strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, is a fundamental concern regarding

the lack of coherence between the two.

7.9 EUNAVFOR exit strategies for 2014 are entirely dependent on the EU development

programme and wider security sector and political reform, actually reaching the Somali coast

line most affected by piracy. External support from diaspora experts may contribute critically

to enhancing strategic coherence in aligning EUNAVFOR & EU CAP Nestor, objectives and

development priorities.

7.10 Mr Rondos in his evidence to the committee identified a failure of intellect and political

will which makes renders nugatory the idea that coastal themselves communities are part of

the solution. The Council of Somalia Organisations on behalf of coastal communities rasies

the following question, which should it is suggested, become a central theme of this

committees questions to policy makers at the EU level.

If pacification and stabilisation of the Somali coastline is the most decisive mean of ending

piracy, where is the investment in those communities?

Can we genuinely achieve stabilisation with 70 rounds of sniper fire from a helicopter a mile

offshore? This has prescient echoes of the words of Ghandi, who remarked.

7 response to s question from Q179 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Combating Somali Piracy: The EU'S Naval Operation Atalanta -

Follow-Up Report Evidence Session No. 5. Heard in Public. Questions 176 - 234 Thursday 21 June 2012


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“One cannot shake hands with a clenched fist.”

Why is it easier to shoot at Somalis rather than to talk to them?

7.11 It is most important that the committee is not left with the erroneous impression that

the 17 seconds attack on Haradehere remotely effected the calculations of battle hardened

leaders of pirate groups. The attack was greeted with incredulity, and the action was

understood to have been intended for domestic political consumption, rather than as a

serious message to pirate groups.

7.12 In fact the message received by pirates was that EUNAVOR is not serious about

meaningful measures, but must appear to be more robust to placate the jingoistic demands

from some quarters of the international media eager for a show of force against an enemy

whose threat is largely a construct of the same media.

7.13 The Council of Somali Organisations, has been asked to extend an invitation to the

honourable chair of the committee and (members thereof), as well as to the commanding

officers of operation Atalanta, to visit Haradhere. The invitation is proffered by one, Mr.

Bahdon, a British national, the regional governor in which Haradhere, was the scene of the

attack, for a dialogue with him and local people.

7.14 Coastal communities have not been silent or passive in relation to the security

challenges which they face. They have persistently lobbied donors for small scale support to

help them develop local mobile marine cadres to patrol their local coastline and also provide

a security presence to deter Alshabab activity in the hinterland in South-central. Kidnapped

seafarers, and Alshabaab bases are located around the South Central coastline and its

hinterland. Without the training, equipment and tools to challenge extremely well financed

pirates and terrorists, coastal communities are forced into an uneasy pact with both sets of

criminals, not of choice but out of the need for self preservation.

8. REGIONAL CAPACITY & EXIT STRATEGIES


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8.1 The current menu of options within the contemplation of the International Community

for land based solutions to piracy, include the following:

Amisom Forces clearing coastal areas. This is entirely unrealistic given the size of their

deployment and the fact that it has taken Amisom several years to begin to move beyond

Mogadisho. At the current rate of travel Amisom cannot realistically be expected to

extend security to coastal regions.

Deployment of Somali Army Units to coastal regions, providing a counter piracy and

counter terrorism function.

8.2 Establishment of Police, criminal justice and coastal enforcement capacity under the

command of local administrations (and ideally part of a unified force structure integrated

into the nascent Somali national Army/ Defence Force) in coastal regions.

8.3 A sober assessment of the timeframe in which any of the above outcomes is likely to be

achieved, would render the "exit strategy" suggested in previous evidence before the

committee (most notably Capt. Reindorp and Nick Harvey) to be most optimistic. The pace

of travel indicates that the EU and other missions will need to be extended well beyond

2014 and potentially extended twice more.

8.4 Despite two large scale missions to train up a national army led by the Americans and

the EU Training Mission, some of 5-7,000 Somalis have been trained since 2008, the extent

to which any or all of these have been deployed is questionable.

8.5 What is certain however, is that the numbers are not close to being sufficient to address

the wide range of security challenges Somalia faces.

8.6 The pace of training and deployment is too slow, to meet the needs of the international

community for a secured Somali coastline and amelioration of the transnational threats

posed by Somali pirates and extremist groups and clan based militias.


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8.7 This will substantially limit the ability of Somalis, HMG and EU to backfill and stabilise

areas liberated by AMISOM. At the current rate of training and deployment of the Somali

National Army, it is fanciful to presume that the operation Atalanta mission can be

completed by 2014. The true duration of this level of deployment may realistically be closer

to 2018.

8.8 The pace of security reform means that there will be continue to be no reliable security

presence in South Central Somalia for some years to come. Local coastal communities will

continue to be starved of development assistance, all of which will continue to fuel local

support for piracy as legitimate economic activity, indeed, it is the only economic activity for

many.

8.9 The answer here is to give support to the regional administrations located South of

Puntland. In particular Gulhiraan and Haradhere as well as Galmudug. They are best placed

to confront pirates onshore, and to police their coastlines, and to help free the large number

of hostages held within those two specific regions. These include abducted seafarers from

the developing world as well as Danes, South Koreans, Indians, and Seychellois nationals.

8.10 Presently the political leadership of those regions have no means or ability to confront

pirates other than through moral arguments which cut little ice.

8.11 It cannot be beyond the wit of the international community to deliver security training

to develop local police and paramilitary forces, including delivery through contracting with

the private sector, to source reputable security training and equipment.

8.12 If states are unable or unwilling themselves to supply security support to coastal

communities, then there is a moral obligation not to get in the way. The current Security

Council embargo on weapons into Somalia is dangerously misguided, inasmuch as it conflates

the provision of training with, even if conducted by reputable and licensed.

8.13 Perversely he embargo does not remotely affect the ability of pirates and terrorists to

obtain new weapons. It does however, restrict the legitimate legal authorities’ from

procurement for the purpose of civil defence of their communities from pirates and


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terrorists. This constitutes part of the perverse incentives which underwrite the piracy

model, which is not properly articulated and hence receives little attention.

8.14 Whilst the international donor communities maintains its risk averse stance, coastal

communities bear the brunt of those very risks.

8.15 The resources dedicated funding talks about counter piracy and an astonishing array of

counter piracy meetings and conferences, could be better utilised in implementing the land

based solutions that promoted as the silver bullet that will end piracy.

8.16 Properly trained, incentivised and with the support of local clan and political elders,

pirate base could be occupied overnight, creating space for emergency employment schemes

and infrastructure development to create fisheries businesses to draw young people away

towards vocational training and away from piracy.

9. HOSTIS OMNIUM HUMANIS GENERIS - UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS:

UNFAIR & UNSAFE PIRACY PROSECUTIONS

9.1 Diaspora perspectives on the conduct of piracy trials, is informed by a desire to secure

enhanced appreciation of human rights and the rule of law in Somalia, and the region as a

whole, thus echoing the requirement set out in Security Council Resolutions on the matter

that seizure, detention limits, transfer, prosecution and incarceration of suspected pirates is

consistent with applicable international law including human rights law.

9.2 Present arrangements for prosecuting pirates have been conceived in a febrile political

atmosphere in which immediate solutions were demanded to the problems of capture and

release, he process in which naval forces released most of those detained for suspected of

piracy.

9.3 Capture and release frustrating as it appeared, was often premised on a sound

assessment of the legal circumstances of detention, as many of these incidents were

occurring within Somalia’s 12 nm territorial waters.


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9.4 However, piracy as an offence in international law, in accordance with UNCLOS Article8

can only occur on the high seas, which includes the 200 nm exclusive economic zone), and

by definition not in territorial waters. Prosecution for alleged acts of piracy within territorial

waters are legally problematic. Offences within territorial waters constitute acts of robbery,

and are therefore to be disposed of domestically within the Somali penal code.

9.5 By corollary, the legality of prosecutions of alleged pirates, by third parties (eg Kenya &

Seychelles) and subsequent transfer and incarceration by fourth parties (Somaliland and

Puntland), is a questionable practice, and a significant violation of UNCLOS. Article 1059

which requires that the arresting states own courts to prosecute.

9.6 The regional prosecutorial circus in relation to piracy, from a Somali perspective, is no

more than a fig leaf, to spare the blushes of states contributing naval forces to operation

Atalanta and related naval operations.

9.7 EU states have been reluctant to undertake piracy prosecutions, for good reason

reasons. Amongst the reasons not stated publicly is the strong likelihood that many of those

prosecutions would infact collapse or otherwise not succeed either at first instance or on

appeal, given the circumstance in which alleged pirates are arrested, and difficulties with

identification and forensic evidence.

9.8 The acquittal in June 2012, in Paris of two alleged pirates in relation to the French vessel

Le Ponant in 2008. After four years of pre trial detention, two were acquitted, and four

sentenced to between 4 and years10.

9.9 One of the reasons for the length of pre trial detention, was the fact that France did not

have in place a law criminalising piracy, and was reliant on a legally obsolete penal instrument

of 1825, until one was promulgated in 7th January 2012

8 UNCLOS Article 101(a)(1),

9 UNCLOS Article 105 : The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the

penalties to be imposed,

10 substantially less than 15 years sentences demanded by prosecutors.


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9.10 The Somali perspective here is to question the legal and moral legitimacy and

indeed the utility of prosecuting Somali children before EU courts (as has happened in

Germany)11 with 4 defendants under the age of 18, and some as

young as 13 years old.

9.11 This is a very important human rights issue, one which policy makers at all levels

including within the UN institutions charged with holding up the universal declaration of

human rights, in all UN operations, should be cautious of.

9.12 In response to an issue raised by Baroness Eccles of Moulton,12 the committee may be

interested in enquiring further into the demographic profile of those detained and convicted

for piracy. Many are minors and more still are former child soldiers, presaged into the

service of pirate groups, and otherwise coerced by poverty to join pirate groups.

9.13 Whilst Some provisions of international law include Article 40 of the UN Convention

on the Rights of the Child, envisages prosecution of minors, this is solely restricted and

qualified by the requirement for an objectively fair procedure is adopted which takes

cognizance of the specific vulnerabilities of young people in the penal system.

9.14 It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution of Somali minors in the context of

regional prosecutions in third countries, does not meet the standard set out in the UN

Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Current trial procedures in the conduct of piracy trials, give rise to legitimate and grave

concerns about the fairness of piracy prosecutions. It is unfortunate that alleged Somali

pirates are conceived & spoken of by the international community as if they were enemy

combatants in a conflict. This has lead to a policy approach, which abandons the principle of

universal human rights in favour of “a good enough approach.”

11 Regarding the hijacking of the German vessel The MV Taipan, April 5, 2010.

12 At question 193. Combating Somali Piracy: The EU's Naval Operation Atalanta - Follow-Up Report Evidence Session No.

5. Heard in Public. Questions 176 – 234, Thursday 21 June 2012

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9.15 This approach essentially holds, that alleged Somali pirates should not expect to be

treated any better than say Kenyan nationals in the Kenyan judicial & penal system, and that

accordingly it would create an invidious situation if Somalis tried in Kenya are accorded

treatment consistent with their universal rights, when Kenyan nationals may not be accorded

access to basic human rights.

9.16 This approach is in the UN-led arrangements made for the prosecution of alleged

Somali pirates taking place in Mombassa Kenya and other jurisdictions.

9.17 The practical implications of this approach, is a conviction rate approaching 95 %, and

virtually no meaningful right of appeal. There have been virtually no appeals on challenging

either the conviction or length of sentence. These statistical outcomes point to

prosecutorial bias and inherently unfair nature of the proceedings, and unsafe convictions

generated.

9.18 It is highly likely that many of the states whose navies originally conducted the arrest

and detentions, may find themselves liable to civil proceedings to recover damages for

unlawful detention and transfer, often of children for prosecution and incarceration by third

parties.

10. EQUALITY OF ARMS

The committee would do well to enquire in more detail as to the conduct of proceedings. In

particular the extent to which those detained EU naval forces are deprived of the procedural

and legal protections offered by the ECHR, in terms of the right to challenge and call witness

evidence13 the right to adequate time and facilities14 and the right to legal assistance15

10.1 Example

13 Article 6(3)(d),

14 Article 6(3)(b)

15 Article 6(3)(c).


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A Somali teenager is arrested on a fishing vessel interdicted by an EU naval vessel, whilst

adrift in the sea. He is with 11 others and the vessel has several rusty AK47 rifles on board.

From the moment of arrest the provisions of the ECHR as confirmed in the Medvedyev,16

ruling is that once a state expresses its jurisdiction by detaining alleged pirates, the detention time

limits of that state and the procedural requirements of the ECHR are immediately engaged,

and crucial protections in theory activated. This was confirmed by the Whilst some nations

(most notably the Danish & German naval forces) have recognised this problem and begun

to deploy judicial authorities onboard their warships) this is by no means universal, patrolling

the Somali coast).

Following detention on a warship which may last several weeks (and in many instances this

may be for several months), the teenager is transferred to Kenya for trial, where he may

detained for many more months before a trial begins.

10.2 His lawyer who does not speak Somali and works through interpreters cannot

undertake any investigation of child’s background. He has no facilities to take witness

statements from the child’s family members or character references.

10.3 On the other hand the prosecutions, has access to forensic laboratories, video suites to

enable naval officers on warships to give evidence, prosecutors who have been given

specialised training around piracy law, and access to a network prosecutors working on

similar cases.

10.4 The child, does not access to independent legal advice and representation. This selected

for him by the same UN agencies which have ensured that the prosecuting authorities have

sufficient resources and tools at their disposal.

10.5 The conduct of these trials do not meet UN standards, and would not be acceptable in

trials held outside of the region. Moreover in relation to children, these trials do not meet

16Medvedyev v France (Application no. 3394/03), In the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Grand Chamber Medvedyev v

France (Application no. 3394/03),

http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=medvedyev&sessionid=51342479&skin=hudoc-en




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the requirements of the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of

their Liberty.17

In the circumstances, the notion that the conduct of piracy trials in the region are fair trials,

is far from the reality of the situation. They may be considered fair in the context of local

Kenyan standards. However, the transfer of Somalis to a third party jurisdiction under the

authority of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, requires that these cases are

prosecuted in compliance with international human rights standards. Accordingly, the

present arrangements constitute no more than, a veneer of legal respectability to be

reported to national parliaments and at international conferences.

10.6 The statistical outcomes in terms of conviction rates approaching 100 % with no

appeals submitted however, disclose a more accurate picture which undermines the

credibility of current regional prosecutions from the perspective of human rights.

10.7 Far from strengthening the rule of law in the region, the way that the international

community through the UN have chosen to conduct these trials is likely to have a

deleterious impact on the rule of law across the region, with significant implications for

judicial practice relating to the conduct of fair trials and human rights.

10.8 The Council of Somali Organisations, condemns this approach as being wholly

inconsistent with the application of universal human rights, and such practices undermine do

not meet the specific requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions.

11. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

11.1 The status of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) covering some 3,330 kilometres is in

many ways the elephant in the room for Somalis universally. The issue complex as it is can

be summarised as a fundamental difference of opinion.

11.2

A. Somalia has an EEZ which has been flagrantly exploited by international fleets since 1988,

although the Govt of the Barre regime collapsed in 1991, had effectively lost control of many

17 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/113of 14 December 1990


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regions by the late 1980s.

B. In policy circles the oft stated position is that Somalia may have enjoyed a de facto EEZ,

and issued licenses under a national law. To the extent that this does not accord with the

requirements of UNCLOS, and that an EEZ may need to be registered but does not

presently subsist.

Somalis as a whole are extremely wary of accepting any outcome which could it is argued be

used to legitimate the rampant theft and depletion of Somalia's natural marine resources by

the international community.

It is important for HMG, and the EUs naval and political operations to

appreciate the visceral nature of Somalis commitment to protect scarce resources.

11.3 The socio economic, political and security ramifications of failing to prevent the large

foreign EU and Asian trawler fleets operating illegally and with impunity across Somali and

indeed other vulnerable African coastlines, is incalculable.

11.4 Despite the many factions, political, clan and regional rivalries, Somalis universally are

peculiarly ad idem on the historic existence of an EEZ across the entire Somali littoral.

Somalis hold that the right to freely and exclusively enjoy resources within their territory

including their EEZ is a fundamental right.

11.5 Moreover, Somalis argue that the fact that the Somali polity and the sovereign rights

attaching thereto have been in a prolonged fragile, does not legitimate international doubts

around the EEZ issue.

11.6 The discovery of significant hydro carbon reserves in blocks largely located within the

Somali EEZ, is already fuelling future tensions with Kenya, regarding potential adverse claims

in blocks straddling the waters of both countries.

11.7 Addressing the EEZ issue was a key aspect of the Kampala Roadmap & the Garowe

accords. This has not to date been progressed. Somali observers therefore deplore the lack


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of political commitment to manage the implementation of this aspect of the August 2012

transition.

11.8 Together with bitter opposition to the absence of democratic process and Somali

ownership of the draft constitution. Somalis cite the EEZ issue as one in which Somali

political and economic rights will remain in a suspended state in ceaseless transitory state

subordinate to the will of regional and international actors, many with opaque vested

interests.

For EUNAVFOR and the international community, getting the messaging and

communications right on these issues is critically important. Understanding and cognizance

of the substantive views of Somalis, is therefore essential.

11. EU FISHERIES POLICY & ILLEGAL UNREGULATED & UNREPORTED

FISHING:

Fisheries resource within 200 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia have

been conservatively estimated to be capable of providing sustainable annual

catches of 200,000 tons.26 Because of the known substantial pelagic fish

resources, including tuna and mackerel species which have high unit values,

the long-term development of these resources could be of vast importance to

the economy and food security in the region.18

11.1 Whilst the relationship between IUUF and piracy off the Somali littoral is given at best a

cursory glance in policy circles, there is an undeniable nexus between the two.

11.2 Somalis rightly condemn the role of EU Common Fisheries Policy for promoting the

exploitation of fishing stocks outside EU waters (whilst stringent legal protection is in place

for the EUs own territorial waters). This concern extends to the particular United Nations

organs with oversight of IUUF, off the Somali coast in particular the regional fishery

18 UN Food and Agriculture Administration estimate of Somalia’s fisheries

(ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/document/fcp/en/FI_CP_SO.pdf.)

Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of Somali natural resources and waters

S/2011/661


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management agencies the IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) and the SWIOFC

(Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission).

11.3 A highly disturbing feature of the IUUF in Somalia, is the extent to which IUUF fleets

are funded as a matter of EU policy to exploit (illegally) fishing stocks outside EU waters. It is

unhelpful for policy makers to deny there is a problem here. EU officials have repeatedly

asserted to the author, that incidents of piracy have driven off illegal fishermen. The fact that

many of the vessels captured in and just off the Somali EEZ, are in fact illegal trawlers from

the EU, Korea, Thailand, China & UAE. This leads to unfavourable perceptions amongst

Somalis who allege that from the very states who supply vessels to protect their illegal

fishing fleets.

11.4 The story of the Spanish trawler the Alkrana, is a salient example of how EU policy may

have contributed to IUUF the Somali coastline. The owners of the Alkrana are alleged to

have received some 4,272,960Euros towards the cost of the vessel, on the contractual

understanding that this vessel would not be used in EU waters.

11.5 This policy is extremely problematic, from both a political and legal perspective. It

leaves the EU seriously exposed to substantial risks of litigation in the context of IUUF and

environmental law.

11.6 Many of the vessels funded by the EU, are classed as bottom trawlers, which employ

the most environmentally unsustainable methods of fishing. These methods have increased

significantly the economic losses suffered by Somali coastal communities, and this is

compounded by the loss of nutritional staples that should be for the sole benefit of the

poorest communities in the world. This constitutes a grave violation of the human rights and

economic rights of all Somalis.

11.7 From a Somali perspective the fact that the five contact Working groups are

chaired (possibly with the exception of WG 2) by states whose fleets are

implicated in unprecedented levels of theft, fraud and large scale financial

laundering of illicit funds (because this is what IUUF entails at its raison d'être)


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12. COMPARATIVE VALUE E OF ILLICIT FLOWS - K&R v IUUF

12.1 As a brief aside in relation to the of tracking illicit finances. The efforts of the

international community to track and trace the illicit proceeds of ransom

payments, is in many ways intellectually flawed. Illegal fishing conducted

under the noses of Operation Atalanta commanders, can see large freezer

trawler generate illegal catch, and launder approx USD 500K to USD 2 million per month.

Well over a thousand illegal trawlers regularly fish in the Somali EEZ and within its territorial

waters.

12.2 The international community needs to review its silence on the conduct and proceeds

legal unregulated and undeclared fishing in Somali waters, and the impact

that this has in regional and global security. The focus on K&R suppresses

prevalence of billions of dollars of illicit funds generated by trans national commercial and

criminal networks. Many like the Spanish illegal trawler Alkrana

are specifically funded by EU tax payers subsidies.

12.3 In this context operation Atalanta is perceived (wholly unfairly one would add) by

Somalis to operate no differently to the role of the Royal Navy in protecting heroin suppliers

in the Opium wars of the 18th Century.

13. DIASPORA SOLUTIONS

13.1 The Council of Somali Organisations, urges HMG, the EU and the international

community to ensure that the following measures are secured within the transitional period.

SOLUTIONS 1 : Please refer to attached Appendix 1 Briefing Note Fishing for

Peace Ceeldarad Fishing Co. Ltd

SOLUTIONS 2 : Council of Somali Organisations Recommendations

immediate recognition of Somalia's historic Exclusive Economic Zone.


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A sensible interim measure would be to task EUNAVOR to increase surveillance and

interdiction of non Somali vessels operating in and around the EEZ area, especially during

peak fishing seasons for high value pelagic stocks, including the autumnal Tuna season.

To supply coastal patrols and coastal surveillance capability to regional administrations.

Undertaking joint patrols in South central Somalia. Policing coastal waters can be delivered

more efficiently and substantially lower operating costs. This would further enhance the rule

of law by developing a nascent coastguard function for both the TFG and the various local

and regional authorities which will arise following the 20th August 2012 transition date on

South Central.

Giving authority to regional administrations in partnership with donors to identify

opportunities to provide private sector led solutions to training of coastal flexible marine

cadres, to expedite the stabilisation of coastal communities in which pirates operate.

Regional authorities require, well trained, lightly armed and highly mobile cadres, supported

by sound human intelligence management would deliver the capacity to disrupt pirate action

groups on land. It would make it virtually impossible to bring or hide hostage seafarers

ashore with the impunity which pirates presently enjoy.

Regional Anti-Piracy Intelligence Co-ordination Centre:

Is it really necessary to build a separate operation in the Seychelles to gather evidence

against piracy kingpins?, whilst there are no funds for supporting policing of coastal

communities. This is an issue of mistaken priorities and an incoherent approach to tackling

the root causes of piracy. The root causes are not the payment of ransoms which are then

allegedly to be traced, but rather a lack of investment in policing of coastal communities on

land.

13.2 A substantial amount of the evidence necessary to support prosecutions of kingpins

already exists. Moreover AML regulations in most jurisdictions are sufficient to launch asset

seizure applications based on suspicion of illicit enrichment. The fact that Kenya where most


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of the piracy proceeds are laundered, has lax legal regimes and practices in respect of illicit

financial flows and financing of terrorism. Herein lies one of the biggest challenges to the

prospect of prosecuting alleged kingpins.

13.3 Whilst such prosecutions have been widely heralded, the reality on the ground is

altogether different. Despite the widely acknowledged involvement of officials in areas like

Puntland in piracy, it is to be noted that the ongoing rhetoric around illicit financial flows, are

beset by vast gaps in intelligence, and an inability to delineate and discriminate between

legitimate and illicit financial flows in the Somali commercial context. This explains to a large

degree why there have been few if any prosecutions in this area.

13.4 Again, to articulate the Somali perspective, the focus on illicit financial flows emanating

from Kidnap & Ransom payments, needs to be balanced by a focus on tracking the

substantially larger illicit finances of Illegal fishing fleets.

13.5 Picture the oft repeated scene if you will. Somali fishermen spotted by an IUUF vessel in

the same area, reporting pirate skiffs in action. The likelihood of being apprehended and

carted for trial in Kenya or the Seychelles on the basis of carrying Kalashnikovs is a very

prospect for Somali fishermen within their own EEZ or closer still on artisanal waters.

13.6 The point here is not to proffer the argument piracy arose from the fact that Somali

fishermen forced to take guns onboard tare compelled to

protect themselves from heavily armed fishing fleets from the EU and beyond.

13.7 It is more than the moral and ethical dimension that is missing from

Naval deployments to Somalia. The need to protect Somalis themselves from illegal fishing

and exploitation of resources.

13.8 Accelerate the proposed regional capacity. Re-establishing regional law

enforcement, judicial capacity and the rule of law as a paradigm of stable governance for

Somali coastal regions and beyond.


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Arrangements for the prosecution, defence & transfer of alleged pirates must

meet internationally acceptable standards as defined by the United Nations

Undersecretary for Legal Affairs. The British diaspora, has a key role to play in this regard, in

supplying UK trained Somali lawyers to assist the regional states and international agencies

to undertake more expedite prosecutions.

Widen the operational mandate of Operation Atalanta, CTF-150 & CTF-151 to

include surveillance, logging and interdiction of potentially illegal fisheries vessels

operating within the proximity of the EEZ. This must mandate protocols for Supplying such

data to prosecuting authorities, competent local and regional enforcement authorities, and

Somali civil society organisations, to pursue civil actions on behalf of victims.

Maritime War risks insurance industry to contribute more substantially to UN

Piracy Trust Fund, from the windfall profits of piracy premiums, to strengthen policing,

law enforcement legal and judicial capacity in coastal communities.

The British diaspora, is a principle stakeholder, in the success of the transitional

arrangements. More efforts must be made by HMG, the UN and state and non

state actors to scale up the capacity of the Anglo Somali diaspora, to find a

meaningful role (at observer status) in substantive discussions pertinent Anglo Somali

diasporas. Challenging as this may seem, it is not beyond our collective wit.

The Council of Somali Organisations stands ready to assist, utilising its best offices, efforts

and endeavours to progressively support the Somali people, HMG and the international

community.

Appendix 1

BRIEFING NOTE

FISHING FOR PEACE

CEELDARAD FISHING CO. LTD

This briefing note has been prepared for the attention of the FCO Maritime and Security

Team, Directorate for Defence and International Security, to address a number of questions

put forward by the department regarding the Ceeldarad Fishing Co. Ltd,. These are as follows;


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UNDER WHAT ORGANISATION IS THIS BEING RUN? I HAD THE

IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS NOT A COUNCIL OF SOMALI

ORGANISATIONS INITIATIVE PER SE.

Ceeldarad Fishing Co. Ltd19, is purely a private sector initiative, which the Council of Somali

Organisations is supporting. Having been approached for advice and assistance with the

initiative, I have offered legal advice and guidance to the directors in dealing with suppliers

and customers in the UK and overseas, eg developing standard terms of business and other

contractual documents.

I WAS IMPRESSED TO SEE THAT SUCH LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY

HAD ALREADY BEEN INVESTED. COULD YOU SAY FROM WHERE THE

FUNDS ORIGINATED?

In short the sources of funding emanate from the personal savings of the investors (there are

presently 10 shareholders who have invested funds in the initiative. A fair slice of the funding

consists of contributions in kind. The investors have contributed over two years of their

professional time to get the business off the ground, the financial value of this contribution is

included in the overall investment made.

For example land purchased for the business in Berbera and offices in Hargeisa, has also

appreciated in value. Some of the funds were raised using traditional pooled savings

mechanisms including the “Hagbad”. This is an indigenous financial savings, investments and

loans instrument, offering a facility to raise interest free capital funds based on a strong

model of Trust and organised along close kinship lines to mitigate risks.

However of the total sums invested approximately some $300k to $400k constituted liquid

funds, required to fund the purchase of capital equipment, and logistical expenses.

The absence of formal banking arrangements in Somaliland remains a challenge, and the bulk

of capital investment, particularly in equipment (commissioning a new trawler, and

19 Ceeldaraad, (Pronounced in English with a silent C) translates into Somali as “Born/Out of Frustration”


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refrigerated vans and lorries, generators for Ice making plant etc was conducted via credit

swaps through Hawalas in Somaliland and Dubai), enabling the procurement of material

required for the business.

HOW IS THE FUNDING AUDITED? ARE THERE ANY FINANCIAL

DOCUMENTS THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO SHARE WITH US?

In terms of auditing, I have instructed an accountant on behalf of the company, to support

the directors in establishing the necessary processes to facilitate a proper audit at the

appropriate stage of the statutory financial reporting cycle.

I have no instructions at present to disclose any confidential information regarding the

business. If however you could explain the rationale for this, who would see the information

(I have a reasonable idea but would need this further clarified for the benefit of the

directors).

I have advised the directors on a number of regulatory matters including the importance of

establishing robust AML and related controls assurance measures. I have assisted them with

respect to securing compliance with FATF requirements, and this has resulted in a board

decision to formally register the business in the UK, to enhance the transparency of the

business. Accordingly, I have helped set up a UK based company as a vehicle to ensure that

financial flows generated through the business are subject to UK auditing and standard

accounting practice. This is part of a series of measures which are being implemented to

ensure compliance with UK legislative requirements and best practice in terms of financial

probity.

DO YOU HAVE RECORDS OF THE OUTCOMES OF THE TRAINING YOU

OFFER? IS THERE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THE IMPACT OF THE WORK AT

ALL? I CERTAINLY DON’T DOUBT THAT SUCH TRAINING HAS THE

POTENTIAL TO BE VERY USEFUL, BUT IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO

SEE THE WAYS IN WHICH IT IS HAVING AN IMPACT. ALTERNATIVELY IF

I DIDN’T UNDERSTAND FULLY AND THE TRAINING IS STILL IN A

PLANNING STAGE, THEN IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A BETTER

IDEA OF HOW YOU ENVISAGE THIS WORKING.


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The training is very much at a nascent stage, and formal evaluation of the outcomes built into

the process if resources permit. The impact of the training will it is expected inspire practical

change in behavioural norms, which will undermine the recruitment of young people into

piracy. However advanced discussions have taken place with the political leadership and

security officials of Galmudug and Gul Hiraan & Haradhere. Whilst almost all of the principle

ports used by the most active pirates action groups are based in these two administrative

districts which are aspiring mini political states in the Somali transitional process.

Initial mapping of vocational training on the coastline (virtually non existent) led to

discussions including extensive dialogue with civil society organisations active across the

whole of the former Somali Republic, including Somaliland.

The Council of Somali Organisations has been asked to facilitate this dialogue. Accordingly

with directors of the company, visits have been made in 2011 & 2012 to Hargeisa, Nairobi,

Mombassa, Arusha, Addis Abbaba, Djibouti and Mogadisho.

Between March 2012 & May 2012, the Council of Somali Organisations specifically visited

detention facilities & courts in Mombassa and held discussions with both the ILO (Paul

Crook Chief Technical Adviser) and on how they can contribute to training provision and

emergency employment and vocational training initiatives in the regions most affected by

piracy). Further discussions of a similar nature took place in Addis Abbaba with Somaliland,

EU and IGAD security sector officials.

The CSO, also meet the East Africa UNDOC Special Representative Ms. Loide Lungameni

and other senior UNDOC officials vis the role of diaspora led initiatives in this area. In terms of

rehabilitation of convicted pirates and the standard patent unfairness of many piracy trial

procedures, meant that discussions with UNADOC were broadly speaking a wholly unedifying

experience.

I have through the CSO mobilised a network of contacts, and thereby assisted the directors of

Ceeldarad Fishing Co. Ltd, by identifying credible and effective NGO partners on the ground who are

interested in supporting this initiative. This has enabled the company to establish dialogue and

partnerships. Some of those groups are as follows.


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The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention which operates across the Somali region

http://www.somalipeacebuilding.org/.

I have also assisted the directors in negotiations with a Somalifairfishing.com, a Danish NGO. This

culminated in a fact finding visit to Hargeisa and Berbera, and current offers of technical and

possibly financial support for the initiative. The Council of Somali Organisations has also put the

directors of Ceeldaraad Fishing Company Ltd, in touch with a youth led civil society organisation

(which are members of the CSO) who may be amongst the first beneficiaries of the proposed

training.

The group called Ururrka Baadbadinta Xeebha (an NGO formed in the principle Pirate ports, by

young Somalis opposed to piracy and actively involved in supplying food, medicine, intercession and

pastoral support to those kidnapped by pirates and held in the region. This is a largely unheralded

initiative taking place in a dangerous environment and inspired by the revulsion of coastal

communities regarding piracy and hostage taking in particular.

HOW DO YOU ENVISAGE THIS WORKING

To fully appreciate the context of this initiative, it is necessary to take a dual view of the

proposed values & benefits which inform this approach.

BENEFITS:

1. Alternate livelihoods to undermine the piracy business model

In specific terms , the beneficiaries will be those who undertake such vocational training, and

are able to put into practice in terms of developing alternate livelihoods

2. INSPIRATIONAL (undermining the piracy business model)

One of the three fundamental precepts for the work of the Council of Somali Organisations

(Inspire – Represent - Integrate) is the need to inspire behavioural change in key areas.

Accordingly the greatest single contribution that this initiative can make will be to inspire

Somali coastal communities to replicate success. This is an incredibly powerful tool for

driving social and political change in Somalia. The propensity for commercial imitation is a

http://www.somalipeacebuilding.org/


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strong driver of Somali entrepreneurship. Initiatives which can be seen to work are very

quickly imitated, and this to some degree explains the preponderance of Remittance and

Telecoms businesses across all Somali diasporas.

Fundamentally, this initiative has significant potential to be replicated across the entire Somali

littoral, from Djibouti, & Berbera in Somaliland to Kismayo in South Central and all ports in

between.

PROPOSED CONTENTS OF TRAINING

SHORE BASED TRAINING

- Emergency Vocational Training: Identifying and working with the coastal communities whose

young people are most vulnerable to being seduced by & inducted into the Piracy Business

Model. This will involve establishing some home truths /dispelling myths about the fortunes

of piracy. This would include some tuition around the numbers drowned and missing at say

and those killed by other pirates and international forces, as well as the numbers facing long

sentences in foreign and local penal institutions. Addressing the cultural religious, ethical and

legal implications of piracy would also be delivered by and with local elders and rehabilitated

pirates.

- Understanding of the alternate, safer and lucrative opportunities available in artisanal and

commercial fishing. Including some of the financial facts and figures to assist comparison of

- risks to rewards and thus undermining the piracy business model, by promoting viable and

objectively verifiable next best alternative livelihoods.

MARITIME TRAINING

Vocational training around technical aspects of fishing and fish processing techniques,

consideration of packaging, sales and marketing of produce. Developing local cooperatives to

pool local resources to purchase necessary equipment to develop onshore and coastal

aquaculture and to repair existing vessels.


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How would you envisage rolling out further help to re-habilitate convicted pirates? / How

might you see this being implemented in different countries? / What is your expected

outcome of this, especially in relation to pirates who are convicted for a number of years in

third countries.

Convicted pirates are a specific target group for rehabilitation. I have had initial discussions

with the Somalialnd Counter Piracy Unit, and Ministers of Interior & Minister of Justice (Mr.

Mahamoud Araleh, Hussein Aideed), as well as Prof. Muhydin of the TFG Counter Piracy

Task Force, with a view to offering rehabilitation support for pirates convicted therein.

The company with the assistance of the Council of Somali Organisations has also visited

Mombassa, to see rehabilitation workshops in furniture making which is currently offered to

some of those convicted in Kenya.

In terms of how this would work in different countries, Ceeldaraad Fishing Company

Ltd, would in partnership with those interested state parties (countries detaining

pirates), deliver programmes of training which will meet the specific needs and

capacity of that state.

Scaling up this initiative to cover other states would depend on the profitability of the

primary fisheries business.

Obviously the role of NSAs such as the UNDP and the various UN Trust Funds

pertinent to this area, as well as the EU and state actors has to date not resulted in

any work specific to this area.

The directors of Ceeldaraad Fishing Company Ltd, are infact delivering privately on

the issues which those institutions have committed themselves to publicly. The extent

of impact and progress the company is able to make in this regard is to contribute

vision, leadership and an innovative model for delivery.

I have also organised the attendance of a number of the directors, at the margins of a

Chatham House meeting on Illegal and Unregulated Fishing in February 2012. Contact


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was made, and informal discussions took place with a Lt Col Michael Rosette, Deputy

Chief Of Staff. Seychelles people’s defence forces / Commander of the Seychellois

Coast Guard with a view to discussions around rehabilitation. This was however very

much dependant on other states agreeing terms for the repatriating of convicted

pirates which was an issue at that point. Additional dialogue was also initiated with

the US National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration who lead on fisheries

matters on behalf of the US department of Commerce.

In terms of how I see this being rolled out. Clearly a series of agreements with detaining authorities

on the modalities around rehabilitation of pirates at various stages of the detention cycle would need

to be implemented at the appropriate stage. This would include

with the government of the Seychelles, Kenya, Mauritius and other detaining states including in the

EU, India, Oman & South Korea. It would be essential for convicted pirates to personally agree to

participate in such rehabilitation programmes.

Fishing for Peace v. Regional Capacity

As a private initiative, the shareholders are planning to invest some 10 % of profits into a corporate

citizenship programme, one element of which they have named “Fishing for Peace”. It is possible

that the insurance and shipping industry as well as interested state parties may be approached in

due course to sponsor the training and or to match fund the investment made by the company.

Despite the fact that this will in the medium term grow into a substantial financial commitment, it is

not possible or indeed appropriate for the shareholders to subsidise regional requirement for

sustained capacity support in respect to regeneration & rehabilitation of both coastal communities

and convicted pirates.

Fishing for Peace is a model for the peaceable regeneration of poor rural communities. It can provide

transformative inspirational leadership and direction to the local and international community with

respect to undermining the Somali Piracy model, and in developing more beneficial developmental

trajectories and narratives for the region.


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Having organised press releases and disseminated same, to a number of interested parties, including

UK & EU parliamentarians, it is likely that substantial media and press interest may be generated

by this initiative.

The Council of Somali Organisations is dealing with all such enquiries and related public affairs

matters. Some of these enquiries may ultimately come back to HMG with respect to requests for

comments from the relevant ministers. I hope that this note therefore serves as a bit of a heads up

for the FCO in this regard.

July 2012

Department for International Development – Oral evidence (QQ109 – 175)

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Department for International Development – Oral evidence (QQ109

– 175)



Members present



Baroness Eccles of Moulton


Baroness Henig

Lord Inge

Lord Jay of Ewelme

Lord Jopling

Lord Radice



________________


Nick Pickard, Head of Security Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Nick Kay,

Africa Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; and Rachel Turner, Director, East

and Central Africa, Department for International Development.

Q109 The Chairman: I am just going to welcome Mr Zahrani, who is from the Tanzanian

High Commission and who is sitting in. We are very pleased that you are able to join the

public session. If I can just go through the normal notices, this is a public session, and we will

be recording the session. There will be a transcript. We will give you a copy of that and that

will allow you to make any amendments where we have made factual errors. Perhaps just to

put some context into it, this is our second evidence session looking at Operation Atalanta,

but the broader EU reaction to the situation in the Horn of Africa generally. This is a short

report that we are doing, and this is the last of the verbal evidence sessions.


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Perhaps what I could ask you to do first of all is just to introduce yourselves for those that

do listen to the webcast at some point and then we will move into questions and go through

the issues. I think you are fairly aware of what we are going to ask. But perhaps if we could

go from left to right from where I am.

Nick Pickard: I am Nick Pickard. I head up the Security Policy Department in the Foreign

Office.

Nick Kay: I am Nick Kay. I am the director for Africa in the Foreign Office.

Rachel Turner: I am Rachel Turner. I am the director for East and Central Africa in DFID

since Monday.

Q110 The Chairman: We will particularly look to you, Rachel, for the answers with a

fresh mind. Perhaps I could start off and really get to the bottom of the history, if you like,

and ask you how well Operation Atalanta has performed in the last two years? What have

been the main achievements and what have been the problems in combating piracy? We will

go through that and then we can move on to some of the other issues that come out of that.

Nick Pickard: We think that the operation has been very successful. Let us just remember

that its original mandate was to protect World Food Programme shipping to allow it to

reach Somalia. It has escorted 159 World Food Programme ships successfully and 126

AMISOM ships have been escorted. So in terms of its core mandate it has been very

effective. None of those has been affected by piracy. It has also had a significant impact on

piracy itself. I think the Minister gave you some figures at the last session, but the figures are

that 47 ships were pirated in 2010 and 19 last year in 2011. This year––we are only half way

through the year––only five ships have been pirated in six months, which is a significant drop

on the levels we were at a couple of years ago.

The Gulf of Aden in particular, which is the main trade artery, of course, through which so

much of our trade goes, is largely secure. What is interesting to me is that unsuccessful


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attacks have also come down significantly. There were 101 unsuccessful attacks in 2011 and

only 25 so far this year. So pirates are not only not succeeding in their attacks but there are

actually fewer attacks as well.

I think the operation has been effective as well in the way in which it has worked with other

international partners, be that NATO, the coalition ships, and ships from a number of other

navies––China, Japan, India and others. The way in which those have worked as part of an

overarching security force has been very impressive. The way in which the operation has

been part of a broader comprehensive approach to try to tackle piracy has also been

impressive, with attempts to attack every part of the piracy business model.

Why has this happened? Part of it is as a result of the military presence, part of it is better

adherence to the best management practices by industry and part of it is the use of armed

guards on ships.

You asked about the problems, Lord Teverson, of combating piracy. I think the largest

problem is the size of the area. You could fit the entire continental Europe into the high-risk

area, and even if you had the whole world’s naval assets, it would be difficult to cover that

sort of territory adequately. The adaptability of the pirates has also been a problem. We

have seen their modus operandi change as we have attempted to confront it. And the

multifaceted approach: the fact that piracy has many different strands and we have got to try

to address them all. There are many different areas of the business model that we need to

attack.

This is not a problem as much as something to be proud of: but the standards that we

maintain also mean that we need to ensure, for example, that we collect sufficient evidence,

that we deal with pirates in a humane way, that the prisons and the prosecution systems are

all up to our standards, and that in itself has created a lot of work to ensure that we are able


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to do that. I am sure that unscrupulous operators would be able to deal with pirates in

different ways but we stand by the values that we need to abide by.

Q111 The Chairman: You mentioned as you went through the international effort and

how Atalanta and all the other partners and individual sovereign nations with navies have

worked together there. I just wonder whether you could give us a little bit of insight from

the Foreign Office’s point of view. It seems to me that in all the grief that there is in the

world and all the tensions this has been an area of enlightenment and international co-

operation that has worked very well. Does it have implications that spread out slightly from

the Indian Ocean in that area, or is just really something that has been useful, and when this

ends that will end?

Nick Pickard: That is a very interesting question. I think I would agree with you, Lord

Teverson, that this has been a very successful demonstration of international co-operation

through the various mechanisms, including the SHADE mechanism in Bahrain. I think we do

want to find a way of bottling that and making sure that we can use it in future. I think it has,

for example, opened the eyes of the Chinese and Indian navies as to how we can co-operate.

I think they arrived in the area expecting to do things on their own and they discovered

through experience that international co-operation was a much more effective way of

achieving it and they have been very open to that. I think the co-operation between the EU

and NATO, which I have discussed with this Committee many times in the past, has also

been very effective at the theatre level, and it is something that we need to build on.

Q112 The Chairman: Mr Kay, was there anything you wanted to add to that at all?

Nick Kay: No, no, not at all. I think as Nick says, it is an interesting question which we are

reflecting upon as we look at other theatres where there is a shared common international

interest that spans all our traditional and non-traditional partners.


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Q113 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: You mentioned the pirates and

operational change. There have been a couple of well-publicised examples of people being

snatched from countries rather than ships being taken. Is it a concern that this particular

tactic is going to be pursued more?

Nick Pickard: Yes, naturally the pirates are making a lot of money, or the kingpins behind it

are making a lot of money, so as we close down one route to them making money they are

clearly going to try to find other ways of making that money. That is a concern. We are

attacking it in two ways: first, by trying to provide alternative livelihoods for people in

Somalia, on which others no doubt can talk later, and secondly, through the RAPPICC, the

Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence Co-ordination Centre—I think I have the

acronym right—that we are setting up in the Seychelles, which is actually aiming to put

together evidence packages to get at the very kingpins, i.e. the key organised criminals to be

honest, who are making the most money.

Q114 Lord Radice: Is it the policy of HMG and obviously the European Union to rid the

Indian Ocean of pirates or merely to contain the piracy?

Nick Pickard: I have no doubt that their ultimate goal is to rid piracy, just as our ultimate

goal is to rid the country of organised crime. But that is clearly a very long term goal and,

therefore, we have to go about it in a way that allows us first to minimise it, and as the only

solution to eradicating it will be on land, and that is, as you know, a very long term goal. But

it is one that we hope to achieve eventually of course.

Q115 Lord Inge: From what you said, we identified certain capability gaps in the past. I

am talking about aerial surveillance, medical and more effective tankers to support the

operation. Are you saying that those capability gaps have been filled, or are you saying that

actually they are just operating more effectively?


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Nick Pickard: The capability gaps have by and large been filled. It has peaks and troughs as

different assets become available from different countries. But at the moment Atalanta has all

the maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft that it requires for its needs, and it has an

auxiliary oiler replenisher––a tanker used for refuelling––which I know was a concern of the

Committee in its previous report. There is now one available for the operation. I think there

is a short capability gap in Medical Role 2 facilities but that is going to be filled within the

next few weeks so as far as I am aware the operation commander is content with the—

Q116 Lord Inge: There are no other capability gaps that you think exist?

Nick Pickard: As far as I am aware the operation commander is content. He certainly has

not come calling, as the Minister said at his evidence session.

Q117 Lord Inge: Is the World Food Programme using more effective ships, if you like?

Nick Pickard: It is. It has chartered what they call a time charter vessel, which essentially

shuttles back and forth between the various ports. By using that vessel the EU has been able

to embark on autonomous vessel protection detachment which saves us from having to use

the frigates to escort that vessel alongside. So, yes, improved shipping is being used by the

World Food Programme.

Q118 Lord Inge: What about the attitude to the insurance agencies; for example, armed

guards and things like that? Has that changed, or is that just what it used to be?

Nick Pickard: We are encouraged by the efforts of the shipping and the insurance industries

to ensure that best management practice is maintained.

Q119 Lord Inge: What do you mean by best management practice?

Nick Pickard: There is a guide, quite a slim guide, produced, which is called Best

Management Practice, which is issued to all shipping companies and it guides them in taking

certain measures that reduce the risk from piracy; for example, by having higher sides to the

ships, by ensuring that they have citadels, manoeuvring in certain ways or using certain


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routes. All of those cost more so some of the less scrupulous companies are reluctant to

use them. But around 70% of ships use these self-protection measures and I think it goes up

to 92% when you talk about UK flagged shipping, which is a significant improvement and the

risks of piracy to those vessels is significantly reduced. Many fewer vessels taking the best

management practice are pirated.

Q120 The Chairman: Do you feel the insurance industry is being responsible? I think

you used the words “we are encouraged by the efforts” which strike me as FCO speak for

“we are mildly disappointed” probably, but I do not know. Tell me, because we were pretty

disappointed the last time we looked at this that, although they were paying out these big

amounts of money, they were 0.111% of their total gross revenue and frankly it was not

something worth worrying about.

Nick Pickard: We have work to continue to do. Certainly 70% is not 100% and we would

like to get it to 100%, but I think particularly the industry in London and elsewhere is making

significant efforts to combat this problem, which affects it of course significantly.

Q121 Lord Williams of Elvel: Do insurers still insure ransoms?

Nick Pickard: Yes.

Q122 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Just following up one point from Lord Inge, is it possible for

us to have a copy of the Best Management Practice guide? I would find it quite useful just to

look at it.

Nick Pickard: Certainly. We will provide it.

Q123 Lord Jay of Ewelme: I just wanted to ask a couple of questions about armed

guards. You said earlier on that the provision of armed guards is one of the factors that had

led to the reduction in the success of piracy. This is something we looked at when we

looked at this issue the first time around. What led the Government to move to a position

in which it would permit armed guards onto ships? You have described clear advantages


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from that. Are there any disadvantages as well which have come up as a result of that

decision? It clearly seems a right decision. We will stop there for the moment.

Nick Pickard: The Government decided to review its policy because it is important that we

keep our policies under review and we wanted to look at every possible way in which we

could try to reduce the threat of piracy. Essentially it was a risk evaluation case and we

decided that the evidence that demonstrated that armed guards on ships would significantly

reduce successful attacks was comprehensive and conclusive. The Department for Transport

led that review, working closely with industry and other Government departments. Since

then no ship that has had armed guards on it has been successfully pirated.

The evidence demonstrates, I think, that it has had a significant effect on the ability of piracy.

There certainly are risks and one of the reasons the Government originally did not support

this policy was the concern that either pirates would adapt their tactics to use more

violence to try to overcome the armed guards, and secondly, that there might be a risk,

therefore, to the ship crew or the ship or innocent parties as a result of that increasing

violence. It is also quite a complex legal area because many different jurisdictions apply when

you are on the high seas and so it is very difficult to determine exactly the impact, for

example, if such an incident were to occur.

But the evidence so far suggests that actually pirates have been sufficiently deterred by

armed guards so as to not attack or to try to use increased levels of violence. So we need

clearly to keep that under review but at the moment we are confident that that policy has

been welcomed and has been working.

I should note that the policy is that we should use private armed guards only in exceptional

circumstances and when it is lawful to do so. So it is for—

Q124 Lord Jay of Ewelme: What does that mean?

Nick Pickard: Well, for example, ships—


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Lord Jay of Ewelme: It is quite interesting what you have said so far, that the practical

advantages of this, which are clearly very considerable, outweigh the potential legal

difficulties when it comes to making a decision, which is a good commonsense and rather

British approach to legal difficulties that might arise. But what exactly do you mean when you

say it can be used only in exceptional circumstances and when it is legal to do so?

Nick Pickard: We mean within the high-risk area, for example: we are not suggesting that

ships all around the world should start having armed guards on them. And only ships of a

certain tonnage or above: we are not suggesting that leisure or passenger craft, should they

start using the high-risk area, have armed guards on to provide protection. So we are not

looking for a great increase in the number of weapons in the area; we are talking about

specific ships which are likely to be in a high-risk environment and need to use that area.

Q125 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: Presumably, conversely, all ships that have been

pirated recently, and the number is very low, did not have armed guards on them?

Nick Pickard: Correct.

Q126 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: We are not talking just about ships flying the UK

flag, are we? We are talking about all ships?

Nick Pickard: Yes, this is the total. There are only five ships - in the Indian Ocean - five

ships of any flags have been pirated.

Q127 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: So we are not the only people who have armed

guards on our ships?

Nick Pickard: Indeed, a number of countries have had armed guards on their ships for some

time. This was about changing Government policy with regard to UK-flagged ships.

Baroness Eccles of Moulton: Thank you.

The Chairman: I have a number of people who want to ask supplementaries on this. Lord

Foulkes.


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Q128 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: You have said there may be dangers in certain

jurisdictions. Is there a danger of one of the armed guards being prosecuted for a crime,

because of shooting a pirate, if it was in the jurisdiction of an unhelpful country?

Nick Pickard: Yes, there is that risk. We have an incident at the moment whereby two

Italian military personnel are being charged in India because of shooting two Indian fishermen

in error in an incident that happened earlier this year. So there is indeed that risk.

Q129 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: How can we avoid that and advise them and help

them to make sure that all European guards are not prosecuted; or if they are prosecuted,

what kind of help do we give them? Do we provide legal assistance and look after them?

Otherwise they are very vulnerable.

Nick Pickard: We are looking to the international community to bring together standards,

which the International Standards Organisation is going to draw up, to help us navigate what

is a very complex legal area. It will be drawing on some work that the International Maritime

Organisation has already been undertaking.

Q130 Lord Williams of Elvel: The guidance which has been issued by the Department

for Transport lays down some quite stringent conditions for private security companies. It

also lays down very astringent conditions for actually using these firearms in practice. It

points out for UK flagged ships that the use of these firearms is equivalent to the use of

firearms on the mainland of the United Kingdom. How many times in the past year have

armed guards actually opened fire on pirates?

Nick Pickard: I am afraid I do not know the answer to that question. I would have to get

you an answer. But as Captain Reindorp, who spoke to you at a previous session, said, by

and large they have not had to fire; merely the pointing of the gun or the presence of the

armed guards has been sufficient. I do not, I am afraid, know the exact answer.


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Q131 Lord Radice: Can we have a copy of the new guidance that you are issuing for

private armed guards?

The Chairman: We have it here. We circulated it only today.

Lord Radice: Sorry. That is why I have not read it.

Q132 Lord Jopling: I would like to come back to Lord Jay’s question about exceptional

circumstances. It is very easy to suppose that the only place that piracy is going on in the

world is off the Horn of Africa. Do you include within exceptional circumstances West

Africa and the Strait of Malacca, where there is significant piracy going on as well, as you

probably know?

Nick Pickard: I would need to check the answer to that but I am pretty confident that the

guidance applies across the globe. So it is in all areas where there is an exceptionally high

risk of piracy. I am told I am wrong on that, I do apologise. It is explicitly for that high-risk

area, but that is the only high-risk area that has been denoted. So if a high-risk area was

denoted in another area—

Q133 Lord Jopling: If you wanted to extend to, for instance, West Africa and the Strait of

Malacca, what would be the process? Do you have to get parliamentary approval? Do you

have to have secondary legislation to do this?

Nick Pickard: Again I would have to get back to you on that, I apologise. I do not know

how high-risk areas are designated but I am confident that if a high risk was designated in

another part of the world, this guidance would apply equally to that area.

Q134 Lord Jopling: But does a Minister have to sign something? What is the process?

Nick Pickard: I will inform you.

Q135 The Chairman: Just to tie up on this area, in terms of when these vessels come

into port and have firearms on board, does that cause any issues in any way? The other thing

I just wanted to follow up—I think it came out in the recent House of Commons debate––is


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that there was a different interpretation between Scottish law and English law as to how you

should use arms and this was seen as being a potential issue. This struck me as being quite

strange if you did not know what jurisdiction you were acting under as an individual on a

British vessel.

Nick Pickard: The Department for Transport would be the best people to answer the

specific legal question as they are those who are responsible for putting the guidance

together. But I have just been informed, very helpfully, that on the high-risk area the Lloyd’s

Joint War Committee would declare a high-risk area so it is their responsibility to do so.

Q136 The Chairman: So we need to refer to the Department for Transport further on?

Nick Pickard: It has responsibility for pulling all that guidance together.

The Chairman: That is fine.

Q137 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Just one other question I was going to ask. You have told us

quite clearly that the incidents of piracy have gone down, so what happens when the

Operation Atalanta’s mandate ends in 2014? Are the pirates just waiting for that and then

they start again, or is there going to be some rollover or some continuation? What happens

in the long and sort of medium term?

Nick Pickard: Operation Atalanta has had its mandate rolled over, I think, in two-year

periods since it began in 2008.

Q138 Lord Jay of Ewelme: There is a presumption that that will continue, is there?

Nick Pickard: It would clearly be decided nearer the time but there is a review about six

months prior to a mandate requiring to be renewed, when we look at the state and decide

whether or not the EU should continue that practice. Clearly it is not a long-term goal to

have naval assets tied up in the Indian Ocean for ever, which is why we are tackling piracy on

land as well, as the causes of the piracy. But for the time being I think the need is evident.


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Q139 Lord Jopling: Can we now turn to what you do with pirates when you have

captured them? I am going to ask a narrow question about prosecution and we will come on

to what you do with them after sentencing in a moment. After the London Conference how

many countries have said that they will take pirates for prosecution, and how confident are

you that those who have promised will actually do something about it? So often at these

conferences people say yes, yes, and when it comes to action it is no, no.

Nick Pickard: We already have a memorandum of understanding with the Seychelles that

we have been using, so there is no doubt they are doing something about it. We have a

memorandum of understanding with Tanzania that we signed at the London Conference, so

they have explicitly done something about it as well. We had an agreement at the London

Conference to negotiate an MOU with Mauritius and we have now negotiated and signed

that agreement as well, so Mauritius have also done something about it.

We have signed a regional burden sharing agreement with Kenya and we are working

towards negotiating an MOU with them as well. So we have bilateral agreements with three

countries so far and we are working on a fourth in the region. The EU also has an agreement

with the Seychelles and it is in the final stages of negotiating agreements with Tanzania and

with Mauritius as well.

Q140 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I get the impression maybe that the Seychelles are

taking a rather excessive part of the burden. Do you think that the other countries are

lagging a wee bit and should be encouraged so that the Seychelles do not have such a heavy

burden?

Nick Pickard: That was one of the reasons that we encouraged the four countries together

at a meeting hosted by Minister Bellingham in the margins of the London Conference on

Somalia to sign a regional burden sharing agreement––a statement or declaration––whereby

they would work together on this issue that affects them all. I think we have seen through


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the Tanzania and Mauritius action since then and indeed the Kenya action––although they

are coming up to elections, they are working on this internally at the moment—that these

countries are stepping up to meet that need.

Q141 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: We heard the numbers from the Seychelles––quite

large numbers––but how do the numbers prosecuted by other countries compare?

Nick Pickard: I do not know the exact numbers but the MOU for Seychelles is longer

standing so in terms of our pirates that we capture naturally there is a longer history there.

We did have an MOU with Kenya until 2010, so they have also been prosecuting a number

of pirates. I think the issue with the countries in the region is that they are happy to play

their part in prosecuting pirates, but what they do not want is to find their prisons full of

Somali pirates for many years. So one of the key aspects to delivering their support has been

to try to create this conveyor belt whereby we capture the pirates, we hand them over for

prosecution in the region but then we are able to move them back to Somalia for

imprisonment. It has been those agreements that we have been putting in place and the

prisons that we have been building in Somaliland and Puntland are going to enable us to build

support for further prosecutions in the region.

Q142 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: I think the first part of my question has

already been answered but the second part is: how sensible and successful is incarcerating

pirates in Somalia and, indeed, Somaliland and Puntland but in particular Somalia?

Nick Pickard: So far the transfer agreements have been with Somaliland and Puntland,

though the Puntland one has not yet come into operation because we are still building the

prison capacity there through the UN. On Somaliland, we had our first transfer from the

Seychelles of 17 pirates to a UNODC refurbished prison in Hargeisa in March and so they

are now successfully incarcerated in Somaliland.

Q143 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: They are still there?


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Nick Pickard: They are certainly still there, yes.

Q144 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: But Somaliland and Puntland, in a way,

one can understand more, but actually sending them back to Somalia seems to be potentially

asking for trouble––asking for them just to be sprung and back to pirating?

Nick Pickard: Nick may want to comment on the conditions in Mogadishu, Somalia. I think

the security has improved significantly in there but at the moment we are focused on

Somaliland and Puntland, as you say, which are the best prospects for being able to provide

that sort of capacity.

Nick Kay: Absolutely.

Q145 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: So at what point will it be practically

sensible to send pirates to Somalia?

Nick Kay: Goodness knows, you would need a very sort of powerful crystal ball to give an

accurate answer to that. I think certainly until we get to the other side of August and the

setting up of new institutions, new presidency, parliament and so on, then I think some way

down the road that those new institutions build some capacity. I would not see it as likely

very soon. Not this year, I would say. The security situation: I think we are coming to it

later.

Q146 The Chairman: Can I just get some further clarity? Is the agreement for these

effectively with the semi-autonomous regional authorities, or is it with the transitional

Government in Somalia? Can we just absolutely be clear who is running the prisons and who

provides the guards and the finance? Is it a completely United Nations operation or is the

agreement with a regional province of Somaliland? Perhaps you could just explain those nuts

and bolts to us.

Nick Pickard: The prisons are refurbished or built by the UNODC and then it acts

essentially as mentors for the running of the prisons. So it is partly about building regional


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capacity to allow the region to take responsibility for those issues itself. The guards and the

running of the prison are local but the UN provides the sort of overall confidence that it is

an effective operation and it mentors and manages the prisons overall as part of that

development project. But is very important, I think, that we encourage the region to be

building its own capacity—under international supervision of course—so that it can take

responsibility for these issues, and the Governments in question are keen to do so.

The Chairman: It is an agreement with the Somali transitional Government or with—

Nick Pickard: The transfer agreement with the Seychelles is between the Seychelles and

Somaliland specifically.

Q147 Lord Jopling: I would like to know more about the prisons that have been built.

How many prisons? How many inmates can they take? What are the security arrangements?

I, first of all, find it astonishing that they should be going back to Somalia itself. When Lady

Kinnock came before this Committee two years ago she said that discussions were going on

then—if you go back to question 326—about whether convicted pirates should be

transferred back from Kenya to Somalia. It would seem insane to me to send them back

there knowing the state of anarchy in that country. We were told by Mr Chitiyo last week—

in answer to Lady Bonham-Carter and myself—that the guards at these prisons are not

armed. That again seems totally insane.

Nick Pickard: Somaliland is a relatively functioning state—Nick or Rachel may want to

comment—so I do not think we should be too dismissive of the quality or the capabilities of

the regional authorities in Somaliland, which is where we have sent our prisoners so far.

Nick Kay: As far as I am aware we are not sending prisoners back or contemplating

encouraging others to send prisoners back to Somalia; Somaliland and Puntland, yes. I may

be wrong on the Somalia point and I will let you know if I subsequently discover that we are

involved in encouraging people to send prisoners to Somalia. In the brief two months I have


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been in this job it has not come to my attention that we are doing that, and I think I would

be surprised, because I would share Lord Jopling’s view that it is unlikely that conditions

within Somalia would be secure enough to do that.

Q148 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: This is really a comment and then a question, the

comment being that the closer to your home that you are held in prison there is an

increasing humanitarian point in that. Also, if you have prosecuted and convicted criminals,

let us say in Kenya, and you then have to hold them for a long time in your prisons, that is

obviously a big cost. So that was the comment. The question is: say you were to go on a visit

to one of these prisons––not that I am suggesting we would but just say we did––what

would we find? Would we find the sort of conditions that we would consider acceptable or

would we find that in a Horn of Africa prison there were conditions that we just could not

believe existed?

Nick Pickard: No, the prisons are being built to international standards by the UN and are

being monitored and mentored by the UN to international human rights standards.

Q149 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: Are they actually able to maintain a level of

monitoring and an insistence on the standards? If it is local staff, their whole attitude to life is

so very different.

Nick Pickard: The UN is very closely involved in managing these prisons and we have

provided significant amounts of money to help them do so. I think we have a lot of

confidence in the UN programme.

Q150 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Are we talking here just about prisons for the pirates? Are

there other prisons for ordinary criminal offences?

Nick Pickard: Yes, these are prisons specifically for pirates.

Q151 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Is there a real difference in quality between the prisons for

pirates under UN conditions and the prisons for everybody else in Somalia and Puntland?


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Nick Pickard: As I understand, there is, and that is a problem as well in the countries in the

region. One of the reasons they are concerned about having too many pirates within their

own countries is that there is a significant difference in standards.

Q152 Lord Inge: You are saying that the pirates live in different prisons. I want to be

absolutely clear on this?

Nick Pickard: The prisons that are being built by the UN are specifically for pirates. In the

Seychelles I have no doubt they are using the extant prison capacity they have, which is

pretty small given how small a nation it is.

Q153 Lord Jopling: Last week when we had the Foreign Minister of Seychelles in this

room, at question 12, he said this, and I quote: “The sentences are 10 to 15 years in general

and it makes much more sense that they are sent back to Somalia. This is also a way of

sending a clear message to pirates in Somalia that it does not pay, if they are actually held in

prisons in Somalia”.

Nick Pickard: By Somalia he means the whole country of Somalia, including Somaliland. We

recognise Somaliland to be part of Somalia but their agreement is with Somaliland. I can

assure you that they are not sending prisoners back to the part of Somalia which the

Transitional Federal Government has responsibility for.

Q154 Lord Williams of Elvel: Can we talk about the recent operation to attack a pirate

base on the Somali coast? Although this was much written up in the press we understand

that this was a very limited operation involving one helicopter, 70 rounds and lasted 17

seconds.

Nick Pickard: Correct.

Q155 Lord Williams of Elvel: So it was not a very big deal. What was the objective of

the operation and did the operation meet its objective? Is there any evidence that potential

pirates were put off by this or discouraged? What is your view?


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Nick Pickard: You are right. It was an operation that used limited military capability. That of

course is a good thing: the less military capability we can use to achieve an effect, the better.

Literally its aim was to destroy a number of boats and supplies in one pirate camp on the

beaches of Somalia. It had a more strategic aim, which was to demonstrate to pirates they

were not invulnerable on shore, as they had previously considered themselves to be. In that

I think it is too early to tell how effective it has been. The weather since the operation has

meant that we have not seen the extent to which pirates have adapted their tactics or how

they have changed. But the fact is that those boats and supplies that were provided by some

Somalian kingpin have not had the economic benefit which he was expecting from them and I

do not think they are very pleased about that.

Q156 Lord Williams of Elvel: We understand that the pirates actually in the base were

advised to leave before the operation took place. Is that right?

Nick Pickard: I cannot comment on detailed operational tactics, nor would it be my

responsibility. But certainly we were very clear before undertaking the operation that we

would not cause any human casualties.

Q157 The Chairman: What was the reaction locally to this operation? I think it cheered

all of us up in some way, but we are not the important players here. In terms of playing out

and providing a message, not just to the pirates, given that Somalia has a history of difficulties

in terms of foreign intervention, was it well received by the rest of the population?

Nick Pickard: I understand it was well received. It is something that the Transitional Federal

Government have been calling for as—

The Chairman: Yes, so it was an important point to make.

Q158 Lord Williams of Elvel: Was there any reaction from neighbouring countries?

Nick Pickard: Again, I think that was positive. I think the Seychelles Foreign Minister, when

he came to see you, also supported the operation.


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Q159 The Chairman: One bit we were not clear about last week was that we did have

some mention of more than one attack or attacks. I just wanted to be clear that there has

only been one.

Nick Pickard: The EU naval operation has only conducted one such attack, correct.

Q160 The Chairman: Have there been any others by any other operations?

Nick Pickard: Not that I am aware of, no.

The Chairman: Okay, thank you.

Q161 Baroness Young of Hornsey: Some say that piracy is an act of criminality and

should be treated absolutely as that in a kind of discrete way, whereas others would argue

that it is a symptom of a failed state and poverty and all the rest of it, and I think we sort of

tend towards the latter explanation, as it were. Can you say something about how effectively

you think the problems of Somalia itself have been addressed, particularly by the EU, and

what is the importance of the role of the EU in trying to sort out some of those issues and

to tackle them with development aid?

Nick Kay: I think that is broadening out the question towards our DFID colleague. Rachel

will be able to speak on the EU development programme in Somalia and I would be very

happy to speak more broadly on the political processes.

Rachel Turner: Shall we start on the development side? Broadly we think that the EU is a

very important partner in Somalia. I guess over the last few years it has been about the

second largest donor after the Americans and it has proved a good partner for the UK. The

way they have done their programming, we have found has been flexible and responsive to

the needs on the ground. Some of their programmes certainly have got a good reputation

for delivering results. They are the biggest donor working in economic infrastructure in

water––particularly in water supply they have played a critical role. Also in education, the EU

is the lead donor in the education sector and there are some quite good results in


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education. Although enrolment rates are extraordinarily low—it is very depressing when

you come to this job to read these statistics—the EU development programme has been

able to make a difference in education. Partly by being quite nimble, there are a lot of private

schools, it is a very ad hoc schooling process, they have had the flexibility to support the

education sector.

Of course, in humanitarian aid they have been a very significant player. ECHO, the EU

humanitarian agency, was absolutely critical to the response and remains critical and a big

funder. So broadly we do think that the EU development programme is doing a good job

given the challenges that we all face in terms of having to run the programmes from Nairobi

and having to work through other partners. But we are finding them good partners to work

with.

Q162 Baroness Young of Hornsey: Is there an expectation that the strategy will have

some sort of positive impact on the situation? Is there an expectation that piracy will be

diminished from this source as well as from the more obvious thing about arming ships and

so on?

Rachel Turner: There is, and certainly that trying to come at this from the issue of

opportunity for youth, jobs for youth, is a very important part of our programme and also of

the EU programme. So we are looking, for example, at how to get more labour intensive

ways into some of the construction work. We are looking at ways to open up agricultural

land to create more opportunities thereby, working with fishing communities. And the EU is

also an important player in the agriculture and livestock sectors. So absolutely that is very

much part of our overall strategy, and Nick will probably want to add to that, to try to

create opportunity and to quickly get in. I think one thing the London Conference did was to

say that all the international players need to be very nimble in getting into areas the

AMISOM have helped secure and open up, to get in very quickly with development support


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so people can see immediately the benefits of different ways of securing their livelihoods.

One of the key conclusions that came out of the London Conference was that we will need

to be a bit more flexible and nimble in getting into some of those opened up areas and,

again, we are working with the EU on that.

I think you know the EU’s strategy means they are coming to the end of the long seven year

strategy and they are just starting their new programming. So it is a good opportunity to

work with them as well now.

Q163 Baroness Young of Hornsey: Intuitively it feels like there will be that connection.

Do you have a methodology for evaluating that and measuring the extent to which it does

have an actual impact on the levels of criminality?

Rachel Turner: I do not know if we have got a methodology for exactly making the

connection between people who would have chosen piracy and are choosing to take other

routes to making their livelihoods. The gains are high from piracy. We have got increasingly

better methodologies for trying to see the impact of what we are trying to do: jobs created,

youth employment, youth livelihood strategies. Nick, do you want to add to that?

Nick Kay: The only thing I can think of is presumably one of our major indicators is the

drop in the number of pirate attacks and the incidents of piracy. If there are fewer people

taking to the seas and conducting these attacks then that is the effect that we are certainly

wanting to achieve. Cause and effect is more difficult to prove, but one would hope it is

because the balance of incentives versus other possibilities for earning a living on land has

changed.

Q164 Baroness Young of Hornsey: I do not want to harp on about the point, but I

think that what often happens is that people make an assertion that something has had an

impact or has been particularly effective without having some rigorous evidence to support


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that. So that is where I would be a bit concerned. We have methodologies for doing that in

other contexts and I am sure there would be ways of measuring that in a more direct way.

The other question I wanted to ask is about how the development and the humanitarian aid

is disbursed in Somalia. Who is responsible? What are the channels that it goes through?

Also how then do you get out of that? What is the exit strategy from that?

Rachel Turner: My understanding is that the EU programme is very similar to ours so it is

mainly disbursed through NGOs and non-state actors who are able and willing to operate in

the current security environment. They have been prepared to pay, for example, stipends

for the police and that I think was a very helpful offer from Europe that they were prepared

to do that, showing some flexibility. One issue that we are trying to move forward on is to

be able to do more private sector contracting to diversify the delivery mechanisms we can

use in Somalia. My understanding is that the EU institutions are not as far as advanced in

being able to do that as we are and that is something that we are talking to them about.

In terms of working directly with the authorities in Puntland and Somaliland, some of the

work that Europe is doing is close to the authorities. Some of the work they have done in

water, for example, has been done very closely with the municipalities. I guess the sort of

broader question of exit strategy from the way we are working now is very linked up to

what happens in August after the TFG. Nick might want to—

Q165 Baroness Young of Hornsey: Sorry, before you do, you said that the EU was a

little bit behind the UK. Could you just expand on what you meant by that?

Rachel Turner: Yes, I have just seen, in preparing myself for this, that in terms of being able

to directly contract with the private sector, it is a challenging thing to do and I think their

systems have not quite brought them to that point for certain types of programme.

Q166 The Chairman: Did you want to say anything on that side?

Nick Kay: No, I think that has covered the humanitarian and the—


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Q167 Lord Inge: We have all this training. Who is doing this training and do we have a

handle on monitoring what happens after they have been trained? Are we judging that or is it

Somalia who is telling us how they are doing or what?

Rachel Turner: The suppliers are a range of different non-government organisations. There

is the Danish Refugee Council and the International Committee of the Red Cross––those

sorts of organisations. We write into our agreements with them that they have to give us

very regular feedback on monitoring. My Secretary of State puts a lot of emphasis on

monitoring. He himself asks for very regular updates on performance and results. Most of

our programmes are long term so we are not trying to do short term things now. We are

trying to programme long term and allow ourselves the ability to monitor the long term

effects. It is difficult, though; the context is difficult.

Q168 The Chairman: Can I just bring up one of the things that concerns us now. In

terms of the development aid that goes on and the work of DFID and the European Union,

is the co-ordination good? Do 27 member states have their own individual work programme

there as well as the EU and the United States or whatever? Does it work as an international

community?

Rachel Turner: My sense is that in Nairobi it works well. Most people are running their

programmes from Nairobi and there are a lot of good structures in Nairobi. I do not know

whether this Committee has discussed some of the wider issues about sharing out sectors

between donors––something that the European institutions are very keen on. Some of those

issues are being handled well in Somalia. For example, we have agreed that we will focus on

health and the commission will focus on education. Some of those co-ordination issues are

working very well. On the ground, with different agencies working in the different regions,

there remains a challenge to co-ordinate all these different delivery agents.


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A lot of what we are trying to do is to build local capacity in some of these low level district

authorities so that they communicate with the suppliers, assert their priorities, and talk to

communities about priorities. It is a complex environment but I do sense that it is working

quite well in Nairobi. Often when one gets briefing on Europe it starts with a list of concerns

about issues that we are trying to push forward for reform. Actually, the briefing that has

come out of Nairobi about the role of European institutions in Somalia was very positive.

Q169 Lord Inge: Have you been to Somalia yourself?

Rachel Turner: I only started my job on Monday. It would be great and I know that our

Secretary of State feels that it is very important that we do get on the ground when we can.

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: We should commend Rachel for the quality of her answers

after a few days.

Rachel Turner: Thanks to the team.

Q170 Baroness Henig: Can I move on to the EU strategy for the Horn of Africa and the

appointment of a special representative for the region. What is your view of that? How are

preparations for EUCAP Nestor progressing and when will it be in place?

Nick Kay: Okay, I get to say something, but Nestor will be Nick’s answer. We are very

positive about the EU’s strategic framework for the Horn of Africa and extremely positive

about the appointment of Alex Rondos as the EU special—

The Chairman: I should tell the Committee that we have Mr Rondos at the back of the

room. I did not want to announce it beforehand but you said the right thing, Mr Kay. I did

not want to skew the conversation.

Nick Kay: Let me breathe a sigh of a relief. I will try to spare Alex’s blushes, but I think his

appointment has marked a significant step change, if you like, in the ability of the EU as an

institution to engage on the political processes, which are, on the whole, vital in

underpinning long term success in Somalia. So, yes, we are very positive and particularly Alex


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has brought a focus to trying to concentrate our efforts on the ground in Mogadishu and has

spent an admirable amount of time himself both in Mogadishu and in the region as well. I

think that is all to the good. There is a role for a travelling circus of international meetings

on Somalia, one of which was very successful in London in February and subsequently we

have had a meeting in Istanbul, the second Istanbul conference. Next week there is going to

be one in Rome. These all have an importance and a role but what we need to do is shift the

centre of our gravity toward Mogadishu increasingly and Alex is doing very well on that side.

Nick Pickard: In terms of EUCAP Nestor, our plans are progressing well. It is quite a

complex operation. A number of different countries are providing a number of different

types of support. The plans are largely in place. The EU has sent out an invitation to the

countries concerned and Djibouti, Somalia and the Seychelles have indicated that they will

accept the mission. We are still waiting for formal acceptance from Kenya and Tanzania but

when we get that we will be able to launch the mission––we hope, in the summer or early

autumn.

Q171 Baroness Henig: What are the timescales? How is it being envisaged that this will

develop?

Nick Pickard: The mandate at the moment is two years, although that may be extended

depending on circumstances at the time. As I said, we expect it to launch in the next few

months.

Q172 The Chairman: Clearly, Britain has a major contribution in terms of the

operational HQ of Atalanta, but in terms of the Nestor, are we expecting to have a UK

input into that?

Nick Pickard: We have nominated seven candidates so far for the mission; they will not all

be successful because they have applied for five positions. So we will be providing a

contribution to the mission. It will launch with 28 staff initially and that should grow to a


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maximum of 176 once it has reached full capacity. So it is a complex and significant mission.

It is providing legal and organisational advice for all the five countries, if the Kenyans and

Tanzanians agree; coastguard training in Victoria, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Djibouti;

training and strengthening of Somali coastal police and judiciary in Somaliland and Puntland

specifically; the enhancement of regional co-operation through information-sharing through a

regional training centre in Djibouti; and then co-ordination with other relevant organisations,

agencies and institutions also working in this area across the Horn of Africa. So there are

really quite a number of strands to this mission.

Q173 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: I am just trying to gather my geography together.

Djibouti is surely a very close neighbour of both Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Nick Pickard: It certainly has a border with Eritrea and Ethiopia as well.

Q174 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: But those two countries are not included in your

list?

Nick Pickard: No. Ethiopia does not have a coastal border. It is a landlocked country. It is

obviously playing a significant part in the broader development of Somalia and its armed

forces have been operating in Somalia. But it does not, I do not think, see a direct role for

itself in combating piracy. We certainly cannot provide coastguard training and the like—

sorry, I do not mean to be facetious—but this mission is focused very much on direct

training for piracy capacity-building that Ethiopia is not in a position to do.

Baroness Eccles of Moulton: But Eritrea has—

Nick Pickard: We have not invited Eritrea. I think the circumstances in Eritrea would make

it quite difficult to achieve a partnership between the EU and Eritrea.

Baroness Eccles of Moulton: They are a bit dodgy, yes.

Q175 The Chairman: Perhaps I could move on to our final question but there are a

couple of other things I want to sweep up. In fact, I will go through those first. On the


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Eritrea question, one of the organisations that we particularly come across in our

conversations is IGAD, which I know Eritrea was more or less thrown out of and I suspect

is one of the reasons it is not perhaps included in this either. Is there a relationship with

IGAD and how do you assess that organisation? Is it helping developments in the Horn of

Africa area? I did not want opening statements but I ask Mr Kay just to give us a view of the

broader Horn of Africa political situation and Somalia itself. When we talk about Somalia,

our image is of one of the most lawless parts of the world––hence the problem of piracy––

where military interventions in the past have been disastrous and frankly there has not been

much of a solution. But the impression I get is that the feeling is rather more positive now. I

think it would be useful for us to have a comment on that.

I would also like comments on the co-ordination between the EU and the UNDP rule of law

and security programme and comments on security reform. But without trying to extend it

too much, as we probably need to finish within about three or four minutes, perhaps you

could do that for us.

Lord Radice: In addition you will obviously want to say something about the African Union

effort in Somalia and so on?

Nick Kay: Indeed. Starting with IGAD, IGAD is a very important player in the Somalia

context and has a very active role, particularly on developing stabilisation planning for

following up in the areas newly liberated by AMISOM or Ethiopian forces. I think they are

very active and, as I say, a valuable member of that.

The African Union, above and beyond, is a sort of superior body to IGAD and the African

Union involvement, again through the AMISOM mission, is extremely valuable. We view the

regional ownership of the problem and the regional willingness to invest significant resources

and indeed their lives in terms of the sacrifices made by AMISOM troops as thoroughly

laudable and a thoroughly positive development.


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In general, the snapshot on how we view Somalia at the moment is that there is increasing

optimism around the progress on the political process which is nearing completion. On 20

August a new Somalia political disposition should be born. There is a certain degree of

optimism around the military process as well. AMISOM has now been able to push out of

Mogadishu and take the strategically important town of Afgoye and there is the progress of

the Ethiopians as well. Similarly, there is the hatting of the Kenyan forces under AMISOM

which happened on 2 June. They have officially become a part of AMISOM. Yesterday, the

EU, in a very significant development, approved the funding for the expanded AMISOM

mission up until the end of this year. They will pay the allowances and stipends for the

AMISOM forces until the end of 2012. That is a significant cost––about €100 million of

investment there.

A lot of things are pointing in an encouraging direction, but I think that we, and many other

long time observers of it, will reserve a certain degree of caution about whether the tides

have turned. We all know that tides have an annoying habit of going out and coming in and

going out. So I think it is far too soon to have the hats in the air. But, on the political

process, hard work is happening now on the ground as the collection of elders has been

assembled and is going to appoint a constituent assembly, which will appoint a parliament as

well. The timeline is eight weeks from yesterday to complete this. So there is a lot of work

there.

Again, on the good news and positive developments, you may have noticed that yesterday a

process began between Somaliland and the Transitional Federal Government hosted by the

UK, EU and Norway to begin talks about talks and to reach a settlement about this 21 year-

old dispute. It is the first time for 21 years that they have formally sat down together. It is

very preliminary and very low profile, but it is in the public domain. This was hosted at

Chevening yesterday and it is continuing today. So, again, it is just an encouraging sign that

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perhaps a political moment and an attitude of more constructive engagement has arrived

there. But let us not fool ourselves. There is a lot to be done still. On the security situation,

the Al-Shabaab capability is still there. They still control a significant amount of central

southern Somalia. The operating environment for the things that we want to do––

stabilisation, interventions, quick impact projects, long-term development, and even

humanitarian aid––is extremely dangerous and risky. This is operating at the outer bounds of

ease, let us say. I say that having come from being ambassador in Sudan, before that

ambassador in DRC and before that the head of our provincial reconstruction team in

Lashkar Gah.

Baroness Eccles of Moulton: Which was the worst?

Nick Kay: My goodness, no, it is invidious to draw comparisons. But, let us say, in terms of

setting up and operating within Mogadishu, we are looking more at a model similar to

Helmand and Lashkar Gah than to establishing even an embassy in Juba, which is a relatively

normal and benign thing by comparison.

The Chairman: Okay. Thank you. We look forward to hearing where you will be

transferred next and I am sure we will be having inquiry on that. I think I need to bring it to

an end there. But, Mr Pickard, Mr Kay, Rachel, thank you very much indeed for giving us an

excellent evidence session. Rachel, we wish you every success in your demanding task. But

thank you very much. I hereby end this public session. Unfortunately I will have to move into

private session for about two minutes. If I could ask members of the public to go outside;

they will be very welcome back afterwards. Thank you.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office – Oral evidence (QQ109 – 175)

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office – Oral evidence (QQ109 – 175)

Evidence to be found under Department for International Development

Foreign and Commonwealth Office – Supplementary written

evidence

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON THE USE OF ARMED GUARDS

Government policy change: risk mitigation

The Department for Transport (DfT) conducted a full risk evaluation as part of the decision

to change UK Government policy on the use of armed guards. DfT strongly recommends

that all UK ships follow the advice included in “Best Management Practices” (BMP). This is

industry-developed advice to international shipping, supported by joint international naval

forces and law enforcement organisations, on measures to avoid, deter and delay acts of

Somali piracy, including reporting to the counter-piracy cell, United Kingdom Maritime

Trade Operations (UKMTO), in Dubai.

The evaluation found that while the adoption of Best Management Practice had been very

effective in helping vessels to avoid, delay and deter piracy attacks, it did not offer full

protection. The use of armed guards could provide further protection in exceptional

circumstances, provided that the associated risks were mitigated. Mitigations identified

include issuing guidance; working with industry and subject matter experts to set

international standards which provide the basis for accreditation of private security

companies; authorising firearms; and process review. These are set out in more detail below.

National guidance

In December 2011, DfT published Interim guidance to UK flagged shipping on the use of armed

guards to defend against the threat of piracy in exceptional circumstances. A revised version of

the guidance (v.1.1) was published on 14 June 2012. This revision includes additional

guidance on the Master's authority and command & control (in section 5); and on defending

against a pirate attack, including the rules on the use of force and the associated legal risks

(in section 8).

The guidance sets out Government policy on the use of armed guards onboard UK ships.

This includes elements that should be included in the contract between the shipping

company and the Private Security Company (PSC); the importance of conducting a full risk

assessment before taking a decision to use armed guards; command and control of the

security team, including the Master’s authority; and the storage, handling and movement of

firearms.

Application of the guidance

The 'exceptional circumstances' for which this guidance on Government policy applies are:

when the ship is transiting the high seas throughout the designated High Risk Area(HRA), an area bounded by Suez and the Straits of Hormuz to the north, 10°S

and 78°E; and

Foreign and Commonwealth Office – Supplementary written evidence

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the latest BMP is being followed fully but, on its own, is not deemed by the shipping company and the ship’s master as sufficient to protect against acts of piracy; and

the use of armed guards is assessed in the ship’s security plan to reduce the risk to

the lives and well-being of those onboard the ship.

Additionally, Government policy to support the use of armed guards in such circumstances

only applies to internationally trading passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnages

and above.

Armed guards are not permitted by UK policy for use in other HRAs currently designated

by Lloyds (for example, the waters off Nigeria and Benin). The decision to allow armed

guards on UK-flagged vessels in the HRA off the coast of Somalia was made following a full

evaluation of the risks associated with their use and the value they could contribute to

security. The situation off Nigeria and Benin is being monitored.

Legal risks

The guidance is designed to support ship-owners and PSCs conducting counter-piracy

operations off the coast of Somalia by providing clear steps that should be taken prior to

deployment and during a pirate attack. Complying with rules on the use of force as detailed

in the DfT interim guidance may serve to reduce the risk of armed guards acting unlawfully.

However, in the event that criminal charges (e.g. in respect of offences related to unlawful

killing or assault) are brought to court, proving that one acted within the agreed rules on the

use of force would not in itself serve as a defence. It would be for the enforcement agencies

and then the court to decide whether the force used in the particular case was lawful. All

parties involved are advised to obtain independent legal advice. Ultimately it is the PSC and

individual armed guard that own the risk of prosecution. PSCs need to make the investment

to follow proper procedure and train their personnel in order that they can mitigate this

risk.

Weapon security risks

Section 6 of the guidance deals with the storage, handling and movement of firearms. It

states that the embarkation and disembarkation of firearms should take place at the soonest

safe, convenient and lawful opportunity outside the High Risk Area and in accordance with

the legal requirements of the State where this takes place. When embarking or disembarking

firearms, ammunition and other security related equipment at a foreign port, or calling at a

foreign port with such items onboard (but not disembarking them), it is essential that the

laws of that port State are respected and complied with.

Prior to the voyage, the PSC must seek clarification from the port State on their laws and

requirements regarding the possession, embarkation and disembarkation of firearms,

ammunition and other security related equipment; and the embarkation and disembarkation

of security personnel. All laws and requirements of the port state must be respected and

complied with fully.

International standards and guidance

Foreign and Commonwealth Office – Supplementary written evidence

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International quality standards are being developed to provide some additional assurance.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has issued interim guidance to PSCs which

was agreed at the Maritime Safety Committee in May, which complements the DfT guidance.

It is based on guidance drafted by a UK-chaired intersessional sub-group of Working Group

3 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. The IMO has requested that the

International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) develop international standards for

private security companies based on their guidance, which will provide the basis for an

international accreditation process. DfT, the Security in Complex Environments Group

(SCEG) and the IMO will be actively engaged in the ISO process, which should produce a

first draft by November 2012. The IMO has also made revisions to its interim guidance for

ship-owners, ship-operators and shipmasters to reflect the new guidance to PSCs issued

following the May Maritime Safety Committee.

Authorisation of firearms

A key part of the Government’s policy review was to determine if the Firearms Act 1968 (as

amended) applies on board UK-flagged ships while on the high seas. The Home Office

decided it was necessary to authorise the possession of prohibited firearms onboard UK

ships using the powers already included in the Firearms Act. Accordingly, any PSC wishing to

deploy armed operatives on board UK-flagged vessels must apply to the Home Office for a

section 5 licence. The Home Office then conducts a number of checks on these companies

and the guards they employ before issuing these authorisations.

The Home Office operates the section 5 authorisation process as follows:

DfT receives a copy of the shipping company’s counter-piracy plan (CPP). This includes a

signed statement from the shipping company confirming that the DfT guidance has been

followed, a copy of the full risk assessment to determine whether the business need to

use these weapons is proven, and whether the number and type of prohibited firearms requested is acceptable and proportionate. This plan must be presented to DfT before

the deployment of armed guards. The DfT advise the Home Office when the CPP has

been received.

Under Home Office instruction, the PSC’s local police force is asked to conduct section

5 checks into the owner of the PSC and, in addition, checks for each of the proposed

armed guards;

On receipt of the results of the checks, a decision is taken [by the Home Office] on whether to grant a section 5 authority to the PSC.

Monitoring and review

DfT has committed to review its interim guidance by December 2012 and is currently

working with the shipping industry and other Government departments on the revision.

HMG does not hold comprehensive and accurate data on the number of armed guards that

have fired at pirates, but there is a dialog with the shipping and security industry through

which the situation is reviewed. We can also confirm that no ship with armed guards on

board has been pirated. We are also monitoring the risk of increased violence: currently

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pirates off the Horn of Africa are being deterred by the presence of armed guards and do

not appear to be responding through increased levels of violence.

There are export controls on the removal from the UK of firearms, ammunition and other

military and paramilitary equipment; and trade controls on the involvement of UK persons in

moving, or arranging the movement, of such items between overseas countries. The Export

Control Organisation (ECO), part of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills

(BIS), is responsible for these controls. In most cases export of, or trade in, such items is

prohibited unless authorised by a licence issued by the ECO. BIS has a compliance team to

monitor the process.

Other countries’ policies on armed guards

Countries that approve the use of private armed guards include: Cyprus, Panama, Hong

Kong, India, Spain, and Norway. France and Italy have military Vessel Protection

Detachments; when these are not available private security companies are permitted.

Although we do not keep complete data, we believe that the number of countries allowing

armed guards on-board is increasing.

July 2012

Christian Le Mière, Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security International Institute for

Strategic Studies – Written evidence

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Christian Le Mière, Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime

Security International Institute for Strategic Studies – Written

evidence

1. Piracy continues to be a problem in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.

However, the number of attempted attacks and successful hijackings continues to fall

for a variety of reasons. According to the IMB, until 21 June 2012, 63 incidents

involving Somali pirates had occurred and 12 vessels had been hijacked. In the first

half of 2011, the comparable figures were 163 attacks and 21 hijackings.

2. Nonetheless, this remains an unacceptably high number of innocent sailors that must

endure the hardship, stress and occasionally physical torment of prolonged hostage

situations. The IMB estimates 178 sailors are currently held by Somali pirates (on 12

ships); EUNAVFOR estimates that number to be 213 hostages (aboard seven

vessels).

3. The reasons for the decline in attacks are multiple: the deployment of international

naval forces has had an effect on the activities of pirates, although it is debatable how

extensive that effect has been; the growing use of private maritime security

companies has acted as a deterrent to attacks on various vessels; improved judicial

cooperation in piracy trials; and perhaps most importantly shipping companies have

increasingly adopted Best Management Practices.

4. Quantifying the effect of each of these factors is impossible, but the activities of the

international naval forces have been effective in providing protection to vessels in the

Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, deterring or preventing numerous

attacks and increasing the costs of each individual piracy action group.

5. The extension of Operation Atalanta’s mandate in March 2012, which subsequently

allowed for on-land attacks in May 2012, has the potential to be a ‘game-changer’, in

that disruptive attacks on Somali pirate bases and logistical hubs would greatly

increase the costs and risks to Somali pirates. While the motivations and drivers for

Somali pirates are multiple, a negative cost-benefit analysis would weigh heavily

against the attraction of further attacks. However, the only operation launched thus

far on land in Somalia was so benign as to be largely ineffective, involving the

destruction of a number of small boats, and reflected the political difficulties inherent

in the EU launching attacks on land. As such, it is unclear whether the political will

exists to undertake more assertive military operations on land that could, through

the very asymmetry of capabilities, be construed negatively in international media.

6. Such an aggressive military option might be the quickest way to resolve the piracy

issue, but it may not be necessary as the current trend of diminishing attacks is likely

to continue nonetheless. The employment of private maritime security companies

has been another factor in undermining the attraction of particular targets. It is a



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much-cited statistic that no vessel with private maritime security personnel has yet

been pirated. This may demonstrate correlation, but it is impossible to prove

causation. There is no fundamental reason why pirates, sufficiently armed and trained

and with innovative tactics, would not be able to attack a guarded ship, overwhelm

the defences and still board it, and there is an argument, as yet unproven, that armed

guards will only encourage more aggressive tactics from the pirates. However, there

are various anecdotes of armed guards successfully repelling or deterring pirates

from attacking vessels, and hence it should be assumed that until now their effect has

been to lessen the incidence of piracy on certain vessels/shipping lines.

7. The ability to prosecute pirates through agreements with countries such as the

Seychelles, Kenya, the Maldives, Tanzania and a host of other regional and extra-

regional countries, ensures that suspected pirates are removed from the system

rather than returned to Somalia. The difficulties with this process have been either a

lack of capacity in regional countries to prosecute and imprison pirates, a factor

largely alleviated by international support, or the impossibility of proving the intent to

pirate from often circumstantial evidence. The latter in particular has stymied

attempts to prosecute pirates, but the renewed effort to secure cooperation from

regional countries means several hundred pirates have been convicted worldwide

thus far.

8. Arguably the most important factor in deterring piracy, however, is the adoption of

Best Management Practices by vessels and shipping companies transiting the Indian

Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Factors such as high freeboards, constant higher speeds,

basic protection measures, evasive manoeuvres, constant look-outs and the

employment of a citadel system have all been proven to assist in avoiding, deterring

or disrupting pirate attacks. The publication of Best Management Practices 4.0 in

August 2011 reflected the continued attempts to encourage BMPs on board

transiting vessels, which appear to have had some effect by late 2011. Some of the

reduction in successful piracy attacks may well be attributable to this fact.

9. The new piracy ransoms international task force, convened by the UK, has the

potential to scope the moral and policy-related problems with allowing ransoms to

be paid. Piracy funding is one of the best ways to target the operations of pirates, as

it does not necessarily involve military activity, strikes at the heart of the motivations

for and ability to commit piracy and has the ancillary benefit of retaining or recouping

money transferred through ransoms.

10. A lack of intelligence on pirates, piracy logistics and pirate action groups has been

partially alleviated by EUNVAFOR’s presence and intelligence gathering/sharing.

However, a shortage of assets, for example helicopters for aerial surveillance, has

hampered some imagery intelligence gathering efforts, while human intelligence has

been poor owing to a lack of an on-land presence. With the development of



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Puntland’s counter-piracy force and greater interaction with an increasingly

emboldened Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, intelligence gaps can slowly

be closed.

11. Ultimately, it has become a cliché, but no less true for it, to state that capacity

building and development in Somalia hold the key to long-term counter-piracy

efforts. While more assertive military activity may prove a short-term fix, it will not

undermine the more fundamental problems such as poor employment opportunities

in coastal communities, the attraction of piracy as a trade, increasingly profound

criminal-cultural factors in pirate areas and the easy availability of small arms. A

cross-agency, integrated approach is therefore the best option, using military, judicial,

political and developmental tools to incrementally deter and prevent pirates from

attacks and slowly offer alternatives to undermine the attraction of the industry in its

entirety.

June 2012

Lloyd’s Market Association – Written evidence

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It is the view of LMA that the contribution of EUNAVFOR has been very significant in

checking piracy in the Indian Ocean. The cooperation with the shipping industry has been

most welcome and has helped both industry and navies understand the limiters which apply

to each. There is little doubt that the world has looked to EUNAVFOR to provide a lead

and it did so with the IRTC and promulgation of the UKMTO reporting area. The recent

intervention onshore was very well received.

For insurers, the benefit has been clear risk mitigation and undoubtedly the situation would

have been far worse without the naval operation ably co-ordinated at Northwood.

The source of the problem remains on land but a combination of continued naval presence,

better observation of BMP, better self protection measures and on-board security teams

have contributed to a reduction in the maritime threat and negated the abilities of pirates to

take vessels at will.

It would be extremely regrettable if the naval presence was to be cut too soon as although

there has been progress, it is not irreversible. This is particularly true whilst many of the flag

states have not made their positions clear firstly in respect of their duty to prosecute pirates under UNCLOS and secondly on the carriage of arms. Nor can the decision of UAE to

withdraw funding from the Puntland Maritime Police Force be portrayed as other than a

setback when the Djibouti Code of Conduct remains mostly aspirational.

Insurers were pleased that the UK offered some guidance to shipping companies about

armed guards but were disquieted by the loopholes that were left around sub-500gt vessels

as that excluded most of the super yachts which often have arms and /or armed guards on

board – on enquiry it seems they can apply for dispensation but have to do so individually.

The proviso that arms can only be carried in the (UKMTO) high risk area has inherent legal

complications around weapon sourcing and access. The paper stipulated that armed guards

can only be employed “when the ship is transiting the high seas throughout the High Risk

Area (HRA) (an area bounded by Suez and the Straights of Hormuz to the North, 10°S and

78°E)”. This presents practical problems for those embarking and disembarking teams – both

have to be done within the HRA but not all countries (and their ports) allow this and it is

impractical in mid-ocean.

It is believed that UK security teams are effectively prevented from using floating arsenals

due to the way the Open General Trade Control Licences are dealt with under the Export

Control Order 2008. As no floating armouries have been approved by BIS to date, to use

one would put an operator in breach of the license. One consequence may be that security

teams from those countries that do allow such access could displace the more professional

and better qualified UK teams, possibly driving standards down; SCEG have been made

aware of this.

Moreover, insurers feel that more needs to be done in the accreditation area as the only

current yard-stick by which to measure the efficiency and competence of a security provider

is by word of mouth.


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Neil Roberts

Lloyd’s Market Association

June 2012

Ministry of Defence – Oral evidence (QQ64 – QQ108)

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10.50 am

Members present





Baroness Henig

Lord Inge

Lord Jay of Ewelme

Lord Jopling

Lord Lamont of Lerwick

Lord Radice

Lord Trimble



________________


Nick Harvey MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces; and Captain Reindorp RN,

Ministry of Defence.

Q64 The Chairman: Minister, Captain, welcome to this first day of our inquiry into

Somali piracy and, more broadly, the EU’s intervention in the Horn of Africa area. This is the

first day we have had of evidence and we are hoping to produce a follow-up report to our

previous one, because we have taken—as I know the House of Commons has—quite an

interest in this issue. I just remind you this is a public session. It is being webcast. We are


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taking a transcription. We will give you an opportunity to look at that to correct any errors

that we have made in that transcription before it becomes an official record. Perhaps what

both of you could do is to introduce yourselves very briefly. Minister, I think you want to

make a short opening statement and then we will open it out to questions. When we get to

questions then which of you wants to answer the questions is entirely up to yourselves.

Minister, would you like to start?

Nick Harvey: Thank you very much, Chairman. Yes, Nick Harvey, Minister for the Armed

Forces and responsible for operations, including counter-piracy operations off the Horn of

Africa.

Captain Reindorp: Good morning. Captain David Reindorp, I lead the MoD’s counter-

piracy team.

Q65 The Chairman: Thank you very much. Minister, I think you wanted to make a short

introduction.

Nick Harvey: Thank you. Yes. Firstly, many thanks for the opportunity to come and help

inform your inquiry. The point I wanted to make in introduction was simply this. I know that

the Committee had previously asked for a representative of the EU to attend this session.

Quite clearly I am not a representative of the EU, so I am not in a position to give views or

opinions on their behalf. Additionally, I should note that my ministerial portfolio includes the

UK military response to piracy off the coast of Somalia but does not include European

defence matters, such as CSDP, as a core part of my work. But if the Committee recognises

and is content with this, what I can do is give a UK perspective on those of your questions

that focus on counter-piracy, and as I can I will point you in the direction of anyone else I

think might be able to answer any specific point that you want to probe.

Q66 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Just for information, what Minister does cover

European defence?


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Nick Harvey: Gerald Howarth does. He is the Minister for International Security Strategy.

The Chairman: Yes. In fact, Mr Howarth has appeared before us in terms of our previous

inquiry on safety. We have had quite a change on the Committee since that point.

Q67 Lord Inge: First of all, Minister, could you please say something about what you

think has been the most important achievements of Operation Atalanta and what progress

has been made since 2010? Do you think the piracy problem has increased or decreased,

and could you say something about what capability gaps you believe it has at the moment?

Nick Harvey: Thank you, yes. The first thing I would point to is that the work being

conducted through the EU Operation Atalanta has been an exemplar for maritime security

co-operation with the other two missions in the area—the NATO mission and the US-led

international force—as well as independent work by China, India, Japan, Russia and Taiwan. I

think the international co-operation has been a success story; the sharing of information has

worked extremely well. I would also say that the connections between the counter-piracy

work and a more comprehensive approach by the international community are working well

also. In terms of the levels of piracy, we are succeeding in reducing piracy to a minimal level,

but while accepting that military activity is not going to eliminate piracy—certainly not on its

own—we are succeeding in helping bringing about a reduction. It is often said that the

solutions to the underlying problems are on the land and not at sea, so I think one just has

to be realistic in recognising the scope of what we can hope to achieve. I expect at some

point in the meeting we will discuss the disruption of pirate logistic events, so we will come

on to that I do not doubt.

In terms of levels and progress in the last couple of years, it would probably be helpful if I

was to say this: this time last year there were 23 pirated vessels and 501 hostages compared

with now eight pirated vessels and 215 hostages. Incidents of piracy vary in their severity but

there has been a steady decline in the success of pirate attacks, which suggests that our


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deter-and-disrupt interventions, combined with a much greater adherence on the part of the

shipping industry with best management practice, is beginning to have an effect. The number

of pirates and suspected pirates currently in the international justice system totals over

1,000 and the EU NAVFOR has transferred 128 since the mission started, including most

recently last month 11 to the Seychelles—I believe you have been talking to the Seychelles

earlier.

I think we can be pleased with progress, with the levels of international co-operation. The

problem is not solved by any means, but the combined efforts of the international

community and the shipping industry itself are definitely beginning to have some effect.

Q68 Lord Inge: Are there any capabilities particularly that you feel you lack?

Nick Harvey: It would be very much a matter for the EU Commander who is responsible

for the mission to point to any capability gaps that he feels he is experiencing. So far as the

UK Government is concerned, we are content that the mission appears to have the

capabilities it needs. But if the EU were to come to us and flag up concerns that there were

problems and capability gaps, we would certainly anticipate working with EU colleagues to

try and fill such gaps.

Q69 Lord Inge: In other words, no bid has been made.

Nick Harvey: Nobody is knocking at our door, are they?

Captain Reindorp: Not at the moment, no.

Q70 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: We heard earlier today from the

Seychelles Foreign Minister, who highlighted the problem of what happens to captured

pirates. Is the main purpose to deter attacks, or is it to apprehend? How, practically, are

suspected pirates handled when captured? Those are the first few questions.

Nick Harvey: Operation Atalanta’s mandate says that the objective is: “the deterrence,

prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast; the


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protection of vessels of the World Food Programme delivering food aid to displaced

persons in Somalia; the protection of African Union Mission on Somalia shipping; and the

protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis”. The main

purpose of the operation in the terms that you are asking is to deter, prevent and repress. I

would say it is a by-product of the activity that we get ourselves involved in the

apprehension of pirates. That is why the EU has sought to use a comprehensive approach

involving not just military deterrents but also legal, judicial, penal, training and development

activities. It is this more comprehensive approach that has enabled the EU to form legal

agreements with various countries in the region in connection with prosecution of pirates.

In terms of how they are handled when captured, in a sense if you get the chance to address

that question to the EU Operation Commander that will be the appropriate place to direct

it, because there are agreements between the EU and the participating states. I do not know

whether Captain Reindorp wants to add anything.

Captain Reindorp: I can if you wish. Can I just go back to your first question though? I will

try and explain where the terminology “repress, deter, disrupt and protect” comes from.

“Repress” is what UNCLOS—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—

requires all states to do when it comes to piracy. It does not particularly define what

“repress” is, but it is just taken to mean do something about it or stop it. Being military we

then convert it into our own language, and that is where the “deter and disrupt” part comes

from. It is the effect we believe that we are best placed to achieve. “Deter” is obvious.

“Disrupt” means stop them in the act. The MoD has chosen to do that because that is

where we think our specialities lie at the high end—the sort of fighting part—of counter-

piracy. As the Minister says, the “apprehend” part is almost a by-product of that.

Q71 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: But “deter” must involve “apprehend”,

must it not?


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Captain Reindorp: “Deter” involves the whole start-to-end solution. It is not just what is

done at sea. Arguably, what is done on land—the prosecutions and locking people away—is

as much a deterrent effect as it is for us to oversee.

On the second part about practice, as a practitioner my answer to your question would be:

“Very, very carefully is how we go about detaining these people”. We are fully trained; we

have become better at it. They are handled very carefully because of course this is a

constabulary operation and they therefore have to be handled in accordance with all the

rules and regulations for handling people that we detain.

Q72 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: Do the vessels have to break off their

duties and make to port to deliver—

Captain Reindorp: If you pick up some people whom you believe to be suspected pirates,

you can continue with your operations up until the point that you then decide, or it is

decided for you, that you need to take them somewhere for prosecution. It is at the point at

which there is a clear legal path of prosecution—that is, another country offers to take

them—that you then have to move them ashore. To the best of my knowledge, that is

generally done by taking the ship into port, yes.

Nick Harvey: You cannot pass them to intermediaries?

Captain Reindorp: I do not think we can, no.

Q73 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: You are not going to keep them on

there forever, so inevitably you are going to have to land.

Captain Reindorp: You have to land them in some way. You can either let them go or you

can pass them on for prosecution.

Q74 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: Could you just fill in the basic arithmetic for us? How

many ships do we have dedicated to the Atalanta mission, how many other UK vessels under


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other commands and how do you decide this? I think you have answered the last part about

demands for an increase. “If asked”, I think, was your reply?

Nick Harvey: Yes. The UK does not currently have any vessels dedicated to Operation

Atalanta. Over the duration of the operation we have typically been contributing one vessel

for three months in a two-year period. Our principal contribution to the operation is that

we continue to provide the Operation Commander, the operational headquarters and

approximately 50% of the staff for the headquarters, and we will continue doing that for the

remainder of the mandate. The last UK warship to contribute to Operation Atalanta was

HMS Richmond in the first half of 2011.

As you say, Lord Lamont, we also participate in the other international effort to combat

piracy there. We have provided frigates to the US-led combined maritime force. Most

recently RFA Fort Victoria and the Navy have also contributed to the NATO Ocean Shield

counter-piracy mission. Again, the last contribution there was also RFA Fort Victoria,

between September last year and January of this year. NATO is working alongside other

task forces to protect maritime traffic.

In terms of how we decide it, at any given point in time resources are allocated on the basis

of an assessment of the availability of our assets, the requirements of each mission and the

opportunity cost of assigning assets to these missions. Sometimes more than one of the

three will ask us for something at the same time and that becomes extremely difficult. I do

not know if Captain Reindorp wants to add anything to that.

Captain Reindorp: Just a little detail, if I may. Our last contribution to NATO, I would just

like to explain. It was more than just a hull. This was a large hull with a dedicated command

team on board with interpreters, with an intelligence fusion function, several helicopters, a

party of marines and one or two other things that I am afraid I cannot go into in this forum.

It was specifically put together to counter a specific threat, which is the known peak period


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of pirate activity during the inter-monsoon periods. It went out into theatre and it did its job

really quite well. There were several well-publicised take-downs. We had one or two

reporters, and this all made the press, and it culminated with the seizure of 14 suspected

pirates, which were eventually landed to the Seychelles for prosecution.

Q75 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: We heard in the previous session that attack helicopters

had proved particularly effective against pirates. In fact, I think it was almost suggested it was

a bit of a game changer. Do you agree with that assessment and would we ever be providing

attack helicopters?

Captain Reindorp: I am not sure I do agree with that assessment. I have to say that using an

attack helicopter to target pirates would, I think, break our rules of engagement, which are

based solely on the law of self-defence. We will only engage when we feel ourselves to be

threatened. That engagement has to be proportional, and I am not sure an attack helicopter

would be considered proportionate.

Q76 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: I think they were using them for targets on land rather

than people.

Captain Reindorp: To the best of my knowledge, the only land attack that there has been is

the one that the EU conducted recently against what they call Camp Grisby up on the north

coast of Somalia. A little detail may explain what that attack looked like. It took 17 seconds,

the helicopter did not go over land and it fired about 70 rounds, and I understand they were

fired from a sniper rifle and one machine gun. That is not an attack helicopter, as I

understand it.

Q77 The Chairman: That is some interesting detail on that and an interesting

perception. Despite what it was made up of—and it might look fairly minor in comparison to

a night out in certain London suburbs—did it have a psychological effect?

Captain Reindorp: Are we talking about the EU attack on Camp Grisby here?


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The Chairman: Yes.

Captain Reindorp: I think it had a significant effect. The messaging was absolutely crucial,

not just to the pirates but also to the international community. It was the first time that

counter-piracy activity had been conducted ashore. There is an interesting aside to that.

Piracy can legally only happen at sea, so this is quite a unique piece of legal instrument that

allows counter-piracy, something that can only happen at sea, to be conducted on land. We

know that it rather upset the pirate who owned the camp, and it is a bit more important

than that because this was the first real occasion that the military forces were able to attack

what we call—sorry, another piece of military speak—their strategic centre of gravity, which

is the strategic thing that gives them their strength.

The Chairman: I am rather treading on the toes of Lord Jay’s question, a little bit further

down the agenda.

Lord Jay of Ewelme: Do carry on.

The Chairman: No, I will stop at that point and we will take the matter on then. I

apologise to Lord Jay.

Q78 Lord Radice: As you imply, the Atalanta operation works by rotation of vessels. Are

you satisfied that this rotation is going well and working smoothly? It would just be

interesting for us to know which other countries are providing vessels.

Nick Harvey: In principle, I would say to you that is a question you would need to address

to the EU headquarters because we, as the UK Government, do not compile information

about the precise contribution other countries are making or obviously the force flow

issues. Having made that rather unhelpful start, I would say I do not think we are aware

particularly of any problems but Captain Reindorp—

Captain Reindorp: We are not, sir. Indeed I spoke to Admiral Potts—the EU Operational

Commander—yesterday during his call on CDS, and he says he would be quite happy to


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appear before you if you were to invite him again. He discussed the issue of force rotation

and from his perspective there were no problems. There are times of dearth and there are

times of plenty, as there always are. He made the point that his three major contributors—

although I cannot quote you any figures, I am afraid—were the French, the Spanish and the

Germans.

Q79 Lord Radice: So we are not a major contributor.

Captain Reindorp: Not in terms of hulls. In terms of leadership—

Q80 Lord Radice: “Hulls” means boats?

Captain Reindorp: Yes.

The Chairman: We are aware that the mission commander is very keen. We have not

managed within the timeframe to sort that out, although we have previously visited

Northwood as a Committee. Was there anything else, Lord Radice?

Q81 Lord Radice: Why are we not contributing more? We are a great maritime nation,

with a great Navy. Is it that we have run out of ships?

Nick Harvey: If you look back to the national security strategy from two years ago, the

point I would make is that counter-piracy is not flagged up as a strategic threat. If you

compare the threat to the UK from piracy with the variety of other threats that we face, and

certainly if you look at figures on the number of UK ships pirated, that national security

strategy assessment seems to me to be entirely valid and spot on. Counter-piracy is neither

a standing nor a contingent task for us and can only be done from spare capacity. We are

always looking for the opportunity to deploy assets to counter-piracy missions, but you

were touching on it. Obviously, the Navy is stretched with a number of standing tasks that it

is committed to and, therefore, there will be occasions where we have the capacity to

contribute into these missions and there will be other times when we have not.


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Q82 The Chairman: Can I just ask about that point, Minister? One of the things we

sometimes forget is that piracy does happen elsewhere in the world other than Somalia. Just

in that broader context, is the UK involved in any other sort of positive anti-piracy activity?

Does clamping down on Somalia give a message elsewhere in the world, or does it not make

any difference? Presumably it is a local enterprise, is it not?

Nick Harvey: It is probably a regional enterprise. I have visited and talked to Governments

in West Africa about increasing problems off the coast there, and it is certainly the case that

we are rendering advice and any support we can. But we are not involved in an actual

practical mission there. I would say that some of our other patrol works—for example,

counter-narcotics work in the central Atlantic area—touch on the activities of a fairly similar

kind. Captain Reindorp, do you have anything to add to that?

Captain Reindorp: Not at all, sir. But, in effect, piracy is just one element of maritime

criminality and the Royal Navy will try and disrupt maritime criminality wherever it finds it.

Q83 Lord Williams of Elvel: Minister, you did say that the United Kingdom provided

the operational headquarters, and you did say that we were prepared to do so for the

remainder of this mandate.

Nick Harvey: Yes.

Q84 Lord Williams of Elvel: Is the implication there that, if and when the mandate is

renewed, we would be prepared to see the operational headquarters go elsewhere, or do

we consider that there is substantial value to the UK of this particular contribution to the

EU CSDP?

Nick Harvey: We have indeed committed to provide the headquarters for the rest of this

mandate, which goes through to December 2014, and we will continue to provide the

headquarters and the operational commander for that period in the build-up to any

discussion about the extending of the mandate. I think we would take a view at that time on


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whether we would continue contributing to the operation, but in principle I am certainly not

aware of any reason why we would not be willing to keep doing this.

Q85 Lord Williams of Elvel: Do you know any other member states who are bidding

for it?

Nick Harvey: Not bidding for it, but the—

Captain Reindorp: I am not aware that there has ever been any formal bid for anybody else

to take it on. There will always be the odd bit of politics floating around, particularly when

there are other issues that can use this to leverage off.

If I could just add to the Minister’s line, the benefit is not just one way. Again, talking to

Admiral Duncan yesterday, he clearly made the point that the EU, and the great majority of

the people who work for him, who do not come from the UK, value the UK’s leadership in

this area. Northwood is a very good command centre. It is co-located with NATO. There

are all sorts of intelligence assets that can be plugged into it as well. It would be difficult but

not impossible to see where they could go to get a better one.

Q86 Lord Williams of Elvel: Does Northwood have sufficient access to intelligence on

a day-to-day basis?

Captain Reindorp: Yes, sir.

Nick Harvey: It is a very substantial UK contribution to the EU CSDP and we are pleased to

get the opportunity to make that contribution, which plays to some of our strengths. I think

that it gives us the opportunity to share some of our experiences with other member states.

It is demonstrating our commitment not only to the EU CSDP but obviously to protecting

shipping in that part of the world, and I think it enhances our reputation. You have to view

the activity as part of a cascading strategy. The military effort is one aspect to it, but—as I

described a few moments ago to Baroness Bonham-Carter—you have to see this as a

comprehensive policy, including the EU’s work to try and build capacity in that region, so


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that ultimately regional countries there are able to take control of these things for

themselves. We are making a really worthwhile contribution and I think we are recognised

as doing so. Given that our availability of hulls is a little stretched at times, the ability to

provide the HQ is a really good opportunity and one that we are pleased to be fulfilling.

The Chairman: Certainly, when we visited Northwood two years ago, it was quite

impressive at the time, given the mix not just of different military nationalities but of civilian

shipping nations as well.

Q87 Lord Inge: You just mentioned 2010 when we first looked at this. We identified

three capability problems: maritime patrol aircraft, tankers and medical facilities. Is that still a

problem or has that now been solved?

Nick Harvey: That is a question that, if you are going to get the EU Operational

Commander in, you would do well to address to him. Obviously from our point of view, as

the UK Government, we would want to be sure that the operation is being resourced

properly, with adequate finance and the right asset commitment that is necessary to fulfil the

objectives. As Captain Reindorp said, we are not aware of any particular problem nor been

petitioned for help in any particular aspect but perhaps he will give you a fuller answer if you

get him in.

Q88 Lord Inge: Presumably you must know whether you are concerned about it, and

you are saying you are not concerned about this?

Captain Reindorp: To the best of my knowledge there have only been one or two periods

where Atalanta is really struggling for any of the key assets that it needs.

Q89 Lord Inge: And that is not the case at the moment.

Captain Reindorp: No, it is not the case at the moment. In fact, in some areas I have heard

Admiral Duncan say he has more than he needs at the moment. He continually gets new


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offers. For instance, the Ukraine are about to offer him and provide him a maritime patrol

aircraft that Luxembourg now charter to the Seychelles.

Q90 Lord Inge: In other words, the capability provided has been enhanced?

Captain Reindorp: In some ways, yes. I think it is cyclical, sir. It will go up and down at

times, but generally speaking I think he will be—

Q91 Lord Inge: The other problem cited was vessels for delivering the World Food

Programme.

Nick Harvey: A lack of capacity?

Lord Inge: A lack of—

Nick Harvey: That would essentially be between the World Food Programme and—

Lord Inge: I am not saying purely—

Nick Harvey: No. I am not aware of a problem in that sense. I do not know—

Captain Reindorp: There was a time when the ships that the World Food Programme was

chartering were—forgive me—what we call colloquially “bottom feeders”. They are very

low in the water, they are very slow and they are perfect pirate targets.

Lord Inge: I have learnt a new expression today.

Captain Reindorp: Perfect pirate targets, and therefore Atalanta had to spend an awful lot

of time and effort protecting them because that is the key part of their mandate. I

understand they have now chartered some much newer ships. I also understand that the

Admiral has adopted slightly different tactics with them, whereby he builds—again, forgive

me, another piece of military terminology—an autonomous vessel protection detachment, a

bunch of Marines who are sufficiently capable to go on to a ship and protect it without the

need for a close escort.

Q92 The Chairman: Let me just explain because I think this is important. The two things

that came out from this before were, for one, the tendering position of the United Nations


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was that you landed up getting the worst ships and so they had to be protected. That was

one problem; the second problem was the one of not having detachments. The problem

about that was that they would not put in the contracts the mandatory point that the flag

state had to agree for there to be a military attachment on board, rather than having to put

a very expensive hull to go alongside it over the whole delivery period. The obvious thing is

you put the detachment on and you do not have to do the ship. But you had to get the

positive “yes” of the flag state, as I understand it. So that was the issue, and we put a fair bit

of pressure, obviously through the FCO rather than the MoD, in terms of trying to get these

contracts challenged. Sorry, I know we are entering into a document, and that is not what

today is about. But that helps you to understand the concerns we have had, that was it.

Nick Harvey: To the best of my knowledge, those concerns have been addressed.

The Chairman: Good.

Q93 Baroness Henig: We have heard already obviously that there are a number of

different units and operations active in this area, and I was interested in the response to the

first question, I think it was, where you described co-operation and communication across

all these different disparate units. You describe it as a success story. In fact, you said that the

sharing of information and intelligence has worked extremely well, so I suppose I want to

probe this a little bit. If we look at some of the countries involved here—take for example

China and India, who inevitably have very different national interests in this region than, say,

the EU mission—can I just probe you a little here on that? You made it sound very

effortless. In my experience these sorts of situations are rarely as smooth as perhaps you

were describing.

Nick Harvey: Yes, it certainly is not effortless. There are the three international efforts:

Atalanta, NATO’s operation Ocean Shield and the US-led international force. The NATO

Ocean Shield also has its headquarters at Northwood, so there is a very strong link between


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those two operations with liaison officers embedded there to make sure there are good

understandings and shared working practices. In terms of actual information sharing, the

Mercury communications system, which is run by the EU, is shared with other non-EU

countries so there is a degree of sharing information and, therefore, improving

communications. There is also a Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Environment meeting

on a regular basis in Bahrain, where NATO, the EU, the international force and some of

those non-aligned countries that you are referring to, and indeed industry and other

interested parties, come together to make sure that they are sharing information, promoting

best practice and so on. Do you want to add anything?

Captain Reindorp: If I may. The Minister mentioned at the beginning that in many ways

Atalanta can be seen as an exemplar of maritime security co-operation and this is exactly

why. It is not solely the EU’s unit that have delivered this but they have been instrumental in

bringing it together. The SHADE—the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Environment—

is a meeting that happens on a regular basis, I think three or four times a year, co-chaired

between two of the coalitions and also the non-aligned nations. It has previously been

chaired by the Chinese. It meets in Bahrain and it brings in the whole comprehensive nature

that the Minister has spoken about: industry is there; the FCO is there; we are there; all the

coalition members are there. They sit down and they thrash these issues out, which in true

seafarer fashion are dealt with very practically at sea and deconflicted on the ground

between ships and sub-units and sub-unit commanders.

You mentioned China and India. That is a very interesting one. That appears to work

naturally, perhaps because the Indians see their sphere of influence as east of 65 degrees east

towards their coast and the Chinese come more to the west. Whether that is deliberate or

not, I do not know, but it certainly seems to work.


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The Chairman: I wonder whether Lord Jopling might like to ask a supplementary about an

issue that particularly exercises him in this Committee in this area.

Q94 Lord Jopling: Yes, I have been prompted by the Chairman just in time. This

Committee has been excited over many years about the abysmal lack of co-operation

between NATO and the EU. We will not go into the reasons, which are based on the

Cyprus/Turkey/Greece problem, but would you like to just tell us to what extent you feel

that that tension between the two is causing problems in this ocean at the moment? We

have been told by some witnesses in other fields that ways are being found of getting over

the tripwire, which Turkey so often puts up to block co-operation between EU and NATO.

It is a very serious problem. It has been discussed at both EU and NATO summits on many

occasions, as you know. Could you tell us to what extent this is a problem in this part of the

world?

Nick Harvey: Very broadly, I do not think it is a problem in this context. I recognise entirely

what you are saying, and Turkey/Cyprus/Greece issues do cause problems in other contexts

and cause a wider friction. In this context I think the working relationship is extremely good,

and I think what the EU particularly brings to the international effort here is that because it

is a soft power—it is perceived in that way by nations in this region and perhaps more

widely in that way—it has been able to unlock doors in some of the relevant countries, to

help bring about this comprehensive approach going and looking at judicial issues, in a way I

think NATO would have struggled to because it is perceived in a very different way.

Therefore, the combination of the two has been pretty effective. The wider problems that

you correctly pinpoint do not seem to me to have caused problems in this operation.

Captain Reindorp: I am not aware of any problems.


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The Chairman: The first time we did this it did come up as a practical issue that was got

round in a practical sense. But if it has gone away that is great news and we will leave it at

that. Lord Jay, I think you wanted to continue the issue.

Q95 Lord Jay of Ewelme: To come back to the question of the onshore attack that we

discussed earlier on, when we were planning this session we thought this was such an

important issue that I needed to share this question with Lord Jopling but Captain Reindorp

has rather given the impression that it was more like leaning out of the window with a

popgun, so it is really a bit overdone I think here. Could you say a little bit about whether it

was always intended to be like that, and how the decisions were made to launch the

operation and what the rules of engagement were? Is it a one-off, or are we likely to see

more attacks of this sort? If so, are they likely to be on the same sort of scale, or might they

be slightly sort of more adventurous than the one you have described?

Captain Reindorp: If I have given the impression it was a bit of leaning out of the window

with a popgun then that is incorrect. This was a properly planned military operation, but the

engagement took 17 seconds and they used circa 70 rounds from very light calibre weapons.

It was entirely in accordance with our understanding of international law regarding this,

which I have already mentioned is self-defence only. I have not seen the EU rules of

engagement for some while but the last time I did they complied with the UK understanding

of this, and in fact if they had not the UK officers on the staff would have told us. They are

under a remit to tell us and they did not.

The effect was out of all proportion to the 17 seconds and 70 rounds piece. Probably the

most significant effect was this was the first time we have been able to attack the strategic

centre of gravity piece, their ability to fund and provide investment money to supply boats to

go to sea, to pirate vessels and to bring them back for profit. So what you now have is a

pirate who has lost a certain number of boats and a certain number of engine houses, which


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Mr Big gave him the money for. Not only has he lost them but he has not brought anything

back to recoup the costs. If I were him, I would be running rather scared at the moment

because they are not terribly nice people. It sent a complete message to the pirates. We

know that that has had some effect on the people ashore who have tacitly supported them

up until now. It generated almost universal international approval. The UN special

representatives supported it, the UN in general and various other nations. The region, in

particular, not only supported it but they asked for it.

Will there be future missions? It is a difficult question to answer because we have always

believed that, having done this once, pirates would learn their lesson and they would move

their equipment dumps further inshore, and at the moment most people are not terribly

keen to go further inshore in Somalia. Having said that, when they want to put their pirate

action groups to sea they will have to build a camp somewhere on the shoreline in order to

get the boats to sea, get the engines on the boats and get their four by fours down there to

bring the fuel. So it may well be possible again, but it will depend on the intelligence and the

circumstances. Certainly, the EU plan on doing this again if the opportunity arises.

Q96 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Was the decision to intervene in this case taken just to have

an effect on others, or was it taken because there was perceived to be a particular problem

with a particular pirate enclave onshore?

Captain Reindorp: I think both, to encourage the others and because the opportunity

existed.

Q97 Lord Inge: Quite clearly you have very good intelligence on this. Is that intelligence

still as good as it used to be? In other words, are you still getting jolly good intelligence

where they have these key places? If you want to go and attack another one, how quickly do

you need the authority to go ahead?


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Captain Reindorp: The answer to the intelligence question is: yes, we do. The authority

will depend on how far down the European Union command chain that authority is

delegated to. My understanding is it is delegated to the force commander and he can make a

decision relatively quickly.

Q98 Lord Jopling: Thinking of the lessons that are being learned every day in Pakistan

and Afghanistan and the use of drones, if they are thinking of more land attacks it would be

logical to use drones for that purpose. We were told there are three drones based in

Seychelles. I asked the Minister outside afterwards whether they were entirely devoted to

anti-pirate operations, because I always understood that some of the Seychelles-based

drones were used for Afghanistan, but I was told that was not the case. How many drones

are there available in this whole area besides those in the Seychelles, and are any of them

capable of launching attacks on the ground in the same way that we have seen recently in

Pakistan?

Captain Reindorp: Could I just make clear at the beginning, sir, if you do not mind, that the

attacks that we are authorised to conduct ashore in Somalia are not against people. We have

no authority to directly target people. It is only logistics and equipment.

Lord Jopling: No, I understand that.

Captain Reindorp: In fact one of the things that have to be done before the attack is

authorised is to make sure that that area is sanitised, it is clear of people, so that the risk of

collateral damage—killing a civilian, an innocent person—is absolutely minimised.

Lord Jopling: We had that evidence from the previous witnesses an hour ago.

Captain Reindorp: Yes. As a personal view, I cannot see that ever changing. Piracy is a

constabulary mission or a policing mission; it is not a war-fighting mission like in Afghanistan.

To turn to the trickier element of your question, I cannot confirm what drones are in the

Seychelles, mainly because I do not know and I do not know whether any of them are used


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in Afghanistan. My area of interest at the MoD is purely Somalia and piracy. I do understand

that drones have been used for intelligence gathering and reconnaissance before, but I do

not know whose drones and I do not know where they came from.

Q99 Lord Jopling: Do you know if any of them are capable of launching missiles?

Captain Reindorp: I do not, sir, no.

Q100 The Chairman: Perhaps we could then move on to one of the complications.

When we last looked at Atalanta it was the only EU engagement in the area directly. We

now have a number of other missions and we have the opening of the EU operations centre

for the first time—something that I think our own Government has been slightly iffy about in

the past. Do you have a perspective on how that is working, how they tie up with each

other and where Northwood fits into that? Are we happy that that extra ability and facility is

working well and adds value?

Nick Harvey: Chairman, the operations centre was activated to provide support to the

Regional Maritime Capacity Building mission, which is now called EUCAP Nestor. This

mission has not yet formally launched, so the impact of the activation on the operations

centre is obviously limited. Once it is up and running I think that centre will bring in

increased coherence to EU operations in the Horn of Africa. Operation Atalanta and NATO

Ocean Shield are at Northwood, and that is a very good set-up for the counter-piracy

activity but the centre to deal with EUCAP Nestor is another thing altogether. The UK is

putting forward high quality candidates to serve in that centre, and we will continue to do

everything that we can to make sure that it is a success and that it works closely with

Northwood. So it is early days yet.

Q101 The Chairman: Do we have any UK staff—I am showing my ignorance here—in

the EU operations centre?


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Captain Reindorp: I do not think we have anyone in the EU Operations Centre, although

those posts are rotational so when they rotate we may have one next time. At the moment

I think we have three people designated to go into the region and be part of the Regional

Maritime Capacity Building project.

The Chairman: We have one there I am being told.

Captain Reindorp: If I could just add that this regional maritime capacity is a training

mission, so it is complementary to the high-end fighting counter piracy that is done at sea.

This is the comprehensive bit that goes on ashore to build local capacity to deal with this

issue on their own, and in that way the EU is utterly unique because nobody else is bringing

this to the party at the moment. In that way, the EU is the only one of the coalitions that is

actually looking at this in a holistic view with a strategy designed to have an end date.

Q102 Baroness Young of Hornsey: Can you tell us how successful has the use of

armed guards on commercial vessels been? How many of those that have had armed guards

have been attacked, and how many of those have been captured by pirates in 2011 and

2012? Also, what is the UK’s position on the law in this respect, on the legal and policy

aspects of private armed security on commercial ships? That is enough to start with, and

then there are a couple of supplementary questions to that.

Nick Harvey: I have been provided with a response from the Department for Transport

and I am happy to give a short update on the UK’s view of this issue. But I would say to you

that if you want any more detailed responses, I would suggest that you write to or invite the

Department for Transport in because this is their responsibility and not ours. In the language

that Captain Reindorp used a few minutes ago, this is very firmly a constabulary function.

We do not hold exact figures on the number of UK or international ships that have been

attacked, which have armed guards on board. What we can say is that to date no ship with

private security on board has been successfully hijacked, which I think is a testament to the


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deterrent effect that it has. In many cases, I think, simply the sight of weapons or a single

warning shot is enough to deter the pirates.

In terms of the legal authority that you asked about, Baroness Young, the UK carried out a

full review of the policy of employing armed guards on UK ships and concluded that it should

be allowed in exceptional circumstances, which is defined in the Department for Transport

guidance. The private security company involved must get a Section 5 authorisation from the

Home Office to use prohibited weapons on UK-flagged ships, as it is the UK Firearms Act

that would apply on UK vessels. Different EU member states have differing policies, some of

which either have been or currently are being reviewed. Some member states do allow

private security on board and others do not. Do you want to add anything on that?

Captain Reindorp: Only if I could pick up on your absolute opening point, that we have

reduced piracy to a minimum. Recognising that we will not ever reduce it completely, I think

there are three key components of that. One is the military activity, the other one is best

management practice and perhaps the key one is the embarkation of armed guards. I suspect

if it could ever be analysed that would be the absolute key driver to it.

Q103 Baroness Young of Hornsey: I think in the last session it was that they

mentioned that there were ways of adapting ships, so that they were less prone to be

boarded by pirates. Does that also serve as a deterrent?

Captain Reindorp: This is the best management practice that I refer to—it is another

wonderful piece of phraseology—which is self-protection. This can range from anything from

having an adequate lookout and, as somebody who has been at sea for a while, not all ships

do keep an adequate lookout. They certainly need to in this area. Or it can mean having

razor wire to stop people climbing on your ships or hoses. It also includes having a citadel, a

safe room that the crew can escape to and control the ship from that is impervious to the

pirates.


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Q104 Baroness Young of Hornsey: Just going back to the legal aspects, presumably it

would be a pretty complex tangled situation were somebody to be seriously injured or killed

as a result of action taken by armed guards on a commercial vessel. I know it is a very

general question, but I am just thinking what sorts of issues that could lead to.

Captain Reindorp: It is not an area I am an expert in, but I believe it turns on the

nationality of the ship as determined by its flag, its port of registry, the nationality of the

armed guards doing the shooting and the nationality of the person unfortunate enough to be

shot. It would take a lawyer to untangle that, I am afraid.

Q105 Baroness Young of Hornsey: A couple of other final questions then. How does

the Government plan to review its interim guidance and how has industry engaged with the

review process?

Nick Harvey: This is certainly something where you might want to seek evidence from Mike

Penning, the Shipping Minister at the Department for Transport. In December last year the

Department for Transport published interim guidance to UK-flagged shipping and they

committed to review that within 12 months, so by the end of this year. The rules on the use

of force have recently been revised in response to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee

report on piracy. The full review is taking place in consultation with other Government

departments, with the shipping industry, and indeed with the private security company, so it

is very much something that the Department for Transport is taking evidence on and is

consulting very widely on. Certainly, the shipping industry will be fully consulted during the

review at every stage.

Q106 The Chairman: Just a couple of short things on that. Is the MoD at all involved in

helping training, given the fact that you are the experts on force I suppose?

Nick Harvey: No, emphatically not. That is entirely a matter for the civilian authorities. This

is not a military function. It is a constabulary function and, if the Department for Transport


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and the Home Office thought that it was appropriate for training and support to be given,

that is something I would expect to see the civilian police doing. It is absolutely not a military

function.

Q107 The Chairman: Do you know if there is any indication—and it is early days in

this—that, with increased armed guards, there is a risk of heightened violence that comes

out of that? When we undertook our original report we were rather sceptical about armed

guards, I think wrongly. One of the fears was this would be an escalation in terms of

violence.

Nick Harvey: This is anecdotal rather than scientific but, if anything, the evidence would

seem to be quite the contrary. The very suggestion of a gun getting involved seems to cause

them to turn away fairly promptly.

Captain Reindorp: If I may add, Minister, shooting is the last resort. There are all sorts of

other non-lethal ways that can draw attention to the fact that the pirates are staring down

the barrel of a gun, and most maritime security companies will judge success or failure on

whether they have an engagement or not. Failure is that they have to shoot; success is that

they manage to keep the pirate away before they have to shoot.

Q108 Lord Williams of Elvel: My recollection—and my recollection may be wrong—is

the French Government takes a slightly different view and, in fact, are prepared to provide

marines as armed guards on their flagged ships, on the grounds that their marines are much

better trained and much better disciplined than the private security guards and, therefore,

will provoke less of a threatened violence. Do you see any merits in that argument and, if so,

is the MoD prepared to consider it?

Captain Reindorp: If I could start with the French, I do not have any specific details. I do

know they do it. I do know that they charge a considerable amount, and I do know that they

require a large group of people to go. We have looked at the idea of providing UK service


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personnel on to UK ships and for a variety of reasons we have discounted it. Our belief at

the moment is that the UK contribution is best served in delivering a deter-and-disrupt

effect rather than a protect effect, which is all embarked personnel can do. That is our forte,

the higher end war-fighting part of counter-piracy. I understand—but I am not an expert

in—that there are also legal issues and other issues associated with this as well.

The Chairman: Minister, Captain, thank you very much. We have probably covered

everything, unless there is anything else that you particularly feel that we have not

mentioned or you wish to say. Fine. Thank you both very much indeed. We will try to have

another go, in terms of the actual EU operation but I think that is going to be quite difficult

this time within the timescale. Thank you very much for your evidence and I think we are

hearing from the Foreign Office during the inquiry as well. I hereby declare the end of the

public session.

Nick Harvey MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces – Oral evidence (QQ64 – QQ108)

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Nick Harvey MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces – Oral

evidence (QQ64 – QQ108)

Evidence to be found under Ministry of Defence

Alexander Rondos – Oral evidence (QQ176 – QQ234)

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10.55 am

Members present



Baroness Eccles of Moulton


Baroness Henig

Lord Inge

Lord Jay of Ewelme

Lord Jopling

Lord Radice



________________

Examination of Witness

Alexander Rondos, European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa.

Q179 The Chairman: Mr Rondos, I very much welcome you to our Committee, and I

was pleased that you could sit in earlier. In fact, there are few people that arrive where you

are with such a strong recommendation from the previous session—made unprompted

without knowing you were there—so that is excellent. We are particularly pleased that you

could respond so quickly to our request to come to this inquiry. Let me just go through the

formalities by saying that this is a public session, which is being webcast and also being

transcribed. We shall send you a copy of the transcription so, if we have made any errors in

the way that it has been recorded, you will be able to correct that.

I know you are very keen to start the session, so perhaps I could ask you to introduce

yourself and say a little bit about how you have got to the position that you are in. The first


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question is also fairly broad and will allow you to give us a run-down of how you see the

situation.

Alexander Rondos: Thank you very much, my Lord Chairman, and thank you all for inviting

me. My name is Alex Rondos. I am a Greek national, although you can tell by my accent that

there have been influences other than Greek in my life—and far profounder than Greek. I

grew up in east Africa, so I am back in some rather familiar territory.

My background is in the world of development and emergency relief, and then slowly I

moved to politics in my own country—I should say that I find Somalia more predictable than

my own country right now so there is a strange consolation in the work I am doing. I have

done a lot of work on Balkans in the last 10 years in my capacity in Greece, where I was a

special adviser to the recent former Prime Minister George Papandreou. Through that I

knew Baroness Ashton and had been able to help a little bit behind the scenes on some

issues there. She knew that I had always been interested in the Horn and eventually asked

me if I would consider this position, which I was very glad to take up. I began in January.

All that I can tell you, in brief, is that my mandate covers Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia,

Kenya and Uganda. In the Sudans, there is a special representative—as you know, Dame

Rosalind Marsden—so thank goodness I do not have to go near that one, but we collaborate

a lot because a lot of the issues intersect. I have to cover everything, including Somalia and

Eritrea—I was there last week to see if we could start checking out quite how dodgy it is, as

I noticed you described it. The Nile River basin is another rather worrying issue that has to

be managed carefully. My mandate is wide, but I have been asked to pay particular attention

to Somalia, and that is what I have been doing.

From the outset, I decided just to get out there and I have spent a good deal of time in the

field, actually in Mogadishu, so that I can get the Somalis accustomed to the notion that

remote-control relationships will be a thing of the past. We are going to get back there and


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they are going to get used to having us dealing with them much more directly. That is what I

have been trying to do—it is a more political role that I have tried to assume and have been

asked to assume. Right now, quite frankly, my worry has been that the European Union, as a

whole, tends to get viewed in much of that part of the world as a cash cow to be milked at

will. That has to end. My job is, in effect, to say, “Well, if you want our cash, there is a series

of other parallel discussions we are going to have regarding politics, security and the like

before we just dish out money”. I am putting it with a broad sweep, but that is really the

intent with which I have been asked to assume my responsibilities. If I may, I will just leave it

at that.

Q180 The Chairman: Yes, indeed. Thank you. That is very useful as an introduction.

Perhaps I could move on and ask; how do you assess the situation in Somalia itself, its

provinces of Puntland and Somaliland—which sometimes seem completely different

universes to us back here—and, indeed, the wider Horn of Africa?

Alexander Rondos: To the situation in Somalia, the word “optimism” cannot ever—and will

not for a while yet—be attached with Somalia, but there is no doubt that we are seeing

some changes that I think take us in a positive direction. On the political front, we have all

been engaged, as has the current leadership of Somalia, in ending a transition. Now, we need

to be very clear here that we do not get lost in semantics. The formal transitional

Government will end, but the real work of transition in Somalia begins only now. I think that

we need to be very clear about that. It is going to take a year or two for things to settle, if—

as one hopes—things continue to move in the right direction.

What does that mean? This change in August is about a new political dispensation arrived at

without elections. I think we must understand that frame. In order to legitimise it, one has

turned to the very traditional structures of the clan elders, who are traditionally those who

endorse much that goes on socially within the country. So, as we speak, there are about 130


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clan elders gathered in Mogadishu who are selecting the members of the constituent

assembly. That should, we hope, in the next two or three weeks, be a finished task. They will

do two things: they will select—I use the word “select”—a Parliament and they will also

start reviewing and commenting on the constitution, which is about now to be made public

as a draft constitution. That is the political process.

My own view is that, in the next eight weeks, there will be a bumpy landing but this plane

will land on the airstrip, as it were. It is what follows afterwards that is the key. I am sure

that there will be a new political dispensation and there will be a leadership. We may see

some familiar faces and we have to work out how we handle that. Having heard the earlier

testimony, I think that the challenge is going to be how one gradually folds into the politics of

Somalia those parts and regions—I am talking specifically about those that have been under

the authority of al-Shabaab until lately—in south central Somalia. As they are brought back

under control, how politically they are represented and folded into the politics of Somalia is

the hard politics of what people are going to have to manage well. That is certainly what I

tell my colleagues in the meetings that I have with other international authorities. With a

light touch, we have to make sure this does not spill over and get out of control. That is the

heart of the game.

Puntland seems to chug along quite well on its own. There is a vestige of law and order;

there is a form of government. I think Puntland has very wisely demonstrated that it is as

well to show and put on a good track record because, when the real debate comes of what

degree of federalism should exist in Somalia—and that is the debate, constitutionally—

Puntland can justify its pitch that it would like to be relatively autonomous within a federal

constitution. I think that is its game.

Somaliland, as I think you all know very well, has proven that it is capable of standing up and

attending to itself. However, it has a vital interest, whatever its constitutional future and fate,


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in making sure the rest of Somalia is secure and stable. The one thing that it cannot afford,

whether it is independent or not, is to have an unstable Somalia. That is why it is very

encouraging that these discussions are actually occurring at Chevening right now.

The Chairman: Thank you. That is very good and useful introduction.

Q181 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Thank you. Before I come on to Operation Atalanta, you

said you had spent some time in Mogadishu. Could you just tell us to what extent is

Mogadishu a functioning town or functioning city now? Some of us have been to other rather

nasty places, Duber and Gomer and so on. But, where is Mogadishu now on the scale of

other more or less functioning African cities?

Alexander Rondos: Somalia is a very strange place in the sense that—if I said to you, it is an

economy without a state. Mogadishu is bustling. I mean it. It is lovely. Anyone who has

known Somalia and eastern Africa, the colours are back, the markets are open. It is just

lovely. The sad fact is that people like myself have to go around with a flak jacket in an

armoured personnel carrier; I wish I could go and just join in.

It is an interesting little litmus test, but it hit me when a Somali businessman decided to put

up glass in his shop front window in Mogadishu. Then I said, “Either the guy’s a complete

fool or he knows something that we all do not really know.” So, Somalis are taking their

money back in, the planes are full. They are coming back. They are bringing money, they are

trying to invest. Houses are being rebuilt. In fact, there is a shortage of labour in Garowe in

Puntland, because they are all coming down to Mogadishu because there is so much demand

for labour, the masons and the like. Now, this is all anecdotal, but I hope it does begin to

give you a picture of a place that is beginning to take off.

Now, the interesting question is why. Here we have to register and acknowledge a success.

We all collectively, and Britain has played a major role in this, have been financing and

supporting the African Union forces. They have delivered the security. So, it is our collective


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treasure but African blood has been spilt to achieve this. This is very unusual and rather

special, as it were. So, the African Union forces are there. They have cleared the place up.

Yes, we are going to get constant—it is the asymmetric attacks that will come from Al-

Shabaab. That will continue, we must be quite realistic. But the fact that Somalis are

returning, they are investing.

On the economy, you are beginning to feel an economy in Mogadishu. We must maintain

that, because it then becomes the beacon for the rest of the country. Especially what is

currently still under al-Shabaab control.

Q182 Lord Jay of Ewelme: We will come on to Atalanta in a second, but what we have

been hearing quite a lot is that the anti-piracy operations are only going to work if there is

also a degree of development on land. That approach, that model, would you say that is

plausible?

Alexander Rondos: Absolutely. It is not only plausible, but necessary.

Lord Jay of Ewelme: I know it is necessary.

Alexander Rondos: Oh, yes. It is. Yes. Earlier I think I heard people made mention of

stabilisation. I think this is an absolutely critical issue and it links into the question about

Atalanta and how one deals with piracy. The challenge in Somalia right now is to make sure

that one can synchronise the establishment of civil administration with the advance of the

military. Because as AMISOM clears with its Somali allies, local allies or the Ethiopians clear

areas up, the issue is who moves in and establishes a degree of governance, law and order so

that the citizens can turn around and say, “Well, this is better than Shabaab rule” at the very

least. Now, I believe that in the next year this is the strategic challenge in Somalia. But we

also have to be very imaginative and also widen the angle of the geographic lens. We should

not simply be talking about the stabilisation of areas, if you will, retrieved from Shabaab

control. It is the stabilisation of the entire country, including the coastal areas.


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What does stabilisation mean? Having a modicum of decent Government. You are not

shooting each other and you are part of a decent economy, or an economy that is

functioning. That is why extending the notion of stabilisation and investing in the coastal

areas becomes an absolute key in offering an alternative incentive to communities for whom,

in most instances, and clearly now, reluctantly feel they need to allow or tolerate piracy to

operate from near their communities.

Q183 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Thank you very much for that. Coming on to Atalanta, how

do you think that has performed? How well has it performed in the last couple of years and

what would you see as having been its main achievements in the combating of piracy? A

subsequent point, which we did discuss with Nick Kay and others, is that clearly something

needs to continue beyond 2014. Do you see that happening? How much longer is one going

to have to have a naval operation offshore?

Alexander Rondos: Let us not forget Atalanta is one of a variety of presences in that part of

the Indian Ocean, but Atalanta has been the most active. Now, my assessment would be that

it has done a very impressive job when you think of how a relatively few ships cover a

geographic area that is the size of Europe, in effect. The effect has been quite striking, and I

think that speaks also to the imagination and skill with which the operation has been

commanded from the military, from the naval side. I do want to acknowledge that. Since I

came to my duties it has been Admiral Potts, and it has been the way it has been run. An

awful lot of what they do never comes to the public eye. So let me just drill a little deeper

on that issue.

Firstly, what we have noticed is certainly the attacks by pirates have diminished. There are

far fewer ships now that are held and there are fewer seafarers who are held hostage. But

they are still there and that is a tragic condition that they are in. Now, what the pirates have

been doing is getting mother-ships, so they are extending way, way—it is 1,000 nautical miles


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and beyond—into the Indian Ocean. What I think Atalanta has also been able to do is locate

and chase down the mother-ships. So they are spreading far and wide rather successfully.

That is regarding Atalanta proper.

Then, what we referred to as the disruption of pirate logistical dumps action was taken,

which indeed was very limited. There were two things to bear in mind on that. Firstly, it was

rather useful that the European Union agreed to, if you will, fire shots in anger—if I may put

it that way—and to do it having said it might do it. That is an interesting signal and I, who

have to travel politically in the region, have sensed a difference. At head of Government level

people are saying, “By golly, you actually did it”. It is an interesting political reaction one gets.

Secondly, there are very few caveats on this. Having been given a green light, Admiral Potts

and his commanders can pick and choose when they want to do the next, and that will

depend on climate opportunity and the like. So this is like a Damocles sword that hangs over

the various pirate groups, and they know that at some point it may happen again. It has that

simple effect of, if you will, breaking little bits of the chain that constitute the business of

piracy.

Q184 Lord Jay of Ewelme: On going on after 2014, can you give a brief overview on

that point?

Alexander Rondos: I am sorry, absolutely. Between now and 2014 I think several things

would need to be done if we feel we have a serious exit strategy for Atalanta, if we want to

put it that way. First of all the programme now referred to as EUCAP Nestor has to get

going, and that is why it is more than timely that it begins hopefully this summer. Secondly, I

think within the context of that it is a question of training and equipment and of getting the

various countries really to buy into this. The eastern coast of Africa is, if you will, the wild

west of the littoral of the Indian Ocean—let us put it that way—and it is time to put some


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order there. Let us get local sheriffs trained to do it well in coastal maritime. That is the

objective. If we can start moving on this fast, then I think we begin to have a real effect.

Somaliland and Puntland are fine—this is again going to come back to the issue of the

stabilisation of south central Somalia. It is from right up below Puntland down to Kismayo

and below. That area has to come back under control and be properly policed, as it were. If

we have that then I think we can look ahead to 2014 with some degree of hope, and that

must be matched with real investment from the development side into the east coastal

communities.

Q185 Lord Jay of Ewelme: Do you see the possibility, therefore, of Atalanta not

continuing beyond 2014, or do you assume that in some way or another it will be rolled

over?

Alexander Rondos: It may have to be rolled over. It is very difficult to tell. We cannot

afford to find ourselves in the position in late 2014 where we are saying we have done

nothing towards an exit strategy. The hydraulics will be there, and we will have to assess

that by mid to autumn 2014.

Q186 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: We have heard from other sessions

about the problems of what to do with pirates once captured and, indeed, last week we

were told there were an estimated 2,000 pirates currently awaiting trial and that

prosecution is more likely to happen if there is a possibility of transferring these prisoners

out of the countries where they have been captured. Which countries that have agreed to

take pirates for prosecution are most in need of support and assistance? What, in your view,

can the EU offer and what does it offer?

Alexander Rondos: The ones that have been most helpful, obviously, are the Seychelles and

Mauritius, but the Seychelles has a capacity problem. They actually have their own criminals

also to deal with, and I think that is an issue that we should treat with the greatest


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understanding and sympathy. Puntland and Somaliland have offered and have helped. I was

listening to some of the earlier conversation you were having on this, and I think the prisons

that have been built to deal with pirates are in fact pretty good. I had our people check so

that we can be sure of that.

There is a very interesting challenge here that we are talking about 2,000 people so far. I

want to step back a bit to pose a larger question—which I must confess I posed within our

system in the EU—which is that we have programmes for the demilitarisation of militias, we

do training programmes for the demobilisation of people who have been killing on behalf of

warlords in Somalia. We do this all over the world, such programmes. The pirates that are

captured, many of these are just kids, they are like the mules for drug runners. They are

intimidated—

Q187 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: Are they all male? are they all men?

Alexander Rondos: Yes, I think so. I am sure the report would have come in very quickly if

a female pirate had been found, but to my knowledge, yes. I think there is a broader issue

here. We need to ask ourselves once we get them: how long are we going to keep a 17 year

old kid who has been put on to a ship and told to go out and possibly make a bit of money

on the side? Are we going to keep them in prison for 15 years, or is there something else

we could possibly do? I would love to catch the kingpins who have been running all of this

and put them away for life. That is one thing, but—

Q188 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: Would it all collapse if the kingpins were

eliminated?

Alexander Rondos: It would probably make a huge—yes, absolutely. This is organised

crime. Piracy is now a speculative exercise. The thing that we already have to be thinking of

is that, if piracy is no longer lucrative, the worrying thing is that these are people who are

probably sufficiently organised to move into illicit movement of guns, drugs or people.


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Q189 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: So they have to be the target?

Alexander Rondos: Yes, and so that is what we must get to. Sorry, I have drifted from your

question, but I wanted to put it in a broader context.

Puntland and Somaliland already do it. In Somalia, Mogadishu do not even consider it—no

one would when they have trouble just keeping their own prisoners. It is just out of the

question. So the question then is: are there any other countries that could do it? Countries

like Kenya and Tanzania are understanding but are a bit reluctant to throw themselves fully

into it.

There has been a parallel discussion, as I am sure you are aware, as to where should people

be tried. There was one suggestion that Arusha should be turned into a centre. I noticed

recently that a country in the Gulf offered to set up an international court for this but we do

still have a problem, which is: when they are captured, what are the judicial procedures by

which pirates can then be taken from whatever is the flag country to be tried somewhere?

That still remains an overall challenge. There is no doubt about that.

Q190 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: Just picking up on what you said, which

was very interesting, about the youth of a lot of the pirates and whether we want to throw

them in prison and throw away the key, I asked last week about the EU development fund

and was told that it is to go towards general support. Is that something that could be used in

rehabilitation, as it were?

Alexander Rondos: Yes, with anything that is a programme that could be developed and

that shows it could deliver some results, our systems would and should look at it.

Q191 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: So a rehabilitation programme of some

kind is something that you are looking at?

Alexander Rondos: I have asked. I want to be clear: I have absolutely no line authority in

the EU—I am like an envoy. So what I do is raise questions and try to prod systems. I cannot


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and do not want to commit the system in any way, but to me it is just absolutely logical. We

do this everywhere else in the world for all sorts of other people who actually do even

nastier things.

The Chairman: Let us move on. Lord Jopling, I know we have gone through some of these

issues, but probably you would like to pursue one or two of them.

Q192 Lord Jopling: I wonder if you would tell us how effective you believe the

prosecution and sentencing has been of pirates up to now, and to what extent it could be

improved? You have talked about countries that might assist in doing this. I have always been

rather surprised that some of the very rich Gulf states have not been prepared to assist over

this because, after all, they have a great interest in the transportation of oil. I have always

been surprised that people have not talked about the willingness or failure of the Gulf states.

I was also very interested in a point we just did latch on to a few moments ago. We have

been sent a report of your press conference two days ago in Brussels, which says,

“Therefore it was important to pursue the financiers of piracy through judicial means.” That

maybe sounds rather an optimistic aim. How practical is it in fact to get at those people who

are well protected in an area where judicial means are pretty minimal?

Then finally, of the prisons you are talking about in Somalia, are the UN building just one? I

asked this previously and did not receive a good answer. How many inmates will they take,

and is it not unbelievable that the UN people there are not armed? Sorry, that is a whole

string of questions.

Alexander Rondos: That is fine. Let me start with the last because I do not think I can

answer it adequately, frankly, and what I would like to do is go and ask my system to come

up with all the facts and send them to you and to the Committee. I think that is the fairest

way to deal with it. I would just be fluffing it in the mean time.


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Regarding the Gulf, interestingly I am going to Dubai next week—in fact, Minister of State

Bellingham will be there as well—for an anti-piracy conference. The Gulf does take an

interest. It has been certainly my view, and the view of several of us in the European Union,

that there is a larger issue here. It is not just the Gulf and anti-piracy; it is the Gulf and the

Horn of Africa. They have an historical link that long predates our presence there. It is a

religious link, they are at trade, everything. So I think given the degree of our investment in

the Horn, it is time we engaged the Gulf in a real serious political discussion. We use this

word “transparency”, and indeed we are very open with what we do, so we would like to

see some, if you will, reciprocal behaviour from the Gulf. There is heavy investment going

from the Gulf. There is a lot of trade. We would like to engage them and say, “We are not

exclusive by any means, but could we all see if we are on the same sheet of music regarding

what our intentions are for this region?” Within that context is the piracy. The United Arab

Emirates have in fact put up some money and have opened up the possibility that we should

have a joint discussion with them—when I say we, I mean the European Union—about doing

some things jointly regarding anti-piracy, and that is one of the purposes why I am going to

go and spend two or three days there. But I want to emphasise the context is a much

broader one, and I would like to engage them much more on that.

When I used the words “judicial means” I probably am not being sufficiently expert—I used

the wrong word. What I mean quite simply is we need to conduct fast, deep, forensic,

criminal investigations that are global about who is making money and using money to

finance piracy. That is what I mean. I do not care what means are used, but the sooner we

get hold of these people the better.

Q193 Lord Jopling: In an almost throw-away remark you said, if I caught you right, that

Henry Bellingham is going to an anti-piracy conference—

Alexander Rondos: That is what I was told just outside by Nick Kay.


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Lord Jopling: Did we know that?

The Chairman: I do not think that we know it. I am not aware that we know it.

Lord Jopling: It is news to me.

Alexander Rondos: I understood that there is to be representation from the UK.

Q194 Lord Jopling: You are going to it?

Alexander Rondos: I am going to it.

Q195 Lord Jopling: Who is convening it?

Alexander Rondos: The United Arab Emirates. It is within the context of the International

Contact Group, I think, on piracy, and it is within that the UAE once or twice a year does a

big conference.

Lord Jopling: Because that seems to be significant and we had not picked it up until now,

so I think that is something we need to have a look at.

The Chairman: Indeed, yes.

Q196 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: Could I ask you about getting at the kingpins, which

seems to be such an absolutely vital way of stopping the piracy more or less? The kingpins

and financiers are obviously the same people in most things, and then there will be links right

through until you get to these unfortunate young men actually on the boats. It makes one

think of beggar masters and mafia and all sorts of not particularly closely related equivalents.

It is a question of how much the pirates who are being held and prosecuted know about

who the people are who are, as it were, their ultimate bosses, and to what extent that

knowledge can be legitimately used and extracted. Maybe they do not know very much

because there are so many stages in-between, but it seems to be a possible source of lead

back to the root, as it were.

Alexander Rondos: Absolutely, and the people that are investigating are on to that already.


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Q197 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: I am just interested by this press cutting

we have about links between the mafia and Somali pirates that you are quoted as having

been looking into. Is that the case?

Alexander Rondos: I just do not know. I am aware—

Q198 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: It says here you are looking into it.

Alexander Rondos: Yes, but we just find out—

Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: It is just for the record.

Alexander Rondos: No, absolutely. There is a fellow based in Paris who did some research

and claims that this occurs. But people better equipped than I need to go into our system

and check and see. It is a neck of the woods that is so strange that anything is possible, but it

also allows anyone with a lively imagination to concoct any type of conspiracy theory so we

have to try and navigate in that one.

Q199 Lord Inge: You were talking about the new aid. What are you hoping to get out of

it? Are any of the other Gulf states showing any real interest in it?

Alexander Rondos: They all have stated that they are interested. What I would like to get

out of it, as I was mentioning earlier, is to establish a degree of, if you will, conversation with

the much higher levels of leadership there and engage them in a discussion with us and the

European Union on two or three key points about the Horn, about security, about some of

the political relations that exist and then on things like anti-piracy.

Let me put it really quite bluntly. We have a tendency to say, “Well, if we go to the Gulf, the

only thing we are going to do there is go and ask them for money”, and they do not take

kindly to that. So there is a different conversation that needs to be had and the type of

conversation I would like us to develop with them in the Gulf is to say, “We, the European

Union and the west, are financing a very substantial military operation carried out by

Africans to bring security to a region that actually brings security to the whole of the Gulf. In


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that context, therefore, could we not possibly see how we share some of the costs, or are

we just going to foot this bill forever, and just be the nice people and someone else’s useful

idiot?”, if I may put it crudely. That is the type of conversation I would like to have and just

see where it takes us.

Q200 Lord Inge: If they were to volunteer to provide some of their capabilities, would

you like that or not?

Alexander Rondos: Absolutely, why not if it is within the framework that we are all agreed?

Q201 Lord Inge: The reason I ask that question is because they get fed up with us asking

them for money.

Alexander Rondos: Precisely, exactly, and there is no reason why we should not share the

burden in all sorts of ways.

The Chairman: It is an interesting area of investigation.

Q202 Lord Jopling: Can I come back to the point that I raised first of all on the issue of

the Gulf? Do you see any possibility of them helping with prosecuting and imprisoning?

Alexander Rondos: I think it is possible and it is one of the things I would like—

Q203 Lord Jopling: Because that would help enormously.

Alexander Rondos: I agree with you completely. We should pursue that further, and I think

Qatar has already indicated that it would be open to a discussion, but I would like to see

which other of the Emirates would also like to talk and whether the Saudis want to discuss

the matter. I agree with you completely.

Q204 The Chairman: Do the Iranians take any interest in this area at all?

Alexander Rondos: You bet. It is fascinating. Let me put it this way; it is funny there are

some issues—and anti-piracy is one—that brings strange groups of people together for a

common purpose.

Q205 The Chairman: So we wait and listen. Good, okay.


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Alexander Rondos: It is very interesting. If I were a pirate I would not want to be caught by

the Iranians, judging from the recent record of Iranian reaction to pirates.

Q206 Lord Williams of Elvel: I have a very quick question on this operation against a

pirate base. Does this mark a fundamental change in policy? In other words, will there be

repeated attacks and, if so, what is the legality for these operations? What would the

reaction of the neighbouring countries be?

Alexander Rondos: They could be repeated because the legal basis upon which this latest

attack occurred was the member states of the EU reviewed and came up with a clear set of

rules of engagement and authority and what is “go” and “no go” for the operational

commander. The case has been made that there is a way in which—or rather the instruction

is clear legally, and that is mandated by the Council of the European Union, so that is the

legal basis. But within that context they have been told that they are authorised to go after

these dumps from which the pirates operate and to make sure that absolutely every

measure is taken to avoid civilian loss of life.

It is entirely up to the operational commander from now on if he chooses to launch another

assault, and it all depends on the season as well, but it is entirely up to him. So there may be

others, and I will not know—or will only know hours before—if he chooses to do that. But

we are entering into the rainy season, which makes it more complicated. I hope I have

addressed the legality—

Q207 The Chairman: Sorry, could I just check on this because clearly we are not in the

19th century any more and Europe cannot decide it is just going to intervene on the

territorial integrity of African states. Presumably, there is a UN background to this.

Alexander Rondos: Yes, absolutely. With the Somali Government, for example, the coastal

states were asked to offer their approval and action would not have been taken without


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that, and that was a precondition for actually being able to proceed with the operation. Yes,

thank you for correcting me.

Q208 Lord Williams of Elvel: The views of the surrounding—

Alexander Rondos: The reactions I have received—the official reaction—has been

satisfactory. They may not want to state it publicly, but they are delighted. This is a scourge

and I can well understand there is no need to make a noise about it, but they have

communicated their satisfaction.

Q209 Lord Inge: How effective do you think the European Union training mission to

Somalia has been, and how are the preparations that you get notice of progressing?

Alexander Rondos: By the training mission you mean what we do in Uganda where we train

the EUTM? My assessment is that it has been very good. Why? First of all, we have been able

to identify, or find a way of identifying the right types of recruit. That was when an early

lesson was learned so it is not just purely a clan-based affair; there is a spread from around

the country from different clans brought together. Secondly, taking them away to Uganda

means that they have been given, my military colleagues assure me, a first-rate training.

Thirdly, these people—

Q210 Lord Inge: Sorry, can I just interrupt, did they come from throughout Somalia, or

do you take the southern ones and northern ones or what?

Alexander Rondos: Throughout, with the exception of Somaliland, but the attempt is

constantly to mix from different clans. That is what becomes important because if you do

not do that, what you end up doing is training people who are clan based who at any time

can become another clan militia. The object is to try to create—

Lord Inge: Whereas in the British Army we do actually base it on clans.

Alexander Rondos: But somehow the regimental system—


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Q211 Lord Inge: I know it is slightly different, but behind that is a serious question

because mixing them sounds easy on paper but how easy is it in practice?

Alexander Rondos: It is not easy. The idea behind it is if a Somali national army is needed,

the structure of command especially in the officer corps is going to have to be one that is

able to reach beyond pure clan-based interests. That has been the thinking behind it and in

fact this training mission now is increasingly going to focus on the middle-ranking officer

training. It has been very effective. The challenge is the following: by the end of, say, next

year, 3,000 or 4,000 people will have been trained. That maketh not a national army, so the

debate that goes on that we are all engaged in is: what then is the broader programme for

security sector reform? Are we creating an army? Are we trying to create a national

gendarmerie? What is it that is needed, and who is going to invest in this?

Q212 Lord Inge: What have we lain down at the moment is the basic role of an army?

Alexander Rondos: To protect the frontiers and to protect the country from attack. That is

what it is.

Q213 Lord Inge: External attack? Nothing to do with internally at all?

Alexander Rondos: No, and yet they are involved in attack right now because they are

attacking Shabelle. They are operating alongside the AMISOM forces.

If I may, you asked me about the other programme, EUCAP Nestor. My hope is this is going

to get off the ground fast. Again, I want to go back to what we were talking about earlier, I

think there is a need for a conversation with the Gulf countries, who have a vital interest in

the success of this. The maritime security of Somalia is of vital interest to them. They are

willing to invest, and they want to do something jointly and we need to take that a step

further.

Q214 Lord Inge: Are you talking about investment, or what are you talking about as far

as the Gulf states are concerned?


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Alexander Rondos: It is not clear. They have already indicated—

Q215 Lord Inge: You say “they”. They all have, have they?

Alexander Rondos: I am talking about the UAE. The UAE has expressed an interest in

working together. We are providing what we refer to as capacity building—in other words,

we are providing skills or training for skills. Sooner or later someone is going to have to

provide the kit to do this, and therein lies the issue, and that is where we need to broaden

the discussion out in my view, because only when we have achieved that can we really talk

about an exit strategy for Atalanta and we will have begun to truly police the coastline

effectively.

Lord Inge: That is quite a big task.

Alexander Rondos: Very big. I agree with you entirely.

Q216 Baroness Henig: I have a number of questions. The first one actually relates to

your appointment. I see in the first instance you were appointed for six months. I am

assuming that will be renewed at the end of June since that comes to an end quite soon.

Alexander Rondos: I was not going to come here for a farewell visit, no.

Q217 Baroness Henig: So how is that working then? You are appointed for six months

in the first instance—

Alexander Rondos: Yes, and then it is renewed for a year, and it has been—

Q218 Baroness Henig: So it has just been renewed for a year, and then—

Alexander Rondos: Yes as of 1 July it starts again for a year.

Q219 Baroness Henig: Is it a rolling year or—

Alexander Rondos: Yes.

Q220 Baroness Henig: So it will continue?

Alexander Rondos: Yes, unless the member states choose to discontinue me at any point.


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Q221 Baroness Henig: Clearly, in practice you describe yourself as an envoy, from

which I take it that your concept of this is that you will be based out there for most of the

time rather than in Brussels or Athens? How do you see the way you operate in practice?

Alexander Rondos: I will, I think, spend at least half of my time if not more—that is what I

have been doing already—in the region. Part of my task is also to do exactly what I am doing

today—and I consider it a fundamental obligation—which is to come to the member states

and the Parliaments and the like and explain what this is. After all it is you all, and in every

other country, who are voting serious funds and otherwise endorsing what we do. So I

regard it as my obligation also to come back and report. That takes up a good deal of time,

and then I have to be in Brussels, which I am still discovering—that is the only way I can put

it.

Baroness Henig: That takes time as well, I would think, yes.

Alexander Rondos: I am not sure I will ever learn entirely, but it is complicated.

Q222 Baroness Henig: In terms of support, are you quite happy so far? I think you are

absolutely right that you need to go around the member countries and that is a way of

making sure you do get support. What do you need to be effective in this role? Do you have

everything at the moment that you need from the member states, or is there more that you

need?

Alexander Rondos: One could always want more of everything. No, I am perfectly content

because I have taken the view that I want to be very targeted in the sense that there is no

point in me interfering in operation issues. What I have to make sure of is—there is a

regional issue here. Somalia is a regional issue, so very few people are given the authority to

try to stitch the region together, and the fundamental question I am asking myself is: in this

region that is marred by multiple flash-points, which become very ugly very quickly, can we

eventually start thinking of how we build an architecture for security so these countries can


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find ways of avoiding coming to blows? Right now we have invasions on order and at will

occurring—incursions occur all over the place. This is the Balkans in 1992, let me put it that

way. So my task is to start doing more and more with, if you like, the shuttling that can begin

to bring people together. The support I need is more the access to be able to talk at the

right levels in the member states so that everyone understands what it is I think needs to be

done and what my recommendations are. I keep a very small team, and that is the way I

prefer to do it, so I prefer to have a tight little ship that can move fast.

Baroness Henig: Yes, and yours is very much a strategic role then. That is how you are

seeing it. Thank you.

Q223 The Chairman: How do you feel you interact with the External Action Service

and the heads of mission in some of the states that you cover? Is that straightforward or

how do you use their own expertise? How does that work?

Alexander Rondos: Absolutely. I draw on them because they have a lot of expertise that is

local. They have all been very welcoming because in many ways I can do certain things that

are very difficult. They are bound by the boundaries within which they operate, not so much

bureaucratically but geographically; I am able to move and, if you will, connect certain dots

that help—for example, someone in Nairobi dealing with Addis Ababa and talking to the

leadership of both countries.

Q224 The Chairman: How many heads of mission are in your patch, Mr Rondos? Just to

give us an idea.

Alexander Rondos: Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia. Six.

Q225 The Chairman: Are you anticipating having your own office out there at all?

Alexander Rondos: Yes, precisely because of the relative flexibility we have, and frankly at a

little bit of my insistence that we have to fly the flag in Mogadishu, I have been asked if I, as

the EU Special Representative, will open an office in Mogadishu so that is beginning as we


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speak. I received the authorisation from the member states to do that, and a modest budget,

so I will have always two to three people in Mogadishu. That way we will be the eyes and

ears, and hopefully the ones who are talking to the system in Somalia as well as working with

AMISOM and the others.

Q226 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: Could I ask: how does that link up with flak jackets

and armoured vehicles? You must have to have a very secure establishment and that is

costly.

Alexander Rondos: Absolutely, yes. My budget was just approved a few days ago on that.

Q227 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: You likened what is happening now in Somalia to

the Balkans in 1992, does that mean there is some ethnic cleansing going on?

Alexander Rondos: No. I was using the analogy in a different way. It is more a broader

region I am talking about. Look at Sudan. Right now we have fighting going on somewhere in

the middle of Sudan. With Eritrea and Ethiopia, there are daily hostilities on the frontier up

there; in Somalia, there is actually a campaign, with daily fighting. That could easily be broken

down to endless separate little battles, but those are more under control. But if you sit back

and look at this picture, this region is a series of flash-points and we are held hostage by

each one of them. That is where I liken it a bit to the Balkans. Every time someone decides

to cause trouble we just become transfixed by that and are sucked into this particular issue

without sitting back and saying, “Is there a broader framework we can put to, if you will,

herd the cats?” It is not easy.

Q228 Baroness Eccles of Moulton: Is this clan versus clan, is it?

Alexander Rondos: In the case within Somalia it tends to be that, but then al-Shabaab puts

the Jihadist overlay on it. So it is not entirely just clan versus clan; it is the marginalised who

have turned to a Jihadi agenda. It is very mixed. But in the broader region it is your classic

frontier disputes between cattle rustlers and who controls a bit of land. It is irredentism—


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that is the elephant in the room in the whole of the Horn of Africa, and that is why Kenya

and Ethiopia are very intrusive because they have very large Somali minorities on the

Ogaden and in the northern territories of Kenya. So there are various causes.

Q229 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: You said you were planning some recommendations

about what needs to be done. I wanted to look at the root causes of the problem. These

kingpins, as you described them, for their muscle they get these unemployed young people

from Somalia; they get unemployed fishermen for their navigational skills who know the sea.

You have described Somalia’s economy as improving. We need to look at some targeted

programmes for unemployed youngsters or fishermen who are going to be recruited to do

this. Are you going to be looking at that?

Alexander Rondos: Absolutely, it has already begun. The challenge is access. The ideas are

there and the programmes can be done, but the issue is this. In an ideal world, you could say

we are going to take some money and we are going to risk it. We are going to send it to

those coastal communities that we cannot even visit, and therefore we cannot be sure we

can account for the money. If I were a private sector risk investor for the promotion of the

coastal communities, I would say I am going to take 3% of my annual turnover and I am going

to risk it. I would do it that way, just to check. This is the real challenge because the auditors

will come and they will say, “Can you prove how your money has been spent?” That is what

blocks the system.

Q230 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: How much is IGAD involved in this kind of planning?

Alexander Rondos: To a certain extent one of my conclusions reached after my first few

months is that actually we need as EU to engage more with IGAD and help give them more

capacity. If we are working on the assumption the best structures for the whole of Africa are

regional organisations, this is the sum of how you build up security. You have ECOWAS in

the west and you have the East African Community. IGAD should begin to play that role in


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that part of the Horn. I think there is ample room to do more and for the countries to pitch

in and accept a wider role.

Q231 Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: If we come out with a report suggesting specifics in

relation to that, would it be helpful in strengthening your arm for help?

Alexander Rondos: Absolutely, yes. Please, emphasise stabilisation: let us wake up and get

going on stabilisation generally in Somalia. In the next 18 months, even where access is

difficult and you cannot do the very long term programmes, there is a gap between end of

conflict and the ability to install serious development programmes. You have to fill that space

fast. That is first. Secondly, the coastal communities are critical. Thirdly, what is the

structure regionally that can become the catalyst, if not the engine, for bringing people

together—to be the forum, as it were, where serious thinking politics but also programmes

can occur? Please, I would welcome it.

Q232 Baroness Young of Hornsey: Your comments on that interest me. My question

is mainly about EU development and the humanitarian aid, but you talked just now about this

gap between the end of conflict and the next phase. Do you think the EU aid as it is

currently set up is able to fill that gap? Is there something you can see in the future that

would work to ensure that transition period is effective?

Alexander Rondos: I think we are bound in the EU by all sorts of rules and so I want to be

very clear about that. The staff of the EU that I see in the field I think would be happy to

plunge into all sorts of programmes, but it is their necks—not physically, but

professionally—that are on the line because people then ask, “Through whom do you give

the money, how can you account for it?” That is one. Having said that, I think there is a

much broader question that applies certainly to the EU, and I have discussed it with

colleagues here in Britain. We have a lot of cases around the world where we now need to

start understanding what you do when conflict ends. Which is the best way of doing it? I am


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not sure we have the answers yet. There is too much theology and not enough practice

going on at the moment. Right now we are fighting a war, which we are possibly winning

and, by golly, we need to consolidate that victory and we have no time to sit and have

seminars. That is the issue.

Who are the types of agencies? This gets you into very interesting territory. There is the

United Nations, which does a lot because we as the EU are really non-operational. We

finance others—it is very important to bear that in mind. So we finance a lot to the UN. I

think it is time to talk to the UN a bit about how in certain circumstances they can move

with an alacrity that is equal to the occasion. That I think might be needed.

There is a wide array of NGOs who do very good work but very often you cannot go and

supervise. An NGO does not have an interest in making a mess of a programme. If they do,

it is because politically something went wrong. I would be more liberal in my attitude to that

and be willing to take the risk.

We then come into a very interesting issue, especially in Somalia. Unlike in other parts of

the world—I take a place like Ethiopia 20 or 25 years ago, when I worked in NGOs there; it

was the domain of all the Christian NGOs because it was a Christian country—we are in

Somalia, which is Muslim. In areas where al-Shabaab controlled, they do not want to see the

Christians at all. The only agencies that have access are Muslim NGOs. If you are looking at

it completely objectively and you say, “How can we reach people who are in need?” then

you get together with the Muslim NGOs and you finance them. It is as simple as that. But

they are not part of the traditional systems that you are all accustomed to here. So I think

there is another very interesting discussion to be had with all these agencies that belong to

countries that are part of the Organisation of Islamic Conferences and the like, some of

which are very good. What I would like to see is them talking more with our NGOs and the


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like, because the reality is now, in Somalia, access is in the hands of countries like Turkey

and NGOs that come from the Muslim world. It is as simple as that.

Q233 Baroness Young of Hornsey: That is very interesting and points to the need for

more imagination, flexibility, putting aside some cultural baggage and so on in order to effect

that change. Just going on to talk about how successful the EU development and

humanitarian aid has been in Somalia and how that has been disbursed, I wonder if you could

give us your views on that and perhaps say a little bit about how you think that success has

been measured? Also, in view of your last comments, might there need to be some different

way of thinking about what success looks like? Sorry, that is a big barrage of questions.

Alexander Rondos: Yes, I know. There is a very interesting issue, very broadly at the

moment, before I get to the specific question. The EU, for the first time—unlike, say, what

you are accustomed to here in Britain—is getting used to the idea that it is doing diplomacy,

defence and development. The system is still getting used to that, and it is both conceptual

and political. How do we avoid the gears grinding and getting the machinery of the EU to

understand how you synchronise and plan all these things together? That is the very broad

context because that then raises questions about what is development, where is the

humanitarian, and what are the various options. Now, specifically on the humanitarian and

developmental, my own view is it is very good. It is effective and they choose good partners.

I think what often frustrates the EU officials themselves is that they would love to be able to

move more quickly but the rules are that things have to be very carefully planned, and all the

rest of it, for reasons of accountability. So, yes, when a programme is up and running, on the

whole, it is really rather good.

On the humanitarian stuff, I have to take my hat off to the people at ECHO, which is the EU

humanitarian organisation. Last year with the famine they were streets ahead of everyone.


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They predicted it, they pre-positioned stuff and they saved an awful lot of lives under very

difficult circumstances but the system stretched.

As a concluding comment on this, we are talking about Somalia, but right now Sudan risks

imploding with all the human consequences there and we have the Sahel that has suddenly

just erupted. So there is a real stretch that is beginning to occur and I think it affects many

countries but certainly the EU as a triage. There is a limited pot of money and suddenly

there are new sets of problems and those problems have to be addressed, not just in a

humanitarian and developmental way, but also there are security issues. The money that is

provided to the EU, for instance, for what is known as the Africa Peace Facility, which is

what finances AMISOM and the fighting there, is development money. Working on the

proposition that you do not have development without security, therefore let us get the

security done. There is a real stretch right now both in terms of personnel and on

resources.

Q234 The Chairman: Finally, just to tie up a few loose ends—I am aware of the time—I

have a factual question on co-ordination between the EU and the UNDP rule of law and

security programme. Does that co-ordinate well? I know Lord Jopling was keen to follow up

something you might have heard on the previous session that was around the firearms on

vessels now and why this is a UK issue in terms of legality. I do not know whether you have

any idea as to whether this is a common problem among other EU nations in the area. That

may not be an area you are aware of.

Lastly, coming back to Atalanta, I want to ask about the mission ending in 2014. This has

been rolled over several times before, but does the piracy industry out there have it as a red

letter date when that mission finishes. Do they think that we will put the investment in then,

or is there an assumption that it will just continue? I suppose having done a report recently

on the Afghan police mission, we just really had the impression that the mission there was


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going to have a huge problem just because everybody knew the military end date was at a

particular time. I do not know whether you feel that is reflected in this or not.

Alexander Rondos: Let me start on the last first. In one form or another there will be anti-

piracy operations that will go on so long as there are pirates around. I think it is as simple as

that. Whether it is the EU or whatever, that will continue.

Q235 The Chairman: Everybody knows that?

Alexander Rondos: Yes.

Q236 The Chairman: Fine, let us leave that at that.

Alexander Rondos: Secondly, on firearms on vessels, different countries seem to react very

differently. A lot of this requires legislation. In some countries there is the request that

actually formal armed forces are put on. In Germany, if I am right, this was raised recently by

some of the industry there. The German Government obviously objected so you have

different variants of the issue, but what is clear is that the presence of trained armed men on

the boats has proven quite a successful deterrent and so long as piracy is a threat in that

area, it is a practice that is encouraged.

EU, UNDP, on that particular programme that you mentioned, we think it is good and in fact

I would like to see it expanded. It is very effective and it is going to be key in Somalia.

Q237 The Chairman: As we said in the previous evidence session, this co-ordination of

work among member states, the EU and others is very important to us. Would you agree

with the comments from the previous witnesses—forgive me, it has just gone completely

out of my mind for some reason, but I think that they were from DFID—that this all works

well?

Alexander Rondos: Yes, let us be clear. People can become co-ordination fetishists and they

spend more time having coffees and meetings as opposed to getting the job done. So we

have to be quite serious, I think, here. What I do agree with is what Nick Kay was saying,


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and I feel very strongly on that. I do not call it co-ordination; we are actually involved in the

joint management of responsibilities here and it is on the ground. What is needed now is

more people in Mogadishu getting together there and dealing with a lot of hard operational

issues that require real close co-operation, synchronisation and whatever else. That is the

issue. Whether that is over politics or over how money is spent or how the stabilisation

programme is done, I think it is the people on the coalface who need to be encouraged just

to be doing much more together. The way we judge who should be involved in the co-

ordination is not simply because you exist; it is by what you do. It is as simple as that.

The Chairman: Mr Rondos, thank you very much indeed for joining us. We all look

forward to seeing you out in Mogadishu when we can come out there ourselves and enjoy

the vibrancy of the cityscape that is clearly there that you described so well. We wish you

every success. Thank you very much indeed for being a part of our session.

Alexander Rondos: You are welcome, any time. Thank you very much for having me.

Dr Lee Willett – Oral evidence (QQ19 – QQ63)

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Dr Lee Willett – Oral evidence (QQ19 – QQ63)

Evidence to be found under Anyimadu

Dr Lee Willett – Supplementary written evidence

Baroness Henig: My problem is about the level of co-ordination between the EU’s different

elements, the naval force Atalanta, the training mission in Somalia and EUCAP Nestor. In particular,

I want to ask how the EUCAP Nestor initiative is progressing and whether the timetables are going

to be reached in terms of making that effective.

The aim of EUCAP Nestor is to assist regional states, including Somalia, to develop a self-

sustainable capacity to enhance their own maritime security and governance. EUCAP Nestor

is run by civilians and supported by military input from EUNAVFOR/Operation ATALANTA.

It is a key part of the EU’s effort to develop a comprehensive approach to dealing with the

problem of Somali piracy, and in particular through working closely with a number of other

international organisations and agencies, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime (UNODC).

Launched in December 2011, EUCAP Nestor has an initial two-year mandate.20 Since 1

January 2012, the EU’s efforts in Nestor have been strengthened by the role of Alexander

Rondos, the EU’s Special Representative to the Horn of Africa.

The central element of EUCAP Nestor’s role is maritime security capacity building, looking

to build within the regional states an enduring ability to police and secure their own waters

and exclusive economic zones. EUCAP Nestor also focuses on training, information sharing

and the development of an effective judicial infrastructure. Other core elements of its role

are humanitarian aid and development co-operation.

The European Union argues that a key component of its ability to integrate effectively with

other organisations and agencies is the fact that it takes a bespoke approach for each

country and each case.21 The intent for Nestor is that it will work very closely with

20 See European Union, ‘EUCAP Nestor’. Available on-line at: http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-

operations/eucap-nestor . Accessed 9 July 2012; Council of the European Union, ‘Fight against Piracy: Council Launches EU

Action to Strengthen Maritime Capacities in the Horn of Africa’. Press Release 18321/3/11 Rev 3. 12 December 2011.

Available on-line at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126796.pdf>. Accessed 9

July 2012. 21 European Union. ‘EUCAP NESTOR: (Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian

Ocean)’. Available on-line at: http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1617222/factsheet__eucap_nestor_en_.pdf . Accessed 9 July

2012.

http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eucap-nestor

http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eucap-nestor

http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1617222/factsheet__eucap_nestor_en_.pdf

Dr Lee Willett – Supplementary written evidence

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ATALANTA’s naval forces, with the EU Training Mission in Somalia and with the EU’s

regional maritime security training centre in Djibouti.

When viewed in the context of EUNAVFOR’s own mandate extension, in terms of

expanding its area of operations to include activities ashore, the establishment of a bespoke

organisation in Nestor to focus specifically on maritime security capacity-building can be

seen as part of a broader effort by the EU to increase the pressure on the pirates while also

enabling the Somali governments and peoples to take greater responsibility for their own

security. It may be too early to tell just how effective Nestor’s efforts to maximise the

synergy of its influence through multi-agency integration will be. However, Nestor’s

establishment fits neatly with the wider strategic message of a dual-track EU approach –

solving the problem at sea while also enabling the improvement of security ashore. Nestor –

with its focus on maritime security capacity-building, training, information-sharing and

building effective governance through the role of law – is able to contribute to both tracks of

this policy. Thus, it is part of the EU’s effort to communicate and demonstrate its strategic

commitment to this issue.

July 2012

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