europe and the falkland islands crisis 1982

Journal of Common Market Studies Volume XXII, No. 4June 1984 0021-9886 $3.00

Europe and the Falkland Islands Crisis 1982*

GEOFFREY E D W A R D S

David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies

On 2 April 1982 Argentinian forces invaded the Falkland Islands. The United Kingdom’s reaction was to break off diplomatic relations, freeze Argentinian assets in London, impose a ban on the export of arms and an embargo on imports from Argentina. At the same time a task force of naval and civilian shipping was mobilised and sent as quickly as possible to the South Atlantic with orders to re-establish British administration in the Islands.

Argentina’s unprovoked aggression was promptly condemned by the ten member states of the European Community, many of whose Political Directors happened to be meeting in Brussels on 2 April. Four days later the British Government asked its Community partners to ban Argentinian imports. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) met on 6 and 7 April. Political Directors met on the morning of 9 April, Good Friday, and COREPER the same afternoon and again on Saturday, 10 April. The imposition of an import ban was then announced by Foreign Ministers. The precise texts of the embargo were agreed on 14 April and entered into effect two days later. Rarely had the Community moved with such speed.

In taking their decision, Britain’s Community partners were strongly influenced by moves made at the United Nations. The Ten’s declaration of 2 April, for example, referred to the call made by the President of the Security Council on 1 April for restraint to be shown and for negotiations on the future of the Falklands to be continued. But of crucial importance was Security Council Resolution 502 agreed on 3 April and drafted by the UK

* The author very gratefully acknowedges his debt to a number of officials and others in London, Brussels and elsewhere who commented on an earlier draft of this article. The author is responsible for any remaining errors.

The article was written as a contribution to the study being undertaken by the Institut f i r Europaische Politik in Bonn on the FRC and the European Community and EPC.

296 EUROPE AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS 1982 ambassador to the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Argentinian forces and for both parties to seek a “diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Resolution 502 secured widespread support for the UK’s position, not least among the other members of the Community.

The United Nations, somewhat surprisingly perhaps in view of the usual Conservative Party criticisms of it, became a focal point for the UK Government. So too did the American Administration which was clearly the only government likely to have any influence with the Argentinian Junta if it chose to use it. Thus, welcome though the declaration of Community solidarity was, the Community was inevitably only one centre of UK attention and, after the imposition of Community sanctions against Argentina, it became almost secondary, at least until its support began to fall apart. The fact that the Ten could not maintain unanimity was not wholly unrelated perhaps to this lack ofattention. On the other hand, the continued imposition of sanctions by even eight member states in the middle of an armed conflict cannot, in Community terms, be considered unsuccessful. Moreover, the inter-relationship between European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the European Community during the crisis marked a step of importance in the gradual evolution of a European foreign policy.

THE BACKGROUND

This is not the place for even a brief history of the Falkland Islands crisis as such or the events which led up to it.’ It is enough perhaps to indicate some of those factors which had an important bearing on the attitudes adopted by the UK and its partners and allies. There was, for example, considerable controversy in the UK over whether Mrs. Thatcher’s government had itself contributed to the Junta’s miscalculation of Britain’s likely response to their seizure of the Falklands by actions such as that of announcing the intention to withdraw HMS Endurance. Whatever the case, Mrs. Thatcher’s determination to regain the Islands was immediately made clear.

Important also in establishing a framework in which the UK Government was obliged to act was the House of Commons. The House played a critical role in ensuring that the Falklands had remained an issue in Anglo- Argentinian relations. In debates in the House, most notably that in December 1980, the Falkland Islands lobby roved effectively organized, encompassing MPs from all political parties? MPs had insisted that the

‘The Franks Committee Report deals with many of the events leading up to the invasion, see The Falkland I s l a d Review, Report of a Committee of Privy Counrcllors. Cmnd 8787 January 1983.

‘In December 1981 an Early Day Motion (a device which provides MPs with the opportunity of making known their views without taking up the time ofthe House) in favour ofcontinued support for the Falklands Islands and their population was signed by 170 MPs drawn from all parties.

GEOFFREY EDWARDS 297 Government should take several conditions into account in any future negotiations. Among these were that the wishes of the Islanders should be

paramount”, to quote Peter Shore, then the Labour Party’s foreign affairs spoke~man.~ The demand was to have a continuing influence on British policy, not least during the search for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

The December 1980 debate also revealed a widespread hostility towards the FCO which was again to be important during the crisis. The FCO was held responsible for attempts at a “sell-out”. Right-wing Conservative backbenchers were echoed by others such as the Liberal Russell Johnston, who declared that there was no Parliamentary support for the “shameful schemes of getting rid of these Islands which have been festering in the Foreign Office for year^".^ Backbench opinion expressed itself even more forcibly after the invasion. Its anger had several important repercussions. First, since so much of it was directed at the FCO, it contributed powerfully to the resignation of Lord Carrington. It was not simply a question of individual ministerial responsibility; the Government was itself collectively responsible although Lord Carrington might have thereby expected rather more support from his leader against the Right. His resignation removed perhaps one of the most widely respected of recent Foreign Secretaries and certainly one extremely familiar with the demands and processes of both the Community and Political Cooperation. Secondly, the Commons’ anger and display ofjingoism built up a strong sense of hostility to negotiations which might not include the restoration of British sovereignty as a basic pre~ondition.~ This contributed to the suspicion of some of Britain’s partners and allies that the British search for a peaceful solution was not pursued with the necessary rigour.

To put it another way, the FCO was seen to lose influence as confidence in the possibility of a diplomatic solution being reached ebbed away. The appointment of Francis Pym as Foreign Secretary contributed to this. Although a leading “wet” and a possible rival to Mrs. Thatcher, Mr. Pym’s appointment was regarded as one aimed less at strengthening Britain’s diplomatic efforts than of ensuring the close identity of all sectors of the Conservative Party with the Falklands War. The inclusion of the chairman of the Party in the “war cabinet” seemed to endorse such a view.6 Somewhat

(6

3Quoted by Franks, see House ofCommons Official Report 2 December 1980 cols. 195-204. 41bid. 5Tht Financial Times of 29 April reported three dozen Conservative MPs who rejected any proposed

concessions and threatened to withdraw their support. ‘The War Cabinet or more properly the South Atlantic sub-committee of the Overseas and Defence

Committee of the Cabinet (ODSA) included: the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Secretary, Mr. Whitelaw, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, Mr. Nott, and Mr. Parkinson. In addition a number of officials attended ODSA and undertook responsibility for both implementing its decisions and preparing its meetings. They included the Chiefofthe Defence Staff, Sir T. Lewin, the new and immediately past Permanent Under-Secretaries at the FCO, Sir Antony Acland and Sir Michael Palliser respectively, and the Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Robert Armstrong.

298 EUROPE AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS 1982

surprisingly the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not included in the “war cabinet” and other Ministers attended only as required. The full Cabinet met exclusively on Falkland Islands business only rarely.

The overall British aims in the dispute were determined very quickly. They were straightforward and simple: the withdrawal of Argentinian forces; the re-establishment of British administration; the insistence on the right of self- determination for the Islanders in any future settlement. However, while these aims met with the unanimous support of the British Parliament, the means by which they were to be achieved caused considerably more controversy -in Parliament and, indeed, in the country and among Britain’s partners and allies.

The despatch of the task force inevitably caused most concern. For some, particularly among those who spoke in the House of Commons debate on 3 April, it was a source of pride that the British Navy should once again be putting to sea in defence of British interests. Many more, in the UK and elsewhere, were more impressed by the fact that a task force could be mobilised and despatched so quickly and efficiently. For others, particularly outside the UK, there was astonishment that 1800 people on what President Reagan called “that little ice cold bunch ofland down should require such a reaction. But there was also widespread uncertainty about the precise role of the task force. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins in perhaps the best history of the conflict, have written that the force had to be regarded as “merely giving a cutting edge to diplomacy”.8 The Cabinet had at least to hope that the Argentinians would not remain unmoved by the threat ofviolent retribution, since “it is clear from our research that no detailed and realistic assessment was made of how the British would actually defeat the Argentines in a full-scale South Atlantic war before the task force set sail”.g

However, even if few actually believed that the task force would need to engage the Argentinians, there was none the less considerable concern in the Government and Parliament that the force should not be recalled without the Falkland Islands having become British once more. I t was not lost on many MPs that thedebateheldon3April was the first time thattheHousehadsaton a Saturday since the Suez Crisis of 1956. I t was hardly a reassuring precedent. Fear ofa further debacle was a powerful influence. But while the Americans in particular were often reminded oftheir role in 1956, thejingoism of MPs on 3 April was not particularly influential. Nor was the hysteria of much of the British press. Of far greater impact in both Europe and America were the televised pictures of cheering crowds waving off the ships of the force. Whatever the attitudes adopted towards the British action, there were few who could doubt popular support for the venture and therefore the seriousness of the Government’s intention.

’Quoted by Sir Nicholas Henderson, Economist, 12 November, 1983. *Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins. The Battlcfor the Falklands Michael Joseph. London, 1983, p. 77. ’Ibid, p. 317.

GEOFFREY EDWARDS 299

T H E DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN

Diplomatically, the U K sought to exercise the maximum pressure on the Argentinian Junta in three main areas. These were: to win the active support of the American administration; to win and maintain the support of the UN Security Council; and to impose the maximum economic and diplomatic impact with, in addition, an import embargo by the Community. All three areas demanded immediate attention. However, while the British carried its Community partners and the Security Council with it in condemning Argentinian aggression, the US, often to the fury of the Prime Minister, remained ambivalent until the end of April. Given a possibly critical American role in bringing about a peaceful solution, attention inevitably tended to focus on Washington rather than Brussels and, once military action had begun and pressures for an immediate ceasefire had increased, on the UN in New York as well.

Even before the actual invasion the U K had been attempting to persuade the American Administration to intercede with the Junta. The Prime Minister, on 1 April, for example, had summed up the Cabinet’s discussion by saying “that the best hope . . . of avoiding confrontation lay in the influence that the United States could bring to bear on the Argentine Government.”lo Not only did it make obvious sense, such a move fitted into the general Atlanticist approach of the Prime Minister. Lord Carrington had in fact already attempted to bring the Americans in as an intermediary late in March. There had been signs then that not all members of the Administration took the Argentinian threat - or perhaps its implications - particularly seriously. These signs gave way to a realization that if no restraint was exercised by Argentina the Americans would still not be agreed on taking one side or the other.” The well-reported wrangling within the American Administration, between the “Europeans” and the “Latinos”, only increased the frustration felt in the United Kingdom with the Americans which had been bubbling to the surface for some time. I t also threw into relief the solidarity immediately shown by the Community and much of the Commonwealth.

As has already been suggested, Security Council Resolution 502 was crucial in winning the support ofmany governments for further action. I t has been rare for the UK, and particularly a Conservative Government, to applaud UN action to quite the same extent as over the Falklands Islands. Resolution 502 did, after all, provide an often repeated, straightforward solution to the dispute - the withdrawal of Argentinian forces. I t “turned out to be a minor classic ofBritish post-war diplomacy. T o many at the UN, Britain’s despatch of a task force was a gross over-reaction to what was seen

“The Franks Report, op. cit., p. 68. “Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Economist, op. cit.


as an anti-colonialist peccadillo by Argentina. To call the Security Council in aid, to win a two-thirds vote there and to avoid the veto, all in 48 hours, was remarkable”.’* As Sir Anthony Parsons, the diplomat largely responsible for the achievement, later wrote, Resolution 502 “had a firm base of international support amongst a wide spectrum of member states without which, in my view, it would have been difficult to persuade the partners, friends and allies to join us in the economic and political measures which, coupled with military action under Article 51 of the Charter. . . formed the three planks of the British Government’s policy, accepted by all parties in Parliament, in reacting to the Argentine’s aggression”. l 3

T H E COMMUNITY DIMENSION

Action at the Community level has necessarily to be seen against this background of frenetic activity in both Washington and New York. That is not to say that efforts made in Brussels were either unimportant or undertaken at a slower pace. The immediate declaration of solidarity shown by the Ten was very much welcomed. But there were more practical issues at stake. Of primary importance was agreement to an arms embargo by several of Argentina’s leading suppliers, among whom the French were supplying Super Etendards and Exocet missiles, the Germans had already sold two submarines and were building frigates and the Italians were supplying aircraft and helicopters. The readiness of Community member states to introduce an arms embargo was evident early on and one had in fact been imposed by member governments individually within the week. The call for an import embargo took only a few days longer.

The issue of economic sanctions was not new to the Community. As members of the UN, Community countries had imposed sanctions against the illegal regime in Rhodesia. At the behest of the Americans they had also introduced restrictions on trade with Iran after the seizure of the hostages, Sanctions, again largely on the American initiative, had been the subject of much debate in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan and had, in fact, been extremely limited. Further sanctions, again of a limited nature, were introduced against the Soviet Union by the Community after the imposition ofmartial law in Poland in December 1981. After the Argentinian seizure of the Falkland Islands, the British had imposed an import ban unilaterally. However, British trade with Argentina was small; as so often the act was symbolic rather than injurious. An embargo by Argentina’s largest market, the European Community as a whole, was considered to be very much more significant. In all some 27 per cent ofArgentina’s trade was carried out with the Community, with Argentinian exports to the Ten

”Hastings &Jenkins, op. cit. p, 101. ”Sir Anthony Parsons, ‘The Falklands Crisis- the UN, 31 March-I4 June 1982, International Affairs,

Vol. 59. No. 2, Spring 1983, p. 172.

GEOFFREY EDWARDS 30 1

valued at some S1.5 billion. While sanctions were not expected to have an immediate economic impact, they indicated the potential expense of the escapade. In addition, it was hoped that the political and psychological impact of the Ten acting in concert would be immediate and significant. Moreover, with the Americans not prepared to take sides and with their influence on the Junta uncertain, it was considered even more imperative that the European allies should show solidarity. In view of past negotiations over sanctions there was some pessimism in the UK that solidarity would only be expressed in pious declarations. Some in England became suddenly acutely aware that the UK had not exactly endeared itselfto most ofits partners on too many issues. And yet there was a hope, if not an expectation, that the Nine would agree to sanctions in some form or other; it was, in the words ofone pro- Market Labour MP “a supreme test ofthe political reality ofthe Community . . . as to whether we had the help and material su port from our partners in

Fortunately such a view was widely shared in the Community. The immediate declaration condemning Argentina’s aggression set the tone and direction of subsequent action. But translating the declaration into an economic commitment was a major achievement by the Community. The British, it was generally agreed, worked extremely hard. Bilateral relation- ships were exploited to the full - the French, for example, had already been encouraged to persuade Togo to vote with the majority in the Security Council. The COREU network ofPolitical Cooperation was also hardworked - not least in winning support from capitals for the Foreign Ministers’ declaration of 2 April. And in London, the EPC network was backed up by extremely high-level briefings of Community embassies.

In their efforts to win support, the British were enormously helped by the strong position taken by the Belgian Government which held the Presidency of the Council of Ministers between January and June 1982. A number of related factors proved particularly fortuitous. These included the fact that the Presidency of EPC and the Council of Ministers was in the hands of a staunch European, M. Tindemans, and that he was eager to exploit the provisions of the recently agreed London Report on the EPC. In addition, a British official had been seconded to the Belgian Foreign Ministry as part of the EPC Presidency support team recommended by the London Report, and he was able to act as an additional, informal source of information and channel of communication. It was also fortunate that in a series of meetings and decisions which crossed and recrossed the boundaries between EPC and EC matters, many residual sensitivities as to the institutional proprieties were swept aside - for the time being at least. At a more practical level, the fact that the Belgians held the Presidency allowed officials separated from their files etc. simply to move up and down the Rue de la Loi, between the

the Community that we have a right to expect”.’ B

14Samuel Silkin, MP. House ofCommons Official Report. 7 April 1982, col. 1015.


Belgian Foreign Ministry and the Charlemagne building of the Council of Ministers.

Inevitably a number of factors were responsible for the rapid decision to impose economic sanctions. Emmanuel Gazzo, the Editor of Agence Europe, summed up one general argument: “It is clear that since the Falklands are part of the overseas territories associated with the Community, it is the Community which has been attacked. . .” . I5 A similar point was made by the European Commission in its declaration of 6 April condemning the Argentine invasion and calling for an Argentine withdrawal. It was a declaration which raised some eyebrows among the more legalistic in Whitehall preoccupied with questions of Community competence but it was hardly considered politic to do anything but welcome the statement. A second widely held view was well expressed by the French Foreign Minister who, as reported in Agence Europe, declared: “What is clear is that since last Friday there has been an aggression, unprovoked, uncalled for by the peoples of the Falkland Islands; then a Security Council development . . . and the invader did not heed it. We are on the side of those who defend international law and decisions. All the more so in the present case as the attacked party is our ally”.16 Similar views were held by many in Germany; D i e Zeit , for example, held that “Britain is exercising its right to self defence against unprovoked aggression. . . . What the West and the overwhelming part of the Third World did not want to allow the Russians to do with impunity in Afghanistan should not be allowed to General Galtieri”.17

Much has been written about the symbolic nature of economic sanctions. Johan Galtung, for example has written: “There is the value ofat least doing something, of having the illusion of being instrumental, of being busy in times of crisis.”18 In the Falklands crisis the feeling was magnified because member states were also highly conscious of acting together as a Com- munity. As one German official was reported as saying: “I have not had the same feeling for a long time. Here was a case where we were doing something for the Community with no national profit to be gained, in fact quite the opposite. But all governments could see that the issue of protecting territory against acquisition by force was of great importance. A Community response could not be avoided and no-one wanted to avoid it.’’19

None the less, even if the decision, and the speed with which it was reached, was of considerable symbolic importance for the Community as such, the embargo itself also had a certain symbolic value for traders which was not wholly lost on governments. As the Economist put it: “. . . the

”Agence Europe 5 /6 April 1982. “Ibid. 13/14April 1982 I7Quoted in The Economist 17 April 1982 ”Quoted in James Barber, “Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument” international Aflairs Vol. 55

‘’Financial Times 27 April 1982. No. 3 July 1979 p. 381.


decision, taken after some high level arm-twisting was eased by the belief that the Falkland Islands dispute will be over before the sanctions have an economic bite rather than a purely diplomatic one.”20 This somewhat cynical view was reinforced by the exclusion qf all goods in transit or for which contracts had been agreed before the actual date of the decision. In fact, non-exclusion may have rendered the Community liable to actions for compensation from traders etc. suffering material loss as a result. But since sanctions were not expected to be long-lasting, member governments did not expect any difficulties or costly commitments to check and prevent the exploitation of any loopholes.

In addition to this mixture of worthy, and somewhat less worthy, considerations which were widely held within the Community, there were other more particular reasons for the support of several individual governments. Condoning aggression through inaction was regarded as an especially poor precedent: “ ‘If you abandon 1800 Falkland Islanders’ said a friendly German at this weekend’s Konigswinter Conference at Cambridge, ‘What will 2 million West Berliners think?’ The cases are scarcely comparable but it was none the less a telling point”.21 In a somewhat similar way, Greek attitudes were largely determined by its scattered and vulner- able islands and, of course, by Cyprus. French views were also influenced by the vulnerability of some of their remaining overseas territories and by their own interventions in former colonial territories for which they had on occasion sought Community support.

While such considerations were important and the 2 April Declaration was welcomed, it was clearly recognized by both the British and the Belgian Presidency that many things could go wrong between declaring united support and taking common action. The legal basis for the imposition of sanctions was foreseen as the most likely obstruction. The British, on practical rather than ideological grounds, were initially in favour of using Article 224 of the Treaty of Rome whereby member states gave effect to common action through national legislation. The Iranian embargo was considered the most useful precedent for action. The idea was to avoid the arguments used before, particularly by the Danes, that as an embargo was clearly a political act rather than a part of trade policy it should be the responsibility of national parliaments to implement and not the Com- munity. However, the Belgian Presidency, the West Germans and the Irish were especially insistent that Article 113 should be used, The Belgian rationale was that the action was a trade matter, that common action was necessary in order to preserve the unity of the market and that therefore Article 1 13 was the appropriate instrument. The Germans were particularly concerned with the need to avoid any legal divergences on implementation as well as with the need for urgency. The Irish position was somewhat

2oThe Economist 17 April 1982. “Sunday Times, 4 April 1982.


different; their economic interests were not especially involved. The imposition of sanctions by means of Article 224 was seen as posing something of a political test which, at least for an Irish government, threatened wholly unnecessary domestic political difficulties. Article 113, on the other hand, defused the situation by making sanctions more a Community responsibility, so distancing the Government from the decision.

The evidence available does not suggest that disagreement over the legal basis for sanctions masked more substantive opposition. However, little headway was made in COREPERdespite strenuous efforts on the part ofthe British and the Belgians to secure agreement. There appeared to be a much greater sense of movement in EPC. The weight of precedent, ofpast conflicts and package deals was somewhat less than in COREPER. Nor did EPC have to decide how precisely to implement the decision that had been agreed in principle so easily: that, of course, was the responsibility ofCOREPER. On 9 April the Political Directors had reached a consensus and had invited the Permanent Representatives to draw up the measures necessary. COREPER, after discussions that continued during the following day, were still able to agree only on the principle ofsanctions; the Danes continued to block the use ofArticle 1 13. The Council could only therefore continue to express solidarity with Britain -and point out the alternative bases for action. It was not until 14 April, after the Danes had referred back to the Folketing, that they were able to agree to the Commission’s proposed text. Regulation 877/82 was then adopted by the Council by its written procedure and came into force on 16 April for one month. Significantly, the Regulation refers to the discussions held in EPC and to consultations pursuant to Article 224.

The decision to impose an embargo on Argentinian goods had been taken within only two weeks of the invasion. Mrs. Thatcher, in the House of Commons, recognized not only the importance of such unprecedented speed but also the difficulties that the decision had caused member states; the decision, she said “. . . cannot have been easy for our partners given the commercial interests at stake, but they were the first to realize that if aggression were allowed to succeed in the Falkland Islands, it would be encouraged the world over”.22 The Times saw an additional importance in the decision when it was set against the irritation caused by Britain’s budgetary claims and added: “In this case it is the Europeans who have reacted with a global perspective while the response of the United States has been made ambiguous by regional considerations. It is a neat turning of the tables in the trans-Atlantic debate”.23

THINGS FALL APART

Once the decision had been taken, attention in the Community inevitably reverted elsewhere, to the progress of the task force, to Washington and the

”House ofCommons Official Report, 14 April 1982, Col. 1148. 23Thc Times, 19 April 1982.

GEOFFREY EDWARDS 305 Haig peace mission, to South America and the reactions ofother states to the European embargo and to more mundane internal matters already on the Agenda, such as agricultural prices and Britain’s budgetary contributions. The linkage between these last and sanctions had not been clearly recognized or pressed in early April, but it became increasingly apparent as the month progressed. For the British the more immediate concern was the mission undertaken by Mr. Haig and the link was either overlooked or ignored. In the rest of the Community, however, not only was the link increasingly discernible, but there was also a sense that in some ways it had been taken by surprise by its own readiness to take a speedy decision on sanctions; there was now rather more time to reflect on the ramifications of the decision. And, as hopes of any compromise faded and the task force approached the Falklands, European minds became increasingly focussed on their dependence on the United States and on the United Nations to renew their peace efforts.

The inherent ambiguities in the relationship between sanctions and the use of force has already been hinted at. It has been the subject of considerable discussion in the past, which has been summed up by one commentator as follows: “Whilst some advocates see them [i.e. sanctions] as an alternative to force, there is a contrary view that sanctions can only be effective when force is available and ready to be used”.24 The Falklands crisis would seem to endorse neither view. In early April, with the task force weeks away from the Falklands and the Americans active in the search for peace, the ambiguities were regarded as of only academic importance. Inevitably attitudes changed as the task force neared the Islands. Hill and Mayall have suggested “EPC has always been a diplomatic operation first and foremost and the prospect of being identified with major military operations against a country which could claim membership of the Third World unnerved many governments in the EC”.25 As other South American governments made clear their positions, so Community governments had to weigh up the danger to their economic interests, direct and indirect, real and potential, though only Italy and Ireland opted out (and for other more immediate reasons). But member governments also had to take into account the fact that impressive though the Community’s solidarity had been, its effect upon the Argentinian Junta appeared to have been limited. The Community was left with the conclusion that even taking into account Soviet blandishments and purchases, the Junta appeared immune to rational argument.

The Community’s doubts and concerns therefore increased many times with the retaking of South Georgia on April and the sinking of the General Belgruno on 2 May. There was, at least until Britain too began to suffer

‘>am,, Barber op. cit. p. 367. 25Christopher Hill and James Mayall Tlu Sanctions Probim: International and European Pmspctives.

European University Institute 1983.


casualties, a fear that the Argentinians would remain intransigent and that the British would then humiliate them politically as well as militarily. In reply to any such expressions of concern, Mrs. Thatcher too appeared immovable, merely reiterating the need simply for Argentina to adhere to UN Security Council Resolution 502. But in some ways the sinking of the Belgrano marked a turning point for, as has been suggested, it was “an important military victory, yet i t turned into a political defeat because ofthe premium that the international community put on the appearance of avoiding escalation. Any military action which is not self-evidently for defensive purposes, even if it is pre-emptive, becomes an outrage”.“

As the prospect of further armed conflict came closer, so Community governments became increasingly aware of how little they could do to influence events. The embargo’s lack of impact on Argentina’s stance coupled with its potential cost to European interests in South America reinforced the sense of frustration. Other than attempting to maintain relations with South American governments bilaterally, Community governments collectively could only emphasize the need for conciliation on Britain and Argentina. The desire to encourage Mrs. Thatcher to take such a path was an important factor in reinforcing the Community’s tendency to take decisions (in this case the renewal of sanctions) only at the last minute.

There was growing concern that the British Government took continued expressions of solidarity by the Ten as a blank cheque in its support. There was suspicion that the Prime Minister was neither personally nor politically disposed towards compromise. The report of Mr Haig’s leaked conversation with President Reagan, that only if Mrs Thatcher was able to sink an Argentinian vessel might her desire for retribution be vindicated, was, of course, set against the information provided by the Foreign Secretary and his officials on the peace negotiations. But in contrast to her doveish Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister appeared increasingly hawkish, and growing in confidence and stature. Continued sniping at the Foreign Office by MPs only served to undermine Mr Pym’s position further - as did various diso’bliging remarks about the Foreign Office and its head which emanated from 10 Downing Street. While the importance of these leaks was probably exaggerated in the interests of a good news story, they reflected the distance between the Prime Minister and her Foreign Secretary which could not but undermine Mr. Pym’s credibility as a negotiator and spokesman.

Doubts were further reinforced by the general British approach to the Community adopted during the crisis. It was accepted by the other nine Governments that the primary attention of the British would be fixed on the Falkland Islands and the various peace proposals. Yet there was a growing sense in the rest of Europe that the British Government was also taking the Community somewhat for granted. The most glaring example of the lack of

p. 209. 26Lawrence Freedman “The War ofthe Falkland Islands 1982”. Foreign Affnirs Fall 1982 Vol. 61 No. 1

GEOFFREY EDWARDS 307 British attention was over the perennial questions of agricultural prices and the Budget. The linkage between sanctions, prices and the British Budgetary contribution was not one that had been immediately established in Community capitals. However, the idea of the “indivisibility” of solidarity grew rapidly. As one French MEP declared in the European Parliament debate on 22 April: “We support Britain in this issue [of the Falklands] but European solidarity ought not to be one way. When we are in need of your solidarity [on agricultural prices] we hope it will be there and we hope you will not show excessive nationali~m”.~’ M. Galland hoped in vain: Britain’s behaviour over both internal Community issues remained unchanged. Attitudes in the other nine were well summed up by the Economist: “There was Europe whistling through trade sanctions against Argentina after the Falklands were invaded; there were France and West Germany holding the line on EC sanctions after the sinking of the General Belgrano had rocked their domestic public opinion into questioning the whole Falklands venture; and there they all were with British budget mud kicked into their eyes”.28

The view from London, needless to say, was somewhat different. The Falklands crisis was all pre-occupying for both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. A link between sanctions and the Budget was either simply not grasped or was considered unseemly, as amounting to little short of blackmail. The Foreign Secretary had in fact had little time to come to terms with the Budget problem. Council discussions expected in early April had been postponed because of the preoccupation with the Falklands crisis, and the brevity of Mr. Pym’s visits to Brussels reduced the opportunities for him personally to learn the general views and approaches of his colleagues over lunch etc. What warnings there were from officials tended to go unheard or were rejected. The result was a series of shocks.

Lack of any British movement on the issue, real or cosmetic, at what became an extremely acrimonious informal Foreign Ministers meeting on 8/9 May contributed to the refusal to agree to renew sanctions before the month came to an end. This, coupled with the refusal of a majority in the Council of Ministers to recognize the British veto on agricultural price rises caused a furious reaction in the UK. It was, after all, the first time that agricultural prices - themselves the origin of the Luxembourg Compromise - had been decided by vote and the first time a member state had been refused recourse to the Compromise. Even the Guardian, normally very pro- European and sober on the Falkland Islands issue, was led to comment that “Even the supposed magnanimity of seven of our EEC partners in renewing trade sanctions against Argentina turns out to involve little sacrifice since the import ban affects only new contracts. . . . The final impression is of a Community which, far from rallying to the support of a member state in need, has taken psychological advantage of our preoccupations with more

27Agcnce Europe 23 April 1982. 2aThe Economist 22 May 1982.


pressing events”.29 The Economist was somewhat isolated from the rest of the press in England in its more balanced assessment: “There is in Mrs. Thatcher an incomprehension of what Europe is about. . . . There was little cause for her to bring upon herself the isolation in Europe that has descended on her government at a moment when it can least afford it. That in the process the Europeans have behaved badly should not disguise the fact that it was British diplomacy that failed to prevent them doing

It is difficult to dissent from such a conclusion though perhaps greater allowance needs to be made for the seemingly all-embracing demands of the Falklands crisis. While other Community issues may not have received the attention they deserved from Ministers, British officials at least would strenuously deny that on the question of sanctions the Community’s continued support was ever taken for granted. All the avenues of communication available to them were used to the full. Perhaps what was lacking was a greater sensitivity at the top in winning the continued personal commitment of other heads of government. However, Community briefings in London reached an intensity, sometimes two or more a week, which for some recalled the levels achieved during negotiations on the final settlement of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe dispute. Political Directors also met on a number of occasions at the UK’s request in order to exchange information and views, for example immediately after the sinking of the Belgruno. Mr. Pym, himself, also took pains, in the margins of Council and Foreign Ministers’ meetings, to inform his colleagues of the course of events and the stage reached in the negotiations. An impromptu Foreign Ministers’ meeting was called on 20 April to allow Mr. Pym to explain the Haig proposals. All these contacts were, of course, in addition to many bilateral meetings and consultations. Yet despite these briefings and exchanges, the suspicion grew that, as Mr. Pym might be out of touch with the Prime Minister and the rest of the war cabinet, the information and views he and his officials provided were limited in value. There were some who recognized that there were inherent difficulties in providing full information in the midst of delicate diplomatic exchanges and preparations for actual battle. Others, less charitably, held that they could read as much as the Foreign Office provided in the press. The feeling, whether or not it was justified, was important, particularly when governments came under increased public pressure.

Such views inevitably weighed differently with each member state as they discussed the renewal of sanctions. The Political Committee had met on 15 May and had failed to agree: COREPER was not therefore needed to “legitimize” any conclusions. Foreign Ministers, when they met on Sunday 16 May (nine out of ten of them were in Luxembourg for an Atlantic Council meeting), also failed to agree. The major sticking points were a continued hankering on the part ofsome for a quidpro quo from the British on the budget,

29The Guardian 25 May 1982. sOTRc Economist 22 May 1982.


and the problem faced by the Italians caused by the swing in Parliamentary opinion against sanctions. Other governments, too, were keenly aware of increased public and parliamentary disquiet. It was reflected also in the European Parliament where support for sanctions fell from 203 to 28 on 22 April down to 137 to 79 on 12 May. Among others, the Socialist International had declared itself against sanctions, a factor of some importance in the Italian Socialist Party’s attack on its Government’s continued support for sanctions. However, led by France and Germany, the majority of the Council of Ministers finally agreed to renew sanctions for a week on 17 May. As M. Mitterrand was to say the following day when in London for the annual Anglo-French summit: “There are no new facts which could cause us to change our minds. The immediate French solidarity with Britain was a result of Argentine intervention by force. The regrettable logic set in motion by this initial act means that we can give no support to the act of aggression in law or in fact”.31

None the less, sanctions were renewed only for one week. Various suggestions have been put forward to account for such a limited period. Denis Healey in the House of Commons asserted that it was viewed by the French as a way of exerting the fullest possible influence over the British G ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~ Others viewed it as a negotiating ploy designed to keep the Irish and Italians on board but which was not amended when both decided against renewal. Yet others have suggested simply that constraints on the political timetable need to be taken into account; that since a decision had to be taken on 17 May on the expiry of sanctions, they were left intact until Ministers could have further discussions at the EPC Council meeting scheduled for 24-25 May. Finally the link with the Budget and agricultural prices has been suggested as a factor; the debate on the latter having begun on 17 May and continued on 18 May when the British veto was overruled. It was not until 24 May that the majority of the Council of Ministers agreed to renew sanctions indefinitely.

It is unlikely that, whatever the level of Community briefings or bilateral arm-twisting by the British, the Irish and Italians could have continued to support sanctions. Their cases were, however, somewhat different. Immedi- ately after the recapture ofSouth Georgia, the Irish Foreign Minister argued that the Community was now in a new “ball game”.33 On the sinking of the Belgrano, the Irish Government declared that it was “appalled by the outbreak ofwhat amounts to open war between Argentina and Great Britain in the South Atlantic and at reports that hundreds oflives have already been lost. . . . It is imperative that the UN becomes involved immediately to secure an end to the present conflict. Accordingly the Irish Government will seek an immediate meeting of the Security Council [Ireland at the time was a

”Agcnce Europe 19 May 1982. 32House ofCommons Oficial Report 20 May 1982 col. 549. 33Guardian 27 April 1982.

310 EUROPE AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS I 982

member of the Council] in order to prepare a new resolution calling for: (i) an immediate cessation of hostilities by both British and Argentine forces; (ii) the negotiation of a diplomatic settlement under the auspices of the United Nations. The Irish Government regards the application of economic sanctions as no longer appropriate and will therefore be seeking the withdrawal of those sanctions by the C o m m ~ n i t y ” . ~ ~ Sanctions had come to be regarded as tending to “reinforce a military solution to the crisis”.35

These views were occasioned by a number of factors. The desire had been expressed earlier that the UK itselfshould go back to the Security Council to try to win a further resolution on the conflict. Although a Soviet veto was considered likely (unlike Resolution 502, that is) it was regarded as a useful way of reconfirming the UK’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. This, it was argued, would be particularly helpful for public opinion in countries such as Ireland where British colonialism still engendered strong feelings. Parallels between the Falklands and Northern Ireland might not have been seen as direct but “they were close enough to excite interest”.36 Further recourse to the UN would also have undermined those who continued to support neutralism by Ireland in any military conflict. But the crisis had also to be set against a background of deteriorating Anglo-Irish bilateral relations. The re-election of Mr Haughey in March 1982 had meant a tougher attitude towards Northern Ireland. Not only was Fianna F6il predisposed towards a more anti-British line, but personal relations between M r Haughey and Mrs Thatcher had also declined dramatically from the high point of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting of December 1980.37 Nor was it without relevance that Mr Haughey’s minority government was facing a by-election in Dublin-West in May 1982. Finally Anglo-Irish relations had not been helped by the sinking of an Irish trawler by a British submarine in April. Whatever the reasons, the Irish action was bitterly resented in London.

It also caused some confusion at the UN and embarrassment in the Community. In New York, the Secretary General was already undertaking consultations on possible peace terms and the Irish move threatened immediate immobility. It also, of course, brought to an end any hope of a continued consensus among the Ten at the UN. In fact, after a pause at the Secretary General’s request and some amendment, the Irish initiative eventually emerged as Resolution 505 which called not for a ceasefire but urged cooperation with the Secretary General in bringing about an end to hostilities. But the initial Irish move had allowed only limited opportunities for any consultation among the Ten. For General Assembly matters,

34Agmct Eurofie 5 May 1982. 35Mr. Haughey quoted in the Economist 22 May 1982. 3 6 J ~ e Joyce and Peter Martagh, The Boss: Charles J. Haughcy in Government Poolbeg Press, Dublin 1983

p. 146. Ibid. pp. 148-153. 37

GEOFFREY EDWARDS 31 1 consultation among the Ten had become extensive and automatic, even if common positions and voting behaviour were not always the most obvious outcome. O n issues before the Security Council, consultation among the Ten had a different flavour, in large part because Britain and France retained their permanent seats and, with them, a determination to uphold their indepen- denceofaction. However, inBritishcirclesatleast, itwas felt that the Irish had not given appropriate warning before breaking ranks so publicly.

The Italian case was different in several respects. The decision to support sanctions had very largely been the responsibility of the Foreign Minister, Sr Colombo. It rapidly came under fire. It was not primarily an economic issue even though sanctions were seen as likely to impose especially heavy burdens on some Italian industries such as the leather industry. Of greater importance were the numbers of Argentinians of Italian extraction.

For many Italians the issue was especially difficult with a conflict between dislike of the Junta for its abuse of human rights and a reluctance actually to engage in hostile acts against their kith and kin. The latter argument was perhaps familiar to many in Britain because of Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe and was therefore more understandable, or less objectionable, than that of the Irish. However the argument was of particular relevance to Italian Deputies because of the parliamentary bill in preparation which would allow all Italians living abroad to vote in Italian elections. This would enfranchize well over a million Argentinians of Italian extraction. Not surprisingly, few Italian parties could look on continued support for sanctions with any great enthusiasm, especially as a number of Argen- tinians travelled to Italy to make clear the prospective voting patterns of their soon-to-be-enfranchized compatriots. With at least half an eye on his longer term future, the leader of the PSI, Sr. Craxi, took the lead in exploiting the sanctions issue in an attempt to embarrass and even bring down the government. The result was the Italian withdrawal from the common position under Article 224. However, at the same time they continued to declare their strong hostility to Argentinian aggression. Both Italy and Ireland agreed not to undermine the impact of the sanctions imposed by the rest of the Community by allowing trade to be deflected.

It needs to be added that in the decision on 17 May, the Danish Government took advantage of the collapse of the consensus by reverting to its position on the use of Article 224. It therefore agreed to continue to apply Community measures only until they could be succeeded by national measures. This agreement to differ among the ten Community governments continued after sanctions were renewed by the seven indefinitely on 24 May. Sanctions were lifted by the Community, though with the exception of the UK, on 21 June on the effective cessation of hostilities. Once again the procedure was that of agreement in EPC before the decision was actually taken by the Council of Ministers.


CONCLUSIONS

The speed with which the European Community arrived at its decision to impose sanctions against Argentina was impressive. Much of the credit for that speed has been given to EPC; the rapidity with which Political Directors reached a consensus was in contrast to the stickiness of the discussions in COREPER. Yet it is perhaps a somewhat false distinction: EPC took over much of the work already done in COREPER; and it did not, of course, have to finalize a legally enforceable text. Both fora were vital, not least in providing the Danes with a way out of their predicament over Articles 224 versus 113. For the British, however, still smarting over the decision on agricultural prices and disagreement over the Budget, the work of “poco” appeared to have particular attractions. As Mr Pym put it “compared with the problems on the economic side of the Community activity, this political cooperation receives less publicity. I t might get more if it did not work so well. Its value cannot be measured in tonnes or calculated in millions ofunits of account. But it is a valuable and important aspect of m e r n b e r ~ h i p ” . ~ ~

Many of the distinctive elements of EPC which distinguish it from the EC were revealed to advantage during the Falklands crisis. Its lack of legal basis and more pragmatic approach based always on a consensus proved positively advantageous. Its more nebulous character, reflected in its lack of an institutionalized secretariat, remains, although it is arguable whether the Falkland Islands crisis showed the usefulness of the “flying secretariat” or, more simply, British good fortune in having an official in the Presidency’s Foreign Ministry. EPC has perhaps always enjoyed the more direct involvement and commitment of Foreign Ministers; there are few if any Ministers other than Prime Ministers and/or Heads of State, who need to be consulted and whose views need to be coordinated other than in the most general terms. Yet in this instance, while the EPC may have been shown to advantage, it was the ability of the EC and EPC to interact successfully that proved the most significant achievement. As one participant in the discussions in both EPC and the Community has suggested: sanctions helped to create a “modus vivendi which, while leaving intact respective competences and procedures, encourages continued action with a shared objective”.”

It could be argued that the circumstances surrounding the imposition of sanctions against Argentina, if not unique, were radically different from those in the past when attempts to introduce similar measures had been less successful. The Falkland Islands’were, for example, associated with the Community and had been clearly the object of unprovoked aggression. While Argentinian trade was not insignificant, it was not vital to any

38House ofCommons Official Report 26 May 1982. col. 937. 39Simon Nuttall Ycurbook ofEuropean Law edited by F. G. Jacobs. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1983 p. 258.


member state and, besides, no one expected sanctions to be imposed for any length of time. It could also be added that Latin America as a whole has always tended to be a lacuna in the Community’s external policy even if individual member states have important interests in the continent. While the Community felt obliged to do something, it did not have to play a central role.

And yet, although it is easy to minimise the longer term implications ofthe Community’s actions over the Falkland Islands, in terms of the gradual evolution of a European foreign policy the crisis was of significance. Sanctions were, for example, introduced without any pressure from a non- member state - and took on greater symbolic importance as a result. They marked, however briefly, a joint determination actually to act and to act, in effect, in support of military action being taken by one of the member states. If political cooperation tends to evolve on the basis of precedent, the Falkland Islands crisis indicates an important marker. At the same time, the failure of the ten member states of the Community to continue in unison is itself revealing. It was a further instance of member states working in groups rather than ci dix. It may not necessarily provide material for those who favour a European directorate; it nevertheless indicates a further degree of flexibility that may yet prove important.

europe and the falkland islands crisis 1982

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