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20112012 26: 135 originally published online 15 AprilEast European Politics and Societies

Theodor TudoroiuConflict

The European Union, Russia, and the Future of the Transnistrian Frozen

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135

Authors Note: Th uthor is grtful to Dr. Mnul Litlin (McGill Univrsity), Dr. Mihi Sim(Univrsity of Victori), nd n nonymous rviwr for thir hlpful suggstions.

East European Politics and

Societies

Volum 26 Numbr 1Fbrury 2012 135-161

2012 SaGe Publictions10.1177/0888325411404885

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The European Union,

Russia, and the Futureof the TransnistrianFrozen ConflictThodor TudoroiuCentre dtudes sur la paix et la scurit

internationale, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

In rcnt yrs, incrsd europn Union intrst in its strn nighborhood hsbn hild s possibl solution of th Trnsnistrin frozn conflict. Th fll of thcommunist uthoritrin rgim of Chiinu nd th intrnl crisis of th Smirnovrgim in Tirspol lso modifid th conditions of th nintn-yr conflict. Howvr,th europn involvmnt in Moldov is prcivd by th Krmlin s n intrusion inits own domaine rserv. Morovr, th 2008 wr in South Ossti illustrts Russisrturn to th rly 1990s policy of ovrt instrumntliztion of th post-Sovit froznconflicts. This voltil sitution is nlyzd in ordr to prdict th futur volution of

th Trnsnistrin conflict in th lrgr contxt of th dvloping rgionl rivlry btwnBrussls nd Moscow.

Keywords: Transnistria/Transdniestria; frozen conflict; Moldova; Russia; European

Union

Th lmost forgottn post-Sovit frozn conflicts wr suddnly rdiscovrd byth Wstrn public in august 2008. Th Russin tnks tht librtd South Osstind invdd Gorgi showd two things. First, tht th frozn conflicts of th Common-

wlth of Indpndnt Stts (CIS) continu to rprsnt srious thrt to rgionlstbility. Scond, tht th Krmlin dcidd to upgrd its longstnding instrumntliz-tion of such conflicts in ordr to prvnt wht it considrs illgitimt xtrnl intru-sion in its own sphr of influnc. In th Gorgin cs, this concrns th amricninvolvmnt. elswhr in th CIS, thr is th incrsingly visibl rgionl rivlrybtwn Russi nd th europn Union (eU). aftr th Fbrury 2010 Ukrinin prsi-dntil lction tht put finl nd to th hops gnrtd by th Orng Rvolution,

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136 est europn Politics nd Socitis

nwly dmocrtizing Moldov bcm th most likly trgt of Moscows nti-eUinititivs. In rcnt yrs, Brussls hs dvlopd n incrsing intrst in this smll

formr Sovit rpublic. Th cours of biltrl rltions ws fvord grtly by th2009 fll of th communist uthoritrin rgim in Chiinu nd by th pro-Wstrnstnc doptd by th nw govrning colition. Yt Moldov hs its own frozn con-flict. Th sitution crtd by th 1992 wr in Trnsnistri is vry similr to tht of SouthOssti. Th Trnsnistrin crisis rprsnts Moldovs wkst point nd hs lrdybn instrumntlizd by th Russins. Furthrmor, th rsolution of this crisis ison of Brussls min objctivs in th rgion. It is thrfor logicl to xpct th trns-formtion of th Trnsnistrin frozn conflict into ky lmnt of th dvlopingrgionl dul btwn Russi nd th europn Union.

This is th complx phnomnon xplord in this rticl. Th dpiction of Brusslsnd Moscows intrsts nd ctions tks into ccount rcnt mjor chngs in bothChiinu nd Tirspol, nmly, Moldovs still frgil procss of dmocrtiztionnd th lgitimcy crisis of Trnsnistris uthoritrin rgim. By nlyzing ll involvdprtis, th rticl tris to prdict th futur dvlopmnt of th Trnsnistrin con-flict s wll s its rgionl implictions.

Th nxt sction mks brif prsnttion of th post-Sovit frozn conflicts.Th following sctions dscrib Moldov, th scssionist rgion of Trnsnistri, ndthir long but fruitlss ngotition procss. Th involvmnt of xtrnl ctorsRussi,

Romni, th europn Union, Ukrin, th Orgniztion for Scurity nd Cooprtionin europ (OSCe), nd th Unitd Sttsis thn nlyzd on th bsis of thir rspc-tiv rgionl intrsts. Th Conclusion xplins in wht wy ll ths lmnts cninflunc th futur cours of th Trnsnistrin crisis.

Unfreezing the Frozen Conflicts

Gnrlly spking, frozn conflicts r simply conflicts tht wr not formlly

concludd by pc grmnt. This is vst nd htrognous ctgory1

including,for xmpl, th Korn Wr nd th Cyprus crisis. Th post-Sovit frozn conflicts,howvr, rprsnt vry homognous subctgory. Lving sid criss tht couldhv volvd in th sm dirction but finlly took diffrnt courssuch s Crimor Ttrstnthr r four such conflicts loctd in Trnsnistri, abkhzi, SouthOssti, nd Ngorno Krbkh. all wr inititd during th trminl phs of thSovit Union s rctions ginst th indpndnc movs of Moldov, Gorgi, ndazrbijn. In most css, thy wr minly thnic conflicts (Trnsnistris situtionis mor complx). From th vry bginning, thy wr supportd nd instrumntlizd

by th Sovit nd thn Russin ldrships in divide et impera logic. Th Krmlintrid to kp th thr Sovit rpublics first within th crumbling USSR nd thnwithin th Russin sphr of influnc. It hs to b notd tht during th rly 1990s,Chiinu, Tbilissi, nd Bku wr th most cntrifugl mmbrs of th Commonwlth



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Tudoroiu / Th Futur of th Trnsnistrin Frozn Conflict 137

of Indpndnt Stts nd thir mmbrship in this orgniztion is du in lrg m-sur to th constrints ssocitd with th four frozn conflicts. Th criss dgnrtd

into civil wrs tht wr won by th scssionists with th militry support of Moscow.Pckping rrngmnts wr md nd nforcd with th mdition of Russind with th prticiption of its forcs (xcpt for Ngorno Krbkh). Militrily, llconflicts wr compltly frozn until 2008. Howvr, from politicl point of viwthr ws no significnt progrss dspit lmost two dcds of ngotitions.

Bcus of thir lmost idnticl profils, th post-Sovit frozn conflicts cn bnlyzd s unitry phnomnon chrctrizd by th following lmnts. First, itsminly politicl ntur. Th trm conflicths obvious militry connottions nd inddin ch of th four css thr ws brif wr. Morovr, s shown by th august 2008

Gorgin pisod, th us of forc hs lwys rmind n option. Still, ftr 1992-1994 th probbility of militry oprtions dcrsd considrbly. Th politicl instru-mntliztion of th scssion, on th contrry, hs bn frqunt nd visibl. Scond,th brkwy nclvs hv dvlopd vry similr d fcto stts2 pursuing cohr-nt stt-building projcts. Thy r highly uthoritrin nd militrizd, nd thirpopultions confind to Moscow-cntrd informtionl nvironmnt.3 Thy rlso chrctrizd by politicl conomy of crim, corruption, trfficking nd vio-lnc.4 Third, th frozn conflicts hv hmprd sriously th dvlopmnt of ththr formr Sovit rpublics s thy drin conomic rsourcs nd politicl nr-

gis from ths wk countris nd impovrishd socitis, gnrt rmpnt cor-ruption nd orgnizd crim, nd prvnt th consolidtion of thir ntion-stts.5Fourth, from th vry bginning ths wr thr-sidd nd not biltrl conflicts.Moscow hs bn dcisiv ctor tht providd th scssionists with militry,politicl, morl, conomic, nd finncil support. It prvntd grtr intrntionlinvolvmnt nd usd its position in th ngotiting mchnisms to protct th dfctostts.6 It lso grntd Russin citiznship to mny of th rsidnts of th scs-sionist rpublics, thus crting th bsis for xtrtrritoril intrvntions undr thprtxt of protcting its own citizns.7 Moscows policy prdigm with rspct to

ths conflicts ws dfind by Vldimir Socor s controlld instbility. It promotsRussis gopoliticl intrsts by prptuting Russin militry prsnc, fostringstt wknss nd chotic conditions in th trgt countris, distrcting th lttrfrom th gnd of systmic rforms, nd discourging Wstrn intrst in dvlopingclos rltions with Moldov, Gorgi, armni, nd azrbijn.8

This lrdy clssicl pictur of th post-Sovit frozn conflicts is ffctdtody by st of nw fctors. Bcus of succssiv nlrgmnts, NaTO nd theuropn Union r now clos to nd intrstd in th southwstrn prt of th CIS.Th concrnd post-Sovit rpublics hv undrgon significnt chngs in both

thir domstic ffirs nd forign rltions nd try to strngthn thir rltions with thWst.9 For its prt, Russi is nggd in policy of prgmtic rimpriliztiontht sks to rstor Moscows rgionl dominnc nd rstblish zons of privilgdintrst in th formr Sovit bloc.10 In this contxt, th frozn conflicts r grdully



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bcoming cornrstons for rnwd forign policy of Russi11 s thy llow Moscowto prvnt th conclusiv rsolution of eursin scurity ordr, somthing to which

it is dply nd instinctivly opposd.12

Th Krmlins ngtiv ttitud towrd NaTOnd its strn nlrgmnt is not nw. On of its consquncs ws th august 2008hting of th frozn conflict of South Ossti. Brussls, on th contrry, ws notconsidrd dngr bfor th mid-2000s:

Th eU [ws] prcivd by pro-govrnmnt lits in Russi s htrognous con-glomrtion of stts, which Russin cn divid from within, using nrgy rsourcsnd by corrupting som europn politicins.13

Yt in rcnt yrs th europn Union hs bcom incrsingly involvd in cr-tin x-Sovit rpublics. In Moscow, this ld to n importnt chng of prcption:

Th eU is mor nd mor on th offnsiv in its rltions with Russi . . . [nd] cts s tough dvrsry nd comptitor. . . . Th eU is strting to bcom comptitor forMoscow lrdy on th Russin trritory itslf, lt lon in th post-Sovit spc.14

Consquntly, Russi tris to frz th procss of europn intgrtion ndrplc it with rgionl bipolrity15 tht would limit drsticlly th eU influncin th CIS rpublics.

as lrdy mntiond in th Introduction, nwly dmocrtizing Moldov is thmost likly trgt of Moscows nti-eU inititivs. This mks Trnsnistri n intr-sting cs study. For Russins nd europns lik, it provids n opportunity toincrs thir influnc nd prstig. Consquntly, th volution of th Trnsnistrincrisis is good indictor of th rgionl blnc of powr btwn th Krmlin ndBrussls. Morovr, th outcom of this dul will influnc considrbly Moldovschncs of following th europn trjctory of its wstrn nighbors.

The Poorest Land in Europe: Moldova

all or prt of wht is tody th Rpublic of Moldov chngd hndsminlybtwn Romni nd Russiin 1812, 1856, 1878, 1918, 1940, 1941, 1944, nd1991. Sovit socil nginring chngd dply its thnicl nd socil composition.Consquntly, th idologicl dbt concrning th Moldovn idntity is n xtrmlycomplx nd yt unsolvd mttr.16 Th dismntlmnt of th Sovit Union trig-grd trumtic conomic downfll. Btwn 1991 nd 1993, Moldovs produc-tion droppd by 60 prcnt nd th purchs powr by 80 prcnt.17 Tody, 53 prcnt

of th Moldovns still liv in rurl rs. Mor thn on qurtr of th ctiv popul-tion works brod. Moldov is th worlds scond rmittnc rcipint (36.2 prcntof th GDP) nd europs poorst country.18

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Prdictbly, ll ths lmnts hd ngtiv consquncs on th Moldovn dmo-crtic lif. according to th ssssmnt of Frdom Hous, Moldovs post-indpndnc

hybrid rgim19

ws followd in 2001 by smiconsolidtd uthoritrin rgim20

tht lstd until 2009. Tht yr, riggd lctions, th brutl polic rprssion of nsu-ing lrg-scl youth protst, nd rly lctions ld to th fll of th ruling Prty ofCommunists of th Rpublic of Moldov.21 Four minly librl prtis formd coli-tion govrnmnt tht doptd pro-dmocrcy nd pro-Wstrn stnc. Howvr,its prlimntry sts wr too fw to llow th lction of prsidnt. Nw rlylctions wr hld in Novmbr 2010. Th rnwd nti-communist govrning coli-tion won lrgr mjority but continud to b unbl to lct prsidnt. Consquntly,th sitution is not yt stbl. Th nw ldrship hs to ithr chng th Constitution

or cll nw rly prlimntry lctions, whil lctorl support for th Communistsrmins strong. But this hs not ffctd hops tht th ruling colition will b bl tocrt gnuinly consolidting Moldovn dmocrcy.

Howvr, for lmost two dcds th min politicl proccuption of th Moldovnshs not bn dmocrtiztion, eU ccssion, or rltions with Romni. all thsmttrs hv bn scondry in rltion to Trnsnistri. Th scssion of th strnprovinc hs bn qustion of cpitl importnc for both th politicl lit nd thpublic opinion. This is du to numbr of rsons. First, from lgl nd constitu-tionl point of viw, th Moldovn stt cnnot ccpt th loss of prt of its

ntionl trritory. Scond nd prhps mor importntly, in symbolic nd idologi-cl trms Trnsnistri is ssntil for th dfinition of th Moldovn idntity. Unlikth rst of th rpublic, it hs nvr blongd to Romni22 nd it is inhbitd by lrgRussin nd Ukrinin communitis tht rjct firmly ny prspctiv of union withth nighboring country. Moldovs runion with Trnsnistri would rprsnt implic-itly gurnt of indpndnc vis--vis Romni. Third, th Trnsnistrin conflictis frozn but not xtinguishd. This mns tht t lst in principl, Chiinu hs tocop with possibl militry thrt. Fourth, th scssion of Trnsnistri prsrvsth conditions llowing th prsnc of Russin troops on Moldovs trritory nd

givs Moscow n importnt mns to influnc Moldovn politics. Fifth, most of thrpublics industry is loctd in Trnsnistri nd thrfor outsid Chiinus con-trol. all txs go to th slf-proclimd govrnmnt in Tirspol. Sixth, th scs-sionist rpublic controls th min trnsport nd communiction lins with Ukrinnd cn cut thm in ordr to put prssur on th Moldovn govrnmnt. Svnth,Trnsnistri is hub of illgl ctivitis, mny of which xtnd to Moldov. Finlly,th politicins in Chiinu hv instrumntlizd constntly th Trnsnistrin qus-tion in thir own intrst. This hs kpt it high on th Moldovn politicl gnd ndvry visibl to th public.

Undr such circumstncs, it is not surprising tht th sttlmnt of thTrnsnistrin crisis rprsnts on of th mjor tsks of Moldovs nw dmocrticgovrnmnt. Th lttrs pro-Wstrn orinttion combind with incrsd eU intrst



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in th rgion undoubtdly crt nw opportunitis. Th sm fctors, howvr, cnhv srious ngtiv consquncs.

The Making of Transnistria

Th first Trnsnistrin politicl-dministrtiv unit ws crtd by Moscow in 1924s n utonomous Moldovn rpublic within Sovit Ukrin. This rtificil constructhd th rol of prpring th Sovit nnxtion of Bssrbi. Whn this Romninprovinc ws invdd in 1940 nd gin in 1944, its northrn nd cntrl prts wrmrgd with th wstrn strip of th prwr utonomous rpublic to form th nw

Moldovn Sovit Socilist Rpublic. Whil hving no spcil dministrtiv sttus,diminishd Trnsnistri bcm th industril cor of Moldov nd hom to th Sovit14th rmy. Th lttrs mission in cs of wroccupying Istnbul in no mor thnsvn dysld to th crtion of hug stocks of wpons nd mmunition.

In 1989, Moldovns rprsntd 39.9 prcnt of Trnsnistris 546,000 inhbit-nts; Ukrinins, 28.3 prcnt; nd Russins, 25.5 prcnt (by 2004, th blnc hdchngd to 31.9 prcnt, 28.8 prcnt, nd 30.3 prcnt rspctivly).23 Whil frfrom rprsnting mjority, th Russins nvrthlss controlld th rgion.24 Onmight think of Grmscin hgmony, but blunt Brzhnvin domintion is prhps

mor pproprit trm. Howvr, t th nd of th 1980s th dominnt position of thisSovit lit ws thrtnd by Moldovn movs towrd indpndnc. Trnsnistrisprdominntly Russin nd Ukrinin dirctors nd lding prsonnl from th sttntrpriss frd for thir positions nd crr opportunitis. Whn nw lnguglgisltion fvoring th us of Romnin/Moldovn ws doptd in utumn 1989 thymobilizd th urbn Russin nd Ukrinin popultion bhind plns to stblish nutonomous Trnsnistrin rpublic.25 This ws th bginning of politicl procssptly dscribd by Stvn D. Ropr s conflict btwn Moldovns nd rgion-lly concntrtd Russophon popultion tht hd Sovit idntity.26

Th Moldovn Suprm Sovit lctd in spring 1990 doptd nw stt symbolsnd dclrtion of sovrignty whil th vry ctiv Populr Front nnouncd thtunion with Romni ws its politicl gol. In rspons, Trnsnistrin politicinsproclimd sprt Trnsnistrin Moldovn Sovit Socilist Rpublic on 2 Sptmbr1990. During 1991 nd rly 1992 thy victd th Moldovn xcutiv nd judiciluthoritis with th hlp of prsonnl of th Sovit 14th rmy.27 Its commndr,Gnrl Gnndii Ykovlv, vn ccptd th position of Trnsnistrin DfnsMinistr in Dcmbr 1991.28 as in abkhzi, South Ossti, nd Ngorno Krbkh,th Krmlin ncourgd procss dstbilizing rpublic tht smd rdy to

scp Moscows control. In fct, th strongly pro-Romnin gnd of th PopulrFront did not rciv brod populr support.29 Th Moldovn govrnmnt bcmlss ntionlistic ftr th ousting of Populr Front Prim Ministr Mirc Druc in



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My 1991 nd doptd dfnsiv stnc.30 Trying to void bloodshd, th Moldovnslft most of Trnsnistri.31 It ws only on 19 Jun 1992, whn th Trnsnistrin

forcs ttckd th lst polic sttion controlld by Chiinu in th town of Tighin/Bndr, tht th Moldovn Prsidnt Mirc Sngur finlly ordrd countrttck.Yt on th night of 20-21 Jun 1992 th 14th rmy intrvnd, dftd thMoldovns, nd occupid th town.32 Moldov csd ll militry oprtions s itws clr tht it could not dft th Moscow-supportd Trnsnistrins. Th lft(strn) bnk of th Nistru Rivr s wll s th town of Tighin/Bndr on th rightbnk bcm d fcto indpndnt stt.

Sisyphus: The Endless Negotiations

Th rmd conflict ws froznbut not nddthrough triltrl pc-kping oprtion runiting Russin, Trnsnistrin, nd Moldovn troops. evntody, thy monitor dmilitrizd scurity zon undr th suprvision of JointControl Commission. This ws th rsult of th Yltsin-Sngur agrmnt of 21July 1992. at first, pc ngotitions wr hld in th so-clld 4 formt, tht is,btwn Russi, Ukrin, Romni, nd Moldov (Bulgri dclind to prticipt).In 1993, Buchrst ws xcludd from th procss. Th sm yr, on Moldovs

rqust th OSCe strtd civilin long-trm mission in Chiinu nd bcminvolvd in th pc procss. aftr 1994, th ngotitions continud in th 5formt (Russi, Ukrin, OSCe, Moldov, nd Trnsnistri). It ws only in My1997 tht Moldov nd Trnsnistri signd Mmorndum on th principls of thnormliztion of thir rltions. But this documnt includd th mbiguous trmcommon state. Disputs on its intrprttion hv prvntd ny furthr progrss.33

In 2001, on of th fctors tht contributd to th lctorl victory of thCommunists ws thir promis to sttl th Trnsnistrin conflict. This ws crdiblbcus th communist ldr, Vldimir Voronin, ws opnly pro-Russin nd

dvoctd rconcilition with th sprtist rgion. His prtys lctorl pltformcould hv bn writtn by th Trnsnistrins: it includd th officil sttus of thRussin lngug in Moldov, th ccssion to th RussiBlrus Union, nd thdpning of conomic rltions with th CIS prtnrs. Rltions with Tirspolimprovd rpidly. In My 2001, four biltrl cooprtion grmnts wr signd.But tht sm month, th Russin Stt Dum proposd multiltrl consulttionsfor th ccssion of both Moldov nd Trnsnistri to th RussiBlrus Union.This gnrtd xtrmly ngtiv rctions within th Moldovn socity, furthrfulling th 2001-2003 nti-communist mss dmonstrtions. Voronin ws forcd to

bndon his most mbitious projcts. In turn, th Trnsnistrins blockd th ngo-titions.34 Moscow nvrthlss rlizd tht hving th Moldovn Communists inpowr ws uniqu opportunity tht should b xploitd. It thrfor prprd th



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2003 Kozk Mmorndum, projct tht would hv llowd th prsnc ofRussin troops in Trnsnistri until 2020. anothr criticl spct ws th crtion of

n uppr chmbr of th Moldovn Prlimnt composd of twnty-svn rprsn-ttivs qully dividd btwn Moldov, Trnsnistri, nd Gguzi. This wouldhv givn th Trnsnistrins nd Gguz th mns to block ny mjor Moldovnconstitutionl nd politicl chng. agin, firc public protst forcd Voronin torjct th grmnt h hd initilly ccptd. Morovr, it ws obvious tht Russicontinud to support its Trnsnistrin protgs, thus prvnting th MoldovnCommunist from obtining much ndd politicl victory. This ws on of thmin rsons tht dtrmind Voronin to dopt n incrsingly pro-europn stnc,implicitly downscling his Russophil orinttion.

In spch t th 2004 Istnbul NaTO summit, th Moldovn prsidnt skdfor th first tim for th dprtur of th Russin troops from Trnsnistri. at thsm tim, th Orng Rvolution in nighboring Ukrin crtd th conditions for nw pproch. In april 2005, th nw Ukrinin Prsidnt, Viktor Yushchnko,lunchd wht cm to b known s th Yushchnko Pln. It ws svn-stpproposl bsd on th orgniztion of fr, dmocrtic lctions for th SuprmSovit of Trnsnistri nd on incrsd intrntionl (nd Ukrinin) involvmnt.Yt for th ldrs in Tirspol, th ccptnc of this pln would hv bn suicidl.For its prt, Moldov ws frid of lgitimizing dmocrtic but not ncssrily

frindly Trnsnistrin ldrship. Th pln fild.35

a nw imptus ws du to Brussls incrsd intrst in Moldov. In Novmbr2005, th europn Union snt Bordr assistnc Mission to Ukrin nd thRpublic of Moldov. It lso bcm, togthr with th Unitd Stts, n obsrvrof th Trnsnistrin ngotitions. Th prsnt 5+2 formt ws thus crtd. Thrr two min ngotitors (Moldov nd Trnsnistri), thr mditors (th OSCe,Russi, nd Ukrin), nd two obsrvrs (th Unitd Stts nd th europnUnion). This hs improvd th ngotiting cpcity of Moldov, which cn usintrntionl support to compnst for Moscows pro-Trnsnistrinparti pris. a

numbr of europn ctions smd to succd in pushing Tirspol towrd n gr-mnt.36 Still, by 2008 it bcm obvious tht no mjor brkthrough could bchivd in th short trm. This cm t tim whn Voronin hd lrdy tkn thdcision to improv rltions with Moscow nd blivd tht solving th Trnsnistrinproblm would hlp win th 2009 lction. Consquntly, h rvrtd to scrtivtriltrl ngotitions with Russi nd Trnsnistri. In Sptmbr 2008, th Moldovnprim ministr vn sttd tht som lmnts of th Kozk Pln would b ccptdby Chiinu.37 Yt no mjor progrss ws md bfor th april 2009 lction.Ltr, politicl turmoil, nw lction, nd th crtion of th nti-communist govrn-

mnt colition compltly chngd th sitution. Th Trnsnistrins immditlyccusd th nw Moldovn ldrship of bing prt of Romnin nd NaTO plot.Thy lso strtd to spk bout possibl nw wr (s blow). Th sttlmnt ofth conflict suddnly bcm highly improbbl.



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Th rptd filur of th ngotitions ws du minly to th incomptibility ofth Moldovn nd Trnsnistrin positions with rspct to th constitutionl sttus of

th scssionist rgion. Chiinu ws rdy to ccpt dgr of utonomy vn mordvncd thn tht of Gguzi, which is frquntly mntiond s n intrntionl modl.Tirspol, howvr, skd stubbornly for confdrtion. This would hv llowd itsldrs to block ny mjor chng both t hom nd in Chiinu. Morovr, s confdrt rpublic Trnsnistri would hv utomticlly cquird th right to quitth confdrtion. Mny Moldovns blivd tht this ws littl mor thn consti-tutionl wy to lgitimiz Tirspols full indpndnc. It is clr tht th only pos-sibl compromis would b bsd on mor or lss blncd fdrtion. In mor thnon occsion, Chiinu smd rdy to ccpt such solution nd th nintn-yr

odyssy includd pisods of justifid optimism. Still, Moldovs occsionl opn-nss ws not mirrord by similr Trnsnistrin stnc. and it is logicl to think thtthis stlmt will prsist s long s two intrrltd fctors do not chng. On isrgionl nd concrns Russis gopoliticl intrst. It will b ddrssd in ltrsction. Th othr is locl nd rlts to Trnsnistris ruling lit.

A Working Political Fiction

Trnsnistri ws crtd s grrison stt mnt to protct locl thnic minoritisfrom discrimintion within Moldov nd from nnxtion by irrdntist Romni.Ironiclly, Moldov did not unit with Romni nd th rights of its minoritisincluding th Russin onr fully rspctd. Furthrmor, ftr 2001 Moldovws ruld by th Communists who shrd Trnsnistrins viw on history, lngugissus, th dmis of th Sovit Union, nd th ttitud towrd Romni.38 Still, thisdid not prvnt th continuing instrumntliztion of thnic frs by th Tirspolldrs. evn tody, thy

r putting fforts into flooding th Intrnt with storis of x-combtnts, witnsss,victims, tht hv sn with thir own ys wht hs hppnd during th conflict.Funds nd fforts r put into printing books nd writing rticls. an spcilly intrst-ing xmpl is th cs with Wikipdi: Tirspol uthoritis hv hird prsonnl whowrit dtild dscriptions of th Moldovn-Russin rltions, Trnsnistrin conflictvnts; thy mnipult th fcts nd gnrlly ttmpt to promot diffrnt vrsionof th conflict, similr to how Sovit-tim spcilists wr building virtul history.39

anothr, rltd mns of nsuring public support for th rgim is bsd on

somthing tht might b lbld th cultur of th intrntionl plot. Officil prop-gnd spks constntly of th dngr of Moldovn/Romnin/NaTO invsion.But it is not th only on to do tht. an intrsting xmpl is providd by NovayaGazeta,40 th journl of th Tighin/Bndr-bsd politicl nlyst andry Sfonov.



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a formr ministr nd, sinc 1999, rivl of Prsidnt Igor Smirnov, Sfonov is onof th vry fw indpndnt (or, t lst, utonomous) voics tolrtd by th

rgim. In My 2009, h publishd gopoliticl ssssmnt of th rgion. It wsftr th april turmoil in Chiinu nd on might hv xpctd to find n nlysisof tht vnts consquncs. Th world Sfonov dscribs, howvr, hs littl incommon with wht Wstrnrs or vn Moldovns know bout estrn europ.Tht prt of th world is in fct svg, dngrous intrntionl nvironmnthuntd by frocious prdtors. Fortuntly, computr simultions llow th Russinmilitry xprts to prdict futur volutions. In turn, ths prdictions hlp thKrmlin lbort its strtgic plns. Bsiclly, th influnc of th Unitd Stts isdiminishing whil th europn Union is incrsing its prsnc. Th min dngr

is th xpnsionism of Romni. This country is trgting Moldov s wll s for-mr Romnin trritoris now controlld by Ukrin. By gtting Moldov nd thUkrinin gs-rich continntl shlf of th Blck S, Buchrst intnds to bcom rgionl supr powr posing lthl thrt to Trnsnistri. Th only hop is nlrdy plnnd Russin intrvntion tht would ld to th dismntlmnt of Romni.This is politiclly incorrct but ncssry scnrio similr to thos usd inYugoslvi, Czchoslovki, nd USSR. Romnin Moldov (btwn th Prut ndth est Crpthins) would mrg with th Rpublic of Moldov. Trnsylvniwould bcom Hungrin nd South-Wstrn Romni Srbin (nothing is sid

bout Buchrst). This would solv ll tnsions in South-estrn europ s wll smny finncil problms. Th only possibl compliction might b cusd byUkrinin mbitions. For Tirspol, RussinUkrinin or RussinPolish wr wouldb ctclysm. In ny cs, Moscow rprsnts Trnsnistris only protctor.41evrywhr in europ, this 1939-typ scnrio would sm grotsqu. Th fct thtin Trnsnistri it is publishd nd widly commntd on is illustrtiv of th rsultsof lmost two dcds of Stlinist-styl propgnd. at lst prt of th popultionss th sprtist rgion s bsigd fortrss tht hs to struggl for its physiclsurvivl. Undr ths circumstncs, contsting th ptriotic ldrship in Tirspol

cn only b suicidl.Such widsprd convictions hlp prptut th rul of th Sovit lit lrdylgitimizd by th initil conflict. Undr th prtxt of rsisting Moldovn fscism,Prsidnt Igor Smirnov ( Russin citizn), Ministr of Stt Scurity Vldimirantyufyv ( formr OMON officr ccusd of politicl crims in Sovit Ltvi),nd thir group built consolidtd uthoritrin rgim whos Stlinist mthods rnot unlik thos of Cntrl asin dicttors. Thr r no fr nd fir lctions. anydissnt is brutlly supprssd. Politicins nd journlists who disply th slightstdgr of disloylty r hrssd or bnnd. Th Ministry of Stt Scurity hs vn

sponsord th crtion of th Proryv youth group whos mission is to prvnt Colord Rvolution nd to protct Trnsnistri from th orng plgu.42

Smirnov nd his ssocits lso bnfit from th vry profitbl conomic ctiv-itis tht md Trnsnistri known worldwid. In 2000, in this rgion thr wr



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42,000 tonns of wpons nd mmunitions blonging to th Russin Fdrtion.about hlf of thm wr vcutd or dstroyd during 2000-2004.43 Th rst, s

wll s wpons mnufcturd illglly in Trnsnistri, r simply bing sold on thintrntionl blck mrkt. Tirspols lck of intrntionl rcognition hs th pr-doxicl ffct of prvnting ny lgl ction ginst its compnis. Russin rms xport-rs did not miss th opportunity nd strtd to us Trnsnistri for thir own illgltrd. Govrnmnts undr intrntionl mbrgo, gurill fightrs, nd trroristgroups r tody rgulr customrs of th rgions rms trffickrs (Xvir Dlu, Frnch journlist who built clos links with Trnsnistrin officils nd businssmn,publishd 2005 book on this subjct44). Furthrmor, ll sorts of trffickrs outsidth wpons sctor lso discovrd th dvntgs of Tirspols spcil sttus. Consqu-

ntly, Trnsnistri, lrdy wpons lundry, hs bcom virtul fr criminlzon dscribd by rport fundd by th British Dprtmnt for Intrntionl Dvl-opmnt s smuggling compny msqurding s stt.45 Th min profitrsr th ldrs in Tirspol. Thy r fully wr tht trfficking cn go on only s longs Trnsnistri mintins its prsnt unclr sttus. Hnc thir rsolut oppositionto ny sttlmnt tht would bring th rgion undr th control of th Moldovn policnd judiciry.

The Transnistrian Wind of Changeand Its Negative Consequences

Smirnovs firm grip on powr prvnts ny dmocrtiztion mov. Howvr, inrcnt yrs th rgim cm to b contstd by mmbrs of th Trnsnistrin oligr-chy. authoritrin xcsss nd humn rights buss ld to th incrsing intrn-tionl isoltion of th rgion. Whn this took th form of srious obstcls toTrnsnistrin xports, som businss groups rlizd tht thir intrsts divrg fromthos of th rgim. Consquntly, in th Dcmbr 2005 prlimntry lctions,

twnty-thr of th forty-thr sts of th Trnsnistrin Suprm Sovit wr wonby th cndidts of th Shriff businss group formlly rprsntd by thObnovlny (Rnwl) prty.46 Shriff is n xtrmly influntil group tht domi-nts most of th rgions conomy. Its vry xistnc would not hv bn possiblwithout clos rltion with th Smirnov rgim. In fct, Olg Smirnov, on of thdicttors sons, vn workd for th group. But th lttrs xport hd sriouslydiminishd in 2004 nd it ws clr tht only politicl chng could hv improvdth sitution. Howvr, Obnovlnys politicl pltform ws similr to tht ofSmirnov on most mjor points nd spcilly on th indpndnc of Trnsnistri.

Shriff simply wntd to rplc th top policy mkrs with its own mn, not to ovr-throw th uthoritrin rgim. Th Obnovlny ldr, th young, Moscow-ductdevghni Shvchuk, bcm th spkr (chirmn) of th Suprm Sovit. H wsrplcing th only thnicl Moldovn mong th ssocits of Smirnov, Grigori



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Mrcu, who hd hld this position sinc 1991. Shvchuk mobilizd significntgroup of dputis nd succdd in imposing constitutionl chngs tht wknd

th position of th prsidnt nd nhncd th indpndnc of th judiciry. H lsotrid to turn th Trnsnistrin officil TV into public compny nd to rduc thcontrol of locl councils by th Tirspol uthoritis.47 Howvr, Shvchuk rfrindfrom full-fldgd crusd. Most notbly, in 2006 h did not run s prsidntilcndidt, llowing Smirnov to b rlctd. H climd tht h did not wnt tondngr Trnsnistris unity t momnt of mjor xtrnl chllng. H might hvddd tht, givn Smirnovs mthods, h didnt wnt to ndngr his own scurityithr. Th disput continud in th domin of constitutionl rform. Th projct of nw Constitution, compltd in april 2009, ws limiting drsticlly th ttributions

of th prsidnt whil rinforcing thos of th Suprm Sovit. Smirnov thrtnd tomobiliz th Cossck troops nd to dissolv th lgisltiv ssmbly nd concivd compting projct rinforcing his own position.48 Finlly, in July 2009 Shvchukrsignd from his position of spkr of th Suprm Sovit, ccusing th prsidntof undmocrtic nd nticonstitutionl ctions.49 Th thn Moldovn PrsidntVoronin, who hd put grt hops in politicl chng in Tirspol, bittrly ccusdShvchuk of bing wk mn.50 In ny cs, dspit this victory th img of thSmirnov group ws sriously ffctd. On 18 Novmbr 2009, thirty-six of th forty-thr mmbrs of th Trnsnistrin Suprm Sovit rjctd th prsidnts cll for

rfrndum modifying th Constitution in his fvor.51

Both Shvchuk nd Mrcutook th opportunity to sk Smirnov to stp down.52 In th Dcmbr 2010 prlimn-try lctions, Obnovlny won twnty-fiv of th forty-thr sts of th SuprmSovit.53 Prhps mor importntly, evghni Shvchuk nnouncd his dcision tontr th 2011 prsidntil rc.54 It is mor nd mor clr tht th survivl of thprsnt ldrship in Tirspol dpnds on its cpcity to rlgitimt itslf.

exggrting th grvity of th xtrnl thrts provids th simplst nd mostconvnint solution. In 2007, NaTOs opning of n informtion nd documnttioncntr in Chiinu ws prsntd by th Trnsnistrin Suprm Sovit s dcisiv

Moldovn stp towrd joining th atlntic allinc.55

But it ws th 2009 fll ofMoldovs communist rgim tht providd th much ndd proof of plot thrt-ning th vry xistnc of Trnsnistri. Smirnov wrnd tht th nw right-wingMoldovn govrnmnt will strt nw wv of violtions of th rights of th Russinspking citizns nd prllld th ntionlist policis of Gorgi nd Moldov.To countr th fforts of th nw govrnmnt in Chiinu to rduc to zro Russisinflunc in th rgion nd to put n nd to th prsnc of Russin troops, h pro-posd th ccssion of his rgion to th Russin Fdrtion. Short of tht, thTrnsnistrins would b forcd to prpr to dfnd by thmslvs th bordrs of

thir stt.56

Som of his collgus wr vn mor ggrssiv. Whn th Moldovncting Prsidnt Mihi Ghimpu skd for th rtrt of th Russin forcs fromTrnsnistri, h ws ccusd by th prsidnt of th Scurity, Dfns, nd PckpingCommitt of th Trnsnistrin Suprm Sovit, Olg Gudymo, of bing



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genetically unbl to ccpt th fct tht Trnsnistri is not prt of Moldov. . . .Mihi Ghimpu cnnot slp wll s long s in Trnsnistri w slp in pc. . . .Drstic ctions such s th rtrt of th Russin troops will not ld to nything good.Th prsnc of th Russin pcifictors could put n nd to th wr. W r ginstthir rtrt. Prsidnt Ghimpus sttmnt on th rtrt of Russi from Trnsnistriws foolish.57 (mphsis ddd)

Th dprtur of th Russin soldirs, concludd Gudymo, would ld to nwwr. In 2006, whn Chiinu ws ruld by th Communists, h hd lrdy sttdtht Moldov hs shrp tth nd ggrssiv plns with rgrd to th TrnsnistrinMoldovn Rpublic.58 Now, with pro-Wstrn govrnmnt, Moldov cn onlyprpr n ovrt ggrssion. Unsurprisingly, this point of viw is shrd by th ntir

Trnsnistrin ldrship, which cn mphsiz onc gin its ptriotic gols.To show th sriousnss of th Moldovn thrt, th Trnsnistrin scrt sr-

vic ntrd th scn. In th spring of 2010 it rrstd Tirspol journlist, ernstVrdnn, nd Tighin/Bndr civil srvnt, Ili Czc, on chrgs of trson ndspying in fvor of Chiinu. Th llgd us of brutl intrrogtion mthods ld toconfssions tht wr brodcst by Trnsnistris officil tlvision. In Dcmbr2010, Vrdnn ws sntncd to fiftn yrs in prison ftr tril ssssd byMoldovn nd intrntionl humn rights ctivists s flgrnt violtion of fund-mntl frdoms.59 It is not illogicl to think tht Smirnov might vn contmplt

th ignition of som smll-scl rmd incidnts on th Nistru. This would nsurlrg-scl mobiliztion within Trnsnistri, rinforcing grtly th lgitimcy ofth prsnt rgim. Howvr, th Tirspol ldrs do not hv th frdom of dcid-ing such xtrm ctions by thmslvs. On srious mttrs, th finl dcision hslwys bn tkn by th Krmlin.

Player and Referee: Russia

Writing bout Russis rol of ptron stt, Nicu Popscu formultd th bstbrif dscription of th TirspolMoscow rltion: Trnsnistri could not hvmrgd without Russi, nor could it hv survivd.60 Th pictur is compltd byNichols Dims qully short xplntion of th 1992 wr: Russi wntd to kpMoldov undr control, Romni t by, nd Ukrin undr thrt.61 Dspit its1999 Istnbul commitmnt, th Krmlin still mintins on th trritory of Trnsnistri1,500 soldirs nd hug stocks of wponry. This forc is smll, but not insignificntif ddd to Tirspols own militi nd comprd with Moldovs poorly trind ndrmd 7,000 soldirs.62 Mor importntly, th Russin militry prsnc is prcivd

by ll prts s xplicit support for th scssionists. Th lttr hv lwys bnpicturd in Russi s victims of Chiinus ggrssion. Moscow rspondd to thMoldovn fforts to forc th withdrwl of its troops with mdi cmpign clim-ing tht this would ld to rnwd violnc.63



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Th 1992 Trnsnistrin nd 2008 South Osstin pisods indict clrly tht nyMoldovn militry ction would triggr Russin dirct intrvntion. For Chiinu,

this is strong incntiv for th pcful sttlmnt of th conflict. But thTrnsnistrins know thy r wll protctd nd s no rson to chng th sttusquo. In this, thy hv bn hlpd by Moscows ttitud in th ngotition procss.Th Russins hv undrmind constntly th fiv-sidd ngotitions s thy blivtht third prtis r fvorbl to Moldov. In fct, Russi trnsformd th othrprticipnts in th 5+2 formt, Ukrin, OSCe, eU nd USa [into] onlookrs.64 Ittrid to impos dirct ChiinuTirspol ngotitions, whil ssuming th rol of bisd, pro-Trnsnistrin rbitrtor.

This protcting ttitud t th intrntionl lvl hs bn prllld by dirct

Russin involvmnt insid Trnsnistri. a 2008 rport of th Moldovn Institutfor Public Policy sssss this involvmnt s including th following lmnts:(1) Mssiv offr of Russin pssports to th inhbitnts of Trnsnistri. Out of totl popultion of bout 550,000, mor thn 100,000 r tody Russin citizns.65(2) Finncil ssistnc nd th promotion of xpcttions rgrding th xtnsionto Trnsnistri of socil ssistnc progrms from Russi. (3) Support for priodiclrfrndums rgrding indpndnc nd ffilition with Russi. (4) Illgl privtiz-tion of strtgic conomic ntitis by Russin public nd privt cpitl. (5) Impositionof pro-Russin mdi spc opnly hostil to th nmy (Moldov). Russi is

prsntd s th only dfndr nd svior. (6) Holding lctions for th stt bodisof Russi in Trnsnistri xctly s on th trritory of th Russin Fdrtion.(7) Imposition of nd support for Russin citizns who xcut th Krmlins indi-ctions in th Tirspol dministrtion. (8) Trnsformtion of th Trnsnistrin scrtsrvic into brnch of th Russin scrt srvic.66

Ironiclly, whil Russin propgnd in Trnsnistri prsnts Chiinu s thrch-nmy, Moscow hs md lso visibl fforts to projct its influnc insidMoldov.67 Using Moldovn printd mdi, locl ditions of populr Russin nws-pprs, nd Intrnt-bsd pltforms, Moscow conductd n fficint propgnd

cmpign tht discrditd NaTO, th Unitd Stts, Wstrn europ, s wll s pro-Wstrn nd pro-Romnin locl politicins.68 This xplins th prfrnc of 50.4prcnt of th Moldovns for Russi s thir countrys most importnt strtgicprtnr. Th much lss ctiv europn Union is supportd by only 25 prcnt of thpopultion; th Unitd Stts, by bout 1 prcnt.69

Th propgnd is fr from xhusting Moscows rsnl. Whn th MoldovnCommunists cm to dopt rthr pro-Wstrn stnc, th Russin Ntionl ScurityCouncil, th Russin govrnmnt, nd th Stt Dum dcidd to us complxprssur mchnism ginst Moldov (nd Gorgi).70 Th most visibl msur

ws th 2006 bnning of th Moldovn griculturl nd win imports. Chiinusdpndnc on Russin gs ws lso fully xploitd. Th first st of msurs tr-gtd th conomic intrsts of th Moldovn lits. Th scond ffctd sriously



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th conditions of living of th common popl. Voronins 2007 pro-Russin turn isthrfor hrdly surprising.71

Th Russin support for Trnsnistri is th rsult of colition of intrst groupsinsid th Russin Fdrtion.72 First, importnt Russin businss groups rinvolvd in th scssionist rgion. Bnfitting from corrupt links with th Smirnovrgim, thy took prt in th privtiztion procss nd md Russi th lrgst for-ign invstor. Scond, lmnts of Russis militry-industril complx cooprtwith Trnsnistrin fctoris. In fct, Russin ordrs hv bn crucil in prvntingthm from going bnkrupt. Third, th rgion is frquntly usd for illgl trffic byinflunt Russin businss, militry, nd mfi groups. For obvious rsons, ll thsintrstd ctors try to kp low profil. But thy r vry influntil in shping

Moscows policis. Finlly, t th politicl lvl, th most vocl supportrs of thrgim in Tirspol r th ntionlist nd communist dputis of th Russin SttDum. Thy hv constntly put prssur on th xcutiv to dopt toughr policistowrd Moldov nd succdd in crting pro-Trnsnistrin ttitud within thRussin public opinion.73

Howvr, conomic, idologicl, nd culturl fctors only rprsnt th tip of thicbrg. Thy r importnt but cnnot b comprd with Moscows gopoliticlintrst. For th Krmlin, th prsnt sitution of Trnsnistri prsnts multipldvntgs in kping Moldov insid th Russin sphr of influnc nd projct-

ing Moscows influnc in th rgion. First, it prvnts th normliztion of thpoliticl nd constitutionl sitution of Moldov. This prptuts th img of nunstbl, lmost fild stt tht cnnot b wlcomd s mmbr by th europnUnion or ny othr Wstrn structur s long s it dos not solv its intrnl prob-lms. evn th Romnin public blivs tht it is bttr to sty wy from thiscrisis-riddn rgion. Scond, it forcs ny ldrship in Chiinu to mintin rl-tivly pro-Russin ttitud. For th ovrwhlming mjority of Moldovns, thrunion with Trnsnistri is mjor policy objctiv. any nti-Russin msur cnonly hmpr this runion nd is thrfor unpopulr. In xtrm css, smll-scl

militry ction undrtkn uniltrlly by Trnsnistrin forcs could b usd tostrss th nd for Russin mdition nd pc kping. Morovr, n opnly hos-til ttitud towrd Moscow might ld to Russin rcognition of Trnsnistrisindpndnc. Such mov would b shock for most Moldovns nd would sri-ously dlgitimiz th locl govrnmnt prcivd s hving cusd it. Third,Russin politicl nd militry prsnc in Trnsnistri cn b usd to put prssur onKiv. Mny of Ukrins lins of communictions with Moldov, Romni, ndCntrl europ cross th trritory controlld by th sprtists. Fourth, fundmn-tlly chngd gopoliticl contxt might rquir th projction of Russin militry

forc in South-est europ. In tht cs, Moscow might dcid to us Trnsnistris militry outpost. For Wstrnr, such prspctiv sms vry unlikly. Buton should not forgt tht things r sn from Russi through nintnth-cntury



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lnss. Fifth, th strn bnk of th Nistru is usd by Russin compnis for lrg-scl illgl xport of wpons. Bsids its obvious utility for som Russin oli-

grchs, this rprsnts convnint wy to rm disrputbl ovrss frinds.This is why th Krmlin hs supportd th Trnsnistrins nd hs md visiblfforts to mintin th sttus quo. Russi might ccpt th runion of th scssion-ist rgion with Moldov, but only undr conditions mirroring th prsnt sitution.Trnsnistri should rciv constitutionl sttus qul to tht of th rst of thcountry nd llowing it to mintin spcil rltions with Russi s wll s th lttrstroops. Russin influnc should lso b dcisiv in Chiinu. Moldov should bndonny pln of joining Wstrn structurs.74

During th april 2009 crisis, th Communists wr supportd by th Krmlin, but

thir subsqunt lctorl filur ws not prcivd by Moscow s its own dft.at th Sptmbr 2009 Chiinu CIS summit, Mdvdv did not vn mtVoronin.75 It sms tht th Russins wr dply disstisfid with th Communistspro-Wstrn pisod nd did not trust th formr Moldovn prsidnt. Furthrmor,lction rigging could hv triggrd colord rvolution with xtrmly ngtivconsquncs for Russis position in Moldov. Consquntly, th Krmlin prfrrdto show smiling fc to th nw govrnmnt in Chiinu dspit its pro-Wstrnttitud. Howvr, th chirmn of th Commission for rltions with CIS mmbrstts nd co-ntionls of th Russin Stt Dum, alksy Ostrovsky, md clr

tht th Russin Fdrtion could rcogniz th indpndnc of Trnsnistri if thnw Moldovn ldrship bcoms too pro-Romnin.76

all this suggsts tht, dspit th politicl chng in Chiinu, Moscow intndsto mintin its prvious ttitud towrd Trnsnistri nd Moldov. It will push for sttlmnt of th conflict only undr conditions tht r xtrmly fvorbl to itsown gopoliticl intrsts. Othrwis, it will continu to protct th scssionistrgion nd will oppos ny mov to modify th sttus quo.

The Missing Link: Romania

at th fll of communism, Moldov ws hrdly on of th Romnins minprioritis. To Vldimir Socor, th Romnin public t lrg pprd lmost whollyindiffrnt to th issu.77 a rthr vgu prfrnc for th union with th formrRomnin provinc ws du minly to th ctivity of som intllctuls invokingwht Chrls King clld th Kosovo complx: th id tht prticulr pic oftrritory within th historicl homlnd is mysticlly linkd with th collctiv wll-bing of th thnos.78 all th politicl prtis includd irrdntist lmnts in thir

progrms, but th importnc of ths lmnts ws modst. evn for th two prli-mntry ultrntionlist prtisth Trnsylvni-bsd Prty of Romnin NtionlUnity nd th Grtr Romni PrtyMoldov ws mttr of scondry impor-tnc s thy trgtd minly th Hungrin minority. Th suprficilly rformd



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formr Romnin Communist Prty ld by Ion Iliscu doptd pro-Moscow stnc.Consquntly, it did nothing to support ffctivly Moldovs nti-Sovit movs nd

thn bcm th sol politicl ctor in Romni willing to ccpt Moldovn stt-hood for th long trm.79 This ws vry importnt bcus Iliscu took powr inDcmbr 1989 nd built smiconsolidtd uthoritrin rgim tht lstd until1996.80 Hnc, h ws bl to control fully Buchrsts forign policy nd limitddrsticlly Romnin support for th Moldovn Populr Front. at tims, thr wrsom concssions md to ntionlist supportrs nd llis. In symbolicl trms, thmost importnt ws th July 1991 Dclrtion of th Romnin Prlimnt con-dmning th Sovit nnxtion of Bssrbi nd Northrn Bukovin nd urging pcful corrction of this lgcy of th MolotovRibbntrop Pct.81 Iliscu lso

offrd th Moldovns significnt id pckg to py for outstnding ful dbts toth Russin Fdrtion. a rng of officil connctions ws crtd btwn th gov-rnmnts in Chiinu nd Buchrst, including high-lvl working groups on bilt-rl rltions. Romni bcm Moldovs lrgst trding prtnr outsid th CIS.82Yt non of ths lmnts ws intndd s th first stp of RomninMoldovnunifiction procss. Furthrmor, bginning with th mid-1990swhn th Moldovnslck of intrst in runion with Romni ws gnrlly cknowldgdth Romninprtis downscld ccordingly thir lrdy wk irrdntist progrms. ThTrnsnistrin ldrs, howvr, sw th sitution in vry diffrnt light. From th vry

bginning, thy usd Romnin pro-union sttmntsvn if thy cm from mr-ginl politicl or culturl groups or individulsto build n ggrssiv rhtoric ginstirrdntist Romni. Th nnxtion of Moldov ws prsntd s imminnt,which in turn justifid th scssion nd th crtion of th Smirnov-ld grrison stt.

For thir prt, most Romnins s Trnsnistri s rmot nd obscur plcwith which thy do not hv nything in common. Howvr, for th first tim sincprhps 1944, in th mid-2000s thr ws short-livd officil Romnin inititivconcrning th scssionist rgion. In Dcmbr 2004, t th bginning of hisprsidntil tnur, Trin Bsscu promotd n ggrssivly pro-amricn forign

policy illustrtd by his projct of BuchrstLondonWshington xis. Whilsupporting Romnis militry prsnc in afghnistn nd Irq, h dvoctd thprsnc of amricn militry bss in Romni nd skd for n ctiv involv-mnt of NaTO nd th Unitd Stts in th Blck S rgion. In spch dlivrdin Mrch 2005 t th Council on Forign Rltions in Wshington, h skd for thformultion of common euro-atlntic strtgy for th Blck S rgion in ordrto promot frdom, dmocrcy, prosprity, nd stbility, lding to th crtionof nw idntity for th Blck S rgion. a Romninamricn strtgic prt-nrship ws proposd in ordr to

find lsting solutions for th frozn conflicts in Trnsnistri, abkhzi, SouthOssti, nd Ngorno-Krbkh [which] thrtn th scurity of europ by spillingovr orgnizd crim, humn nd rms trfficking, nd trnsntionl trrorism.



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Coming to th point, h xplicitly skd for th withdrwl of Russin troops fromTrnsnistri nd Gorgi.83 H trid to win Prsidnt Bushs support for this pln dur-

ing two visits to th Whit Hous, in Mrch 2005 nd July 2006.84

In Sptmbr 2005,in spch dlivrd t Stnford Univrsity, h vn proposd th crtion of U.S.europn Union militry tsk forc in th rgion, s th Russin Fdrtiondos not ccpt th intrntionliztion of th Blck S. H insistd tht it is timfor th Blck S to cs bing Russin lk.85 Romnis Ntionl Scurity Strtgy,doptd in april 2006, rflctd th sm ids.86

Howvr, dspit th gnuin intrst of th Bush dministrtion in this projct,thr wr fw visibl consquncs, non of which concrnd Trnsnistri.Bcus of Wst europn opposition, th april 2008 NaTO Summithld pr-

cisly in Buchrstfild to mrk th ccptnc of Ukrin nd Gorgi inNaTOs Mmbrship action Pln. In Sptmbr 2009, th dcision of th Obmdministrtion to bndon plns for th nti-missil systm in Polnd nd th CzchRpublic put n nd to ny hop for incrsd amricn intrst in th rgion.

Furthrmor, domstic volutions lso ffctd th cohrnc of Buchrstsstrn policy. Prsidnt Bsscu is in control of only on of th thr mjorRomnin politicl groups. His Dmocrt Librl Prty, now in powr, ws prt ofcolition govrnmnts during 2005-2007 (with th Librls) nd from Dcmbr2008 to Octobr 2009 (with th Socil Dmocrts). Ths two prtis try to build

good rltions with Russi. Sinc 2006, th Librl Ntionl Prty is undr th totlcontrol of th controvrsil billionir Dinu Ptriciu, who dvocts opnly closconomic tis with th CIS countris. Within th Socil Dmocrt Prty (th formrCommunists), Ion Iliscu, now honorry prsidnt, is supportd by th prtys ovr-whlmingly pro-Russin old gurd. Thir viw on Moldovn mttrs is wll illus-trtd by n intrviw givn in Sptmbr 2009 to th Moldovn dprtmnt ofRdio Fr europ by Iliscus formr dfns ministr, Ion Mirc Pcu. askdto commnt on th nw nti-communist govrnmnt colition in Chiinu, Pcu,now Socil Dmocrt mmbr of th europn Prlimnt, spok xclusivly nd

insistntly of th Moldovns nrgy dpndnc on Russi, of thir nd to doptn ttitud fvorbl to Russin intrsts, nd of th grt dngr of ntgonizingMoscow.87 It smd mor of sttmnt of Comcon rprsnttiv thn tht of europn prlimntry. Th 2005-2010 Socil Dmocrt prsidnt, MircGon, blongs to th youngr, pro-Wstrn fction. Howvr, in Novmbr 2009it ws disclosd tht on 27 april 2009, whn h ws prsidnt of th Snt nd vicprsidnt of Romnis Suprm Dfns Council, h md th first of sris ofthr scrt visits to Moscow. Thr h llgdly mt arkdy Dvorkovich, ssistntto th prsidnt of th Russin Fdrtion on conomic mttrs, nd Srgi

Prikhodko, id to th Russin prsidnt. Gon first dnid th vnts. Whn hws forcd to rcogniz thm, h climd thos wr privt visits dsignd to nor-mliz th Russi-Romni dilogu.88 H did not disclos ny furthr dtil, butprss rports climd tht h ngotitd Russin finncil nd politicl support for



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his 2009 prsidntil cmpign. In xchng, h llgdly promisd tht onc lctd,h would downscl th Romnin involvmnt in th Nbucco gs piplin projct

whil joining South Strm, th Russin rivl projct.89

Whil ths llgtions cn-not b provd, th visits thmslvs dmonstrt th intrst of th youngr SocilDmocrts in improving th BuchrstMoscow rltion. any involvmnt inTrnsnistri might complict this tsk nd thrfor th Socil Dmocrts hvjoind th Librls in discourging it. Thy r hlpd by th fct tht th Romninpublic opinion is rsolutly hostil to ny involvmnt in post-Sovit criss. Consquntly,dspit his continuing support for n amricn militry prsnc in th rgion,prsidnt Bsscu hd to bndon his rlir plns. Romnis brif prsnc on thTrnsnistrin stg cm to n irrvrsibl nd.

Deus ex Machina: The European Union

Th europn UnionMoldov rltionship bgn quit modstly. a biltrlPrtnrship nd Cooprtion agrmnt ws signd in 1994 nd ntrd into forcin 1998. In Jun 2001, Chiinu bcm mmbr of th eU-inititd Stbility Pctfor South-estrn europ. Yt Moldovs importnc ws prcivd in Brussls smrginl. Btwn 1991 nd 2006, th eU ssistnc mountd to only 300 mil-

lion.90

Howvr, n importnt chng ws dtrmind by th lunching of theuropn Unions europn Nighborhood Policy (eNP).91 an mbitious joint eNPaction Pln ws doptd in Fbrury 2005 by th eUMoldov CooprtionCouncil. Th europn Union lso incrsd its prsnc in Moldov. In Octobr2005, full europn Commission Dlgtion ws opnd in Chiinu nd adrinJcobovits d Szgd ws ppointd eU Spcil Rprsnttiv for Moldov.92 Infct, th europn dmarche hs two indpndnt constitunts. Th first concrns theuropniztion of Moldov, in wy similr to tht of th post-communist coun-tris now mmbrs of th europn Union. It probbly contributd, in limitd

msur, to th socitl chng tht finlly ld to th 2009 lctorl dft of thCommunists. Th scond hs th objctiv of putting n nd to th Trnsnistrincrisis. It sms tht Brussls considrd this n sir tsk nd gv it priority.Consquntly, th Trnsnistrin qustion ws ddrssd by both th 2005 eNPaction Pln93 nd th europn Commissions Country Strtgy Ppr 2007-2013for th Rpublic of Moldov.94 Progrssivly, thr-lvl Trnsnistrin strtgymrgd.95 First, dirct prssur ws put on Tirspol. alrdy in 2003, th europnUnion (nd th Unitd Stts) introducd vis bn ginst lding mmbrs of thsprtist rgim. Th bn hs bn rnwd nnully.96 also in 2003, th europn

Commission convincd Ukrin to conclud with Moldov n grmnt forcingTrnsnistrin xportrs to cquir customs stmps only issud by Chiinu.97 a mormbitious (but short-livd) customs rgim ws introducd by Kiv in 2006 lsoundr eU prssur.98 Morovr, n eU Bordr assistnc Mission ws dployd to



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prvnt illgl trffic t th MoldovnUkrinin bordr. Th scond lvl is incn-tiv bsd. In rcnt yrs, Brussls hs offrd Moldov incrsd finncil ssis-

tnc, trd concssions, progrms of studnt scholrships, tc. This trnd bcmvry visibl ftr th 2009 rgim chng in Chiinu. Th ngotitions for nwassocition agrmnt strtd on 12 Jnury 2010.99 Tirspol is xcludd from thMoldoveuropn Union cooprtion nd this bcoms mor nd mor frustrting.Trnsnistrin trd with th europn Union hs incrsd, with 59 prcnt during2006-2008, nd could bnfit grtly from th prfrntil rgim grntd to Moldov.100Th third lvl is rprsntd by th lrdy mntiond dirct europn involvmntin th ngotition procss. This ld to th crtion of th 5+2 formt tht improvdsignificntly th position of Chiinu. Howvr, s shown rlir in this rticl, in

2008 Voronin bndond this formt in fvor of scrtiv triltrl ngotitions withRussi nd Trnsnistri tht ndd without ny rsult. an importnt dvlopmnttook plc in Jun 2010, whn Grmn Chncllor angl Mrkl proposd to PrsidntDmitri Mdvdv of Russi to rsolv th long-running conflict in Trnsnistri byrviving th 5+2 ngotitions. In rturn, Mrs. Mrkl offrd th stblishmnt of neURussi Politicl nd Scurity Committ whr Brussls nd Moscow wouldwork closly togthr in civil nd militry crisis mngmnt oprtions.101 Th proposlws furthr dvlopd t th Octobr 2010 MrklMdvdvSrkozy runion inDuvill nd t th Dcmbr 2010 OSCe astn Summit.102 Yt Russi cnnot b

skd to study sriously this Grmn pln s long s it is not trnsformd into full-fldgd eU inititiv. and for th tim bing, it is not clr if Chncllor Mrklsviws r supportd by th othr eU mmbrs.

On on hnd, ll ths lmnts might ld to optimism. Th europn Union isforging incrsingly fficint instrumnts tht turn it into mjor rgionl plyr. Thscssionists in Tirspol hv to fc nw st of sticks nd crrots nd, idlly, mightb tmptd to giv up. On th othr hnd, howvr, th plot-obsssd Trnsnistrinldrs prciv th eU ctions s hostil nd illgitimt. Thy hrdly pprcitBrussls pro-Chiinu ttitud nd ssss it s th rsult of dngrous Romnin

Wstrn pln. Moscow hs similr stnc. Losing Trnsnistri to fully indpn-dnt Moldov is inccptbl, s this would cncl th multipl dvntgs numrtdin th sction on Russi. But losing Trnsnistri to Moldov and th europnUnion would b vn wors. Th Krmlins gopoliticl vision llows only on intr-prttion of such n vnt: th Russin sphr of influnc would diminish in fvor of rivl, ggrssiv sphr of influnc. This dmnds countrction, not ppsmnt.

The Minor Actors: Ukraine, the OSCE,

and the United States

Ukrin hs bn mditor in th Trnsnistrin ngotitions nd sttions mili-try obsrvrs on th dmrction lin. In principl, Kiv is intrstd in putting n



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nd to crisis tht dstbilizs th rgion nd mintins Russin forcs t its Wstrnbordr. Still, s it ws shown in th prvious sctions, it hs tkn littl ffctiv ction.103

Morovr, it did so only undr strong prssur from th europn Union. ThOrng rvolution brought th Yushchnko Pln, but its rsults wr disppointing.In prt, this is du to th fct tht Ukrin hs importnt intrsts in th sprtistrgion. Thr r mjor Ukrinin invstmnts in Trnsnistrin compnis. Corruptofficils in Ukrin bnfit from smuggling through th rgion. and Trnsnistrintrd through th Ukrinin customs, trritory, nd sports rprsnt n importntsourc of rvnu for th budgt of th Odss rgion.104 Mor importntly, UkrinsTrnsnistrin policy is only n lmnt of th complx nd troubld KivMoscowrltion. This is subjct too vst to b prsntd hr. But it is clr tht Ukrin

is not fr to ply fully indpndnt rol on th Trnsnistrin rn. This cn onlychng if nd whn Kiv brks its strn links nd follows gnuinly europntrjctory.

Th rol of th OSCe ws mntiond in th sction on th ngotition procss.In th 1990s, its contribution ws quit importnt nd hlpd stbiliz th rgion.105Ltr, howvr, it bcm clr tht th orgniztion hd xhustd its potntil.Nutrl brokrg is tody insufficint nd th OSCe lcks th instrumnts nddin ordr to brk th ddlock. This is vn mor obvious whn comprd with theuropn Unions ctions in th rgion.

Finlly, th Unitd Stts hv lwys voidd ny srious nggmnt inTrnsnistri. Whn thy did tk som ctionsuch s th 2003 doption of th visbn or th 2005 dcision to bcom n obsrvr within th 5+2 ngotition formtit ws in conjunction with th europn Union. This lrdy cutious pproch cnonly b rinforcd by th Sptmbr 2009 dcision of th Obm dministrtion todopt forign policy lss hostil to Russin intrsts. In this contxt, it would bunrlistic to xpct ny nw mjor amricn involvmnt in th sttlmnt of thTrnsnistrin crisis.

Conclusion

a cynicl dscription of th Trnsnistrin sitution would dpict nintn-yrold, thr-sidd gm btwn Moldov, Trnsnistri, nd its Russin protctor.Somwhr clos to th tbl but unbl or unwilling to ply r Romni, Ukrin,th OSCe, nd th Unitd Stts. Howvr, nw plyr hs ntrd th gm. Theuropn Union is bringing nw sticks nd crrots for th Trnsnistrin ldrship.Bsids this mjor chng, thr of th initil ctors hv undrgon importnt trns-

formtions. Moldov hs ovrthrown th uthoritrin rgim of th Communistsnd hs doptd pro-Wstrn forign policy. Th wknd Trnsnistrin rgimtris to tk dvntg of this nw thrt in ordr to rlgitimiz itslf. andMoscow considrs th eU support for Moldov s thrt to its own sphr of influnc.



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It is clr tht th two locl ctors r wk nd unbl to win th gm by thm-slvs. Moldov rmins country with mny problms tht hs only vry rcntly

rvrtd to dmocrcy. Th nw rgim is frgil nd its futur unclr. It is highlyunlikly tht such circumstncs will llow victory tht could not b chivdby th stbl nd cohrnt rgim of th Moldovn Communists. Trnsnistri is in similr position. Domsticlly, th disputs within th uthoritrin ldrship illus-trt lgitimcy crisis tht ndngrs th vry survivl of th Smirnov rgim. atth intrntionl lvl, th sitution of Tirspol is rminiscnt of th RpublikSrpsk in th mid-1990s. Th Bosnin Srbs wr rjcting th runion with thirMuslim dvrsris. Thy could not b dftd militrily. But th rcntly rrivdamricns ngotitd dirctly with th Blgrd ldr nd imposd th Dyton

grmnt tht vrybody ls hd to ccpt. Similrly, th rgim in Tirspol cnsurviv only s long s Russi supports it. a dl with th Krmlin could bring thsttlmnt of th Trnsnistrin qustion in mttr of wks.

Th crisis, thn, hs to b scrutinizd t th rgionl nd not locl lvl. Morovr,unlik Bosni, for th two globl plyrsMoscow nd BrusslsTrnsnistri isnot n isoltd cs. Th europn Union strtd wht sms to b cutious butnvrthlss rvolutionry involvmnt in th CIS r. Wht is t stk on thNistru Rivr is not th sttlmnt of minor 1992 conflict. Th europn Union iststing its cpcity to pcify, europniz, nd vntully bring undr its influnc

prts of wht, until rcntly, usd to b Moscows uncontstd chasse garde. Onth opposit sid, Russi is crfully wtching th intrusion. To gopolitics-obsssdKrmlin obsrvr, thr is littl diffrnc btwn th europn involvmnt inMoldov nd th amricn on in Gorgi. Both r thrtning th Russin sphrof influnc. Unfrzing th South Ossti conflict ws th Russin rspons toWshington. Th sm rdicl option is unlikly on th Trnsnistrin thtr onlybcus Moscow hs widr rng of instrumnts t its disposl nd th mgnitudof th xtrnl thrt is mor modst thn in Gorgi.

It is importnt to not tht th frozn conflict itslf s wll s its possibl unfrz-

ing plys purly instrumntl rol. It is difficult to find rgumnts showing tht thovrll gopoliticl gm is subordintd in ny wy to th intrnl logic of thTrnsnistrin crisis. On th contrry, th crisis itslf hs bn nd continus to binstrumntlizd by th mjor rgionl plyrs. Th obvious conclusion is tht st-tlmnt cn b scurd only through Dyton-styl grmnt btwn ths plyrstht would lv littl spc to mnuvr to Tirspol nd Chiinu. Such n gr-mnt, howvr, is unlikly bcus of th obvious rgionl imblnc btwnRussi nd th europn Union. First, th rsourcs thy cn mobiliz in Moldov/Trnsnistri diffr grtly. Moscow hs troops, n importnt conomic prsnc,

strtgic nrgy rsourcs, th control of mjor TV sttions nd nwspprs, nd thsupport of importnt locl politicl forcs. Brussls provids only limitd ssistncnd trd concssions. Th only fctor tht would crtinly chng th sitution is



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crdibl commitmnt to ccpt Moldov s n eU mmbr. Yt for th tim bing,this is out of qustion. Scond, similr imblnc chrctrizs th Russin nd

europn prcptions of th lgitimcy of thir involvmnt in th rgion. In Russi,both th politicl lit nd th gnrl public r fmilir with th crisis nd shr thconviction tht thy hv th right nd th obligtion to protct th Russin minorityof lnd dfndd hroiclly by Suvorov nd Stlin. Th vrg europn citizn,on th othr hnd, is unbl to point Moldov on th mp. His or hr intrst inTrnsnistri is roughly qul to tht in Wstrn Shr. Third, this hug diffrnclds to qully diffrnt politicl prioritis. Th Krmlin rgrds this prt of th CISs blonging clrly to its sphr of influnc. any intrusion hs to b limintd. Theuropn Union could hrdly dopt similrly rsolut ttitud. Th simpl citizns

dont vn know tht crisis xists. Th govrnmnts of th eU mmbr stts rdividd on th rltion with Russi. Th burucrts in Brussls dopt by dfinitioncutious strtgis. and th nomintion of low-profil eU High Rprsnttiv forForign affirs nd Scurity Policy md ny chng improbbl. Fourth, th loclprcption of th two mjor ctors is vry diffrnt. Bcus of its cpbilitis, com-mitmnt to th rgion, nd ggrssivnss, Moscow is frd by vrybody, frind orfo. acting ginst its intrsts is sldom prcivd s wis ttitud. For its prt, theuropn Union is sn s frindly but rmot nd wk powr. On should thinktwic bfor rlying on such prtnr whn it coms to fc th ngry br.

Ths diffrncs prvnt Brussls from forcing nw Dyton. Tody, n eURussi grmnt on Trnsnistri could only tk th form of slightly modifidKozk Mmorndum. Th europn Union hs no rson to support sttlmnt thtwould b so unfvorbl to Moldov. It is mor logicl to wit until th constntlyincrsing europn prsnc in th rgion improvs significntly Brussls ngoti-tion sttus. This mns tht in th short nd, probbly, mdium trm thr will b nosignificnt progrss in th sttlmnt of th crisis. Dspit th ncourging eU dis-cours, th prsnt stlmt will most likly b prsrvd for long priod of timwith ll its ngtiv consquncs for th rgionl scurity nd for Moldovs politi-

cl nd conomic dvlopmnt. Th Trnsnistrin qustion will most likly continuto b instrumntlizd by both Russi nd th Moldovn Communists in wys thtcn ffct ngtivly Moldovs dmocrtic consolidtion procss.

Notes

1. S Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasias Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De FactoStates (Wshington, DC: Unitd Stts Institut of Pc Prss, 2004), 47.

2. For dfinition nd discussion of this trm s Lynch,Engaging Eurasias Separatist States, 1516.

3. Vldimir Socor, The Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests (Rport prprdby th Grmn Mrshll Fund of th Unitd Stts, on th occsion of th NaTO Summit 2004, 2004).http://www.jmstown.org/fildmin/Vlds_Cornr/policypprs/KonstRon.doc, 2.



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4. Cslv Ciobnu, Political Economy of Frozen Conflicts in ex-Soviet States: Challenges andProspects for the U.S. and Russia (Chiinu: Institut for Public Policy, 2007), 9. http://www.psos.org/contnt/downlod/14333/83843/fil/Frozn+Conflicts.doc.

5. Socor, The Frozen Conflicts, 1.6. Lynch,Engaging Eurasias Separatist States, 7980.7. Pirr Jolicour, The Frozen Conflicts of the Wider Black Sea Region (Occsionl Ppr,

Kingston, Ontrio, Cnd: Cntr for Intrntionl Rltions, Quns Univrsity, 2008), 7.8. Socor, The Frozen Conflicts, 2.9. Jolicour,Frozen Conflicts of the Wider Black Sea Region, 5

10. Jnusz Bugjski, Russis Prgmtic Rimpriliztion, Caucasian Review of InternationalAffairs 4, no. 1 (2010): 3.

11. Mykol Kpitonnko, Rsolving Post-Sovit Frozn Conflicts: Is Rgionl IntgrtionHlpful? Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1 (2009): 37.

12. Stphn Blnk, Russi nd th Blck Ss Frozn Conflicts in Strtgic Prspctiv,Mediterranean Quarterly 19, no. 3 (2008): 31.

13. arcdi Brbroi t l., Synthesized Vision over the Transnistrian Issue (Chiinu: Th BlckS Trust for Rgionl Cooprtion, Institut for Public Policy, 11 Sptmbr 2008). http://www.ipp.md/fils/Summry_11_1_.09.2008_ng.doc.

14. Nicu Popscu, Th eU in MoldovSttling Conflicts in th Nighbourhood, europnUnion Institut for Scurity Studis Occsionl Ppr no. 60 (Octobr 2005), 25.

15. Blnk, Russi nd th Blck Ss Frozn Conflicts, 31.16. Luk Mrch, From Moldovnism to europniztion? Moldovs Communists nd Ntion

Building, Nationalities Papers 35, no. 4 (2007): 60126 ( 6034). S lso Chrls King, MrkingTim in th Middl Ground: Contstd Idntitis nd Moldovn Forign Policy Journal of Communist

Studies and Transition Politics 19, no. 3 (Sptmbr 2003): 6082.17. Cristin Ghin nd Srgiu Pnint, Th Politicl Systm from th Rpublic of Moldov ndIts evolution, in Moldova. At the Crossroads, d. Srgiu Pnint (Buchrst: Soros FondtionRomni, 2009), 99. http://www.soros.ro/ro/fisir_cord_gnrl.php?id_fisir=4.

18. Institutul pntru Dzvoltr i Iniitiv Socil Viitorul, Politicl & Scurity Sttwtch.Monthly Analytical Bulletin on Moldova 14, no. 7 (July 2008): 2.

19. according to th Frdom Hous dfinition, th hybrid rgims r lctorl dmocrcis thtmt only minimum stndrds for th slction of ntionl ldrs. Dmocrtic institutions r frgil ndsubstntil chllngs to th protction of politicl rights nd civil librtis xist. Th potntil for sus-tinbl, librl dmocrcy is unclr. Frdom Hous, Ntions in Trnsit 2009, Mthodology.http://www.frdomhous.hu/imgs/nit2009/mthodology.pdf. S lso Lrry Dimond, Thinking

bout Hybrid Rgims, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 2135; Mtthijs Bogrds, How toClssify Hybrid Rgims? Dfctiv Dmocrcy nd elctorl authoritrinism, Democratization 16,no. 2 (2009): 399423.

20. Th smiconsolidtd uthoritrin rgims ttmpt to msk uthoritrinism with limitdrspct for th institutions nd prctics of dmocrcy. Thy typiclly fil to mt vn th minimumstndrds of lctorl dmocrcy. Frdom Hous, Ntions in Trnsit 2009, Mthodology.

21. Cristin Ghin nd Srgiu Pnint, Moldovs Rltions with th europn Union nd thRol Plyd by Romni. In Moldova. At the Crossroads, d. Srgiu Pnint (Buchrst: SorosFondtion Romni, 2009), 11315. http://www.soros.ro/ro/fisir_cord_gnrl.php?id_fisir=4.

22. excpt for th militry occuption during World Wr II.23. Glin Lungu, Populi btin Trnsnistrii fost nntrrupt romnsc, Vocea Basarabiei

(28 Sptmbr 2009). http://socil.moldov.org/nws/populti-bstins--trnsnistrii--fost-nintrrupt-romnsc-203734-rom.html.

24. Ntli Cojocru, Ntionlism nd Idntity in Trnsnistri,Innovation: The European Journalof Social Science Research 19, no. 3 (2006).



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53. Obnovlny (Rnwl) Prty, Podvdny Prdvritlny Itogi Vyborov V Vrhovnyi Sovt(13 Dcmbr 2010). http://www.obnovlni.info/nws.php?id=1819.

54. Trnsdnistrs Ft To B Dcidd by Oligrchs,Nezavisimaya Gazeta (14 Dcmbr 2010).

55. Institutul pntru Dzvoltr i Iniitiv Socil Viitorul, Tirspolul st ngrijort d propird Moldov alini Nord-atlntic (4 Octobr 2007). http://www.viitorul.org/libviw.php?l=ro&idc=297&id=931.

56. Trnsnistri s cr n Rusi,Ziarul Financiar(7 Octobr 2009).57. Olg Hudim: Rtrgr truplor rus din Trnsnistri v duc l un nou rzboi, New Land

of Transnistria (10 Octobr 2009).58. Olg Gudimo: Pntru Mihi Ghimpu przn pcifictorilor rui p tritoriul Trnsnistrii c

i crp roi pntru un tur,BBC Romanian Service (26 July 2006). http://www.bbc.co.uk/romnin/nws/story/2006/07/060726_trnsnistri_moldov_rm.shtml.

59. Financial Magazine, 18 Dcmbr 2010. U.S. Rgrts nd Follows with Concrn th CsVrdnn. http://finncil-mgzin.nt/rgrts-follow-concrn-cs-vrdnn/12461.html; Timpul,2 July 2010. nc un utodnun n Trnsnistri. Ili Czc rcunot c fcut spionj n fvor RM.http://www.timpul.md/rticol/inc-un-utodnunt-in-trnsnistri--ili-czc-rcunost-c--fcut-spionj-in-fvor-rm-12833.html;Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 27 Dcmbr 2010. Jurnlism i spionjn Trnsnistri. http://www.uroplibr.org/contnt/rticl/2260701.html.

60. Popscu, Th eU in Moldov, 24.61. Nichols Dim, Th Moldvin-Dnstr Rpublic: a Go-Politicl Gm, The Journal of

Social, Political and Economic Studies 24, no. 1 (1999): 37.62. Popscu, Th eU in Moldov, 19.63. Mnzrri, Russin Forign Policy, 44.64. arcdi Brbroi t l., Synthesized Vision.. http://www.ipp.md/fils/Summry_11_1_.09.2008

_ng.doc.65. Cslv Ciobnu, Frozn nd Forgottn Conflicts in th Post-Sovit Stts: Gnsis, Politicl eco-nomy nd Prospcts for Solution, (2008): 141. http://www.ipp.md/fils/Publictii/2008/USIP_mnuscript

_MaR13_08__Moldov_.doc.66. Brbroi t l., Synthesized Vision.67. Mnzrri, Russin Forign Policy, 4243.68. Ibid, 4344.69. Institutul d Opinii Public,Barometer of Public Opinion (Novmbr 2009), 108. http://www

.ipp.md/fils/Bromtru/2009/BOP_noimbri_2009_englsih.pdf.70. Mnzrri, Russin Forign Policy, 18.71. Ibid, 1819, 27.

72. Popscu, Th eU in Moldov, 24.73. Ibid, 2425.74. Ibid, 21; Brbroi t l., Synthesized Vision.75.Kommersant, 10 Octobr 2009.76. Russi Likly to Rcognis th Indpndnc of Trnsnistri, Democracy and Governing in

Moldova 144/7 (1-18 Sptmbr 2009). http://www.-dmocrcy.md/n/-journl/20090918/#3.77. Vldimir Socor, Moldovn-Romnin Rltions ar Slow to Dvlop, RFE/RL Research

Report1, no. 26 (26 Jun 1992): 38.78. Chrls King, Moldovn Idntity nd th Politics of Pn-Romninism, Slavic Review 53, no. 2

(1994): 363.79. Socor, Moldovn-Romnin Rltions, 38.

80. Vldimir Tismnnu, Romnin excptionlism? Dmocrcy, ethnocrcy, nd UncrtinPlurlism in post-Cuscu Romni, in The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, d.Krn Dwish nd Bruc Prrott (Cmbridg: Cmbridg Univrsity Prss, 1997).



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