ethnic conflict and european security pub155

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CONFERENCE REPORT

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY:LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Ms. Maria AlongiRapporteur

October 18, 1996


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The views expressed in this report are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position ofthe Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or theU.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

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Women in International Security (WIIS) is an international,non-partisan educational program and professional network,dedicated to the advancement of women in the field of foreign anddefense policy, international security studies broadly defined.Founded in 1987 by Catherine McArdle Kelleher, now with theDepartment of Defense, WIIS offers a comprehensive set ofprograms designed to educate the international community aboutthe roles and contributions of women working in the field ofinternational security. The program includes women in the

military, in government, in policy-making and diplomatic areas,private enterprise, academia, and the mass media. Ongoing seminarseries and conferences provide mechanisms for women to contributedirectly to the international security dialogue. The WIIS(pronounced "wise") computerized databank includes over 4000listings worldwide. WIIS publications offer professionaldevelopment and substantive information, including directories onfellowships and internships, and an anthology of case studies onethnic conflict in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244. Copies of thisreport may be obtained from the Publications and ProductionOffice by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX(717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at [email protected].

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All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)monographs are available on the Strategic Studies InstituteHomepage for electronic dissemination. SSIs Homepage address is:

http://carlisle-www.army. mil/usassi/


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PREFACE

On October 23-25, 1995, coinciding with the Bosnia peacetalks being held in Dayton, Ohio, Women in International Security(WIIS), an international, nonpartisan educational program; TheFriedrich-Eberet Foundation; the U.S. Institute of Peace; and the

Army War Colleges Strategic Studies Institute sponsored aconference, "Ethnic Conflict and European Security: Lessons fromthe Past and Implications for the Future." Among the participantsand attendees were scholars and policymakers from the UnitedStates and Europe concerned with the crisis in the Balkans andthe larger ramifications of ethnic conflict for Europeansecurity.

This rapporteurs summary, compiled by Ms. Maria Alongi,captures the primary themes of the conference to include linkagesbetween ethnicity and instability in Europe, the role Europeanand transatlantic security institutions can play in mitigatingthose tensions, and the various positive roles Russia and the

United States can play in resolving or lessening the impact ofethnic conflict. Ms. Alongi concludes that the nature of thethreat posed by ethnic conflict to European security is boundinexorably to a political manipulation; an ethnicization ofpolitics. And while the Balkan crisis held the potential forcatapulting Europe back to July 1914, the way the internationalcommunity reacted to head off a further deterioration in thesituation provides some basis for optimism.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to present thisoverview of the conference. The opinions summarized in thefollowing pages are those of the participants and do notrepresent official positions of the U.S. Government, theDepartment of Defense, or the U.S. Army.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOONColonel, U.S. ArmyDirector, Strategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE RAPPORTEUR

MARIA ALONGI currently is Special Assistant to the DefenseAdvisor at the U.S. Mission to NATO. She served as rapporteur andconsultant to Women in International Security (WIIS) for this

project prior to assuming her current position.


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ETHNIC CONFLICT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY:

LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Introduction.

With the outbreak and intensification of a number ofethnically defined conflicts on the European continent since thefall of communism, a conventional wisdom has formed that makesethnic tensions and instability in Europe almost synonymous. Thisprevailing notion of an ethnic threat to European stability alsohas affected the debate on European and transatlantic securityinstitutions. Indeed, the capacity to prevent and respond toethnic conflict has been a major consideration in the process ofinstitutional development undertaken by several key political andsecurity organizations, including the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and theOrganization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Asfurther proof of the centrality of ethnic questions in European

security, the effectiveness and continued relevance of theseorganizations has often been linked to their responsiveness, orlack thereof, to the most prominent ethnic conflict in Europe:the Balkan crisis.

1

Is this linkage between ethnicity and instability in Europein fact correct? And, does our evaluation of the Europeansecurity processes and organizations reflect their actual andpotential capacity to manage the problem? In order to evaluatethe impact of ethnicity on the tensions and conflicts affectingEuropean security and the role of security organizations inmitigating that impact, Women In International Security, theFriedrich-Ebert Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace,and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War Collegeconvened a conference in Washington, DC, on October 24-25, 1995,entitled "Ethnic Conflict and European Security: Lessons from thePast and Implications for the Future." The two-day discussion,which analyzed the sources of ethnic tensions in Europe as wellas the institutional developments in the European securityframework, yielded four principal conclusions:

First, greater precision is required when discussingethnic conflict in the context of European security. The ethnicproblem in Europe is multifaceted: stemming from differentcauses, involving a variety of issues, and thus requiring

different approaches. In addition, although ethnic tensions are aprominent feature of the European security landscape, not allpresent a threat to security and stability. In sum, not allethnic problems should be equated with ethnic conflict.

The threat to security and stability in Europe arises not


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from the presence of ethnic tensions in regional relationships,but from the exploitation and manipulation of these tensions forpolitical ends--a process that can be termed the "ethnicizationof politics."

The international community has not yet developed

appropriate mechanisms to respond to challenges of an ethnicnature. Although certain effective tools to manage thecentrifugal forces that ethnic tensions have produced alreadyexist, prior to the implementation of the Dayton accords,responses have been halting, ad hoc, and inconsistent. Inaddition, in certain cases, international responses to ethnicconflict have actually aggravated the problem.

The inconsistent approach of the international communityto ethnic demands and grievances reflects to a large extent theinadequacy of existing norms for international behavior in thepost-Cold War era. Indeed, there is an inherent dichotomy in thecurrent international approach to ethnic questions, which is

based on the potentially contradictory norms of the inviolabilityof borders, ethnic and minority rights, and the right to self-determination. It is incumbent upon the international communityto reevaluate how these norms are to be applied in response toethnic questions.

Ethnicity and Security: Linkages and Tensions.

The optimism fueled by the end of the Cold War and rejectionof communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the former SovietUnion was quickly muted by the emergence of tensions andconflicts in the former communist states. As analysts struggledto define the forces that would shape international relations andaffect security in Europe, nationalism linked to ethnic identityemerged in the literature as a key defining factor.

2Yet, as many

of these analysts also highlight, the relationship betweenincreased ethnic consciousness and instability is not clear-cut.

3

Indeed, the relationship among ethnicity, nationalism, andconflict generates vastly different analyses. While some expertsbelieve heightened ethnic consciousness fosters nationalism,which in turn can lead to secessionist movements and conflict,others assert that state failure itself will spur people to seekdifferent means to organize themselves, fomenting nationalism andpossibly national conflict.

4

Recent experience in Europe also suggests that ethnicquestions are only one component of a number of factors anddynamics that result in conflict between and within states.Although the conflicts in the Balkans, Nagorno-Karabakh, andChechnya indicate that ethnicity plays a distinct role in thebreakdown of security, there are also a number of cases on the


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European continent in which ethnic tensions between and withinstates have been managed so far without resort to violence.Poland, for example, has not reacted in a confrontational mannerto laws limiting the rights of Polish minorities living inLithuania and Belarus. The identification of the Russianpopulation in Crimea with Russia has also not led to

confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, despite the sometimeselevated tension between the two countries. And, despite the 1990clashes between Hungarians and Romanians in Romania, the twogovernments also avoided confrontation over the status of the 2million ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Indeed, Romania adopted aseries of measures designed to ensure some limited rights for theHungarian population within its borders.

The above cases also highlight the complexity of the ethnicproblem in Europe. Under the heading of "ethnicity" in Europe areoften subsumed questions relating to a states treatment ofminority populations of different nationality within its borders,a states relations and aspirations towards its own minorities

living outside the borders, relations between different ethnicgroups that share national borders, and even, as demonstrated bythe identification of the Balkan war as an ethnic conflict,relations among groups of similar ethnicity but with differentreligious and cultural traits. As a result, as conferenceparticipant Heather Hurlburt suggested, the conventional wisdomsurrounding the question of ethnicity in Europe suffers fromparadoxical and sometimes clearly contradictory notions. Ethnicconflict is ascribed as often to historical regional enmities asto systemic changes resulting from the end of authoritarianregimes. It is thus described alternatively as an "old" and "new"problem. Another paradox involves the international communitystreatment of the problem, which so far has focused on therecognition and preservation of the collective rights of aminority group. Although designed to stabilize interethnicrelations, this approach, in the opinion of several conferenceparticipants, may generate an adverse effect. First, it singlesout and therefore elevates ethnicity among the many factors--linguistic, cultural, and religious--that make up the identity ofa population. Second, the emphasis of the international communityon minority rights may encourage groups who feel disenfranchisedto organize along ethnic lines so as to attract the attention andassistance of the international community in pursuing theirgoals. In developing appropriate responses to the ethnic problemin Europe, it is therefore necessary to reexamine widely-held

beliefs about ethnicity and conflict in Europe and distinguishthe issues concerning ethnicity in the European security context.

Ethnic Issues in the European Security Context.

Conference participants identified three distinct issues and


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problem areas in ethnic relations in Europe:

power struggles among substate groups that identifythemselves along ethnic lines as a result of the collapse ofstate authorities, exemplified by the Balkans;

the potential that the status of an ethnic minority withina state might provoke irredentist claims by another state, asituation that might arise in regions of Central and EasternEurope and the Baltics; and,

tensions that occur within a state as a result of thestates resistance to demands by minority or other groups forspecial ethnopolitical status, examples of which abound on theterritory of the Russian Federation.

Conference participants debunked the idea, prevalent in thepublic debate, that enduring ethnic differences fomented theconflict in the Balkans. Indeed, as several experts highlighted,

the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia, wasethnically mixed, with at least one seventh of the population ofmixed heritage. The conflict in the Balkans can be bestunderstood instead as stemming from the deterioration of existingstate power structures brought about by the discreditation ofcommunism. In her book, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and DissolutionAfter the Cold War, Susan Woodward takes the analysis of systemicchange even further, and argues that the deterioration of thepower structures in Yugoslavia predates even the end ofcommunism, and has deeper roots in the transformation of theglobal economy that burdened the Yugoslavian state with a debtcrisis that undermined its authority. In Woodwards opinion, thesubsequent change in the international order brought about by thedemise of the Soviet Union magnified a state crisis already inprogress.

5Conference participant Mjusa Sever, of the Slovenian

Libra Institute, also argued that the source of the crisis inthe Balkans lies in the decline of communism. In Severs opinion,elites in Yugoslavia, confronting a challenge to their powerbase, sought to create new support for themselves by rallyingpeople around the nationalist cause,

6thus radicalizing the

political debate.

Effective manipulation of information contributed to makingethnic differentiation and nationalism an integral part of thepost-communist politics in the former Yugoslavia. Panelist Ana

Husarska, a journalist who has covered the conflict in the formerYugoslavia, found that public perceptions among Bosnian Serbswere strongly influenced by nationalist propaganda, as well asthe efforts of Bosnian Serb authorities to limit the peoplesexposure to a variety of views on the developing crisis.

7

Finally, the initial response of the international community tothe changes sweeping Eastern Europe in the aftermath of communism


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may have affected the splintering and radicalization of politicsin the former Yugoslavia. Several speakers made the point thatthe recognition by the West of claims of independence by theBaltic countries encouraged those in the former Yugoslavia whosought independence as a means of extracting themselves from asystem that did not work and, in some cases, from human rights

abuses. Mjusa Sever further argues that when the internationalcommunity at the outbreak of the crisis in the Balkans pressedfor maintaining the integrity of Yugoslavia, it dealt a setbackfor moderate reformists, for it lent legitimacy to existing powerelites.

A second expression of the ethnic problem in Europe is thepresence of large minority populations within established states--a situation that occurs in Central and Eastern Europe and in theBaltics. Here, a number of ethnically distinct groups resideoutside national borders, such as Hungarians in Romania,Slovakia, and Vojvodina; Turks in Bulgaria; and Russians inUkraine, Kazakhstan, and the Baltics. In addition, several

Central and East European countries have sizable populations ofthe stateless Roma (gypsies). The demands of these minorities forspecial status, and the treatment of these groups by the state,constitute potential flashpoints for the degradation of inter-state or intra-state relations. Indeed, several post-communistgovernments in Central and Eastern Europe articulated claimstowards national minorities residing outside state borders,raising fears that this expression of "ethnic nationalism" wouldturn into irredentism and foment instability. Former PrimeMinister Antall of Hungary, for example, repeatedly stated thathe was president of the five million Hungarians residing outsidestate borders, and, despite Hungarys adoption of the OSCE (thenknown as CSCE) pledge that borders cannot be changed by force,the government repeatedly refused to explicitely recognize theborders of neighboring states.

8

Despite this situation, conference participants concurredthat the potential for instability in Central and Eastern Europeis greatly diminished by the yearning of the Central and EastEuropean countries to become integrated into the Westerncommunity of nations, symbolized by membership in the EuropeanUnion and NATO. Indeed, minority rights questions in the regionhave been handled largely through negotiation and agreement. In1993, Hungary and Ukraine ratified a 1991 treaty on friendshipand cooperation, which rejects territorial demands by either

party against the other and includes provisions for the treatmentof the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. In addition, dialogue isunderway between Hungary and Slovakia, and Hungary and Romania--belying earlier expectations of a potential escalation oftensions.

Conference speaker Charles Gati argued that threat


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perceptions in Central and Eastern Europe provide a powerful pushtoward integration in Western security structures. Relativeeconomic deprivation--following the high expectations generatedby the end of communism-- have indeed created a backlash againstminority populations, which are often scapegoated for economic orsocietal failures. Yet, a more potent dynamic in these countries

is created by the perception of a longer-term threat to theirterritorial integrity by Russia. Gati pointed out the widely-heldbelief in Central and Eastern Europe that a downcast Russia willeventually seek to regain lost status through territorialaggression. Thus, countries such as Poland, Hungary, and theBaltic states actively seek entry into NATO as a hedge againstfuture insecurity. In the opinion of Gati, this aspiration hascontributed to keeping ethnic tensions in check, as regionaltensions have come to be perceived as incompatible with "entryinto the club."

Likewise, Ukrainian-Russian relations on the question ofminorities have remained stable, despite the 1994 efforts by

Crimean regional president Yuri Meshkov to hold a referendum onwhether Crimea should become an independent state "in union" withmembers of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and hispronouncements about potential reunification with Russia.Conference participant Elizabeth Pond argued this expression ofCrimean nationalism owes more to the aspirations of the Russianpopulation in Ukraine for economic well-being than to a desire torejoin Russia. As Pond pointed out, Russians in Ukraine largelysupported the 1991 vote on Ukrainian independence, primarily inthe expectation that the Ukranian economy would undergo reformand grow faster than Russias. As the Ukranian economy languishedand these expectations were proven wrong, desire for change waschannelled into expressions of nationalism. According to Pond,nationalism in Crimea is not likely to receive great support fromRussia, which has not demonstrated a great deal of solidaritytowards Meshkov, or the remainder of the Russian population inUkraine; yet this situation could change if the economy inUkraine deteriorates further. A hopeful sign is the movementamong certain Russian intellectuals in Ukraine to develop a"western-oriented Slav identity" for Ukraine, which envisionsgreater political and economic ties with Western Europe, even ifshort of joining Western institutions such as the European Unionand NATO.

Thus, a consensus emerged at the conference that, as long as

irredentism is perceived as hindering economic development, inthe form of closer relations with the more stable and prosperouspart of Europe or regional cooperation for example between Russiaand Ukraine, tendencies toward excessive nationalism will bemoderated. In this context, efforts by security institutions todevelop standards for cooperation on political and securityissues among countries in the region--such as the emphasis on


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"good neighborly relations" by the OSCE and NATOs Partnershipfor Peace (PfP) program--can provide additional moderatinginfluences.

A different dynamic is at work in Estonia, where a series offactors contribute to making the status of the large Russian

minority a source of tension between this country and Russia.First, the Russian population in Estonia constitutes a majorityin certain regions of the country--up to 82 percent in countyIda-Virumaa, for example--and furthermore it has retained adistinct Russian identity, as 62 percent of these people wereborn outside of Estonia.

9Second, Estonia has articulated a very

restrictive definition of citizenship that excludes a greatnumber of its ethnically Russian residents. Third, Russian policytowards its diaspora contributes to strengthening the ties of theRussian population in Estonia to Moscow and therefore discourageswhatever integration could be initiated by those willing to doso. As a result, avoiding the intensification of the ethnicquestion in Estonia will owe as much to Estonian actions and

policy toward the Russian minority as to the treatment of theissue of Russian minorities abroad in Russia.

Indeed, a key factor affecting relations between the ethnicminority and the rest of the population in a state is, accordingto panelist Leila Alyeva, the identification of the minoritygroup with the interests of the state in which it resides,regardless of the ethnicity of the majority population. Alyevacited the case of Azerbaijan, where ethnic Russians have formedpolitical groupings that have supported the policies of the stateeven when these did not coincide with those of Russia. Loyalty tothe state by minorities, cultivated in turn by policies ofintegration on the part of the state, have contributed todiminishing the potential for ethnic rivalry in Azerbaijan, inthe opinion of the speaker.

Loyalty by the minority to the state in which it resides isalso, however, affected by the policies of the state from whichthe minority originates. Klara Hallik pointed out in herpresentation that Russia is engaging in an activist policytowards its minorities abroad, and particularly in Estonia, whichdiscourages integration by ethnic Russians. She further arguedthat influencing Russians abroad has become part of Russianforeign policy. By this line of action, Russia hopes toaccomplish these goals: maintain some level of control over a

former territory, and allow the minority to retain a link to themother country short of repatriation, which would weigh heavilyon Russias currently strained resources.

Analyst Tatiana Shakleina suggested that Russias positionon ethnic issues is still taking shape and will largely depend onthe evolution of the countrys foreign policy, a question that is


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in turn tied to the development of Russian politics. Shakleinadescribes different positions by groups on the Russian politicalspectrum that vary from isolationism, to support for Westernorientation by Russia, to an activist foreign policy that isprimarily oriented toward Russias eastern and south-easternborders. According to this perspective, which group prevails in

the coming elections, and which view of Russias place in theworld prevails, will affect the treatment of the ethnicquestion.

10

A third aspect of the ethnic problem in Europe is the statusof the Russian population within non-Russian regions of theRussian Federation. Leokadia Drobizheva cites a study that counts150 intergroup conflicts on the territory of the fomer SovietUnion, of which 30 involved open confrontation, with the Chechencrisis perhaps the most virulent.

11Yet, Drobizheva and several

other conference participants cautioned against viewing theproblem of nationalities in the Russian Federation as a harbingerof widespread ethnic conflict. Although the Russian government

today confronts a number of challenges from non-Russian peopleswho seek different levels of autonomy, not all such demands willresult in conflicts of the magnitude of the Chechen crisis.Indeed, as Marjorie Balzer pointed out, the Russian centralgovernment has engaged in negotiations and concluded treatieswith several regional governments seeking greater autonomy, suchas Tatarstan and the Sakha Republic.

Ethnic issues in the Russian Federation are best understoodin the context of adaptation by the people that formed the SovietUnion to the realities of a new political system that is stilltaking form. One aspect of this political transformation that hascontributed to the ethnic problem in the Russian Federation isthe dissonance between the old, Soviet constitutional approach toethnic matters and that of the new Russian state. While theConstitution of the Soviet Union included the right to self-determination, the Constitution of the Russian Federation doesnot contain the right to secession, and the state has activelyinhibited the realization of self-determination.

12Yet, this very

different legal approach to minority questions also reflects thealtered ethnopolitical map of the Russian Federation. In the oldSoviet state, about 49 percent of the population was made up ofnon-Russians holding different ethnopolitical status, with someresiding in union republics, others in autonomous republics, andyet others in national administrative units, such as okrugs and

oblasts.

13

Today, 18 percent of the total population is ethnicallynon-Russian, although it occupies 53 percent of Federationterritory.

14

Another aspect of the ethnic question in the Russian

Federation, in the analysis of Marjorie Balzer, is thedevelopment of a new set of relationships between the central


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Russian government and the regions in the periphery. Balzerargued that at least two secessionist movements in the RussianFederation, in Tuva and the Sakha Republic, lost momentum whentheir claims to the right secession were articulated bynationalist parties as part of their constitutions. Balzerconcluded that support for ethnic nationalism in these cases

reflected pride in national identity rather than a real desirefor severing economic and political ties with the Federation. Theresolution of questions surrounding the control of naturalresources and the fiscal responsibility of the regions toward thecentral government will also alleviate sources of disagreementbetween the center and periphery, and moderate centrifugaltensions in these regions of the Russian Federation.

The picture in Russia is not all positive, however. Indeed,the tensions in the Caucasus region provide the greatestpotential for the spread of ethnic conflict in Europe. Theinability of the Russian government to negotiate a resolution tothe Chechen crisis may, in the opinion of several conference

participants, highlight the weakness of the Yeltsin governmentand spur other latent conflicts to reignite. In addition, thefailure to put down the rebellion quickly, and the resulting lossof life, both Russian and Caucasian, have the potential forcreating political instability within the Federation. Theconflict, which has received extensive media coverage, hashighlighted for many the willingness of the Russian government touse force against its own citizens, diminishing backing for theYeltsin government by democratic forces. The result,unexpectedly, may be the marginalization of democratic elementsin Russian politics, as Yeltsin seeks other sources of politicalsupport.

The Nature of the Problem: The Ethnicization of Politics.

Although the expression of the ethnic problem in Europe ismultifaceted, and its causes are diverse, it is possible todistinguish several common factors that determine whether tenseethnic relations will turn into a conflictual situation. Therange of ethnic issues in Europe and the limited examples ofarmed confrontation that have resulted indicate that the simpleexistence of ethnic grievances and nationalist claims does not,in itself, produce conflict. The cases in which conflict haserupted violently, in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, share amixture of ethnic grievances, highly unstable political systems,

and underdeveloped democratic institutions. In each case, theexploitation of ethnic grievances by political leaders forpolitical ends--a process that can be termed the "ethnicization"of politics--contributed to a highly-charged domestic environmentin which immature democratic processes and institutions could notmanage to adjudicate competing demands fairly. In each case as


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well, mistargeted international intervention aggravated thesituation.

In the former Yugoslavia and in Chechnya, cultural andethnic divides formed along preexisting economic and politicalcleavages. In the former Yugoslavia, the decentralized system of

economic and political power developed during the Tito years hadled to deep economic differences among the constituent republics.As Susan Woodward argues, these economic and social differenceswere largely at the individual, rather than national, level andreflected the public-private sector divide in the economy ratherthan ethnic identity. Yet, as a result of the economicdisplacement created by the introduction of market reforms andthe coincidental economic crisis of the 1970s, internal migrationin search of employment or higher education resulted in livingpatterns in which socio-economic status coincided with cultural-ethnic identity.

15Thus, perceptions of relative deprivation

became regional, as different groups were thought to berelatively better off than others, and increasingly ethnic in

nature.

Economic powerlessness and perceptions of other groupsbehavior play powerfully in the intensification of relationsbetween Russia and the Caucasus, as well. The rapid deteriorationof the standard of living in the former Soviet Union thataccompanied political change and economic reform coincided withthe emergence of a black market economy widely perceived to becontrolled by Caucasian elements. The association ofcriminalization with ethnicity in Russia led to a deteriorationin ethnic relations, exemplified by the campaign of expulsions ofcitizens of Caucasian appearance from Moscow and other Russiancities beginning in 1993.

Elite exploitation of these sentiments, coupled withimmature democratic processes, also contributes to thedeterioration of intra-state and inter-state ethnic relations.Woodward argues that in the former Yugoslavia, primarily inrepublics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, nationalism waspromoted by the inability of citizens to organize along politicallines. The process of political and economic decentralization wasnot accompanied by political liberalization. Thus, unable toorganize along party lines that competed with the preeminence ofthe communist party, people drifted toward nationalistorganizations. Leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, in turn,

tapped into the emerging nationalism to press for their politicalcause. Mjusa Sever also places responsibility for the escalationof ethnic tensions on political elites, arguing that manyproponents of ethnic nationalism in the former Yugoslavia wereformer communist party leaders who seized upon a differentideology in an attempt to find new bases of support.


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As in the Balkans, the manipulation by elites of ethnictensions fed into the management of the conflict between theRussian government and the break-away Chechens. As conferenceparticipant Leokadia Drobizheva remarked, depiction in the mediaof Caucasian involvement in criminal activity in Russia coincidedwith developments in the Chechnya crisis, so that during periods

of negotiation between the Russian government and the Chechenrebels, the number of Caucasians reportedly involved in crimefell dramatically.

Another common thread in the intensification of ethnicconflicts is the reaction of the international community.International responses to conflicts of an ethnic nature havelargely been shaped by competing norms: the inviolability ofborders, a central aspect of the normative construct for Europeansecurity enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, and support for therights of minority groups, represented in Europe by theestablishment of an OSCE High Commissioner for NationalMinorities. In the opinion of several conference participants,

the early attempts by the international community to shape itsresponses to ethnic conflicts in Europe--primarily in theBalkans--on the basis of respect of these norms complicated theresolution of the crisis. Several conference participants, forexample, argued that the early efforts of the internationalcommunity to prevent the recognition of the claims ofindependence of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia, whilealso supporting claims of self-determination by particulargroups, facilitated an outcome in which self-determination wasperceived as possible only by force.

Conference panelist Paul Goble argued further thatinstitutionalizing international support for claims of minoritygroups--through the creation of the office of the OSCE HighCommissioner for National Minorities--fosters demands for self-determination by aggrieved groups when other mechanisms foraddressing valid grievances by national groups on bases otherthan ethnicity do not exist or are not given equal visibility.Goble reflected that claims of an essentially economic naturecould find expression in ethnic demands if greater efforts arenot made to elevate the profile of other internationalorganizations that address grievances that cut across ethniclines.

The international community may also unwittingly aggravate a

crisis by engaging discredited leaders in diplomatic initiatives.Mijusa Sever argued that the West failed in its response to theBalkans because it communi- cated with the representatives of theold regime, rather than the emerging democratic forces. The Westwas not prepared to deal with a country undergoing a systemicchange. It sought to keep the country together, in keeping withits policy of maintaining existing borders intact, and continued


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to interact with state authorities, which were no longerlegitimate. In so doing, it imbued them with legitimacy andbolstered their position.

Finally, panelist Warren Zimmerman argued that theinternational community bears responsibility for the

intensification of the Balkan conflict for having refused tointervene militarily at the early stages of the crisis. Zimmermanargued that the inaction of outside powers in response tomilitary attacks on civilian targets emboldened the aggressorsand allowed the escalation of violence. This, in turn, furtherimpeded an international response by raising the risk inherent inintervening in a more violent conflict.

The Role of International Security Institutions and Processes.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, European andtransatlantic organizations and mechanisms have undertaken aprocess of adaptation to the new conditions on the European

continent that has produced a host of new acronyms--such as OSCE,Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), and PfP. This process ofadaptation has sought to reflect the changing nature of thechallenges to European security from the Cold War bipolarconfrontation to the emergence of regional tensions and thechallenges inherent in the political and economic transformationof entires societies.

Since 1991, NATO has undertaken a transformation designed toincrease its capacity to respond to contingencies other thancollective defense. At a ministerial meeting held in Oslo in1992, NATO stated its intent to support the United Nations andOSCE in peacekeeping with its military capabilities. Thesignificance of this statement was great for the Alliance, for itwas the first indication of its will to move beyond the functionof defense of member states to undertaking operations of aregional nature--so-called non-Article V contingencies. Sincethen, the Alliance has been engaged in a process of adaptation tobe able to respond to the new challenges of the European securityenviron- ment. The process of adaptation is two-fold, and is inresponse both to the desire for entry into the Alliance by newmembers and to the demand that it be able to respond effectivelyto regional contingencies that fall short of collective defensebut that affect security perceptions in Europe--such as theBalkan conflict. NATO is thus currently engaged in a study

designed to suggest changes to its military and politicalstructures to take in new members and integrate militarily thosethat have not been integrated, and to take on new tasks of a non-Article V nature.

If the experience of post-World War II Europe is an


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indication, NATO enlargement is promising for European securitybecause it could work to increase security cooperation amongneighbors. Of course, an important caveat for European securityis to simultaneously increase cooperation with those states whichwill not become members, so as not to create security vacuums. Inthis context, the PfP initiative is an important development both

to prepare potential new members for entry and to avoid securityvacuums. Preparation for membership is done by including Partnersin Alliance processes of consultation, through meetings inexpanded Partner format, and transparency, through the process ofsharing information on defense plans. NATO has indeedinstitutionalized transparency in defense matters among itsmembers during the past 40 years through the routine exchange ofinformation regarding defense capabilities and plans. Partnersare now sharing similar information with each other and with thealliance through the Planning and Review Process (PARP).

PfP also can work to avoid the perception of insecurity bythose who will not become members because it was established and

is viewed by NATO as a continuing program even after NATOenlargement is concluded. PfP was set up by NATO to offer apermanent relationship with the Alliance short of membership. PfPcould then be viewed as a means for crisis prevention. Byincreasing transparency and opportunity for consultation, it candiminish the potential for crisis and escalation of tensions.

PfP can also contribute to a potentially key factor toavoiding ethnic conflict: democratization--even if in a limitedway. By signing on to PfP, partners commit to establishingcivilian and democratic control of the military and defenseestablishment. NATO as an institution, and NATO membersindividually, have undertaken a series of exchanges with partnerson the wide range of procedures and traditions among establishedsocieties that contribute to embedding defense planning and themilitary within democratic structures. This could be an importantfactor in stabilizing areas of ethnic and nationalist tensions,where there exists the potential for the politicization of themilitary.

NATOs involvement in Bosnia constitutes so far the mostsuccessful case of crisis management in Europe. NATO organizedand forms the core of the Implementation Force (IFOR) that isimplementing the provisions of the Dayton peace settlement amongthe parties in the Balkan conflict: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,

and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Although the IFOR missionis so far the test case for conflict resolution in Europe, itsimpact on the wider European security framework awaits completionof the mission.

The OSCE has also undergone a great deal of change to adaptto post-Cold War European security challenges. In 1992 the then-


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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began itsevolution by establishing the office of CSCE Secretary Generaland a permanent secretariat. These steps gave permanence to anorganization that had been influential in European security sincethe early 1975, but that had been originally structured as a"loose consultative process."

16In 1992, as well, the then-CSCE

added an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(ODIHR), which had earlier begun as the Office of Free Elections,set up in 1990 primarily to monitor polls in the emergingEuropean democracies. As discussed above, the OSCE has alsoinstituted a High Commissioner for National Minorities chargedwith monitoring minority issues and troubleshooting in cases inwhich ethnic tensions have flared up. Perhaps the most directlyrelevant developments to prevention of ethnic conflict to emergefrom the OSCE evolution are the establishment of ConflictPrevention Center (CPC) and the FSC. Among the CPCs main tasksis the monitoring of crises and the mediation of disputes, whilethe FSC is charged with facilitating confidence-building andmilitary transparency among OSCE member states.

As many analysts have remarked before, the organization hassome inherent limitations in its all-inclusive membership andcumbersome decision-making procedures, which make consensusdifficult to achieve. Yet, the organization has taken up tasks,such as monitoring missions in areas of instability and regionaldiscussions on arms control and stabilizing measures that arepromising for crisis prevention. A test case for theeffectiveness of both these commitments is in the Balkans. OSCEmonitors have been deployed in Kosovo, and the OSCE serves as theumbrella forum under which the disarmament and arms controlprovisions included in the settlement agreement between theparties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the DaytonAccords, are being negotiated.

The adaptation of a nonsecurity European institution, theEU, is equally significant to future European security. If theprospect of becoming part of the prosperous part of Europe hasacted as a moderating force in tense regional relationships, theorganization has a great potential for improving stability on thecontinent. Yet, as Catherine Kelleher, Jane Sharp, and LawrenceFreedman remark, the capacity of the EU to continue to influencesecurity affairs is limited by its ability to take on new membersin a timely manner. If it proves incapable of doing so, itscredibility with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will

be damaged, and its moderating influence will disappear.

17

Conclusion.

Close examination of the nature of the ethnic threat toEuropean security reveals the importance not simply of the ethnic


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aspect of a crisis, but of the susceptibility of the crisis topolitical manipulation--the ethnicization of politics. In themost severe cases of ethnic conflict in Europe to date--theBalkan crisis and Chechnya--the breakdown of political authorityand profound systemic change facilitated the exploitation bypolitical leaders of preexisting ethnic tensions, exacerbated by

political and economic cleavages, and elevated the crisis toconflict. The Balkan crisis in particular suggests that thenature of the response of the international community can have asignificant impact on development of the crisis. It alsohighlights the importance of developing appropriate tools toprevent or manage of the crisis.

The development of European security institutions so farsuggests that a great deal of progress has been made inestablishing mechanisms for conflict prevention, while crisismanagement and resolution tools are less developed. A largelyuntapped potential for crisis management rests in establishingmechanisms for involving grass roots groups and non-elites in

preventive diplomacy. This approach may alleviate the problem,cited as a key aspect in the denouement of the Balkan crisis, ofimparting undue legitimacy on political leaders who exploitethnic tensions by making them the only interlocutors of theinternational community.

In addition, normative questions raised by ethnic conflicts,such as the relative weight of national self-determination inrelation to the commitment to respect borders, and minorityrights vis--vis individual rights have not been addressed fully.In order to establish better tools for institutions, suchquestions will have to be resolved to provide guidance for thirdparties in formulating policy responses to situations of ethnictensions and conflict. An equally important normative exercisefor the international community will be to reexamine assumptionsabout the early use of force as a measure for conflictresolution. Ultimately, as the end-game of the Bosnia conflictmay demonstrate, the influence of the international community inconflict prevention and management may rest on the credibility ofits commitment to back its words with force.

ENDNOTES

1. Recall, for example, the statement by Senator RichardLugar (R-Indiana) that NATO should go "out of area or out of

business," ("NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business," speech to theOverseas Writers Club, Washington, DC, June 24, 1993).

2. See, for example, Jonathan Dean, Ending Europes Wars:The Continuing Search for Peace and Security, New York: TwentiethCentury Fund Press, 1994, pp. 113-116.


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3. Jonathan Dean, for example, argues that conflict relatedto ethnic minority questions is more likely to arise when acombination of other factors exists, including the relativedevelopment of democratic institutions, economic well-being, andthe size of the minority population. Ending Europes Wars, p.116.

4. For two competing interpretations of the link amongethnicity, nationalism, and conflict, see Anthony Smith, "TheEthnic Sources of Nationalism," Survival, Spring 1993, pp. 48-49,and Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-SovietState," Survival, Spring 1993, p.20.

5. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and DissolutionAfter the Cold War, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,1995, pp. 15-20.

6. Mjusa Sever, "Ethnicization in Politics: Lessons of theBalkan Crisis and Implications for Other Potential Conflicts in

the Region," paper presented at the WIIS, USIP, U.S. Army WarCollege conference on Ethnic Conflict and European Security:Lessons from the Past and Implications for the Future, October24-25, 1995.

7. Husarska described her first-hand experience with aninformal system of censorship on the part of Serb authorities inBosnia, who prevented the access of journalists who did notdepict the Serb cause sympathetically.

8. Jonathan Dean, Ending Europes Wars, p. 117.

9. Klara Hallik, "Russians in Estonia: A Minority ofEstonia or Russia?", paper presented at the WIIS, USIP, U.S. ArmyWar College conference, October 24-25, 1995, p. 1.

10. Tatiana Shakleina, "Russia and Post-Soviet States:Ethnic Problems and Foreign Policy," paper presented at the WIIS,USIP, U.S. Army War College conference, October 24-25, 1995.

11. Leokadia Drobizheva, "Ethnic Tensions: Sources andPerspectives," paper presented at the WIIS, USIP, U.S. Army WarCollege conference, October 24-25, 1995, p. 10.

12. Drobizheva, p. 3.

13. Ibid., p. 2.

14. Figures cited by Paul Goble, in comments delivered atthe WIIS, USIP, U.S. Army War College conference, October 24-25,1995.


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15. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 42-45.

16. Jonathan Dean, Ending Europe's Wars, p. 204.

17. Catherine M. Kelleher, Lawrence Freedman, and Jane M.O.Sharp, The Political Context of Conventional Arms Control, Nomos,

forthcoming.


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