ethical foundations - houston community college

Ethical FoundationsThis book will provide an overview of different answers to the foundations of ethical beliefs. These answers give rise to different ethical

theories. This book will examine emotivism, egoism, relativism, natural law theory, and divine command theory.

Site: HCC Eagle OnlineCourse: 6142-PHIL-2389-Cooperative In Philosophy-RT-77609Book: Ethical FoundationsPrinted by: Nathan SmithDate: Sunday, 1 June 2014, 10:55 PM

Ethical Foundations http://eo2.hccs.edu/mod/book/tool/print/index.php?id=609401

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Table of contents1 Foundations of Normativity

2 Metaethics2.1 What is Good?2.2 What is the Basis for Moral Beliefs?

3 Cognitivism vs. Non-cognitivism3.1 The Emotivist's Challenge

4 Relativism4.1 Differences in Moral Views4.2 Two Arguments Against Relativism and Their Replies

5 Universalism5.1 Divine Command5.2 The Euthyphro Dilemma5.3 Natural Law Theory5.4 Consequentialism5.5 Constructivism

6 Review


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1 Foundations of Normativity

As we have seen, ethical claims are expressions of normativity. They tell us what is good orbad, right or wrong, what we ought and ought not to do. Since normative claims aredistinguished from descriptive claims by the fact that they do not tell us about facts or states ofaffairs anywhere in the world, it makes sense to ask what normative claims refer to. After all,normativity does not refer to the the way the world actually is, then are there any normativefacts? And if the existence of normative facts is in question, then what are normative claimsabout?

When we start to ask questions about the real, ontological, or metaphysical status of normativeclaims, we are embarking into the field of metaethics. Our commitments in metaethics willinform our ethical theories. So, as we discuss the various kinds of answers to the question,'What is the basis of ethics?', we will also begin to discuss various ethical theories.


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2 Metaethics

Metaethics is the philosophical study of the concepts used in ethics. This means that inmetaethics we are interested in the reality, nature, origin, foundation, meaning, knowledge, etc.of ethical concepts. The field of metaethics is vast. We will only introduce some of the basicquestions posed by the metaethics.

While it is the case that metaethical questions can be entirely abstract, without any bearing onour moral theories or applications of morality, it is also the case that many important moraltheories are the consequence of certain kinds of answers to metaethical questions. As a result,when we discuss metaethics here, we will illustrate different responses to metaethical questionsusing some of the prominent moral theories.


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2.1 What is Good?

The question 'what is good?' is an obvious metaethical question. After all 'good' is a centralconcept in ethics. So inquiring after the nature of goodness is a suitable metaethical task. Inorder to explore this question, however, we should realize that the question is ambiguous. Onthe one hand, we might mean 'what kind of a thing is something 'good'?'. On the other hand, wemight mean 'what is the meaning of the word 'good'?'. Both questions are perfectly finemetaethical questions, but they have a different nature. The first is metaphysical (it asks whatis the real nature of good things, e.g., whether there are any), while the second is semantic (itasks about the meaning of the word or concept 'goodness', i.e., what it refers to). Thesequestions are often thought to be related, but they are slightly distinct questions (one is aboutthe meaning of words, the other about the nature of reality).

One important division in answers to the question 'what kind of a thing is something good?' isto say: good things are either natural or non-natural. What do we mean by 'natural'? Here Imean simply that the whatever things are good are properties or objects that are part of thephysical world, obey the laws of nature, and causally interact with other things in the naturalworld. The view that good things are natural or that the concept 'good' refers to natural things iscalled naturalism. The view that good things are non-natural has many varieties, but there aretwo basic sorts of non-naturalism. While it is clear that if the concept 'good' refers to naturalthings, it is a real concept, non-naturalist views on the good can either be realist oranti-realist. If you are a realist, you might think that 'good' is a property of minds (it is "in ourheads," where our "heads" are not part of nature). Those believe that 'good' refers to statementsmade by God (or conceived in God's mind) are also realists. And those who hold that theconcept 'good' is the result of an ideal rational agreement that exists only as an abstraction arerealists, too. Anti-realists reject the idea that the concept 'good' refers to anything real. Theyclaim that the concept 'good' is a fiction or that it is simply an expression of some feeling ordesire that is not entirely rational.

When you talk about the idea of 'good' or 'bad', do you imagine that you are referring to someset of properties or qualities that are part of the natural world or not? Do you think that theconcept 'good' refers to something real or not? Why do you think the way you do about theconcept 'good'?


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2.2 What is the Basis for Moral Beliefs?

Even after we have addressed the question of what kinds of things are 'good', the question ofthe basis or foundation of our moral beliefs is still open. Whereas the first question is semanticor metaphysical, the second question is epistemological. When we ask 'what is the basis of ourmoral beliefs?' we are asking what are our reasons for holding the beliefs that we do, whetherthey are well-founded reasons or not. Even if we agree, for instance, that our concept of the'good' refers to real properties in the natural world, we still need to explain how it is that weknow about these properties or how we know that our particular beliefs about what is moraland immoral track the actual good or bad properties out there. Here, we are interested in anaccount that justifies why we have the particular moral beliefs we do: in short, we need to saywhy we think that our moral beliefs pick out the actual things that are moral. (Now, if you thinkthat there are no good things, that the idea 'good' is a fiction, then there is little question abouthow your ideas of the good track the good!)

Now that I have differentiated the question about the justification of our moral beliefs from thequestion of the reality of our moral concepts, I must admit that these two things are closelyrelated. In particular, the kinds of justification that are satisfactory will depend on the nature ofmorality. So, for example, if you believe that moral concepts refer to properties in nature, thenthe proper justifications for those moral beliefs will depend on natural causes. In this case, youwill want a justification for your moral beliefs that provides an account of how your beliefs arecausally related to moral properties. Perhaps you arrive at your moral beliefs throughexperience of good and bad things or through an evolutionary process whereby nature selectsfor creatures that possess the right sorts of moral concepts. By contrast, if you hold that moralconcepts are abstract ideals that are reached through a sort of agreement between idealreasoners, then you will want to justify your moral beliefs by appealing to a process ofreasoning that aligns itself with the sort of agreement that ideal reasoners would reach.

Given your response to the previous question, think about what kinds of justifications wouldsatisfy you in terms of proving that a persons' concepts of 'good' and 'bad' refer accurately tothe good or bad.

All of these metaethical question may sound abstract and unrelated to actual ethical questions.However, I think it is important for you to gain a sense of the lay of the land before we diveinto some of the disputes about our concepts of morality.


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3 Cognitivism vs. Non-cognitivism

The primary division in metaethical theories lies between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.Non-cognitivism says that moral beliefs and statements are not the sort of things that can betrue of false. For the non-cognitivist, moral beliefs are like feelings, wishes, or commands thatdo not refer to anything that could be true or false. On this view, moral beliefs or claims arelike an urge: as when you see something disgusting and say, "Ewwww!", or when someone isdoing something you don't like and you shout, "Stop it!". For the non-cognitivist, all moralbeliefs resemble these kinds of gut-level expressions. This does not mean that non-cognitivismis necessarily anti-realist. If you think that vocalizations of gut-level urges represent real statesof affairs (for instance, bodily states), then you might still think that moral claims are real evenif they are subjective.

By contrast, cognitivists hold that moral beliefs or claims are, in fact, the sorts of things thatcan be true or false. They are assertions of the cognitive part of our selves, not the emotions orurges. Most cognitivists hold that some of these claims actually do refer to real things, i.e.,some moral beliefs are true. There are some, however, that claim that all moral beliefs are false,that when we make claims about morality we are systematically incorrect in making thoseclaims (no matter what they are). So, some cognitivist are anti-realists about morality.

All of the philosophers that you will read in this course are cognitivists and realists of one sortor another. This was true for most of the figures in the history of western philosophy. But therewas one famous philosopher, David Hume, who was a non-cognitivist. In The Treatise onHuman Nature (1740), Hume challenges the idea that moral beliefs refer to anything real thatcan be discovered by reason. Instead, he insists, moral beliefs are expressions of emotion orsentiments. This view has come to be called "emotivism."


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3.1 The Emotivist's Challenge

In The Treatise on Human Nature, David Hume writes the following:

But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer byreason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you canfind that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certainpassions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, aslong as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find asentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but `tis the object offeeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to bevicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame fromthe contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which,according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind...

Here, Hume makes several important points. First, he denies that reason can discover facts about morality. There is nothing infacts (no matter how awful or gruesome) that leads to moral prescriptions. Or, according to a claim that is often attributed toHume, you can't derive an ought from an is. Second, moral claims have their origin in us. This establishes that moral claims aresubjective, not universal. Third, Hume compares moral claims to feelings or sensations like sound, color, heat or cold. Thisdoes not diminish the reality of moral claims, for Hume. In fact, he is a committed naturalist about morality. But moral claimsare just the feelings we get when we see certain actions. These feelings are conditioned by society and experience. They arereal, but they are not what we thought they were.

The emotivist offers a view of morality that is strikingly different than most views in the history of philosophy.Hume says that moral claims are really about certain kinds of subjective experience, sentiments or emotions.These are entirely natural phenomena and so they can be explained scientifically. But they are purely subjectiveand thus not universal. How does Hume's view compare to your own? Do you think moral claims are subjective oruniversal?


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4 Relativism

Relativism is a claim about the nature of moral beliefs. It says that moral beliefs are relative toa particular person or culture. This makes moral values and beliefs largely subjective. But weshouldn't identify moral relativism with moral subjectivism. As we will see there aresubjectivist views, like the Divine Command Theory, that are supposed to hold universally.

There is good empirical reason to think that moral relativism is correct. We know of manydifferent cultures and times where people held very different views about right and wrong.Even within a culture, we can find widely divergent opinions about right and wrong. So, wemight conclude that morals are just the sort of thing that vary between persons and cultures.Now, an objectivist or universalist about moral beliefs might respond that despite thesedivergent views, there still is one correct view (even if no person or culture has ever fullyembodied it). So, most relativists go further, to say that the very nature of morality is to berelative to a particular person or culture. That is, relativism results in the claim that there is nosuch thing as universal or objective moral claims.

Since the very nature of morality is relative to a person or culture, there cannot be any truthsabout morality that explain or justify other truths about morality, except those that are relativeto the same persons or cultures. This means that we shouldn't look for a resolution to thedivergent views of two groups of people or two cultures. There is no higher, more universal setof moral truths that could bridge the gap between the divergent view of two different cultures.It may turn out that certain cultures come to share many of the same preferences and so havelargely overlapping sets of moral beliefs. But we should not expect that widely divergent moralsystems would ever find common ground. On the one hand, this view encourages tolerance.After all, if there is no right view on morality, then it is best to "live and let live." On the otherhand, if there are genuine moral disagreements, this view would not offer much hope for aresolution.


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4.1 Differences in Moral Views

One of the attractions of relativism is that it appears to make sense of differences in moralviews. Why do different people and different cultures have different views on morality?Because morality is relative to cultures and people.

However, if we dig a little deeper, we will see that the reality of moral differences does notnecessarily support relativism. First, consider what the relativist is saying: moral beliefs aretrue relative to people or cultures. This is similar to etiquette or eating habits. So, moral beliefsare matters of preference. But in fact, when you think about the nature of moral disagreements,part of what makes more disagreements so contentious is that the disagreement is not just aboutpreferences. When someone says that a woman should have the right to choose whether or notshe wants to carry a pregnancy to term, this claim is not just about a person's preferences. If itwere, then it would be asserting a preference that is incompatible with the preference of theopposition, namely, to preserve the life of each unborn child. These preferences cannot beasserted in a person-relative way. They must be asserted in a universal way. That is, a personcan't exercise her preference to preserve the lives of every unborn child without making itimpermissible for someone else to choose whether or not to carry her pregnancy to term or viceversa.


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4.2 Two Arguments Against Relativism and Their Replies

Based on the preceding example, we can imagine an argument like the following:

Some moral disagreements involve claims that cannot be understood in terms ofdisagreements about preference.

1.

Relativism requires that all moral claims are relative to a person's or culture'spreferences.

2.

So, relativism is false.3.

A relativist might reply that this argument only works for moral disagreements involvingclaims that are universal. And the relativist rejects universalist claims in morality. So, therelativist might say that premise #1 is not true for relativism.

But this reply just poses another problem for relativism. In short, relativism rules out certainkinds of moral claims that are frequently made. These are claims that must be applieduniversally. And if the relativist rules out certain kinds of claims, then at the least thisrequirement must hold universally. So we can imagine another argument against relativism:

Relativism requires that no moral claims can be applied universally.1.But this requirement is a universal claim.2.So, relativism makes at least one claim about morality that is applied universally.3.So, relativism claims both that universal moral claims are both impermissible andpermissible.

4.

But this is a contradiction. So, relativism must be false.5.

This seems to be a devastating argument. But a relativist can reply that the requirement that nomoral claims can be applied universally is not itself a moral claim. It is a metaethical claim,i.e., it is about moral claims. Moreover, the relativist is not requiring that people stop makinguniversal moral claims (as if this were a requirement of morality). Rather, the relativist justrecognizes that when people make universalist moral claims they are mistaken. These peopleimagine that their universal moral claims refer to something, but they don't. Universal moralclaims are all false. The only moral claims that are true, says the relativist, are those that aretrue relative to persons and cultures.


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5 Universalism

In contrast to the relativist position, we have the universalist position. According to thisposition, moral claims are true for all people, not just true relative to certain people or cultures.Universalism has many variants both theoretically and metaethically. In terms of metaethics,we will focus on four different foundations for the universality of moral claims. Recall that inorder for universalism to be true, it must find a reference for moral concepts that is not relativeto persons or cultures. So, what do our moral claims refer to, if they are supposed to begenuinely universal? We will explore four possible responses:

Moral claims refer to the stated or conceived commands of God (they are written in theHoly Scriptures or conceived in the mind of God).

1.

Moral claims refer to natural laws. There are laws of nature that govern how we ought tobehave in addition to the laws of nature that govern how physical objects do behave.

2.

Moral claims refer to objective states of affairs that are the foreseen (or unforeseen)outcomes of actions.

3.

Moral claims refer to the sorts of rules about human behavior that ideal human reasonerswould agree to in an ideal scenario where they agree to these rules only on their rationalbasis (rather than their personal preferences, for instance).

4.

These four answers to our question result in four different metaethical theories: divinecommand theory, natural law theory, consequentialism, and contractarianism (orconstructivism).


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5.1 Divine Command

The Divine Command theory of morality is a natural moral theory to many people. When youask someone where their ethical beliefs come from, or what determines right and wrong,frequently you hear the response: my religion, God, or my faith. Many people locate the sourceof their moral beliefs in religion and faith. There is good reason for this. After all, religiousinstitutions have been traditional sources of moral teaching. And, especially in the UnitedStates, there is a cultural tendency to identify morality with a particular Judeo-Christian set ofcommandments.

However, from what we have already learned about morality, we should recognize that there isa difference between the historical fact about where we acquired or learned our moral beliefsand the reality of unreality of our moral beliefs. Just because you learned right from wrongfrom your parents or religious institution doesn't mean that this is the basis of moral beliefs.After all, I learned how to swim from my swimming instructor. But my swimming instructordidn't invent swimming.

So, we should ask the question of whether or not God provides an adequate ground for theexistence of moral beliefs. That is, does morality derive its nature and reality from God'scommands? Now, many people think that it does. In fact, one popular argument for theexistence of God is that without God, there would be no good or bad, right or wrong. Manypeople support this view by reference to a phrase often attributed to Fyodor Dostoyevski in thenovel Crime and Punishment: "Without God, everything is permitted." So, we can imagine anargument like the following:

If God does not exist, then any action is permissible.1.It is not the case that any action is permissible.2.So, God exists.3.

Two things are of interest about this argument: 1) is it the case that if God did not exist, then allactions would be permissible? and 2) is it the case that not every action is permissible?Obviously, these two questions address the two premises in the argument above.

Let's examine the second one first: is it the case that not every action is permissible? Well, Ithink we can say yes, but only for some people. If you are a relativist about morality, then you


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might think that given any action, there is some set of people for whom that action ispermissible. So, a relativist might think that every action is permissible. Similarly, ananti-realist might think that concepts such as 'permissible' and 'impermissible' simply do notrefer to anything and so there is no problem in asserting that every action is permissible. So,this second premise assumes a universalist, realist position. That is, it takes matters ofpermissibility and impermissibility to be real and to apply universally.

Let us now return to the first question: is it the case that if God did not exist, then all actionswould be permissible? This statement implies that the existence of God is a necessarycondition for the impermissibility of some actions. In other words, God has to exist or else allactions would be permissible. This claim asserts that there is no other foundation, independentof God's existence, that is satisfactory for universal moral claims. But we have already seen (inbrief) that there are several other possible positions that support a universalist position onmorality. Among these positions are the consequentialist and the constructivist positions. So, itdoes not appear that we are forced to accept this premise either. And since we do not have toaccept the premises of this argument, we are not forced to accept the conclusion.


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5.2 The Euthyphro Dilemma

We have already seen some general objections to one form of the divine command theory. Nowwe will see a more specific argument directed against divine command as a basis for morality.This argument is known as the "Euthyphro Dilemma." It is named after the Platonic dialogue,"The Euthyphro." In the dialogue, Socrates and Euthyphro are searching for a definition ofpiety. Euthyphro offers several possible definitions, but one in particular leads to an importantdilemma.

In 9e, Euthyphro proposes the following definition of piety: "I would certainly say that thepious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious."

If we simply restate Euthyphro's definition to apply to morality more generally, we can see howSocrates' argument reveals a fundamental problem for the Divine Command Theory. Considerthe following definition of morality: "The obligatory is whatever God commands us to do andthe impermissible is whatever God commands us not to do." This leaves open a number ofother possibly ethical actions: the permissible, the omissible, and the optional. But itnevertheless places some clear parameters on moral actions.

Now, the dilemma looks like this:

Either actions are obligatory because God commands them or God commands thoseactions because they are obligatory.

1.

If actions are obligatory because God commands them, then moral obligations arearbitrary.

2.

If God commands actions because they are obligatory, then moral obligation isindependent of God's commands.

3.

So, either moral obligations are arbitrary or they are independent of God's commands. 4.

This is a dilemma (which is a technical name for a valid argument). The first three premisesseem pretty clearly true, so it looks like the argument is also sound. So, where does this leaveus? Assuming Divine Command Theory, we are faced either with the prospect that moralobligations are arbitrary or they are independent of God's commands. The second of these twooptions seems contradictory to the very idea of Divine Command Theory. So, perhaps it isbetter to accept the first option.


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Suppose that moral obligations are arbitrarily determined by God: whatever God says ismorally required is morally required. Does that sound right? Well, perhaps. One problem is thatthis makes Divine Command Theory sound a lot like relativism. After all, it sounds likemorality is relative to a certain persons' preferences. It's just that this person is God. Maybethere is no problem with that. After all, if you are a religious person, then you likely trust Godand think that God is good and just. But what happens if God is not good and just? After all,aren't there religions that appear to require terrible actions of its believers, like child sacrifice,the execution of adulterers, or the eternal torture and suffering of non-believers. If Godscommands dictate morality, then it may be the case that it is a moral requirement for us to killinfants or execute adulterers. But this just sounds wrong, doesn't it?


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5.3 Natural Law Theory

One way to resolve the dilemma posed in the Euthyphro argument is to try to conceive of God'scommands in a different light. Instead of thinking of God's commands as arbitrarydeterminations that include some morally questionable actions advocated in Holy Scriptures,perhaps we should think of these scriptures as an interpretation and approximation of somemoral laws that are written into the nature of the universe, just like physical laws. The idea herewould be that divine commands are part of the fabric of the universe in the way that gravity orelectricity are.

This view is known as "Natural Law Theory." Moral claims are embedded in nature in the formof laws that govern how we should act in a way that is analogous to the way that gravitygoverns how heavy bodies act. It is important to see how this view resolves the Euthyphrodilemma posed above. Natural Law Theory takes the dilemma posed by Euthyphro and claimsthat neither alternative is problematic. Assume that moral obligations derive from God'scommands. Well, this is no different than the way that the existence of matter, electricity, orgravity derives from God's commands at the beginning of the universe. All of these thingscame into existence as a part of God's creation; they are all a result of God's commands.Assume that God only commands what is morally required, meaning that moral requirementscan be discovered independently of God's commands. Again, there is no problem, the NaturalLaw Theorist says, because one could discover God's commands just by understanding thenature of morality. The justifications for moral requirements are perfectly consistent with God'scommands.

This view became prominent with St. Thomas Aquinas and the modern philosophers JohnLocke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It offered a way of uniting theology with a rational accountof the natural world. Also, it provided a naturalist foundation for ethics, in the sense that itembedded ethics in natural laws (of course, these thinkers accept that these laws come from asupernatural creator, which would not be something contemporary naturalism would accept).The view becomes foundational for modern political theory as well. Consider, for instance, thephrase from the Declaration of Independence, "all men are enowed by their creator with certaininalienable rights. The idea that the notion of rights could be grounded in the act of creation isa direct consequence of the influence of Natural Law Theory.

Despite its many attractions, and the improvements made over Divine Command Theory,


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Natural Law Theory suffers from some serious potential problems. First, it requires the beliefin a supernatural creator. This is no small matter, as the existence of God is highly controversialand the very idea that we should turn to a supernatural source for something like ethics whenthere are other alternative natural sources of ethical beliefs makes the view unappealing tomany. Second, we face the problem of determining exactly which laws are the correct ones formorality. How should we determine the natural laws? We have already ruled out that they couldbe discovered through experiment or observation (as other natural laws are discovered). Andgiven the variety of religious customs and ethical viewpoints, it seems difficult to decide whichtheory of morality is the true natural law theory.


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5.4 Consequentialism

Another obvious sort of response to the foundation of moral concepts is to look at the effects ofthat our actions have and assess the morality of the action based on the effects it produces.There are many variants of this view, depending on how we evaluate the effects of differentactions. Below is a list of some different sorts of consequences that we might view as good:

pleasuredesire-satisfactionobjective goods: knowledge, skills, success

In addition to determining which kinds of consequences are valued as good, we have todetermine who the are the appropriate beneficiaries of these good consequences. If we shouldpromote pleasure, whose pleasure? If we should satisfy desires, whose desires? And so on. Thedifferent answers to these questions prompt different consequentialist theories.

Consequentialism has the advantage of being fairly easy to determine. As long as we are clearabout which consequences matter and who the beneficiaries ought to be, then determiningwhich actions are moral and which immoral becomes a matter of calculation. And thateliminates a lot of the philosophical ambiguity.

However, there are important objections to consequentialist theories. Most objections centeraround imagining a scenario where promotion of the best consequences results in an action thatis morally questionable. This leads to the conclusion that determining the consequences doesnot resolve the moral issue. I will provide one such example adapted from the philosopherBernard Williams:

Imagine that you are a botanist dong on-site research in the jungles of South America.You are staying with a local tribe in their camp and have befriended several of theleaders of the tribe. One day, while you are out collecting specimens, there is aninsurrection in the camp. Men capture and tie up 20 of the tribesmen (many yourfriends). When you return, one of the bandits approaches you with a proposal. He says,"If you take my gun and kill one of these 20 men, I will release everyone else. If you donot, I will kill them all."


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Suppose that you think human life is valuable and that, all other things being equal, you shouldchoose the course of action that results in preserving the greatest amount of human lifepossible. In this situation, it would seem that consequentialism would require you to shoot oneof the tribesmen. But this is morally repugnant! And, so Williams reasons, consequentialismcan't be right. After all, if morality were simply a matter of consequences, then this should be aclear-cut case. But it's not. So, morality can't be about only consequences.

Consequentialists typically reply by either providing nuance to our view of the consequences(so that not killing the tribesman results in better consequences in the long run) or they bite thebullet and simply reply that our concepts of morality are confused. If we were only clearerabout what morality is really all about, we would see that it is better to shoot a tribesman thanto allow all 20 to die. This may sound repulsive, but only because we have become accustomedto an incorrect view on morality.


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5.5 Constructivism

Constructivism is a realist position in metaethics: it holds that there really are moral truths.However, it can be either a universalist or relativist position about moral truths. Theconstructivist holds that moral truths exist, but they are not entirely mind independent. The ideais that there are genuine truths about right and wrong, but these are somehow constructed byhuman beings. As a result, we can discover these truths by following an idealized rationalprocedure.

One sort of constructivism is conventionalism, which holds that moral truths are establishedby convention. This version of constructivism is relativist. But this does not mean that just anymoral beliefs may be true. Instead, it holds that moral truths are justified according to somerational decision procedure. An early form of conventionalism can be seen in Aristotle's virtueethics. Aristotle held that virtue is a "state of character involving choice," where the choice is"determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdomwould determine it" (Nicomachean Ethics, II:5). So, virtue is determined by reference to reasonand, specifically, by the sort of reason that a person of practical wisdom would use. In thissense, virtue involves a judgment about right or wrong in accordance with a rational standard.Aristotle acknowledge that the rational standards of virtue would depend on the normativepreferences of the society, but he required that these preferences be determined by reference toa rational principle.

Other forms of constructivism are more universalist. Immanuel Kant is sometimes consideredto have provided one of the first universalist constructivist metaethical theories. Kant holds thatright and wrong are determined by a priori reflection on the nature of reason. When we justthinking about how reason operates, we see that we must be constrained by certain principlesof action. In particular, Kant held that all actions must be guided by the "categoricalimperative," which is to act only in such a way that the rule governing your action couldbecome a universal, moral law. Additionally, he provides an account of how we can know thecategorical imperative and the duties that follow from it. In short, we use our imagination toconsider a scenario in which everyone acted according to the same principles we are using toact. If we do this, we will see which actions are required and which are impermissible.

Many universalist constructivists have been inspired by Kant. For example, Jurgen Habermasholds that right and wrong actions can be determined by following the "discourse principle,"


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where right actions are those and only those that would be agreed upon by all effected partiesin an ideal dialogue among them. And John Rawls' "veil of ignorance" is an imaginativescenario that prompts the kind of rational deliberation that, he thinks, leads to principles ofjustice that can be applied universally.


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